The only way to fix Trump's mayhem

(REUTERS)

The System Did Not Fail Alone

A Reform List Built Around Power

Robert Reich’s proposal, circulated as an appeal for candidates seeking election on November 3, presents ten reforms meant to constrain presidential abuse and unblock progressive policy. The list ranges from Supreme Court term limits and restored voting protections to wealth taxation, campaign-finance reform, limits on media consolidation, and restrictions on political interference in prosecutions.

Its central insight is sound: removing one officeholder does not dismantle the machinery that made the damage possible. But describing the resulting disorder as “mayhem Trump and his regime have created” leaves too much of that machinery politically anonymous.

Help fuel the work. Independent analysis doesn’t fund itself:☕ Buy us a coffee

Trump Had Power Because Institutions Supplied It

The presidency holds enormous institutional power over prosecutions, pardons, federal spending, appointments, and executive administration. Reich correctly identifies those pressure points. His proposed restraints are acknowledgments that presidential misconduct is not merely a matter of temperament; it becomes consequential when law and institutional practice leave room for it.

But Trump did not design every vulnerability named here. Congress controls appropriations and writes federal law. States draw congressional districts and administer elections. Supreme Court justices exercise power under lifetime appointments. Wealthy donors and corporate media owners operate through legal structures that government has chosen to preserve.

Trump exploited concentrated authority. Other institutions created, tolerated, or declined to close the openings. Any diagnosis that names the exploiter but softens the role of the enablers is incomplete.

“Abuse” Is Not a Mysterious Force

The list sometimes treats institutional failure as though it were a technical defect awaiting repair. It is also a distribution of power that benefits identifiable actors.

Gerrymandered districts protect politicians from voters. Large donors gain access and influence from privately financed elections. Owners gain leverage when media holdings become more concentrated. Fortunes preserved through stepped-up basis remain with heirs rather than being taxed on unrealized capital gains. None of these arrangements persists because Washington has overlooked a maintenance request.

They persist because people with power profit from them, while the people bearing the consequences usually have less control over legislation, litigation, and political spending.

The “Prerequisite” Claim Hides Political Choices

Reich calls all ten proposals structural prerequisites for enacting good policy. That framing is too neat. Supreme Court tenure, electoral rules, campaign financing, and voting protections plainly shape who governs and what government can do. But a wealth tax is itself a major distributive policy, not merely scaffolding for some later agenda. Restrictions on media ownership are likewise substantive choices about markets and control.

Bundling everything under “reform” can obscure the conflict at the heart of the program. These proposals would not simply make government work better. They would reduce the advantages enjoyed by incumbents, concentrated wealth, dominant media owners, and officials who benefit from weak restraints. That is why passage would be contested.

The source also says these reforms “must be passed by Congress,” while proposing a constitutional amendment or an interstate compact for the popular vote. The contradiction matters. Congress is powerful, but it is not the sole institution capable of delivering every item on the list.

A Checklist Cannot Replace a Theory of Enforcement

Several proposals name a prohibition without explaining who would enforce it. A president would be barred from influencing prosecutions. A president would be held in contempt for impounding appropriated funds. Pardons and commutations would face congressional review.

Those phrases identify real concentrations of authority, but a rule is only as durable as the institution willing and able to impose consequences. “Congressional review” could mean scrutiny without restraint. A contempt finding could become symbolism if enforcement remains uncertain. Conflict-of-interest rules can be written broadly and applied timidly.

Institutional cowardice does not disappear when a statute is enacted. If legislators, prosecutors, judges, or regulators refuse to confront powerful officials, formal safeguards become decorative.

The Systemic Error Is Organized Permission

The larger pattern is not that one president discovered a perfectly healthy government and broke it. It is that American institutions distribute extraordinary power, surround portions of it with weak or politically dependent restraints, and then pretend character will supply the missing safeguards.

Reich is right that opposition to Trump is not a governing program. The harder conclusion is that reform requires confronting every institution and constituency that converts concentrated power into protected advantage. The problem is not mayhem without an author. It is organized permission: authority granted, constraints weakened, enforcement deferred, and responsibility dispersed until no one powerful has to admit choosing the outcome.

Thanks to Alter Net

Source: The only way to fix Trump’s mayhem

Systemic Error is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

We warned them.We told them.We shouted from the rooftops.We plead.We begged.They didn’t listen.Now, we all will suffer.Y’all know what to do, right?VOTE BLUE! 💙Vote as if your life — nay, our country — depend on it.Because, this time, and every time, it does.