Michael Eddy: In 2015, El Salvador had the highest murder rate on the planet, higher than any war zone. 105 killings per 100,000 people. The actual murder capital of the world. Today that number is close to zero. That's the headline President Naeeb Bukele wants you to hear. And it's real. You ask folks in El Salvador today, and they will tell you the streets feel different. But here's the number he doesn't lead with. Most with no warrant, no lawyer, no day in court. Nearly two percent of the entire adult population is now behind bars, and this is the highest incarceration rate on earth. Journalists are gone, term limits are gone, and Washington is leaning in anyway, sending its own deportees to the prison at the center of it all. So, is this a security miracle or a new dictatorship with good PR in our own backyard? And why does it matter to Americans? These are the questions we're gonna dig into today. Joining us on Arm Chair Diplomat is Enrique Roig. He's the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. And he's someone who spent his career inside the exact tension we're about to unpack security versus rights and what the US does when an ally delivers one by gutting the other. Enrique Roig, old friend, thank you for being here.
Enrique Roig: Thanks Michael for the invitation. I'm looking forward to this conversation.
Michael Eddy: All right, well, set the stage for us a little bit. Can you tell us a little bit about your yourself, your background and how you engage with El Salvador over your career?
Enrique Roig: sure Michael. So yeah, as you mentioned, in my Previous role, I Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau for Human Rights, Democracy and Labor at the Department of State, and then previously was the USAID coordinator for the regional Central America Regional Security Initiative. And so during that time had the opportunity to do a lot of work on violence prevention, particularly in El Salvador, looking specifically at the reasons why young people actually join gangs. What are those risk factors and how do you Deal with that in terms of different approaches. And so it was a fascinating experience, really doing a deep dive into understanding the motivations, the reasons behind that. And actually taking a lot of lessons from the United States, places like Los Angeles, for example, which has dealt with its own. gang violence problem for decades, which actually has a very direct link to El Salvador because it's the origins of Body of the Siotcha and MS-13, right? Because of door deportation policies, many of those individuals who started in the gang life in LA ended up back in El Salvador. So to some extent the problem sort of was created here in Los Angeles. But what we tried to do was take some of those lessons and best practices from LA and how to actually prevent gang violence. And share those with our colleagues in El Salvador, both on the government side, police, as well as those nonprofits working in those communities with at-risk youth. So I had the privilege and the opportunity to be on the ground doing that work, and you know, saw firsthand obviously the unfortunate impact of that high homicide rate that you mentioned at the outset, right? It was a country that did unfortunately have a homicide rate that, you know, put it on par with countries having major conflicts. And for that reason, with Nayeb Bukele's security approach, where yes, the homicide rate has been reduced, most Salvadorans that you talk to will say they are very happy with the current state of play. But the question which I know we'll dive deeper into in this conversation is how sustainable is that and is it just good marketing and PR?
Michael Eddy: Exactly. Well yeah, let's let's jump right into that then. You know, there's been an extended state of emergency in the country. the the the the you know from murder capital to the world to you know and we've both been in the streets recently there, right? I mean i i it it does feel that you can go out at night, you can have dinner, you can you can eat on an outdoor patio, which was unheard of ten years ago, fifteen years ago. So I mean quality of life, all that is is significant. But you know, is this durable, right? The the the there's an extended state of emergency. one presumes you can't maintain a a state of emergency forever. What happens when that ends? You know, is this a durable approach? Lock everybody up.
Enrique Roig: So this is the question that I would, you know, pose to my counterparts in the Salvadoran government when I was at the Department of State and we would have meetings with them was around is this strategy sustainable in the long term? What are you doing to actually prevent future generations of young people to join gangs? Because many of those risk factors have not gone away. I mean You know, the poverty levels in El Salvador continue to be extremely high. It's not like you know you have a lot of foreign investment pouring into the country. And so that's one huge issue. The educational system, of course, is another one that's not up to standards that really encourages young people to stay in school. And then of course you've got you know other risk factors, drug use, lack of parental supervision, you know, critical life events that many of these young people face in in very complicated neighborhoods. So surely, you know, you can lock everybody up, 91,000, as you mentioned at the outset, but it comes with ramifications, lack of due process, right? Democratic erosion that we've seen in this country. you know, individuals, organizations, journalists who have had, you know, who have gone into exile because of the of the democratic erosion that they've experienced under the Bukele administration. And so what you see are, you know, citizens to some extent are willing to give up some democracy, so to speak, for some of these security gains, which you know you can't discount. Yes, people feel safer. They feel like they can walk out on the street. But to some extent I'll say, you know, it's much easier in some ways to lock people up than it is to actually prevent newer generations from joining gangs. And that's where we tried to always focus our attention to actually get more of those investments into those communities to ensure that these policies that security gains are actually sustainable. And I'm not here to say that you shouldn't use incarceration. You need to use it properly in a way, again, that respects due process and human rights. My own bureau at the State Department, the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, you know, documented the state of play within the prisons, right? and which is not a pretty picture. You know, these are prisons that are known for human rights violations, torture and other abuses that take place. And in particular, this new prison that Bukele built, which is called Sekot, which gets a lot of publicity, particularly from you know, administration officials currently in the Trump administration as well as other influencers who help Abu Kele to some extent market this model of prisons. but we also know that SECAT also comes with you know allegations also of abuses that have taken place and in particular what we saw recently last year when some 250 Venezuelans were deported from the US and had a stay in SECOT which we know from New York Times reporting and others like Cristo Sal it was not exactly a very pleasant experience for them and came with a lot of abuse that they experienced so You know, at the end of the day, these are the tensions that we're faced with, right? You have the reality on the street that people do feel safer, but then you have the the challenges within a prison system that Human rights abuses have been documented pretty extensively. There's no due process for those who are picked up. maybe they're not a gang member, maybe they just happen to have some tattoos, or they were at the wrong place at the wrong time. and this is why, you know, the rule of law and democracy should matter in this context, because it does come, you know, into play here in the United States as well, as we saw with this recent, you know, eff effort to deport Venezuelans to CECAT and where we're spaying you we're spending US taxpayer money, right? for these individuals, these Venezuelans, to be deported to a prison system that has a very notorious reputation and not one that I would think most Americans would be happy to spend any time in.
Michael Eddy: Right. Well, they'll lose to a little bit. Yeah, it i it's fine if there's safety until it happens to you or someone you love, right? That's a it's a tough spot to to be in. I appreciate you shedding some light on that, Enrique. Well, and then just you know, pulling back the curtain a little bit again on this you know, security miracle or the you know gr the great great shift, I know because I know you've reported on this a little bit, i is there evidence that Bukele's government negotiated or cut deals with the big gang members, you know, that you yeah, mentioned you know, MS thirteen and the and the other. Is there evidence that there was a deal negotiated before the crackdown that also impacted the numbers? And if that's the case or you know what the evidence shows, you know, what how does that affect the official narrative that's out there about this security miracle?
Enrique Roig: Yeah, Michael, so there has been really good reporting on that there were negotiations and a truce between Bukele, the administration, and even going back to when he was mayor of San Salvador with leadership, the Ronflow, as they're called, leaders of MS-13. What's interesting here, and and I'll just provide a personal anecdote, is that when I was in government, I was all I was always actually a proponent of truces, but truces done in a way that were transparent. and open to the public in the sense that whatever deals were cut were with the intention that they were aimed at reducing homicides. And the reason I say this because truces have actually been used in the United States in many cases to try and reduce the homicide rate, but normally they're done in a transparent manner. What happened here in the Bukele administration, it was all done behind the scenes and if not for reporting, then we wouldn't know exactly what were some of the deals that were cut, you know, things like improved prison conditions and, you know, all kinds of other goodies and benefits and et cetera. And so, you know, unfortunately, and truces have been a part of the Salvadoran government's responses predating Bukele as well, right? and so there's always been that criticism that they've been done in a way that haven't been fully transparent to the public. And so in this case, yes, that was something that did take place in terms of negotiations that happened. And then there was a breakdown in that, right? There was I think it was a period in around April of twenty twenty-two where there was a unfortunate, you know, let's call it massacre that happened on a bus by MS-13 against some 80 plus individuals. And that led to the breakdown in that that negotiation and that truce. And from there on out you saw where Bukele took a much hardliner hard line approach towards dealing with the gangs. because previous to that there w there was a you know an understanding that, you know, they would receive benefits if they helped contribute to a reduction in the homicide rate. And then once that went south, then the Bukele administration's you know approach at that time was obviously to crack down on the way that it has. And so So yeah, that's sort of the story of of the truce. And then at the same time, you had the US Department of Justice conducting its own investigations of MS thirteen gang leaders here in the US who were, you know, being charged for all kinds of criminal activity, which was part of what was called the Vulcan Task Force. And so at the same time that you had these negotiations happening in El Salvador with Bukellian S thirteen leadership, you also had the Vulcan task force as well in the US. dealing with prosecutions. And so this'll come into play later when you know, we look at the issue around the Venezuelans that we de sent to SECOT, right? 'Cause there were supposedly some conversations and deals behind the scene of returning some of those Salvadorian leaders who were being investigated by the Vulcan Task Force back to El Salvador. And one presumes the reason was that Bukele wanted these persons back in El Salvador so they wouldn't blow the whistle on some of the things that were being negotiated behind the scenes during this this truce.
Michael Eddy: Wow. Thank you, Enrique. I follow this and I I kind of thought I knew what was going on, but this is really, really interesting. And I appreciate you sharing the detail. you know, I'm glad you touched on a little bit, you know, the work of the US government there. I worked with the US Agency for National Development quite a bit in Central America. We've talked about some of these staggering numbers, you know, 91,000 arrests didn't mention, but nearly 500 deaths in custody, right? That's also not all that reported. And I, you know, I don't know if it's the irony of, you know. Painful iron. we we train public defenders because we believe in in administration of justice and they defend people. We train journalists because we believe in independent media. And now these partners that we have are some of them are in jail. Some of them I met in other parts of Central America and they didn't feel they could live in El Salvador anymore. They didn't feel safe, they were gonna be arrested without due process. this is tough. So I I guess you know, if you could try to unpack, is there Another option is this is the security gains is this structural, but you can't have the security unless you have you know these gross violations of human rights. this trade-offs, you talked about the fact that Salvadorans right now are the you know, they're opting for you know, I d I wanna feel safe, I don't want to feel persecuted. So that you know that that that trade-off I guess I'm asking, is it have to be structural? Is there another way that d that that it it doesn't have to be so black or white or you know such a challenging situation for the individuals that find themselves incarcerated?
Enrique Roig: Yeah Michael, I mean I would say I think there's other ways of doing this, improving security that does not need to rely on this type of overly abusive incarceration that doesn't respect due process. 'cause even here I would say like even, you know, going back to, you know, the claim, and the understanding that, you know, most Salvadorians obviously are happy with the reduction to homicides. You also have many who privately will tell you that they are concerned about the direction of the country and democratic erosion as they're seeing it. And in particular families of those who are locked up now who you know, are asked, for example, to pay a hundred dollars for sort of a basket of goods that they bring to the prison for their their their friends or family members and you know there's a lot of questions around like w where is this money going? And so there's also allegations of potential corruption within the prison system. so there's a lot of other concerns there that are at play. And at the same time as we mentioned, the the exile of prominent human rights activists and journalists and others and the incarceration of somebody like Ruth Lopez who is a prominent activists, anti corruption crusader who works with Cristo Saal, who's now been, you know, accused of all kinds of things without really a clear you know, due process in her case as well. So so all that is the context, right? And so I I you know I would say that we can definitely do better in terms of how we manage security policy. I mean we've seen it here in the US with different ways of reducing gun violence, for example, just up the street here from where I live in Baltimore, it's had a lot of success with very targeted inter interventions at you know what you would call the key troublemakers who are likely to commit you know that type of violence but it can be done with lots of coordination between police, with community leaders, violence interrupters, faith-based leaders to working together under a coordinated strategy to actually do that. That again doesn't just rely on throwing people in in prison and throwing away the key without any due process. Unfortunately, you know, we know that this sells though, right? And so we've seen Bukele market this approach across the region and even here in the US, you have people touting the Bukele model, right? and so this is the the current sort of situation we're in and and the tension that we're facing because this type of security policy has been used in various political campaigns across Latin America from Chile to Colombia to Argentina to Costa Rica, right? and elsewhere. And so it's become a popular campaign mantra to say we will, you know, build more prisons, we're gonna go after the narco-terrorists, we're going to, you know, use the Bukele strategy. And so I think this is where those of us who have worked on this on this, you know, challenge for many years, and and including, you know, important players like the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank and others who fund a lot of these activities to emphasize why prevention is also an important part of the equation, but also rehabilitation, right? Second chances for individuals who were involved in gang violence end up in prison, but as we've seen from the evidence, can find another path when they're provided an exit ramp that provides, you know, skills training, you know, dealing with psychological trauma and you know workforce development. And they can become, former gang members can become very productive members of society. As we've seen, for example, in Los Angeles with Homeboy Industries, which has become a very well-known program that's been run by Father Boyle that actually takes former gang members and helps rehabilitate them and and help them turn their lives around and become productive members of society, right? So so I like to try and emphasize that as the alternative to what we've seen with Bukele strategy, which again I'll say I have my doubts that it's truly a sustainable approach in in the long term.
Michael Eddy: Thanks for Enrique. Well, and I'm glad you mentioned, you know, kind of this regional effect. And I guess I want to dig in a little deeper, not to not to belabor, but you you mentioned it dawned on me, you like Daniel Naboa in Ecuador, I kind of ran on this. Yeah, we're bring Bukele here, we're gonna do this here, the new president of Colombia de la Espriela, etc. And you mentioned a number of other cases. I'm just kind of curious if this really has that kind of traction or people try to replicate this model. And we've talked about some of the you know concerns there. How does this impact US interests in the region and democratic stability? How do you see this playing out were it to continue on that trajectory?
Enrique Roig: So, I mean I think what you're seeing play out across the region and and largely promoted and inspired by the Trump administration through the shield of the Americas is a sort of very hard line approach towards what they would regard as narco terrorism. So we've seen it with the you know, the bombing of speed boats in the Caribbean without any due process. I think we're up to something over you know, almost two hundred individuals that have been killed and really don't have the full story on who they are, to efforts to support these kinds of attacks against, you know, drug labs in Ecuador. Or now what you've seen with the Colon the new Colombian president, Diasprella, who's, you know, essentially having press conferences where they have the bodies of dead individuals stacked in front of them that he refers to as these narco terrorists. And again, so this concept of like, you know, we can take this hardline approach, we can kill individuals without any due process, is becoming sort of the standard across the region, unfortunately. and some of it is marketed as sort of this sort of bukele approach, though. you know, different in the sense of, you know, Bukele's incarceration strategy actually is not something that you could just sort of cut and paste and put into a Colombian context, for example, it's a very different situation, an armed conflict, a level of direct trafficking that you don't have in El Salvador and a much larger population and geographic range, right? So but it gets used as the narrative the to talk about sort of the Bukele approach across the region. Or in a place like Chile, for example, which Interestingly, it has a very low homicide rate comparatively to most of the other countries in the world. But again, this became a big part of the campaign that eventually cost won and continues to use that as part of his own political narrative as well, in terms of like, you know, reforming the constitution and sort of trying to cut back on on certain rights, etc. And so you know, again, this is where we find ourselves and so and I don't think it's going away anytime soon, particularly as we have the Trump administration here that's sort of promoting this approach and this style of dealing with you know, whether it's it's narco-violence or gang violence and using and justifying that, you know, again, as part of its own America first strategy and supposedly trying to stop the spread of fentanyl and other drugs into the US, but then enlisting others in the region to do the same. Though you've seen countries like Mexico, however, who have pushed back on that to some extent, obviously because of their own strong feelings around sovereignty, aren't super excited about the idea of US drone strikes against cartel leaders in Mexico. But, you know, we still got two years left, so we'll see where this all ends up going. But this is where we're currently at in this moment.
Michael Eddy: Yeah, no, thank you for for that. And we touched on a little bit about, you know, this how does this impact people back home here in the United States and and whatnot. And I guess I want to dig in a a little bit on this. you know, you talked about the CISO at this the Center for Counterterrorism that, you got can house as many as 50,000 or, you know, the in in the deplorable conditions, the challenging conditions. Now where US deportees are going under the Alien Enemies Act, right? So this is now there are people who are part of our have been part of our immigration system or being deported are are ending up there. I kind of you know wanted to ask you, you know, one, what does El Salvador get out of taking US deportees? As you mentioned, some are from Venezuela, other countries, these are not just Salvadorans or Salvadoran Americans, or you know, these are people from a variety of other countries. so what do they get out of this? You know, what's the impact on the US legal system and immigration system and and is this scenario, this status quo, durable given that, you know, the Supreme Court is weighing in on this and the the continually being challenged in court? you know how durable is this scenario?
Enrique Roig: That's a great question, Michael. I I think that you know, we've seen the Trump administration signing third country agreements you know, across the globe with countries to essentially take in deportees who are not of the nationality of that country that's receiving them. And, you know, what we've seen are monetary agreements essentially, you know, negotiated by the State Department and and Department of Homeland Security, that these countries take these individuals. So whether it's El Salvador or Equatorial Guinea or Rwanda. South Sudan, others where we've seen this play out, this has become sort of the this this has become the Trump administration's one of their tools to trying to increase the number of deportees, right? And so for a country like El Salvador, which was one of the first to to do this and and really without, you know, a very transparent let's say agreement, around what exactly was negotiated and how much money was in did the US taxpayer end up paying for this whole deportation process from the airplanes to the use of SECOT, for example. it happened and of course there was a lot of uproar and litigation that that took off and continues to play out. So we'll see where this all ends up. But it's become an unfortunate outcome of our current immigration policy in the US. And you know, for a country like El Salvador that's obviously trying to curry favor with the Trump administration, you know, for them I think this was early on seen as an opportunity to do that. it may have given them some pause afterwards given the the worldwide condemnation that came with it and scrutiny over human rights abuses taking place in their prison system across the board, not just SICCOT. So you know, we'll see if this is something that they continue to want to take on or not. and, you know, the reporting will continue to take place. So hopefully that information will come to bear in some future accountability process that, you know, we hope takes place to look back on exactly what happened and you know, put into place the guardrails hopefully in the future so this these kinds of abuses don't take place again.
Michael Eddy: Absolutely. Well thank you, Henrique. You we we try to we've touched on a bit, you know, how and in this show we try to you know sh share with the US public how why how things that happen overseas, you know, impact them here. it may seem far away, but these are issues and these are that are being felt here in the United States, you know, and with with that in mind, I'm just wondering if you have any, I know you lived in El Salvador, have spent time there, like I have over the years, you know, love the place. is there any kind of personal experience or anecdote that you want to share? with the audience that of just in terms of that gives you know a feel for what El Salvador is like or the Salvadoran people, something that it can help people bring these issues home.
Enrique Roig: Yeah, Michael, mean I would say that, you know, first of all, El Salvador is a fantastic country, right? I've I've had the privilege of traveling there since the early nineties, after the peace accords were signed and and working with USAID programs there on the ground to help with the reconstruction after the the armed conflict. And so I've gotten to know so many Salvadorans from all you know walks of life. have spent many hours in those communities impacted by violence and have met some incredibly determined inspirational people who are doing the work on a daily basis and working with, you know, either at-risk youth or working with former gang members to truly make a difference in their community and are committed to improving security in a different way that's not just based on incarceration. And so they have always given me the inspiration to do this work. And for that reason, you know, El Salvador always has and continues to have a special place in my heart because of of its people and and who they are and you know the commitment they have to to their country and the passion that they have for it.
Michael Eddy: Yeah, I mean if I may share one too. I mean, so I we're contemporaries there, right? in my own experience. in nineteen ninety-two I went and and lived there just after the the the signing of the of the peace accords. I was doing master's thesis research, and I had a few contacts going in from my American University Dean and and professors, but you know, just that that that became exponential because Salvadorans to the highest levels, you know, in the government and the FMLN who are just coming out of conflict were willing to to to sit down and do interviews with with a gringo, right? There was I I felt no animosity, I mean just amazing people. But the anecdote I always like to share when people talk about, you know, the gang violence and the violence of El Salvador, that being a violent people, if that's the connotation, right? Is in during the and we've talked on this show about how peace negotiation is very difficult, but peace accord implementation is so much more complicated, right? Long haul process. So fraught. So in the early stages of implementing the 1992 accords, there was a period where the military police had to be disbanded as part and the military the security apparatus had to be disbanded as part of the Peace Accords. But they were months, if not more, away from actually standing up the new civilian police. So there was this period, and everyone there were concerns where there was going to be no formal police presence. And I was in villages and stuff and and traveling quite a bit in that period, and it was was calm. It was still celebratory. People were just happy to not be at war. There were a few folks shooting off, you know, guns, celebrating the end of the conflict. But there was from my recollection some of the lowest crime rates in the country's history, right? So I mean these are peaceful, hardworking people. And they they were so embracing to me, putting me up as I traveled around. I had no money. but they were
Enrique Roig: Mm-hmm.
Michael Eddy: so supportive of of of of this research that I was doing and and it's just always so dear to my heart and
Enrique Roig: Yeah.
Michael Eddy: and critical. And that's sort of the Salvador that I want people to know instead of the you know the gang violence and the tattoos and stuff, which is just too obvious too easy to become the you know the connotation or the with with with what is a great country.
Enrique Roig: Exactly.
Michael Eddy: so Enrique this has been so enlightening I wanna you know our try to wrap every show with key takeaways of why should you care? Why is this important? So why are the th what are three reasons that the the American public should care about what's going on in El Salvador?
Enrique Roig: Well Michael, I would say I mean the first one is, you know The this is how your taxpayer dollars are being spent when we do foreign policy rights. So, you know, when we send Venezuelans to a prison in El Salvador that's notorious for human rights abuses and we're paying for this, these are your American dollars, right? Is this really the way that you want them spent? we have a lot of needs at home to to begin with. and then secondly, I don't think that most Americans, if they knew the actual conditions within this prison SECOT, would be very happy that this is the way that their hard-earned money is is being spent. And let's, you know, America we have an image, right? We're a country that, you know, is based on the rule of law, on democracy. You know, these are the types of values, principles that we should be projecting overseas and not these types of agreements that are done in a non transparent manner and and that actually are, you know, promoting potential human rights abuses. The other reason I would say, you know, in this this drug war that's you know that the administration constantly characterizes, you know, let's be smart about it at the end of the day. You know, we blowing up speed boats in the Caribbean, again, is probably not the best way of using US taxpayer money when we know that's not actually contributing to lessening the amount of fentanyl in particular that comes into the US because it doesn't come through the Caribbean, it comes through Mexico. So, you know, let's be smart about how we're you know, doing our own foreign policy and our own security policy at the end of the day. And then lastly, you know, I would say that, you know, the United States, you know, we're part of the the Western Hemisphere. These you know, countries like El Salvador are important allies and neighbors for us, important trade partners. and for economic prosperity and foreign investment to take place, it usually functions better in democracies, right? and so the you know, this is again what we should be trying to promote overseas at countries that respect due process, the rule of law. elections, you know, independent institutions, et cetera. And at times I know this can become and sound a bit abstract for for folks, but ultimately if we want our own economic prosperity to grow, we also need neighbors and allies in the region that are on par with us as well for the long term.
Michael Eddy: Well said. Enrique Roig, I I thought I knew this issue, but I have learned a lot today and I really appreciate you informing us and our our audience. Thank you for being here. I hope you'll come back and good luck with your
Enrique Roig: For sure. Thank you, Michael. Yeah.
Michael Eddy: good luck with your professorship.
Enrique Roig: Thank you, I appreciate it. And great to be with you today.
Enrique Roig: Thanks Michael for the invitation. I'm looking forward to this conversation.
Michael Eddy: All right, well, set the stage for us a little bit. Can you tell us a little bit about your yourself, your background and how you engage with El Salvador over your career?
Enrique Roig: sure Michael. So yeah, as you mentioned, in my Previous role, I Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau for Human Rights, Democracy and Labor at the Department of State, and then previously was the USAID coordinator for the regional Central America Regional Security Initiative. And so during that time had the opportunity to do a lot of work on violence prevention, particularly in El Salvador, looking specifically at the reasons why young people actually join gangs. What are those risk factors and how do you Deal with that in terms of different approaches. And so it was a fascinating experience, really doing a deep dive into understanding the motivations, the reasons behind that. And actually taking a lot of lessons from the United States, places like Los Angeles, for example, which has dealt with its own. gang violence problem for decades, which actually has a very direct link to El Salvador because it's the origins of Body of the Siotcha and MS-13, right? Because of door deportation policies, many of those individuals who started in the gang life in LA ended up back in El Salvador. So to some extent the problem sort of was created here in Los Angeles. But what we tried to do was take some of those lessons and best practices from LA and how to actually prevent gang violence. And share those with our colleagues in El Salvador, both on the government side, police, as well as those nonprofits working in those communities with at-risk youth. So I had the privilege and the opportunity to be on the ground doing that work, and you know, saw firsthand obviously the unfortunate impact of that high homicide rate that you mentioned at the outset, right? It was a country that did unfortunately have a homicide rate that, you know, put it on par with countries having major conflicts. And for that reason, with Nayeb Bukele's security approach, where yes, the homicide rate has been reduced, most Salvadorans that you talk to will say they are very happy with the current state of play. But the question which I know we'll dive deeper into in this conversation is how sustainable is that and is it just good marketing and PR?
Michael Eddy: Exactly. Well yeah, let's let's jump right into that then. You know, there's been an extended state of emergency in the country. the the the the you know from murder capital to the world to you know and we've both been in the streets recently there, right? I mean i i it it does feel that you can go out at night, you can have dinner, you can you can eat on an outdoor patio, which was unheard of ten years ago, fifteen years ago. So I mean quality of life, all that is is significant. But you know, is this durable, right? The the the there's an extended state of emergency. one presumes you can't maintain a a state of emergency forever. What happens when that ends? You know, is this a durable approach? Lock everybody up.
Enrique Roig: So this is the question that I would, you know, pose to my counterparts in the Salvadoran government when I was at the Department of State and we would have meetings with them was around is this strategy sustainable in the long term? What are you doing to actually prevent future generations of young people to join gangs? Because many of those risk factors have not gone away. I mean You know, the poverty levels in El Salvador continue to be extremely high. It's not like you know you have a lot of foreign investment pouring into the country. And so that's one huge issue. The educational system, of course, is another one that's not up to standards that really encourages young people to stay in school. And then of course you've got you know other risk factors, drug use, lack of parental supervision, you know, critical life events that many of these young people face in in very complicated neighborhoods. So surely, you know, you can lock everybody up, 91,000, as you mentioned at the outset, but it comes with ramifications, lack of due process, right? Democratic erosion that we've seen in this country. you know, individuals, organizations, journalists who have had, you know, who have gone into exile because of the of the democratic erosion that they've experienced under the Bukele administration. And so what you see are, you know, citizens to some extent are willing to give up some democracy, so to speak, for some of these security gains, which you know you can't discount. Yes, people feel safer. They feel like they can walk out on the street. But to some extent I'll say, you know, it's much easier in some ways to lock people up than it is to actually prevent newer generations from joining gangs. And that's where we tried to always focus our attention to actually get more of those investments into those communities to ensure that these policies that security gains are actually sustainable. And I'm not here to say that you shouldn't use incarceration. You need to use it properly in a way, again, that respects due process and human rights. My own bureau at the State Department, the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, you know, documented the state of play within the prisons, right? and which is not a pretty picture. You know, these are prisons that are known for human rights violations, torture and other abuses that take place. And in particular, this new prison that Bukele built, which is called Sekot, which gets a lot of publicity, particularly from you know, administration officials currently in the Trump administration as well as other influencers who help Abu Kele to some extent market this model of prisons. but we also know that SECAT also comes with you know allegations also of abuses that have taken place and in particular what we saw recently last year when some 250 Venezuelans were deported from the US and had a stay in SECOT which we know from New York Times reporting and others like Cristo Sal it was not exactly a very pleasant experience for them and came with a lot of abuse that they experienced so You know, at the end of the day, these are the tensions that we're faced with, right? You have the reality on the street that people do feel safer, but then you have the the challenges within a prison system that Human rights abuses have been documented pretty extensively. There's no due process for those who are picked up. maybe they're not a gang member, maybe they just happen to have some tattoos, or they were at the wrong place at the wrong time. and this is why, you know, the rule of law and democracy should matter in this context, because it does come, you know, into play here in the United States as well, as we saw with this recent, you know, eff effort to deport Venezuelans to CECAT and where we're spaying you we're spending US taxpayer money, right? for these individuals, these Venezuelans, to be deported to a prison system that has a very notorious reputation and not one that I would think most Americans would be happy to spend any time in.
Michael Eddy: Right. Well, they'll lose to a little bit. Yeah, it i it's fine if there's safety until it happens to you or someone you love, right? That's a it's a tough spot to to be in. I appreciate you shedding some light on that, Enrique. Well, and then just you know, pulling back the curtain a little bit again on this you know, security miracle or the you know gr the great great shift, I know because I know you've reported on this a little bit, i is there evidence that Bukele's government negotiated or cut deals with the big gang members, you know, that you yeah, mentioned you know, MS thirteen and the and the other. Is there evidence that there was a deal negotiated before the crackdown that also impacted the numbers? And if that's the case or you know what the evidence shows, you know, what how does that affect the official narrative that's out there about this security miracle?
Enrique Roig: Yeah, Michael, so there has been really good reporting on that there were negotiations and a truce between Bukele, the administration, and even going back to when he was mayor of San Salvador with leadership, the Ronflow, as they're called, leaders of MS-13. What's interesting here, and and I'll just provide a personal anecdote, is that when I was in government, I was all I was always actually a proponent of truces, but truces done in a way that were transparent. and open to the public in the sense that whatever deals were cut were with the intention that they were aimed at reducing homicides. And the reason I say this because truces have actually been used in the United States in many cases to try and reduce the homicide rate, but normally they're done in a transparent manner. What happened here in the Bukele administration, it was all done behind the scenes and if not for reporting, then we wouldn't know exactly what were some of the deals that were cut, you know, things like improved prison conditions and, you know, all kinds of other goodies and benefits and et cetera. And so, you know, unfortunately, and truces have been a part of the Salvadoran government's responses predating Bukele as well, right? and so there's always been that criticism that they've been done in a way that haven't been fully transparent to the public. And so in this case, yes, that was something that did take place in terms of negotiations that happened. And then there was a breakdown in that, right? There was I think it was a period in around April of twenty twenty-two where there was a unfortunate, you know, let's call it massacre that happened on a bus by MS-13 against some 80 plus individuals. And that led to the breakdown in that that negotiation and that truce. And from there on out you saw where Bukele took a much hardliner hard line approach towards dealing with the gangs. because previous to that there w there was a you know an understanding that, you know, they would receive benefits if they helped contribute to a reduction in the homicide rate. And then once that went south, then the Bukele administration's you know approach at that time was obviously to crack down on the way that it has. And so So yeah, that's sort of the story of of the truce. And then at the same time, you had the US Department of Justice conducting its own investigations of MS thirteen gang leaders here in the US who were, you know, being charged for all kinds of criminal activity, which was part of what was called the Vulcan Task Force. And so at the same time that you had these negotiations happening in El Salvador with Bukellian S thirteen leadership, you also had the Vulcan task force as well in the US. dealing with prosecutions. And so this'll come into play later when you know, we look at the issue around the Venezuelans that we de sent to SECOT, right? 'Cause there were supposedly some conversations and deals behind the scene of returning some of those Salvadorian leaders who were being investigated by the Vulcan Task Force back to El Salvador. And one presumes the reason was that Bukele wanted these persons back in El Salvador so they wouldn't blow the whistle on some of the things that were being negotiated behind the scenes during this this truce.
Michael Eddy: Wow. Thank you, Enrique. I follow this and I I kind of thought I knew what was going on, but this is really, really interesting. And I appreciate you sharing the detail. you know, I'm glad you touched on a little bit, you know, the work of the US government there. I worked with the US Agency for National Development quite a bit in Central America. We've talked about some of these staggering numbers, you know, 91,000 arrests didn't mention, but nearly 500 deaths in custody, right? That's also not all that reported. And I, you know, I don't know if it's the irony of, you know. Painful iron. we we train public defenders because we believe in in administration of justice and they defend people. We train journalists because we believe in independent media. And now these partners that we have are some of them are in jail. Some of them I met in other parts of Central America and they didn't feel they could live in El Salvador anymore. They didn't feel safe, they were gonna be arrested without due process. this is tough. So I I guess you know, if you could try to unpack, is there Another option is this is the security gains is this structural, but you can't have the security unless you have you know these gross violations of human rights. this trade-offs, you talked about the fact that Salvadorans right now are the you know, they're opting for you know, I d I wanna feel safe, I don't want to feel persecuted. So that you know that that that trade-off I guess I'm asking, is it have to be structural? Is there another way that d that that it it doesn't have to be so black or white or you know such a challenging situation for the individuals that find themselves incarcerated?
Enrique Roig: Yeah Michael, I mean I would say I think there's other ways of doing this, improving security that does not need to rely on this type of overly abusive incarceration that doesn't respect due process. 'cause even here I would say like even, you know, going back to, you know, the claim, and the understanding that, you know, most Salvadorians obviously are happy with the reduction to homicides. You also have many who privately will tell you that they are concerned about the direction of the country and democratic erosion as they're seeing it. And in particular families of those who are locked up now who you know, are asked, for example, to pay a hundred dollars for sort of a basket of goods that they bring to the prison for their their their friends or family members and you know there's a lot of questions around like w where is this money going? And so there's also allegations of potential corruption within the prison system. so there's a lot of other concerns there that are at play. And at the same time as we mentioned, the the exile of prominent human rights activists and journalists and others and the incarceration of somebody like Ruth Lopez who is a prominent activists, anti corruption crusader who works with Cristo Saal, who's now been, you know, accused of all kinds of things without really a clear you know, due process in her case as well. So so all that is the context, right? And so I I you know I would say that we can definitely do better in terms of how we manage security policy. I mean we've seen it here in the US with different ways of reducing gun violence, for example, just up the street here from where I live in Baltimore, it's had a lot of success with very targeted inter interventions at you know what you would call the key troublemakers who are likely to commit you know that type of violence but it can be done with lots of coordination between police, with community leaders, violence interrupters, faith-based leaders to working together under a coordinated strategy to actually do that. That again doesn't just rely on throwing people in in prison and throwing away the key without any due process. Unfortunately, you know, we know that this sells though, right? And so we've seen Bukele market this approach across the region and even here in the US, you have people touting the Bukele model, right? and so this is the the current sort of situation we're in and and the tension that we're facing because this type of security policy has been used in various political campaigns across Latin America from Chile to Colombia to Argentina to Costa Rica, right? and elsewhere. And so it's become a popular campaign mantra to say we will, you know, build more prisons, we're gonna go after the narco-terrorists, we're going to, you know, use the Bukele strategy. And so I think this is where those of us who have worked on this on this, you know, challenge for many years, and and including, you know, important players like the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank and others who fund a lot of these activities to emphasize why prevention is also an important part of the equation, but also rehabilitation, right? Second chances for individuals who were involved in gang violence end up in prison, but as we've seen from the evidence, can find another path when they're provided an exit ramp that provides, you know, skills training, you know, dealing with psychological trauma and you know workforce development. And they can become, former gang members can become very productive members of society. As we've seen, for example, in Los Angeles with Homeboy Industries, which has become a very well-known program that's been run by Father Boyle that actually takes former gang members and helps rehabilitate them and and help them turn their lives around and become productive members of society, right? So so I like to try and emphasize that as the alternative to what we've seen with Bukele strategy, which again I'll say I have my doubts that it's truly a sustainable approach in in the long term.
Michael Eddy: Thanks for Enrique. Well, and I'm glad you mentioned, you know, kind of this regional effect. And I guess I want to dig in a little deeper, not to not to belabor, but you you mentioned it dawned on me, you like Daniel Naboa in Ecuador, I kind of ran on this. Yeah, we're bring Bukele here, we're gonna do this here, the new president of Colombia de la Espriela, etc. And you mentioned a number of other cases. I'm just kind of curious if this really has that kind of traction or people try to replicate this model. And we've talked about some of the you know concerns there. How does this impact US interests in the region and democratic stability? How do you see this playing out were it to continue on that trajectory?
Enrique Roig: So, I mean I think what you're seeing play out across the region and and largely promoted and inspired by the Trump administration through the shield of the Americas is a sort of very hard line approach towards what they would regard as narco terrorism. So we've seen it with the you know, the bombing of speed boats in the Caribbean without any due process. I think we're up to something over you know, almost two hundred individuals that have been killed and really don't have the full story on who they are, to efforts to support these kinds of attacks against, you know, drug labs in Ecuador. Or now what you've seen with the Colon the new Colombian president, Diasprella, who's, you know, essentially having press conferences where they have the bodies of dead individuals stacked in front of them that he refers to as these narco terrorists. And again, so this concept of like, you know, we can take this hardline approach, we can kill individuals without any due process, is becoming sort of the standard across the region, unfortunately. and some of it is marketed as sort of this sort of bukele approach, though. you know, different in the sense of, you know, Bukele's incarceration strategy actually is not something that you could just sort of cut and paste and put into a Colombian context, for example, it's a very different situation, an armed conflict, a level of direct trafficking that you don't have in El Salvador and a much larger population and geographic range, right? So but it gets used as the narrative the to talk about sort of the Bukele approach across the region. Or in a place like Chile, for example, which Interestingly, it has a very low homicide rate comparatively to most of the other countries in the world. But again, this became a big part of the campaign that eventually cost won and continues to use that as part of his own political narrative as well, in terms of like, you know, reforming the constitution and sort of trying to cut back on on certain rights, etc. And so you know, again, this is where we find ourselves and so and I don't think it's going away anytime soon, particularly as we have the Trump administration here that's sort of promoting this approach and this style of dealing with you know, whether it's it's narco-violence or gang violence and using and justifying that, you know, again, as part of its own America first strategy and supposedly trying to stop the spread of fentanyl and other drugs into the US, but then enlisting others in the region to do the same. Though you've seen countries like Mexico, however, who have pushed back on that to some extent, obviously because of their own strong feelings around sovereignty, aren't super excited about the idea of US drone strikes against cartel leaders in Mexico. But, you know, we still got two years left, so we'll see where this all ends up going. But this is where we're currently at in this moment.
Michael Eddy: Yeah, no, thank you for for that. And we touched on a little bit about, you know, this how does this impact people back home here in the United States and and whatnot. And I guess I want to dig in a a little bit on this. you know, you talked about the CISO at this the Center for Counterterrorism that, you got can house as many as 50,000 or, you know, the in in the deplorable conditions, the challenging conditions. Now where US deportees are going under the Alien Enemies Act, right? So this is now there are people who are part of our have been part of our immigration system or being deported are are ending up there. I kind of you know wanted to ask you, you know, one, what does El Salvador get out of taking US deportees? As you mentioned, some are from Venezuela, other countries, these are not just Salvadorans or Salvadoran Americans, or you know, these are people from a variety of other countries. so what do they get out of this? You know, what's the impact on the US legal system and immigration system and and is this scenario, this status quo, durable given that, you know, the Supreme Court is weighing in on this and the the continually being challenged in court? you know how durable is this scenario?
Enrique Roig: That's a great question, Michael. I I think that you know, we've seen the Trump administration signing third country agreements you know, across the globe with countries to essentially take in deportees who are not of the nationality of that country that's receiving them. And, you know, what we've seen are monetary agreements essentially, you know, negotiated by the State Department and and Department of Homeland Security, that these countries take these individuals. So whether it's El Salvador or Equatorial Guinea or Rwanda. South Sudan, others where we've seen this play out, this has become sort of the this this has become the Trump administration's one of their tools to trying to increase the number of deportees, right? And so for a country like El Salvador, which was one of the first to to do this and and really without, you know, a very transparent let's say agreement, around what exactly was negotiated and how much money was in did the US taxpayer end up paying for this whole deportation process from the airplanes to the use of SECOT, for example. it happened and of course there was a lot of uproar and litigation that that took off and continues to play out. So we'll see where this all ends up. But it's become an unfortunate outcome of our current immigration policy in the US. And you know, for a country like El Salvador that's obviously trying to curry favor with the Trump administration, you know, for them I think this was early on seen as an opportunity to do that. it may have given them some pause afterwards given the the worldwide condemnation that came with it and scrutiny over human rights abuses taking place in their prison system across the board, not just SICCOT. So you know, we'll see if this is something that they continue to want to take on or not. and, you know, the reporting will continue to take place. So hopefully that information will come to bear in some future accountability process that, you know, we hope takes place to look back on exactly what happened and you know, put into place the guardrails hopefully in the future so this these kinds of abuses don't take place again.
Michael Eddy: Absolutely. Well thank you, Henrique. You we we try to we've touched on a bit, you know, how and in this show we try to you know sh share with the US public how why how things that happen overseas, you know, impact them here. it may seem far away, but these are issues and these are that are being felt here in the United States, you know, and with with that in mind, I'm just wondering if you have any, I know you lived in El Salvador, have spent time there, like I have over the years, you know, love the place. is there any kind of personal experience or anecdote that you want to share? with the audience that of just in terms of that gives you know a feel for what El Salvador is like or the Salvadoran people, something that it can help people bring these issues home.
Enrique Roig: Yeah, Michael, mean I would say that, you know, first of all, El Salvador is a fantastic country, right? I've I've had the privilege of traveling there since the early nineties, after the peace accords were signed and and working with USAID programs there on the ground to help with the reconstruction after the the armed conflict. And so I've gotten to know so many Salvadorans from all you know walks of life. have spent many hours in those communities impacted by violence and have met some incredibly determined inspirational people who are doing the work on a daily basis and working with, you know, either at-risk youth or working with former gang members to truly make a difference in their community and are committed to improving security in a different way that's not just based on incarceration. And so they have always given me the inspiration to do this work. And for that reason, you know, El Salvador always has and continues to have a special place in my heart because of of its people and and who they are and you know the commitment they have to to their country and the passion that they have for it.
Michael Eddy: Yeah, I mean if I may share one too. I mean, so I we're contemporaries there, right? in my own experience. in nineteen ninety-two I went and and lived there just after the the the signing of the of the peace accords. I was doing master's thesis research, and I had a few contacts going in from my American University Dean and and professors, but you know, just that that that became exponential because Salvadorans to the highest levels, you know, in the government and the FMLN who are just coming out of conflict were willing to to to sit down and do interviews with with a gringo, right? There was I I felt no animosity, I mean just amazing people. But the anecdote I always like to share when people talk about, you know, the gang violence and the violence of El Salvador, that being a violent people, if that's the connotation, right? Is in during the and we've talked on this show about how peace negotiation is very difficult, but peace accord implementation is so much more complicated, right? Long haul process. So fraught. So in the early stages of implementing the 1992 accords, there was a period where the military police had to be disbanded as part and the military the security apparatus had to be disbanded as part of the Peace Accords. But they were months, if not more, away from actually standing up the new civilian police. So there was this period, and everyone there were concerns where there was going to be no formal police presence. And I was in villages and stuff and and traveling quite a bit in that period, and it was was calm. It was still celebratory. People were just happy to not be at war. There were a few folks shooting off, you know, guns, celebrating the end of the conflict. But there was from my recollection some of the lowest crime rates in the country's history, right? So I mean these are peaceful, hardworking people. And they they were so embracing to me, putting me up as I traveled around. I had no money. but they were
Enrique Roig: Mm-hmm.
Michael Eddy: so supportive of of of of this research that I was doing and and it's just always so dear to my heart and
Enrique Roig: Yeah.
Michael Eddy: and critical. And that's sort of the Salvador that I want people to know instead of the you know the gang violence and the tattoos and stuff, which is just too obvious too easy to become the you know the connotation or the with with with what is a great country.
Enrique Roig: Exactly.
Michael Eddy: so Enrique this has been so enlightening I wanna you know our try to wrap every show with key takeaways of why should you care? Why is this important? So why are the th what are three reasons that the the American public should care about what's going on in El Salvador?
Enrique Roig: Well Michael, I would say I mean the first one is, you know The this is how your taxpayer dollars are being spent when we do foreign policy rights. So, you know, when we send Venezuelans to a prison in El Salvador that's notorious for human rights abuses and we're paying for this, these are your American dollars, right? Is this really the way that you want them spent? we have a lot of needs at home to to begin with. and then secondly, I don't think that most Americans, if they knew the actual conditions within this prison SECOT, would be very happy that this is the way that their hard-earned money is is being spent. And let's, you know, America we have an image, right? We're a country that, you know, is based on the rule of law, on democracy. You know, these are the types of values, principles that we should be projecting overseas and not these types of agreements that are done in a non transparent manner and and that actually are, you know, promoting potential human rights abuses. The other reason I would say, you know, in this this drug war that's you know that the administration constantly characterizes, you know, let's be smart about it at the end of the day. You know, we blowing up speed boats in the Caribbean, again, is probably not the best way of using US taxpayer money when we know that's not actually contributing to lessening the amount of fentanyl in particular that comes into the US because it doesn't come through the Caribbean, it comes through Mexico. So, you know, let's be smart about how we're you know, doing our own foreign policy and our own security policy at the end of the day. And then lastly, you know, I would say that, you know, the United States, you know, we're part of the the Western Hemisphere. These you know, countries like El Salvador are important allies and neighbors for us, important trade partners. and for economic prosperity and foreign investment to take place, it usually functions better in democracies, right? and so the you know, this is again what we should be trying to promote overseas at countries that respect due process, the rule of law. elections, you know, independent institutions, et cetera. And at times I know this can become and sound a bit abstract for for folks, but ultimately if we want our own economic prosperity to grow, we also need neighbors and allies in the region that are on par with us as well for the long term.
Michael Eddy: Well said. Enrique Roig, I I thought I knew this issue, but I have learned a lot today and I really appreciate you informing us and our our audience. Thank you for being here. I hope you'll come back and good luck with your
Enrique Roig: For sure. Thank you, Michael. Yeah.
Michael Eddy: good luck with your professorship.
Enrique Roig: Thank you, I appreciate it. And great to be with you today.
