ABOUT THIS EPISODE
In this episode, authors Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick and Dr. Hugo Harvey-Valdés compare the transatlantic partnerships between the United States and West Germany in the 1970s, the US and South Korea in the 1970s and 80s, and the US and Chilean armies’ relations in the 1960s. They discuss the successes and struggles of those partnerships and the strengths and limits of American influence during these time periods.
Keywords: history, partnerships, Cold War, Post-Cold War, Federal Republic of Germany, South Korea, Chile, foreign policy, defense industry, political indoctrination
Stephanie Crider (Host)
You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m speaking remotely today with Hugo Harvey-Valdés and Michael Fitzpatrick. Both were authors of articles featured in the Historical Studies forum in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters.
Dr. Hugo Harvey-Valdés, full professor and researcher at the University of Los Americas Santiago, held a variety of field and academic positions during 27 years of active military service before retiring in December 2020. He is the author of “Allies, Partners, or Puppets: American and Chilean Armies, 1961–69.”
Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and supports the Defense POW-MIA Accounting Agency. Fitzpatrick wrote “Korea, Germany, and the Arsenal of Democracy.”
Welcome to Decisive Point. Thank you for joining me.
Michael Fitzpatrick
Thank you for having me.
Hugo Harvey-Valdés
I appreciate the invitation. Thanks a lot for having me.
Host
What drew you to study these particular aspects of US foreign military policy?
Fitzpatrick
I was drawn to this subject because I think the relationship between the US and its allies is so important to the crafting of contemporary foreign policy. I think, in the last several presidential administrations, Americans have really tried to reconsider their alliance relationships. And, I think that the actual mechanics of these relationships are often understudied in the historiography.
And, I think that this is such an important subject and an interesting subject because I see a lot of overlap between the West German situation in the 1970s and the South Korean situation. The strategic outlook in both of those regions is very similar. And yet, American policy and American actions in those countries—and the result of American policy and action in those countries—is often radically different. And so, this creates an interesting opportunity for study and an interesting opportunity for comparison.
Host
Hugo, what was your inspiration?
Harvey-Valdés
When I was working on my doctoral dissertation that was about President [Eduardo Frei Montalva’s] foreign policy between 1964 and 1970, I analyzed many declassified documents from the United States and Chile, which showed that Chile was not above its state—I mean that Chile didn’t follow the US guidelines in foreign or domestic policy. Despite the millions of dollars that Frei Montalva received from economic aid plans and that supported his presidential campaign in his first years in office.
Then, I asked myself, “If the politicians developed independently, why would the military have faithfully followed US demands?”
Furthermore, in my own exchanges and training with the US Army, I never felt any intention to influence or ideologize my military thought.
Therefore, I realized that there was a need to reassess prevailing narratives that have depicted the relations between American and Chilean armies during the Cold War, especially during [the] Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
Host
Michael, give us an overview of US military involvement in Korea and Germany. What were the strategic priorities in each case, and what time frame are we talking about here?
Fitzpatrick
So, the time frame of the article is actually quite broad. I started looking at the immediate post-war and the onset of the Cold War through to the current day. But particularly, I like to focus on the period of the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s, which I think is a very dynamic period in the three-party alliance. The strategic priorities, generally, are very similar, I think, between South Korea and West Germany. Both countries were divided. East and West in the case of Germany [and] North and South in the case of Korea. The American allies in each country, their allied nations, were confronted by kind of aggressive neighbor states on the border, who looked to, at some point in the ambiguous far future, to try and end this artificial division and bring Marxist Leninism to these divided situations.
So, for the United States, deterrence is an incredibly important component of their strategic outlook in these regions. Third, in the case of both divided situations, both sides of the division were backed by outside superpowers. The United States backed West Germany and South Korea, China backed North Korea, and the Soviet Union backed East Germany. And so, there was a tremendous amount of outside military aid, economic aid—support that flowed into these divided situations—which only exacerbated inflamed tensions. So ultimately, I would argue in both cases that the US pursues a policy of deterrence, and they focus on maintaining the status quo in each country—that they prefer the status quo situation rather than some kind of very violent attempts to realize it.
The issue for American foreign policy, and I would love to talk about this more, is that in Germany the status quo for most of the period that we’re talking about is a pretty positive one. Germany remains democratic. It remains committed to the kind of government that’s created in the aftermath of World War II and is committed to a very specific interpretation of the aftermath of World War II. But in South Korea, particularly once you get into the 1960s and ’70s, the situation is undemocratic. There are significant problems in South Korea. And so, American commitment to the status quo in South Korea actually becomes very problematic to South Korean politics.
Host
How was US military assistance to Chile in the 1960s different from Korea and Germany?
Harvey-Valdés
US military assistance to Chile, during the 1960s, contrasted a lot with its relationships with Korea and Germany. While the US involvement in Korea and Germany included three kinds of relations—extensive long-term military alliances, operational developments, and joint technological developments—US and Chilean interactions remained just educational and professional. Military exchanges with Chile involved mainly training and limited equipment transfers.
In fact, when the United States sold weapons to Chile within the Mutual Assistance Pact, in order to give stabilization within the region, similar equipment was transferred to neighboring countries [such] as Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. Furthermore, US policy toward Chile was a joint effort complementing civilian-driven economic initiatives like the Alliance for Progress.
Host
What determined whether the United States treated a country as an ally, partner, or puppet?
Harvey-Valdés
The distinction between what was considered an ally, partner, or puppet rested on the degree of autonomy first and then, the mutual benefits perceived by both countries. In Chile’s case, the relationship reflected mutual professional interests rather than a mere subordination. My research shows that Chile maintained significant autonomy in decisions regarding military cooperation, and these were always made by civilian authorities [and], thus, aligned with Chilean foreign policy.
Chile’s refusal to fully support US policies during the Cuban Missile Crisis and then, during the Dominican Republic intervention in 1965, reinforced this position as a sovereign partner, rather than being a recipient or a puppet state. The nature of the relationship was based on the willingness and then capacity of recipient nations to exercise independent decision making.
Host
Was military aid meant to build independence or was it a tool for American influence in Korea and Germany?
Fitzpatrick
The historian’s answer is that both, I think, are true at different times as we look through the timeline. Ultimately, for the US, I think, military aid is a tool for independence, generally, and it’s a tool to secure deterrence. I think that, especially for Army planners in the Pentagon itself, military aid was necessary in order to produce the strategic outcomes that they were looking for. And, American influence was secondary to that—or a vehicle—in order to get the situation that they were looking for. Like I said, I think in both cases, but especially in South Korea, there was a desire to maintain the status quo. Using American influence to achieve that strategic outlook was something that was sometimes palatable, but I think that there’s significant variation from period to period.
For example, in Germany in the 1950s, US aid was an important tool to the remilitarizing German Bundeswehr, which began to rearm in 1954. After that, American arms sales were important because they could keep Germany in the Western sphere. They could rapidly militarize, remilitarize, especially the German land army. Of course, weapon sales to the West German army were profitable for American companies, using that as a tool to try and support the US’s own deterrence and production posture. But ultimately, I think, also, in the 1950...
