World Cup Security Challenges

WEBVTT
1
00:00:03.680 --> 00:00:07.839
Welcome to the Disaster's Own podcast. I'm Eric Holdman, your
2
00:00:08.199 --> 00:00:14.679
Disaster's Own host, and with me today is Andre McGregor,
3
00:00:15.000 --> 00:00:19.519
who is the CEO and founder of Force Metrics, leveraging
4
00:00:19.679 --> 00:00:24.480
his background and law enforcement and cybersecurity to improve decision
5
00:00:24.600 --> 00:00:28.480
making in policing. And Andre, what I've learned in my
6
00:00:28.719 --> 00:00:32.679
emergency management career is that information management is a critical
7
00:00:32.719 --> 00:00:37.880
element when it comes to just normal emergencies and to disasters.
8
00:00:38.600 --> 00:00:41.600
And today we'll discuss how this also applies to World
9
00:00:41.679 --> 00:00:46.479
Cup security operations that are ongoing, and how states and
10
00:00:46.560 --> 00:00:49.920
cities might leverage what they learned from hosting World Cup
11
00:00:50.759 --> 00:00:55.000
beyond the actual games themselves. Well, welcome to the podcast.
12
00:00:55.159 --> 00:00:59.960
Andre, thank you for having me and all.
13
00:00:59.880 --> 00:01:03.920
My my podcast listeners know the first question I always asked, Andre,
14
00:01:04.760 --> 00:01:08.280
I'm interested in people's career, So what is your educational
15
00:01:08.319 --> 00:01:12.599
background and then your personal professional work experiences that you
16
00:01:12.719 --> 00:01:18.319
have had up until today. And I always say this
17
00:01:18.400 --> 00:01:21.680
is not for your mother, so it don't do the
18
00:01:21.719 --> 00:01:22.840
abbreviated version.
19
00:01:23.439 --> 00:01:28.319
Sure, I sort of stumbled into law enforcement emergency services,
20
00:01:28.359 --> 00:01:31.480
so you re winding the tape. I'm a computer geek,
21
00:01:31.799 --> 00:01:36.519
data nerd that went to Brown University, was a Golden
22
00:01:36.640 --> 00:01:39.200
Sachs for a little bit, and then Cardinal Health, big
23
00:01:39.239 --> 00:01:41.959
farm until I got recruited by the FBI. After Quantic
24
00:01:42.000 --> 00:01:44.040
by the FBI, aadnew They made me a special agent.
25
00:01:44.799 --> 00:01:47.599
I worked on the Joint Task Force in the beginning
26
00:01:47.640 --> 00:01:51.599
a little bit of a time organized crime and then cybercrime,
27
00:01:52.000 --> 00:01:56.599
so mostly hacking from China, Russia around North Korea. Enjoyed it,
28
00:01:56.680 --> 00:01:59.120
but also as a firefighter medic while also being a
29
00:01:59.239 --> 00:02:01.560
farm's instructors and asthmad and a few other things in
30
00:02:01.599 --> 00:02:04.400
the bureau that kind of got me into space.
31
00:02:05.040 --> 00:02:08.039
Okay, so you've got the street crab there at a
32
00:02:08.039 --> 00:02:10.680
little bit a little probably not muddy booth, but they
33
00:02:10.719 --> 00:02:12.319
at least hit the concrete.
34
00:02:12.000 --> 00:02:15.759
Right, you get very wet in the fire service, I'll
35
00:02:15.759 --> 00:02:15.919
tell you.
36
00:02:16.039 --> 00:02:20.120
Yeah, yeah, Okay, there you go. So what is it
37
00:02:20.159 --> 00:02:24.800
about major events like the World Cup that causes jurisdictions
38
00:02:25.159 --> 00:02:29.360
and agencies at all levels to affect more coordination with
39
00:02:29.400 --> 00:02:31.960
one another leading up to the event and then during
40
00:02:31.960 --> 00:02:33.919
the actual conduct of the event.
41
00:02:35.039 --> 00:02:37.719
Well, you know, I would say, first as we don't
42
00:02:37.719 --> 00:02:41.560
have a national police like the UK or anything like that,
43
00:02:41.599 --> 00:02:44.960
so you you know, you can name a lot of
44
00:02:45.240 --> 00:02:49.400
the country South Africa had you know, fifty thousand police
45
00:02:49.439 --> 00:02:53.120
officers and there's one. But you know, you have eighteen
46
00:02:53.159 --> 00:02:58.759
thousand different agencies to man to, you know, NYPD, and
47
00:02:58.879 --> 00:03:03.400
they're all not really used to always coordinating. They may
48
00:03:03.439 --> 00:03:06.479
respond to the situation together, you know, be able to
49
00:03:06.560 --> 00:03:09.599
escalate resources, be on task forces. But you know, when
50
00:03:09.599 --> 00:03:11.560
you're kind of looking at an event like the World Cup,
51
00:03:11.599 --> 00:03:15.000
where you've got stadiums in one city, hotels in another city,
52
00:03:15.199 --> 00:03:18.800
buses that are traveling airports, you know you're crossing too
53
00:03:18.800 --> 00:03:22.199
many jurisdiction alliance for any single agency to be able
54
00:03:22.199 --> 00:03:24.039
to handle all that in one place.
55
00:03:25.680 --> 00:03:29.680
Yeah, you know, I came out of the military twenty
56
00:03:29.759 --> 00:03:33.840
years as infantry officer and started with Washington State Emergency
57
00:03:33.879 --> 00:03:38.879
Management and that's where I found out that the buyer
58
00:03:39.560 --> 00:03:43.159
discipline and the police law enforcement discipline always didn't get along.
59
00:03:43.360 --> 00:03:46.039
They didn't coordinate with one another. They might not be
60
00:03:46.080 --> 00:03:50.000
on common frequencies. And I say, oh, kind of like
61
00:03:50.039 --> 00:03:52.240
the Navy and the Army, which I was used to
62
00:03:52.479 --> 00:03:56.599
at the time. Well, this isn't a super Bowl, but
63
00:03:56.639 --> 00:04:00.719
it's like having many multiple Super Bowls stood by three
64
00:04:00.759 --> 00:04:04.599
countries and sixteen cities. What was the impact of this
65
00:04:04.960 --> 00:04:10.599
type of complexity over multiple venues, jurisdictions, even nations, and
66
00:04:10.800 --> 00:04:14.080
many weeks of play due to security operations. I mean,
67
00:04:14.240 --> 00:04:16.439
you're not surging just for one event. You're doing this
68
00:04:16.920 --> 00:04:18.519
over a couple months time frame.
69
00:04:19.399 --> 00:04:23.240
Yeah, it's I mean, a You've got lots of people
70
00:04:23.279 --> 00:04:27.879
that are not residents or even you know, living in
71
00:04:27.879 --> 00:04:29.639
the country coming to the country. So now you're trying
72
00:04:29.680 --> 00:04:34.480
to vet those individuals they're traveling. Ideally, you're keeping them
73
00:04:34.519 --> 00:04:38.399
safe because the host, host country, hosts state, host city
74
00:04:38.480 --> 00:04:42.319
wants positive outcomes, not negative outcomes. So and then as
75
00:04:42.360 --> 00:04:45.480
I mentioned earlier, you've got hotels in one city, you
76
00:04:45.560 --> 00:04:47.920
might have multiple hotels in different cities. You start getting
77
00:04:47.959 --> 00:04:50.439
into a place like New Jersey where everything is so
78
00:04:51.000 --> 00:04:54.319
scattered around that you know, you don't have a single
79
00:04:54.519 --> 00:04:56.879
a single place is going to look at that, you know.
80
00:04:56.959 --> 00:05:00.439
So it's a massive operation because the main thing is
81
00:05:00.480 --> 00:05:02.959
everyone stays safe. And then the second thing is you're
82
00:05:02.959 --> 00:05:06.120
looking for active threats while still keeping everyone safe. And
83
00:05:06.160 --> 00:05:09.079
then the last is if something were to go bad,
84
00:05:09.160 --> 00:05:12.639
how do you move thousands and thousands of people in
85
00:05:12.680 --> 00:05:15.120
a safe way that doesn't trample people in the variety
86
00:05:15.120 --> 00:05:17.839
of then create another safety hazard. So it is like
87
00:05:17.959 --> 00:05:20.839
an onion upon an onion of rings of you know,
88
00:05:20.920 --> 00:05:24.600
safety concerns that you're putting into place, and.
89
00:05:24.680 --> 00:05:29.720
You know people who aren't you know, familiar with national
90
00:05:29.800 --> 00:05:34.480
level events like this, maybe it take a big disaster. Right,
91
00:05:35.240 --> 00:05:37.759
Many people still believe FEMA is in charge of everything,
92
00:05:38.319 --> 00:05:41.000
which is not true. So I would think they think,
93
00:05:41.240 --> 00:05:44.560
based on your FBI experience, all the truths fund that
94
00:05:44.680 --> 00:05:48.519
the FBI is in charge of everything. How does that work?
95
00:05:49.839 --> 00:05:54.399
I mean, we we always look at States rights tenth Amendment,
96
00:05:54.920 --> 00:05:57.600
so always going back to the states and the cities,
97
00:05:57.800 --> 00:05:59.680
so they tend to be in charge. And then there's
98
00:05:59.680 --> 00:06:02.399
a certain of resources from the federal level. The surge
99
00:06:02.399 --> 00:06:04.439
of resources comes in a couple of ways. That comes
100
00:06:04.439 --> 00:06:07.920
in people like the FBI or like a FEMA, you know,
101
00:06:08.040 --> 00:06:12.120
usually pre planning alongside, but also comes with money. The
102
00:06:12.160 --> 00:06:13.920
Feds are really good at bringing in.
103
00:06:13.920 --> 00:06:16.639
Money the local level.
104
00:06:17.199 --> 00:06:19.879
Right, then the local level can actually purchase things or
105
00:06:20.240 --> 00:06:22.839
get more resources of what they were looking for. Obviously
106
00:06:22.839 --> 00:06:26.800
there's threats like drones and then countering those drones and
107
00:06:26.839 --> 00:06:30.079
the variety stuff that you know may not be a
108
00:06:30.240 --> 00:06:33.399
topic that a small town would entertain. But when the
109
00:06:33.399 --> 00:06:36.120
World Cup is there, now it's something that can be entertained.
110
00:06:36.759 --> 00:06:41.079
Okay, all right, and then again we just have this
111
00:06:41.199 --> 00:06:45.439
common thing idea. Okay, the security for the World Cup,
112
00:06:45.839 --> 00:06:48.720
it's all focused on the individual stadiums where the soccer
113
00:06:48.759 --> 00:06:54.480
matches are being played over there other security impacts for transit,
114
00:06:54.600 --> 00:06:59.319
public infrastructure, public safety in general. This expands the number
115
00:06:59.360 --> 00:07:03.480
of security players significantly. What's the influence of this broader
116
00:07:04.079 --> 00:07:11.879
information sharing operational coordination that must be happened beyond law enforcement? Really? Yeah?
117
00:07:12.000 --> 00:07:15.360
I mean you start looking at you know, parks, you
118
00:07:15.399 --> 00:07:18.480
start looking at you know, hospitals, you start looking at
119
00:07:18.480 --> 00:07:23.160
the just general public infrastructure that's being used, roads. You know,
120
00:07:23.240 --> 00:07:25.480
there's just a lot that comes into play when you
121
00:07:25.519 --> 00:07:28.160
look at the mass amount of people that could be
122
00:07:28.199 --> 00:07:32.120
coming in that's not typical. A super Bowl is actually
123
00:07:32.240 --> 00:07:35.480
easy because you have plenty of time to prep and
124
00:07:35.519 --> 00:07:37.519
you know that everyone's going to be in one sort
125
00:07:37.560 --> 00:07:40.759
of central area. You actually have no idea where all
126
00:07:40.759 --> 00:07:42.920
the people are going to be congregating you, as much
127
00:07:42.959 --> 00:07:46.959
as you may want them to congregate. Think of how Scotland,
128
00:07:47.160 --> 00:07:49.480
you know, took over Boston and drank them out of beer.
129
00:07:49.920 --> 00:07:52.519
You know, there's no police pre planning that would have
130
00:07:52.519 --> 00:07:54.480
ever thought that that was going to happen. And then
131
00:07:54.560 --> 00:07:58.040
luckily there didn't seem to be anything bad that occurred.
132
00:07:58.079 --> 00:08:00.759
But you don't know, depending on how how things sort
133
00:08:00.759 --> 00:08:01.079
of play.
134
00:08:01.160 --> 00:08:06.160
So you should always have seventy two hours of beer
135
00:08:06.240 --> 00:08:07.399
on hand at all times.
136
00:08:07.680 --> 00:08:13.800
Okay, should exactly. I always remember Hurricane Sandy in the
137
00:08:13.839 --> 00:08:18.199
northeast of New York, and you know, within twenty four
138
00:08:18.240 --> 00:08:21.199
hours after Hurricane Sandy, the island of New York ran
139
00:08:21.240 --> 00:08:24.240
out of money in their ATMs. Twenty four hours ran
140
00:08:24.279 --> 00:08:26.279
out of money and all the ATMs and all of the.
141
00:08:27.120 --> 00:08:30.319
Yes, that's one of the disaster facts is you become
142
00:08:30.959 --> 00:08:35.200
a cash society at that point, and they'll exactly, if
143
00:08:35.200 --> 00:08:41.720
you save your petties, they'll take that. Well, it makes
144
00:08:41.759 --> 00:08:44.480
me think about the I don't know if she's studied
145
00:08:44.559 --> 00:08:48.639
at all the Atlantic Olympics and the bombing that happened
146
00:08:48.679 --> 00:08:52.360
there didn't happen at a venue. You recall that at Illinois.
147
00:08:52.480 --> 00:08:53.759
At the Olympic Park.
148
00:08:54.600 --> 00:08:57.200
Yeah, but it's not in a secured area if I
149
00:08:57.200 --> 00:08:57.840
remember right.
150
00:08:58.480 --> 00:09:01.000
No, it wasn't secure it was a open park with
151
00:09:01.120 --> 00:09:04.240
open entrances, and you know, which means like when you
152
00:09:04.279 --> 00:09:07.360
don't have you know, sort of gated entrances where I
153
00:09:07.399 --> 00:09:09.399
know where people are gonna flow in and flow out,
154
00:09:10.080 --> 00:09:15.240
you also can't you protect against some of those you know, unknowns.
155
00:09:15.440 --> 00:09:18.360
Yeah, and it's kind of but you know, recently I
156
00:09:18.399 --> 00:09:23.519
was in Chicago. Are you familiar with Millennium Park there? Oh? Yeah,
157
00:09:23.679 --> 00:09:27.120
And so it was not a special occasion at all,
158
00:09:27.159 --> 00:09:32.679
but they had the entire part secured with a couple
159
00:09:32.679 --> 00:09:37.080
of entry points and you know, metal detectors coming in
160
00:09:37.240 --> 00:09:40.440
going out, just as a standard precaution. So I think
161
00:09:40.480 --> 00:09:43.519
we've learned some from past experiences.
162
00:09:43.679 --> 00:09:47.200
Yeah, it's you know it all everyone has to accept
163
00:09:47.200 --> 00:09:50.799
a certain level of friction, right, I think there's over time.
164
00:09:50.840 --> 00:09:53.840
Life is about risk and de risking, and there's friction
165
00:09:53.960 --> 00:09:55.919
with just driving your car. Am I gonna stop at
166
00:09:55.960 --> 00:09:58.039
a stop sign or stop line? Or run? It's a
167
00:09:58.080 --> 00:10:00.639
friction point like am I gonna you know? Just you know,
168
00:10:00.720 --> 00:10:04.639
at a certain point we accept something the necessity.
169
00:10:05.159 --> 00:10:08.519
All right, time going wing another question chance that we
170
00:10:08.919 --> 00:10:11.480
haven't talked about in advance, So just put you on
171
00:10:11.480 --> 00:10:17.440
the spot. So as we go through the airport. You know, again,
172
00:10:17.720 --> 00:10:20.519
we now have a process much more detailed than before
173
00:10:20.639 --> 00:10:22.679
nine to eleven, and a lot of people call it
174
00:10:22.759 --> 00:10:27.120
homeland security theater, you know, kabok, it's kind of going
175
00:10:27.159 --> 00:10:30.960
through the motions. What would you say in response to that?
176
00:10:32.279 --> 00:10:36.720
You know, I think you know the theory that you know,
177
00:10:36.720 --> 00:10:39.279
it was kind of coined after JFK's assassination that if
178
00:10:39.320 --> 00:10:42.000
someone wants to kill someone else and they're willing to
179
00:10:42.039 --> 00:10:46.120
take their life in exchange, that's really hard to stop.
180
00:10:47.320 --> 00:10:54.240
I do think that the PSA security does help people
181
00:10:54.320 --> 00:10:57.759
be honest. And what I mean by that is, I
182
00:10:57.799 --> 00:11:00.919
trust my neighbors plus all off my content. I'm not
183
00:11:00.960 --> 00:11:02.960
expecting that you're going to go into my car, but
184
00:11:03.000 --> 00:11:05.519
I'm also not giving you the ability to do something
185
00:11:05.919 --> 00:11:08.440
that you may wish that you didn't do. And so
186
00:11:08.559 --> 00:11:12.519
I think that sometimes people are, you know, mistake taking
187
00:11:12.559 --> 00:11:15.240
something in And I think once you're in an aluminum
188
00:11:15.279 --> 00:11:19.240
tube a few miles above the ground and there's no
189
00:11:19.279 --> 00:11:22.720
way to control that environment, you kind of want to
190
00:11:22.759 --> 00:11:24.799
limit the things that people can have on their possession.
191
00:11:25.000 --> 00:11:28.679
Yeah, and you know, it's unfortunately I've seen it. Oh,
192
00:11:28.759 --> 00:11:30.960
I don't know, in the last two or three months,
193
00:11:30.960 --> 00:11:33.960
there's been a number of I rate passengers trying to
194
00:11:34.039 --> 00:11:37.600
open the door and on aircraft that's in the air
195
00:11:38.200 --> 00:11:42.120
or on the ground and be restrained by fellow passengers
196
00:11:42.120 --> 00:11:42.320
in it.
197
00:11:42.440 --> 00:11:45.720
So what people don't always know is that if you're
198
00:11:45.759 --> 00:11:48.639
an FBI agent and you're flying, you are the air
199
00:11:48.679 --> 00:11:51.639
marshal on that plane. And so every time I was
200
00:11:51.759 --> 00:11:53.320
when I was an agent and I flew, I was
201
00:11:53.480 --> 00:11:56.679
armed and I was the quote unquote air marshal and
202
00:11:57.159 --> 00:11:59.919
nothing ever, you know, you know, sort of a level
203
00:12:00.080 --> 00:12:03.399
reattacked on the coppit. You know, never never happened, which
204
00:12:03.440 --> 00:12:07.240
is good. But you get called on sometimes for the
205
00:12:07.279 --> 00:12:09.879
issue with the passenger and you have to break cover
206
00:12:10.120 --> 00:12:13.440
and you know it's you know, always interesting.
207
00:12:14.039 --> 00:12:17.000
But but do you get extra handouts when you're the
208
00:12:17.000 --> 00:12:20.279
air marshal? No alcohol, I know that.
209
00:12:20.200 --> 00:12:23.440
No alcohol, but they do feed you and get you,
210
00:12:23.440 --> 00:12:25.320
you know, some of the other stuff, which is which
211
00:12:25.360 --> 00:12:25.879
is nice.
212
00:12:26.799 --> 00:12:31.159
Wow, guy, you got something for being on duty? Right, Yes, Well,
213
00:12:31.399 --> 00:12:35.200
on the city by city case, there might be the
214
00:12:35.240 --> 00:12:40.159
opportunity to establish unified command across agencies levels of government. Personally,
215
00:12:40.320 --> 00:12:45.960
I've never seen that happen. Ever, they say that unified command,
216
00:12:46.279 --> 00:12:50.759
and no, they're all in their trailers and all congregated
217
00:12:50.840 --> 00:12:53.440
together in the same area, but there's not unified command.
218
00:12:53.799 --> 00:12:58.120
If it's better than that, then amen, I compliment whoever
219
00:12:58.159 --> 00:13:01.879
it has done that, But that and itself could be daunting,
220
00:13:02.000 --> 00:13:04.919
as I just mentioned, where do you see it all
221
00:13:04.960 --> 00:13:09.279
breaking down? Is it staffing hardware? Or they dare and say,
222
00:13:09.320 --> 00:13:12.600
what we have here is failure. This is Paul Newman.
223
00:13:12.639 --> 00:13:16.840
Then we'll hand luke failure to communicate or even at
224
00:13:16.840 --> 00:13:18.919
the basic level coordinate.
225
00:13:20.039 --> 00:13:23.639
First off, Coolhand looks a great movie, so everyone should
226
00:13:23.639 --> 00:13:27.120
watch it. A fantasy. What we got here is failure
227
00:13:27.200 --> 00:13:30.679
to communicate. But what I do think is, you know,
228
00:13:30.679 --> 00:13:34.159
we strive for a unified command, you know, instant command.
229
00:13:34.240 --> 00:13:36.919
I see s we take all the training to prep
230
00:13:36.960 --> 00:13:40.480
for it, but you still have split soldiers that want
231
00:13:40.480 --> 00:13:43.399
to be told by their six per years what they
232
00:13:43.480 --> 00:13:48.000
should do. So I see the ideals of a unified
233
00:13:48.039 --> 00:13:52.600
command across jurisdictions, the equivalent to you know, sort of
234
00:13:53.080 --> 00:13:56.919
NATO or you know, sort of like Eisenhower McCain, a
235
00:13:57.399 --> 00:14:01.559
supreme Allied commander where you're commanding multi pull countries, troops
236
00:14:01.559 --> 00:14:03.919
and they all kind of trust you. I think you
237
00:14:03.960 --> 00:14:06.759
can get there, especially some of the larger cities where
238
00:14:06.759 --> 00:14:10.360
they already kind of look to support a New York
239
00:14:10.399 --> 00:14:14.279
City where they look to support a Chicago or you know,
240
00:14:14.320 --> 00:14:18.279
maybe a Miami. But in general, you know, it's it's harder.
241
00:14:18.360 --> 00:14:22.039
So you're trying to just get the heavy shouldered brass
242
00:14:22.080 --> 00:14:24.519
all in one trailer together so that they can at
243
00:14:24.600 --> 00:14:28.879
least agree together and then have a unified message. Maybe
244
00:14:29.039 --> 00:14:31.639
less unified command and more unified message.
245
00:14:31.919 --> 00:14:34.879
Yeah, that's and that's okay. As long as they're all together.
246
00:14:35.120 --> 00:14:38.480
I'm happy with that. No one has to be in command.
247
00:14:38.480 --> 00:14:42.840
But how about they all coordinate most leaves one? Well,
248
00:14:42.879 --> 00:14:49.639
for individual agencies, what does interoperability actually look like in practice?
249
00:14:50.279 --> 00:14:54.720
For the basics patrol, dispatch analysts and command step, how
250
00:14:54.720 --> 00:14:59.000
do you expand that to work with multiple agencies? And
251
00:14:59.039 --> 00:15:01.879
you can answer that first part some people might not
252
00:15:01.960 --> 00:15:06.639
be familiar with, just how a law enforcement agency a
253
00:15:06.720 --> 00:15:09.519
bunction of day to day for patrol dispatch analysts, and
254
00:15:09.559 --> 00:15:14.320
then expand that to multiple agencies. Yeah, I mean, you.
255
00:15:14.279 --> 00:15:18.360
Know, in general, you have a town, a city, a county,
256
00:15:18.799 --> 00:15:21.279
you have a certain number of personnel that's deployed to
257
00:15:21.360 --> 00:15:24.759
look at a beat a district of zone. It could
258
00:15:24.759 --> 00:15:28.200
be two, could be ten, could be fifty per beat
259
00:15:28.279 --> 00:15:30.879
district zone. And then you have individuals that are in
260
00:15:30.960 --> 00:15:34.240
charge of those different zones that coordinate with a higher commandment.
261
00:15:34.279 --> 00:15:36.159
That is essentially what happens. And then there's a group
262
00:15:36.200 --> 00:15:40.840
of people that manage radio traffic, usually dispatch telecommunicators that
263
00:15:40.879 --> 00:15:43.320
will kind of decide, you know, hey, this is a call,
264
00:15:43.519 --> 00:15:46.840
This goes to Beat one. Who's available on Beat one?
265
00:15:46.919 --> 00:15:49.480
It's Andre, okay, Ondre, can you take this call at
266
00:15:49.480 --> 00:15:52.360
one TJ main stream. That's just policing one on one.
267
00:15:52.960 --> 00:15:55.919
Now you start to get into like larger, you know, events.
268
00:15:56.159 --> 00:15:58.360
You need to create sort of an amp HOP task
269
00:15:58.440 --> 00:16:01.200
force to kind of deal with the ad hoc situations
270
00:16:01.240 --> 00:16:04.960
that come up. But you still have general issues that
271
00:16:05.039 --> 00:16:07.360
are happening in the city. Hey, someone just got beat
272
00:16:07.440 --> 00:16:09.440
up in front of the stadium. They called nine to
273
00:16:09.480 --> 00:16:12.799
one one who picks up, Well, probably the local distracts center.
274
00:16:12.840 --> 00:16:14.720
No matter what you set up, well where are you?
275
00:16:14.840 --> 00:16:16.639
I don't know where I am. So now you have
276
00:16:16.639 --> 00:16:20.840
to use diolocated information to identify where they are. The
277
00:16:20.960 --> 00:16:23.480
officer that might be the closest to you might not
278
00:16:23.639 --> 00:16:26.159
be in the frequency to get the information to know
279
00:16:26.240 --> 00:16:28.559
to come to you. That's actually a big problem with
280
00:16:28.720 --> 00:16:32.200
Grand Central Terminal, which is where the trains are in
281
00:16:32.200 --> 00:16:36.120
New York City. Oftentimes, when you're in Grand Central Terminal
282
00:16:36.120 --> 00:16:38.879
and you call nine one one, you actually don't get
283
00:16:38.919 --> 00:16:42.600
the MTA police, which police at the terminal. You get
284
00:16:42.720 --> 00:16:45.279
regular nine to one one, which goes to the state
285
00:16:45.360 --> 00:16:46.840
and then comes back to New York and the New
286
00:16:46.919 --> 00:16:49.320
York says, hey, where you know, where are your Grand
287
00:16:49.360 --> 00:16:51.799
Central Terminal? Then you get to MKA police. By that time,
288
00:16:51.840 --> 00:16:53.600
the police officer could have been right around the corner
289
00:16:54.080 --> 00:16:56.360
seeing all this stuff and just took you five minutes,
290
00:16:56.720 --> 00:17:00.039
So you know. They unified communications part is probably the
291
00:17:00.039 --> 00:17:02.720
the bigger part of this, because dispatch and these real
292
00:17:02.799 --> 00:17:06.640
time crime centers are monitoring in real time what's happening
293
00:17:07.000 --> 00:17:10.880
and then seeing what resources to provide, what resources available
294
00:17:11.359 --> 00:17:12.400
to provide support.
295
00:17:14.359 --> 00:17:18.200
Yeah, I mean, I can't remember the cartoon, but the
296
00:17:18.319 --> 00:17:23.440
we've met the enemy and it is us the quote
297
00:17:23.440 --> 00:17:29.640
frum it, Well, how do you expand that work? With
298
00:17:29.640 --> 00:17:33.400
the multiple agencies? So you described the problem, but how
299
00:17:33.440 --> 00:17:37.960
do you expand it? I mean with a special event
300
00:17:38.119 --> 00:17:41.880
you could probably work out the network of communications needed
301
00:17:41.920 --> 00:17:46.240
for that particular event, but then we're going to talk
302
00:17:46.279 --> 00:17:48.240
about how do you maintain that after the event, so
303
00:17:48.279 --> 00:17:50.720
you don't have to talk about now. But I you know,
304
00:17:51.000 --> 00:17:56.640
that's a challenge of yeah that multiple agents and so
305
00:17:56.920 --> 00:18:00.319
so transit's in the no, you know, and well, no,
306
00:18:00.440 --> 00:18:03.519
there's been an event, and immediately they gear up and
307
00:18:03.519 --> 00:18:05.799
they've probably done some prior planning and they have more
308
00:18:05.839 --> 00:18:11.400
surgeons on hand. I mean that elective surgeries are not
309
00:18:11.640 --> 00:18:14.480
all in progress at the same time doing things like that,
310
00:18:14.559 --> 00:18:17.319
but they got to know what's going on well, and.
311
00:18:17.279 --> 00:18:18.880
I think that I mean, you know, we could talk
312
00:18:18.880 --> 00:18:21.400
about tabletop exercise that we can talk about sort of
313
00:18:21.480 --> 00:18:24.880
like what has happened before in other places. But you know,
314
00:18:24.960 --> 00:18:28.799
you're also there's the yeah, you're you're training for a
315
00:18:28.920 --> 00:18:33.720
mass casualty event, whether it's a stadium or it's a shooting.
316
00:18:34.400 --> 00:18:36.799
You know, how do I have enough resources and people
317
00:18:36.920 --> 00:18:40.960
and blood and ambulances and responders. You know, all that
318
00:18:40.960 --> 00:18:43.200
stuff comes into play where you're just trying to figure
319
00:18:43.200 --> 00:18:46.000
out do I have enough resources for the bus that
320
00:18:46.240 --> 00:18:48.440
just crashed and all the kids are on it, right,
321
00:18:48.480 --> 00:18:50.000
Like I need to be able to get there and
322
00:18:50.039 --> 00:18:52.200
get them out and get them timely. The golden hour,
323
00:18:52.640 --> 00:18:54.559
you know, that's the hour that's you know, from when
324
00:18:54.559 --> 00:18:56.680
you touch the person to the time that you actually
325
00:18:56.960 --> 00:18:58.440
get them to the hospital.
326
00:18:58.559 --> 00:18:58.759
You know.
327
00:18:58.799 --> 00:19:01.880
These are all the things that just are general emergency services.
328
00:19:03.279 --> 00:19:06.559
Right. Well, this has been great. Andrea Kay is set
329
00:19:06.559 --> 00:19:09.039
in the stage if you will, for the second half
330
00:19:09.039 --> 00:19:11.359
of the podcast, but at this point want to take
331
00:19:11.400 --> 00:19:14.799
a quick break for some messages and we'll be right
332
00:19:14.839 --> 00:19:15.640
back after this.
333
00:19:17.000 --> 00:19:20.400
Are you looking for bleeding control equipment? Impulse by Dovererman.
334
00:19:20.519 --> 00:19:24.440
Bleeding Control Equipment is professional grade and build to save lives.
335
00:19:24.640 --> 00:19:27.640
From the responder pro slingk for first responders, to wall
336
00:19:27.759 --> 00:19:31.559
mounted kits with ADS, compact packs for ushers and security,
337
00:19:31.680 --> 00:19:35.519
and the MCI resupply cast for standby teams. Get your
338
00:19:35.640 --> 00:19:42.200
Impulse kits and training from Impulse Kits dot Com. Our
339
00:19:42.279 --> 00:19:47.160
set builds immersive virtual reality environments that mere real world spaces,
340
00:19:47.240 --> 00:19:51.079
giving military and first responders the power to train, analyze,
341
00:19:51.119 --> 00:19:55.839
and document with precision experience, mission ready simulation with our
342
00:19:55.920 --> 00:20:00.880
set dot com. Protect your school, venue, facility, or community
343
00:20:00.960 --> 00:20:05.839
with Doverman Emergency Management Specialized three by three approach. We
344
00:20:05.920 --> 00:20:10.359
do this with protecting life, property, and continuity of operations
345
00:20:10.400 --> 00:20:14.319
through advanced planning, training and assessments. Learn more about our
346
00:20:14.319 --> 00:20:18.119
cutting edge approach with world class professionals at emergency services
347
00:20:18.160 --> 00:20:23.799
today at DOBERMANEMG dot com. Emergency management is changing. Are
348
00:20:23.839 --> 00:20:26.279
you keeping up? The Readiness Lab takes it to the
349
00:20:26.319 --> 00:20:30.839
next level with exclusive tabletop exercises, live sessions, and real
350
00:20:30.880 --> 00:20:34.880
world intel access. The EOC as a trol insider, train
351
00:20:34.960 --> 00:20:38.920
with us through EDLAM or rep the fuel with our EMTs. Yeah,
352
00:20:39.000 --> 00:20:41.400
that's a put. We also deliver top tier marketing and
353
00:20:41.480 --> 00:20:45.640
design for emergency services and public safety outreach, product reviews,
354
00:20:45.680 --> 00:20:49.279
trade show support, sponsorships, and more. The Readiness Lab is
355
00:20:49.319 --> 00:20:52.640
the number one emergency services podcast network, home of the
356
00:20:52.720 --> 00:20:56.920
EDLAM certification, fold outreach and everything pushing the field forward.
357
00:20:57.079 --> 00:20:59.680
Learn more at the Readiness Slab dot com. Like what
358
00:20:59.759 --> 00:21:02.519
you're hearing? Check out our show notes for more details,
359
00:21:02.599 --> 00:21:04.480
including the links to each of our sponsors.
360
00:21:05.960 --> 00:21:10.000
And we are back today talking with Andre McGregor, a
361
00:21:10.000 --> 00:21:15.440
co founder and CEO of the company Force Metrics. We're
362
00:21:15.440 --> 00:21:18.599
going to pick up where we left off, and before
363
00:21:18.599 --> 00:21:20.559
I do that, so I need to take a moment
364
00:21:20.640 --> 00:21:24.359
to recognize Zach Bors who is a technical producer and
365
00:21:24.400 --> 00:21:29.279
provide support to produce these podcasts. Without him, this disaster
366
00:21:29.440 --> 00:21:34.400
zone would not happen. Thank you, Zach so Andre. What
367
00:21:34.839 --> 00:21:37.839
are the host cities learning in real time as their
368
00:21:37.960 --> 00:21:41.000
plans meet reality? I mean that's another thing. We plan
369
00:21:41.079 --> 00:21:43.119
all we want, which is good. You need a plan,
370
00:21:43.200 --> 00:21:48.039
but as you learn things, you gotta hitch shifts and rotate.
371
00:21:49.000 --> 00:21:51.559
Yeah, I mean I think you're learning what's what you know?
372
00:21:51.559 --> 00:21:54.079
That sounds very basic, what's working on that? What's not working?
373
00:21:54.160 --> 00:21:57.759
But you have a whole plan and are people at
374
00:21:57.799 --> 00:22:00.759
you know, congregating where you expect them the congregate, is traffic
375
00:22:00.799 --> 00:22:03.319
moving the way that you're expecting it to move, is
376
00:22:03.359 --> 00:22:05.960
your visibility where you expect it to be? You know,
377
00:22:06.279 --> 00:22:07.839
do you have any hiccups in any of that? Are
378
00:22:07.880 --> 00:22:10.400
you able to mitigate those hiccups in real time or
379
00:22:10.480 --> 00:22:12.799
is it a at the end of the day, at
380
00:22:12.839 --> 00:22:14.960
the end of the shift, coming back and having sort
381
00:22:15.000 --> 00:22:18.240
of lessons learned in real time because you know, while
382
00:22:18.240 --> 00:22:20.839
these games are going on, it's twenty four hours worth
383
00:22:20.880 --> 00:22:23.960
of activity that there maybe there's a gap between like
384
00:22:24.680 --> 00:22:28.400
two am and eight am, but for the most part,
385
00:22:28.440 --> 00:22:29.599
it's all day.
386
00:22:31.119 --> 00:22:33.359
Yeah, you know, I'm just thinking about the rural traffic
387
00:22:33.519 --> 00:22:37.839
cameras now play or just public safety cameras which dominate
388
00:22:37.960 --> 00:22:41.640
some major metropolitan areas. Others don't like the idea, but
389
00:22:43.319 --> 00:22:48.319
I'm just thinking about Oklahoma City bombing. If you'd had
390
00:22:48.359 --> 00:22:54.559
traffic cameras around that facility just general use yeah, this explosion,
391
00:22:56.000 --> 00:22:59.119
they might have had a better idea immediately rather than
392
00:22:59.200 --> 00:23:01.880
trying to find the to the truck, which helped them
393
00:23:01.920 --> 00:23:04.759
identify who rented the truck and that. But they'd have
394
00:23:05.000 --> 00:23:09.119
immediate information. So there's lots of sources out there that
395
00:23:09.160 --> 00:23:13.279
we didn't have previously. But then getting that information to
396
00:23:13.359 --> 00:23:17.519
the right people is a big deal. And my next
397
00:23:17.559 --> 00:23:20.319
question has to do with that speed of information transfer
398
00:23:20.440 --> 00:23:26.599
sharing impact outcomes when time matters most So what your
399
00:23:27.200 --> 00:23:30.440
FBI background taught you about the importance of getting right
400
00:23:30.480 --> 00:23:36.039
information the right people quickly, and that's can be challenging.
401
00:23:37.440 --> 00:23:40.559
It can be because you're also trying to communicate with
402
00:23:40.599 --> 00:23:44.960
them on a technology that they have access to. So
403
00:23:45.039 --> 00:23:48.680
it's not just you know, a radio, it's also bone text, email,
404
00:23:48.960 --> 00:23:52.079
you know, timely. Is it asynchronous versus synchronous. You know,
405
00:23:52.200 --> 00:23:54.680
radio is the synchronous Like at the time of me
406
00:23:54.759 --> 00:23:58.039
saying that hopefully someone's listening to me, email is asynchronous,
407
00:23:58.039 --> 00:23:59.519
like I hope that you read my email and you're
408
00:23:59.519 --> 00:24:02.960
reading a time but I have no idea. So you're
409
00:24:03.039 --> 00:24:06.519
you're trying to manage how you're how you send that
410
00:24:06.559 --> 00:24:10.599
information along with who you send that information to. And
411
00:24:10.599 --> 00:24:13.920
then of course there's information overlooked, like am I sending
412
00:24:13.960 --> 00:24:16.200
too much information that no one actually digests it or
413
00:24:16.200 --> 00:24:19.720
if they do, they can't really understand it. Right, So
414
00:24:19.759 --> 00:24:24.519
you're you're you definitely identify those points of contact that
415
00:24:24.680 --> 00:24:27.960
you know can take in the information in a timely
416
00:24:28.039 --> 00:24:30.759
manner and also understand without sort of giving you the
417
00:24:30.799 --> 00:24:33.680
history of time of what they're what they're taking in,
418
00:24:34.359 --> 00:24:37.240
and then they can send it to their people because
419
00:24:37.240 --> 00:24:40.160
it's like, oh, I trust Andre, so this little snippet
420
00:24:40.880 --> 00:24:42.680
I don't have to ask any questions. I already know
421
00:24:42.799 --> 00:24:45.960
that it is. It means something to the agency or
422
00:24:45.960 --> 00:24:46.640
the city or the.
423
00:24:46.559 --> 00:24:48.279
Town something like that, And you have a trust in
424
00:24:48.359 --> 00:24:55.960
network established beforehand exactly the people know one another. Is
425
00:24:56.000 --> 00:25:00.000
the thing is isn't just a nameless uh mail bod
426
00:25:00.559 --> 00:25:03.599
or whatever. I think they have. Trust you need to
427
00:25:03.640 --> 00:25:08.599
build it with between individual people. If you go back
428
00:25:08.720 --> 00:25:11.400
just a couple of podcasts, I had an entire podcast
429
00:25:11.480 --> 00:25:16.400
on trust and how you establish that from that standpoint,
430
00:25:17.240 --> 00:25:22.680
you know this way. I had a lot of operational
431
00:25:22.720 --> 00:25:27.359
experience in the army, you know, did I was never
432
00:25:27.400 --> 00:25:31.640
in combat, but had lots of Please tell my deputy
433
00:25:31.680 --> 00:25:35.279
I spent thousands of hours in a command center and
434
00:25:35.319 --> 00:25:38.119
she said, oh, And I said, yeah, yeah, No, I
435
00:25:38.200 --> 00:25:41.519
was a company of the time, brigade, division, corps and
436
00:25:41.680 --> 00:25:45.039
army levels. I was in the op center or technical
437
00:25:45.039 --> 00:25:52.559
command pills many many, many hours. But the challenge there is,
438
00:25:52.720 --> 00:25:54.720
and you mentioned it which made me think of this
439
00:25:55.640 --> 00:25:58.920
is initially in a disaster, something happens and you know
440
00:25:59.160 --> 00:26:02.000
very little and you're just trying to find colonel's information,
441
00:26:02.200 --> 00:26:04.680
and then the fire hose opens up kind of what
442
00:26:04.720 --> 00:26:08.160
you alluded to, where all this information comes at you
443
00:26:08.920 --> 00:26:11.519
and you know what's critical and what isn't critical. And
444
00:26:13.079 --> 00:26:16.359
I hadn't solved that a problem yet. But I think
445
00:26:16.799 --> 00:26:22.359
artificial intelligence can do that for us. Whether it's key words,
446
00:26:22.480 --> 00:26:25.920
I don't know that it can pick that up and
447
00:26:26.000 --> 00:26:29.799
shoot it in a predetermined fashion. To the nodes that
448
00:26:30.000 --> 00:26:33.319
need to have that and highlight it that type of thing.
449
00:26:33.359 --> 00:26:36.119
Do you think that's possible, and maybe Forest Metrics does that.
450
00:26:36.200 --> 00:26:39.519
I don't know, Yeah, I mean there's I think, you know,
451
00:26:39.599 --> 00:26:41.759
kind of going back to information overlad, there's just a
452
00:26:41.799 --> 00:26:43.839
lot of information.
453
00:26:43.920 --> 00:26:44.119
Now.
454
00:26:44.119 --> 00:26:46.759
It's not just the reports that you're reading or even
455
00:26:46.839 --> 00:26:50.799
the radio traffic, it's the drone activity, it's the video,
456
00:26:51.079 --> 00:26:54.359
it's you know, so many things that you just don't
457
00:26:54.400 --> 00:26:57.680
have time, you know. I remember talking to one department
458
00:26:57.839 --> 00:27:00.079
that said, hey, like, we don't have the time to
459
00:27:00.160 --> 00:27:03.599
look at all the body cam video that we collect
460
00:27:03.920 --> 00:27:07.599
in any incident in a single day. Just not possible.
461
00:27:08.000 --> 00:27:11.839
So AI agents is a big part of that workflow.
462
00:27:11.880 --> 00:27:14.319
Can we create an agent that says, hey, look for
463
00:27:14.480 --> 00:27:16.839
this particular thing and if it is, you know, take
464
00:27:17.160 --> 00:27:20.079
you know, take a snapshot of that in some capacity,
465
00:27:20.119 --> 00:27:22.640
and then there's another agent that can take that and say,
466
00:27:22.640 --> 00:27:25.000
now take this and combine it with this piece of information,
467
00:27:25.119 --> 00:27:27.160
and combouy with this and by the time you've done,
468
00:27:27.200 --> 00:27:29.759
you have a finished product that you would normally put
469
00:27:30.200 --> 00:27:33.440
five or ten people to do with an AI bot,
470
00:27:33.599 --> 00:27:37.279
which is amazing right those are coming out there's still
471
00:27:37.799 --> 00:27:41.640
early stages because this is very sensitive data. It's vulnerable people,
472
00:27:41.759 --> 00:27:44.599
and you know, there's always a concern around surveillance state,
473
00:27:44.680 --> 00:27:46.839
so you have to kind of figure out how you
474
00:27:47.279 --> 00:27:50.759
collect these data data points. But you know, I think
475
00:27:50.799 --> 00:27:52.839
AI is moving in that direction.
476
00:27:54.119 --> 00:27:59.599
Yeah. I always say it's like everybody loves responsibility except
477
00:27:59.599 --> 00:28:03.440
when they're held responsible, you know, So they'd love to
478
00:28:03.440 --> 00:28:06.960
have all these tools helping them to identify who perpetrated
479
00:28:07.079 --> 00:28:09.440
something against them. But then oh, I don't want all
480
00:28:09.440 --> 00:28:12.279
these cameras looking at me, or having a license plate reader,
481
00:28:12.359 --> 00:28:16.960
or have red light cameras or all that. So there's
482
00:28:16.960 --> 00:28:20.519
a challenge to that too. So what when is the
483
00:28:20.559 --> 00:28:24.000
World Cup revealing about the current state of public safety
484
00:28:24.039 --> 00:28:28.240
and coordination in US health cities? These are the lessons
485
00:28:28.279 --> 00:28:28.880
being learned.
486
00:28:29.680 --> 00:28:33.480
Yeah, no, I think that, you know, the first thing
487
00:28:33.519 --> 00:28:35.559
that's being understood is that there's a lot of new
488
00:28:36.279 --> 00:28:41.279
technology that's being utilized, and you know, it's it's up
489
00:28:41.279 --> 00:28:44.799
to the departments for how they utilize it. But you know, prior,
490
00:28:45.279 --> 00:28:47.680
you know, the last World Cup was you know, nineties,
491
00:28:47.799 --> 00:28:49.640
you know, and now we're getting to a place where,
492
00:28:49.960 --> 00:28:54.519
you know, we the best technology isn't the m wrapped
493
00:28:54.799 --> 00:28:58.960
you know vehicle, a slat vehicle. It's now the drone,
494
00:28:58.960 --> 00:29:02.680
and it's now you know data, you know analytics, you know,
495
00:29:02.720 --> 00:29:04.519
it's how can I put all this data to action
496
00:29:04.839 --> 00:29:07.200
with one person to do the work of ten versus
497
00:29:07.480 --> 00:29:09.200
you know, ten people in the back of a truck
498
00:29:09.359 --> 00:29:11.880
driving to a location and standing up posts.
499
00:29:11.640 --> 00:29:14.640
And faster, that's if faster.
500
00:29:14.759 --> 00:29:18.319
And also I think you're you're giving purpose to many
501
00:29:18.359 --> 00:29:21.640
people that critically think all the time, and if you
502
00:29:21.720 --> 00:29:25.640
give them the data and the capabilities and the visuals,
503
00:29:26.000 --> 00:29:28.000
they can make a good decision. You know, I don't
504
00:29:28.000 --> 00:29:29.920
think you had that before because it was always the
505
00:29:30.960 --> 00:29:34.440
you know one computer terminal, the one you know at
506
00:29:34.640 --> 00:29:38.240
you know active, you know, sort of a piece of intel.
507
00:29:38.480 --> 00:29:38.640
You know.
508
00:29:40.200 --> 00:29:44.519
Well you mentioned there and then a fleeting thought and
509
00:29:44.559 --> 00:29:50.559
it flew away. Maybe it'll come back to me. And
510
00:29:51.240 --> 00:29:54.759
one of the sorry state of affairs that happens is,
511
00:29:56.480 --> 00:29:58.279
you know, I was I'm old enough, I went through
512
00:29:58.319 --> 00:30:01.880
white to a cave. Let's see, are you born Well, yeah,
513
00:30:01.920 --> 00:30:04.960
you were born all right, so but you were involved
514
00:30:04.960 --> 00:30:08.240
in this stuff. And we ramped up all the preparations
515
00:30:08.240 --> 00:30:10.480
for Y two K really worked I mean we were
516
00:30:10.519 --> 00:30:14.000
at everybody who's ready for something happened. We are all
517
00:30:14.000 --> 00:30:18.440
tuned up, all these computer systems have been upgraded, and
518
00:30:18.480 --> 00:30:21.279
the majority and all that is a great and then
519
00:30:21.960 --> 00:30:26.440
you know, two thousand happened and oh yeah, we got
520
00:30:26.480 --> 00:30:30.119
through that, and then it all kind of disintegrates quickly,
521
00:30:30.319 --> 00:30:33.119
all those nodes that were coordinating and stood up and
522
00:30:33.359 --> 00:30:37.440
trying to coordinate. So why is it the temporary event
523
00:30:38.000 --> 00:30:43.039
operations often fade unless cities intentionally build towards a more
524
00:30:43.079 --> 00:30:47.440
permanent capability. And what could they be doing now? I mean,
525
00:30:47.480 --> 00:30:51.599
this number of cities are declining already. See I'll just
526
00:30:51.680 --> 00:30:54.880
hosted their last one last week. You know what should
527
00:30:54.960 --> 00:30:58.799
cities be learning now if they want these investments to
528
00:30:58.920 --> 00:31:01.519
outlist last the tournament?
529
00:31:02.359 --> 00:31:04.759
Yeah, I mean like everyone's got to work towards a
530
00:31:04.799 --> 00:31:09.640
common operating picture, right, And so when you don't have
531
00:31:09.759 --> 00:31:13.480
something happening, it's hard for the you know, small town
532
00:31:14.079 --> 00:31:17.319
to constantly be prepping and prepping and prepping because it's
533
00:31:17.319 --> 00:31:19.920
expensive and time consuming and you know, do I have
534
00:31:20.039 --> 00:31:23.599
enough people and sick leave and medical leave and militarily,
535
00:31:23.720 --> 00:31:25.319
like you have a lot of stuff that's kind of like,
536
00:31:25.960 --> 00:31:29.079
you know, you're you're balancing, so you you know, if
537
00:31:29.119 --> 00:31:31.640
you don't have something active, it's it is sometimes hard
538
00:31:31.799 --> 00:31:34.559
to just sort of keep up the training and the
539
00:31:34.599 --> 00:31:38.240
task force type work. But I think the thing that
540
00:31:38.319 --> 00:31:40.279
you can take away from it is you may not
541
00:31:40.559 --> 00:31:44.319
have thirty people dedicated, but you can have five and
542
00:31:44.400 --> 00:31:48.160
those five people are still educated or ready and prepared.
543
00:31:48.240 --> 00:31:50.240
Much like a swat team. You know that, hey, you're
544
00:31:50.240 --> 00:31:53.480
not always every day, you know, hitting a house, but
545
00:31:53.960 --> 00:31:56.440
you are ready to if you need to. But you're
546
00:31:56.480 --> 00:31:58.200
you're doing it, you know, maybe once a.
547
00:31:58.119 --> 00:31:58.599
Month, you know.
548
00:31:58.720 --> 00:32:02.319
So I think there's positivity and this type of work.
549
00:32:02.359 --> 00:32:04.640
It's just unless you have something that you're sort of
550
00:32:05.079 --> 00:32:07.400
a goalpost, sometimes it faids.
551
00:32:08.559 --> 00:32:11.079
Yeah, you're there, you've arrived and now you're done. Right.
552
00:32:12.039 --> 00:32:15.559
Where in law enforcement would this go? I always think
553
00:32:15.599 --> 00:32:18.880
about detectives being on cases, being given the case now,
554
00:32:19.000 --> 00:32:24.039
But where's this data analytics on an ongoing basis within
555
00:32:24.359 --> 00:32:30.160
a law enforcement agency or many times there's different solutions
556
00:32:30.240 --> 00:32:32.720
value to this, So where might it be. It's not
557
00:32:32.759 --> 00:32:34.200
going to be in the nine to one to one center,
558
00:32:34.279 --> 00:32:35.319
I don't think so.
559
00:32:36.279 --> 00:32:39.240
Yeah, I mean that's and that's honestly why even a
560
00:32:39.319 --> 00:32:42.240
force metrics like us exist is because there's lots of
561
00:32:42.319 --> 00:32:44.839
data that's being you know, pulled together all the time
562
00:32:44.880 --> 00:32:47.279
that don't the pieces are sort of like connected and
563
00:32:47.839 --> 00:32:49.880
you know, you were talking about the World Cup, where
564
00:32:49.880 --> 00:32:53.119
another place it might just be a school activity or
565
00:32:53.680 --> 00:32:56.720
event at the high school for prom that could be
566
00:32:56.880 --> 00:32:59.839
the equal you know, sort of big big ticket item
567
00:33:00.119 --> 00:33:02.599
that you know. So for us, like we're we're pulling
568
00:33:02.599 --> 00:33:05.519
together as a real time intelligence platform. You know, our
569
00:33:05.559 --> 00:33:08.119
goal is that the data is useful not only to officers,
570
00:33:08.160 --> 00:33:11.000
but dispatchers and analysts and the real time crime center
571
00:33:11.039 --> 00:33:14.359
and everyone really just wants faster context on a person,
572
00:33:14.440 --> 00:33:18.200
a location, or a situation, both as the call for
573
00:33:18.279 --> 00:33:21.920
services happening, you know, and then afterwards and then you
574
00:33:21.920 --> 00:33:24.039
get to take that data and say, you know, are
575
00:33:24.039 --> 00:33:27.240
we thinking about the next phase of wherever is happening
576
00:33:27.240 --> 00:33:30.279
in our community? Like that's what's kind of happening with
577
00:33:30.319 --> 00:33:33.200
all the technologies that we have, and there's not a
578
00:33:33.240 --> 00:33:36.359
single person that can think about all corners of a
579
00:33:36.440 --> 00:33:39.480
city or county, So you have to be thinking about
580
00:33:39.720 --> 00:33:44.920
those individual officers and dispatchers and analysts as those you know,
581
00:33:45.160 --> 00:33:47.640
mini detectives that are making a decision that like, hey,
582
00:33:47.680 --> 00:33:49.960
I'm going to dive into this thing. I don't have
583
00:33:50.519 --> 00:33:52.839
other people to ask, and I don't think other people
584
00:33:52.839 --> 00:33:55.680
are looking at this, but the school resource officer is
585
00:33:55.720 --> 00:33:57.359
and that's important to the school.
586
00:33:58.000 --> 00:34:03.559
Yeah. So one of my concerns as we get into
587
00:34:03.880 --> 00:34:08.320
this technological race, if it will to be better and
588
00:34:08.400 --> 00:34:11.719
it's the end goal, is the interoperability. It's not. It's
589
00:34:11.760 --> 00:34:16.960
also intel and information awareness, but then achieve this multi
590
00:34:17.000 --> 00:34:22.360
agency kind of have the interoperability aspect to it. So
591
00:34:23.159 --> 00:34:26.480
how do you move from disconnected systems to a shared
592
00:34:26.719 --> 00:34:31.840
operational picture or just Intel picture. Initially it's intail picture
593
00:34:31.840 --> 00:34:34.599
and then it might turn into an operational picture.
594
00:34:35.480 --> 00:34:38.320
Yeah, I mean, I think honestly, that's why technology like
595
00:34:38.360 --> 00:34:41.760
ours exists is that it's hard when you're kind of
596
00:34:41.760 --> 00:34:45.480
thinking about your individual you know, single computers, right, if
597
00:34:45.480 --> 00:34:47.199
you're looking at like a network, I'm only looking at
598
00:34:47.199 --> 00:34:49.639
my computer. I'm not looking at all the other data
599
00:34:49.639 --> 00:34:52.039
that's in other people's sort of network folders and a
600
00:34:52.119 --> 00:34:54.480
variety of stuff. So i only see my world. You know,
601
00:34:54.519 --> 00:34:56.599
when you start creating a network of computers and you're
602
00:34:56.599 --> 00:34:59.000
starting network folders, all of a sudden, Now I have
603
00:34:59.039 --> 00:35:02.039
a much bigger picture, so you know, but you know,
604
00:35:02.159 --> 00:35:05.639
I still require the other people doing work on their computer.
605
00:35:06.559 --> 00:35:07.880
You know, it can't just be me. I don't have
606
00:35:07.880 --> 00:35:09.280
all the time in the world to do that, right,
607
00:35:09.320 --> 00:35:11.159
So you're collecting all of that, and then you're now
608
00:35:11.320 --> 00:35:14.519
putting something on top to say, you know, tell me more.
609
00:35:14.840 --> 00:35:17.559
The nice thing is that a I can't actually tell
610
00:35:17.559 --> 00:35:19.639
you more. So it's you know, the hard part is
611
00:35:19.639 --> 00:35:21.719
collecting the data. That's the hardest part of data is
612
00:35:21.719 --> 00:35:24.159
collecting data. That's why open ai and others have run
613
00:35:24.159 --> 00:35:26.719
out of data. They took up the Internet and they
614
00:35:26.760 --> 00:35:28.639
don't have any more data. So now they're just hey,
615
00:35:28.639 --> 00:35:31.079
can I follow a person around and they can just
616
00:35:31.159 --> 00:35:33.440
make human data for me because they need more data.
617
00:35:33.599 --> 00:35:36.960
That's literally what they're doing. So the fact that cities
618
00:35:37.000 --> 00:35:40.480
and law enforcement is already collecting data and storing it,
619
00:35:40.519 --> 00:35:42.960
that's the hard part. Now it's just putting stuff on
620
00:35:42.960 --> 00:35:45.880
top that'll actually make it, you know, easy to digest.
621
00:35:46.800 --> 00:35:51.960
Okay, well, I think this reach opportunity at this point
622
00:35:52.199 --> 00:35:56.199
for you to share what fourth Metrics is doing and
623
00:35:56.320 --> 00:36:04.000
building to sell this communications coordination challenge, and perhaps it's
624
00:36:04.000 --> 00:36:09.480
collecting data, but making the existing information visible, usable across
625
00:36:09.599 --> 00:36:13.960
agencies jurisdictions when time matters. Well, so it's great to
626
00:36:13.960 --> 00:36:17.880
have this goal, but we have a human limitation of
627
00:36:17.880 --> 00:36:21.280
our abilities to do that. So what does fourth metrics?
628
00:36:21.639 --> 00:36:27.039
What can it do for single organizations and then jurisdictions
629
00:36:27.039 --> 00:36:30.400
who have agreed to try and work more collaborative related together.
630
00:36:31.360 --> 00:36:34.400
Yeah, so we see ourselves as like the real time
631
00:36:34.440 --> 00:36:39.239
intelligence layer, you know that also provides a decision assist platform.
632
00:36:39.280 --> 00:36:41.559
And what I mean by that is, you know, right now,
633
00:36:41.920 --> 00:36:43.800
in both of our cities, someone's calling nine to one
634
00:36:43.880 --> 00:36:46.960
one and we're sending for someone's thinking of his own disaster,
635
00:36:47.119 --> 00:36:50.280
talking to them. We're sending resources there, and we're going
636
00:36:50.320 --> 00:36:52.840
into the unknown. You know, do we know something about
637
00:36:52.880 --> 00:36:56.000
the person or the location, do we have pre planned something?
638
00:36:56.039 --> 00:36:59.119
We don't know because there's oftentimes too much information. So
639
00:37:00.039 --> 00:37:02.480
we're creating, you know, the ability to on your smartphone
640
00:37:02.519 --> 00:37:05.239
or on your laptop or at the discact center to say, hey,
641
00:37:05.719 --> 00:37:07.880
what things do I know about safety and social needs
642
00:37:07.880 --> 00:37:11.199
on this is someone with dementia or autism, the PTSD,
643
00:37:11.920 --> 00:37:15.199
domestic violence victim, you know, things that can help me
644
00:37:15.320 --> 00:37:18.599
understand how to relate to that person as much as like, oh, hey,
645
00:37:18.639 --> 00:37:21.400
they've had an overdose before and I'm thinking about narcan, right,
646
00:37:21.519 --> 00:37:25.280
So you know, everyone is always hoping for the positive outcome,
647
00:37:25.760 --> 00:37:28.119
and we're providing the technology to get them to that
648
00:37:28.320 --> 00:37:30.639
to that positive outcome. We actually, I asd someone tell
649
00:37:30.679 --> 00:37:34.239
me recently, you're building the thing that we see on
650
00:37:34.320 --> 00:37:36.639
TV that we think police already.
651
00:37:36.280 --> 00:37:38.400
Have that tell you that they don't like.
652
00:37:38.440 --> 00:37:40.519
That's one hundred percent what I'm deal with.
653
00:37:40.719 --> 00:37:46.159
Yes, okay, So where where does the technology reside or
654
00:37:46.280 --> 00:37:50.039
where can it reside? I mean, if you would say, okay,
655
00:37:50.360 --> 00:37:54.519
I'm a city a I said, oh Andre, oh man,
656
00:37:54.639 --> 00:37:58.199
this is so great. I want to purchase what you have.
657
00:37:58.360 --> 00:38:00.800
And now where should I be put in this? And
658
00:38:01.559 --> 00:38:04.840
how many people will take it to operate? And also
659
00:38:05.079 --> 00:38:07.039
which is just going to cost me? Andre, I'm a
660
00:38:07.079 --> 00:38:10.400
small city of twenty five thousand people, but we're looking
661
00:38:10.440 --> 00:38:13.119
ahead to the twenty first century.
662
00:38:13.280 --> 00:38:16.599
Yeah. So we we store it in the cloud, and
663
00:38:16.639 --> 00:38:19.079
we you know, have a siege just you know, criminal
664
00:38:19.159 --> 00:38:22.960
just information system adjudicated you know, cloud environment where we
665
00:38:22.960 --> 00:38:26.280
can store this very sensitive data. We're also sought to
666
00:38:26.519 --> 00:38:28.760
type two audited, so that we can do all the
667
00:38:28.760 --> 00:38:32.119
security you know that this needed to protect this data,
668
00:38:32.559 --> 00:38:36.840
but inherently it's the city, county, town's data. It's they
669
00:38:36.920 --> 00:38:39.599
have the encryption keys. They get to own the control
670
00:38:39.679 --> 00:38:43.000
over this, and then when the relationship is over, they
671
00:38:43.000 --> 00:38:45.119
just take the encryption key away. So you have to
672
00:38:45.159 --> 00:38:48.440
make sure that the ownership is decided because the citizens
673
00:38:48.480 --> 00:38:51.440
own the data, it's not any particular you know agency.
674
00:38:52.039 --> 00:38:53.519
And then for us, we want to be as cost
675
00:38:53.559 --> 00:38:56.239
effective as possible, so you know, we keep it into
676
00:38:56.280 --> 00:38:59.360
the hundreds of dollars per user to be able to
677
00:38:59.400 --> 00:39:02.559
get access into this data. That will give them you know,
678
00:39:02.760 --> 00:39:05.639
ten to not hundreds of thousands of dollars of you know,
679
00:39:05.920 --> 00:39:08.360
cost savings and output per user as well.
680
00:39:08.960 --> 00:39:13.800
Okay, so for some people might be unfamiliar with user,
681
00:39:13.960 --> 00:39:17.719
I'm going to call it, but in seat one person
682
00:39:18.119 --> 00:39:22.360
is that what a user is? One one access to
683
00:39:22.440 --> 00:39:23.119
it exactly.
684
00:39:23.360 --> 00:39:26.119
Yeah, but un limited devices and a variety of so
685
00:39:26.159 --> 00:39:28.480
you're not you know, charging them for how much data
686
00:39:28.519 --> 00:39:30.320
they put in or I'm not trying to how much
687
00:39:30.360 --> 00:39:32.400
data they put in or you know, how many systems
688
00:39:32.440 --> 00:39:35.880
are connected. It's you know, you get the system and
689
00:39:35.960 --> 00:39:38.239
we're going to give you access, and you want access
690
00:39:38.280 --> 00:39:42.159
to your dispatch records, your police reports, your you know,
691
00:39:42.360 --> 00:39:45.039
jail information. You know you also may want you know,
692
00:39:45.119 --> 00:39:48.679
open source data as well. We're bringing all it into
693
00:39:48.719 --> 00:39:51.559
one place and giving a I call it a Google
694
00:39:51.800 --> 00:39:56.400
meets redfinillowreeltor dot Com experience. If you can find a
695
00:39:56.440 --> 00:39:59.719
three bedroom, two bath house in a neighborhood of your choosing,
696
00:40:00.119 --> 00:40:02.760
you should be able to find the domestic violence victim
697
00:40:02.800 --> 00:40:05.280
that is looking for support well before it gets to
698
00:40:05.320 --> 00:40:07.599
a very bad outcome. We make it so easy to
699
00:40:07.679 --> 00:40:11.800
use that we actually don't require any training to use it. Literally,
700
00:40:11.840 --> 00:40:13.760
we have people deployed in that we never got trained,
701
00:40:13.760 --> 00:40:16.239
and we figured out exactly how to sault crime. Five
702
00:40:16.280 --> 00:40:22.320
people in need put together a pattern of issues around
703
00:40:22.360 --> 00:40:25.639
mental health or homelessness on their phone.
704
00:40:25.800 --> 00:40:29.679
Okay, and so the biggest thing is them feeding their
705
00:40:29.679 --> 00:40:34.760
information into fourth Metrics and using yourself ware to sort it.
706
00:40:35.920 --> 00:40:39.039
I don't know, can you highlight specific issues, you know,
707
00:40:39.039 --> 00:40:42.360
the kind of red flag well alert, alert alert, there's
708
00:40:42.360 --> 00:40:44.480
something going on here. I don't know, yeah, I.
709
00:40:44.480 --> 00:40:47.480
Mean, we can find like the again, the patterns around
710
00:40:48.119 --> 00:40:52.960
any issue, legal dumping to you know, homeless encampments to
711
00:40:53.480 --> 00:40:55.440
people that are at the tail end of a mental
712
00:40:55.440 --> 00:40:59.400
health episode, even opioid issues in a city, we can
713
00:40:59.440 --> 00:41:02.480
identify where they are, who they are, and that way
714
00:41:02.719 --> 00:41:06.920
first responders but also mental health co responders can actually
715
00:41:07.519 --> 00:41:10.880
identify the people need get aworded on any one that is,
716
00:41:11.039 --> 00:41:15.280
you know, threshold out to a bad place. That's what
717
00:41:15.320 --> 00:41:15.519
we do.
718
00:41:16.280 --> 00:41:20.960
Okay, So what's the feedback you're getting from users? And
719
00:41:22.519 --> 00:41:24.920
is it better than Slice Cheese, which if you go
720
00:41:24.960 --> 00:41:29.280
to Monroe, Wisconsin, just north of the Illinois border, that's
721
00:41:29.320 --> 00:41:33.760
the Cheesemakers is the name of this the high school
722
00:41:33.800 --> 00:41:37.320
team there. So what's the reception to worthymetrics? Man.
723
00:41:37.719 --> 00:41:41.039
Yeah, So we're in about seventy five cities and counties
724
00:41:41.079 --> 00:41:45.679
and seventeen states everywhere from Beverly Hills to Seattle, to
725
00:41:45.800 --> 00:41:49.119
Tampa to Newark, New Jersey to half the Denver metro
726
00:41:49.159 --> 00:41:52.119
area using Force Metrics. And we actually do surveys with
727
00:41:52.159 --> 00:41:55.920
our users all the time and we have very very
728
00:41:55.960 --> 00:41:59.679
high scores that are equivalent to Apple and USAA and
729
00:41:59.719 --> 00:42:01.800
even Cosco. You know, I would say we're as good
730
00:42:01.840 --> 00:42:05.280
as Cosco pizza and hot dogs. You know, our users
731
00:42:05.360 --> 00:42:07.880
really really like what we're bringing in there, asking us
732
00:42:07.880 --> 00:42:09.760
for more and more functionality as a result.
733
00:42:10.280 --> 00:42:13.199
All right, so let me summarize here that. And one
734
00:42:13.199 --> 00:42:16.519
of my concerns about the technology that's available today is
735
00:42:16.559 --> 00:42:21.639
that only the big dogs can afford it. This is
736
00:42:21.679 --> 00:42:25.800
like twelve years ago, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office
737
00:42:25.840 --> 00:42:28.920
had a billion dollar budget. I mean that's real money.
738
00:42:28.960 --> 00:42:30.960
It's probably a billion and a half, if not two
739
00:42:30.960 --> 00:42:36.079
billions by now. So it sounds to me that, you know,
740
00:42:36.159 --> 00:42:40.519
no matter the size of your jurisdiction, if you're looking
741
00:42:40.519 --> 00:42:45.639
at for a way to consolidate information and produce good
742
00:42:45.679 --> 00:42:51.880
intel for across the board, just normal civic engagement, it
743
00:42:51.880 --> 00:42:55.079
would be a good solution that's cost effective, and anybody
744
00:42:55.119 --> 00:42:57.280
could afford that.
745
00:42:57.480 --> 00:43:01.599
We have cities and towns as small as thirty and
746
00:43:01.679 --> 00:43:04.559
as large as two thousand, you know, so you know,
747
00:43:04.639 --> 00:43:07.400
everyone has a need to get get more out the
748
00:43:07.480 --> 00:43:11.440
less and not like I want to work my employees more,
749
00:43:11.599 --> 00:43:14.360
but rather I want to give them the purpose that
750
00:43:14.400 --> 00:43:17.639
they join the agency to do, which is to help
751
00:43:17.679 --> 00:43:19.599
people and solve problems.
752
00:43:19.920 --> 00:43:24.360
Yeah, okay, Well, any final thoughts about something we've covered
753
00:43:24.400 --> 00:43:27.760
already or perhaps missed in our discussions today.
754
00:43:28.400 --> 00:43:31.719
No, I mean emergency services are very complex. I've been
755
00:43:31.719 --> 00:43:34.519
in the law enforcement role as well as the fire
756
00:43:34.559 --> 00:43:38.760
ems role. Everyone's got a part in it. Oftentimes you
757
00:43:38.760 --> 00:43:40.360
don't know what your part is in the whole picture
758
00:43:40.400 --> 00:43:43.000
because the instant commander is thinking about that. You're just
759
00:43:43.280 --> 00:43:46.760
in a post, in a corner, in a car, hoping
760
00:43:46.800 --> 00:43:48.800
that nothing happened. That bad happens, but if it does,
761
00:43:48.960 --> 00:43:50.800
you have good resources to back yet.
762
00:43:51.320 --> 00:43:56.679
Okay, and would you say when you said it already?
763
00:43:56.719 --> 00:44:00.599
We talked around AI. Does force metrics is AI?
764
00:44:01.679 --> 00:44:05.519
We use very very limited AI, and it's always optional
765
00:44:05.559 --> 00:44:09.800
for agencies because not all cities wanna you know, so
766
00:44:10.320 --> 00:44:13.199
our full application is not with AI, and we have
767
00:44:13.280 --> 00:44:16.440
some AI features that can help depending on what an
768
00:44:16.440 --> 00:44:20.960
agency looking for. So just not I'm I started a
769
00:44:21.000 --> 00:44:26.480
software company, but I'm always hesitant of adding fast technology
770
00:44:26.679 --> 00:44:27.760
without it being tested.
771
00:44:28.840 --> 00:44:32.159
Okay, well, you might sound a little bit like me,
772
00:44:32.239 --> 00:44:34.400
but I'm not a technologist. I like being on the
773
00:44:34.440 --> 00:44:37.320
cutting edge, but I have crossed over to the bleeding
774
00:44:37.400 --> 00:44:40.639
edge at that point. I see I have a ramp
775
00:44:40.639 --> 00:44:42.719
on my finger, but it's really a triner finger. I
776
00:44:42.719 --> 00:44:45.880
didn't cut myself so well I just want to say
777
00:44:45.920 --> 00:44:49.519
thank you to Andre McGregor for being I guess here
778
00:44:49.559 --> 00:44:51.199
on the Disasters Own podcast.
779
00:44:52.599 --> 00:44:55.920
Thank you for having me. I enjoyed it, and I.
780
00:44:56.239 --> 00:45:00.199
Think, folks, this example how all technology doesn't have to
781
00:45:00.239 --> 00:45:05.760
be super expensive, and I keep telling emergency managers and
782
00:45:05.800 --> 00:45:09.239
I think emergency managers could use this portion of the
783
00:45:09.280 --> 00:45:12.840
application that in our future everything is going to revolve
784
00:45:12.880 --> 00:45:17.440
around data and data requires technology, and we have an
785
00:45:17.480 --> 00:45:22.320
opportunity to use it, maybe on a cost effective basis
786
00:45:22.360 --> 00:45:26.320
as we heard today. So lastly, a reminder to everyone
787
00:45:26.400 --> 00:45:28.519
to be safe. Think about what you can do today
788
00:45:29.039 --> 00:45:31.920
become personally better prepared for the next disaster, and that
789
00:45:32.119 --> 00:45:36.159
means looking at technology. Folks. If you like this Disaster's
790
00:45:36.159 --> 00:45:39.119
Own podcast, please share it with your social media context.
791
00:45:39.679 --> 00:45:46.000
Thanks for listening, and be safe.