GrapheneOS Phone Wipe Case: When Privacy Tools Become Evidence

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Welcome to the Shared Security podcast, the longest running cybersecurity and privacy
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show for actual humans.
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No jargon, no hype, just honest analysis from industry veterans who've seen everything
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and survived it.
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Each week we break down the stories that matter, expose the nonsense that doesn't, and give
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you the tools to stay safe in a world where everything is connected and nothing
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is guaranteed.
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This is Shared Security.
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Today on Shared Security, we're talking about a federal case that turns a privacy feature
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into the center of a criminal prosecution.
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Prosecutors charged an Atlanta man after agents says his Graphene OS phone wiped itself during
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an airport search.
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The legal question is bigger than one phone, though.
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When does using strong privacy tooling become treated as suspicious or even as evidence or
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wrongdoing?
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And joining me to discuss this timely topic is my co-host, Mr. Scott Wright.
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Yep, I'm here again.
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Here you are.
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Here you are.
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Can't get rid of me.
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No, I can't.
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We keep trying, but you keep coming back.
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What's happening here?
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So yeah, no good topic for today.
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It is.
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Hopefully we get some good viewer feedback, too.
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That'd be fun.
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Yeah, definitely.
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It reminded me of, and we'll actually right up here on the YouTube video, we will link
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another episode that we did a while back on Border Searches, which actually was one
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of our most popular episodes.
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So this is somewhat related to that topic, but this is a little bit different.
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So Scott, would you want to talk a little bit about why this came up as a story to talk
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about?
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Yeah, I mean, I just grabbed my attention that first of all, it was talked about a person
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with a phone that had the ability to just wipe itself when you use what's called a
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duress password, which is interesting.
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I've learned about that doing some work in high security organizations, and they have
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that situation sometimes where if you're at gunpoint to your head and they ask you to
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open the safe or unlock a door, you can put in a code and in some systems, the
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code will actually work, but it alerts people with a silent alarm and a response
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can be initiated.
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But in this case, the duress code in the phone is sort of highly integrated
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with the OS, and I didn't know that.
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So I thought that was really interesting that you can have this
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mobile operating system that takes a password and says, oh, this is a password
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that tells me not to let the person in, just wipe the whole device.
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Yeah, that was pretty cool.
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Yeah, exactly.
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And for our listeners that may not know about this story.
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So this gentleman, Sam Turnick, was apparently under federal investigation
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or still is by the FBI for apparent terrorism, something to do with a group
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that he's part of in his hometown, something that, you know, he was him
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and some other protesters or something were going against some type of center
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for police, I'm not really sure exactly what exactly it is.
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But it was outside the U.S.
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So I somewhere in he was returning from somewhere outside the U.S.
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Well, he was coming from Dominican Republic back into the United States,
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into Atlanta, which was not where he's from, but it was like the first airport
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that probably had a connection or what have you.
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And the FBI actually sent the airport an alert that this gentleman was going
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to be landing there.
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And so they essentially started questioning him, took him into a room.
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He had asked for a lawyer like four times and was denied a lawyer.
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And, you know, maybe before we get into more of the details, you and I have
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talked about this before that airports are kind of this gray area in terms
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of what rights do you actually have?
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And this is not just a U.S. thing.
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This is an international thing, right?
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Like, you don't have all the rights that you do as a citizen of your country
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when you are in an airport because it's this it's just this gray area
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because you're you're at the border.
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They can do certain things.
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And so there are debates of do you actually have all of your rights?
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Yeah, I guess it comes down to where the laws have jurisdiction, right?
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And the territory inside an airport security space could have a different
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legal status, right?
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Yeah, yeah.
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So so more about the story.
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So obviously he was asked that if they could search his phone, he said no at
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first and then he it looked like he was putting in his passcode or I think he
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gave his passcode a passcode to the law enforcement people at the airport.
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And it was actually that duress code that you mentioned, Scott.
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And so it started wiping the device.
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Thank you.
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Restarted the device and that gave them the first clue.
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Hey, it's not letting us in.
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Right.
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And I guess it showed a screenshot or it showed Graphene OS when it rebooted.
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And for those of you that don't know, Graphene OS is a mobile operating
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system that will replace your Android operating system with this operating
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system that is more private and secure.
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So this operating system has certain things that can lock down your data.
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It can only use certain types of wireless networks or, you know, for
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example, two G networks are famously infamous.
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Let's say they're infamous for being insecure, right?
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So the phone basically disables that.
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So it only uses, you know, more modern wireless technology.
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So that's one of many things that this operating system can do.
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And so the big debate is because this person was using Graphene OS from
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a privacy perspective, the government is considering this evidence.
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And because he gave the duress code to wipe the device, this person
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is essentially destroying evidence.
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And I think that's what they are prosecuting him with, which is
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pretty unprecedented that this has happened.
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Mobile apps are just part of everyday life now.
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Banking, healthcare, shopping, entertainment, you name it.
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And with that comes a lot of trust because users are putting
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their personal data directly into your app.
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But here's the reality.
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Mobile apps are a growing target.
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A recent survey found that 72% of organizations experienced
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a mobile app security incident last year and 92% say threats
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are only increasing.
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And the way attackers are going after apps is pretty sophisticated.
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They're reverse engineering them, modifying them and redistributing
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fake versions through phishing campaigns, side loading and even
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third party app stores.
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So from a user's perspective, everything can look completely legitimate.
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That's why taking a proactive approach to mobile app security
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really matters.
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You want to stay ahead of these threats, not react after the damage is done.
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This is where Guard Square comes in.
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They provide advanced protection for both Android and iOS apps along
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with automated security testing to catch vulnerabilities early and
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real-time threat monitoring.
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So you can actually see what's happening out there.
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If your mobile app is critical to your business, and it probably is,
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this is something worth paying attention to.
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You can learn more at GuardSquare.com.
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That's GuardSquare.com.
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Yeah, yeah.
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I guess in my mind, I'm questioning like, did he actually
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have some, was he charged with anything before that?
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Maybe they were investigating him.
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But I guess the question is, if you wipe your browser history,
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is that destroying evidence?
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Right.
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Yeah, how far do you take this?
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Exactly, because you're right.
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You're right, Scott.
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I mean, you could think of all the things that is considered
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destroying evidence.
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You know, I think in a traffic stop, I always think of the most
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simple things, right?
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Or your house is being raided and you see in the movies,
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like the drug dealer, you know, putting all the drugs down
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the toilet, right?
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Like that is technically destroying evidence because,
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but in those cases, the police are raiding the house because
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they have a warrant and they have evidence that this person
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is a drug dealer, right?
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So hence, they're most likely going to find drugs in the house.
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So how do you apply that to this?
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Yeah, it is certainly based on the information we have in the
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story. It's probably unclear as to whether it was a privacy
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issue or not, because if they had already had an extensive
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investigation, they had a whole bunch of probable cause for,
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you know, looking at his stuff, then maybe I guess it could
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be potentially valid to say that it's destroying evidence to
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do what he did.
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But there was no warrants issued.
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Right, right.
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There was no warrant for his arrest either.
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This was a, you know, they just wanted to question him.
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But then questioning led to, let's see your device.
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He said, no, and that's where this kind of got a little worse.
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Yep, yep, yep.
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I'm curious as to like what percentage of people use the
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Graphene OS and and of those people, how many use it for
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this purpose or this kind of situation?
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It's a good question.
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I think I always look at this as people that install these
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operating systems, these privacy focused operating systems.
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I don't say they don't have anything to hide, right?
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So they're, you know, these are people that I would say are
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more on the extreme side of protecting their privacy for
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whatever reason, right?
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Yeah, there are lots of valid reasons.
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I mean, you know, there can be reporters trying to
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protect their sources, et cetera.
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Right.
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Yeah, all those things.
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And so I think there is this with law enforcement,
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probably because of previous cases where drug dealers and
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known criminals have used things like Graphene OS and
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there's, you know, there's actually, I was listening
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to the 404 media podcast that kind of went into this
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a little bit more in a little more detail.
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And they talked about there are phones that criminals
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buy that are preloaded with things similar to
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Graphene OS or they copy Graphene OS onto these
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phones.
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And then, of course, law enforcement knows that
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these phones are used by drug dealers and criminals.
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So there is a underlying, oh, if you're using Graphene
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OS, you must be, therefore, you must be a criminal.
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And that is the dangerous slippery slope that I
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think we want to talk about on this show is
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because that's not always the case, right?
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You may just want more privacy for whatever reason.
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Like you said, Scott, a journalist, a human
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rights activist or a politician or, I mean, it goes on
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and on and on or you just really care about your privacy.
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It doesn't mean that you are a criminal because
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you're using this.
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So yeah, it's it's a great example of situations
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where people need to think a little more, because
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clearly now that this has become a big story, there
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will be more attention from authorities on this kind
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of situation, right?
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They'll be looking for it more.
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Yeah, and I think it's a reminder about, you know, when
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you cross a border or you're at an airport, you're
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flying back or you're flying into a country, just be
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aware that the normal laws and the normal rules don't
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necessarily apply.
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And if your threat model says, you know, that you
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are in a high risk position, like I mentioned,
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journalist or politician or someone that is being
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actively targeted by either the government or a
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nation state or some type of threat actor, you need
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to be aware of these situations.
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And it might be a good idea, right?
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For you to use something like Graphene OS, depending
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on your situation, but I think be aware that this
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is a risk of working in that mode too, right?
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It definitely is.
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It definitely is.
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So this court case doesn't happen until October.
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So we won't know until then what happens to
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this gentleman or if he's going to be prosecuted
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is his lawyers, I think, have a good case because,
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by the way, this is an American citizen we're talking
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about too.
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So, you know, Americans do have certain rights,
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whether those rights are allowed or not, because
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he was at an airport, I think is also one of the
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big debates, because he did ask for a lawyer several
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times and was denied.
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Yeah.
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And so I think that's the big thing that his
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lawyers are probably going to be betting on.
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So, so, yeah, so let us know if you're
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listening or watching this podcast.
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We'd love to hear your feedback.
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Is this is this something that is concerning to you
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when you cross the border?
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Do you feel that people running something like
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Graphene OS have something to hide or is this just
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yet another privacy tool that people can just
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install and it's not necessarily something that
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shows guilt, right?
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Yeah, yeah, absolutely.
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And Scott, I think you had an update about
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your digital legacy tree.
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Yeah.
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So I've reached the stage now where the
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digital legacy tree book is in its final stages
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as a manuscript, almost ready for publication,
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which is exciting, and I'm looking for a small
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group of thoughtful reviewers who are interested
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in this idea of ensuring that your loved
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ones can have access to the digital accounts
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that you may want to have them take over if
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you die, kind of a sad situation, but a lot
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of people don't think about it that much.
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And as I mentioned in the past, I've been
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working on this for a little while.
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My goal is actually to release the book in
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around September and, you know, it's not a long
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book. It's actually quite full of value, I think
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through every chapter, just in terms of doing
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little exercises or things that you can record,
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create your own digital legacy file, I call it.
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And so just like to get people's viewpoints,
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you don't have to be a security or privacy
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expert just to get your own real life
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experience and concerns around this issue of
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what happens to your accounts when you die.
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So if you actually are able to do a review
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and provide me with feedback, I'm looking
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at, you know, doing an acknowledgement section
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in the book to name the people who've
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helped out and also give early access to
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people to the published book and the working
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materials that come with it.
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As I mentioned, there is quite a few
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little work worksheets and things that will
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help you create a record that you can save.
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So it's not huge, but 30,000 words.
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So you should be able to get through it in a
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couple of hours.
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So really excited to get people's feedback.
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And I think Tom is going to put a link to
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it in the show notes.
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So looking forward to getting more of that done.
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We'll be linking that in the show notes
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for everybody if you're interested.
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And if you want to connect with Scott on that,
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it's super, super important topic.
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And I think, like we've always said, right,
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Scott, the two things are inevitable in
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life, death and taxes.
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So very important topic for everybody.
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All right.
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Well, I think that's all we have time for today.
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So thank you all for listening.
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And until next time, stay safe, stay secure
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and stay private.
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Thank you for listening or watching.
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If you liked this episode, hit subscribe,
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share it with your friends and colleagues
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or jump into our community at shared
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security dot net slash supporter to keep the
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conversation going.
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Thanks again, and we'll see you next week for
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another episode of shared security.