WEBVTT
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Recognizing that on the service side, you know, not the secretariat side where acquisition occurs, on the service side, if I don't get the requirements right, uh it's never it's never going to be fielded effectively, efficiently, on time, on budget, etc.
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So we've really gone back and rescrubbed our process.
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How is it we develop requirements?
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What does a good requirement look like?
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And we found that at a minimum there's three levels of requirements.
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Hello, I'm Copeline Stover.
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I'm with the Center for Space Policy and Strategy, part of the Aerospace Corporation.
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Welcome to the Space Policy Show.
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For people that are not watching the YouTube video right now, you're missing something.
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We're actually in the walls of the Pentagon in the executive office.
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So this is part of our leadership series.
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It's a series of shows that are featuring chiefs.
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I resisted calling it the chief series.
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Um, but we have the chief executive officers of Voyager and Vardom talking about enabling the space economy, and they're also with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director of Office of Space Commerce.
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Um, we've got the US Space Force Chief Scientist talking about advanced technology.
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We've got the NASA medical officer, chief medical officer, talking about living on the moon.
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So today I am very pleased to feature Chief of Space Operations for the US Space Force, General Chance Salzmann.
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He has been assigned to the Space Force since um 2022 in this role as CSO, and he is the senior uniformed officer.
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Um he's only the second one in history.
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Um the Space Force was established in December 2019.
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So he's getting ready to kind of end his tenure later in the year, and we've asked him to come onto the space policy show to reflect about how the service has matured and developed over his time.
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And we've got Jamie Moran leading the conversation.
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He is with Aerospace Corporation.
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He's the executive director of the Center for Space Policy and Strategy, and he's also the vice president of Defense Strategic Space at the company.
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So I'm just gonna go right over to them.
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Thank you everyone for joining.
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We're gonna be showing you some more stuff from inside the Pentagon after the show.
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Thanks.
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Well, it is great to be back on the uh Space Policy Show with General Chance Saltzman.
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Salty, uh Chief, wonderful to have you back again.
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Thank you.
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It's been five years since we last had you on the side.
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Seems like yesterday.
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You uh you've been up to a fair bit ever since.
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So um first let me just say uh thank you to you to you and to Jennifer for everything you guys have done in your tenure as Chief of Space Operations.
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It's a it's a significant undertaking for the the whole family.
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And obviously the nation owes you guys a debt of gratitude.
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Not done quite yet, but uh we thought it would be great to get your thoughts as part of this series we're doing on chiefs of all sorts across the space community and kind of how they're approaching their roles and leadership in the rapidly changing environment that we live in right now in the space community.
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Um so this would be a great coda to that.
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And we are um we're appreciative of your time as well for today.
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So l let me just start by asking you a little bit about uh the people of the Space Force.
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So uh when we talked, I guess it's five years ago now, we uh talked a lot about uh building the guardians the nation needs in the rapidly changing space domain, uh the technical foundation they needed to understand their domain and their mission.
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You've now grown significantly in terms of uniformed and civilian guardians.
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You've grown in terms of the industrial base that's supporting you.
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Um have we made the right steps to build the people we need for the nation's interests in space?
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What are the next steps to ensure we've got that human capital?
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Well, I first I appreciate you starting there because nothing makes me more proud of the Space Force than the guardians uh that make it up.
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Um it's an amazing group of people, it is.
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And I mean officer enlisted, civilians alike.
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Um and and one of the first things we tackled was trying to make sure we had clear definitions of the roles and responsibilities that we generally wanted to ascribe to the civilians, to the officers, and to the enlisted.
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Thought it was important that we say, how do we want to use our workforce?
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Um and then you have to say, what's the right size of the workforce?
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And then you say, what are the individual kinds of training and education and experiences?
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So you start to think about career paths and and we tackled all of that.
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Uh we didn't say, well, we'll get to that later, uh, because it's it's too important to set aside.
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Uh so I'm really proud of where we are.
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Um if you say, have we taken all the right steps?
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I I would say it's a work in progress.
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I think that uh um my initial thought was if I can build the right processes and foundation to build on, then the steps will have to unfold over time because we'll learn as we go.
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This worked, this didn't work.
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I'm really proud of the professional military education courses that we've established.
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Start with BMT.
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We inherited an Air Force BMT, uh, which trained airmen, and we still use the Air Force BMT, uh basic military training, but we've built our own curriculum.
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So inside the Air Force BMT is this guardian experience that sets them on a path towards being an effective guardian.
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Proud of that.
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Uh we we took the SOS Squadron Officer School from the Air Force and we created our own captain's leadership course.
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Uh we we partnered with the private institution, uh, you know, Johns Hopkins to uh to do our version of uh of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.
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So we have our own uh professional military education there.
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We've rebuilt uh enlisted tech training.
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Uh just ever at every step we said it's time to build a guardian from the ground up.
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We need our own organic and independent training, education and experience.
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Um now I think we're in a position where we need to learn and we need to stay a learning organization, uh, evaluate what we're doing, uh, get feedback from the field.
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Is it the kind of training, education, and experience that's helpful?
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Are there some tweaks we need to make?
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Um, and are there other opportunities we need to take advantage of?
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And I'll just give you one example.
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Um we're really trying to change our relationship with industry.
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So I really want to start deploying guardians into industry and literally think about it like that, in the same way that, you know, when I was an airman, we would I would deploy forward into uh into the Expeditionary Air Force and gain experience there.
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Uh this, we want to actually deploy them four, six months at a time, go learn what industry is doing, contribute to that uh industry and learn something, and then bring it back in.
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Uh that that kind of experience, that kind of education we think will be valuable to keep us on the leading edge of technology and and what industry is trying to accomplish.
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So foundations are established, and now we just need to stay a learning organization uh collectively and improve our guardians as we go forward.
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You know, we're interestingly exploring a similar model at uh aerospace where we're uh which we're use we're calling government-furnished talent, where government program offices deploy our folks out to their industry partners that are working on the programs.
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Perfect when they're struggling with specific hard problems or you know, trying to understand the user perspective and things like that that you know we can bring in.
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It's a uh it's an interesting model, and we're seeing some uh really good uptake already.
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The the the benefits of being embedded, being there every single day.
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So it's not episodic, it's not, hey, come into this conference and we'll all have a pleasant conversation.
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No, no, you get to see the trouble, you get to see the challenges, you get to see the opportunities, and it's that day-to-day routine interaction, I think, which both enhances the educational opportunity, but also it it starts to build this collaborative trust uh between the organizations.
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It's not the mystery of industry or the mystery of government.
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You're you were there working together, and I think that's value-added.
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In the act of doing that matters a lot.
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Yeah.
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Do you um we we have this really kind of diverse and interesting audience for the space policy show, and one of the subsets of that audience is students.
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We get um we hear a lot from students who are watching.
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Thanks for watching.
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Uh they that's part of your recruiting base, whether it's military or civilian guardians.
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Are there specific attributes you're looking for, you know, besides the learn the continuous learning and the willingness to engage with a emerging military domain, are there other attributes that you would say, hey, you should come join us?
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Yeah, I you know, yes.
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Uh but I think it's it's I I want to caveat it by saying right now, because we're we're at a very specific stage of our development as a service.
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Uh we need critical thinkers and we need people with high initiative.
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If you need process and procedure and be told precisely how to do something, that may not be the best fit right now.
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Because we're, like I said, we're learning.
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We're we're trying to adapt uh other services' processes for uniqueness to the Space Force.
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And so we need people that that can test assumptions, evaluate courses of action, think critically about what's the best step forward, think of uh aspirationally about what the vision of the future could look like or should look like, uh, and then have high initiative, not waiting to be told what to do about that, whatever they find out, but actually taking the initiative and and and doing something.
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That's a different kind of person.
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And so it's not you need an engineering degree or you need a you know a math degree or computer science degree.
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Uh interesting, to be technically savvy has probably got some benefits, but I'll take a critical thinker with high initiative and and we'll train them on the rest.
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That makes sense.
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So let me shift more to uh military operations, the geopolitical world.
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Uh we're in an environment right now with ongoing conflicts, both in Europe and uh hopefully coming to an end in the in the Middle East.
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Uh you, I'm sure, are carefully watching day-to-day operations to draw lessons to build the future force.
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Um space has been a major player in both of those conflicts.
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Uh recognizing this is a a public event, what what can you talk about as far as lessons that you're learning and that you're passing on to the force uh as you look at the operations we're taking in right now?
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A couple things because I'd start by saying we've got to be careful as these operations unfold that we quickly declare that we've learned a lesson.
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Um my experience is sometimes it takes some perspective before you can really learn the lessons.
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You have to you can't be in the mix.
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You can't be in the fray and be objective about what you're seeing or learning.
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I I just I'd throw that out as a caveat, because collect all the observations, but you know, back to Boyd's theory about observe, then orient before you decide and act.
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Uh we're in the observation phase, I think.
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Uh, and and maybe over time we're we're orienting about what well, what does this mean and what does it mean for us in the long term?
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So I'm very careful that we don't jump to conclusions.
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Do you do you have a formal center for lessons learned?
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I'm can I confess I don't know that.
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Well, we we've given it almost as an additional duty to our doctrine center.
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Okay.
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Um, that you know, that while whatever our collective lessons learned are should end up in doctrine, they're the ones that are capturing our lessons, uh, observations for the purpose of evaluating them to be doctrine.
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And we've recently established on the staff an S9 function, which helps with force design, but it has the operational analysis function.
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So they'll also be involved in our lessons learned.
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So we don't have a lessons learned center, but we have people who have that as a part of their responsibility.
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Um yes, you you have to observe intently and actively uh with what's going on.
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Nothing, I say this all the time, nothing's more clarifying than combat feedback.
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So we were watching very close what's going on in the Middle East, obviously, what's going on in Ukraine.
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And from a space perspective, a couple of things jump out.
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One is let's not argue anymore about how critical space is to national security, military operations, the economies of the world.
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Space is a vital contributor to all those facets.
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I see that looking at adversary targeting.
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I see that with how we're using it and integrating it across the joint force.
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And so we've crossed the threshold where it can ever be debated again that space is critical.
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Um, the the bad analogy that I've used before, you know, it where space used to be kind of icing on the cake.
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We made things a little better.
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We are truly the eggs and the batter of that cake now.
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You can't possibly extract space out and expect the same outcome uh anymore.
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It is just fully baked in.
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Phil, let me continue with the pun.
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Um, cyber networks are integral to space operations.
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There's as much about ground operations with space as there is about on orbit.
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And we we see cyber attacks with the Russians in Ukraine uh that had that were intended to have a space effect.
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Right.
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Um, so we have to be uh very clear-eyed about how we use our networks and how we protect those networks.
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And I think we've we've seen, at least we've observed, what happens when you don't pay attention to those things.
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Uh the other one that jumps out at me that I think is interesting is commercial space integration into military operations.
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Uh with the Viasat attack in Ukraine, uh suddenly the Ukrainians are looking for a way to use telecommunications to command and control forces.
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And very publicly, Starlink was there uh to help contribute to that.
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So a couple of things.
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One is commercial capabilities can be integrated effectively into military operations, and then maybe not so much of a lesser impact is proliferated.
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LEO is very resilient uh in a way that maybe geosynchronous sally communications aren't as resilient uh in the current EW electromagnetic warfare environment.
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So we're we're observing those things and and again trying to not be uh too bold about drawing quick conclusions, but those are some things that jump out at me.
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Yeah, that that's a good pivot to this broader question of uh of commercial exploitation.
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And we've we've talked about this many times, but uh you're making some pretty big bets uh in the 2027 budget pitch and in recent contracts that have been awarded to really large contracts, multi-billion dollar contracts for commercial or commercially derived uh proliferated low Earth orbit services or hardware.
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The as you look at that and you look at this uh tightening relationship between commercial capabilities and the military, um, how do you think through the pros and the cons?
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You talked about rapidly moving overhead proliferated LEO assets being harder to jam in certain circumstances, either at that kind of implementation level or at the higher operational and strategic levels, how do you think through those pros and cons?
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It's a great question.
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It's a multifaceted question.
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So I I I like to think in terms of these frictions, and leadership has to balance these frictions.
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Right.
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Um, I could clearly say that to be more effective requires you to use all the orbital regimes.
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If I can use LEO and GEO and HEO, that makes it more of a targeting problem for the adversary.
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And so effectiveness likes that redundancy, that level of resiliency.
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From an efficiency standpoint, it's not the cheapest way to go.
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Sure.
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So how do I balance that?
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You know, the the I have to pay attention to how much something costs and what the price points are, but I want it to be as effective as possible.
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You have you have to balance those things out.
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Um, sometimes you have a single vendor that can go very fast if they were to get the contract, uh, because they've already demonstrated capability to do something.
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But competition usually creates a better uh incentive structure for the government.
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So, how do I reward a company for going fast, but at the same time generate competition that's gonna maybe compete with that company.
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Right.
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Those are good frictions, uh, but leadership has to continually evaluate what where are we in the in the current needs of the government and how do we want to play both sides of that coin to the max benefit of national security.
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Uh, and that it can get kind of complicated pretty fast.
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Aaron Powell A lot of that's balancing sort of short-term and long-term factors, right?
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You want that competition in the long run, it'll probably deliver you better prices, better quality.
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But it will cost more.
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And it might mean slowing yourself down even.
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Aaron Powell Or God forbid, vendor lock, you know, which is the the worst thing the government could ever do, right?
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But sometimes there's an advantage to that.
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So do you are there lessons from the engagement you've had over the last nearly four years in that transition to more reliance on commercial that you would pass on to the next CSO, that you would pass on to your next service acquisition executive?
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Any key thoughts coming out of that?
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Well um the the the one overarching thing, and it's so easy to say and so hard to do, is you could kill yourself with analysis.
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Like I those those friction points that I just said, those are complicated and there's no answer.
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It's just a continual balancing.
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So sometimes you just have to make the decision for the sake of making decision and move forward and then adjust as required.
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And so this idea that you can analyze and figure out what exactly the right deal is for the government, that might be, you know, it might just be a brass ring you're never gonna quite get to.
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So just don't be afraid to make a decision, move in a direction that's positive, and then continually evaluate assumptions, continually evaluate um uh trade-offs, and and and don't be afraid to shift as you're moving forward.
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No big bet can't be unmade and go a different direction.
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So I think it's about continual balancing and not be afraid to make a decision uh with without perfect information.
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Aaron Powell One of my colleagues at CSPS in a paper several years ago you know highlighted that oftentimes with commercial, especially services, the the big expenses are not actually the service itself, but rather the integration of it into everything else, putting the terminal on the aircraft or on the ship, training with it, building all of the tactics and techniques and procedures that you need to make it militarily effective.
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Um do you think the service is making the progress it needs to do in laying that foundation for exploitation?
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I think there's two aspects of that that I'm paying particular attention to.
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One is the traditional military term is, you know, you've heard dot mil PF.
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So it's one thing to buy the system, it's another to do all of the other work that turns that system into a combat force uh to achieve a military effect, whether that's MILCON for facilities or the growth of manpower or new operational concepts, you have to do all of that.
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And I think that's what you're talking about is sometimes those can be more expensive in collective nature than the system itself.
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But if you don't account for it or you shortchange it, then you don't really have a force, you just have a system.
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And so I'm I'm really conscientious of building processes where we plan for, account for, and resource all of those.mil PF factors uh for any given system.
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Yeah, this is a billion-dollar system, but it's really a$2.5 billion system when you factor in manpower, MILCON, et cetera.
00:20:16.960 --> 00:20:24.400
And I we owe that to the taxpayers, to Congress, uh to the capes of the world to say this is what it's gonna cost if you want to go down this path.
00:20:24.640 --> 00:20:27.359
I think that's that's an important aspect of it.
00:20:27.599 --> 00:20:30.400
Um doesn't make it any easier, but we still have to account for it.
00:20:30.720 --> 00:20:35.680
You had talked early on about needing to think about a fully burdened force and understanding that.
00:20:36.400 --> 00:20:51.200
Do you you obviously you've uh you've had enormous budgetary growth in your tenure if the if the current budget request is is fully enacted, I think it's on the order of five times growth probably from when you started.
00:20:51.440 --> 00:20:58.720
Um do you think you've made real progress in getting to that fully burdened level, or is there still quite a bit of work to do toward that?
00:20:59.200 --> 00:21:03.200
Recognizing that I'm talking to a master here from Cape Days, uh you know full well.
00:21:04.640 --> 00:21:04.799
Okay.
00:21:05.200 --> 00:21:09.759
You but you know full well in terms of the logic that budgets don't just get pencil whipped.
00:21:10.160 --> 00:21:12.319
You have to defend every single dollar.
00:21:12.720 --> 00:21:38.960
The reason we've grown so much is because I feel like we have accounted uh effectively for all of that other burdening, the manpower, the training ranges, the the simulators that have to come with systems, the you know, the MILCON, the op centers, the resiliency and ground networks, everything that has to go into making an on-orbit system effective, we've accounted for, we've done the cost analysis, we've determined with good data uh analysis what's required.
00:21:39.119 --> 00:21:47.440
And only with that could we pitch a budget that gets accepted all the way through all the channels, through OMB, over to the White House, and finally over to Congress.
00:21:47.599 --> 00:21:54.160
I feel really proud of the fact that I feel like we've done that uh effectively so that it's not a hollow force when it's put in place.
00:21:54.640 --> 00:22:12.880
When we talked to five years ago, one of the problems that was on your radar was kind of The modeling and simulation to make the case for space as the massive force multiplier for the whole joint force, as well as the need for domain superiority in its own right.
00:22:13.680 --> 00:22:22.799
Do you feel like that foundation is built, that analytic foundation, so that I mean it appears that it withstood the uh resource scrutiny, but I do.
00:22:22.960 --> 00:22:24.880
I it starts with a vision.
00:22:25.039 --> 00:22:33.279
Uh vision kind of turns into requirements, retirements come turns into contracts, contracts turn into capabilities, and then you integrate, et cetera.
00:22:33.440 --> 00:22:41.680
Um we're somewhere just shy of fielding the full vision, I think, you know, five years hence from when we really started with that vision.
00:22:41.839 --> 00:22:52.079
Um we had a a pretty small fraction of a small budget devoted to test and training and simulation.
00:22:52.319 --> 00:23:06.799
We have a pretty sizable, I mean, half a billion dollars a year, more or less, is just focused on building the test and training equipment that the forces need, the acquisition community needs, the modeling and the simulation to really do the work that's necessary.
00:23:07.039 --> 00:23:10.000
So I do feel like all that's in place now, the requirements there.
00:23:10.079 --> 00:23:11.039
We have a plan.
00:23:11.200 --> 00:23:13.920
We we have a new PAE for infrastructure.
00:23:14.000 --> 00:23:21.279
Uh so you at the highest level of our acquisition management, uh, we're accounting for test and training infrastructure as a key component.
00:23:21.599 --> 00:23:23.359
So again, I feel like the foundation's there.
00:23:23.440 --> 00:23:25.359
Now we just got to bring it to fruition.
00:23:25.839 --> 00:23:33.759
Uh speaking of the PAEs, this is a you know, it's significant change as part of the acquisition transformation effort the department's going through.
00:23:34.000 --> 00:23:45.039
Um are there key issues that you're watching as we go through that transition to these more empowered executives leading each of the major capability areas?
00:23:45.680 --> 00:23:46.319
A couple of thoughts there.
00:23:46.400 --> 00:23:48.720
And one of them kind of ties back to an original thought.
00:23:48.880 --> 00:23:54.480
As I'm Congress designated me, the CSO, as a force design architect for space for the armed forces.
00:23:54.720 --> 00:23:58.400
And when as soon as you say for the armed forces, that's that integration piece.
00:23:58.640 --> 00:24:06.559
And so we stood up an office in the J8 to pull in other service space requirements so that we can account for it holistically.
00:24:06.720 --> 00:24:14.000
This is the, hey, we can put GPS 3Fs on orbit all day long, but if you don't have receivers that can take advantage of the new codes, then it doesn't matter.
00:24:14.720 --> 00:24:19.920
So that it's about synchronizing the investments across all the services to get all the full interoperability.
00:24:20.079 --> 00:24:23.599
And I think that's a you know a key aspect of this.
00:24:23.839 --> 00:24:29.039
Umce design architect that also then translates into the requirements.
00:24:29.279 --> 00:24:36.720
And um it's I can't give bad requirements to a new PAE, PEOs that become PAEs and say, okay, now you're gonna be fine.
00:24:36.799 --> 00:24:41.200
I'm still giving you the old bad requirements and bad process, but I'm sure you'll be better at managing them.
00:24:41.359 --> 00:24:55.359
So recognizing that on the service side, you know, not the secretariat side where acquisition occurs, on the service side, if I don't get the requirements right, uh it's never, it's never gonna be fielded effectively, efficiently, on time, on budget, et cetera.
00:24:55.519 --> 00:24:58.480
So we've really gone back and rescrubbed our process.
00:24:58.640 --> 00:25:00.400
How is it we developed requirements?
00:25:00.559 --> 00:25:02.400
What does a good requirement look like?
00:25:02.640 --> 00:25:06.480
And we found that at a minimum, there's three levels of requirements.
00:25:06.640 --> 00:25:08.640
There's high-level mission requirements.
00:25:08.880 --> 00:25:11.920
This is what we needed to do to solve an operational problem.
00:25:12.319 --> 00:25:14.319
There's the system requirements.
00:25:14.559 --> 00:25:20.160
Okay, the system that we think will answer this has the following characteristics that we can start to talk about.
00:25:20.319 --> 00:25:22.799
And then you get down to contract specifications.
00:25:22.880 --> 00:25:27.519
What are we going to put on contract and hold a contractor uh responsible for?
00:25:27.759 --> 00:25:40.559
And I think understanding that there are those three tiers, and each of them comes with a different mindset is important to getting them right and not having to go back or back and forth and or adding uh requirements that are hard to field because it doesn't tie back connect.
00:25:40.880 --> 00:25:48.319
So we have this thread that goes through all of those at the appropriate level of detail to help the PAEs do their job.
00:25:48.640 --> 00:25:50.480
So it's that there's a balance between the two.
00:25:50.559 --> 00:25:55.599
Aaron Ross Powell So our traditional analogy of uh big R requirements and little R requirements has to be broadened.
00:25:56.000 --> 00:25:57.119
And we we all said it.
00:25:57.200 --> 00:25:57.279
Yeah.
00:25:57.519 --> 00:25:58.240
We've lost the meaning.
00:25:58.480 --> 00:25:58.559
Yeah.
00:25:59.039 --> 00:26:01.759
And so we've got to get back to what does that really mean when we say that?
00:26:01.920 --> 00:26:03.039
What are the left and right balance?
00:26:03.359 --> 00:26:04.960
What does good big R look like?
00:26:05.039 --> 00:26:06.640
What does good little R look like?
00:26:06.799 --> 00:26:09.039
And if we define those terms, I think we're in a better position.
00:26:09.200 --> 00:26:09.359
Trevor Burrus, Jr.
00:26:09.440 --> 00:26:14.559
So that I mean that raises a really interesting tension to follow onto your tensions point.
00:26:14.720 --> 00:26:20.480
Uh the department is really shifting to emphasize more fixed price contracting.
00:26:20.720 --> 00:26:29.359
And certainly one lesson I learned the hard way from failed programs is uh a fixed price contract is not a panacea.
00:26:29.440 --> 00:26:40.640
If you haven't written down what the government really needs, you will get exactly the wrong thing and it'll be useless, or you will change what you want, and that fixed price is no longer so fixed.
00:26:41.599 --> 00:26:52.079
Um If we're gonna do this pivot to fixed price contracting successfully, we obviously have to have good understanding of those detailed contract specs.
00:26:52.720 --> 00:27:07.839
Um That's that's gotta be an ongoing dialogue between operators, users and other services that are depending on the downstream for the kind of force enhancement stuff and the contracting people, the acquisition people.
00:27:08.319 --> 00:27:13.920
Um have we made the progress necessary to make smart business decisions in that environment?
00:27:14.319 --> 00:27:15.920
Jamie, you've got a lot of experience with this.
00:27:16.000 --> 00:27:18.880
You know, I it's an ongoing journey, I just think it's an ongoing journey.
00:27:19.200 --> 00:27:29.920
And you know, um fixed price contracts are a tool, but if we think they're the tool that that that solves every problem, we're wildly wrong, I think.
00:27:30.079 --> 00:27:35.759
Um I think the more unknowns there are going into a program, the less valuable a fixed price contract.
00:27:36.240 --> 00:27:36.799
On both sides.
00:27:37.680 --> 00:27:47.119
The contractor won't know what to charge because there's too many unknowns, so they'll overprice it or or or not, and that's even worse as it as it goes along.
00:27:47.359 --> 00:27:51.440
Um so I just think we got to use the right tool for the right problem.
00:27:51.680 --> 00:27:56.960
And there are certainly good examples where a fixed price contract is what really should apply.
00:27:57.119 --> 00:28:07.759
Um and where that's the case, we should go with that because it's it helps oversight, it helps Congress understand how much you plan to spend on something and what should be delivered when you get it, and there's value in that.
00:28:07.920 --> 00:28:24.480
But we ought to be eyes wide open that, hey, when we're building space-based interceptors for a Golden Dome, fixed price contract, how in the world could you do the kind of RD and demos and resolve all the technical issues that you know are going to come up and hold a contractor to only a certain dollar value?
00:28:24.559 --> 00:28:27.279
Um I just think it we just got to be eyes wide open.
00:28:27.440 --> 00:28:33.519
Pick the right contracting tool for the problem set that you're trying to resolve, and then you you got a better shot at success.
00:28:33.599 --> 00:28:38.720
Aaron Powell I will say with home improvement projects, I'm often criticized for not using the right tool for the job.
00:28:38.799 --> 00:28:43.279
So I take your And it usually costs more than you expect when you do.
00:28:43.519 --> 00:28:43.599
Yeah.
00:28:44.720 --> 00:28:55.599
Looking even more broadly, so as a service chief, you spend a non-trivial amount of your time engaging with allies and partners around the world.
00:28:55.759 --> 00:29:10.960
Um we have seen dramatic changes in uh the willingness of key allies and partners to invest in space capabilities, to talk about them publicly over the last several years.
00:29:11.039 --> 00:29:13.200
That that's certainly positive.
00:29:13.440 --> 00:29:16.640
Uh we're also seeing, maybe on both the U.S.
00:29:16.799 --> 00:29:26.480
side and with some of the allies, more emphasis on building out sovereign capabilities where we maybe had heavy interdependence before.
00:29:26.640 --> 00:29:31.680
We're now seeing some more effort to have standalone capabilities.
00:29:32.160 --> 00:29:40.079
Without asking you to get into specific names of individual allies you're talking to, how how are your counterparts thinking through those issues?
00:29:40.160 --> 00:29:48.960
And how would you advise them, you know, as a as a friend and ally as they're thinking about really significant investments in some cases?
00:29:49.359 --> 00:29:49.519
Sure.
00:29:50.000 --> 00:30:03.759
You know, it's a full spectrum from those who are interested and know it's important, but but don't have any aspirations that they're going to be a space for your nation, uh, all the way up to partners that are as capable as we are in many areas.
00:30:03.920 --> 00:30:06.720
Um and and so the key is understanding your partners.
00:30:06.799 --> 00:30:10.079
What are their strengths, what are their weaknesses, uh, where can they contribute?
00:30:10.240 --> 00:30:12.000
Where are they willing to contribute?
00:30:12.160 --> 00:30:16.400
And and and and just continuing the dialogue of partnership builds trust.
00:30:16.559 --> 00:30:23.200
And I and I start always with um there are certain areas of space operations where capacity is king.
00:30:23.519 --> 00:30:25.599
You don't have to go further than satellite communications.
00:30:25.680 --> 00:30:31.599
Uh, anytime we're in a crisis or conflict, the demand for bandwidth for satellite communications is almost unlimited.
00:30:31.680 --> 00:30:32.079
Yep.
00:30:32.240 --> 00:30:37.119
Uh and so the more that's available to a coalition, the better off it will be.
00:30:37.200 --> 00:30:43.920
Uh, and so I I tell them, you really pretty can't can't you pretty much can't build too much satellite communications.
00:30:44.079 --> 00:30:55.680
Uh and that also is is they're encouraged by that because there's such a a peaceful use for that that they don't have to think of themselves as building just a military use kind of capability.
00:30:55.839 --> 00:30:57.759
Um, space domain awareness.
00:30:57.839 --> 00:31:00.880
Uh, we all need to understand flight safety in space.
00:31:01.119 --> 00:31:06.640
That takes a lot of data, which requires a lot of sensors, which requires a lot of sensors around the planet.
00:31:06.799 --> 00:31:08.960
Uh so partners can contribute to that.
00:31:09.039 --> 00:31:10.480
And the more data, the better.
00:31:10.559 --> 00:31:16.640
Uh, and so it's another area where capacity is king and where you are on the earth looking up uh matters.
00:31:16.880 --> 00:31:25.279
Um uh and then and even if you get into some of the more military things like electronic warfare for counter-selling communications, for example, capacity is king.
00:31:25.440 --> 00:31:28.799
The number of apertures matters, and where you are on the footprint matters.
00:31:28.880 --> 00:31:36.720
And so we're working in areas with our partners that are interested in buying equipment in terms of those areas where there's high capacity demands.
00:31:36.799 --> 00:31:38.960
And that's that's that's a starting point.
00:31:39.039 --> 00:31:40.960
Uh, but I always quickly follow on.
00:31:41.119 --> 00:31:45.119
Then build your space cadre, train and experience expertise.
00:31:45.200 --> 00:31:53.039
So you have organic, sovereign space expertise to help you make the planning and and resourcing decisions that'll go forward.
00:31:53.519 --> 00:31:56.160
Yeah, that's I think that's a helpful message for them.
00:31:56.480 --> 00:32:02.720
And just like your Human Capital Limited, our many of the allies and partners are even much more acutely.
00:32:02.799 --> 00:32:14.160
So do you still see a constructive level of exchange officers coming over and joint particip or coalition participation in exercises?
00:32:14.400 --> 00:32:20.240
Of course, we have real-world events where they're participating too, but is that building, continuing to build the foundation?
00:32:20.480 --> 00:32:28.079
Yeah, far more requests uh to send people over and integrate into our operations than sometimes we can handle.
00:32:28.480 --> 00:32:40.720
Uh they they certainly like the operations, and we've had long-going, uh ongoing um uh relationships for liaison officers, exchange officers, and our operations like missile warning and the NORAD example with Canada.
00:32:41.039 --> 00:32:45.519
Uh the five eye partners have been integrated into our operations for a long time.
00:32:45.680 --> 00:32:47.839
Uh now I think we're starting to expand that out.
00:32:47.920 --> 00:32:52.480
The the Combined Space Operations Initiative, CISPO, 10 nations now.
00:32:52.799 --> 00:32:56.160
Uh, all of them want to see how the Space Force is operating.
00:32:56.240 --> 00:32:58.160
All of them want to learn firsthand the lessons.
00:32:58.240 --> 00:32:59.599
And so we've gotten requests.
00:32:59.759 --> 00:33:02.559
The Italians want to put uh an officer on our staff.
00:33:02.799 --> 00:33:08.559
I have uh uh Air Marshal Godfrey is now part of the staff to connect and uh doing great work there.
00:33:08.799 --> 00:33:12.799
So much so we just established a two-letter organization that's about partnerships.
00:33:12.880 --> 00:33:14.240
Uh, you know, how do we manage these?
00:33:14.319 --> 00:33:20.000
Where do we put people so they can get the most for them their own country, but contribute to the growth of the Space Force as well.
00:33:20.480 --> 00:33:21.119
Lots of interest.
00:33:21.440 --> 00:33:22.559
Yeah, that's important.
00:33:23.039 --> 00:33:36.400
Do you um one of the stories that we've long told ourselves, and I think has some real truth in it, is that the uh network of allies and partners and the closeness that the U.S.
00:33:36.559 --> 00:33:41.200
has with those allies and partners kind of plays a critical role in deterrence.
00:33:41.440 --> 00:33:50.400
Um obviously our demonstrated capabilities matter a lot, our allies demonstrated capabilities, but the notion that you would be taking on both the U.S.
00:33:50.480 --> 00:33:54.960
and its allies complicates an adversary's decision calculus.
00:33:55.279 --> 00:34:00.240
Um there specific ways beyond CISPO that you're looking to communicate that?
00:34:00.559 --> 00:34:02.160
Well, first, do you think that's true still?
00:34:02.400 --> 00:34:08.320
And yeah, are there specific ways you're looking to communicate that on the global stage to hopefully reduce the risk of conflict?
00:34:08.639 --> 00:34:08.960
Yeah, I agree.
00:34:09.119 --> 00:34:14.960
I I think uh I absolutely agree with that premise that uh coalitions have a deterrent effect.
00:34:15.199 --> 00:34:19.280
Uh it's an asymmetric advantage to say you can't just go to war against one nation.
00:34:19.360 --> 00:34:23.119
If if that nation happens to be the U.S., we're gonna bring partners and allies with us.
00:34:23.199 --> 00:34:29.360
And and I think that does have kind of a chilling constraining effect on adversary uh goals.
00:34:29.840 --> 00:34:34.480
So I I think that is an important part of deterrence that we should we should continue to factor in.
00:34:34.880 --> 00:34:38.719
Um now, does that mean we don't we get along every time?
00:34:38.880 --> 00:34:39.920
Well, no, of course not.
00:34:40.079 --> 00:34:41.199
Families fight, you know.
00:34:41.360 --> 00:34:45.679
I mean, but the but the bottom line is they don't become non-family.
00:34:46.079 --> 00:34:49.599
Um and so CSPO is one important initiative.
00:34:49.760 --> 00:34:54.559
W uh NATO the NATO structure talking about how space is going to grow inside NATO.
00:34:54.880 --> 00:34:59.599
Um, maybe someday to be equivalent to the air component or the maritime component, land component.
00:34:59.760 --> 00:35:01.519
Do we need a space component NATO?
00:35:01.599 --> 00:35:02.800
Those discussions are ongoing.
00:35:02.960 --> 00:35:13.519
That's a lot more nations, brings a lot more of that spectrum of capabilities uh regarding space into question uh to for the utility of a component, but that is happening.
00:35:13.679 --> 00:35:23.440
Uh there's certainly a a series of allies and partners in the Western Pacific uh in PACOM that we're having continual uh conversations with.
00:35:23.519 --> 00:35:31.920
We have components now in Korea, we have a Space Force component in Japan that's uh sub-organization of our component to PACOM.
00:35:32.239 --> 00:35:41.679
So uh it it's just it's important that we always think about those because that's how we ultimately would like to go through a crisis.
00:35:42.239 --> 00:35:43.119
Who wants to join us?
00:35:43.199 --> 00:35:44.000
Who wants to help out?
00:35:44.159 --> 00:35:48.400
We seem to always ask that question, and we want to make that as easy from a space perspective as possible.
00:35:48.880 --> 00:35:49.920
No, that makes sense.
00:35:50.559 --> 00:35:54.320
Well, let me ask you to take this to big picture.
00:35:54.400 --> 00:35:58.239
Again, you're approaching four years as a as a service chief.
00:35:58.559 --> 00:36:01.840
What's the uh what's the accomplishment you're most proud of?
00:36:02.239 --> 00:36:04.000
And I will follow it up with the flip side.
00:36:04.079 --> 00:36:12.320
So it's hard to it's hard to kind of zero in on the one thing.
00:36:12.559 --> 00:36:14.400
Um but there's that's why I asked.
00:36:14.559 --> 00:36:15.920
I know, it's it's a really good question.
00:36:16.000 --> 00:36:17.920
I so I'm gonna cheat a little bit.
00:36:18.400 --> 00:36:24.960
I I think the the the description of our service and what are the service level responsibilities.
00:36:25.119 --> 00:36:34.239
One of the things that hit me early on was hey, we really haven't asked these fundamental questions about what a service does since the establishment of the Air Force almost eighty years ago, right?
00:36:35.119 --> 00:36:37.280
Everybody that did that's long gone.
00:36:37.440 --> 00:36:40.159
Um and so we started asking fundamental questions.
00:36:40.320 --> 00:36:41.440
Why do we have a service?
00:36:41.599 --> 00:36:44.960
What is it that a service does that a combatant command can't do?
00:36:45.519 --> 00:36:53.679
Um and and I finally just decided that uh it it boiled down to services are responsible for four basic activities.
00:36:53.920 --> 00:37:00.639
And it all centers on our ability to contest, command, or control a domain, a new domain warfareing space.
00:37:00.960 --> 00:37:03.119
We have to be able to do force design.
00:37:03.280 --> 00:37:07.119
What's the equipment that we need to control the space domain?
00:37:07.280 --> 00:37:13.599
We have to develop a force, force development, train, educate, experience our operators to be able to be effective.
00:37:13.760 --> 00:37:15.280
We have to generate forces.
00:37:15.360 --> 00:37:17.519
How are they ready to do the missions that we're asking to do?
00:37:17.599 --> 00:37:19.760
And then they have to actually do the missions effectively.
00:37:20.079 --> 00:37:23.039
Force design, force development, force generation, and force employment.
00:37:23.119 --> 00:37:25.920
All services are responsible for those four activities.
00:37:26.159 --> 00:37:40.639
So just by stating that and then putting all of our key initiatives under those headers, saying, hey, the reason we're developing an objective force and standing up S9 and using battle school at SWAC is because we have to do force design.
00:37:40.880 --> 00:37:48.400
Hey, the reason we have PME and we're building our own captain's leadership course and we redesigned our officer training course, because we have to develop a force that understands this.
00:37:48.559 --> 00:37:57.039
The reason we did SPA4 Gen, a force generation model where we came out of commit phase, trained for high-end fight before we go back into operations.
00:37:57.199 --> 00:37:58.960
That was our force generation model.
00:37:59.199 --> 00:38:09.760
And then the service components, establishing them all, is how you integrate with the joint force to employ the force effectively and as in a synchronized way with the joint community.
00:38:10.079 --> 00:38:11.440
We had to do all of that.
00:38:11.519 --> 00:38:17.039
And so I'm proud that we structured our efforts in one coherent way to say this is what a service does.
00:38:17.199 --> 00:38:22.960
It's not a bunch of ad hoc decisions or a bunch of activities we say, maybe this will all add up to us doing a good job.
00:38:23.199 --> 00:38:24.239
No, we structured it.
00:38:24.400 --> 00:38:36.000
So I'm really proud that we have a framework where everybody can see where they fit into what it is that a service does, and all of our initiatives have a coherence to them about being the newest, youngest service.
00:38:36.400 --> 00:38:36.800
Yeah.
00:38:37.039 --> 00:38:50.320
I um for Father's Day, I saw a cute meme with a grandfather, father, and uh baby in arms, and with the Army, Air Force, and Space Force seals on each of them.
00:38:50.400 --> 00:38:52.239
And you probably saw that one too.
00:38:52.400 --> 00:38:56.400
It's a bring building, birthing a new service is no joke.
00:38:56.480 --> 00:38:56.639
Trevor Burrus, Jr.
00:38:56.719 --> 00:39:06.079
And it's it is it's an interesting fact, because that is definitely just the way it happened, um, that we're not the baby that maybe the grandfather thinks we are.
00:39:06.159 --> 00:39:08.719
We're we're pretty dang important to the entire team.
00:39:08.960 --> 00:39:14.639
But I will say that as we look at our culture, there's things that we're doing because the Army did it.
00:39:14.800 --> 00:39:20.239
And because the Army did it, the Air Force chose to do it, and because the Air Force did it, the Space Force kind of inherited it.
00:39:20.320 --> 00:39:22.159
And you go, well, why did the Army do it?
00:39:22.320 --> 00:39:24.000
It's like, uh, nobody, I don't know.
00:39:24.159 --> 00:39:25.840
It's just the way it's always been done.
00:39:26.079 --> 00:39:31.840
So questioning those assumptions because of that lineage, I think is another important thing that we have to keep reminding ourselves.
00:39:32.000 --> 00:39:36.079
Does this work for the kind of service we are or the kind of service we want to be?
00:39:36.239 --> 00:39:38.159
And if the answer is yes, then let's keep it.
00:39:38.239 --> 00:39:40.320
Like, no, let's not reinvent the wheel.
00:39:40.480 --> 00:39:43.599
But in a lot of cases, it was like, no, we're a little different.
00:39:43.679 --> 00:39:53.679
You know, what works for a 400,000-person army or a 300,000 person Air Force doesn't downscale to a 10,000 active component in the Space Force.
00:39:53.840 --> 00:39:55.119
So we just have to be mindful of that.
00:39:55.519 --> 00:39:58.000
Yeah, different roles of geography for each of the services.
00:39:58.400 --> 00:39:59.519
We're not really expeditionary.
00:39:59.679 --> 00:40:03.440
We have some expeditionary elements, but as a service, we don't largely do that.
00:40:03.840 --> 00:40:08.960
So, you know, other services have to orient around being expeditionary, but we don't.
00:40:09.199 --> 00:40:09.599
Yeah.
00:40:10.320 --> 00:40:12.320
So uh biggest regret.
00:40:14.000 --> 00:40:19.920
I I got this question asked that in all hands, and so I slyly said, I have no regrets.
00:40:20.159 --> 00:40:33.920
Um and I and I kind of do mean that, um, honestly, because I don't feel like I ever put myself in a situation where we made a decision that I felt was so one way that if if we go through this door, there's no way back.
00:40:34.159 --> 00:40:37.280
I've always felt like this is going to be more of a work in progress.
00:40:37.519 --> 00:40:38.639
Hey, let's get started.
00:40:38.719 --> 00:40:42.960
Let's do something, let's take an action, and then let's evaluate how well that action works.
00:40:43.039 --> 00:40:46.159
And what we like, we keep, what we don't like, we discard, we keep moving forward.
00:40:46.559 --> 00:40:50.639
So any regrets where you were too slow to make a decision, given that ethos?
00:40:51.360 --> 00:40:53.519
Um Yeah, probably.
00:40:53.599 --> 00:40:56.400
And and I use this example when I got the question.
00:40:56.719 --> 00:41:00.880
We are still using uh Air Force performance reports.
00:41:01.679 --> 00:41:04.079
Um and it seems like such an administrative thing.
00:41:04.239 --> 00:41:06.400
It's like build your own form, let's just go.
00:41:06.559 --> 00:41:15.199
Uh but I personally, and I so I full accountability here, slowed that down because I felt like it was an opportunity.
00:41:15.280 --> 00:41:26.400
That the performance report truly could be a valuable tool to give guardians the feedback they need and help them understand where their where their strengths are, where their weaknesses are.
00:41:26.639 --> 00:41:29.840
And we're so small, no one can fall through the cracks.
00:41:30.079 --> 00:41:31.679
Everybody has to be optimized.
00:41:31.760 --> 00:41:37.280
And I felt like, yes, we could adopt the processes that we inherited from the Army and from the Air Force.
00:41:37.440 --> 00:41:39.760
And you you've seen these forms.
00:41:39.840 --> 00:41:41.280
Uh I've handwritten them.
00:41:41.519 --> 00:41:45.360
They have some utility sometimes and they have less utility in other areas.
00:41:45.599 --> 00:41:46.800
I wanted ours to be different.
00:41:46.880 --> 00:41:47.840
I wanted ours to be good.
00:41:47.920 --> 00:41:49.440
So I deliberately slowed it down.
00:41:49.519 --> 00:41:55.039
So here we are, I'm about to leave, and we still don't have our own individual performance reports.
00:41:55.119 --> 00:41:58.800
So a little bit of regret that I probably couldn't see that through to the finish line.
00:41:59.039 --> 00:42:10.000
But I I am proud of the fact that we didn't just go the path of least resistance, that we decided deliberately we're gonna we're gonna do something different, we're gonna get it right, and it's just gonna take a little longer to unfold.
00:42:10.159 --> 00:42:12.880
But in the end, I hope it'll be a better outcome.
00:42:13.920 --> 00:42:18.480
Well, I was I'm just glad that you didn't say sitting down for this interview was your greatest regret.
00:42:18.559 --> 00:42:19.519
I appreciate that.
00:42:19.679 --> 00:42:29.280
Um So I know you have a strong appreciation for a good dad joke, if if that is an actual thing.
00:42:29.760 --> 00:42:44.480
Um so I I did want to offer you the opportunity to throw one in, but just to s get you started, um I notice we have this beautiful backdrop here, so I thought you might know um what really makes my day.
00:42:45.840 --> 00:42:47.360
The rotation of the earth.
00:42:49.440 --> 00:42:50.880
And I'm not even gonna try to top that.
00:42:51.280 --> 00:42:52.079
It's so it's so dear.
00:42:52.960 --> 00:42:54.400
That's a way just to leave it there, yeah.
00:42:54.719 --> 00:43:01.119
Uh thank you so much for your service again to Jenfer as well for all that you guys have done together.
00:43:01.360 --> 00:43:03.360
And we appreciate your time today.
00:43:03.599 --> 00:43:14.480
The uh the Space Force clearly is stronger for your efforts, and we will uh look forward to seeing it grow through it's through infancy, it's through toddlerhood.
00:43:14.639 --> 00:43:20.000
Now we're distinctly into the elementary years, and uh hopefully it's a significant upward trajectory.
00:43:20.320 --> 00:43:23.440
Well, thanks thanks to you as well, and thanks for the aerospace team partnership.
00:43:23.599 --> 00:43:28.000
Uh it's it's one of the good relationships I think that's helped the Space Force in its infancy.
00:43:28.159 --> 00:43:32.400
And so thanks for all you do for that, and and thanks for the opportunity to talk to the pleasure.
00:43:32.960 --> 00:43:33.280
Great.
00:43:33.599 --> 00:43:34.079
Thank you.
00:43:34.880 --> 00:43:40.239
Thank you so much to General Salzman and to Jamie for that very great discussion.
00:43:40.480 --> 00:43:46.239
They really covered a lot of ground from from tiered requirements all the way through dad jokes.
00:43:46.400 --> 00:43:49.920
Um as you can see, we are here still in the Pentagon.
00:43:50.159 --> 00:43:54.079
I'm actually here along this space capabilities wall.
00:43:54.239 --> 00:44:03.519
And at this space capabilities wall, there's different things that are going on in terms of what the Space Force can do, and then further on down in terms of what other nations can do.
00:44:03.840 --> 00:44:08.480
There are some other great things in this space hall here in the Pentagon.
00:44:08.639 --> 00:44:15.840
Things like the flag, the original Space Force flag that was unfurled in the signing ceremony in the White House.
00:44:16.079 --> 00:44:21.599
Also, there is a flag that was flown on the ISS that is a Space Force flag.
00:44:21.679 --> 00:44:26.880
Um, and then that was because I was the first guardian ever in space who brought it up there.
00:44:27.119 --> 00:44:38.000
There's also some very good historical artifacts, other historical artifacts here, an explanation about the kind of motto of the space force, the Semper Supram.
00:44:38.719 --> 00:44:51.199
Um and then even here on another wall that we're gonna show you, we've got um the story of Operation Desert Storm, where space was actually first used in war.
00:44:51.280 --> 00:44:59.119
So it's not new, um, but Space Force is something that's still growing and maturing as we learn from the conversation today.
00:44:59.519 --> 00:45:05.920
So all of our shows are at csps.aerospace.org slash space policy show.
00:45:06.159 --> 00:45:11.679
Um you can also find all the shows on YouTube or by all the normal podcast channels.
00:45:11.920 --> 00:45:20.480
The Center for Space Policy has deep research papers on our website, and you can also subscribe there if you want to get notified of things as they come out.
00:45:20.719 --> 00:45:26.320
Please follow us on social media and thank you again, everyone, for joining the space policy show today.
00:00:00.640 --> 00:00:14.320
Recognizing that on the service side, you know, not the secretariat side where acquisition occurs, on the service side, if I don't get the requirements right, uh it's never it's never going to be fielded effectively, efficiently, on time, on budget, etc.
00:00:14.640 --> 00:00:17.600
So we've really gone back and rescrubbed our process.
00:00:17.760 --> 00:00:19.519
How is it we develop requirements?
00:00:19.600 --> 00:00:21.519
What does a good requirement look like?
00:00:21.760 --> 00:00:26.079
And we found that at a minimum there's three levels of requirements.
00:00:34.000 --> 00:00:36.240
Hello, I'm Copeline Stover.
00:00:36.399 --> 00:00:40.240
I'm with the Center for Space Policy and Strategy, part of the Aerospace Corporation.
00:00:40.399 --> 00:00:42.320
Welcome to the Space Policy Show.
00:00:42.479 --> 00:00:46.880
For people that are not watching the YouTube video right now, you're missing something.
00:00:47.039 --> 00:00:50.960
We're actually in the walls of the Pentagon in the executive office.
00:00:51.200 --> 00:00:53.520
So this is part of our leadership series.
00:00:53.600 --> 00:00:57.039
It's a series of shows that are featuring chiefs.
00:00:57.200 --> 00:00:59.840
I resisted calling it the chief series.
00:00:59.920 --> 00:01:11.760
Um, but we have the chief executive officers of Voyager and Vardom talking about enabling the space economy, and they're also with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director of Office of Space Commerce.
00:01:11.920 --> 00:01:18.159
Um, we've got the US Space Force Chief Scientist talking about advanced technology.
00:01:18.319 --> 00:01:24.480
We've got the NASA medical officer, chief medical officer, talking about living on the moon.
00:01:24.719 --> 00:01:33.040
So today I am very pleased to feature Chief of Space Operations for the US Space Force, General Chance Salzmann.
00:01:33.599 --> 00:01:43.599
He has been assigned to the Space Force since um 2022 in this role as CSO, and he is the senior uniformed officer.
00:01:43.760 --> 00:01:46.079
Um he's only the second one in history.
00:01:46.239 --> 00:01:50.159
Um the Space Force was established in December 2019.
00:01:50.239 --> 00:02:02.000
So he's getting ready to kind of end his tenure later in the year, and we've asked him to come onto the space policy show to reflect about how the service has matured and developed over his time.
00:02:02.400 --> 00:02:06.159
And we've got Jamie Moran leading the conversation.
00:02:06.319 --> 00:02:08.400
He is with Aerospace Corporation.
00:02:08.560 --> 00:02:17.039
He's the executive director of the Center for Space Policy and Strategy, and he's also the vice president of Defense Strategic Space at the company.
00:02:17.280 --> 00:02:18.719
So I'm just gonna go right over to them.
00:02:18.879 --> 00:02:20.080
Thank you everyone for joining.
00:02:20.159 --> 00:02:24.159
We're gonna be showing you some more stuff from inside the Pentagon after the show.
00:02:24.400 --> 00:02:24.879
Thanks.
00:02:25.439 --> 00:02:31.439
Well, it is great to be back on the uh Space Policy Show with General Chance Saltzman.
00:02:31.680 --> 00:02:35.280
Salty, uh Chief, wonderful to have you back again.
00:02:35.599 --> 00:02:35.840
Thank you.
00:02:36.159 --> 00:02:39.520
It's been five years since we last had you on the side.
00:02:39.759 --> 00:02:40.560
Seems like yesterday.
00:02:40.960 --> 00:02:44.479
You uh you've been up to a fair bit ever since.
00:02:44.719 --> 00:02:53.840
So um first let me just say uh thank you to you to you and to Jennifer for everything you guys have done in your tenure as Chief of Space Operations.
00:02:53.919 --> 00:02:57.520
It's a it's a significant undertaking for the the whole family.
00:02:57.840 --> 00:03:00.879
And obviously the nation owes you guys a debt of gratitude.
00:03:01.120 --> 00:03:21.599
Not done quite yet, but uh we thought it would be great to get your thoughts as part of this series we're doing on chiefs of all sorts across the space community and kind of how they're approaching their roles and leadership in the rapidly changing environment that we live in right now in the space community.
00:03:22.080 --> 00:03:24.879
Um so this would be a great coda to that.
00:03:25.280 --> 00:03:30.000
And we are um we're appreciative of your time as well for today.
00:03:30.479 --> 00:03:38.319
So l let me just start by asking you a little bit about uh the people of the Space Force.
00:03:38.479 --> 00:03:55.599
So uh when we talked, I guess it's five years ago now, we uh talked a lot about uh building the guardians the nation needs in the rapidly changing space domain, uh the technical foundation they needed to understand their domain and their mission.
00:03:57.199 --> 00:04:03.199
You've now grown significantly in terms of uniformed and civilian guardians.
00:04:03.360 --> 00:04:07.039
You've grown in terms of the industrial base that's supporting you.
00:04:07.360 --> 00:04:14.639
Um have we made the right steps to build the people we need for the nation's interests in space?
00:04:14.960 --> 00:04:17.839
What are the next steps to ensure we've got that human capital?
00:04:18.240 --> 00:04:26.240
Well, I first I appreciate you starting there because nothing makes me more proud of the Space Force than the guardians uh that make it up.
00:04:26.399 --> 00:04:28.800
Um it's an amazing group of people, it is.
00:04:28.959 --> 00:04:31.759
And I mean officer enlisted, civilians alike.
00:04:32.079 --> 00:04:44.240
Um and and one of the first things we tackled was trying to make sure we had clear definitions of the roles and responsibilities that we generally wanted to ascribe to the civilians, to the officers, and to the enlisted.
00:04:44.560 --> 00:04:47.439
Thought it was important that we say, how do we want to use our workforce?
00:04:47.600 --> 00:04:50.160
Um and then you have to say, what's the right size of the workforce?
00:04:50.319 --> 00:04:55.680
And then you say, what are the individual kinds of training and education and experiences?
00:04:55.920 --> 00:04:59.839
So you start to think about career paths and and we tackled all of that.
00:04:59.920 --> 00:05:05.519
Uh we didn't say, well, we'll get to that later, uh, because it's it's too important to set aside.
00:05:05.759 --> 00:05:08.240
Uh so I'm really proud of where we are.
00:05:08.399 --> 00:05:11.519
Um if you say, have we taken all the right steps?
00:05:11.680 --> 00:05:13.519
I I would say it's a work in progress.
00:05:14.079 --> 00:05:25.519
I think that uh um my initial thought was if I can build the right processes and foundation to build on, then the steps will have to unfold over time because we'll learn as we go.
00:05:25.680 --> 00:05:27.439
This worked, this didn't work.
00:05:27.839 --> 00:05:32.240
I'm really proud of the professional military education courses that we've established.
00:05:32.399 --> 00:05:33.519
Start with BMT.
00:05:34.000 --> 00:05:46.079
We inherited an Air Force BMT, uh, which trained airmen, and we still use the Air Force BMT, uh basic military training, but we've built our own curriculum.
00:05:46.240 --> 00:05:53.920
So inside the Air Force BMT is this guardian experience that sets them on a path towards being an effective guardian.
00:05:54.319 --> 00:05:55.279
Proud of that.
00:05:55.439 --> 00:06:02.480
Uh we we took the SOS Squadron Officer School from the Air Force and we created our own captain's leadership course.
00:06:02.639 --> 00:06:11.839
Uh we we partnered with the private institution, uh, you know, Johns Hopkins to uh to do our version of uh of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.
00:06:11.920 --> 00:06:14.800
So we have our own uh professional military education there.
00:06:14.959 --> 00:06:17.519
We've rebuilt uh enlisted tech training.
00:06:17.600 --> 00:06:22.160
Uh just ever at every step we said it's time to build a guardian from the ground up.
00:06:22.399 --> 00:06:27.120
We need our own organic and independent training, education and experience.
00:06:27.279 --> 00:06:37.360
Um now I think we're in a position where we need to learn and we need to stay a learning organization, uh, evaluate what we're doing, uh, get feedback from the field.
00:06:37.519 --> 00:06:40.720
Is it the kind of training, education, and experience that's helpful?
00:06:40.879 --> 00:06:42.560
Are there some tweaks we need to make?
00:06:42.639 --> 00:06:45.360
Um, and are there other opportunities we need to take advantage of?
00:06:45.439 --> 00:06:47.199
And I'll just give you one example.
00:06:47.439 --> 00:06:51.040
Um we're really trying to change our relationship with industry.
00:06:51.360 --> 00:07:06.480
So I really want to start deploying guardians into industry and literally think about it like that, in the same way that, you know, when I was an airman, we would I would deploy forward into uh into the Expeditionary Air Force and gain experience there.
00:07:06.639 --> 00:07:16.959
Uh this, we want to actually deploy them four, six months at a time, go learn what industry is doing, contribute to that uh industry and learn something, and then bring it back in.
00:07:17.120 --> 00:07:24.720
Uh that that kind of experience, that kind of education we think will be valuable to keep us on the leading edge of technology and and what industry is trying to accomplish.
00:07:24.959 --> 00:07:33.360
So foundations are established, and now we just need to stay a learning organization uh collectively and improve our guardians as we go forward.
00:07:33.759 --> 00:07:48.959
You know, we're interestingly exploring a similar model at uh aerospace where we're uh which we're use we're calling government-furnished talent, where government program offices deploy our folks out to their industry partners that are working on the programs.
00:07:49.199 --> 00:07:57.519
Perfect when they're struggling with specific hard problems or you know, trying to understand the user perspective and things like that that you know we can bring in.
00:07:57.759 --> 00:08:04.079
It's a uh it's an interesting model, and we're seeing some uh really good uptake already.
00:08:04.480 --> 00:08:08.240
The the the benefits of being embedded, being there every single day.
00:08:08.319 --> 00:08:13.040
So it's not episodic, it's not, hey, come into this conference and we'll all have a pleasant conversation.
00:08:13.360 --> 00:08:27.519
No, no, you get to see the trouble, you get to see the challenges, you get to see the opportunities, and it's that day-to-day routine interaction, I think, which both enhances the educational opportunity, but also it it starts to build this collaborative trust uh between the organizations.
00:08:27.680 --> 00:08:30.399
It's not the mystery of industry or the mystery of government.
00:08:30.560 --> 00:08:33.600
You're you were there working together, and I think that's value-added.
00:08:33.919 --> 00:08:36.080
In the act of doing that matters a lot.
00:08:36.240 --> 00:08:36.399
Yeah.
00:08:36.879 --> 00:08:45.120
Do you um we we have this really kind of diverse and interesting audience for the space policy show, and one of the subsets of that audience is students.
00:08:45.279 --> 00:08:48.240
We get um we hear a lot from students who are watching.
00:08:48.480 --> 00:08:49.360
Thanks for watching.
00:08:49.840 --> 00:08:56.799
Uh they that's part of your recruiting base, whether it's military or civilian guardians.
00:08:57.039 --> 00:09:08.000
Are there specific attributes you're looking for, you know, besides the learn the continuous learning and the willingness to engage with a emerging military domain, are there other attributes that you would say, hey, you should come join us?
00:09:08.320 --> 00:09:09.759
Yeah, I you know, yes.
00:09:10.000 --> 00:09:19.600
Uh but I think it's it's I I want to caveat it by saying right now, because we're we're at a very specific stage of our development as a service.
00:09:19.759 --> 00:09:23.759
Uh we need critical thinkers and we need people with high initiative.
00:09:24.080 --> 00:09:31.519
If you need process and procedure and be told precisely how to do something, that may not be the best fit right now.
00:09:31.679 --> 00:09:33.440
Because we're, like I said, we're learning.
00:09:33.519 --> 00:09:38.720
We're we're trying to adapt uh other services' processes for uniqueness to the Space Force.
00:09:39.120 --> 00:10:00.159
And so we need people that that can test assumptions, evaluate courses of action, think critically about what's the best step forward, think of uh aspirationally about what the vision of the future could look like or should look like, uh, and then have high initiative, not waiting to be told what to do about that, whatever they find out, but actually taking the initiative and and and doing something.
00:10:00.320 --> 00:10:01.759
That's a different kind of person.
00:10:01.919 --> 00:10:07.279
And so it's not you need an engineering degree or you need a you know a math degree or computer science degree.
00:10:07.440 --> 00:10:15.679
Uh interesting, to be technically savvy has probably got some benefits, but I'll take a critical thinker with high initiative and and we'll train them on the rest.
00:10:16.000 --> 00:10:16.960
That makes sense.
00:10:17.279 --> 00:10:23.200
So let me shift more to uh military operations, the geopolitical world.
00:10:23.279 --> 00:10:33.120
Uh we're in an environment right now with ongoing conflicts, both in Europe and uh hopefully coming to an end in the in the Middle East.
00:10:33.360 --> 00:10:42.000
Uh you, I'm sure, are carefully watching day-to-day operations to draw lessons to build the future force.
00:10:42.080 --> 00:10:48.080
Um space has been a major player in both of those conflicts.
00:10:48.240 --> 00:11:00.000
Uh recognizing this is a a public event, what what can you talk about as far as lessons that you're learning and that you're passing on to the force uh as you look at the operations we're taking in right now?
00:11:00.720 --> 00:11:10.159
A couple things because I'd start by saying we've got to be careful as these operations unfold that we quickly declare that we've learned a lesson.
00:11:10.639 --> 00:11:15.679
Um my experience is sometimes it takes some perspective before you can really learn the lessons.
00:11:15.759 --> 00:11:17.600
You have to you can't be in the mix.
00:11:17.759 --> 00:11:22.320
You can't be in the fray and be objective about what you're seeing or learning.
00:11:22.639 --> 00:11:33.039
I I just I'd throw that out as a caveat, because collect all the observations, but you know, back to Boyd's theory about observe, then orient before you decide and act.
00:11:33.600 --> 00:11:36.000
Uh we're in the observation phase, I think.
00:11:36.080 --> 00:11:42.720
Uh, and and maybe over time we're we're orienting about what well, what does this mean and what does it mean for us in the long term?
00:11:42.879 --> 00:11:45.200
So I'm very careful that we don't jump to conclusions.
00:11:45.840 --> 00:11:48.320
Do you do you have a formal center for lessons learned?
00:11:48.399 --> 00:11:49.840
I'm can I confess I don't know that.
00:11:50.159 --> 00:11:54.159
Well, we we've given it almost as an additional duty to our doctrine center.
00:11:54.399 --> 00:11:54.559
Okay.
00:11:54.720 --> 00:12:08.639
Um, that you know, that while whatever our collective lessons learned are should end up in doctrine, they're the ones that are capturing our lessons, uh, observations for the purpose of evaluating them to be doctrine.
00:12:08.879 --> 00:12:16.639
And we've recently established on the staff an S9 function, which helps with force design, but it has the operational analysis function.
00:12:16.720 --> 00:12:18.799
So they'll also be involved in our lessons learned.
00:12:18.879 --> 00:12:23.360
So we don't have a lessons learned center, but we have people who have that as a part of their responsibility.
00:12:23.759 --> 00:12:29.519
Um yes, you you have to observe intently and actively uh with what's going on.
00:12:29.679 --> 00:12:33.200
Nothing, I say this all the time, nothing's more clarifying than combat feedback.
00:12:33.679 --> 00:12:38.159
So we were watching very close what's going on in the Middle East, obviously, what's going on in Ukraine.
00:12:38.559 --> 00:12:41.840
And from a space perspective, a couple of things jump out.
00:12:42.080 --> 00:12:50.080
One is let's not argue anymore about how critical space is to national security, military operations, the economies of the world.
00:12:50.720 --> 00:12:53.840
Space is a vital contributor to all those facets.
00:12:54.399 --> 00:12:57.679
I see that looking at adversary targeting.
00:12:57.840 --> 00:13:01.440
I see that with how we're using it and integrating it across the joint force.
00:13:01.600 --> 00:13:07.360
And so we've crossed the threshold where it can ever be debated again that space is critical.
00:13:07.519 --> 00:13:13.120
Um, the the bad analogy that I've used before, you know, it where space used to be kind of icing on the cake.
00:13:13.200 --> 00:13:14.480
We made things a little better.
00:13:14.720 --> 00:13:17.360
We are truly the eggs and the batter of that cake now.
00:13:17.519 --> 00:13:22.399
You can't possibly extract space out and expect the same outcome uh anymore.
00:13:22.559 --> 00:13:23.840
It is just fully baked in.
00:13:24.080 --> 00:13:26.080
Phil, let me continue with the pun.
00:13:26.639 --> 00:13:30.559
Um, cyber networks are integral to space operations.
00:13:30.639 --> 00:13:35.120
There's as much about ground operations with space as there is about on orbit.
00:13:35.360 --> 00:13:42.159
And we we see cyber attacks with the Russians in Ukraine uh that had that were intended to have a space effect.
00:13:42.320 --> 00:13:42.639
Right.
00:13:42.879 --> 00:13:49.279
Um, so we have to be uh very clear-eyed about how we use our networks and how we protect those networks.
00:13:49.440 --> 00:13:55.120
And I think we've we've seen, at least we've observed, what happens when you don't pay attention to those things.
00:13:55.759 --> 00:14:03.279
Uh the other one that jumps out at me that I think is interesting is commercial space integration into military operations.
00:14:03.679 --> 00:14:11.279
Uh with the Viasat attack in Ukraine, uh suddenly the Ukrainians are looking for a way to use telecommunications to command and control forces.
00:14:11.600 --> 00:14:16.320
And very publicly, Starlink was there uh to help contribute to that.
00:14:16.480 --> 00:14:17.519
So a couple of things.
00:14:17.679 --> 00:14:28.799
One is commercial capabilities can be integrated effectively into military operations, and then maybe not so much of a lesser impact is proliferated.
00:14:28.879 --> 00:14:39.679
LEO is very resilient uh in a way that maybe geosynchronous sally communications aren't as resilient uh in the current EW electromagnetic warfare environment.
00:14:40.080 --> 00:14:49.039
So we're we're observing those things and and again trying to not be uh too bold about drawing quick conclusions, but those are some things that jump out at me.
00:14:49.440 --> 00:14:55.759
Yeah, that that's a good pivot to this broader question of uh of commercial exploitation.
00:14:55.840 --> 00:15:20.240
And we've we've talked about this many times, but uh you're making some pretty big bets uh in the 2027 budget pitch and in recent contracts that have been awarded to really large contracts, multi-billion dollar contracts for commercial or commercially derived uh proliferated low Earth orbit services or hardware.
00:15:20.960 --> 00:15:32.240
The as you look at that and you look at this uh tightening relationship between commercial capabilities and the military, um, how do you think through the pros and the cons?
00:15:32.399 --> 00:15:48.879
You talked about rapidly moving overhead proliferated LEO assets being harder to jam in certain circumstances, either at that kind of implementation level or at the higher operational and strategic levels, how do you think through those pros and cons?
00:15:49.679 --> 00:15:50.639
It's a great question.
00:15:50.720 --> 00:15:52.399
It's a multifaceted question.
00:15:52.559 --> 00:15:58.799
So I I I like to think in terms of these frictions, and leadership has to balance these frictions.
00:15:58.879 --> 00:15:59.279
Right.
00:15:59.519 --> 00:16:05.200
Um, I could clearly say that to be more effective requires you to use all the orbital regimes.
00:16:05.360 --> 00:16:10.240
If I can use LEO and GEO and HEO, that makes it more of a targeting problem for the adversary.
00:16:10.320 --> 00:16:14.159
And so effectiveness likes that redundancy, that level of resiliency.
00:16:14.320 --> 00:16:16.879
From an efficiency standpoint, it's not the cheapest way to go.
00:16:17.039 --> 00:16:17.279
Sure.
00:16:17.440 --> 00:16:18.720
So how do I balance that?
00:16:18.879 --> 00:16:25.200
You know, the the I have to pay attention to how much something costs and what the price points are, but I want it to be as effective as possible.
00:16:25.360 --> 00:16:27.360
You have you have to balance those things out.
00:16:27.600 --> 00:16:36.080
Um, sometimes you have a single vendor that can go very fast if they were to get the contract, uh, because they've already demonstrated capability to do something.
00:16:36.320 --> 00:16:41.679
But competition usually creates a better uh incentive structure for the government.
00:16:41.919 --> 00:16:49.200
So, how do I reward a company for going fast, but at the same time generate competition that's gonna maybe compete with that company.
00:16:49.279 --> 00:16:49.440
Right.
00:16:49.919 --> 00:17:04.799
Those are good frictions, uh, but leadership has to continually evaluate what where are we in the in the current needs of the government and how do we want to play both sides of that coin to the max benefit of national security.
00:17:04.960 --> 00:17:07.359
Uh, and that it can get kind of complicated pretty fast.
00:17:07.440 --> 00:17:12.000
Aaron Powell A lot of that's balancing sort of short-term and long-term factors, right?
00:17:12.240 --> 00:17:16.559
You want that competition in the long run, it'll probably deliver you better prices, better quality.
00:17:16.880 --> 00:17:18.160
But it will cost more.
00:17:18.480 --> 00:17:20.720
And it might mean slowing yourself down even.
00:17:20.880 --> 00:17:26.160
Aaron Powell Or God forbid, vendor lock, you know, which is the the worst thing the government could ever do, right?
00:17:26.319 --> 00:17:28.000
But sometimes there's an advantage to that.
00:17:28.160 --> 00:17:46.640
So do you are there lessons from the engagement you've had over the last nearly four years in that transition to more reliance on commercial that you would pass on to the next CSO, that you would pass on to your next service acquisition executive?
00:17:46.880 --> 00:17:48.079
Any key thoughts coming out of that?
00:17:48.400 --> 00:17:56.799
Well um the the the one overarching thing, and it's so easy to say and so hard to do, is you could kill yourself with analysis.
00:17:57.200 --> 00:18:02.000
Like I those those friction points that I just said, those are complicated and there's no answer.
00:18:02.319 --> 00:18:04.559
It's just a continual balancing.
00:18:04.880 --> 00:18:11.039
So sometimes you just have to make the decision for the sake of making decision and move forward and then adjust as required.
00:18:11.200 --> 00:18:23.279
And so this idea that you can analyze and figure out what exactly the right deal is for the government, that might be, you know, it might just be a brass ring you're never gonna quite get to.
00:18:23.440 --> 00:18:36.960
So just don't be afraid to make a decision, move in a direction that's positive, and then continually evaluate assumptions, continually evaluate um uh trade-offs, and and and don't be afraid to shift as you're moving forward.
00:18:37.839 --> 00:18:40.799
No big bet can't be unmade and go a different direction.
00:18:40.960 --> 00:18:47.759
So I think it's about continual balancing and not be afraid to make a decision uh with without perfect information.
00:18:47.839 --> 00:19:15.759
Aaron Powell One of my colleagues at CSPS in a paper several years ago you know highlighted that oftentimes with commercial, especially services, the the big expenses are not actually the service itself, but rather the integration of it into everything else, putting the terminal on the aircraft or on the ship, training with it, building all of the tactics and techniques and procedures that you need to make it militarily effective.
00:19:16.000 --> 00:19:22.160
Um do you think the service is making the progress it needs to do in laying that foundation for exploitation?
00:19:22.799 --> 00:19:26.480
I think there's two aspects of that that I'm paying particular attention to.
00:19:26.720 --> 00:19:30.400
One is the traditional military term is, you know, you've heard dot mil PF.
00:19:30.559 --> 00:19:45.599
So it's one thing to buy the system, it's another to do all of the other work that turns that system into a combat force uh to achieve a military effect, whether that's MILCON for facilities or the growth of manpower or new operational concepts, you have to do all of that.
00:19:45.680 --> 00:19:51.920
And I think that's what you're talking about is sometimes those can be more expensive in collective nature than the system itself.
00:19:52.079 --> 00:19:58.240
But if you don't account for it or you shortchange it, then you don't really have a force, you just have a system.
00:19:58.720 --> 00:20:10.000
And so I'm I'm really conscientious of building processes where we plan for, account for, and resource all of those.mil PF factors uh for any given system.
00:20:10.400 --> 00:20:16.799
Yeah, this is a billion-dollar system, but it's really a$2.5 billion system when you factor in manpower, MILCON, et cetera.
00:20:16.960 --> 00:20:24.400
And I we owe that to the taxpayers, to Congress, uh to the capes of the world to say this is what it's gonna cost if you want to go down this path.
00:20:24.640 --> 00:20:27.359
I think that's that's an important aspect of it.
00:20:27.599 --> 00:20:30.400
Um doesn't make it any easier, but we still have to account for it.
00:20:30.720 --> 00:20:35.680
You had talked early on about needing to think about a fully burdened force and understanding that.
00:20:36.400 --> 00:20:51.200
Do you you obviously you've uh you've had enormous budgetary growth in your tenure if the if the current budget request is is fully enacted, I think it's on the order of five times growth probably from when you started.
00:20:51.440 --> 00:20:58.720
Um do you think you've made real progress in getting to that fully burdened level, or is there still quite a bit of work to do toward that?
00:20:59.200 --> 00:21:03.200
Recognizing that I'm talking to a master here from Cape Days, uh you know full well.
00:21:04.640 --> 00:21:04.799
Okay.
00:21:05.200 --> 00:21:09.759
You but you know full well in terms of the logic that budgets don't just get pencil whipped.
00:21:10.160 --> 00:21:12.319
You have to defend every single dollar.
00:21:12.720 --> 00:21:38.960
The reason we've grown so much is because I feel like we have accounted uh effectively for all of that other burdening, the manpower, the training ranges, the the simulators that have to come with systems, the you know, the MILCON, the op centers, the resiliency and ground networks, everything that has to go into making an on-orbit system effective, we've accounted for, we've done the cost analysis, we've determined with good data uh analysis what's required.
00:21:39.119 --> 00:21:47.440
And only with that could we pitch a budget that gets accepted all the way through all the channels, through OMB, over to the White House, and finally over to Congress.
00:21:47.599 --> 00:21:54.160
I feel really proud of the fact that I feel like we've done that uh effectively so that it's not a hollow force when it's put in place.
00:21:54.640 --> 00:22:12.880
When we talked to five years ago, one of the problems that was on your radar was kind of The modeling and simulation to make the case for space as the massive force multiplier for the whole joint force, as well as the need for domain superiority in its own right.
00:22:13.680 --> 00:22:22.799
Do you feel like that foundation is built, that analytic foundation, so that I mean it appears that it withstood the uh resource scrutiny, but I do.
00:22:22.960 --> 00:22:24.880
I it starts with a vision.
00:22:25.039 --> 00:22:33.279
Uh vision kind of turns into requirements, retirements come turns into contracts, contracts turn into capabilities, and then you integrate, et cetera.
00:22:33.440 --> 00:22:41.680
Um we're somewhere just shy of fielding the full vision, I think, you know, five years hence from when we really started with that vision.
00:22:41.839 --> 00:22:52.079
Um we had a a pretty small fraction of a small budget devoted to test and training and simulation.
00:22:52.319 --> 00:23:06.799
We have a pretty sizable, I mean, half a billion dollars a year, more or less, is just focused on building the test and training equipment that the forces need, the acquisition community needs, the modeling and the simulation to really do the work that's necessary.
00:23:07.039 --> 00:23:10.000
So I do feel like all that's in place now, the requirements there.
00:23:10.079 --> 00:23:11.039
We have a plan.
00:23:11.200 --> 00:23:13.920
We we have a new PAE for infrastructure.
00:23:14.000 --> 00:23:21.279
Uh so you at the highest level of our acquisition management, uh, we're accounting for test and training infrastructure as a key component.
00:23:21.599 --> 00:23:23.359
So again, I feel like the foundation's there.
00:23:23.440 --> 00:23:25.359
Now we just got to bring it to fruition.
00:23:25.839 --> 00:23:33.759
Uh speaking of the PAEs, this is a you know, it's significant change as part of the acquisition transformation effort the department's going through.
00:23:34.000 --> 00:23:45.039
Um are there key issues that you're watching as we go through that transition to these more empowered executives leading each of the major capability areas?
00:23:45.680 --> 00:23:46.319
A couple of thoughts there.
00:23:46.400 --> 00:23:48.720
And one of them kind of ties back to an original thought.
00:23:48.880 --> 00:23:54.480
As I'm Congress designated me, the CSO, as a force design architect for space for the armed forces.
00:23:54.720 --> 00:23:58.400
And when as soon as you say for the armed forces, that's that integration piece.
00:23:58.640 --> 00:24:06.559
And so we stood up an office in the J8 to pull in other service space requirements so that we can account for it holistically.
00:24:06.720 --> 00:24:14.000
This is the, hey, we can put GPS 3Fs on orbit all day long, but if you don't have receivers that can take advantage of the new codes, then it doesn't matter.
00:24:14.720 --> 00:24:19.920
So that it's about synchronizing the investments across all the services to get all the full interoperability.
00:24:20.079 --> 00:24:23.599
And I think that's a you know a key aspect of this.
00:24:23.839 --> 00:24:29.039
Umce design architect that also then translates into the requirements.
00:24:29.279 --> 00:24:36.720
And um it's I can't give bad requirements to a new PAE, PEOs that become PAEs and say, okay, now you're gonna be fine.
00:24:36.799 --> 00:24:41.200
I'm still giving you the old bad requirements and bad process, but I'm sure you'll be better at managing them.
00:24:41.359 --> 00:24:55.359
So recognizing that on the service side, you know, not the secretariat side where acquisition occurs, on the service side, if I don't get the requirements right, uh it's never, it's never gonna be fielded effectively, efficiently, on time, on budget, et cetera.
00:24:55.519 --> 00:24:58.480
So we've really gone back and rescrubbed our process.
00:24:58.640 --> 00:25:00.400
How is it we developed requirements?
00:25:00.559 --> 00:25:02.400
What does a good requirement look like?
00:25:02.640 --> 00:25:06.480
And we found that at a minimum, there's three levels of requirements.
00:25:06.640 --> 00:25:08.640
There's high-level mission requirements.
00:25:08.880 --> 00:25:11.920
This is what we needed to do to solve an operational problem.
00:25:12.319 --> 00:25:14.319
There's the system requirements.
00:25:14.559 --> 00:25:20.160
Okay, the system that we think will answer this has the following characteristics that we can start to talk about.
00:25:20.319 --> 00:25:22.799
And then you get down to contract specifications.
00:25:22.880 --> 00:25:27.519
What are we going to put on contract and hold a contractor uh responsible for?
00:25:27.759 --> 00:25:40.559
And I think understanding that there are those three tiers, and each of them comes with a different mindset is important to getting them right and not having to go back or back and forth and or adding uh requirements that are hard to field because it doesn't tie back connect.
00:25:40.880 --> 00:25:48.319
So we have this thread that goes through all of those at the appropriate level of detail to help the PAEs do their job.
00:25:48.640 --> 00:25:50.480
So it's that there's a balance between the two.
00:25:50.559 --> 00:25:55.599
Aaron Ross Powell So our traditional analogy of uh big R requirements and little R requirements has to be broadened.
00:25:56.000 --> 00:25:57.119
And we we all said it.
00:25:57.200 --> 00:25:57.279
Yeah.
00:25:57.519 --> 00:25:58.240
We've lost the meaning.
00:25:58.480 --> 00:25:58.559
Yeah.
00:25:59.039 --> 00:26:01.759
And so we've got to get back to what does that really mean when we say that?
00:26:01.920 --> 00:26:03.039
What are the left and right balance?
00:26:03.359 --> 00:26:04.960
What does good big R look like?
00:26:05.039 --> 00:26:06.640
What does good little R look like?
00:26:06.799 --> 00:26:09.039
And if we define those terms, I think we're in a better position.
00:26:09.200 --> 00:26:09.359
Trevor Burrus, Jr.
00:26:09.440 --> 00:26:14.559
So that I mean that raises a really interesting tension to follow onto your tensions point.
00:26:14.720 --> 00:26:20.480
Uh the department is really shifting to emphasize more fixed price contracting.
00:26:20.720 --> 00:26:29.359
And certainly one lesson I learned the hard way from failed programs is uh a fixed price contract is not a panacea.
00:26:29.440 --> 00:26:40.640
If you haven't written down what the government really needs, you will get exactly the wrong thing and it'll be useless, or you will change what you want, and that fixed price is no longer so fixed.
00:26:41.599 --> 00:26:52.079
Um If we're gonna do this pivot to fixed price contracting successfully, we obviously have to have good understanding of those detailed contract specs.
00:26:52.720 --> 00:27:07.839
Um That's that's gotta be an ongoing dialogue between operators, users and other services that are depending on the downstream for the kind of force enhancement stuff and the contracting people, the acquisition people.
00:27:08.319 --> 00:27:13.920
Um have we made the progress necessary to make smart business decisions in that environment?
00:27:14.319 --> 00:27:15.920
Jamie, you've got a lot of experience with this.
00:27:16.000 --> 00:27:18.880
You know, I it's an ongoing journey, I just think it's an ongoing journey.
00:27:19.200 --> 00:27:29.920
And you know, um fixed price contracts are a tool, but if we think they're the tool that that that solves every problem, we're wildly wrong, I think.
00:27:30.079 --> 00:27:35.759
Um I think the more unknowns there are going into a program, the less valuable a fixed price contract.
00:27:36.240 --> 00:27:36.799
On both sides.
00:27:37.680 --> 00:27:47.119
The contractor won't know what to charge because there's too many unknowns, so they'll overprice it or or or not, and that's even worse as it as it goes along.
00:27:47.359 --> 00:27:51.440
Um so I just think we got to use the right tool for the right problem.
00:27:51.680 --> 00:27:56.960
And there are certainly good examples where a fixed price contract is what really should apply.
00:27:57.119 --> 00:28:07.759
Um and where that's the case, we should go with that because it's it helps oversight, it helps Congress understand how much you plan to spend on something and what should be delivered when you get it, and there's value in that.
00:28:07.920 --> 00:28:24.480
But we ought to be eyes wide open that, hey, when we're building space-based interceptors for a Golden Dome, fixed price contract, how in the world could you do the kind of RD and demos and resolve all the technical issues that you know are going to come up and hold a contractor to only a certain dollar value?
00:28:24.559 --> 00:28:27.279
Um I just think it we just got to be eyes wide open.
00:28:27.440 --> 00:28:33.519
Pick the right contracting tool for the problem set that you're trying to resolve, and then you you got a better shot at success.
00:28:33.599 --> 00:28:38.720
Aaron Powell I will say with home improvement projects, I'm often criticized for not using the right tool for the job.
00:28:38.799 --> 00:28:43.279
So I take your And it usually costs more than you expect when you do.
00:28:43.519 --> 00:28:43.599
Yeah.
00:28:44.720 --> 00:28:55.599
Looking even more broadly, so as a service chief, you spend a non-trivial amount of your time engaging with allies and partners around the world.
00:28:55.759 --> 00:29:10.960
Um we have seen dramatic changes in uh the willingness of key allies and partners to invest in space capabilities, to talk about them publicly over the last several years.
00:29:11.039 --> 00:29:13.200
That that's certainly positive.
00:29:13.440 --> 00:29:16.640
Uh we're also seeing, maybe on both the U.S.
00:29:16.799 --> 00:29:26.480
side and with some of the allies, more emphasis on building out sovereign capabilities where we maybe had heavy interdependence before.
00:29:26.640 --> 00:29:31.680
We're now seeing some more effort to have standalone capabilities.
00:29:32.160 --> 00:29:40.079
Without asking you to get into specific names of individual allies you're talking to, how how are your counterparts thinking through those issues?
00:29:40.160 --> 00:29:48.960
And how would you advise them, you know, as a as a friend and ally as they're thinking about really significant investments in some cases?
00:29:49.359 --> 00:29:49.519
Sure.
00:29:50.000 --> 00:30:03.759
You know, it's a full spectrum from those who are interested and know it's important, but but don't have any aspirations that they're going to be a space for your nation, uh, all the way up to partners that are as capable as we are in many areas.
00:30:03.920 --> 00:30:06.720
Um and and so the key is understanding your partners.
00:30:06.799 --> 00:30:10.079
What are their strengths, what are their weaknesses, uh, where can they contribute?
00:30:10.240 --> 00:30:12.000
Where are they willing to contribute?
00:30:12.160 --> 00:30:16.400
And and and and just continuing the dialogue of partnership builds trust.
00:30:16.559 --> 00:30:23.200
And I and I start always with um there are certain areas of space operations where capacity is king.
00:30:23.519 --> 00:30:25.599
You don't have to go further than satellite communications.
00:30:25.680 --> 00:30:31.599
Uh, anytime we're in a crisis or conflict, the demand for bandwidth for satellite communications is almost unlimited.
00:30:31.680 --> 00:30:32.079
Yep.
00:30:32.240 --> 00:30:37.119
Uh and so the more that's available to a coalition, the better off it will be.
00:30:37.200 --> 00:30:43.920
Uh, and so I I tell them, you really pretty can't can't you pretty much can't build too much satellite communications.
00:30:44.079 --> 00:30:55.680
Uh and that also is is they're encouraged by that because there's such a a peaceful use for that that they don't have to think of themselves as building just a military use kind of capability.
00:30:55.839 --> 00:30:57.759
Um, space domain awareness.
00:30:57.839 --> 00:31:00.880
Uh, we all need to understand flight safety in space.
00:31:01.119 --> 00:31:06.640
That takes a lot of data, which requires a lot of sensors, which requires a lot of sensors around the planet.
00:31:06.799 --> 00:31:08.960
Uh so partners can contribute to that.
00:31:09.039 --> 00:31:10.480
And the more data, the better.
00:31:10.559 --> 00:31:16.640
Uh, and so it's another area where capacity is king and where you are on the earth looking up uh matters.
00:31:16.880 --> 00:31:25.279
Um uh and then and even if you get into some of the more military things like electronic warfare for counter-selling communications, for example, capacity is king.
00:31:25.440 --> 00:31:28.799
The number of apertures matters, and where you are on the footprint matters.
00:31:28.880 --> 00:31:36.720
And so we're working in areas with our partners that are interested in buying equipment in terms of those areas where there's high capacity demands.
00:31:36.799 --> 00:31:38.960
And that's that's that's a starting point.
00:31:39.039 --> 00:31:40.960
Uh, but I always quickly follow on.
00:31:41.119 --> 00:31:45.119
Then build your space cadre, train and experience expertise.
00:31:45.200 --> 00:31:53.039
So you have organic, sovereign space expertise to help you make the planning and and resourcing decisions that'll go forward.
00:31:53.519 --> 00:31:56.160
Yeah, that's I think that's a helpful message for them.
00:31:56.480 --> 00:32:02.720
And just like your Human Capital Limited, our many of the allies and partners are even much more acutely.
00:32:02.799 --> 00:32:14.160
So do you still see a constructive level of exchange officers coming over and joint particip or coalition participation in exercises?
00:32:14.400 --> 00:32:20.240
Of course, we have real-world events where they're participating too, but is that building, continuing to build the foundation?
00:32:20.480 --> 00:32:28.079
Yeah, far more requests uh to send people over and integrate into our operations than sometimes we can handle.
00:32:28.480 --> 00:32:40.720
Uh they they certainly like the operations, and we've had long-going, uh ongoing um uh relationships for liaison officers, exchange officers, and our operations like missile warning and the NORAD example with Canada.
00:32:41.039 --> 00:32:45.519
Uh the five eye partners have been integrated into our operations for a long time.
00:32:45.680 --> 00:32:47.839
Uh now I think we're starting to expand that out.
00:32:47.920 --> 00:32:52.480
The the Combined Space Operations Initiative, CISPO, 10 nations now.
00:32:52.799 --> 00:32:56.160
Uh, all of them want to see how the Space Force is operating.
00:32:56.240 --> 00:32:58.160
All of them want to learn firsthand the lessons.
00:32:58.240 --> 00:32:59.599
And so we've gotten requests.
00:32:59.759 --> 00:33:02.559
The Italians want to put uh an officer on our staff.
00:33:02.799 --> 00:33:08.559
I have uh uh Air Marshal Godfrey is now part of the staff to connect and uh doing great work there.
00:33:08.799 --> 00:33:12.799
So much so we just established a two-letter organization that's about partnerships.
00:33:12.880 --> 00:33:14.240
Uh, you know, how do we manage these?
00:33:14.319 --> 00:33:20.000
Where do we put people so they can get the most for them their own country, but contribute to the growth of the Space Force as well.
00:33:20.480 --> 00:33:21.119
Lots of interest.
00:33:21.440 --> 00:33:22.559
Yeah, that's important.
00:33:23.039 --> 00:33:36.400
Do you um one of the stories that we've long told ourselves, and I think has some real truth in it, is that the uh network of allies and partners and the closeness that the U.S.
00:33:36.559 --> 00:33:41.200
has with those allies and partners kind of plays a critical role in deterrence.
00:33:41.440 --> 00:33:50.400
Um obviously our demonstrated capabilities matter a lot, our allies demonstrated capabilities, but the notion that you would be taking on both the U.S.
00:33:50.480 --> 00:33:54.960
and its allies complicates an adversary's decision calculus.
00:33:55.279 --> 00:34:00.240
Um there specific ways beyond CISPO that you're looking to communicate that?
00:34:00.559 --> 00:34:02.160
Well, first, do you think that's true still?
00:34:02.400 --> 00:34:08.320
And yeah, are there specific ways you're looking to communicate that on the global stage to hopefully reduce the risk of conflict?
00:34:08.639 --> 00:34:08.960
Yeah, I agree.
00:34:09.119 --> 00:34:14.960
I I think uh I absolutely agree with that premise that uh coalitions have a deterrent effect.
00:34:15.199 --> 00:34:19.280
Uh it's an asymmetric advantage to say you can't just go to war against one nation.
00:34:19.360 --> 00:34:23.119
If if that nation happens to be the U.S., we're gonna bring partners and allies with us.
00:34:23.199 --> 00:34:29.360
And and I think that does have kind of a chilling constraining effect on adversary uh goals.
00:34:29.840 --> 00:34:34.480
So I I think that is an important part of deterrence that we should we should continue to factor in.
00:34:34.880 --> 00:34:38.719
Um now, does that mean we don't we get along every time?
00:34:38.880 --> 00:34:39.920
Well, no, of course not.
00:34:40.079 --> 00:34:41.199
Families fight, you know.
00:34:41.360 --> 00:34:45.679
I mean, but the but the bottom line is they don't become non-family.
00:34:46.079 --> 00:34:49.599
Um and so CSPO is one important initiative.
00:34:49.760 --> 00:34:54.559
W uh NATO the NATO structure talking about how space is going to grow inside NATO.
00:34:54.880 --> 00:34:59.599
Um, maybe someday to be equivalent to the air component or the maritime component, land component.
00:34:59.760 --> 00:35:01.519
Do we need a space component NATO?
00:35:01.599 --> 00:35:02.800
Those discussions are ongoing.
00:35:02.960 --> 00:35:13.519
That's a lot more nations, brings a lot more of that spectrum of capabilities uh regarding space into question uh to for the utility of a component, but that is happening.
00:35:13.679 --> 00:35:23.440
Uh there's certainly a a series of allies and partners in the Western Pacific uh in PACOM that we're having continual uh conversations with.
00:35:23.519 --> 00:35:31.920
We have components now in Korea, we have a Space Force component in Japan that's uh sub-organization of our component to PACOM.
00:35:32.239 --> 00:35:41.679
So uh it it's just it's important that we always think about those because that's how we ultimately would like to go through a crisis.
00:35:42.239 --> 00:35:43.119
Who wants to join us?
00:35:43.199 --> 00:35:44.000
Who wants to help out?
00:35:44.159 --> 00:35:48.400
We seem to always ask that question, and we want to make that as easy from a space perspective as possible.
00:35:48.880 --> 00:35:49.920
No, that makes sense.
00:35:50.559 --> 00:35:54.320
Well, let me ask you to take this to big picture.
00:35:54.400 --> 00:35:58.239
Again, you're approaching four years as a as a service chief.
00:35:58.559 --> 00:36:01.840
What's the uh what's the accomplishment you're most proud of?
00:36:02.239 --> 00:36:04.000
And I will follow it up with the flip side.
00:36:04.079 --> 00:36:12.320
So it's hard to it's hard to kind of zero in on the one thing.
00:36:12.559 --> 00:36:14.400
Um but there's that's why I asked.
00:36:14.559 --> 00:36:15.920
I know, it's it's a really good question.
00:36:16.000 --> 00:36:17.920
I so I'm gonna cheat a little bit.
00:36:18.400 --> 00:36:24.960
I I think the the the description of our service and what are the service level responsibilities.
00:36:25.119 --> 00:36:34.239
One of the things that hit me early on was hey, we really haven't asked these fundamental questions about what a service does since the establishment of the Air Force almost eighty years ago, right?
00:36:35.119 --> 00:36:37.280
Everybody that did that's long gone.
00:36:37.440 --> 00:36:40.159
Um and so we started asking fundamental questions.
00:36:40.320 --> 00:36:41.440
Why do we have a service?
00:36:41.599 --> 00:36:44.960
What is it that a service does that a combatant command can't do?
00:36:45.519 --> 00:36:53.679
Um and and I finally just decided that uh it it boiled down to services are responsible for four basic activities.
00:36:53.920 --> 00:37:00.639
And it all centers on our ability to contest, command, or control a domain, a new domain warfareing space.
00:37:00.960 --> 00:37:03.119
We have to be able to do force design.
00:37:03.280 --> 00:37:07.119
What's the equipment that we need to control the space domain?
00:37:07.280 --> 00:37:13.599
We have to develop a force, force development, train, educate, experience our operators to be able to be effective.
00:37:13.760 --> 00:37:15.280
We have to generate forces.
00:37:15.360 --> 00:37:17.519
How are they ready to do the missions that we're asking to do?
00:37:17.599 --> 00:37:19.760
And then they have to actually do the missions effectively.
00:37:20.079 --> 00:37:23.039
Force design, force development, force generation, and force employment.
00:37:23.119 --> 00:37:25.920
All services are responsible for those four activities.
00:37:26.159 --> 00:37:40.639
So just by stating that and then putting all of our key initiatives under those headers, saying, hey, the reason we're developing an objective force and standing up S9 and using battle school at SWAC is because we have to do force design.
00:37:40.880 --> 00:37:48.400
Hey, the reason we have PME and we're building our own captain's leadership course and we redesigned our officer training course, because we have to develop a force that understands this.
00:37:48.559 --> 00:37:57.039
The reason we did SPA4 Gen, a force generation model where we came out of commit phase, trained for high-end fight before we go back into operations.
00:37:57.199 --> 00:37:58.960
That was our force generation model.
00:37:59.199 --> 00:38:09.760
And then the service components, establishing them all, is how you integrate with the joint force to employ the force effectively and as in a synchronized way with the joint community.
00:38:10.079 --> 00:38:11.440
We had to do all of that.
00:38:11.519 --> 00:38:17.039
And so I'm proud that we structured our efforts in one coherent way to say this is what a service does.
00:38:17.199 --> 00:38:22.960
It's not a bunch of ad hoc decisions or a bunch of activities we say, maybe this will all add up to us doing a good job.
00:38:23.199 --> 00:38:24.239
No, we structured it.
00:38:24.400 --> 00:38:36.000
So I'm really proud that we have a framework where everybody can see where they fit into what it is that a service does, and all of our initiatives have a coherence to them about being the newest, youngest service.
00:38:36.400 --> 00:38:36.800
Yeah.
00:38:37.039 --> 00:38:50.320
I um for Father's Day, I saw a cute meme with a grandfather, father, and uh baby in arms, and with the Army, Air Force, and Space Force seals on each of them.
00:38:50.400 --> 00:38:52.239
And you probably saw that one too.
00:38:52.400 --> 00:38:56.400
It's a bring building, birthing a new service is no joke.
00:38:56.480 --> 00:38:56.639
Trevor Burrus, Jr.
00:38:56.719 --> 00:39:06.079
And it's it is it's an interesting fact, because that is definitely just the way it happened, um, that we're not the baby that maybe the grandfather thinks we are.
00:39:06.159 --> 00:39:08.719
We're we're pretty dang important to the entire team.
00:39:08.960 --> 00:39:14.639
But I will say that as we look at our culture, there's things that we're doing because the Army did it.
00:39:14.800 --> 00:39:20.239
And because the Army did it, the Air Force chose to do it, and because the Air Force did it, the Space Force kind of inherited it.
00:39:20.320 --> 00:39:22.159
And you go, well, why did the Army do it?
00:39:22.320 --> 00:39:24.000
It's like, uh, nobody, I don't know.
00:39:24.159 --> 00:39:25.840
It's just the way it's always been done.
00:39:26.079 --> 00:39:31.840
So questioning those assumptions because of that lineage, I think is another important thing that we have to keep reminding ourselves.
00:39:32.000 --> 00:39:36.079
Does this work for the kind of service we are or the kind of service we want to be?
00:39:36.239 --> 00:39:38.159
And if the answer is yes, then let's keep it.
00:39:38.239 --> 00:39:40.320
Like, no, let's not reinvent the wheel.
00:39:40.480 --> 00:39:43.599
But in a lot of cases, it was like, no, we're a little different.
00:39:43.679 --> 00:39:53.679
You know, what works for a 400,000-person army or a 300,000 person Air Force doesn't downscale to a 10,000 active component in the Space Force.
00:39:53.840 --> 00:39:55.119
So we just have to be mindful of that.
00:39:55.519 --> 00:39:58.000
Yeah, different roles of geography for each of the services.
00:39:58.400 --> 00:39:59.519
We're not really expeditionary.
00:39:59.679 --> 00:40:03.440
We have some expeditionary elements, but as a service, we don't largely do that.
00:40:03.840 --> 00:40:08.960
So, you know, other services have to orient around being expeditionary, but we don't.
00:40:09.199 --> 00:40:09.599
Yeah.
00:40:10.320 --> 00:40:12.320
So uh biggest regret.
00:40:14.000 --> 00:40:19.920
I I got this question asked that in all hands, and so I slyly said, I have no regrets.
00:40:20.159 --> 00:40:33.920
Um and I and I kind of do mean that, um, honestly, because I don't feel like I ever put myself in a situation where we made a decision that I felt was so one way that if if we go through this door, there's no way back.
00:40:34.159 --> 00:40:37.280
I've always felt like this is going to be more of a work in progress.
00:40:37.519 --> 00:40:38.639
Hey, let's get started.
00:40:38.719 --> 00:40:42.960
Let's do something, let's take an action, and then let's evaluate how well that action works.
00:40:43.039 --> 00:40:46.159
And what we like, we keep, what we don't like, we discard, we keep moving forward.
00:40:46.559 --> 00:40:50.639
So any regrets where you were too slow to make a decision, given that ethos?
00:40:51.360 --> 00:40:53.519
Um Yeah, probably.
00:40:53.599 --> 00:40:56.400
And and I use this example when I got the question.
00:40:56.719 --> 00:41:00.880
We are still using uh Air Force performance reports.
00:41:01.679 --> 00:41:04.079
Um and it seems like such an administrative thing.
00:41:04.239 --> 00:41:06.400
It's like build your own form, let's just go.
00:41:06.559 --> 00:41:15.199
Uh but I personally, and I so I full accountability here, slowed that down because I felt like it was an opportunity.
00:41:15.280 --> 00:41:26.400
That the performance report truly could be a valuable tool to give guardians the feedback they need and help them understand where their where their strengths are, where their weaknesses are.
00:41:26.639 --> 00:41:29.840
And we're so small, no one can fall through the cracks.
00:41:30.079 --> 00:41:31.679
Everybody has to be optimized.
00:41:31.760 --> 00:41:37.280
And I felt like, yes, we could adopt the processes that we inherited from the Army and from the Air Force.
00:41:37.440 --> 00:41:39.760
And you you've seen these forms.
00:41:39.840 --> 00:41:41.280
Uh I've handwritten them.
00:41:41.519 --> 00:41:45.360
They have some utility sometimes and they have less utility in other areas.
00:41:45.599 --> 00:41:46.800
I wanted ours to be different.
00:41:46.880 --> 00:41:47.840
I wanted ours to be good.
00:41:47.920 --> 00:41:49.440
So I deliberately slowed it down.
00:41:49.519 --> 00:41:55.039
So here we are, I'm about to leave, and we still don't have our own individual performance reports.
00:41:55.119 --> 00:41:58.800
So a little bit of regret that I probably couldn't see that through to the finish line.
00:41:59.039 --> 00:42:10.000
But I I am proud of the fact that we didn't just go the path of least resistance, that we decided deliberately we're gonna we're gonna do something different, we're gonna get it right, and it's just gonna take a little longer to unfold.
00:42:10.159 --> 00:42:12.880
But in the end, I hope it'll be a better outcome.
00:42:13.920 --> 00:42:18.480
Well, I was I'm just glad that you didn't say sitting down for this interview was your greatest regret.
00:42:18.559 --> 00:42:19.519
I appreciate that.
00:42:19.679 --> 00:42:29.280
Um So I know you have a strong appreciation for a good dad joke, if if that is an actual thing.
00:42:29.760 --> 00:42:44.480
Um so I I did want to offer you the opportunity to throw one in, but just to s get you started, um I notice we have this beautiful backdrop here, so I thought you might know um what really makes my day.
00:42:45.840 --> 00:42:47.360
The rotation of the earth.
00:42:49.440 --> 00:42:50.880
And I'm not even gonna try to top that.
00:42:51.280 --> 00:42:52.079
It's so it's so dear.
00:42:52.960 --> 00:42:54.400
That's a way just to leave it there, yeah.
00:42:54.719 --> 00:43:01.119
Uh thank you so much for your service again to Jenfer as well for all that you guys have done together.
00:43:01.360 --> 00:43:03.360
And we appreciate your time today.
00:43:03.599 --> 00:43:14.480
The uh the Space Force clearly is stronger for your efforts, and we will uh look forward to seeing it grow through it's through infancy, it's through toddlerhood.
00:43:14.639 --> 00:43:20.000
Now we're distinctly into the elementary years, and uh hopefully it's a significant upward trajectory.
00:43:20.320 --> 00:43:23.440
Well, thanks thanks to you as well, and thanks for the aerospace team partnership.
00:43:23.599 --> 00:43:28.000
Uh it's it's one of the good relationships I think that's helped the Space Force in its infancy.
00:43:28.159 --> 00:43:32.400
And so thanks for all you do for that, and and thanks for the opportunity to talk to the pleasure.
00:43:32.960 --> 00:43:33.280
Great.
00:43:33.599 --> 00:43:34.079
Thank you.
00:43:34.880 --> 00:43:40.239
Thank you so much to General Salzman and to Jamie for that very great discussion.
00:43:40.480 --> 00:43:46.239
They really covered a lot of ground from from tiered requirements all the way through dad jokes.
00:43:46.400 --> 00:43:49.920
Um as you can see, we are here still in the Pentagon.
00:43:50.159 --> 00:43:54.079
I'm actually here along this space capabilities wall.
00:43:54.239 --> 00:44:03.519
And at this space capabilities wall, there's different things that are going on in terms of what the Space Force can do, and then further on down in terms of what other nations can do.
00:44:03.840 --> 00:44:08.480
There are some other great things in this space hall here in the Pentagon.
00:44:08.639 --> 00:44:15.840
Things like the flag, the original Space Force flag that was unfurled in the signing ceremony in the White House.
00:44:16.079 --> 00:44:21.599
Also, there is a flag that was flown on the ISS that is a Space Force flag.
00:44:21.679 --> 00:44:26.880
Um, and then that was because I was the first guardian ever in space who brought it up there.
00:44:27.119 --> 00:44:38.000
There's also some very good historical artifacts, other historical artifacts here, an explanation about the kind of motto of the space force, the Semper Supram.
00:44:38.719 --> 00:44:51.199
Um and then even here on another wall that we're gonna show you, we've got um the story of Operation Desert Storm, where space was actually first used in war.
00:44:51.280 --> 00:44:59.119
So it's not new, um, but Space Force is something that's still growing and maturing as we learn from the conversation today.
00:44:59.519 --> 00:45:05.920
So all of our shows are at csps.aerospace.org slash space policy show.
00:45:06.159 --> 00:45:11.679
Um you can also find all the shows on YouTube or by all the normal podcast channels.
00:45:11.920 --> 00:45:20.480
The Center for Space Policy has deep research papers on our website, and you can also subscribe there if you want to get notified of things as they come out.
00:45:20.719 --> 00:45:26.320
Please follow us on social media and thank you again, everyone, for joining the space policy show today.
