1
00:00:01,050 --> 00:00:05,440
Welcome to The Bottom Line Up Front, the
podcast that cuts through the noise to
2
00:00:05,440 --> 00:00:09,219
deliver distilled insights from today's
most important technical webinars,
3
00:00:09,219 --> 00:00:11,049
presentations, and demonstrations.
4
00:00:11,459 --> 00:00:15,020
Designed for federal and military
IT leaders, each episode breaks down
5
00:00:15,049 --> 00:00:19,629
complex technologies into mission-ready
takeaways so you get the key points fast.
6
00:00:19,830 --> 00:00:22,939
Whether it's cybersecurity, cloud
architecture, or emerging defense
7
00:00:22,939 --> 00:00:26,709
technologies, we highlight what matters
most and how trusted integrators
8
00:00:26,709 --> 00:00:30,660
like ATPGov can help implement
and operationalize these solutions
9
00:00:30,660 --> 00:00:32,399
across your agency or command.
10
00:00:32,720 --> 00:00:36,079
No fluff, no filler, just
the bottom line up front.
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00:00:38,550 --> 00:00:42,089
If your data needs to stay
secret for 10 years, it's
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00:00:42,089 --> 00:00:43,889
probably already at risk today.
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00:00:44,449 --> 00:00:48,460
That was the mantra at a recent HPE
Partner Day featuring post-quantum
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00:00:48,460 --> 00:00:51,000
cryptography, or PQC, vendor EigenQ.
15
00:00:51,309 --> 00:00:54,630
And in this episode, we're going to
keep the buzzwords at bay and talk
16
00:00:54,630 --> 00:00:58,929
about why software-only post-quantum
crypto misses the real risk, why
17
00:00:58,929 --> 00:01:03,230
entropy, device identity, and execution
security are the actual problem, and
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00:01:03,230 --> 00:01:06,759
what it means for agencies that can't
rip and replace their infrastructures.
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00:01:07,099 --> 00:01:09,509
Why quantum is a now problem.
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00:01:09,809 --> 00:01:14,539
So the government got intelligence
information that they will be
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able to develop a quantum computer
that will break the encryption.
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And you say, "So what?" Breaking
one encryption here and there
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will happen soon, not later, soon,
in a matter of 12 to 24 months.
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But because quantum computers are
growing a trillion times faster, three
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or four years, an adversary nation
can do a quantum attack in the United
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States, shutting down all the airports,
all the hospitals, all the power
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plants, communications, in minutes,
driving the United States to the Stone
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Age without firing a single bullet.
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00:01:52,450 --> 00:01:54,370
This is the situation we have today.
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Let's start with the phrase you've
probably heard many times by
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now, harvest now, decrypt later.
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Adversaries are already collecting
encrypted traffic today, that being TLS,
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VPN, satellite links, and mission systems.
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They don't need to decrypt it now, they
just need to store it, and the moment a
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00:02:10,569 --> 00:02:14,450
sufficiently powerful quantum computer
comes online, or even a breakthrough
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00:02:14,480 --> 00:02:18,969
algorithm hits, long-lived encrypted
data becomes readable overnight.
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00:02:19,109 --> 00:02:23,209
That includes military communications,
intelligence reporting, PKI-protected
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00:02:23,209 --> 00:02:27,450
identities, OT, ICS, and satellite
telemetry, and anything with a
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00:02:27,450 --> 00:02:29,310
life cycle longer than 10 years.
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00:02:29,800 --> 00:02:34,609
Google, for example, with all their
technological expertise, were bragging
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00:02:34,609 --> 00:02:40,880
about reducing the algorithm from 20
million qubits to a million qubits.
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00:02:40,939 --> 00:02:43,800
So everybody was very
impressed 'cause it's 20 times.
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So I said, "No, I can do much better than
that." Just as an example to tell them
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that the Chinese must have done this.
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Because I did that and it wasn't hard.
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I reduced it not by 20 times like Google
did, and a lot of other companies.
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00:02:58,094 --> 00:03:02,974
I reduced it by 20,000 times the
number of qubits that you need.
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00:03:03,525 --> 00:03:06,184
And with that said, what came
through loud and clear in the
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00:03:06,184 --> 00:03:10,925
briefing was waiting until quantum
computers are here is too late.
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00:03:11,204 --> 00:03:14,864
Migration timelines are longer than
the threat timeline, and that's why
51
00:03:14,864 --> 00:03:19,464
federal mandates now focus on near
term migration and not future planning.
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00:03:19,835 --> 00:03:22,175
But encryption is not enough.
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It does quantum prove encryption.
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Why it is not enough?
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You encrypt and it's perfect.
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Let's say your laptop has this
unbreakable encryption, but your
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password or your server exposed
to the public is one, two, three.
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Who will not break one, two, three?
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So yet people are using their servers
and generating the key in their own
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computers, which is called pseudo random.
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You need to have completely random.
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Pseudo means fake, so it's
fake random, and then a quantum
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computer can break that.
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Moreover, we need to understand that
software only PQC is insufficient.
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Most conversations about PQC today
stop at the algorithms themselves.
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You've heard names like MLKLM for key
exchange and MLDSA for digital signatures,
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and these are NIST selected quantum
resistant algorithms, which are necessary,
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but they're not necessarily sufficient.
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Post quantum algorithms don't fix
weak entropy, compromise firmware,
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or expose execution environments.
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And three problems remain even after,
quote unquote, "upgrading your crypto".
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The first being entropy.
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If cryptographic keys are generated from
predictable or software based randomness,
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quantum safe math doesn't matter.
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Entropy quality becomes a compliance
metric and not an implementation detail.
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Secondly, identity, that being PKI
certificates and device identity are
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foundational to zero trust authentication,
secure boot, and remote attestation.
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If those roots of trust can be spoofed
or forged, then identities collapse
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no matter how good your algorithm is.
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And thirdly, execution.
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If private keys and cryptographic
operations live in memory or OS level
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processes, a compromised host means
compromised crypto, and software
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isolation at that point is not enough.
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And this is where hardware anchored
execution becomes the main differentiator.
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There is a hardware component.
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We have that in the cloud as well.
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That's how the IoT is then.
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We do certain things that are not
using encryption, but it needs the keys
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Everything I'm discussing with you tested,
certified by NIST, and operational.
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That's not a research project And in
this case, EigenQ's core architectural
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idea can be summed up in one
phrase: entropy identity execution.
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This creates a continuous chain
of trust from power on to runtime
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because EigenQ leverages quantum
entropy as their foundation.
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It's physics-based randomness from
quantum processes with no reliance
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on pseudo-random algorithms, and its
provable key material is stronger.
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And you might be asking yourself,
"So why does that matter?"
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Because weak entropy silently undermines
every downstream control and affects
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TPM-backed based device identities,
secure boot verification, and
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continuous measurement and attestation.
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And this ties zero trust decisions
to actual device states and
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not software-based assumptions.
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And we all know by now that zero
trust only works if device trust
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can be measured and proven.
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But with trusted execution environment,
when you're doing this encryption,
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it is executed in an area of the
processor that nobody's using.
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But let's say somebody's attacking
you and they want to see how you
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are processing such that they can
interfere with the security, we are
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on the trusted execution environment.
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They can't do anything.
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And EigenQ's post-quantum
cryptography runs entirely inside
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of trusted execution environments.
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The private keys are never exposed to the
host operating system, and cryptographic
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operations are remotely attestable.
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Even if the OS is compromised,
the keys remain protected.
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And it's also important to remember
that software-based cryptography can't
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prove where it ran, whereas EigenQ's
hardware-anchored execution can.
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Or how do we... Do we have to yank out
all that you have and then put the EigenQ?
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That's nuts because that will
take 10 years to do that.
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No, the, the most difficult thing
to do is to change somebody's mind.
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And how do we do that?
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You're not removing anything.
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We're gonna go and put an
envelope on top of everything.
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And, oh, I'm used to operate using my VPN.
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Yes, okay.
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We put a quantum VPN
proof on top of the VPN.
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Or use SSL.
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That's okay.
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We have a quantum proof SSL that
goes as an envelope, so it's very
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quick adoption Overall, EigenQ's
strategy means no rip and replace.
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And one thing that came through
clearly in the briefing, especially
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for those of us with federal programs,
is that PQC has to deploy inside
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of existing system boundaries.
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With EigenQ's integration strategy,
no agency is replacing entire PKI
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stacks, server fleets, or mission
systems at the tactical edge.
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Because of their hardware
architecture, they are able to
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emphasize hybrid cryptography
using both classical and PQC, phase
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00:08:03,074 --> 00:08:05,355
migrations, and retrofit capabilities.
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Each phase in this model delivers
independent risk reduction, including
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secure boot baselines, hybrid PQC
services, and fleet-wide adoption.
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This overall idea elegantly fits
into how federal programs actually
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modernize and how ATOs actually work.
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But it's also not that easy.
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You have to ask yourself
the hard questions before
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implementing any PQC strategy.
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Where does the PQC actually
belong in your architecture?
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What systems have
long-lived data exposure?
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How does this impact zero trust,
PKI, ATOs, and compliance evidence?
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What can be deployed now without
breaking the mission systems?
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Using EigenQ as part of your PQC
deployment means solutions aren't just
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installed, they're integrated, and they're
integrated into existing HPE, Dell, and
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00:08:51,274 --> 00:08:55,774
mixed server environments, into existing
PKI and identity workflows, into fielded
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and disconnected edge systems, and it
provides hardware-anchored security,
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along with federal infrastructure
realities and zero trust and
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00:09:03,444 --> 00:09:05,414
cryptography modernization programs.
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Though that list might sound
like a bunch of buzzwords, it's
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00:09:08,594 --> 00:09:10,314
really about deployable trust.
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So what's the bottom line up front?
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Post-quantum risk is
immediate, not future-dated.
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Algorithms alone do not solve
entropy, identity, or execution risk.
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Hardware-anchored trust enables
zero trust that actually works.
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And migration must be incremental,
attestable, and federally realistic.
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And EigenQ's hardware-based solution
helps agencies implement PQC as
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00:09:32,795 --> 00:09:34,554
infrastructure and not a theory.
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So if your data needs to stay protected
beyond the next refresh cycle, remember
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that the clock is already ticking.
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00:09:40,234 --> 00:09:44,345
So if you wanna go deeper on PQC,
hardware-anchored zero trust, PKI
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00:09:44,345 --> 00:09:47,724
modernization, or phased migration
strategies for federal systems,
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00:09:47,884 --> 00:09:51,224
know that ATPGov is actively
working with agencies and mission
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partners on solutions right now.
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Be sure to reach out to ATPGov today at
www.atpgov.com or email info@atpgov.com or
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00:10:01,715 --> 00:10:04,015
check us out on social media on LinkedIn.
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00:10:04,265 --> 00:10:07,455
Thanks for listening, and be sure to
subscribe to the Bottom Line Up Front
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00:10:07,455 --> 00:10:11,155
wherever you get your podcasts, and stay
tuned for more distilled insights from the
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00:10:11,155 --> 00:10:13,545
front lines of tech and national security.
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00:10:13,694 --> 00:10:17,795
So until next time, stay
secure, stay mission ready.
00:00:01,050 --> 00:00:05,440
Welcome to The Bottom Line Up Front, the
podcast that cuts through the noise to
2
00:00:05,440 --> 00:00:09,219
deliver distilled insights from today's
most important technical webinars,
3
00:00:09,219 --> 00:00:11,049
presentations, and demonstrations.
4
00:00:11,459 --> 00:00:15,020
Designed for federal and military
IT leaders, each episode breaks down
5
00:00:15,049 --> 00:00:19,629
complex technologies into mission-ready
takeaways so you get the key points fast.
6
00:00:19,830 --> 00:00:22,939
Whether it's cybersecurity, cloud
architecture, or emerging defense
7
00:00:22,939 --> 00:00:26,709
technologies, we highlight what matters
most and how trusted integrators
8
00:00:26,709 --> 00:00:30,660
like ATPGov can help implement
and operationalize these solutions
9
00:00:30,660 --> 00:00:32,399
across your agency or command.
10
00:00:32,720 --> 00:00:36,079
No fluff, no filler, just
the bottom line up front.
11
00:00:38,550 --> 00:00:42,089
If your data needs to stay
secret for 10 years, it's
12
00:00:42,089 --> 00:00:43,889
probably already at risk today.
13
00:00:44,449 --> 00:00:48,460
That was the mantra at a recent HPE
Partner Day featuring post-quantum
14
00:00:48,460 --> 00:00:51,000
cryptography, or PQC, vendor EigenQ.
15
00:00:51,309 --> 00:00:54,630
And in this episode, we're going to
keep the buzzwords at bay and talk
16
00:00:54,630 --> 00:00:58,929
about why software-only post-quantum
crypto misses the real risk, why
17
00:00:58,929 --> 00:01:03,230
entropy, device identity, and execution
security are the actual problem, and
18
00:01:03,230 --> 00:01:06,759
what it means for agencies that can't
rip and replace their infrastructures.
19
00:01:07,099 --> 00:01:09,509
Why quantum is a now problem.
20
00:01:09,809 --> 00:01:14,539
So the government got intelligence
information that they will be
21
00:01:14,539 --> 00:01:18,029
able to develop a quantum computer
that will break the encryption.
22
00:01:18,430 --> 00:01:22,700
And you say, "So what?" Breaking
one encryption here and there
23
00:01:23,000 --> 00:01:28,320
will happen soon, not later, soon,
in a matter of 12 to 24 months.
24
00:01:28,719 --> 00:01:32,770
But because quantum computers are
growing a trillion times faster, three
25
00:01:32,770 --> 00:01:38,349
or four years, an adversary nation
can do a quantum attack in the United
26
00:01:38,349 --> 00:01:42,660
States, shutting down all the airports,
all the hospitals, all the power
27
00:01:42,660 --> 00:01:48,170
plants, communications, in minutes,
driving the United States to the Stone
28
00:01:48,170 --> 00:01:51,850
Age without firing a single bullet.
29
00:01:52,450 --> 00:01:54,370
This is the situation we have today.
30
00:01:54,850 --> 00:01:57,630
Let's start with the phrase you've
probably heard many times by
31
00:01:57,630 --> 00:01:59,810
now, harvest now, decrypt later.
32
00:01:59,999 --> 00:02:04,560
Adversaries are already collecting
encrypted traffic today, that being TLS,
33
00:02:04,560 --> 00:02:06,509
VPN, satellite links, and mission systems.
34
00:02:06,810 --> 00:02:10,569
They don't need to decrypt it now, they
just need to store it, and the moment a
35
00:02:10,569 --> 00:02:14,450
sufficiently powerful quantum computer
comes online, or even a breakthrough
36
00:02:14,480 --> 00:02:18,969
algorithm hits, long-lived encrypted
data becomes readable overnight.
37
00:02:19,109 --> 00:02:23,209
That includes military communications,
intelligence reporting, PKI-protected
38
00:02:23,209 --> 00:02:27,450
identities, OT, ICS, and satellite
telemetry, and anything with a
39
00:02:27,450 --> 00:02:29,310
life cycle longer than 10 years.
40
00:02:29,800 --> 00:02:34,609
Google, for example, with all their
technological expertise, were bragging
41
00:02:34,609 --> 00:02:40,880
about reducing the algorithm from 20
million qubits to a million qubits.
42
00:02:40,939 --> 00:02:43,800
So everybody was very
impressed 'cause it's 20 times.
43
00:02:43,800 --> 00:02:47,690
So I said, "No, I can do much better than
that." Just as an example to tell them
44
00:02:48,200 --> 00:02:50,894
that the Chinese must have done this.
45
00:02:51,154 --> 00:02:53,115
Because I did that and it wasn't hard.
46
00:02:53,444 --> 00:02:58,054
I reduced it not by 20 times like Google
did, and a lot of other companies.
47
00:02:58,094 --> 00:03:02,974
I reduced it by 20,000 times the
number of qubits that you need.
48
00:03:03,525 --> 00:03:06,184
And with that said, what came
through loud and clear in the
49
00:03:06,184 --> 00:03:10,925
briefing was waiting until quantum
computers are here is too late.
50
00:03:11,204 --> 00:03:14,864
Migration timelines are longer than
the threat timeline, and that's why
51
00:03:14,864 --> 00:03:19,464
federal mandates now focus on near
term migration and not future planning.
52
00:03:19,835 --> 00:03:22,175
But encryption is not enough.
53
00:03:22,175 --> 00:03:23,674
It does quantum prove encryption.
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Why it is not enough?
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You encrypt and it's perfect.
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Let's say your laptop has this
unbreakable encryption, but your
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password or your server exposed
to the public is one, two, three.
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Who will not break one, two, three?
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So yet people are using their servers
and generating the key in their own
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computers, which is called pseudo random.
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You need to have completely random.
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Pseudo means fake, so it's
fake random, and then a quantum
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computer can break that.
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Moreover, we need to understand that
software only PQC is insufficient.
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Most conversations about PQC today
stop at the algorithms themselves.
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You've heard names like MLKLM for key
exchange and MLDSA for digital signatures,
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and these are NIST selected quantum
resistant algorithms, which are necessary,
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but they're not necessarily sufficient.
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Post quantum algorithms don't fix
weak entropy, compromise firmware,
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or expose execution environments.
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And three problems remain even after,
quote unquote, "upgrading your crypto".
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The first being entropy.
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If cryptographic keys are generated from
predictable or software based randomness,
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quantum safe math doesn't matter.
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Entropy quality becomes a compliance
metric and not an implementation detail.
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Secondly, identity, that being PKI
certificates and device identity are
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foundational to zero trust authentication,
secure boot, and remote attestation.
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If those roots of trust can be spoofed
or forged, then identities collapse
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no matter how good your algorithm is.
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And thirdly, execution.
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If private keys and cryptographic
operations live in memory or OS level
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processes, a compromised host means
compromised crypto, and software
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isolation at that point is not enough.
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00:05:05,574 --> 00:05:09,564
And this is where hardware anchored
execution becomes the main differentiator.
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There is a hardware component.
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00:05:11,865 --> 00:05:13,445
We have that in the cloud as well.
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That's how the IoT is then.
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We do certain things that are not
using encryption, but it needs the keys
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Everything I'm discussing with you tested,
certified by NIST, and operational.
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That's not a research project And in
this case, EigenQ's core architectural
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00:05:29,369 --> 00:05:33,730
idea can be summed up in one
phrase: entropy identity execution.
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This creates a continuous chain
of trust from power on to runtime
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because EigenQ leverages quantum
entropy as their foundation.
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It's physics-based randomness from
quantum processes with no reliance
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on pseudo-random algorithms, and its
provable key material is stronger.
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And you might be asking yourself,
"So why does that matter?"
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Because weak entropy silently undermines
every downstream control and affects
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TPM-backed based device identities,
secure boot verification, and
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continuous measurement and attestation.
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And this ties zero trust decisions
to actual device states and
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not software-based assumptions.
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And we all know by now that zero
trust only works if device trust
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can be measured and proven.
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But with trusted execution environment,
when you're doing this encryption,
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it is executed in an area of the
processor that nobody's using.
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But let's say somebody's attacking
you and they want to see how you
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are processing such that they can
interfere with the security, we are
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on the trusted execution environment.
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They can't do anything.
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And EigenQ's post-quantum
cryptography runs entirely inside
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of trusted execution environments.
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The private keys are never exposed to the
host operating system, and cryptographic
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operations are remotely attestable.
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Even if the OS is compromised,
the keys remain protected.
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And it's also important to remember
that software-based cryptography can't
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prove where it ran, whereas EigenQ's
hardware-anchored execution can.
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Or how do we... Do we have to yank out
all that you have and then put the EigenQ?
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00:07:03,160 --> 00:07:06,980
That's nuts because that will
take 10 years to do that.
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No, the, the most difficult thing
to do is to change somebody's mind.
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And how do we do that?
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You're not removing anything.
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We're gonna go and put an
envelope on top of everything.
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And, oh, I'm used to operate using my VPN.
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Yes, okay.
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We put a quantum VPN
proof on top of the VPN.
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Or use SSL.
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That's okay.
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We have a quantum proof SSL that
goes as an envelope, so it's very
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quick adoption Overall, EigenQ's
strategy means no rip and replace.
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00:07:39,045 --> 00:07:41,975
And one thing that came through
clearly in the briefing, especially
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for those of us with federal programs,
is that PQC has to deploy inside
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of existing system boundaries.
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With EigenQ's integration strategy,
no agency is replacing entire PKI
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stacks, server fleets, or mission
systems at the tactical edge.
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Because of their hardware
architecture, they are able to
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00:07:59,195 --> 00:08:03,074
emphasize hybrid cryptography
using both classical and PQC, phase
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00:08:03,074 --> 00:08:05,355
migrations, and retrofit capabilities.
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00:08:05,605 --> 00:08:09,704
Each phase in this model delivers
independent risk reduction, including
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00:08:09,704 --> 00:08:13,524
secure boot baselines, hybrid PQC
services, and fleet-wide adoption.
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00:08:13,805 --> 00:08:18,134
This overall idea elegantly fits
into how federal programs actually
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modernize and how ATOs actually work.
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But it's also not that easy.
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You have to ask yourself
the hard questions before
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implementing any PQC strategy.
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00:08:27,974 --> 00:08:30,645
Where does the PQC actually
belong in your architecture?
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00:08:30,965 --> 00:08:33,175
What systems have
long-lived data exposure?
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00:08:33,544 --> 00:08:37,495
How does this impact zero trust,
PKI, ATOs, and compliance evidence?
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What can be deployed now without
breaking the mission systems?
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Using EigenQ as part of your PQC
deployment means solutions aren't just
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installed, they're integrated, and they're
integrated into existing HPE, Dell, and
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mixed server environments, into existing
PKI and identity workflows, into fielded
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and disconnected edge systems, and it
provides hardware-anchored security,
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00:09:00,314 --> 00:09:03,444
along with federal infrastructure
realities and zero trust and
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00:09:03,444 --> 00:09:05,414
cryptography modernization programs.
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00:09:05,675 --> 00:09:08,594
Though that list might sound
like a bunch of buzzwords, it's
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00:09:08,594 --> 00:09:10,314
really about deployable trust.
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00:09:10,814 --> 00:09:12,194
So what's the bottom line up front?
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00:09:12,745 --> 00:09:15,944
Post-quantum risk is
immediate, not future-dated.
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00:09:16,274 --> 00:09:20,124
Algorithms alone do not solve
entropy, identity, or execution risk.
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00:09:20,465 --> 00:09:24,084
Hardware-anchored trust enables
zero trust that actually works.
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00:09:24,405 --> 00:09:27,984
And migration must be incremental,
attestable, and federally realistic.
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00:09:28,264 --> 00:09:32,795
And EigenQ's hardware-based solution
helps agencies implement PQC as
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00:09:32,795 --> 00:09:34,554
infrastructure and not a theory.
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00:09:34,764 --> 00:09:38,414
So if your data needs to stay protected
beyond the next refresh cycle, remember
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00:09:38,414 --> 00:09:40,045
that the clock is already ticking.
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00:09:40,234 --> 00:09:44,345
So if you wanna go deeper on PQC,
hardware-anchored zero trust, PKI
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00:09:44,345 --> 00:09:47,724
modernization, or phased migration
strategies for federal systems,
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00:09:47,884 --> 00:09:51,224
know that ATPGov is actively
working with agencies and mission
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partners on solutions right now.
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Be sure to reach out to ATPGov today at
www.atpgov.com or email info@atpgov.com or
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00:10:01,715 --> 00:10:04,015
check us out on social media on LinkedIn.
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00:10:04,265 --> 00:10:07,455
Thanks for listening, and be sure to
subscribe to the Bottom Line Up Front
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00:10:07,455 --> 00:10:11,155
wherever you get your podcasts, and stay
tuned for more distilled insights from the
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00:10:11,155 --> 00:10:13,545
front lines of tech and national security.
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00:10:13,694 --> 00:10:17,795
So until next time, stay
secure, stay mission ready.
