How Arctic Wolf found product-market fit: Brian NeSmith on getting to the tipping point

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Welcome to the startup field guide and
unusual ventures podcast, where we learn from

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the successful startup leaders of today how
the companies truly found product market fit.

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I'm your host sunk here and in
every episode I'll have into a different aspect

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of earnie stage company building with our
guests. Let's go. So in today's

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episode, our guest is a veteran
of the cybersecurity industry, having led three

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successful companies, the latest of which
is Arctic worth networks, last valued at

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about six billion dollars. A W
N is the leader in the cybersecurity category

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known as m Dr, which is
managed detection and response, which it offers

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as a service. And what makes
the story really special is that the company

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had a pretty row first five to
six years and then finally hit a tipping

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point after which the growth of the
business has been just phenomenal. You can

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compare to very few other enterprise software
companies in history to be growing so fast

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at this scale. So welcome to
our podcast the founder of Arctic Wolf,

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Brian Nesmith brand. Please say hi. Thank you. Pleasure to be here.

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And another reason this episode is special
as I have a co host today

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WHO's my partner and the founder of
unusual ventures, John Dry ones. John,

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say hello. John Actually led the
first venture investment, an Arctic Wolf,

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ten years ago, which was a
seven point five million dollar around just

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as Brian started this company. So
it's this interview is going to be really

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epic. It's very special to have
both of you here together. So,

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going back to that moment in two
thousand twelve, Brian, maybe you can

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kick us off by sharing a bit
about, like what was happening when you

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decided to start optical networks. What
was going on in your mind? You

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have done this a couple of times
before. You know how hard it is.

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What was the opportunity? What got
you excited? Sure, so we

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we have to kind of rewind prior
to the official start date, like you

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often do in these things. They
don't come into existence out of nowhere.

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They come from a set of ideas
I had. Ostensibly retired, I actually

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knew John. We joined a small
company that had its own struggles and so

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it got to go John Through.
That experience really well served me well,

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I think when we talked about the
fundraising, because that was a big part

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of the motivation for me, having
worked with a venture company that, especially

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in a challenging dynamic. How do
they behave? What do they do?

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And it was a real strong proofpoint
for me that the partner you get in

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with matters a lot, and especially
when times can get difficult. I got

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bored. The other way of putting
it, I got retired. I got

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bored. It's called up my co
founder, Kim, Kim Tromblay, who's

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based in Waterloo Ontario, and hey, how's those things going? Post you

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know my previous company and think we
worked together at the previous company. Says

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well, on board too, and
that's a bad formula. Two Board.

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You know kind of entrepreneurial folks.
You know, what are they gonna do?

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They're going to jump in and do
something. And so we we got

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together at her over her kitchen counter
in in Waterloo and brainstorm half dozen different

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ideas. Five of the six would
have made it. One would have been

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a complete, abysmal failure and we
decided to focus on this one. UH,

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mostly because I wasn't as excited about
starting a company that was going to

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be get acquired. Not to say
that we couldn't have got acquired, but

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it wasn't going to be a feature. That had to be a part of

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a bigger company, and so I
wanted to be something it was a little

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more category defining. Didn't have to
be category defining, but I thought that

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could be sustained and grow into a
truly large entity, and maybe that created

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some later challenges for us and what
we were doing, but that was that

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was really the start of everything there. And what was kind of the market

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insight? What were you looking we
decided to start a company? What were

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you looking for in terms of an
actual problem to chase and why? So?

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The actual space we focused focused on. People today call it m Dr,

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that managed detection response. I look
at it is like neighborhood watch for

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your I t infrastructure. So it's
collecting data from the environment understanding when things

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are not doing what they should be
doing. We called it continuous monitoring.

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At the time the essence of the
idea came from my prior company, bluecoat.

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BLUECOAT, the security solution produced really
voluminous locks, like massive locked data,

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huge wealth of information that data.
We found it very rare that a

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customer was able to understand what that
data was telling them, and so that

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was the kernel of the idea.
If you look across everything that's in your

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environment. You know your endpoints,
your servers, your security devices, your

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firewalls, every one of them is
producing data. There's a huge amount of

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wealth in that data mixed with a
massive amount of noise, and so the

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thought process was we could build a
solution that would get through all that and

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draw out the specific items that are
relevant to the end customer. Um and

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you know, and that we called
a continuous monitoring and evolved over several iterations,

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through different names, into what we're
doing. But that was the original

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insight and the thought process of what
we wanted to build. And John,

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as an investor, what was exciting
about the problem area Brian wanted to focus

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on peat your attention. Well,
it actually all started with Brian. You

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Know Brian and I, as he
had said, we worked on a board

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together. I had recruited him to
an early stage company and had worked with

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him through multiple rounds of funding and
unfortunately, not a great exit. I

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don't know if Brian knows this,
but when I was business school at Stanford

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we actually studied cash flow or blue
coat. So I remember him as the

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protagonist in that case. And you
know my mentor, Andy Ratcliffe, and

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Brian worked together. Andy as an
investor and Brian, Brian as the CEO.

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So we we had that history.
And then Brian is on the proud

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father of daughters like myself and also
a lover of soccer. So we had

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hit it off both on a professional
and a personal level. So when he

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came to me I was already positively
inclined about anything that he was going to

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do, although I did think he
was retired. So I was a bit

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surprised when he came. But he
made his very compelling argument, as the

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good founders do, about why the
industry was changing, why there was a

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need for what Arctic Wolf would inevitably
become, and it felt like he had

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what we call that proprietary insight.
He understood the market and how the world

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was evolving and he saw the opportunity
uniquely because of his experience. So a

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combination of those two things, I
was really excited to work with Brian again.

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Well, so, going back to
two thousand and twelve, you've raised

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your seed round from John and then, I think very soon after you actually

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also did a preemptive a which almost
feels like you're back in one but but

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you know, you did this way
back before. It was the norm.

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You had a preemptive a round led
by red point. What was happening on

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the product side? Like, as
a repeat founder, like, how did

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you approach developing the product, testing
the hypothesis? What was the product market

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for journey for optical? Yeah,
so just a slight correction there. So

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the light speed was the a round
with John and then the B round was

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with red point. It was a
fairly simple process. Red Point had missed

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out on the a round. They
did not get selected in the person that

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was leading at just wanted to get
into the D l. So he came

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to me and we weren't actually trying
to raise money at that time and we

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just added the money at that point
in time. Uh. That being said,

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a lot of this is when you
you have an idea of a company.

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You have an idea, if you
think something's gonna want, you don't

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actually know if it's true, like
and you don't really know if it's true

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until you go out and try to
get somebody to pay money to buy it

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from you. And so that's that
to me. Uh, I you know,

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I started with a group of engineers. I was the only non engineer,

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even though I have an engineering degree
I was. I haven't really practiced

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engineering, so I'm no longer can
qualify as an engineer in the truest sense

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of the word. I spent most
of that first year, year and a

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half, selling early like starting to
think about, you know, who's the

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target customer? What's that profile look
like? Um, and a realization,

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especially for a B two B business. Uh, it's it's there's a lot

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of direct interaction with the customer and
so you've got to do a bunch of

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things to kind of help you figure
out how you're going to get that product

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market fit. One of the things
things that I think is a common misnomer

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is, I think it's a question
that comes all the time, how do

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you know you have product market fit? And I don't think that's actually the

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best question. I think what's really
important is what is the process? How

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are you going to go about learning
how you're going to get product market fit?

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Because product market fit is is,
you know, hard work, it's

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intelligence, it's luck. You can't
control everything there, but the process you

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go through and figure out how to
get a product market fit for a B

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two B company, I think is
something that can be done and you can't

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dictate the outcome, but you can't
dictate the process. And so could you

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walk us through, like what that
process felt like? A doctical sure,

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and it's simplest form, and you
see this illustrated if you talk about people

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doing fundraising and say what's Your Elevator
Pitch? I don't think that's good enough.

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So that you think about it is
is you get five seconds to get

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somebody to listen for fifteen seconds and
in fifteen seconds to get a minute,

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in a minute, to actually ask
for a meaning, to talk about what

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you do. So those three sessions
and ultimately the pitch that you're going to

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give them to get them to buy
the product, those have to be scripted

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and you don't have to wait to
have the product that you want to sell

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to do those scripts. You can
go test them, start learning and iterating.

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Uh, and I actually wrote those
scripts out early, early on.

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I was the only one doing that. I was the sales development rep the

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SDR. I was the SDR that
would give them the fifteen second pitch,

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I was the one that would do
the one minute pitch and then I did

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an interesting thing. I created an
alter ego early, early on. That

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was not me. As the CEO
but me as a salesperson. I called

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that person Brian Robinson and Um and
I was I was Brian Robinson doing the

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sales pitch because it's it's for some
customers you get a different dynamic whens the

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CEO selling, but when it's this
sales guy. And so you know,

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I would do that pitch and and
do it as Brian Robinson. And it

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also afforded me if people would ask
for discounts or they'd want help, I

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could say, well, you know, I gotta talk to the CEO and

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we'll see what he can do.
And I did get caught once. I

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fest up immediately, but it happens. But it also it kind of put

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in me the idea that I'm not
the CEO selling right now. What does

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that pitch got to look like?
It's the story itself, not my personality

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or not my title is not going
to get me the meeting. And wrote

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those scripts, did him myself,
before I hired anybody in sales, many,

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many times iterated on them and and
even after I started hiring people into

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those specific positions, still participated fairly
actively in selling right along with those people

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and listening to them. But I
also reserved, even as we're still learning

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that product market fit with as I
hired people, I reserved about capacity for

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an alternate script. So and then
I would hold once a quarter I'd hold

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a free day. Everybody can try
their own script and tell me what work.

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It can't be what we do now
and just trying to find ways to

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iterate and create that rapid learning dynamic. I think I articulate to people you

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can't dictate the outcome. You're going
to get product market fit. You're not

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guaranteed to get it, but what
you can do is control the process and

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be as an efficient as possible about
what doesn't work. And it can be

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frustrating and painful because I guarantee you, anybody that does this, you will

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get a lot more but what doesn't
work than what does work. You may

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go through hundreds of iteration of what
doesn't work and until you find what does

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work. One of the things about
Brian that was so compelling was his perspective

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on the market but at the same
time his willingness to continue to try different

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scripts, as he called them.
Right. So he, he and Kim

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had this fundamental insight about the security
market being broken in the sense that it

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was most companies were cobbling together a
bunch of point products and then building a

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security operations center to try to really
get to the root cause of a lot

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of the most recent attacks. And
he just saw that because he had been

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one of those point product vendors and
he saw the opportunity to build a platform

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that brought a lot of that data
together. But how to articulate that right?

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How to to compel a customer about
the value proposition when they were accustomed

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to buying something else, more of
a point product? It took time,

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it took a lot of time and
it was a creative process that's very difficult,

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difficult to put a schedule too.
But he would always come to us

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as investors with these different these different
scripts right, these different positioning statements,

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these different narratives as he was working
his way through the process and, as

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he said, there's no guarantee of
the outcomes of success, but he knew

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that by following a process and continuing
to iterate and iterate, iterate, he

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was he was maximizing his probability of
finding it makes sense. And Brown,

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I am curious, like, how
do you what were the reactions you looked

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for in a pitch to say,
Oh, this meeting went very well.

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I think my my bios like leaning
in hard versus. They said Nice things,

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but actually that meeting was a complete
like. Could you share examples of

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how have you built your own engage? Well, it so the five second

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pitch. Did you get a fifteen
second pitch? I actually literally tracked that.

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And then the fifteen second do I
get a minute? And I would

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understand. No, they hung up
after fifteen seconds. Okay, well,

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something in the five or fifteen didn't
work. Uh. And then sometimes I

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get to the minute pitch and I'd
say hey, could you take a fifteen

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minute meeting when I'll give you a
more thorough overview? They'd say no,

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you know, they kind of yeah, they're being polite, and I'd say,

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Hey, could you share? Could
you for a minute here, share

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to me? Why not, like, tell me what you didn't like or

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what didn't resonate with you, and
and I would encourage them, because of

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what I would do is I criticized
myself. I think you didn't like this,

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because then that opens the door,
because people are naturally generally polite.

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They won't tell you why they don't
want to do it U and you know,

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ultimately it's very obvious. Your five
second pitch gets you the majority of

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the time of fifteen second and fift
and gets you the minute in your minute

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gets you the full meeting, even
for the full meeting that was scripted and

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pitched. And you know, we
would try to get customers too. We

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did something a little different. In
a typical generally in an enterprise level product,

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people want to do a POC.
I didn't want to do pocs.

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So what we would do is we
would get customers to buy the first month's

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service. And so we did not
do POC S. it's like, I'm

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not going to do a POC.
This is worth it to you, uh,

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and I'll put you on a month, a month subscription and and so

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pay for the first month. And
if you're not willing to pay for the

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first month, then my guess is
the POC would have been a waste of

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our time. So it's every step
of the way asking for the order.

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You know, five seconds, can
you give me fifteen? Can you give

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me a minute? A minute,
can you give me that? You know,

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fifteen minute meeting. And in that
fifteen minute meeting, are you ready

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to buy it, you know,
because I'll only charge you a month and

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if you don't like it, you
can cancel after a month and you can

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move on. And and it's hard, I think as an entrepreneur you don't

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like rejection, you know, and
so you know it's your little baby that

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you're building and you know, they
run it for a month and they say,

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yeah, it wasn't worth it to
me, and you know, there's

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a lot of lessons. You may
have the basic idea right, but I

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guarantee every entrepreneur has to iterate on
even the basic idea to really turn it

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into something that's truly going to be
successful. What was some of those atuations

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like that? You know, do
you remember kind of the very first original

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form of the idea and then how
you guys evoluted based on the feedback?

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It was mostly, I saved marketing
pitches, how we talked about we did

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continuous monitoring, we had soccer as
a service, we had SIM as the

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service. We had even had this
term firebreak, which I think was kind

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of reaching the pinnacle of my team
getting frustrated with me. So it's uh,

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you know. So I as mostly, I'd say, iterations on that

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piece. Ultimately, all that aside, by focusing on the process and measuring

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it, you get to reward yourself
that I've I've learned, things I've I've

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things that I've improving the product,
things that I'm improving how I talk about

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things here. We didn't really achieve
product market fit, and I think this

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is a lesson for people is it's
not always about your iterations. Sometimes the

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market just has to come your way. And for us, you know,

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five and a half years into it, uh, if you know, our

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audience might remember, but the big
ransomware events occurred with the UK hospitals change

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the dynamic of our space because prior
to that, yeah, hackers get into

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your network, they steal your stuff, so what wasn't that big of a

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deal? Yeah, they say it
is a big deal, but they didn't

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really care about it. When those
ransomware events return those hospitals to the dark

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ages, AL sudden everybody woke up
and said, hey, hacker could bring

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down my entire infrastructure, and so
everything shifted. You could just feel the

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win. When you talk to people
that are like, Oh, somebody that

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would watch and tell me when that's
about to happen and warn me and correct

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me and then they just start taking
stuff away from you. They can't stop

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you. They're they're like yeah,
let's do the meeting, yes, let's

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take the next call, let me
get my other team on the phone,

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all those sorts of kind of signals
that tell you on that and those are

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the indicators of it. But ultimately
the real indicators people buy it and they

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keep it installed. It tells you
more than anything. And this was like

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two thousand seventeen eighteen, right about
five six yels after optical was born.

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So what were what was that kind
of you know wandering through the wilderness process

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like, like what, what did
the board conversation sound like when you went

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back and said no, we're still
figuring it out. We didn't get this

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is what made it especially frustrating.
It's not that there was no success.

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So it's like we're getting some traction. And I joke even today, you

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know, we've been doubling for almost
ten years and so every year we're getting

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growth. It's just not in the
traditional model. It wasn't like three times,

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three times, two times, two
times. It's been, you know,

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two X, two X, two
x two X, and out the

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size. We're getting the two x
start to matter, and so not every

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company grows the same way. And
I think that a couple of things.

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One, I have the experience where
I've lived it and I was comfortable being

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fully transparent, like where we screwed
up, where we made mistakes, where

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that was a waste of money,
and okay, well, that wasn't a

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waste of money, but I did
learn something, you know, and moved

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on from that, and that's the
benefit of experience. But I think even

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a young entrepreneur, there's there's no
reason not to be transparent. It's you'll

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just benefit measurably like that, just
even for your own psyche, that you're

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not trying to maintain two sets of
books in your heads about what you told

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your investors versus what's actually happening for
whatever reason, and and we just you

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know. I think that, coupled
with I saw enough proofpoints in the individual,

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not in the overall market, in
the individual where people did rip it

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out of my hands and I believe
that eventually the market would come about.

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I the, you know, misleading
to tell you that I knew was going

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to be the ransomware event that was
going to cause that. But I knew

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something would happen in our space that
would that would trigger that kind of event

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to take place, and so that
transparency and and then also just, you

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know, sharing the anecdotal information about
when it was successful and what made it

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successful and as proofpoints that this is
going to happen. Yeah, I mean,

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Brian, you can't under understate that. I think for our audience right,

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the fact that Brian was brutally honest
and brutally transparent, it actually gave

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us confidence in him right to continue
to persevere. You know, I think

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way too often vcs believe in this
mythical well, it's supposed to triple,

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it's supposed to triple and then double
double. But it's an artificial growth rate

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that you're putting on a startup and
while we'd all love to see those happen,

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it's unrealistic, especially when you're creating
a new category, that that company

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is going to grow according to some
spreadsheet exercise. And so I think what

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happens is rounds happen, valuations go
up and all of a sudden people with

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hindsight say, Oh, we're supposed
to triple, triple, double double,

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and when they don't, they kind
of panic and in this case, because

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Brian was so transparent and so truthful
about the struggles, uh, and,

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you know, the moderate successes we
we continue to have. Believe, I

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certainly did, in him and believing
that eventually the market would come around if

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we could really figure out how to
position and get the narrative right. And

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I think that was that was true. He's underselling his ability to continue to

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do that, but it also was. There was a macroeconomic shift in peoples

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thinking and sometimes it's just about being
around, surviving until that happens and having

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the antidote. You know, in
this case that people really recognize now that

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they needed. Makes Sense and ran
onto a very important question, especially in

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this environment. How did you think
about, like your bull and your teeth

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while you were kind of going through
this uh, you know, more of

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the woodenest spat right, like the
big dipping point hasn't happened yet. You

316
00:22:08.039 --> 00:22:12.079
can see that. How did you
think about, you know, planning your

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00:22:12.319 --> 00:22:18.160
team expansion accordingly, and what did
your team look like, you know,

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in the you know, three,
maybe two or three years in for the

319
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first two, two and a half
years, it was me and a bunch

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of engineers. So I was selling
and marketing and doing all the pieces that.

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My marketing skills aren't great, my
design skills aren't great, but but

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what I, you know, was
comfortable doing as selling and and doing the

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pitch and and I didn't think I
needed, you know, something too fancy

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to articulate the value proposition to the
customers. So, uh, now does

325
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it start to iterate and you start
getting a little bit of traction. And

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we started adding resources, paying attention
to the metrics, like you know,

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having five of something, are you
learning any better or any faster than having

328
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two of something? If two of
some things you're learning fast enough, then

329
00:23:04.240 --> 00:23:08.680
don't add more. So you really
prove a formula. Although we've raised a

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lot of money, you know,
over the history, through the early you

331
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know, through all the way up
even the d round, we had not

332
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raised that much money. We made
it last a good six, six and

333
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a half years, and it's really
on the last couple of rounds. Did

334
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the fundraising, you know, increase
in the volumes increase? Uh Uh,

335
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and so it's just being measured and
being honest with yourself, like you know,

336
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it's running a big marketing campaign and
to change it in our particular world.

337
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Now. I didn't have trouble getting
to people to give them my initial

338
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five second pitch, you know,
and so that's not my problem then.

339
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Okay, it's it's that steps to
the to the other funding. To just

340
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be cautious when you're doing it now. It's very different for a b two

341
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C or some other type of company. For A B two B company,

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00:23:52.559 --> 00:23:55.960
there's no reason you don't need a
big, massive marketing spit, you know,

343
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spending, launch and all those things
to kind of prove that people really

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want to buy you're selling makes sense
and you know. So kind of looking

345
00:24:03.839 --> 00:24:08.319
at that time period again, Um, you probably needed to like go out

346
00:24:08.599 --> 00:24:14.920
raise that next round before the tipping
point had really played out, and so

347
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you know you have the pressure of
being compared to like the gold standard or

348
00:24:18.799 --> 00:24:23.640
even triple for three years benchmarks.
What was your fundraising process like, like

349
00:24:23.839 --> 00:24:27.920
joint has John has given me a
spoiler alert here that it was really tough.

350
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So would love to dig into that
and it really help all the founders

351
00:24:33.160 --> 00:24:38.240
who are going to pretty much go
through the same experience in the next eighteen

352
00:24:38.359 --> 00:24:45.319
months or so of fundraising in a
very challenging environment where the standards have been

353
00:24:45.440 --> 00:24:49.440
raised extremely high for, you know, ABC rounds. Would love to hear

354
00:24:49.559 --> 00:24:56.480
from you kind of what your approach
to fundraising in that environment was. So

355
00:24:56.160 --> 00:25:00.279
yeah, the A and the B
round, I think, just my reputation

356
00:25:00.400 --> 00:25:03.759
historical experience, were fairly straightforward.
So we're talking about the B two.

357
00:25:04.480 --> 00:25:07.920
I'll talk about why we call it
a b to the c and the D

358
00:25:08.400 --> 00:25:15.599
hard would be an understatement. They
were full on agony and you know,

359
00:25:15.880 --> 00:25:18.480
the B two round kind of should
have indicated to me. So I I

360
00:25:19.119 --> 00:25:22.680
and now, at the benefit of
hindsight, I go back and look at

361
00:25:22.720 --> 00:25:26.279
it. Uh. I'd like to
tell you that the venture world is Um

362
00:25:27.119 --> 00:25:30.720
you know that everyone really kind of
looks through to the root of everything and

363
00:25:30.799 --> 00:25:33.720
understands it. Is Willing to swim
against the tide, but it's a momentum

364
00:25:34.119 --> 00:25:37.279
style business, like a lot of
public markets are. Uh. And we

365
00:25:37.359 --> 00:25:41.359
had two negative things going with this. Is that what we were doing as

366
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a service was delivered as a service. It wasn't a product company and I

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think the experience in the venture industry
and generally with service companies has not been

368
00:25:48.880 --> 00:25:53.079
great. Like it's been pretty bad. Uh. And the second part is

369
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our initial focus when I found through
my iteration small customers were the best fit.

370
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Not so were small, but kind
of the one five employees and that

371
00:26:03.440 --> 00:26:07.960
type of investment has generally not played
out well for a lot of venture investors.

372
00:26:07.039 --> 00:26:11.279
So even going into the pitch for
the B to the C and the

373
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D, which is well, you're
selling the small companies and you're selling a

374
00:26:14.160 --> 00:26:18.240
service. Okay. And then on
top of that, uh, you know,

375
00:26:18.519 --> 00:26:22.039
the the metrics, we hadn't grown
into them yet. So we weren't

376
00:26:22.079 --> 00:26:26.559
experiencing that kind of growth that John
alluded to, that they like to see.

377
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And and even though I think we
were getting good traction m the B

378
00:26:30.839 --> 00:26:34.640
two frankly happened, because I think
in the end I talked to probably a

379
00:26:34.799 --> 00:26:38.000
D plus companies in the B two
round and they all said No. I

380
00:26:38.079 --> 00:26:41.839
had a three or four that got
close but ultimated up at no. One

381
00:26:41.880 --> 00:26:45.359
in particular one potenture venture group.
It was a split one partner one to

382
00:26:45.400 --> 00:26:48.440
do it, the other one to
not, and I actually got blackballed by

383
00:26:48.440 --> 00:26:52.599
the other partner, as I come
to find out through history. there.

384
00:26:52.200 --> 00:26:56.319
Uh, and then John and I
we both put some of our personal money

385
00:26:56.359 --> 00:26:59.240
in that kind of set. The
round. The B two was done at

386
00:26:59.240 --> 00:27:02.680
the same value was the b a
year and a half later. So there's

387
00:27:02.720 --> 00:27:07.319
no increase. You arguably could call
it a down round. Uh and the

388
00:27:07.400 --> 00:27:08.920
way, I don't think of it
like that, I know other people do.

389
00:27:10.400 --> 00:27:12.519
We needed the money and I would
have taken the money at that price.

390
00:27:12.559 --> 00:27:15.440
I would have taken the money even
at a lower price. But we

391
00:27:15.480 --> 00:27:18.319
did the down round, I think, with me stepping up, John Stepping

392
00:27:18.440 --> 00:27:22.480
up on the personal side, and
then we created the metrics we were then

393
00:27:22.119 --> 00:27:26.640
got some of the existing investors to
participate, not all of them, Um

394
00:27:26.319 --> 00:27:30.880
and and then we were able actually
with that able to add a few others.

395
00:27:30.000 --> 00:27:37.160
We added a country company out of
Europe and atypical investor and a few

396
00:27:37.240 --> 00:27:40.480
others to round out the round.
So we did the B too. The

397
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C was probably my lowest point in
the company. At that point I went

398
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and talked to hundred and fifty plus
companies. Partly, I think. Now

399
00:27:52.599 --> 00:27:55.440
you've got to remember, still got
the small business, still got the delivered

400
00:27:55.480 --> 00:28:00.839
as a service. Now you've got
the failed success of the B two,

401
00:28:00.200 --> 00:28:03.039
or the failure of the B two, kind of hanging over you as this

402
00:28:03.200 --> 00:28:08.400
rain cloud. Um and I had
talked to everybody and got nos across the

403
00:28:08.480 --> 00:28:15.559
board. Actually went to a session
with John and and John I to his

404
00:28:15.680 --> 00:28:18.119
credit, this company would not be
here without John Going to the wall with

405
00:28:18.319 --> 00:28:25.240
the WHO became the lead ultimately Um
in the sea round and Um and I

406
00:28:25.359 --> 00:28:27.960
think they did as much off of
John's reputation and what they're doing and they've

407
00:28:27.960 --> 00:28:33.160
obviously done very well that investment um
as a result. Yeah, they look

408
00:28:33.279 --> 00:28:38.319
like geniuses, I think. I
think it's fair to say that John looks

409
00:28:38.359 --> 00:28:42.519
like the genius. So as as
the piece there. But you know,

410
00:28:42.680 --> 00:28:45.200
it was, I mean just to
give you sow, disheartening. Was I

411
00:28:45.279 --> 00:28:48.559
had scheduled a two week vacation with
my family to Italy and I canceled it.

412
00:28:49.119 --> 00:28:52.519
Um and the rest of my family
went off to Italy in that vacation.

413
00:28:52.559 --> 00:28:55.759
I'm not sure my wife has forgiven
me to this day for for doing

414
00:28:55.839 --> 00:28:57.839
that. And and it was.
It was as stressed as I think I've

415
00:28:59.000 --> 00:29:02.519
I've been in a long time related
to work related items. Uh. But

416
00:29:02.640 --> 00:29:06.920
then John Stepping in, we made
the pitch. Uh, they did invest.

417
00:29:07.000 --> 00:29:10.319
We had a few other smaller people
follow along with that lead investor Um

418
00:29:10.759 --> 00:29:15.359
and not a very, very small
uptick you know the the pre money.

419
00:29:15.640 --> 00:29:21.200
You know, the valuation was right
around posts the B and the B two,

420
00:29:21.599 --> 00:29:22.920
and we only went up to like
a hundred forty million. You know,

421
00:29:22.960 --> 00:29:26.480
where people are used to jumping hundreds
of millions, you know, even

422
00:29:26.559 --> 00:29:32.720
into the billions of that category.
And then the d round, same thing.

423
00:29:32.799 --> 00:29:37.000
Now this is kind of now two
thousand seventeen. I did get one

424
00:29:37.119 --> 00:29:40.839
particular investor of pe firm that wanted
to invest, but Um, it was

425
00:29:40.880 --> 00:29:44.559
a bit of you give your soul
over to them. They control everything about

426
00:29:44.599 --> 00:29:47.279
it, and we said No.
I said No. I remember sitting in

427
00:29:47.319 --> 00:29:48.880
the board meeting and they're like yeah, you can take this money, but

428
00:29:48.960 --> 00:29:52.359
you don't. You don't have anybody
else ready to do it at this point

429
00:29:52.359 --> 00:29:55.799
in time. But it comes at
a price and we chose not to and

430
00:29:55.880 --> 00:30:00.519
we were able to stitch together around
with blue cloud and STEREOCAP, not your

431
00:30:00.559 --> 00:30:03.599
atypical not your typical investors, and
then we got other people to follow on

432
00:30:04.119 --> 00:30:08.759
Um and then after that it became
pretty easy. Uh, I you know,

433
00:30:10.119 --> 00:30:14.680
I fundraising is either ridiculously easy or
ridiculously hard. I don't there's usually

434
00:30:14.720 --> 00:30:18.599
not a middle ground and these things, and it was ridiculously hard for everyone

435
00:30:18.359 --> 00:30:22.240
and honestly I was a bit surprised. People that I knew and had worked

436
00:30:22.279 --> 00:30:26.079
with before said No. Other folks, I had multiple firms say no more

437
00:30:26.160 --> 00:30:30.119
than a few times. Even as
part of the D round. I had

438
00:30:30.160 --> 00:30:33.400
one particular firm, a very well
known firm in the valley, called me

439
00:30:33.519 --> 00:30:37.119
in say no, call me back
in again and talk to him again and

440
00:30:37.160 --> 00:30:38.480
they said no again, and then
call me back in again. So I

441
00:30:38.559 --> 00:30:41.559
got so I didn't just get one
rejection in that d round, I got

442
00:30:41.680 --> 00:30:45.839
three from that firm. Uh as
they I think we're struggling how to think

443
00:30:45.880 --> 00:30:49.440
about it so and what to do. But you know, if you believe

444
00:30:49.519 --> 00:30:53.279
in it, you know and you
can. You know, you kind of

445
00:30:53.359 --> 00:30:56.359
bet and you've got to be willing
to fail also, like at some point

446
00:30:56.440 --> 00:30:59.960
you know it's yeah, it was
a non zero chance it could have all

447
00:31:00.000 --> 00:31:03.400
failed. Yeah, I think you
have so many follow up questions. Let's

448
00:31:03.799 --> 00:31:07.880
think first, I think question for
John, like what what gave you the

449
00:31:08.079 --> 00:31:14.319
conviction, because you know you have
to decide as an investor and you have

450
00:31:14.480 --> 00:31:18.480
multiple companies that you know, some
of which are struggling, all of which

451
00:31:18.599 --> 00:31:21.759
need your help. You have to
kind of decide like, okay, where

452
00:31:21.839 --> 00:31:26.880
are you going to really, you
know, do something monumentally different? And

453
00:31:27.359 --> 00:31:32.640
so I'm curious what gave you the
conviction to step in with Brian and,

454
00:31:33.200 --> 00:31:34.960
you know, go to the wall, like you said. Well, it's

455
00:31:36.000 --> 00:31:37.359
definitely not that I was a genius. So I think we need to just

456
00:31:37.680 --> 00:31:41.920
make that really clear. Anybody who
knows me knows that's already true. But

457
00:31:42.200 --> 00:31:45.759
honestly, it was mostly about Brian
in the end. You know, back

458
00:31:45.799 --> 00:31:49.680
to that transparency, that that belief
in and you know, we're I'm a

459
00:31:49.720 --> 00:31:53.119
bit of a product nerd myself,
and so I had done a lot of

460
00:31:53.240 --> 00:32:01.440
work around the space and the customer
problems and increasing just had conviction, uh,

461
00:32:02.599 --> 00:32:07.599
both in Brian and the need in
the marketplace and that our solution in

462
00:32:07.720 --> 00:32:09.880
Arctic Wolf was actually the right one. It was just going to be a

463
00:32:09.960 --> 00:32:15.319
matter of time and, you know, not being afraid of the grind right

464
00:32:15.440 --> 00:32:19.160
and you know, as an investor, you you make investments and then you

465
00:32:19.400 --> 00:32:22.319
it's almost like a poker game.
You you turn over some cards, you

466
00:32:22.400 --> 00:32:24.799
have more data and you have to
decide do you want to stay in the

467
00:32:24.880 --> 00:32:28.839
game and keep and keep betting or
do you do? You do you want

468
00:32:28.839 --> 00:32:31.599
to fold based on what you know, and in this case I was really

469
00:32:31.680 --> 00:32:37.200
convinced that the right answer was to
stay in Um, you know, maybe

470
00:32:37.279 --> 00:32:40.240
more than any other investment I've been
a part of. And so over time,

471
00:32:40.640 --> 00:32:45.880
you know, there were those nuggets
of success that continue to give everyone

472
00:32:45.000 --> 00:32:51.079
belief. But to Brian's point,
a lot of times investors don't like to

473
00:32:51.599 --> 00:32:55.039
acknowledge they made a mistake. So
we we did have this overhang where we

474
00:32:55.079 --> 00:33:00.559
had tried to pitch the story before
people said No. Um. Some of

475
00:33:00.599 --> 00:33:04.400
the other early investors, the funds, they you know, despite being multi

476
00:33:04.519 --> 00:33:07.960
stage funds, they weren't stepping up
in a meaningful way, like they just

477
00:33:08.039 --> 00:33:14.799
were a lot of issues that created
headwind for Arctic Wolf Um. And then

478
00:33:14.839 --> 00:33:17.599
when it was obvious Brian was beating
people away with a stick, I mean

479
00:33:17.759 --> 00:33:22.400
just people throwing money at him like
you wouldn't believe. But those three financings

480
00:33:23.000 --> 00:33:28.119
they were lean, they were leaning, you know, scrappy years Um.

481
00:33:28.279 --> 00:33:31.119
So it's just really a credit to
him and the team that they they persevered.

482
00:33:32.119 --> 00:33:36.279
And the follow up question for you, bran, what what do you

483
00:33:36.359 --> 00:33:40.240
think in hindsight? I think two
separate questions. One in hindsight, what

484
00:33:40.839 --> 00:33:45.039
you know? What? What decisions
do you feel like you made that helped

485
00:33:45.119 --> 00:33:51.480
you survive through that phase where you
might potentially be seeing other people trip up,

486
00:33:51.640 --> 00:33:53.720
like how do you survive? And
it's lean and you need to kind

487
00:33:53.759 --> 00:33:59.480
of wait for the market to meet
too in terms of readiness, and then

488
00:33:59.559 --> 00:34:01.559
too, you know, what would
you do differently if you had to do

489
00:34:01.680 --> 00:34:07.359
it again? In terms of the
whole fundraising process itself? Well, he

490
00:34:07.480 --> 00:34:12.000
had an amazing spouse. What's going
right there? That was the real reason

491
00:34:12.119 --> 00:34:15.320
that he go ahead. But I
know you're gonna say that, yeah,

492
00:34:15.840 --> 00:34:19.280
I mean that is a big part
of it too, is that you know

493
00:34:19.360 --> 00:34:24.039
this. These these comment a significant
personal sacrifice, you know, not not

494
00:34:24.239 --> 00:34:29.239
just time but energy and psyche and
stuff like that. You know, and

495
00:34:29.320 --> 00:34:32.599
you can live through some pretty dark
times where just why don't, why doesn't

496
00:34:32.599 --> 00:34:36.039
everybody get what I get? Like, I don't understand this. It's like,

497
00:34:36.239 --> 00:34:39.239
you know what's what's happening there.
Um, you know, I I

498
00:34:40.280 --> 00:34:45.880
know. My my advice is,
uh, you know, for someone here,

499
00:34:45.360 --> 00:34:52.960
is that you know, you you
you know the transparency that's required.

500
00:34:52.000 --> 00:34:54.639
We talked about the board level.
I think also applies to your team.

501
00:34:55.000 --> 00:35:00.199
And even at present day works were
very transparent as a opening about how we're

502
00:35:00.239 --> 00:35:05.800
doing and where we're going. And
and you know, I explained to folks.

503
00:35:05.880 --> 00:35:07.880
Now I had a history with a
lot of these early folks, so

504
00:35:07.960 --> 00:35:13.199
they knew me from prior life and
and know that you know I'm not sugarcoating

505
00:35:13.199 --> 00:35:15.760
when I'm delivering to you like this
is okay, this is pretty dicey,

506
00:35:15.760 --> 00:35:17.559
it may not work. You know
what's going to happen. Um. So

507
00:35:17.679 --> 00:35:22.320
I think that transparency. But I
also think you can't lose sight, as

508
00:35:22.760 --> 00:35:27.079
the senior executives, that you have
to be able to tell a story like

509
00:35:27.159 --> 00:35:30.039
that, this is why it's happening, you know, this is what you

510
00:35:30.119 --> 00:35:31.960
know, to give some explanation for
it and explain what you're doing to try

511
00:35:32.039 --> 00:35:37.199
to fix it or make it better
and and what you're doing so and getting

512
00:35:37.239 --> 00:35:39.719
the team bought in. That,
I mean, that's in a lot of

513
00:35:39.800 --> 00:35:43.280
cases, that's what sustained me.
You know, I saw the team members,

514
00:35:43.440 --> 00:35:45.920
I saw some of the early customers
that we were getting success with,

515
00:35:45.800 --> 00:35:49.360
you know, using the product and
keeping with it. We still have our

516
00:35:49.559 --> 00:35:52.639
very first customer is still a customer
uh. So it kind of highlights,

517
00:35:52.719 --> 00:35:55.400
you know, some of the value
that we got there early on. So

518
00:35:55.480 --> 00:35:59.960
there wasn't that, there was no
you know, if you're getting no response,

519
00:36:00.639 --> 00:36:04.480
that's a different thing that you're getting
somewhat of a response and you just

520
00:36:04.639 --> 00:36:07.639
think that the market is not really
there. And that's probably what sustained me.

521
00:36:07.039 --> 00:36:10.599
I believe that we were getting a
response, the market just hadn't quite

522
00:36:10.639 --> 00:36:15.960
come into its own and and that
if we could just be persistent and patient,

523
00:36:15.079 --> 00:36:17.400
that this is going to pay off
in a big way. And obviously,

524
00:36:17.440 --> 00:36:21.400
with hindsight now we look like geniuses. But it would have been a

525
00:36:21.440 --> 00:36:22.599
hard time to tell you that that
I knew for sure that was going to

526
00:36:22.679 --> 00:36:25.920
happen, but that was my that
was my best assumption. And you know,

527
00:36:27.039 --> 00:36:31.800
going back to kind of the two
hundred plus rejections and those two fundraising

528
00:36:31.880 --> 00:36:36.440
grounds, like, do you feel
like there's something you would have done differently

529
00:36:36.519 --> 00:36:42.719
in hindsight? I think the positioning
of the company. I over emphasized the

530
00:36:43.000 --> 00:36:46.840
delivered as a service Um and where
I think that the venture community in general

531
00:36:46.920 --> 00:36:51.199
wants to see a product and I
think we could have probably emphasized that much

532
00:36:51.239 --> 00:36:53.039
better, especially in the B two
round or we could have made it much

533
00:36:53.079 --> 00:36:57.840
more of the technology and the portfolio, and I think we ended up making

534
00:36:57.920 --> 00:37:00.760
mistakes there that created the overhang that
John highlining. So then we did fix

535
00:37:00.840 --> 00:37:04.039
that as we went into the C
and the D, but it's too late,

536
00:37:04.360 --> 00:37:07.159
like they have a view of it, but now kind of taint what

537
00:37:07.239 --> 00:37:12.119
you're doing and so that that becomes
there. God. So I think this

538
00:37:12.239 --> 00:37:15.679
goes back to you of your comment
that people are not trying to get to

539
00:37:15.800 --> 00:37:19.800
the root of your story. They're
kind of reacting to the first five,

540
00:37:19.960 --> 00:37:23.039
fifteen seconds. So you have to
be very careful what you lead with.

541
00:37:24.239 --> 00:37:29.079
Moving on a little bit to kind
of the board situation, like how how

542
00:37:29.159 --> 00:37:34.519
you're communicating to the team, how
you are handling your board. I'm curious,

543
00:37:34.599 --> 00:37:37.599
John, like do you have advice
for other founders based on like what

544
00:37:37.960 --> 00:37:43.679
was your best experience with Brian?
What would you like other founders who are

545
00:37:43.760 --> 00:37:47.000
going through hard times in terms of
scaling their company, like, what is

546
00:37:47.079 --> 00:37:51.760
it that you need to see to
give you that conviction that you had with

547
00:37:51.880 --> 00:37:54.559
Brian? Well, I think,
I think when things aren't going well,

548
00:37:54.880 --> 00:38:01.360
which in every startup there's a time
when that's the case, as an investor,

549
00:38:02.000 --> 00:38:06.960
you want to be helpful and you
know one of the few few benefits

550
00:38:07.039 --> 00:38:09.920
you can bring is your perspective,
the reality that you've seen a lot of

551
00:38:09.960 --> 00:38:17.000
companies go through their ups and downs
and the truth is you know things are

552
00:38:17.079 --> 00:38:24.440
probably not all going right. So
if the CEO is isn't telling you that

553
00:38:24.559 --> 00:38:30.360
things aren't going right, they either
don't know or they're not telling you on

554
00:38:30.480 --> 00:38:36.639
purpose, and neither is good,
right. And so in this case,

555
00:38:36.719 --> 00:38:40.400
Brian was always very open about the
things he was trying in, what wasn't

556
00:38:40.440 --> 00:38:45.079
working and what was, and that
allowed us to work together on how to

557
00:38:45.159 --> 00:38:51.400
solve these things. Um, you
know, I I never lost belief in

558
00:38:51.519 --> 00:38:53.920
Brian and sometimes I think investors fool
themselves. They think they add value in

559
00:38:53.960 --> 00:38:58.679
all these ways, but I actually
think the single most important thing an investor

560
00:38:58.760 --> 00:39:02.599
can do is continue to give that
founder a sense of belief in them right,

561
00:39:02.760 --> 00:39:07.639
that we're going to get through it. And and for me, you

562
00:39:07.679 --> 00:39:09.880
know, that was that was a
lot easier with Brian because of just how

563
00:39:10.000 --> 00:39:15.639
he handled you know, the openness
right in terms of hey, this isn't

564
00:39:15.679 --> 00:39:19.960
working, this is working. He
always kept US informed, he treated us

565
00:39:20.440 --> 00:39:23.679
like partners in this and Um,
I think that made a huge difference.

566
00:39:23.840 --> 00:39:27.760
So if I had to give any
advice, it would just be you know

567
00:39:27.840 --> 00:39:32.719
that it's it's really along those lines. Treat treat your investors truly like partners,

568
00:39:32.960 --> 00:39:37.280
and the good ones they understand that
there's going to be ups and downs,

569
00:39:37.400 --> 00:39:39.960
but if you want them to help, they need to know what's going,

570
00:39:40.320 --> 00:39:45.360
what's going sideways or wrong, so
that they can the thing I'd add

571
00:39:45.400 --> 00:39:51.119
to the openness is not simply just
speeling raw data. It's your board members.

572
00:39:51.920 --> 00:39:54.480
So you know, part of the
job is is you need to frame

573
00:39:54.559 --> 00:39:59.400
the problem and understand it and and
put it in a way that that they

574
00:40:00.079 --> 00:40:04.639
members, can add value and what
you're doing. And so I like to

575
00:40:04.719 --> 00:40:07.840
talk about like I like to bring
challenges to the board when I think I

576
00:40:07.960 --> 00:40:12.760
have what are the different potential answers
to it, but I haven't made up

577
00:40:12.760 --> 00:40:15.000
my mind yet. So it's that's
it's a little bit of an art form.

578
00:40:15.079 --> 00:40:17.119
So if you get too far down
theline, you've already made up your

579
00:40:17.159 --> 00:40:20.480
mind, then when you bring it
to the board and they disagree with you,

580
00:40:20.559 --> 00:40:22.679
and now what do you do?
But if you bring it to the

581
00:40:22.719 --> 00:40:25.320
board when you can frame the problem. Uh, you know, it's a

582
00:40:25.400 --> 00:40:29.599
mistake for an entrepreneur, I think, to go to the board and have

583
00:40:29.960 --> 00:40:31.719
no idea what to do now.
If you're doing that, basically you're saying

584
00:40:31.760 --> 00:40:35.039
you give up. Uh, you
know, what should I do now?

585
00:40:35.320 --> 00:40:37.960
That doesn't mean you can't go to
some of your investors and you just need

586
00:40:38.000 --> 00:40:40.519
a bit of a pep talk,
like and you can do that. Just

587
00:40:40.679 --> 00:40:44.039
ask say hey, I'm really struggling
right now. Give me a little bit

588
00:40:44.039 --> 00:40:46.320
of a pep talk, and I've
done that before with with board members.

589
00:40:46.400 --> 00:40:49.199
I'm like, I don't even want
to tell you about anything, I just

590
00:40:49.239 --> 00:40:51.199
need a little bit of a pep
talk. Tell me how good I am,

591
00:40:51.280 --> 00:40:52.920
you know, give me some confidence
and what we're doing. But I

592
00:40:53.400 --> 00:40:59.480
I spend a lot of energy and
also just making clear that you know,

593
00:40:59.639 --> 00:41:04.320
by focusing on the process and showing
the measurements, showing the data associated that

594
00:41:04.440 --> 00:41:07.360
process, can't guarantee the outcome,
but I can show you all the work

595
00:41:07.400 --> 00:41:09.639
we're doing in the process and what
we've learned along the way, and you

596
00:41:09.719 --> 00:41:14.199
can have ideas and we're open to
whatever you want to do. So all

597
00:41:14.440 --> 00:41:16.400
those things, I think, are
part of it. So openness is not

598
00:41:17.519 --> 00:41:21.760
it doesn't forgive you not being prepared, not doing the work, not not

599
00:41:21.960 --> 00:41:25.320
getting ready. It's those things as
critical for someone understand, because I think

600
00:41:25.320 --> 00:41:29.599
sometimes someone confuses that. It's like
I'm just gonna dump to you my last

601
00:41:29.679 --> 00:41:31.440
meeting and how that felt. Okay, now, that's not that's not value.

602
00:41:31.800 --> 00:41:36.559
Like frame it help it put in
a form that people can understand and

603
00:41:36.719 --> 00:41:37.599
have a plan. Right, Brian, I mean I would say that you,

604
00:41:38.320 --> 00:41:42.400
despite the problems, you always had
a suggestion or a plan that you

605
00:41:42.480 --> 00:41:46.199
wanted feedback on, as opposed to
just venting. Um. One other thing.

606
00:41:46.239 --> 00:41:49.719
I'm conscious at times on you,
but I also wanted to say that

607
00:41:50.000 --> 00:41:53.280
I would often bring Brian my problems. You know, sometimes it's nice to

608
00:41:53.280 --> 00:41:57.199
think about other people's problems. Is
just a little bit of a restment and

609
00:41:57.440 --> 00:42:00.199
and so I always valued, you
know, an opportunity to kind say,

610
00:42:00.199 --> 00:42:01.519
Hey, Brian and these other companies
are struggling with these things. What do

611
00:42:01.639 --> 00:42:05.920
you think? And Uh, anyway, it just it made it more of

612
00:42:05.960 --> 00:42:09.400
a two way dynamic. I have
a story, not from Arctic wealth,

613
00:42:09.440 --> 00:42:15.559
but from two companies ago. Uh, a venture investor. Um, I

614
00:42:15.599 --> 00:42:20.199
should probably give him credit because I
quote him all the time to other entrepreneurs

615
00:42:20.239 --> 00:42:22.239
that come to me. John Fiber, who booked more, David Ow,

616
00:42:22.320 --> 00:42:29.199
he's now retired, and we this
not the not blue coat, but the

617
00:42:29.280 --> 00:42:31.679
company before that wasn't really playing out
the same sort of thing. And so

618
00:42:31.760 --> 00:42:35.639
we had a board meeting. OPTION
TO A, B and C. Nobody

619
00:42:35.679 --> 00:42:37.800
wanted to see. It was clear
the board wanted to be and the management

620
00:42:37.800 --> 00:42:42.840
team one to day in this conversation
and you know, after a while you

621
00:42:42.880 --> 00:42:45.440
realize you're talking in circles. So
we said that. I called a break.

622
00:42:45.719 --> 00:42:47.679
I go walking down the hall with
John And he looks at me and

623
00:42:47.719 --> 00:42:51.559
said I just want to be clear
that if you choose option a and it

624
00:42:51.599 --> 00:42:53.360
doesn't work out, you're gonna get
fired. And first time, CEO,

625
00:42:53.400 --> 00:42:55.559
it was a little bit taken aback. You know, what am I gonna

626
00:42:55.599 --> 00:42:59.920
do? Uh, and he goes
and then he you know, little dramatic

627
00:43:00.000 --> 00:43:01.920
pause and he goes. But if
you choose, you know, option being

628
00:43:01.920 --> 00:43:05.639
it doesn't work out, YOU'RE gonna
get fired anyway. And his basic point,

629
00:43:05.719 --> 00:43:07.440
and I think this is something I
tell entrepreneurs all the time, is

630
00:43:08.800 --> 00:43:13.559
you know, because it's your industry, it's Your Business and what you're doing.

631
00:43:13.760 --> 00:43:15.920
You've got to be willing to get
fired, and I'm not saying you

632
00:43:15.960 --> 00:43:17.440
got to behave in a bad way, but you've got to be willing to

633
00:43:17.519 --> 00:43:22.800
stand by your convictions and and present
the case, uh, and do it.

634
00:43:22.920 --> 00:43:25.880
And I you know there's I had
another situation with a very well known

635
00:43:27.679 --> 00:43:30.519
persona in the industry that was on
my board and they had presented a plan

636
00:43:30.639 --> 00:43:35.599
for me that I categorically disagreed with
and I said no, I'm not going

637
00:43:35.679 --> 00:43:37.440
to do that and they ultimately resigned
from the board. It was a bit

638
00:43:37.480 --> 00:43:42.400
of a hit for us, but
those are all kind of that developing that

639
00:43:42.559 --> 00:43:45.440
inner strength and the conviction and your
thoughts, being open minded. But you're

640
00:43:45.440 --> 00:43:51.360
still the CEO, like like you
know, and even if the board tells

641
00:43:51.400 --> 00:43:53.280
you to do accident doesn't work out, that's still going to be your fault

642
00:43:53.280 --> 00:43:57.000
as the CEO. So it's you
know, I'd leave you with that advice,

643
00:43:57.079 --> 00:44:00.800
which is listen, but it's still
your call and you need to live

644
00:44:00.840 --> 00:44:06.599
by it. Awesome. Well,
on those awesome words of advice, we'll

645
00:44:06.719 --> 00:44:09.840
wrap this episode up. Thank you
so much for spending time with us,

646
00:44:09.960 --> 00:44:14.440
Brian, and it was really lovely
to see you. Know you and John,

647
00:44:14.679 --> 00:44:19.440
like h take take time to kind
of share all these learnings from ten

648
00:44:19.559 --> 00:44:25.760
years of of of this relationship navigating, you know, the extreme rocket ship

649
00:44:25.960 --> 00:44:32.760
journey of opticalwth networks. It was
a real joy learning about it from both

650
00:44:32.800 --> 00:44:36.159
of you. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thanks. Ada.

651
00:44:44.400 --> 00:44:49.440
You've been listening to the startup field
guide with some here an unusual ventures podcast.

652
00:44:49.920 --> 00:44:53.239
Stay connected with us by subscribing to
the show in your favorite podcast player.

653
00:44:53.719 --> 00:44:58.320
If you like what you heard,
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654
00:44:58.400 --> 00:45:01.920
reach more aspiring found earth with lessons
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655
00:45:02.519 --> 00:45:08.920
Thanks for listening. Until next time, H