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In this special "From the Archives" edition of the [i3] Podcast, 'Conversations with Institutional Investors', we're going back to September 2021, when I spoke with Alistair Barker, then Head of Total Portfolio Management at AustralianSuper, which at the time managed around 200 billion dollars. How times have changed. AustralianSuper is now more than $450 billion in assets under management and Alistair is now Head of Asset Allocation at the fund.
But this conversation turned out to cover themes that haven't gone away. Alistair talks about why he thinks a risk budget works better as a range than as a number that has to be spent, and why dynamic asset allocation matters at all times, not just in a crisis. He explains how he thinks about the role of bonds in a portfolio, and why liquidity may matter even more than returns when markets turn.
We also discuss the Your Future, Your Super reforms and what benchmarking does to behaviour, and he shares his research with Stanford University's Ashby Monk on technological disruption, including a great analogy involving the early days of the automobile.
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Overview of Episode 147
1:00 Starting out as a intern without pay 3:00 Working at Hastings and learnings from the early days 4:30 In funds management it is not about the quantity of decisions; it is about the quality of decision making 5:00 Investing with Raphael Arndt in a series of gas pipeline assets 6:25 "If you are not paying for things that might potentially provide future upside, then those are usually the best deals." 7:30 Starting at AustralianSuper in a hybrid role of private market investments and portfolio strategy 10:00 "Early on in my career, AustralianSuper decided to bulk up with internal investment teams" 13:00 Does internalisation of asset management change the culture or create a clash of cultures? 16:00 "A number agency issues disappear with internal management." 17:00 "My title change reflected more that there was now a term in the industry that reflected what I've been doing for a number of years [rather than a new focus on total portfolio management]." 19:00 "The challenge of a multi-strategy setup is that too often you have great ideas that just don't have any impact on the total portfolio." 21:00 A risk budget implies a number that needs to be spent. For us it is more about a range of risk taking depending on where we are in the cycle. 25:00 DAA is important at all times, not just in periods of distress such as a pandemic, because you never know when it is going to pay off. 30:30 The role of bonds is to diversify from equities. So what sort of risks are we worried about that we need to diversify against? 33:00 Losing your control over the portfolios liquidity leads you to a path-dependent outcome where you might be a forced seller of a particular asset class 34:00 Our portfolio liquidity is set at a level that we can buy the most attractive assets at the bottom of the market. 34:30 Liquidity is the key enabler by which to affect the asset allocation and you don't want to lose control of that 36:00 We had a university student do a thesis on member switching and they found that over 60 per cent of switching detracted value 37:00 We want every member to be engaged with their super, but not so engaged that they log on every day to see what their unit price is doing 38:40 If you are not selling your equity portfolio tomorrow, then why are you worried about what it is worth today? Intrinsic value manifests over time. 40:00 Your Future, Your Super reforms: are you concerned about how it affects your ability to invest in active management? 41:30 I testified in front of the productivity committee and said that benchmarking helps 43:30 What benchmarking has taught us is that you get rid of active management that is redundant. Not necessarily, poor active managers, but those who are diversified away at a total portfolio level. 46:00 Working at Stanford with Ashby Monk on technological disruption 47:00 Technological disruption is not new, but it is often not captured by risk models 48:00 Often people think that to protect against technological disruption you just buy a bunch of venture funds. Well, venture is never going to be big enough to make a difference. 50:30 If you see what you have to pay for renewable energy assets today, it not only prices in carbon risk, but it also presumes there won't be any new technology. 51:00 Are there similarities between the early days of the internet and what is happening now in crypto? 53:00 Getting involved in venture capital 54:30 Using big data to make Indian corner shops more profitable
Full Transcription of Episode 147
Wouter Klijn 00:11
Alistair, welcome to the show.
Alistair Barker 01:23
Good to be here.
Wouter Klijn 01:25
So you've been with Australian Super for quite a while. Can you tell me a little bit about how you got started in the investment space?
Alistair Barker 01:32
So a family friend of mine worked at NAB, as it turned out, and in the late '90s I contacted him, and he agreed to flick my CV around to do what might be considered illegal now. It was unpaid internships.
Wouter Klijn 01:52
Unpaid?
Alistair Barker 01:55
Yeah, yeah. So I remember someone said to me once, "You learn before you earn," and this was a particularly good example. So I managed to pick up a bit of internship work with the chief economist at NAB, and then also doing some work with the asset management arm of NAB, NAM, National Asset Management. And there was a small team there doing some work in private markets, mainly infrastructure, and they decided they were looking for an analyst, and having done a bit of work with them, they said, "Oh, why don't you stay on?" And at the time I was still doing university, and I negotiated with the university to defer my honours year to start work, which turned out to be a pretty good call, apart from one minor issue, which is that NAB had just bought MLC and were then winding up a heap of their active funds management business. So at the tender age of 20 or 21, I was almost down on the street, so to speak, and had my first redundancy.
Wouter Klijn 02:59
So when you finally started to get paid, you were very quickly made redundant.
Alistair Barker 03:04
Yeah, well, I was redundant for the best part of three hours. Thankfully, by that time, I knew it was coming and had agreed terms to go and work at Hastings Funds Management, a pretty prominent manager in the infrastructure, private equity and credit space, and this was in the early 2000s. And so I spent a bit under a decade at Hastings working with a number of really talented investors, and, I guess, a great bunch of people and a really boutique, family-oriented culture led by Mike Fitzpatrick in particular, but also people like Tim Pool.
Wouter Klijn 03:42
What were some of the early learnings there?
Alistair Barker 03:45
So I think some of the early learnings were that there's really no substitute for hard work and for making up your own mind about things. If you're in a meeting full of people who are going to ask the hard questions about potential transactions that we were looking at the time, it's important to have a really strong conviction about why you like a potential asset, or what's going on with the numbers or the due diligence. And there's really no substitute for actually doing the work and making up your own mind. I think the other aspect is, particularly in the infrastructure sector, you live with your successes and your failures for a very long time, so it teaches you to think very deeply and make very few high-quality decisions. And I think in funds management that's a pretty important discipline. It's not necessarily a game of quantity of decision-making, but of quality. And I think you probably only pick up some of those lessons by seeing really good investors and really good people in action.
Wouter Klijn 04:45
Do you remember some of those decisions that you think, in hindsight, okay, this definitely made a difference in the way that I invested?
Alistair Barker 04:54
Well, a good example for me was a particular transaction that myself and, as it turns out, Raph Arndt, who's now the CEO of the Future Fund, were involved in, and it involved a series of gas pipeline assets. If you did a traditional discounted cash flow analysis, the value of the assets was effectively the book value or market value. But these assets were based in Queensland and South Australia and New South Wales, and what became clear to us was that at some point in the future the flow of gas was going to change, and this was in the early to mid-2000s. We thought, gee, this coal seam gas thing might come off, or there could be some other gas supply somewhere in northern Australia, and so just simply valuing it on a discounted cash flow based on the current known gas reserves got you to a certain point. But actually, there was probably some embedded value out in the future that you're not paying for. And at the time, coal seam gas wasn't really a well-understood quantity, certainly not the way it has been over the last decade. So a lot of the lessons in that were that if you can find investments where you're absolutely bulletproof on your underwriting for a base level of returns, but you're not paying for things that may provide future upside, then those are usually the best deals. So in that particular case, it was a good investment on the base case, but that underwriting didn't price in a lot of potential future upside.
Wouter Klijn 06:35
Yeah. And so now you've been with Australian Super for more than 13 years. Can you tell me a little bit about your first role when you started, and also how things have changed over that time? Because Australian Super has grown to be a very large fund now, but 13 years ago it wasn't quite as big. Can you tell me a little bit about some of those changes and how you got started there?
Alistair Barker 07:01
Yes, it is 13 years ago, and quite a lot has changed.
Wouter Klijn 07:04
Sorry to remind you of that.
Alistair Barker 07:06
That's all right. So as it turned out, Australian Super was my biggest client before I joined. When I joined the fund, it was in a hybrid role, which was to do a combination of some direct investing, looking at our private markets investments, and some work on portfolio strategy. I'd done a fair bit of work on portfolio management when I was at Hastings, but also through my actuarial and finance training. And Mark was keen, and I was keen, to see whether we could do a little bit of both in one role. At the time, Australian Super would have had maybe 15 people on the investment team and about 20 billion in assets. So it was very much a small to medium fund. In that environment you're working across various different things, and so there was a good opportunity for breadth across potential direct opportunities and what we were looking at across the whole portfolio. In some senses, one of the first things I did was really trying to take a more integrated view between bottom-up investment opportunities, in terms of what markets are pricing certain assets at, and what we were thinking about from a top-down standpoint in terms of asset allocation, the outlook for equities and the outlook for various markets. And the week I joined Australian Super was the week Bear Stearns collapsed. Okay, the date is sort of etched in my brain. So to join the fund at that time, and then four months later Lehman's collapsed, and another four months before equity markets fully bottomed, it was a really interesting time to come in, see the asset allocation process in its full glory through a crisis period, and then look for opportunities to invest coming out of the crisis. One of the great investment opportunities early on was that we participated in senior debt as part of the Victorian desalination plant. At the time, credit markets were effectively frozen. But to get a transaction like that with solid government backing, where effectively the refinancing risk was being covered by the government, was a pretty good deal. And the minute we did it, the investment committee said, "Oh, can we have a few more of those?" My response was, "I think the time's probably passed. That's probably a high-water mark."
Wouter Klijn 09:36
Yeah, I presume everybody was looking for government-guaranteed investments at that stage.
Alistair Barker 09:42
Yeah, and look, at a time when capital is hard to find and there isn't much liquidity, you can take advantage of those opportunities. But they tend to fall away as things start to heal, and that's fine. That's just the way capital markets operate. But back to the second part of your question, about how Australian Super has evolved and how my role has evolved. It really has just been an evolution, in the sense that as the fund has grown, there's a need for all of us to look at our roles and, in some cases, specialise. So pretty early on in my journey, there was a decision that Australian Super was going to look to bulk up in terms of its internal management and its direct investing, and so there was a choice as to whether I spend more time on portfolio management or more on direct investing. My feeling was that I really liked to spend more time on directing the overall portfolio, and there were plenty of people who were ready and ambitious to establish more on our direct investing side. I guess the other added benefit is that I can live vicariously through other people on the direct investing side, because when we look at transactions, we bring them to a number of internal committees, so I still get to whet the appetite, so to speak, when they bring some of the larger deals for us to sign off on. But yeah, the place has evolved. I'd liken it to a lot of the experience I had when I was in the US, where if you see a successful startup, they have what the academics would call product-market fit. A really powerful product that consumers want, and I think Australian Super really hit that mark: a strong brand, good performance, low cost. What we've seen is that the fund has been phenomenally successful in terms of growth, and that's a path similar to a lot of the successful startups in Silicon Valley, where if they get that acceptance, there's then a need to move the organisation onto a different growth trajectory in terms of its people, its processes and its systems, and that really forces a little bit of a culture change towards a more sophisticated and institutionalised way of doing things. But at the same time, that product-market fit only exists because the core purpose of the company is sound, and that's the thing that hasn't changed with Australian Super: the core purpose of being there to serve members and deliver returns to members doesn't change.
Wouter Klijn 12:27
Yeah. You touched upon the internal management that was added over the years, and there's been a lot of thought and discussion around whether that changes the culture of a pension fund. What's been your take on that? Because you go from a more back-office-related administration organisation to suddenly, you know, pretty competitive people. How does that work?
Alistair Barker 12:53
Well, the culture does change in some respects, but the notion underlying your question, I think, carries a connotation that when the culture changes, it's a negative.
Wouter Klijn 13:03
I thought more in terms of a clash of cultures rather than a negative.
Alistair Barker 13:08
Yeah, I wouldn't necessarily see it as a clash of cultures, and that's partly about how you hire and how you motivate people. If what you're trying to do leads you to hiring people where you're just trying to hire the highest paid and most type A personalities, then you'll most likely get a culture clash of some kind. But I think what we've tried to do with a lot of our hiring is to say to people, look, what Australian Super offers is the ability to manage and be involved in looking after quite a lot of capital on behalf of members, and that selling point is really what we want a number of our people to focus on. It's not so much the remuneration. The added benefit is that in funds management, and I lived this for quite a while, people have to spend a lot of their time managing clients and doing business development, and a lot of people don't like doing that. And it's also time-consuming. So for some people the pitch is actually: look, the job is rewarding. It's almost all investing. There's very little business development, very few issues where you have to manage both a shareholder and a client and the portfolio, and so reducing those conflicts of interest and simplifying the role and probably making it smaller, and affording people work-life balance outside of that job, is really attractive to some people. So we find those people who like what our people and culture team would call an employee value proposition, and those are the people that we'll select in. And it's quite likely when we run recruitment that a number of people say, you know what, that's not interesting to me, and that's fine. It's actually important for those people to select out early, so that when we get to the shortlist, we know that people are buying into the risk-reward trade-off, and what the hours are, and that they really like that. If they do, then there's a much better chance that they'll fit and be much better aligned with the core purpose of the fund. I think what we've found culturally is that if you get those people, then what you have is really genuine, good investment conversations. If I go and talk to our property guys, or our infrastructure guys, or our credit guys, and say, "Is it a good time to invest?" it's not always the case that they'll say yes. Whereas if I ask a fund manager, "Is it a good time to invest in your asset class?" they'll never say no. More often than not, they won't, and that's not to say that some people don't, but certainly when we ask all of our investment teams to take a whole-of-portfolio view, they'll often say, you know what, my sector might not necessarily be as good as others, or if there is a better opportunity to deploy capital in another asset class, then they'll be supportive of that because it'll be in the fund's best interest, and by extension, theirs. So a number of those agency issues disappear with internal management, but it then requires fostering the culture to support that.
Wouter Klijn 16:34
Yeah. So you touched upon that whole-of-portfolio view, and you mentioned that you made a decision to focus on portfolio management. You've been involved for a number of years now in asset allocation, but more recently, I think two or three years ago, that changed to embracing the total portfolio approach, and your title changed from head of asset allocation to head of total portfolio management. Can you tell us a little bit about why the decision was made and why that's a better way of doing things?
Alistair Barker 17:07
So, as a point of context, in some ways the team title change and my title change partly reflected the fact that there was now more of an industry-standard terminology that reflected what I was doing. In some senses, a lot of the things I've been doing for a number of years haven't changed, and it's probably more that there's a term that people have a greater affinity with across the market, rather than a substantial change in focus. But for us, the most important thing about total portfolio is that about 97 or 98 per cent of our fund's members retire based on the outcome of a diversified portfolio. They're not invested in equities or fixed income or cash. They're invested in a balanced portfolio, or perhaps a capital stable portfolio. They're invested in a blend of asset classes, and so if that's the case, and we are genuinely member-centric, then we should be concerned with the investment outcome of how all those diversified portfolios fit together. So at its core, it's trying to be member-centric, but make sure the investment outcomes actually impact the member. Where does that come to bear? It's partly about simple things like, if we're spending members' money on active management, we need to make sure that that money is actively deployed and it's generating active returns that are impactful at a total portfolio level. And if things are diversifying away at a total portfolio level and not having impact, then why are we doing them? For us, it is about trying to drive both a certain degree of efficiency in how we run and bring together the asset classes, but also just making sure that when you add up the sum of the parts, it actually equals a coherent whole. Now, the challenge I think often with a multi-manager or multi-strategy setup is that too often you have great ideas that just don't have impact on the total portfolio, and in many cases what we're trying to achieve is a concentration of ideas, so that if someone has a really good idea, you can actually see it have an impact on member account balances. That can be a challenge as we grow, but just having that mindset keeps us focused on doing things that are impactful.
Wouter Klijn 19:47
Yeah, and I think as part of the total portfolio approach there's a strong focus on risk, and you use a risk budget for making your investment decisions. Can you tell me a little bit about your thinking around that risk budget, and also how you split it between your team in asset allocation and portfolio management, and the teams at the individual asset classes?
Alistair Barker 20:14
Yeah, so I think risk budgeting is a term that gets bandied around the industry. I think we have one or two of these every few years that become the term, and it often sounds great, but unless it's well implemented, it might not necessarily improve the outcome. So what we've learned about risk budgeting is that perhaps the term budget is a bit of a misnomer for us. As an active investor, the critical thing for us in our risk framework is that we want to take risk when we think it's being well rewarded, and take less risk when it's not being well rewarded. Now, that's easy to say and hard to do, but importantly, when we think about a risk budget, it's important not to think about it as a fixed object. The fact that it's referred to as a budget indicates that it's a number that has to be spent. Given our philosophy, we probably think of it more as a range, and where we are in that range. We'll have a range at a total portfolio level, and a range for each key part of the portfolio. So there'll be a range for asset allocation, for the equities group, for the fixed income, cash and currency group, and for the mid-risk group, which is predominantly property, infrastructure and credit. So we'll have a broad budget for each, but they'll be framed in terms of ranges, so that there's an expectation of an average amount of risk-taking, but depending on where we are in the cycle, we might have more or less in a particular asset class, or more or less at an asset allocation level. What that's trying to do is make sure that we keep the portfolio actively invested through a cycle, but not to the point where we're taking undue risk where we don't think it's being well rewarded. So in many ways it has been about trying to take a really good idea in theory, being risk budgeting, and then trying to meld it to our investment philosophy. And I think that's the really critical thing with any of these fancy words and sexy words that come up in investing: actually trying to make them fit with the investment philosophy is the most critical thing, because if you don't do that, then what you're going to end up with is a conflict between your beliefs and your metrics.
Wouter Klijn 22:46
Yeah, but does it affect your side of the role, where I believe you guys do the dynamic asset allocation? Does that risk budget change as well, or does...
Alistair Barker 22:56
Yeah, in terms of the budget, the range doesn't change, but where we are in that range does. We work with our colleagues in the team called Asset Allocation and Research, headed by Carl Astorri, who do a lot of work on the economic outlook. And so a lot of our asset allocation process is co-created between our teams. But the amount of risk we're taking on asset allocation will vary. I remember Bernie Fraser, who was the chair of the investment committee when I joined Australian Super, said to me, "Equity markets never return their average, so why should we have an average allocation to equities?" Which is true, and again, very easy to say, very hard to execute on. But there's a point to it, which is that long-run averages are exactly that. They're a long-run average, but the variation around those averages is so substantial, and to the extent that we can have insight on whether to have more or less of an asset class around those long-run averages, then we should be trying to exercise that. So again, easy to say, hard to do.
Wouter Klijn 24:07
Yeah. So some of the asset allocation teams in different funds that do DAA have a set target that they're going for, like 30, 40 bips of alpha. Are you guys having that as well?
Alistair Barker 24:21
We have a target, but we measure it over a rolling period. This is the case for a lot of teams: we'll have an ambition or an objective, much the same as we have an objective for returns at a total portfolio level. But we'll try and measure it over a rolling period, usually rolling three, rolling five, rolling 10-year periods, because there will be times when particular views are out of favour, and in many cases some strategies will have an outsized payoff in one year and be weak in other periods. So yes, there's an objective, but given the nature of the asset classes we're investing in, I think the worst thing you can do is try and measure them over a short time period in terms of the efficacy of the strategy.
Wouter Klijn 25:11
So in this sort of chaotic period, with the pandemic raging and a lot of uncertainty, does dynamic asset allocation become more important?
Alistair Barker 25:20
It's a good question. I contend no, in part because I think we'd hold the view that whether you call it dynamic asset allocation or just being active with asset allocation, it's probably a worthwhile thing at all times. And it's very hard to know when it will pay off well. So this is the challenge with a lot of active management, I think: it's hard to know when it will work very well, in which case it's very hard to actually time when to have a lot of it or when to have a little. So I think our view is that it's probably something we do all the time, and the key is making sure that the process provides the opportunity for outsized returns when the rewards are good, and hopefully limits drawdowns in periods where the chances of being wrong are higher. I think the pandemic was a good example, where coming into January and February of last year, policy was tightening and implied vol was very low, so you had a couple of things going on in the environment where the reward for risk was not particularly huge, and so the opportunity to take outsized positions was probably pretty low. And then you had this exogenous shock. It's not, I think, hard to anticipate or predict exactly what might have happened with COVID, but the ability to make a lot of money going into that period was probably pretty low, and therefore, if you'd taken a view that the risk-return trade-off for taking large DAA positions was relatively low at that point in time, then you might have had limited losses coming through that period. And then once vol blew out and you got a large degree of cross-sectional dispersion, there were probably some opportunities for some outsized trades, if you're brave enough and you've got the liquidity coming out of that period.
Wouter Klijn 27:13
Yeah. Can you give an example of a trade like that?
Alistair Barker 27:16
I think the critical point for us was that we made sure we were anchoring our process on what works well for our investment philosophy. So the critical thing for us in February, and particularly in March of last year, was reappraising our view on the environment and saying, what do we genuinely believe in terms of the likely policy response? How bad might the recession be, how short and sharp could it be, and what would the likely response of markets be to a particularly large stimulus? Our investment process anchors a fair bit on a combination of value and where we are in the cycle and our outlook, and that led us to a view that it was probably not going to be a particularly deep and long recession, but one where quite a large amount of policy would probably take the worst of all outcomes off the table. In which case, we wanted to be overweight risky assets. So for us, it was probably a time, and this is, I think, often the case when you face an odd crisis, where just going back to what your process would say in the absence of having judgement is sometimes the best thing to do. It's good to have a naive signal that's telling you what you should do, because often in these periods the market behaviour and the sentiment and the attitude of people might be to do the opposite.
Wouter Klijn 28:50
Yeah. So I think from an asset allocation perspective, one of the main things that has happened in the last, well, 10 years probably, is that the enormous amount of quantitative easing has reduced bond yields, and arguably, when you look at asset allocation, suddenly one asset isn't behaving the way it has historically. There's a lot of discussion around the protective role of bonds, the conservative role of bonds, and some people have taken that as, okay, let's look at what else we can do. So we've written a little bit about this idea of a crisis risk offset sleeve, where you put in a whole lot of things that are non-correlated with equities, and a lot of that, apart from still some bonds, is alternatives, which has had mixed results, partly because it depends on exactly what you invested in. What is your thinking around that role of bonds in a portfolio, and is it replaceable with other types of assets?
Alistair Barker 29:54
It's a very difficult issue. When we talk to a number of our peers around the world and around the Australian industry, I would say very few people have a high-conviction view about what to do with it. If there were a silver bullet, I'd suspect that we all would have fired it by now, so to speak. The thing we keep coming back to is that the role of bonds is, in many ways, to diversify equity risk, and so what we would need to think about in that instance is, well, what risks are we worried about from equities that we need to diversify against? It depends a little bit on the collection of scenarios you'd be interested in, as to what's causing the equity market to roll over. Quite clearly, if what you're worried about is a Fed-tightening-induced, classical kind of slowdown, well, bonds won't help in that at all until such time as the Fed raises rates and the yield curve inverts. So I think it depends a lot on what you're actually trying to protect the portfolio from. If you're worried about a secular stagnation argument, like à la Japan, well, of course bonds will still perform a decent role. I remember talking to a couple of people from GPIF, the big Japanese pension fund, who came and saw us a few years ago, and they delivered a nominal return of 2 per cent, but they'd still achieved CPI plus four because CPI was minus two, and they had 60 or 70 per cent of their portfolio in JGBs at the time. So if you're worried about outright deflation and stagnation, then a GPIF-style bond-heavy portfolio, and they've moved more into equities recently, will work well. But if you're worried about a more classical scenario where you've still got growth but you're seeing policy tightening, well, bonds won't help. So for us, it's probably about saying, well, what are the few scenarios that you're most worried about, and what are the correlations between equities and other asset classes going to be? And depending on what your beliefs on those are, you'll form a view about what kind of basket of diversifying assets you hold.
Wouter Klijn 32:16
Yeah. So if we just look at a simple decision to diversify against big drawdowns in the equity market, what then drives it to hold?
Alistair Barker 32:25
It depends on the scenario that causes it. It's also about your risk appetite and your ability to wear those drawdowns. I quite liked a publication from New Zealand Super, I think, not in their last annual report, maybe the one from a year ago, that said that if there's a GFC-style drawdown, they'll see a drawdown in the portfolio of perhaps something in the order of 50 per cent, and that they got their board of guardians comfortable with the fact that if that risk eventuated, that would be the outcome. So part of the issue is actually making sure things are within risk appetite. In many senses, I think for us, just looking at risk is one aspect. But the other relevant factor, and we spend probably as much time on stress testing for this as we do on returns, is liquidity. For us, what happens to the liquidity base of the portfolio, and the amount of illiquid assets, as we go through a crisis is perhaps, if not as important, more important, because losing control of the portfolio's liquidity leads you to a path-dependent outcome where you might be a forced seller of a particular asset class simply because it has liquidity. So in our view, you always have to make sure that the portfolio can withstand those issues, and then you can look at the returns. So a roundabout way of answering the question is that if we've got our risk appetite set correctly, the next thing we often look at is ensuring that when we go through these scenarios, our portfolio liquidity is set at a level which gives us the flexibility to buy the most attractively priced assets at the bottom of the market. That's the kind of test we hold ourselves to, because liquidity is a key enabler of being able to affect the asset allocation, and you don't want to be in a position where you lose control of that.
Wouter Klijn 34:30
And I suppose in the Australian system, where you have investment options within the funds, you kind of have to remain true to label as well. If you look at a balanced fund, which I think is the MySuper standard default option, you can't then have an underlying investment portfolio that has a completely different asset allocation from the 70/30 or 80/20, whatever the split is that has been set for that option.
Alistair Barker 34:59
Yeah, correct. Although I would say that in many instances, if members are exercising a choice in that period, our experience has been that they're moving into cash, and we've certainly done a lot of work trying to advise them that super is a long-term investment. Be very careful about these decisions. The majority of people who switch to cash don't make a decision to go back into risk assets, and in almost all instances they're worse off as a result. This happened in 2009 quite substantially. It happened again last year. It's human nature and it's hard to fight. But importantly, if members are moving from, say, our balanced option to cash, they're moving from an option which is in the majority invested in liquid asset classes. So the most important thing we need to do when members switch is, effectively, they're reducing the size of the investment in the balanced option and increasing the amount of cash. So what we need to do is actually sell equities and bonds and transfer that into cash, and that's just reflecting a change in preference. It's actually quite easy to manage if you look at it from that perspective, and as long as you do it progressively, rather than waking up a month or two later and realising that the preferences have drifted substantially. The biggest lament is that from an investment perspective it's a preference, and we have to respect the preference. But from a member engagement and advice perspective, it's a pretty poor preference. And by and large, most people who exercise it... Well, we actually had a university student do an honours thesis, and what they found was that over 60 per cent of investment switching decisions destroyed value. And so it's important for us that there is a real need to advise and help people that these switching decisions should be made in the cold light of day, in the context of a longer-term plan, and not necessarily in reaction to market volatility.
Wouter Klijn 37:07
Yeah, this is interesting because I remember, and this is quite a few years ago, you were on a panel with Jack Grey, and Jack Grey told this story about how his son had absolutely no interest in superannuation, and he thought that was a very healthy thing to have at his age.
Alistair Barker 37:26
What's the saying? A little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing. And in many senses it's right. At one level we would want every single person in the fund to be engaged with their superannuation, but engaged in a way that they're confident that what we're doing for them is going to help them achieve their goals, but not so engaged that they feel they need to log on to our website every day and check what the unit price is doing. I, for one, hope that by the time I get to the point where I'm retired, the last thing I think about is checking my super balance. I actually don't think it's very good for people's mental health to be looking at their worth on a regular basis. I always go back to this point. I remember my mother rang me up in 2008 and said, "Oh, I'm really worried about this crisis. What's it going to do to the value of my house?" And I said to her, "Are you selling your house tomorrow?" She said, "No." I said, "Good. Well, why are you concerned about the value of your house today if you're not selling it tomorrow?" And the same goes for things like equities, and it's particularly relevant for people in retirement: if you're not selling your equity portfolio tomorrow, why are you worried about what it's worth today? So we often look at rolling three-, five- and 10-year averages for things like valuations and markets and account balances for this exact reason: intrinsic value manifests over time, and what it is on any given day at a member level is probably just not relevant. They should be worried about whether they're on track to meet their objective, and whether they're contributing enough. So I think in many senses the industry has moved to a high level of engagement and daily pricing and a lot of disclosure. That's great, because it's important for us to have a robust and transparent industry, but all that extra information just gives people the feeling that they should worry about all of it more. And at a member level, when I think about my own superannuation, I try and look at it once every few years. You make a decision and you should stick with it and worry about the outcome, not necessarily the journey.
Wouter Klijn 39:45
Yeah, absolutely. Now, this industry has always been one where there's been a lot of tinkering going on, and one of the more recent changes that has come up is the Your Future, Your Super reform. From some of the funds that I've been talking to, there's a bit of concern around the way the performance test is structured. The idea is that you take the asset allocation that's listed in your PDS, and they measure it against a reference portfolio of asset allocation by indices. One of the main issues that I've heard with that is that it basically puts more attention on tracking error. And so, as a fund like Australian Super, which I believe in active management, you tend to have times where there is more tracking error and times where there's less tracking error, and there's a bit of concern that this reinforces the shift we've already seen, globally, amongst institutional investors to more passive. Are you concerned about these new rules and the role that active management can have in your portfolio?
Alistair Barker 40:55
There's a really simple answer to this, and there's a really complex answer to this.
Wouter Klijn 41:01
Let's hear them both.
Alistair Barker 41:02
The simple answer is no. I'm not concerned, and the reason for that is that we've been doing benchmarking for how we measure the effectiveness of our investment programme internally for the best part of eight to 10 years, and the sky hasn't fallen in. In fact, at the margin, things have probably improved, because what we're worried about is whether we're getting the right amount of tracking error for the right cost spend and the right performance outcome. So it's really forced us to think about it like a business and look at whether we're getting a return on investment. I actually testified in front of the Productivity Commission review in respect of benchmarking, and it effectively said something to the effect that we think benchmarking helps. So on that level, I'm not worried about it, but on another level, I am, and it's primarily the behavioural aspect to all this. I should say my observations about the performance test are more about the principle. I think there's been a lot of debate in the industry about the actual technical application, but in principle my concerns are more about the behavioural issues. What we've learnt is that if you have all this, you need to actually make sure that things like anchoring, loss aversion and herding, those kinds of behaviours that come from benchmarking, are managed, that you're actively designing a way to invest that actually manages those issues. That's probably what we've really learnt: it's important to measure things, but if you're not encouraging people to invest in the right way, then you can get all the bad side effects of what comes from benchmarking. So my sense is that if each super fund has the right culture to promote active risk-taking and can prove their worth, then they shouldn't have any issues here. What they actually will have is greater confidence that where they're spending money, they're delivering value for their members, which to me, in principle, sounds like a pretty good thing. Part of that then leads to a challenge around how you make sure you implement that and foster the right culture. So it's a really complicated issue. Will it lead to more indexing? I think you mentioned that in your question. Look, our experience is that when we've done more work on where we spend for value for money, the bit that's fallen out of the portfolio is active management that's potentially redundant, not necessarily poor active managers, but those that diversify away at a total portfolio level, and we've either replaced those with internal managers or, at the margin, maybe some indexing, but actually very, very little. If you look through our portfolio at the moment, if you exclude cash, the best part of 80 to 90 per cent would be regarded as actively managed. So it certainly hasn't changed our approach to active management. What it's done is really lifted the bar and said to all of our active managers, both internal and external, and internal managers are held to the same discipline: how can you add value, net of tax and net of fees, over a reasonable rolling period? And those are the questions we would ask the companies we invest in: how are you making profit for us and for the members of the fund over a period of time? I can't see why that's a poor discipline, unless behavioural finance style issues cloud what is meant to be a good investment outcome. That in many ways is something we look at at a total portfolio level, which is often to say to people, well, okay, I've given Team XYZ a benchmark, but what are you going to do with the money?
So it's important, when we look at a multi-manager, multi-strategy portfolio, to always come back to the point: if the outcome isn't sensible, then perhaps the process that got us there isn't necessarily helping. Benchmarking is a good example of that. If it's not promoting people to invest in what they think are the best opportunities, then maybe we need to go back and look at it. And that's the kind of conversation we have with some of our internal teams: there's measurement, but what are you actually doing with the money? And we find that kind of helps get to a common-sense outcome.
Wouter Klijn 45:45
Yeah, yeah. I want to finish up by looking a little bit outside of your activities with Australian Super. I believe you took a sabbatical where you spent some time in the US and did work for Stanford University, and one part of that was, I believe, that you worked with Ashby Monk on the use of technology by institutional investors. Can you tell us a little bit about that?
Alistair Barker 46:08
Yeah, well, I'm hoping that we'll eventually get our research published. Paradoxically, when you're writing a paper about technological disruption, it's become more important to publish the paper, but being made more difficult by the pandemic, because we've both had other priorities to address. But what we did was a whole heap of case study research on how large institutional investors were dealing with the risk of technological disruption in their investment portfolios. So it's not so much about how investors use technology, but how it impacts portfolios. To give you a little bit of a sneak peek at a few of the insights, what we've really found is that disruption in itself isn't really a new thing, and the challenge is that it can happen over long timescales, and often using data that isn't necessarily well captured in things like risk models, because you're looking across cycles and through cycles, or you're looking at things like regime change. So it's really hard to actually use a lot of the financial mathematics that a lot of people in risk management and portfolio management use these days. But what we found is that you've got a cycle of innovation and disruption, and then a cycle of markets that both speculate on and discount those waves. And for a lot of institutional investors, we have a very large exposure to incumbent portfolio companies that are at greater risk of disruption than they are of innovating. You just look at shopping centres versus e-commerce, which is the poster child that a lot of institutional investors have lived through in the last five to 10 years. So it's important, I think, for investors to think about it, to use an American football term, as much about defence as it is about offence. Often when people think about technological disruption, they say, "I should buy some venture funds." Well, the amount of money invested in Silicon Valley is about 400 billion. So that's two Australian Supers. It's never going to be big enough to actually make a difference, but what you've got in your shopping centre portfolio might, what you have in your equity portfolio might, just by weight of value. I also came up with a really good analogy that a team member left with me. If you went back to the early 1900s, the biggest revolution then was really mechanisation and the production of automobiles. At the time, there were 125 companies that sprang up in the US, mainly in Detroit, to try and win the mass-produced automobile war. Now, as it turns out, Ford and Chrysler and a couple of others won, but most people who invested in those companies lost all of their money, because only a few were successful out of 125, and that's venture, right? It's very skewed. You hear about the big wins, you don't hear about all the losses. But the most important thing to do at that time was probably to sell horses, right? It wasn't necessarily to buy. If you could buy Ford, congratulations. But the most obvious thing to do, as an institutional investor, was to look for the horses, because that's the big exposure we have. And importantly, to figure out when to sell the horse, all you needed to do was figure out that one car company was going to win. So it's actually a slightly easier decision to make, because all you have to figure out is whether a technology will disrupt, not who's going to be the winner. And so I think this area is something that requires a lot of thought. But this is a longer-cycle risk. It parallels a lot of the issues and themes we see in things like ESG and climate change, where the issues are likely to come to bear but will take time, and financial markets go through periods of not pricing them at all and then perhaps fully pricing them. I mean, you think about what you've got to pay for a renewable energy asset at the moment. That's pricing in quite a lot of carbon risk, but it also presumes that there won't be any new technologies that displace those existing renewables. So markets go through cycles in pricing these, and we just have to be careful. Now, the perfect parallel to a more recent period is if you look at 1997 through to 2001. Some phenomenal companies were created in that period, but a lot of people lost a lot of money. But out of that period emerged the really strong internet powerhouses and the ability to then develop that into cloud and mobile applications. So you had a phenomenal speculative boom that invested a heap of money into a sector, and then eventually some successful players emerged. Your mind might be wandering to whether this is what's going on with blockchain and crypto at the moment. There's so much money flowing into the space. It's hard to tell who's going to win. There's a lot of talk of "this time it's different," and other successes.
Wouter Klijn 51:28
You're not a strong believer in crypto, I take it.
Alistair Barker 51:31
I heard a joke one day. Someone said to me that crypto is the veganism of investing. If you love it, you think everyone else is a bit silly. So, look, something will come out of it. The notion that it's a store of value, when central banks would like to maintain sovereignty over the money supply and their tax base, seems to me to be a blocker to what the value of cryptocurrencies is. But the notion that the world will continue to operate through cheques or even credit cards, I can't see that occurring in 30 years' time. So the way in which we transact will change, but upon what platform that occurs, that's the battlefront. And I would guess that there are a number of banks and credit card companies that are very focused on thinking about who's going to win the war in payments and transactions.
Wouter Klijn 52:31
Yeah, might be Google. I can't remember the last time I actually took my wallet with me, other than just paying with my phone. So maybe that's where it's going.
Alistair Barker 52:42
Yeah, yeah. And the simple answer is, if you are interested in some of this, sometimes looking to places like China is relevant. Having spent a bit of time in the Valley while I was on sabbatical, what you realise is that in relation to e-commerce, China is probably a little bit further ahead. However, there are obviously substantial challenges, which have become really apparent to a lot of investors recently, with the fact that it's very hard to untangle the government from the financial system.
Wouter Klijn 53:14
Yeah, yeah. So you mentioned venture a couple of times, and I saw that you're a founding partner of Reaction, which is a venture firm that I think focuses mainly on innovation, but also linked to sustainability. Did you get involved in that when you were in Silicon Valley?
Alistair Barker 53:32
Yeah, I did. I did some study at the business school, and the cohort of people I was with were leaders across various industries and about 50-odd countries, and we formed the view that there were a lot of great things happening in Silicon Valley, but they weren't always reaching places outside the US, particularly a lot of emerging and developing countries. And so Reaction is, we believe, an opportunity to invest in those economies using technology that might be a bit more prevalent in the US. A good example is a portfolio company that is providing big data solutions to mum and dad corner store owners in India. Most people buy their groceries daily from a corner store in India. But how do those people who are running those small stores know what inventory to stock? Well, it was thumb in the air, but providing those people with access to distribution facilities and the data to know what to order when helps those mums and dads become more profitable. So there are plenty of opportunities, I think, to take great technology into the emerging and developing world, and Reaction is about trying to improve the lives of people and hopefully make some money along the way. But it's primarily about the fact that these economies can benefit from technology probably far more than we can in places like Australia, because you're taking people potentially out of poverty or out of a low income into a medium income. And that improvement, as we've learned over the last 30 years, has seen about 800 million to a billion people moved out of abject poverty into some kind of decent income through the globalisation of trade. It's been the biggest economic revolution in quite a while, and there's more to be done in places like India, Africa, Southeast Asia and South America, and myself and our alumni have various connections and networks in those places.
Wouter Klijn 55:50
Yeah, that's interesting work. Well, Alistair, thank you very much. You've been very generous with your time, so I'll let you go. But thank you very much for this conversation. I enjoyed it a lot.
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The [i3] Podcast is the official podcast of the Investment Innovation Institute [i3]. It covers major trends and innovations in institutional investing, providing independent and thought-provoking content about pension funds, insurance companies and sovereign wealth funds across the globe.