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00:00:12.240Thanks for tuning in to Simplifying Cyber.
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00:00:15.679I'm Aaron Pritz, and today we are here with two special guests.
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00:00:16.640No Cody Rivers.
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00:00:18.399Cody's off doing something else.
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00:00:21.440And uh this is a little bit of another impromptu episode.
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00:00:26.079So pleased to be joined with uh or by Jim Wales and Bronwyn Hudson.
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00:00:46.799Bronwyn is our fearless uh show publisher, and Jim is our fearless uh cyber, he leads a lot of cyber awareness programs and driving some of the human uh risk management program changes that we're actually sharing a lot of on uh social media and LinkedIn uh this month and building up obviously towards October, although we like to make it a year-round thing.
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00:00:47.439All right.
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00:00:55.920So today's topic is uh, you know, I was writing a another piece for my newsletter, um, Risk Realist, on LinkedIn.
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00:01:10.000And the piece was uh stemmed from a conversation I had with a financial services executive, and he was concerned and had shared some thought leadership on agentic AI bots that that can talk and use voice.
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00:01:21.920And we we all kind of you know have probably on our phones, if you've got Chat GTP or Jim and I or whatever, you've probably engaged into the phone version of the talking thing where you can chat with it and have a conversation.
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00:01:37.519The the agents that he was talking about were more um agents that you could build into semi-autonomous agents, and they could make things like phone call, outbound phone calls, and they could negotiate reductions and fees with a call center.
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00:01:42.640And his concern was, and you can read more in the article, um, forget about cybersecurity.
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00:01:45.040Like, business processes weren't designed for this.
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00:01:51.599Like now the call centers were designing bots for years, and they started out real, real bad, and now they're a little bit less bad.
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00:01:54.799But we're all used to dealing with them at the call center.
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00:01:57.599The call centers are not used to the bots coming for them.
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00:02:03.359So that was kind of the risk of like, let's let's go down that path of like, that's not even a cyber thing.
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00:02:12.719What business processes will need to change to tell people, you know, could you, should you even be negotiating with this bot without the human owner of them on the call?
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00:02:14.400So that's where it started.
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00:02:19.759And then I want to get your reaction on that, but then I pivoted quickly to oh my gosh, what's the cyber implications of this?
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00:02:30.400And I'm like, I'm sure someone can or you could build a um uh an agent that would um be deceptive and be able to make calls and do bad things.
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00:02:41.360What I didn't realize though is it only took me about 10 minutes using a free version of a widely available um SaaS platform to build an agent.
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00:02:48.240And I um used like a wizard to you know ask me some questions, and I said, I want you to manipulate people over the phone.
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00:02:56.080And I made it sound very training and you know, um benevolent in scope so that I could get past the warning flags that it might throw out.
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00:03:06.080But then I took that prompt that it, the system prompt that it started with, I threw it into Claude and I gave it some more practitioner knowledge to be able to make it more effective.
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00:03:16.080So end to end, I was up and running with a um an agent that could make phone calls to a 317 Indianapolis area code number.
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00:03:19.919Um, so it would show up and it would sound like it's local in 15 minutes.
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00:03:26.80015 minutes flat, no experience, guided by Claude to tell me which tools I should look into.
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00:03:28.159So let me pause right there.
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00:03:34.080Let me get your reaction to the I mean I'm 20 years out of being a technical hands-on programmer.
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00:03:37.280I did not look at a single line of code to do any of this.
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00:03:39.039Which what are your thoughts?
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00:03:41.520Well, I'm gonna go scream into a pillow.
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00:03:43.360Jim, what you got?
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00:03:46.960Make sure you mute your mic uh if you're doing that.
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00:03:48.960But I will not be muting my mic.
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00:04:00.719Yeah, it's um it it's not a surprise uh to me that that we're at this point, um, because I've been kind of watching this uh evolve.
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00:04:06.479Um, but it does it does concern me because it is so easy and it's so approachable.
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00:04:19.120And um and I I think that it's something that there's probably a a large part of the end user um population that is they're not ready for this.
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00:04:20.240Yeah.
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00:04:21.120Totally.
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00:04:21.519Yeah.
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00:04:39.040It's uh the the ability to to I mean some of these attacks that that are gonna be facilitated with this, you know, like the um you know, these uh the f the fakes and fake and impersonation type attacks um are not something that's necessarily new, but it's been something that's really hard to scale.
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00:04:42.079Well, the the days of not being able to scale that are now gone.
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00:04:44.639And and that and that's what's really worrisome about it.
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00:04:45.279Yep.
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00:04:52.560Yeah, like five probably less years ago, like penetration tests, there were options for doing phone phishing.
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00:04:53.759No one ever bought it.
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00:04:56.959It was like a premium, you know, very few firms actually did it.
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00:04:58.879A couple that I can think of.
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00:05:00.800Um, we all knew about it.
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00:05:07.120If you've gone to DEF CON, you've you know most likely gravitated to the social engineering village.
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00:05:12.480Cool way to spend a couple hours listening to competitive people do a contest with that.
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00:05:20.160But it was very few programs that actually had any capabilities to vish their employees.
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00:05:26.879And I remember like one of the awareness platforms created a vishing capability, or maybe it was text message, but it was super clunky.
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00:05:32.639It sounded like a 1995 robot, you know, robotic, you know, phone phone tree system.
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00:05:36.959It wasn't interactive, it wasn't in local dialect and whatnot.
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00:05:41.360So anyway, we're not just gonna talk about this on this episode.
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00:05:47.360We're gonna actually have the agent call in and actually I'm gonna I'm gonna do an audible.
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00:05:53.040Um, Jim got to Jim was my first call from uh 317 number, although he lives in Florida now.
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00:06:03.759But I'm we're gonna we're gonna have this agent call in and Bronwyn, having never heard we didn't even discuss this topic before I told you to set up a recording uh for for today.
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00:06:10.959So you're not gonna hear the phone ring, but let's I'll I'll tell you we'll do a little ring ring, and then you're gonna be talking to this agent.
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00:06:11.839Are you ready?
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00:06:14.639I I mean uh no, yes, I guess so.
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00:06:16.000Ring ring, I guess.
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00:06:21.439Any any specific accents that you'd uh like me to to put put him or her into?
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00:06:22.959Love a Midwest.
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00:06:23.759Midwest.
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00:06:25.120You know, uh Minnesota.
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00:06:34.879Yeah, that's all that's all I know how to say, but actually, I I I I winged offering the change, and I um I realized technically that's not the wisest thing to do right before a demo.
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00:06:38.560So I went call center, we're in IT, you know, IT people.
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00:06:42.800So I went with a offshore Indian, pleasant sounding female.
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00:06:43.120Uh-huh.
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00:06:45.519So that is who is going to be calling you.
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00:06:49.600Uh, and Bronwyn, I'm going to share my screen here.
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00:07:08.079So I'll share the screen one so you can kind of see what it's doing behind the scenes, and you'll probably see it will not catch all of um Bronwyn's words exactly right, but enough to to chat with her.
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00:07:10.079So uh let's go ahead and call.
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00:07:15.439Ring ring.
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00:07:17.920Hi there.
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00:07:19.600This is Alex from IT security.
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00:07:20.720Do you have a quick minute?
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00:07:24.319Uh yeah, thank thanks, Alex.
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00:07:25.759Um, yeah, I do.
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00:07:31.120Great thanks.
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00:07:35.199I'm following up on a potential security flag we got on your account earlier today.
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00:07:38.959Nothing to worry about, but I just need to verify a couple of quick things with you.
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00:07:41.839What's your job title and which department are you in?
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00:07:45.920Uh I'm the marketing lead, uh marketing department.
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00:07:50.800Perfect, thanks.
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00:07:52.079And who's your direct manager?
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00:07:54.319Just need to confirm that in our system real quick.
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00:07:58.079Uh oh yeah, uh Aaron Pritz is my direct manager.
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00:08:02.639Got it, Aaron Pritts.
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00:08:03.199Thanks for that.
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00:08:06.000So we're seeing some unusual login activity on your email.
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00:08:07.920Just want to make sure your account is secure.
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00:08:11.680Have you logged in from any new devices or locations in the last couple days?
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00:08:13.839Uh no, I don't think I have.
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00:08:19.439Okay, good to know.
00:08:19.680 -->
00:08:20.560One more thing.
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00:08:24.240We actually sent out a security bulletin about accounter protection.
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00:08:25.920Would you mind taking a quick look at it?
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00:08:29.040I can give you the URL and you can verify it's legit on your own time.
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00:08:30.800Yeah, sure, thank you.
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00:08:31.600I'll take that.
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00:08:36.080Awesome.
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00:08:39.840So go ahead and pull up reveal risk-security.com slash update.
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00:08:43.759Just take a peek when you get a chance and let me know if you see anything out of the ordinary, yeah?
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00:08:46.240Okay, sounds good.
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00:08:50.879Perfect.
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00:08:53.440Hey, I really appreciate your time on this.
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00:09:01.360Just to be clear though, this was actually an authorized security awareness simulation we run here to help keep everyone sharp on these kinds of calls.
00:09:01.519 -->
00:09:04.720Nothing about this was real, and no data was compromised at all.
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00:09:06.159Thank you for going along with it.
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00:09:07.600Two quick takeaways.
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00:09:11.840First, you handled that really well by not volunteering extra info.
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00:09:13.120That's exactly right.
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00:09:20.480Second, keep in mind that even for internal sounding calls, it's always okay to say, let me call you back through the main line to verify.
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00:09:22.559Legitimate callers won't mind at all.
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00:09:26.720If you have any questions about this exercise, you can reach out to your security team.
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00:09:27.919Thanks again.
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00:09:29.519All right.
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00:09:31.840So I would be going to tune that a little bit.
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00:09:34.480Uh again, 15 minutes, no iterations.
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00:09:37.200It actually um glazed you a little bit.
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00:09:38.879It said that you you nailed it.
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00:09:41.919And in fact, you gave three sensitive things away.
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00:09:42.399Yeah.
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00:09:43.840Do you know what they were?
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00:09:48.720Um, I would say like confirming my my job title feels like that.
00:09:48.799 -->
00:09:54.480I mean, I know it's sort of like LinkedIn public available information, but still feels like it's like this confirmation aspect.
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00:10:01.519Definitely saying that you're my boss, like giving them your name and that you're I'm that your direct report, that feels sensitive.
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00:10:02.639Um, those are two things.
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00:10:03.759What else did I give away?
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00:10:18.480The third was, and you know, if if it was a a live call and you didn't know we were kind of talking about this topic, when she asked you to pull up reveal-risk slash security, that was basically this playbook is straight out of what they do at DEF CON.
00:10:18.639 -->
00:10:32.480You, you know, they're proving that they can capture the flag through getting you, give or asking you and verifying that you'll give up pieces of sensitive information that are not life-changing sensitive, but they're, but they're enough.
00:10:32.559 -->
00:10:36.399Like another one is like, what VPN do you use when you're not in the office?
00:10:36.559 -->
00:10:36.960Uh-huh.
00:10:37.200 -->
00:10:43.279Or is your physical security, you know, coming into the office uh, you know, a proximity card or a key?
00:10:43.360 -->
00:10:47.679Those are the types of things kind of in a safe and control way that you can give up.
00:10:47.919 -->
00:10:54.000So anyway, um, gosh, the the agent, voice agents have come a long way since the call center.
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00:10:55.759Like she was responded to you.
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00:11:01.759There was only one other slip up where she kind of the way that she said, thanks, Aaron Pritz, there was no pause.
00:11:01.840 -->
00:11:03.600Like, thanks, Aaron Pritz, got it.
00:11:03.759 -->
00:11:04.159Uh-huh.
00:11:04.399 -->
00:11:08.000So it it almost sounded like she was calling you Aaron Pritz.
00:11:08.080 -->
00:11:15.600So overall, though, uh that was a startling experience with a voice where I was like, this sounds very believable.
00:11:15.759 -->
00:11:16.399It really does.
00:11:16.559 -->
00:11:20.159It sounds organic in a way that like these that I just don't associate these.
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00:11:31.759Yeah, and you can there's a little bit of an extra pause, but maybe not nothing to draw attention because she might be writing stuff down, or you could add some clicking background sounds to make it seem like she's typing notes in.
00:11:31.840 -->
00:11:32.240But yeah.
00:11:32.399 -->
00:11:33.759Um, Jim, Jim, what are your thoughts?
00:11:33.840 -->
00:11:35.840I know this is your second time hearing it.
00:11:36.000 -->
00:11:37.679Um, how concerned are you?
00:11:37.759 -->
00:11:41.279Are you going to be working with your programs to amplify Vishing?
00:11:41.440 -->
00:11:46.720Uh, we kind of that was all not never the top topic, but no, it's never the top topic.
00:11:46.799 -->
00:11:56.960Um, but I think this fits squarely into the discussion around social engineering um and and the evolution of that um and what it looks like current day.
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00:12:07.519And it's uh each time that we've done this, Aaron, I've I've been more impressed with the technology and more concerned.
00:12:07.600 -->
00:12:12.480And it's it just makes me think, you know, we we really have to start addressing this.
00:12:12.559 -->
00:12:17.039And I think of more and more populations that that this type of attack can be used against.
00:12:17.120 -->
00:12:29.600And I think about um, you know, what what about um our our population of of folks who are less tech savvy, you know, maybe you know, some of our like like you know, my grandparents, you know, what about what about them, right?
00:12:29.679 -->
00:12:35.279And they're potentially going to give up you know banking information or information about investment accounts and things like that.
00:12:35.440 -->
00:12:39.679They're they wouldn't think twice about that type of delay.
00:12:40.080 -->
00:12:47.039Um, you know, you think back to the to the old days of like long distance phone calls, there were odd delays during those times.
00:12:47.120 -->
00:12:51.279You know, it's not so I don't I don't know that that would even register with a lot of people.
00:12:51.440 -->
00:12:54.080So I think they're they're very much at risk for this.
00:12:54.159 -->
00:13:11.279And then on on the corporate side, you know, the calls coming in from uh tech support, you know, that that's that's definitely a uh a threat vector that has yielded a lot of results for threat actors traditionally.
00:13:11.440 -->
00:13:23.279Um you know when we do phishing simulations uh for email, some of the the highest click rates we get for some of the phishing emails are uh they're IT and HR related.
00:13:24.080 -->
00:13:34.240So there's no reason to think that that wouldn't be the same case if you're using this threat threat vector um as opposed to uh to an email.
00:13:34.480 -->
00:13:38.080Um so uh and and it's and it's been shown.
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00:13:54.879I I think you know if you if you watch the news, you you look at some of the reports coming in, you know, there's more and more of these uh these voice type attacks um that are going on, and um you know the threat actors are posing as people from IT calling, and and sometimes they they'll even you know set people up.
00:13:54.960 -->
00:14:10.559I heard a story uh very recently about uh a threat actors, a group of threat actors that were just spamming people all day long with emails and phone calls and calling and hanging up and just you know and just driving people nuts.
00:14:10.720 -->
00:14:16.480And then they call and pretend to be from IT and say, hey, um, you know, I know I I we see a lot of activity.
00:14:16.639 -->
00:14:19.759Seems like you've been getting a lot of spam calls and a lot of spam emails.
00:14:19.919 -->
00:14:21.120We'd like to help you out with that.
00:14:21.200 -->
00:14:23.360And of course, they they people fall for it.
00:14:23.440 -->
00:14:26.960They're like, Yes, somebody to help me with this, get rid of this annoying problem.
00:14:27.120 -->
00:14:30.879I will cooperate with you as much as you would like me to, solve my problem.
00:14:31.440 -->
00:14:34.000And and then they give up the keys to the kingdom.
00:14:34.480 -->
00:14:48.720Well, Jim, you mentioned your grandparents, and my dad actually almost like he was on the horn, they were logged into his bank account, or he was logged in, and he could start to see them making making changes on the screen, and then there was a glitch.
00:14:48.799 -->
00:15:02.720Uh, and the the guy on the call center, the scammer, actually went to get somebody else who was supposedly a supervisor, and and my dad got got wiser to it and hung up, but like literally his bank account number was up and they were putting a transaction in.
00:15:03.360 -->
00:15:07.200Um anyway, I just sent him, I just had had the agent call him.
00:15:07.279 -->
00:15:09.120So I'll drive I'll call him on the drive home.
00:15:09.200 -->
00:15:12.720Uh, I accidentally sent the wrong agent his way, so he'll he'll get two calls.
00:15:12.799 -->
00:15:20.399One from the uh reveal risk receptionist I was gonna see if I could uh create, and then the second one is the person you just talked to, Brianwin.
00:15:20.480 -->
00:15:24.480So we'll see if he falls for it again, it's gonna, there's gonna have to be an intervention.
00:15:24.720 -->
00:15:34.799And you've spent, you know, you've you said Aaron, you spent 15 minutes setting this up, you know, like since you first started uh kind of working with this and exploring it.
00:15:34.960 -->
00:15:46.720How much time do you think that you've spent on this grand total in the last I don't I don't know, two weeks on agentic voice agents research or only on this tech on the tech?
00:15:47.200 -->
00:15:48.720Only on this, just on this.
00:15:49.039 -->
00:15:50.00042 minutes.
00:15:50.320 -->
00:15:51.27942 minutes.
00:15:51.519 -->
00:15:55.919So you accomplished like what we just witnessed, what Bronwyn just experienced.
00:15:56.080 -->
00:15:59.360You you spent 42 for you've spent a grand total of 42 minutes on.
00:15:59.919 -->
00:16:00.559Maybe 43.
00:16:00.639 -->
00:16:01.200It was 42.
00:16:01.919 -->
00:16:02.000Right.
00:16:02.639 -->
00:16:03.120Who's counting?
00:16:03.200 -->
00:16:03.679Who's counting?
00:16:04.000 -->
00:16:04.799Right, exactly.
00:16:04.960 -->
00:16:10.879But that and and the thing about it is you're you're not doing this on purpose-built um technology, right?
00:16:10.960 -->
00:16:14.720You don't you don't have a special rig that you've set up to support this.
00:16:14.799 -->
00:16:18.639You know, and and you know, this has been but I wasn't a yeah, well, yeah, well, yeah.
00:16:20.399 -->
00:16:28.960You know, but point being, it's it you just you you just grabbed what you had and gave it a shot, and it went pretty well.
00:16:29.279 -->
00:16:32.320Well, and if I was a nefarious person, what would I do?
00:16:32.399 -->
00:16:38.399I'd take that 45 minutes, maybe they take an hour and a half if they don't know cyber and kind of some of the tactics, but they do.
00:16:38.480 -->
00:16:40.559They've been doing this one than a half, probably.
00:16:40.720 -->
00:16:45.120Um, and then they go buy a list off the dark web or just any, you know.
00:16:45.200 -->
00:16:50.000I go out to one of the sales tools and I get a list of you know, I can pinpoint target.
00:16:50.080 -->
00:16:54.960I want adult males between 60 and 80, right?
00:16:55.200 -->
00:16:57.279Whatever your target market is, just like a marketer.
00:16:57.360 -->
00:17:08.960And then I'm gonna get a million phone numbers, I'm gonna upload the Excel file into this, and it's gonna queue over, you know, probably probably can spin up a whole, I think you can build a squad, an agent squad.
00:17:09.119 -->
00:17:11.920So you can probably have a hundred calling at once, right?
00:17:12.319 -->
00:17:15.839Yeah, a little agentic call center to do nefarious stuff for you.
00:17:16.160 -->
00:17:17.440It's already happening.
00:17:17.680 -->
00:17:22.799So we we have to, we have to talk about solutions, right?
00:17:23.519 -->
00:17:23.920Yeah, yeah.
00:17:24.079 -->
00:17:26.960Never want to put a th a challenge out there without a problem.
00:17:27.200 -->
00:17:33.839So interestingly, um, this morning I I had uh published this article about this topic a couple days ago or yesterday.
00:17:34.160 -->
00:17:35.359Yeah, it was yesterday.
00:17:35.599 -->
00:17:41.200And I had uh, of course, the salespeople start like, oh, I have the solution for this, Aaron.
00:17:41.359 -->
00:17:47.920But it was a it was a it was a cloud-based agentic vision education solution.
00:17:48.079 -->
00:17:56.319And I'm like, bro, it might have not been clear, but I just vibe coded that shit in 15 minutes.
00:17:56.559 -->
00:17:59.680I don't need your$50,000 SaaS solution.
00:18:00.079 -->
00:18:04.480And no offense, I would not want to be in SaaS right now, like the stuff, the innovation that's popping up.
00:18:04.559 -->
00:18:07.440Like that was a great idea two years ago when they call it.
00:18:08.480 -->
00:18:08.640Right.
00:18:08.799 -->
00:18:09.200Yeah.
00:18:09.519 -->
00:18:19.599Do I need that if I'm a CISO, can I just create my own little squad and do a week's worth of testing to make sure it doesn't go haywire and I'm off to the races.
00:18:19.759 -->
00:18:26.960But I would start with, I mean, not that phishing is the right solution, that the we're limited in what we've done from an emo phishing standpoint.
00:18:27.039 -->
00:18:28.240We've sent a bunch of tests.
00:18:28.480 -->
00:18:31.759People haven't experienced the the fishing test for the most part.
00:18:32.000 -->
00:18:32.160Yeah.
00:18:32.480 -->
00:18:49.599So being able to do that at scale and not have a pen tester that's going to make 25 calls as a test of whether the organization's susceptible, you could hit all employees once a quarter and give them some variety than just seeing the the typical email fish.
00:18:49.759 -->
00:19:00.960Um, I think beyond that, like with human risk management and you know using um insights from behaviors and risks to pinpoint where you focus, there's departmental and job type risks.
00:19:01.039 -->
00:19:08.799You might accounts payable or groups that need their business process re-engineered to have some controls to do human verifications or callbacks.
00:19:08.960 -->
00:19:12.720Um, and then there's also like targeted education.
00:19:12.799 -->
00:19:18.880But Jim, beyond that, I hit a couple big things there, but what else, what else are we doing here to defray the risk?
00:19:19.200 -->
00:19:36.559Well, I I think first of all, we we need to um as as we approach this topic, we need to uh understand ourselves and and also uh communicate to uh other practitioners, to uh to the workforce that this is just social engineering.
00:19:36.720 -->
00:19:40.079It's it's the same thing that that it's the same thread, right?
00:19:40.319 -->
00:19:42.960It's just it's just a different method of getting to it, right?
00:19:43.039 -->
00:19:44.640So it's a different style of attack.
00:19:44.880 -->
00:19:50.720But those basic skills that we have to detect social engineering, they're already on board.
00:19:50.799 -->
00:19:59.359We've been working on this for 20 plus years, teaching our workforce to recognize things that seem out of the ordinary and to have a raised awareness about that.
00:19:59.599 -->
00:20:07.359So, you know, if if you get one of these phone calls and it doesn't seem right, then listen to that instinct and and respond accordingly.
00:20:07.440 -->
00:20:10.559You know, if you if you get that call from IT and you think, well, this is weird.
00:20:10.720 -->
00:20:12.400IT's never called me before.
00:20:12.559 -->
00:20:13.839This seems totally out of care.
00:20:14.079 -->
00:20:15.599Usually I have to reach out to them.
00:20:15.759 -->
00:20:17.200Well, yeah, that's right.
00:20:17.440 -->
00:20:28.640So hang up and call the number that you know is a good number for IT, or hang up and email the good email that you know is the good email for IT and make sure that that's a legitimate call.
00:20:28.799 -->
00:20:32.960Use that second channel the same way that you would for any other kind of social engineering attack.
00:20:33.359 -->
00:20:44.160And then I think the other thing too, Aaron, to your point about building this out and doing it internally, we can do this much in the same way that we've done training, awareness, and training around phishing.
00:20:44.240 -->
00:20:55.440You know, and it's um you know we we are very much focused on moving beyond the this the old version of the you know security awareness and training and getting into really risk reduction.
00:20:55.599 -->
00:20:59.119But the first thing that we have to do is make people aware of the threat.
00:20:59.359 -->
00:21:02.000And then, and we so that's the awareness part.
00:21:02.160 -->
00:21:03.680We have to do the training piece, right?
00:21:03.839 -->
00:21:12.480Let everybody know that this is a tactic, and then we do the same thing that we've done with phishing uh exercises in the past where we start doing these tests, just like you're talking about, Aaron.
00:21:12.720 -->
00:21:20.000And and of course, that's if you have a 40,000, 50,000 you know employee company, that's really hard to do for that for the entire population.
00:21:20.240 -->
00:21:24.160But intentionally try and figure out who are your most likely targeted groups.
00:21:24.240 -->
00:21:26.559You know, are they gonna be your folks in accounts payable?
00:21:26.720 -->
00:21:36.880Are they gonna be your executive assistants that maybe you know have some uh privileged access, you know, some of those groups, and then start do some targeted testing with them and see how they do.
00:21:37.119 -->
00:21:49.119Gather some data, see who's having a hard time with it, circle back with them and do some targeted training with smaller populations after you identify where that risk is coming from, and then take some intentional steps to reduce that risk.
00:21:49.359 -->
00:21:56.000And use the data that you gather through the old style of security awareness training, pull that information out of there and make that actionable.
00:21:56.079 -->
00:21:59.839And I think that's that's that's the way that you that you implement this kind of thing.
00:22:00.160 -->
00:22:00.960Current day.
00:22:01.279 -->
00:22:05.039You know, this is all this could all be wildly different in six months, right?
00:22:05.519 -->
00:22:06.480It's changing fast.
00:22:07.200 -->
00:22:15.839Maybe even if you're not technical, like I've got some years on me beyond what I was in into code, but if you're in cyber, if you're in IT, like experiment with this, learn.
00:22:16.000 -->
00:22:19.200Like maybe think like a bad guy so we understand.
00:22:19.359 -->
00:22:20.799Oh, did I just put on the hood?
00:22:23.119 -->
00:22:25.200I rarely wear hoods to the office, but I'm leaving it.
00:22:25.599 -->
00:22:26.079Perfect opportunity.
00:22:28.960 -->
00:22:31.680But yeah, I would say um play with the technologies.
00:22:31.839 -->
00:22:39.440Like there's some things that you can do and um bring to your organization, or just do a podcast like this internally and and have a discussion.
00:22:39.680 -->
00:22:40.480Interesting topic.
00:22:40.799 -->
00:22:40.880Yeah.
00:22:41.279 -->
00:22:44.240Well, Bronwyn, Jim, thanks for coming on today's special episode.
00:22:44.319 -->
00:22:45.359It was going to be five minutes.
00:22:45.440 -->
00:22:47.200We've spent 25 minutes talking about it.
00:22:47.279 -->
00:22:49.119It's a fun topic, scary topic.
00:22:49.440 -->
00:22:50.960But again, thanks, thanks for joining.
00:22:51.119 -->
00:22:51.839Good conversation.
00:22:52.079 -->
00:22:52.799Thanks for having us.
00:22:52.960 -->
00:22:53.200All right.
00:22:53.279 -->
00:22:53.920Thanks, Aaron.
00:22:54.079 -->
00:22:55.200Appreciate it.
