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Hey everyone, Dr.
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John C.
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McManus here, your host of Someone Talked, and wanted to
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kind of give a special intro to this episode that
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we had an interview with Craig Simons at the America's
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History LLC conference in Richmond, Virginia in November of 2025.
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And regretfully, recently we lost Craig. He died on October
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13th of 2026, which was really a shocker to many
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of us. And so I just wanted to take a
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quick moment And, you know, just share a few thoughts
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about what a special guy Craig was and what he
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meant to me. I first met him at a conference
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at the World War II Museum, a D-Day conference in 2014.
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It was the beginning of just a delightful friendship and
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relationship with just a good man. He was, in my opinion,
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one of the greatest ever naval historians, and his contributions
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are going to live forever. But beyond that, he was
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just a good guy. And I had the opportunity to
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work with him quite a bit. He and I served
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together as featured historians for the World War II Museum
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for its tours in Normandy. And so it was fun
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to kind of get together with Craig, chew things over.
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And I want to tell a little, just a quick
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anecdote that highlights Craig's sense of humor and maybe kind
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of sets up this interview a little bit for everybody. Um,
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so the, the tours would often start in Paris and
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the way they, uh, World War II museum had it
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set up is that, uh, sometimes the historians had to
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go in different directions with different groups and then you
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would like switch, you know, depending on which sites you
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were visiting, but you would have that kind of initial
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day or so together in Paris. And, uh, so Craig
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and I took the opportunity to have a really nice
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and kind of long breakfast with our respective wives. It
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was a delightful time. We had so much fun because,
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you know, they're just, the Simons are just wonderful people. And, uh,
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but you know, it had to head to end. We
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had to go in our separate directions at the end
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of the day. And so, uh, when that happened, Craig
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looked at us, uh, looked at my wife, Nancy and me,
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and he said, well, we'll always have Paris. And, um,
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so anytime we would, uh, we would see each other
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on these tours as we're just sort of passing in
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the night, he would, he would say that. And then
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when he would send, uh, he and his wife, Mary
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Lou would send holiday cards to us. They would, they
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would write that at the bottom of the card, we'll
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always have Paris. So that, that was kind of his
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sense of humor. Um, And he was just a good man.
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And he was a giant in our field. And I
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can say that I'm really going to miss him. But
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I can also say I was influenced by him, I
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think kind of mentored by him. This was a very
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special opportunity in retrospect that we had on Someone Talk
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to sit down with him and talk about his latest
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work among his many, many great works over the course
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of his career. So just wanted to share that perspective
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with everybody and just thank have this kind of quick
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tribute to a remarkable guy, Craig Simons. So we're at
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the America's History LLC World War II conference in the Richmond,
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Virginia area. And part of that conference is the great
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Craig Simons, who's here with us, deigned to sit down
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with us. I mean, this is just an amazing dude. So,
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I mean, in all seriousness, Craig is one of the
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greatest living naval historians and many other types of history, too.
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Author of how many books? 19.
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19.
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Is that all?
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But who's counting? Exactly. Thank you, April.
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On 19 books.
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Soon to be 20. Yeah. Yeah.
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That's great.
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Always. So anyway, Craig and I have known each other
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for years, and he's put up with me all these years,
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which makes him also a special guy and a great guy.
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So just as a teaser, we're going to have you
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on to talk about your new book in a greater depth.
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But if you could give us an update on Annapolis
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at War. Just got published. How's it all going so far?
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Yeah, I call it Annapolis Goes to War, just to
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make sure everybody gets the title right. No, that's okay.
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And I was led to it for two reasons. One
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is that the class of 1940, which, of course, graduated
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just on the cusp of war. The war was already
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going on in Europe, of course. Americans were paying partial
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attention to what was going on. So the timing of
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it is critical. The other reason is that the class
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of 1940 decided at their 25th reunion that they wanted
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as a gift to their succeeding classes at the Naval Academy.
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They wanted to leave something behind of what they remembered
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about their experiences, both at the Academy and in the war.
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And they created an archive. Now, not everybody in the
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class participated, but more than 100 did. And they answered
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nine questions. Why did you go? What was it like?
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What do you remember about Plebe Year? What were your
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classes like? What was your first duty assignment? What did
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you do in the war? And so on. So those
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who took it seriously wrote pretty substantial memoirs about those events,
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and it created this 19-box archive that nobody had looked at.
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So this gave me an opportunity to look at a
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class from the Naval Academy who lived at a very
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volatile time, a very historically significant time, and wrote about
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it and remembered it and were honest about what they
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remembered because they were writing remember for their successors. who
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would graduate subsequent to them. And so many of them
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were quite candid in what they said. So it gave
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me a window into that class, and it was fascinating.
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So you were a professor at the Naval Academy for
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many years. You've been retired there from 20 years ago,
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I guess.
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Yes.
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It's not hard to believe. Right, right.
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And you were chair or head of the history department there.
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So that's over at the Special Collections, right?
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Over in the library.
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Did you know about it all these years or just
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did that come into your.
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I had known about it from the moment it was
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created because the class of 1940 decided when they were
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going to do this, well, we need somebody who's an
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historian who can kind of help us put this together,
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show us what to do, how to arrange it and
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organize it. And my colleague, Bob Love, who's now also retired,
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is the guy who took that on. So I'm Bob's
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office was across the hall from mine, and we would
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talk all the time, all the time, about World War II.
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I knew Bob. You know Bob. You know what I'm saying.
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So I knew about this, the creation of this archive,
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and their expectation was that Bob at some point would
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write the history of the class. Well, he never got
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around to it. So I talked with him and made
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sure it was okay with him before I picked up
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that challenge and wrote the book.
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Great resource. Were there any surprises as you went through that?
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Oh, gosh, a lot of surprises because, you know, they're
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just faces in the yearbook. But then you read their
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memoirs and they become real people. I began to think
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of them as my kids because they were, you know,
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in those days when you went to the Naval Academy,
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you had to be between 16 and 20. Now it's
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between 17 and 24 because a lot of people have
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previous college or previous enlisted service. So they really are kids.
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When they first arrive. And so I got to know
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their personalities and who they were. And there was the
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guy who was the smart aleck and the guy who
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was the grind and the guy who was the athlete.
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And once they become individuals like that, then they're people.
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Yeah. I mean, and I'm sure you can't help but
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as you're researching and looking at those things, thinking that
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they're on the cusp of a global war. Yeah. Yeah.
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And they kind of knew it, you know, in a way,
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because three months before they arrived, Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland.
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And while they were juniors, you know, the Czechoslovakian crisis
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was taking place. The week they had their graduation parade,
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the British Expeditionary Force evacuated the beach at Dunkirk. So
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this is part of their living experience the whole time. Now,
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they're not thinking, oh, we're going to get into this.
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But in the back of their minds, they thought that
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this is what the world is doing. So, yeah, they
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were aware of it.
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Are there any, or tell us some recognizable names from
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that class.
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Well, that's the thing. There probably aren't any recognizable names,
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certainly not the ones I focused on, because I wanted
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to have a book that told kind of what the
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general experience was of these junior officers, not this guy's
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going to become a great admiral. I mean, there were
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admirals who came out of the class. But they're not
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my featured characters. The eight or 12 individuals who kind
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of carry the story stayed in the Navy, in one
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case the Marine Corps, for a career and retired as captains.
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And none of them were really historical figures. You can take,
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you know, John's trilogy on World War II in the Pacific,
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and their names are not in the index because these
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are not the people who moved history, but they are
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the people who made history by being the ones who
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flew the planes and conned the ships and charged the
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beaches as junior officers. And that's kind of the experience
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I wanted to illuminate.
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Good, because that's really what's needed a lot of times.
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Yeah.
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You know, everyone knows the name Nimitz.
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Right. And especially from a.
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Great book that you write.
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I've heard of it. But, yeah, it's a lot of
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times the, you know, it's kind of deliberate on my part.
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I wrote the book on Nimitz and I really like Nimitz.
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I'm really pleased with the book and the way it
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came out. But, you know, that's the war from 30,000 feet.
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That's the war from his headquarters first in Hawaii and
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then on Guam and looking down a grand strategic perspective.
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But these junior officers, when you're 23, your perspective is
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entirely different than when you're 56. So I wanted to
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capture that as well. So in Nimitz's 30,000 feet, these
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guys are at deck plate level. Yeah.
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And, of course, obviously the conflict they were part of
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is World War II, which we're here, you know, talking
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about different aspects. of World War II at this conference.
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We've got a bunch of different scholars here. Topics all
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over the map. Well, one of which, of course, is Guadalcanal.
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Our mutual friend, Charlie Niemeyer, the great Marine Corps historian,
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gave an interesting presentation on that last night. In a way,
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addressing some of the naval battles. Because, you know, this
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is the deadliest battle in the history of the Navy
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until Okinawa. And obviously, you know, that requires a lot
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of unpacking, I think. And so from your perspective as
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a naval historian, where do you see the Navy's capability
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as of like mid-1942 versus the end of the Battle
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of Guadalcanal and how that impacts?
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Well, I think the decision to go into Guadalcanal in
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the first place is a huge reach. I mean, this
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is Ernie King who really wants to grasp the initiative.
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Put the Japanese back on their heels. Be the one
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who's directing the action rather than reacting to whatever the
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Japanese are doing. So he's eager to get in some
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offensive operation. And he sees the opportunity on Guadalcanal because
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the Japanese are building an airfield there. And he defends
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it by saying, well, this is not really an offensive move.
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This is a defensive move. Because if we let them
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finish that airfield, they'll interrupt our lines of communication between
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Hawaii and Australia. So the United States goes into this
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really just on a threadbare, you know, one reinforced Marine division,
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just barely enough ships to keep them supplied. And after
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the Battle of Savo Island on the 9th of August,
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and those ships are pulled back, they don't even have
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that supply chain that ships, when they leave, take with
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them most of the barbed wire, a lot of the equipment,
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Marines needed to complete the airfield. The airfield's not finished yet.
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You know, we talk about having Henderson Field, and that
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gives us control of the skies in the daytime. But
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that field's not finished for several weeks, and the Marines
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are kind of stuck there for a while. But the
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action that takes place off of Guadalcanal and what comes
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to be known as Iron Bottom Sound because of all
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the battles that are fought there and all the ships
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that are sunk there, I think really is revealing in
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a lot of ways. First of all, it's several months long,
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The United States is hanging on, barely hanging on. The
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Japanese are losing ships faster than they can replace them.
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And it's becoming a battle of attrition. Not what King
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had in mind, but that's what it becomes. And particularly
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the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. And I'll mention this in
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particular because one of my class of 40 dudes, Robert Weatherup,
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whose academy nickname was Doc... There were quite a few
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nicknamed Doc, and I don't know why, but he was Doc,
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and he wanted to fly. He went to the Naval
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Academy in the first place because he wanted to fly,
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but the rule then was you had to serve two
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years in surface ships before you were allowed to go
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to any specialty, including flight school. So, okay, fine, I'll
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do my two years in destroyers. Well, the destroyers turned
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out to be the Duncan, the Ferenholt, and the Aaron,
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all of which were engaged in the first battle of
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Cape Esperance, then the battle of Naval Battle of Guadalcanal,
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and two of them were sunk. And he's right in
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the middle of all that. So his memoir is particularly
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vivid in terms of what he was doing and what
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was happening aboard ship and how it felt to be on,
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for example, the Ferenhold, which was one of the ships
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that got caught in that crossfire between the Japanese cruisers
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and the American cruisers in the Battle of Cape Esperance.
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And then he was on the Aaron Ward cruise, which
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was dead in the water. Its engines had been incapacitated
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within visual sight of a Japanese battleship. Not a good
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place to be. So you can imagine the way he
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described that for the benefit of future midshipmen and, of course,
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in this case, for the benefit of readers of the
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Second World War.
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Was he an ensign? He was an ensign.
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No, he's an ensign. What was his job? He was
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communications officer, but the captain said, listen, I want you
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to be next to me because my night vision is
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not that great, and you've got young eyes, and I
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want you to, so you just hang around by my shoulder.
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So when it hits the fan and shells start coming
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in from both directions, Weatherup looks around. He can't find
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a captain. Holy mackerel, where's he gone? And bullets are
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flying by. He's wounded twice, and he dives behind a
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splinter shield on the bridge, lands on top of his captains.
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who had done exactly the same thing. So that was
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his experience at Cape Ensperance.
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Did you find with some of these young men that
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you researched, did they influence any naval doctrine or strategies?
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No, they're too junior. What they are, again, back to
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the idea, they're kids. I mean, I know they're 21,
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22 years old. They're endowed with this responsibility, life and
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death decisions that have to be made in an instant.
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And they're children, really. I mean, they've been through the
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Naval Academy. Good for them. But the Naval Academy really
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depended on rote learning in those days. It wasn't really
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an institution of higher academic learning that it subsequently became
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in the years that I taught there. So they're not
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really well prepared. They come on board. 150 of them
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went to Pearl Harbor after graduation because most of them
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went on board battleships. Three of them were officers of
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the deck on board battleships on the morning of December 7th, 1941.
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They were the OOD when the planes came in and
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dropped the torpedoes. And they're 23 years old.
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So one of the key leaders for the Americans at
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Guadalcanal is Admiral Gormley.
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Yes.
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You know a lot about him. And obviously in relation
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to Nimitz and the call that Nimitz has to make
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to have him step aside.
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Right.
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I wonder if we could kind of delve into that
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a little bit, because I'm always interested in your thoughts
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on the command structure, whether there need to be the changes,
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how all this plays out.
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Right. Well, the organizational structure of the Pacific Ocean, you
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know that Nimitz is the POA, Pacific Ocean Area Commander.
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But the South Pacific was sort of carved off from
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that to become a separate theater command. And King asked Nimitz,
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who do you think would be an appropriate commander? And
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he immediately named Pye. P-Y-E, we mean Pye. But Pye,
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you see, was too closely associated with the Pearl Harbor
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catastrophe and therefore was politically unacceptable in Washington. So they said, nope,
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Pye's out. You got to name somebody else. And that's
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how he came up with Gormley. And Gormley's previous service
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to this had been as Franklin Roosevelt's personal representative to
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the British in London. So he's really playing a kind
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of diplomatic role. He's not driving ships, deploying troops and
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so forth. But he's ordered to go from that directly
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out to the South Pacific, take command of this, and
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literally the moment he takes that job, King says, oh,
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by the way, in two weeks, I want you to
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conduct a major operation and invade the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.
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So he has very little advance notice, very little preparation,
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very little support. He puts his headquarters on board this
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World War I army transport, and he's often criticized for that. Well,
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why didn't he set up a regular headquarters ashore? And
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the reason was... Because New Caledonia at the time was
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occupied by the Vichy French, and we didn't want to
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upset the Vichy French. And the Vichy French said, no,
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you can't establish a headquarters ashore. So he thought he
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was doing the diplomatically appropriate thing by staying on board ship.
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And then the final factor there is he had impacted gums.
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He had terrible, terrible pain in his mouth. And the
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dentist that's available on a World War, one transport ship
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in Noumea is not that great. So he's in pain.
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He's pressed to do something he's not really set up
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to do. He can be criticized for not having gone
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personally to Guadalcanal. He can be criticized for not personally
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attending the trial for the landings that took place in Fiji.
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Those are fair criticisms. But Nimitz knew and liked Gormley,
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knew he was smart, knew he was capable, visited Gormley
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at New Caledonia and saw what a terrible environment he
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had inherited. There was no offloading capability for ships there.
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He had originally set up his headquarters in Australia, and
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King told him, no, get closer to the front. So
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that's why he's there. So Gormley's kind of a victim
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in many ways, and Nimitz is reluctant to kick him
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to the curb uh even though clearly things are not
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working out but once halsey had recovered from his battle
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with what is probably shingles uh and becomes available uh
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nimitz sells it to gormley as now that halsey is
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available we need to take advantage of his expertise and
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experience and he's going to replace you in command and
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there was an awkward moment when gormley came back through
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hawaii on his way back to the states to have
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his teeth fixed finally uh and he has dinner with
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uh Nimitz and asks him, why did you replace me?
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What did I do wrong? And Nimitz said kind of
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a revealing thing. He says, Bob, I had to choose
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from all the officers on the planet who was best
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prepared to take that job. Were you that man? And Gormley,
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to his credit, said, no, probably not.
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He knew it. He was that self-aware. Yeah.
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We love to talk about Ernest King around here. He's
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one of the characters we track quite a bit on
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this podcast.
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John and Ernie King are so similar. We really are.
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You remind me a lot.
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Ernie King would have loved me.
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I'm curious your take, how much of his ambition to
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take Guadalcanal was based on real strategic need versus... getting
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out from under the Europe first thumb.
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Yes, that's an all of the above answer. I mean,
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both of those are clearly primary reasons for him. I
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think he genuinely believed that if you left the Japanese
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alone to build up their defensive perimeter without bothering them
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in any particular way, taking that back in 1943 or
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1944 or whenever the offensive finally began would be that
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much harder, would cost that many more lives. And that
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was probably true. It's not like it was easy. In addition,
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he's in a constant, constant confrontation with those who want
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to send everything that we're producing to England to sit
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there for six, eight, 10, 12 months before the invasion
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of continental Europe can take place. Uh, so he's eager
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to get, uh, some kind of offensive going in the
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Pacific for, uh, the opportunity to increase his share of
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00:21:05.839 --> 00:21:10.180
assets from 15% up to 30% of what's available to
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fight the war for the Pacific.
394
00:21:12.740 --> 00:21:16.240
Yeah, who could blame him? I mean, it's going to
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have to be done anyway to fight Japan at some point,
396
00:21:19.640 --> 00:21:20.849
although it makes total sense.
397
00:21:21.069 --> 00:21:23.369
No, it really does. And of course, being a son
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of a bitch, which is exactly how he described himself,
399
00:21:27.029 --> 00:21:29.250
aided him in that because people were a little bit
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00:21:29.289 --> 00:21:31.809
afraid of Ernie King. I'm still afraid of Ernie King
401
00:21:31.829 --> 00:21:33.210
and he's dead. You and me both.
402
00:21:33.470 --> 00:21:34.750
I was reading about him.
403
00:21:34.789 --> 00:21:39.769
And I was the Ernest J. King chair. Whether he
404
00:21:39.789 --> 00:21:42.630
would have approved of that is another... I don't know.
405
00:21:43.859 --> 00:21:47.660
Yeah, he's a pretty hard figure. But I think you've
406
00:21:47.680 --> 00:21:51.680
made the point as well as any historian of the
407
00:21:52.019 --> 00:21:55.890
core importance of shipping. Because every conversation we have from
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00:21:55.930 --> 00:21:58.950
an American perspective, maybe not always from a Soviet perspective,
409
00:21:58.990 --> 00:22:02.990
you know, but from an American perspective, everything depends on shipping.
410
00:22:03.349 --> 00:22:08.130
Absolutely. And people tend to bypass that because it's not glamorous. Yeah.
411
00:22:08.369 --> 00:22:10.150
I mean, first of all, the Battle of the Atlantic. Oh, yeah,
412
00:22:10.170 --> 00:22:12.960
it was important. Sure. Yeah. But boring and tough and
413
00:22:13.019 --> 00:22:16.140
seasickness and so on. But boy, was that critical. And
414
00:22:16.279 --> 00:22:19.420
shipping worldwide. We simply, when the war began, did not
415
00:22:19.480 --> 00:22:22.779
have enough shipping. to sustain a war in the Atlantic,
416
00:22:22.859 --> 00:22:25.339
in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean, in the South Pacific.
417
00:22:25.960 --> 00:22:28.180
We just didn't have the shipping. That's one reason why,
418
00:22:28.299 --> 00:22:32.359
after the Battle of Savo Island, Gormley pulled those transport
419
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ships away from the beachhead. He could not afford to
420
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lose them. In fact, during the Battle of Savo Island,
421
00:22:38.430 --> 00:22:42.130
if Tanaka had ignored the cruisers and gone straight for
422
00:22:42.150 --> 00:22:44.730
the transports, he might have done more damage to the
423
00:22:44.789 --> 00:22:48.369
Allied cause than by sinking those cruisers. So shipping was
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00:22:48.630 --> 00:22:53.460
absolutely critical. Now, that's overcome in time by the absolutely
425
00:22:53.599 --> 00:22:58.039
remarkable American ability to build ships so fast, so quickly,
426
00:22:58.940 --> 00:23:01.440
faster than the Germans could sink them, faster than they
427
00:23:01.480 --> 00:23:06.109
could be deployed to the Pacific, so that by 1944, certainly,
428
00:23:06.150 --> 00:23:09.690
and even by 1943, the shipping problem is beginning to
429
00:23:09.730 --> 00:23:13.410
be resolved. But in 1942, it's very tight. Yeah.
430
00:23:13.849 --> 00:23:16.339
Yeah, there just isn't much there. And, I mean, I'm
431
00:23:16.380 --> 00:23:18.140
not aware of any other time in history when any
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00:23:18.180 --> 00:23:21.930
power built shipping that quickly. No. And efficiently.
433
00:23:22.410 --> 00:23:25.730
Right. And effectively. Right, right. You know, I mean, a
434
00:23:25.750 --> 00:23:28.349
couple of examples. It took 250 days to build a
435
00:23:28.369 --> 00:23:33.779
ship going full speed, double shift, before the war. By
436
00:23:33.799 --> 00:23:35.420
the middle of the war, they were building them in
437
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17 days. I mean, and, you know, they would launch
438
00:23:38.559 --> 00:23:41.000
a ship, and the day it hit the water, they
439
00:23:41.019 --> 00:23:43.710
put a new keel in the slot. And these are
440
00:23:43.829 --> 00:23:47.869
all new shipyards that were being built, even as the
441
00:23:47.910 --> 00:23:50.829
ships themselves were being built. So it's truly remarkable.
442
00:23:50.930 --> 00:23:52.990
And just last thought, because we're running out of time.
443
00:23:53.049 --> 00:23:55.819
The amazing thing, too, is a lot of the LSTs, which, again,
444
00:23:56.019 --> 00:23:58.559
you've gone into that in great depth, pointing out the
445
00:23:58.619 --> 00:24:01.740
importance of LSTs to the whole global war effort. A
446
00:24:01.759 --> 00:24:03.940
lot of them are not built on the coast. They're
447
00:24:03.960 --> 00:24:04.859
built in the river system.
448
00:24:04.880 --> 00:24:09.480
Yeah, yeah, yeah. The middle of the country. Right. Yeah, Evansville, Indiana, Pittsburgh.
449
00:24:09.900 --> 00:24:13.019
I mean, strange places you wouldn't think of as. constructors
450
00:24:13.059 --> 00:24:15.940
of deep draft ocean-going ships. But if shipping is the
451
00:24:15.980 --> 00:24:20.130
bottleneck globally, LSTs are the bottleneck within shipping. So there
452
00:24:20.150 --> 00:24:22.450
were never, never quite enough of them.
453
00:24:22.509 --> 00:24:23.730
Until the end, exactly.
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Right, right up until D-Day.
455
00:24:25.329 --> 00:24:28.029
I think Evansville built, what, 40% of them?
456
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Something, I mean, on the Ohio and Indiana rivers, yeah.
457
00:24:31.569 --> 00:24:32.630
And there's one there today.
458
00:24:32.890 --> 00:24:33.430
Yes, there is.
459
00:24:33.569 --> 00:24:37.710
And they still run it. So if you're ever in
460
00:24:37.730 --> 00:24:40.720
that area. Everybody listening, please go see that.
461
00:24:40.799 --> 00:24:42.299
Worth a visit. Yeah, for sure.
462
00:24:42.319 --> 00:24:44.539
Well, Craig Simons, this has been amazing to sit down
463
00:24:44.599 --> 00:24:47.140
with you. As I said, we're going to go into
464
00:24:47.160 --> 00:24:49.759
more depth on your new book next year. All right.
465
00:24:50.059 --> 00:24:52.230
Look forward to that. We appreciate you making time for us.
466
00:24:52.460 --> 00:24:54.049
You guys are fun. I appreciate being here.
467
00:24:54.109 --> 00:24:57.509
So you just heard what was, unfortunately in retrospect, our
468
00:24:57.549 --> 00:25:01.390
last opportunity on Someone Talked to sit down and talk
469
00:25:01.430 --> 00:25:04.789
it over with the amazing, the legendary, the great Craig Simons,
470
00:25:05.009 --> 00:25:07.460
who was just a A wonderful guy and one of
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the great historians of all time. Craig, wherever you are,
472
00:25:13.490 --> 00:25:17.069
thank you so much for making time for us, just
473
00:25:17.109 --> 00:25:19.549
for being the kind of guy that you were. We
474
00:25:20.230 --> 00:25:23.619
will never forget you. And I'll just close by saying
475
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we'll always have Paris.
1
00:00:00.030 --> 00:00:00.970
Hey everyone, Dr.
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John C.
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McManus here, your host of Someone Talked, and wanted to
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kind of give a special intro to this episode that
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we had an interview with Craig Simons at the America's
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History LLC conference in Richmond, Virginia in November of 2025.
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And regretfully, recently we lost Craig. He died on October
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13th of 2026, which was really a shocker to many
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of us. And so I just wanted to take a
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quick moment And, you know, just share a few thoughts
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about what a special guy Craig was and what he
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meant to me. I first met him at a conference
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at the World War II Museum, a D-Day conference in 2014.
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It was the beginning of just a delightful friendship and
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relationship with just a good man. He was, in my opinion,
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one of the greatest ever naval historians, and his contributions
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are going to live forever. But beyond that, he was
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just a good guy. And I had the opportunity to
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work with him quite a bit. He and I served
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together as featured historians for the World War II Museum
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for its tours in Normandy. And so it was fun
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to kind of get together with Craig, chew things over.
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And I want to tell a little, just a quick
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anecdote that highlights Craig's sense of humor and maybe kind
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of sets up this interview a little bit for everybody. Um,
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so the, the tours would often start in Paris and
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the way they, uh, World War II museum had it
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set up is that, uh, sometimes the historians had to
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go in different directions with different groups and then you
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would like switch, you know, depending on which sites you
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were visiting, but you would have that kind of initial
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day or so together in Paris. And, uh, so Craig
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and I took the opportunity to have a really nice
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and kind of long breakfast with our respective wives. It
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was a delightful time. We had so much fun because,
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you know, they're just, the Simons are just wonderful people. And, uh,
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but you know, it had to head to end. We
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had to go in our separate directions at the end
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of the day. And so, uh, when that happened, Craig
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looked at us, uh, looked at my wife, Nancy and me,
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and he said, well, we'll always have Paris. And, um,
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so anytime we would, uh, we would see each other
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on these tours as we're just sort of passing in
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the night, he would, he would say that. And then
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when he would send, uh, he and his wife, Mary
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Lou would send holiday cards to us. They would, they
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would write that at the bottom of the card, we'll
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always have Paris. So that, that was kind of his
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sense of humor. Um, And he was just a good man.
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And he was a giant in our field. And I
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can say that I'm really going to miss him. But
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I can also say I was influenced by him, I
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think kind of mentored by him. This was a very
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special opportunity in retrospect that we had on Someone Talk
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to sit down with him and talk about his latest
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work among his many, many great works over the course
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of his career. So just wanted to share that perspective
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with everybody and just thank have this kind of quick
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tribute to a remarkable guy, Craig Simons. So we're at
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the America's History LLC World War II conference in the Richmond,
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Virginia area. And part of that conference is the great
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Craig Simons, who's here with us, deigned to sit down
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with us. I mean, this is just an amazing dude. So,
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I mean, in all seriousness, Craig is one of the
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greatest living naval historians and many other types of history, too.
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Author of how many books? 19.
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19.
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Is that all?
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But who's counting? Exactly. Thank you, April.
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On 19 books.
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Soon to be 20. Yeah. Yeah.
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That's great.
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Always. So anyway, Craig and I have known each other
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for years, and he's put up with me all these years,
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which makes him also a special guy and a great guy.
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So just as a teaser, we're going to have you
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on to talk about your new book in a greater depth.
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But if you could give us an update on Annapolis
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at War. Just got published. How's it all going so far?
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Yeah, I call it Annapolis Goes to War, just to
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make sure everybody gets the title right. No, that's okay.
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And I was led to it for two reasons. One
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is that the class of 1940, which, of course, graduated
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just on the cusp of war. The war was already
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going on in Europe, of course. Americans were paying partial
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attention to what was going on. So the timing of
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it is critical. The other reason is that the class
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of 1940 decided at their 25th reunion that they wanted
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as a gift to their succeeding classes at the Naval Academy.
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They wanted to leave something behind of what they remembered
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about their experiences, both at the Academy and in the war.
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And they created an archive. Now, not everybody in the
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class participated, but more than 100 did. And they answered
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nine questions. Why did you go? What was it like?
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What do you remember about Plebe Year? What were your
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classes like? What was your first duty assignment? What did
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you do in the war? And so on. So those
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who took it seriously wrote pretty substantial memoirs about those events,
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and it created this 19-box archive that nobody had looked at.
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So this gave me an opportunity to look at a
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class from the Naval Academy who lived at a very
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volatile time, a very historically significant time, and wrote about
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it and remembered it and were honest about what they
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remembered because they were writing remember for their successors. who
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would graduate subsequent to them. And so many of them
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were quite candid in what they said. So it gave
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me a window into that class, and it was fascinating.
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So you were a professor at the Naval Academy for
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many years. You've been retired there from 20 years ago,
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I guess.
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Yes.
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It's not hard to believe. Right, right.
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And you were chair or head of the history department there.
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So that's over at the Special Collections, right?
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Over in the library.
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Did you know about it all these years or just
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did that come into your.
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I had known about it from the moment it was
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created because the class of 1940 decided when they were
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going to do this, well, we need somebody who's an
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historian who can kind of help us put this together,
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show us what to do, how to arrange it and
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organize it. And my colleague, Bob Love, who's now also retired,
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is the guy who took that on. So I'm Bob's
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office was across the hall from mine, and we would
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talk all the time, all the time, about World War II.
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I knew Bob. You know Bob. You know what I'm saying.
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So I knew about this, the creation of this archive,
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and their expectation was that Bob at some point would
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write the history of the class. Well, he never got
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around to it. So I talked with him and made
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sure it was okay with him before I picked up
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that challenge and wrote the book.
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Great resource. Were there any surprises as you went through that?
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Oh, gosh, a lot of surprises because, you know, they're
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just faces in the yearbook. But then you read their
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memoirs and they become real people. I began to think
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of them as my kids because they were, you know,
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in those days when you went to the Naval Academy,
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you had to be between 16 and 20. Now it's
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between 17 and 24 because a lot of people have
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previous college or previous enlisted service. So they really are kids.
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When they first arrive. And so I got to know
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their personalities and who they were. And there was the
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guy who was the smart aleck and the guy who
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was the grind and the guy who was the athlete.
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And once they become individuals like that, then they're people.
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Yeah. I mean, and I'm sure you can't help but
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as you're researching and looking at those things, thinking that
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they're on the cusp of a global war. Yeah. Yeah.
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And they kind of knew it, you know, in a way,
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because three months before they arrived, Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland.
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And while they were juniors, you know, the Czechoslovakian crisis
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was taking place. The week they had their graduation parade,
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the British Expeditionary Force evacuated the beach at Dunkirk. So
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this is part of their living experience the whole time. Now,
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they're not thinking, oh, we're going to get into this.
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But in the back of their minds, they thought that
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this is what the world is doing. So, yeah, they
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were aware of it.
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Are there any, or tell us some recognizable names from
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that class.
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Well, that's the thing. There probably aren't any recognizable names,
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certainly not the ones I focused on, because I wanted
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to have a book that told kind of what the
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general experience was of these junior officers, not this guy's
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going to become a great admiral. I mean, there were
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admirals who came out of the class. But they're not
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my featured characters. The eight or 12 individuals who kind
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of carry the story stayed in the Navy, in one
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case the Marine Corps, for a career and retired as captains.
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And none of them were really historical figures. You can take,
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you know, John's trilogy on World War II in the Pacific,
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and their names are not in the index because these
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are not the people who moved history, but they are
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the people who made history by being the ones who
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flew the planes and conned the ships and charged the
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beaches as junior officers. And that's kind of the experience
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I wanted to illuminate.
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Good, because that's really what's needed a lot of times.
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Yeah.
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You know, everyone knows the name Nimitz.
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Right. And especially from a.
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Great book that you write.
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I've heard of it. But, yeah, it's a lot of
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times the, you know, it's kind of deliberate on my part.
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I wrote the book on Nimitz and I really like Nimitz.
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I'm really pleased with the book and the way it
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came out. But, you know, that's the war from 30,000 feet.
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That's the war from his headquarters first in Hawaii and
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then on Guam and looking down a grand strategic perspective.
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But these junior officers, when you're 23, your perspective is
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entirely different than when you're 56. So I wanted to
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capture that as well. So in Nimitz's 30,000 feet, these
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guys are at deck plate level. Yeah.
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And, of course, obviously the conflict they were part of
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is World War II, which we're here, you know, talking
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about different aspects. of World War II at this conference.
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We've got a bunch of different scholars here. Topics all
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over the map. Well, one of which, of course, is Guadalcanal.
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Our mutual friend, Charlie Niemeyer, the great Marine Corps historian,
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gave an interesting presentation on that last night. In a way,
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addressing some of the naval battles. Because, you know, this
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is the deadliest battle in the history of the Navy
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until Okinawa. And obviously, you know, that requires a lot
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of unpacking, I think. And so from your perspective as
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a naval historian, where do you see the Navy's capability
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as of like mid-1942 versus the end of the Battle
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of Guadalcanal and how that impacts?
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Well, I think the decision to go into Guadalcanal in
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the first place is a huge reach. I mean, this
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is Ernie King who really wants to grasp the initiative.
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Put the Japanese back on their heels. Be the one
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who's directing the action rather than reacting to whatever the
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Japanese are doing. So he's eager to get in some
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offensive operation. And he sees the opportunity on Guadalcanal because
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the Japanese are building an airfield there. And he defends
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it by saying, well, this is not really an offensive move.
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This is a defensive move. Because if we let them
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finish that airfield, they'll interrupt our lines of communication between
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Hawaii and Australia. So the United States goes into this
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really just on a threadbare, you know, one reinforced Marine division,
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just barely enough ships to keep them supplied. And after
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the Battle of Savo Island on the 9th of August,
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and those ships are pulled back, they don't even have
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that supply chain that ships, when they leave, take with
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them most of the barbed wire, a lot of the equipment,
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Marines needed to complete the airfield. The airfield's not finished yet.
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You know, we talk about having Henderson Field, and that
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gives us control of the skies in the daytime. But
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that field's not finished for several weeks, and the Marines
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are kind of stuck there for a while. But the
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action that takes place off of Guadalcanal and what comes
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to be known as Iron Bottom Sound because of all
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the battles that are fought there and all the ships
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that are sunk there, I think really is revealing in
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a lot of ways. First of all, it's several months long,
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The United States is hanging on, barely hanging on. The
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Japanese are losing ships faster than they can replace them.
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And it's becoming a battle of attrition. Not what King
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had in mind, but that's what it becomes. And particularly
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the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. And I'll mention this in
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particular because one of my class of 40 dudes, Robert Weatherup,
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whose academy nickname was Doc... There were quite a few
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nicknamed Doc, and I don't know why, but he was Doc,
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and he wanted to fly. He went to the Naval
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Academy in the first place because he wanted to fly,
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but the rule then was you had to serve two
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years in surface ships before you were allowed to go
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to any specialty, including flight school. So, okay, fine, I'll
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do my two years in destroyers. Well, the destroyers turned
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out to be the Duncan, the Ferenholt, and the Aaron,
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all of which were engaged in the first battle of
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Cape Esperance, then the battle of Naval Battle of Guadalcanal,
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and two of them were sunk. And he's right in
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the middle of all that. So his memoir is particularly
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vivid in terms of what he was doing and what
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was happening aboard ship and how it felt to be on,
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for example, the Ferenhold, which was one of the ships
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that got caught in that crossfire between the Japanese cruisers
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and the American cruisers in the Battle of Cape Esperance.
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And then he was on the Aaron Ward cruise, which
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was dead in the water. Its engines had been incapacitated
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within visual sight of a Japanese battleship. Not a good
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place to be. So you can imagine the way he
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described that for the benefit of future midshipmen and, of course,
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in this case, for the benefit of readers of the
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Second World War.
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Was he an ensign? He was an ensign.
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No, he's an ensign. What was his job? He was
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communications officer, but the captain said, listen, I want you
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to be next to me because my night vision is
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not that great, and you've got young eyes, and I
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want you to, so you just hang around by my shoulder.
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So when it hits the fan and shells start coming
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in from both directions, Weatherup looks around. He can't find
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a captain. Holy mackerel, where's he gone? And bullets are
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flying by. He's wounded twice, and he dives behind a
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splinter shield on the bridge, lands on top of his captains.
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who had done exactly the same thing. So that was
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his experience at Cape Ensperance.
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Did you find with some of these young men that
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you researched, did they influence any naval doctrine or strategies?
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No, they're too junior. What they are, again, back to
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the idea, they're kids. I mean, I know they're 21,
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22 years old. They're endowed with this responsibility, life and
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death decisions that have to be made in an instant.
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And they're children, really. I mean, they've been through the
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Naval Academy. Good for them. But the Naval Academy really
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depended on rote learning in those days. It wasn't really
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an institution of higher academic learning that it subsequently became
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in the years that I taught there. So they're not
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really well prepared. They come on board. 150 of them
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went to Pearl Harbor after graduation because most of them
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went on board battleships. Three of them were officers of
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the deck on board battleships on the morning of December 7th, 1941.
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They were the OOD when the planes came in and
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dropped the torpedoes. And they're 23 years old.
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So one of the key leaders for the Americans at
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Guadalcanal is Admiral Gormley.
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Yes.
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You know a lot about him. And obviously in relation
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to Nimitz and the call that Nimitz has to make
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to have him step aside.
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Right.
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I wonder if we could kind of delve into that
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a little bit, because I'm always interested in your thoughts
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on the command structure, whether there need to be the changes,
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how all this plays out.
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Right. Well, the organizational structure of the Pacific Ocean, you
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know that Nimitz is the POA, Pacific Ocean Area Commander.
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But the South Pacific was sort of carved off from
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that to become a separate theater command. And King asked Nimitz,
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who do you think would be an appropriate commander? And
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he immediately named Pye. P-Y-E, we mean Pye. But Pye,
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you see, was too closely associated with the Pearl Harbor
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catastrophe and therefore was politically unacceptable in Washington. So they said, nope,
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Pye's out. You got to name somebody else. And that's
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how he came up with Gormley. And Gormley's previous service
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to this had been as Franklin Roosevelt's personal representative to
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the British in London. So he's really playing a kind
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of diplomatic role. He's not driving ships, deploying troops and
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so forth. But he's ordered to go from that directly
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out to the South Pacific, take command of this, and
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literally the moment he takes that job, King says, oh,
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by the way, in two weeks, I want you to
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conduct a major operation and invade the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.
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So he has very little advance notice, very little preparation,
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very little support. He puts his headquarters on board this
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World War I army transport, and he's often criticized for that. Well,
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why didn't he set up a regular headquarters ashore? And
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the reason was... Because New Caledonia at the time was
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occupied by the Vichy French, and we didn't want to
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upset the Vichy French. And the Vichy French said, no,
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you can't establish a headquarters ashore. So he thought he
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was doing the diplomatically appropriate thing by staying on board ship.
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And then the final factor there is he had impacted gums.
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He had terrible, terrible pain in his mouth. And the
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dentist that's available on a World War, one transport ship
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in Noumea is not that great. So he's in pain.
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He's pressed to do something he's not really set up
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to do. He can be criticized for not having gone
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personally to Guadalcanal. He can be criticized for not personally
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attending the trial for the landings that took place in Fiji.
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Those are fair criticisms. But Nimitz knew and liked Gormley,
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knew he was smart, knew he was capable, visited Gormley
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at New Caledonia and saw what a terrible environment he
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had inherited. There was no offloading capability for ships there.
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He had originally set up his headquarters in Australia, and
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King told him, no, get closer to the front. So
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that's why he's there. So Gormley's kind of a victim
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in many ways, and Nimitz is reluctant to kick him
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to the curb uh even though clearly things are not
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working out but once halsey had recovered from his battle
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with what is probably shingles uh and becomes available uh
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nimitz sells it to gormley as now that halsey is
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available we need to take advantage of his expertise and
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experience and he's going to replace you in command and
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there was an awkward moment when gormley came back through
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hawaii on his way back to the states to have
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his teeth fixed finally uh and he has dinner with
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uh Nimitz and asks him, why did you replace me?
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What did I do wrong? And Nimitz said kind of
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a revealing thing. He says, Bob, I had to choose
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from all the officers on the planet who was best
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prepared to take that job. Were you that man? And Gormley,
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to his credit, said, no, probably not.
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He knew it. He was that self-aware. Yeah.
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We love to talk about Ernest King around here. He's
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one of the characters we track quite a bit on
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this podcast.
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John and Ernie King are so similar. We really are.
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You remind me a lot.
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Ernie King would have loved me.
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I'm curious your take, how much of his ambition to
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take Guadalcanal was based on real strategic need versus... getting
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out from under the Europe first thumb.
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Yes, that's an all of the above answer. I mean,
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both of those are clearly primary reasons for him. I
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think he genuinely believed that if you left the Japanese
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alone to build up their defensive perimeter without bothering them
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in any particular way, taking that back in 1943 or
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1944 or whenever the offensive finally began would be that
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much harder, would cost that many more lives. And that
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was probably true. It's not like it was easy. In addition,
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he's in a constant, constant confrontation with those who want
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to send everything that we're producing to England to sit
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there for six, eight, 10, 12 months before the invasion
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of continental Europe can take place. Uh, so he's eager
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to get, uh, some kind of offensive going in the
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Pacific for, uh, the opportunity to increase his share of
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assets from 15% up to 30% of what's available to
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fight the war for the Pacific.
394
00:21:12.740 --> 00:21:16.240
Yeah, who could blame him? I mean, it's going to
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have to be done anyway to fight Japan at some point,
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although it makes total sense.
397
00:21:21.069 --> 00:21:23.369
No, it really does. And of course, being a son
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of a bitch, which is exactly how he described himself,
399
00:21:27.029 --> 00:21:29.250
aided him in that because people were a little bit
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00:21:29.289 --> 00:21:31.809
afraid of Ernie King. I'm still afraid of Ernie King
401
00:21:31.829 --> 00:21:33.210
and he's dead. You and me both.
402
00:21:33.470 --> 00:21:34.750
I was reading about him.
403
00:21:34.789 --> 00:21:39.769
And I was the Ernest J. King chair. Whether he
404
00:21:39.789 --> 00:21:42.630
would have approved of that is another... I don't know.
405
00:21:43.859 --> 00:21:47.660
Yeah, he's a pretty hard figure. But I think you've
406
00:21:47.680 --> 00:21:51.680
made the point as well as any historian of the
407
00:21:52.019 --> 00:21:55.890
core importance of shipping. Because every conversation we have from
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00:21:55.930 --> 00:21:58.950
an American perspective, maybe not always from a Soviet perspective,
409
00:21:58.990 --> 00:22:02.990
you know, but from an American perspective, everything depends on shipping.
410
00:22:03.349 --> 00:22:08.130
Absolutely. And people tend to bypass that because it's not glamorous. Yeah.
411
00:22:08.369 --> 00:22:10.150
I mean, first of all, the Battle of the Atlantic. Oh, yeah,
412
00:22:10.170 --> 00:22:12.960
it was important. Sure. Yeah. But boring and tough and
413
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seasickness and so on. But boy, was that critical. And
414
00:22:16.279 --> 00:22:19.420
shipping worldwide. We simply, when the war began, did not
415
00:22:19.480 --> 00:22:22.779
have enough shipping. to sustain a war in the Atlantic,
416
00:22:22.859 --> 00:22:25.339
in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean, in the South Pacific.
417
00:22:25.960 --> 00:22:28.180
We just didn't have the shipping. That's one reason why,
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after the Battle of Savo Island, Gormley pulled those transport
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ships away from the beachhead. He could not afford to
420
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lose them. In fact, during the Battle of Savo Island,
421
00:22:38.430 --> 00:22:42.130
if Tanaka had ignored the cruisers and gone straight for
422
00:22:42.150 --> 00:22:44.730
the transports, he might have done more damage to the
423
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Allied cause than by sinking those cruisers. So shipping was
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absolutely critical. Now, that's overcome in time by the absolutely
425
00:22:53.599 --> 00:22:58.039
remarkable American ability to build ships so fast, so quickly,
426
00:22:58.940 --> 00:23:01.440
faster than the Germans could sink them, faster than they
427
00:23:01.480 --> 00:23:06.109
could be deployed to the Pacific, so that by 1944, certainly,
428
00:23:06.150 --> 00:23:09.690
and even by 1943, the shipping problem is beginning to
429
00:23:09.730 --> 00:23:13.410
be resolved. But in 1942, it's very tight. Yeah.
430
00:23:13.849 --> 00:23:16.339
Yeah, there just isn't much there. And, I mean, I'm
431
00:23:16.380 --> 00:23:18.140
not aware of any other time in history when any
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power built shipping that quickly. No. And efficiently.
433
00:23:22.410 --> 00:23:25.730
Right. And effectively. Right, right. You know, I mean, a
434
00:23:25.750 --> 00:23:28.349
couple of examples. It took 250 days to build a
435
00:23:28.369 --> 00:23:33.779
ship going full speed, double shift, before the war. By
436
00:23:33.799 --> 00:23:35.420
the middle of the war, they were building them in
437
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17 days. I mean, and, you know, they would launch
438
00:23:38.559 --> 00:23:41.000
a ship, and the day it hit the water, they
439
00:23:41.019 --> 00:23:43.710
put a new keel in the slot. And these are
440
00:23:43.829 --> 00:23:47.869
all new shipyards that were being built, even as the
441
00:23:47.910 --> 00:23:50.829
ships themselves were being built. So it's truly remarkable.
442
00:23:50.930 --> 00:23:52.990
And just last thought, because we're running out of time.
443
00:23:53.049 --> 00:23:55.819
The amazing thing, too, is a lot of the LSTs, which, again,
444
00:23:56.019 --> 00:23:58.559
you've gone into that in great depth, pointing out the
445
00:23:58.619 --> 00:24:01.740
importance of LSTs to the whole global war effort. A
446
00:24:01.759 --> 00:24:03.940
lot of them are not built on the coast. They're
447
00:24:03.960 --> 00:24:04.859
built in the river system.
448
00:24:04.880 --> 00:24:09.480
Yeah, yeah, yeah. The middle of the country. Right. Yeah, Evansville, Indiana, Pittsburgh.
449
00:24:09.900 --> 00:24:13.019
I mean, strange places you wouldn't think of as. constructors
450
00:24:13.059 --> 00:24:15.940
of deep draft ocean-going ships. But if shipping is the
451
00:24:15.980 --> 00:24:20.130
bottleneck globally, LSTs are the bottleneck within shipping. So there
452
00:24:20.150 --> 00:24:22.450
were never, never quite enough of them.
453
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Until the end, exactly.
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Right, right up until D-Day.
455
00:24:25.329 --> 00:24:28.029
I think Evansville built, what, 40% of them?
456
00:24:28.069 --> 00:24:31.529
Something, I mean, on the Ohio and Indiana rivers, yeah.
457
00:24:31.569 --> 00:24:32.630
And there's one there today.
458
00:24:32.890 --> 00:24:33.430
Yes, there is.
459
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And they still run it. So if you're ever in
460
00:24:37.730 --> 00:24:40.720
that area. Everybody listening, please go see that.
461
00:24:40.799 --> 00:24:42.299
Worth a visit. Yeah, for sure.
462
00:24:42.319 --> 00:24:44.539
Well, Craig Simons, this has been amazing to sit down
463
00:24:44.599 --> 00:24:47.140
with you. As I said, we're going to go into
464
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more depth on your new book next year. All right.
465
00:24:50.059 --> 00:24:52.230
Look forward to that. We appreciate you making time for us.
466
00:24:52.460 --> 00:24:54.049
You guys are fun. I appreciate being here.
467
00:24:54.109 --> 00:24:57.509
So you just heard what was, unfortunately in retrospect, our
468
00:24:57.549 --> 00:25:01.390
last opportunity on Someone Talked to sit down and talk
469
00:25:01.430 --> 00:25:04.789
it over with the amazing, the legendary, the great Craig Simons,
470
00:25:05.009 --> 00:25:07.460
who was just a A wonderful guy and one of
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00:25:07.500 --> 00:25:13.400
the great historians of all time. Craig, wherever you are,
472
00:25:13.490 --> 00:25:17.069
thank you so much for making time for us, just
473
00:25:17.109 --> 00:25:19.549
for being the kind of guy that you were. We
474
00:25:20.230 --> 00:25:23.619
will never forget you. And I'll just close by saying
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we'll always have Paris.
