nathalie: Hello?
Ezgi Basaran: Hi, how are you?
nathalie: Hang on. Can you hear me?
Ezgi Basaran: Yeah, yeah.
nathalie: ⁓ hello, how are you?
Ezgi Basaran: I'm fine, how are you?
nathalie: Good, good, Can you hear me well?
Ezgi Basaran: Yeah, I do.
nathalie: Perfect. How's everything?
Ezgi Basaran: Okay. I'm teaching this term and students are a bit all over the place. I mean, this generation is interesting, seriously. I this is a graduate course. You don't need to come if you don't write essays. I mean, if you don't want to work or... Why are you here?
nathalie: Yeah. I to.
Ezgi Basaran: I don't understand. I it's really impossible for them to... One of them said that she is having a writer's block for a formative essay. I said, you don't have to be creative or anything. You just need to answer the question. They are so, I mean, fragile and everything.
nathalie: Right. Thank you. Yeah, exactly. Just gonna do the work. Yeah, I know exactly what you mean. I've just finished now because semester ended last week. Some are absolutely fantastic. But sometimes the requests that they have and the really high maintenance I found, I mean, we were not this high maintenance.
Ezgi Basaran: Yeah, exactly. No, that's what I told Mehmet. I've done the same, you know, it's just I don't know why they need a lot of support and they're like 25.
nathalie: It's just really like... I know, I know. They have really high expectations and they think that they're the business. I remember like before asking for something from a professor, ⁓ as in a favor of some sort, I would really think about it 20,000 times. they, yeah, I mean, there's, anyway.
Ezgi Basaran: So true.
nathalie: It is what it is.
Ezgi Basaran: Yeah, yeah. Shall we start?
nathalie: Absolutely.
Ezgi Basaran: Okay, so ⁓ I watched the ⁓ documentary and Natalie, think the documentary is a hopeful piece. I and ⁓ I really enjoyed it. I think ⁓ there are a lot of spaces that serves as solutions.
nathalie: It's so good.
Ezgi Basaran: But I also noticed something that ⁓ Turkey appears almost as a structural intentional ⁓ absence. So the Russian threat is there, the American ⁓ withdrawal is there, China is there, the far right is there. But so was it a deliberate editorial ⁓ choice or it shows like a ⁓ symptom of how Brussels and the European intellectual class have learned not to think about Turkey.
nathalie: So I would say that, ⁓ no, it was not a deliberate choice, but it's, I think, symptomatic of the fact that Turkey doesn't fit ⁓ the current sort of intellectual slash political categories that are floating around in Europe because ⁓ Although, you know, there are some like von der Leyen herself, you know, with her recent statements ⁓ that kind of, you know, lumped Turkey in the category of the adversaries, but I don't think in the slightest that this view is shared. So Turkey does not fit into the categories that, ⁓ you know, Putin and she and Trump fit in. I guess that's the good side of the story, right? I mean, it's not amongst the baddies in the public perception. However, neither is it on the map of the goodies, right? ⁓ And there... ⁓
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm. Yes.
nathalie: So, you know, neither is it whatever we have to stand by Ukraine kind of thing, nor is it does it fit easily? And this is where it gets to the complicated, I think, part of the story. Nor does it fit easily into the, you know, we're in the business of enlarging because ⁓ there is there isn't a free, secure and democratic gray zone. ⁓ between whatever, know, the baddies and the goodies. And so we're in the business of integrating the Western Balkans. We're in the business of integrating Georgia, sorry, Moldova and Ukraine. And when you have countries like Georgia that have flipped to the dark side, okay, fine, we may not be able to do much about it now, but when they will at some point see the light,
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.
nathalie: I mean, I'm just slightly caricaturing here, right? But when they will eventually see the light, then they will return to the European fault. Now, this narrative does not quite fit with the Turkey case, because on the one hand, you could make a similar argument that you would make to Georgia, right? When Turkey sees the light, when Erdoğan is gone. But the natural next step of that argument, which is, and that's when we will return
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm. Yeah. Yeah.
nathalie: to Turkey's accession process kind of implicitly, right? Sort of very unconsciously sort of, you know, crashes into this brick wall of resistance. And so there isn't a category to fit Turkey. And so when, you know, something doesn't fit easily into something, you end up just not talking about it. And as I say, you don't do it as a conscious choice. It simply doesn't fit your overall
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm.
nathalie: schema, yeah, sort of analytical scheme, an argument. And so, you know, it's kind of uncomfortable and you just basically kind of drop it off.
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. When you said ⁓ wall of resistance, where does it come from?
nathalie: So thank I don't think there's a single element of this. mean, there is the, do we really think that Turkey can become a liberal and democratic country moving forward, question mark, given that it's now been what, sort of basically a quarter of a century. ⁓ under Erdoğan's rule. And of course, even before that, it's not as if it was a shining liberal democracy either. So I think, you know, there would be some that would frame the resistance in those terms. There are some that would frame the resistance ⁓ as basically kind of size and complexity and ⁓ just overall political balances in Europe. There were some that would
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm.
nathalie: perhaps not explicitly so, but implicitly frame it through a civilizational, religion, racist kind of lens. ⁓ And I guess then there would be some that would also frame it or rather ⁓ they would be unable to frame it as a clear cut, let's call it geopolitical argument. And here we come back to the point about, I think, Ukraine and Moldova and the gray zones. Because in a sense, in the case of Ukraine, NATO is not an option because the US does not want Ukraine and NATO. In fact, several European countries actually think the same. so the European Union becomes the next best thing as a security policy. ⁓ In the case of Turkey, this doesn't apply.
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm. Yes.
nathalie: Firstly, because Turkey is a NATO and secondly, because Turkey is a strong military power. there are no, you know, if enlargement today is being revived by a quote unquote geopolitical logic, which is a very negative logic, if you see what I mean, it's like you have to integrate countries or else, you know, bad things will happen. ⁓
Ezgi Basaran: Hmm. Okay, yeah.
nathalie: That argument doesn't apply to Turkey. And then there are these other old, let's call them, sources of resistance that have always ⁓ made the Turkey-EU relationship difficult. And so, as I said, it becomes a very uncomfortable situation because no one really has an answer. And so it just ends up not being talked about.
Ezgi Basaran: But you also touched upon Ursula von der Leyen's... Some people talks about it and she did in Hamburg in April. You said that it's not being shared publicly among the leaders as well. but she is the president of the commission. So ⁓ it's not a, you know, someone just talking about some, politician talking about Turkey. So, and it, it was received, the remarks did not really land well in Turkey and actually added another layer of, to the relationship that is already, ⁓ you know, running on accumulated frustration. within Turkey. So how do we just get out of this? What happened? Was that a misstatement? What happened there?
nathalie: Yeah. Well, who knows, but what I do know is that this is not the first time that Von der Leyen completely oversteps the mark. Von der Leyen said this about Turkey. Von der Leyen has taken a very, very explicit side when it comes to, for example, US-Israel attack on Iran. That certainly doesn't reflect. the European mainstream view. Von der Leyen is on a limb on Israel and you could just see her physical discomfort every time that she has to somehow criticize Israel. So Von der Leyen is a very political figure and she's got very, I would say, of right-wing European views. you which is, and I think you put your finger there, yeah? I mean, anyone can have their views. And of course, right-wing views are, you know, fairly diffuse in Europe, but they're not the only views and it's not her role to express them. Because her role is that of being the president of an institution, i.e. the commission, whose role is that of being the guardian of the treaties.
Ezgi Basaran: Yeah.
nathalie: So it's a technical role that she's supposed to embody, which is why when she then makes these political statements, the problem is not just that they are political ⁓ and reflect just one side of the argument, which is not shared by others. It's just that it's not her role. for example, it was, you know, let's say it's ⁓ the German chancellor that says the same thing, right? ~
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm.
nathalie: I mean, it would still be problematic, but it's in his right to say it, right? It's not in her right. You know, what's so problematic when she makes statements like this is that she is basically overstepping what her own mandate is. And she's doing so in a way which is not reflective of everyone's views. And that's what makes it so strident. Now as to what is the solution.
Ezgi Basaran: Yes, exactly. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.
nathalie: I think here, Esgi, mean, to be completely honest with you, it's our collective failure. And by our, what I mean is not just, you know, people in the institutions, not just those are rowing against, but, you know, people like you and me and many others that have been working and thinking about this question for many, many years. And we also know that Turkey's accession prospects are stuck and they have been for not just months and years, but basically kind of well over a decade here. And every time that people like ourselves, and I really kind of, I won't even talk in plural, I'll just talk about in the singular here. People like me, when I think about, so what to do about EU Turkey, I end up constantly going back to the same ideas. ⁓ well, maybe we should modernize the customs union.
Ezgi Basaran: Yes.
nathalie: ⁓ well, maybe we should explore forms of cooperation on whatever security. ⁓ well, maybe we should liberalize visas. I mean, don't get me wrong, none of these ideas are bad ideas. And the reason why we keep on coming back to them is that they haven't been implemented, right? But it also, I think, tells us something about a failure of imagination that I think we all have. But if we keep on coming back to old recipes, which are never then implemented.
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. That is true. So with Brexit, I mean, I think there is now a new space ⁓ open that maybe we can be more creative. ⁓ Maybe there's a, you know, now Turkey, Turkey is a NATO ⁓ ally and with the second largest army in the Alliance.
nathalie: because we have to use it. Thank you. ⁓ Thank
Ezgi Basaran: and also an indispensable partner on migration, on Black Sea settlement and EU's fifth largest trading partner. So maybe we can find a place for Turkey and Britain. Maybe. What's your take? Not accession? But because even now, Turkey's liberals are just ⁓ lost their appetite to be part of the EU. it's not even, you know, ⁓ with Fonderley, I mean, that was, I think, ⁓ the last nail in the coffin that we're not really looking for accession. That is now the main sentiment. But... What else can we do with Britain and Turkey involved?
nathalie: Look, I think what makes this a difficult moment to have ⁓ this discussion is that, so had we had this conversation, for example, two years ago, ⁓ I think that indeed, ⁓ we would have been talking about the fact that the UK and the EU wanted to turn the page, ⁓ but that ⁓ the UK did not want to return into the EU, it didn't actually even want to return to the single market. And so it was exploring forms of cooperation. Indeed, we then got to the agreement on a whole range of issues from fighter sanitary to the agreement to keep on talking about youth mobility to the agreement on a security partnership negotiations over the UK's access to safe. But if one is to be completely honest, and then I'll come to Turkey, but what if one is to be completely honest about this? I think one would say that actually here we are, know, in May 2026, that hasn't gone down very well either. Right? So I think what we're beginning to see, you know, Let's see what holds in store for the United Kingdom. But it seems to be me that as also the debate in the UK has, in a sense, radicalised to two extremes, what tends to have more traction is either very negative views, yeah, a la reform, like just kind of break everything even more, break it again, even after you've broken it, right? Or... the opposite side. mean, if you hear the kind of things that I mean, you're far more into British politics than I am. But if you hear the kind of things that for example, come from the Green Party, they're criticizing Labour and not going far enough. And if you go down that argument, the only logical conclusion of that argument is actually the only thing that makes sense is to return into the European Union. So it seems to me that
Ezgi Basaran: Yes.
nathalie: the space for these in-between solutions compared to where we were two years ago has actually been shrinking. And if, and here we come back to the Turkey point, if in the case of Turkey, we're in a situation in which ⁓ full membership is not on the cards, but these shrinking in-between options have actually not really, they're not really happening.
Ezgi Basaran: Hmm. Mm-hmm. Yes.
nathalie: This is why I think we're fundamentally stuck. Because even in the case of Turkey, ever since, I mean, if one is to put a date on this, ever since the 2016 migration statements that was originally never meant to be only about migration, it was meant to be the sort of opening salvo for agreements on security, agreements on modernized customs union, agreements on visa liberalization. 2016, 2026, 10 years, right? 10 years in which these in-between solutions haven't developed, know, haven't actually led to anything. Less time, and you know, 10 years since Brexit and nothing meaningful in between has developed. So I think actually now
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.
nathalie: we're in this very uncomfortable place in which the conversation has gone back to being an either-or conversation, either in or out, which is what makes it particularly difficult, I think, in the Turkish case.
Ezgi Basaran: Hmm. Hmm.
nathalie: ⁓ I've lost you.
Ezgi Basaran: ⁓ dear. Thanks
nathalie: Ooh, you're back. No worries, no worries.
Ezgi Basaran: I'm so sorry. You were just talking. Okay. I think.
nathalie: I don't know whether you caught, I mean, I suppose the recording has carried on, so you probably managed to...
Ezgi Basaran: Yeah, ⁓ So, ⁓ Comfort Arrow, the head of International Crisis Group, gave the D'Arendorf lecture ⁓ at Oxford recently and argued on top of ⁓ Joseph Borrell's ⁓ lecture that was the previous year, that now the world sees the European project as a project, not only the EU, as hypocritical and self-serving and post-colonial. And that view long predates Gaza and began with ⁓ what you said about the EU migration deal with Turkey. Do you agree with that chronology?
nathalie: Yeah, yes, mean, in a sense, ⁓ Europeans are world champions in hypocrisy. But I also think that we should reflect about what hypocrisy actually means and be very careful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. ⁓ Hypocrisy in international relations ⁓ is in a sense the gap which exists between the affirmation of norms and the exercise of power. And if you affirm norms and you have made of your entire, going back to the project, project, this being all about norms, because you're not a state, you don't have religion and language and ethnicity and whatever and history that joins you, right? And so the only way to affirm an identity is based on a particular, whatever, civic ⁓ rules-based understanding of who you are, right? And this is what the European project has been all about. ⁓ the fact that, so every actor in the international system does not ⁓ fully respect that vision. It's just that the Europeans made that vision so integral to who they were, which basically means that they were always going to be more ⁓ susceptible to being hypocritical. Now, you know, I think we have to be very careful about this discussion because there's a very easy way of getting rid of hypocrisy. And that is getting rid of norms altogether. Yeah.
Ezgi Basaran: Exactly.
nathalie: ⁓ When, example, ⁓ which wouldn't be nice. And I think that this is the danger. If one pushes this hypocrisy accusation of Europe, we actually may end up in exactly the opposite place than we would like to be. Because of course, when people accuse Europe of hypocrisy, what we would like to see happen is reducing that gap between norms and power.
Ezgi Basaran: Yes, which wouldn't be nice.
nathalie: by living up to the norms through the exercise of power. What we don't mean is getting rid of the norms, right? But this may be the effect that we end up with. Because if basically what European ⁓ leaders look around the world and say, yeah, but I mean, know, look at Donald Trump, he's not a hypocrite at all, right? He just says exactly what he wants to do and does it. Look at...
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm.
nathalie: Putin, he's not a hypocrite at all. He just says he wants, you know, whatever Ukraine and he just goes and tries to take it. I find it and at times, you know, let's go back to von der Leyen or even Mertz, at times you hear some remarks by European leaders that dangerously move in this direction. ⁓ You had Mertz saying in reference to the war in Iran that
Ezgi Basaran: Yes.
nathalie: international law was not a useful framework to understand this war. ⁓ You had von der Leyen speaking at the ambassadors conference, ⁓ know, insisting on the fact that, you know, we have to acknowledge that, you know, the rules based order is gone and kind of adapt to it. Yeah. So let's be careful in how we push for this hypocrisy. argument because we could end up in a much worse place. I would rather have a hypocritical Europe, right, that I can continue to accuse of being hypocritical because I can continue to say, well, you say you want to live up to these standards, look at what you're doing. And that gives me a quote unquote weapon, right, in my criticism. If I end up with a Europe that basically says, no, I mean, I don't care about those rules and laws and norms. ⁓ you know, I just want to be big, bad and ugly like everyone else. Then I'm completely defenseless because I can't even accuse them. Right. I mean, they're just being not hypocritical. So this is why I'm saying yes, or I'm all for, you know, the hypocrisy, the double standards, blah, blah, blah,
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.
nathalie: Let's be careful in how we use it because it can end up really backfiring.
Ezgi Basaran: As you might have known, Israel's ⁓ lobby is working full-time ⁓ now with the accusations, the framing that Turkey is the next Iran and ⁓ all. And within Turkey, the EU's stance, the thinking is that it's Israel's lobby that is affecting, influencing ⁓ Europeans against Turkey and it will continue to being like this. So what's your take on and with Ursula von der Leyen being prone to Israeli lobby. it really adds up in the Turkish ⁓ public opinion that it's Israel's doing ⁓ against Turkey.
nathalie: Yeah, that's a really interesting point that I hadn't thought about it. And of course, I haven't done research on this. It sounds intuitively correct, right? I mean, it sounds intuitively correct that, you know, indeed, as you say, Israel is trying to present ⁓ Turkey as its next big thing, you know, in its quest to basically dominate the Middle East.
Ezgi Basaran: Yes.
nathalie: The only way it can dominate the Middle East is by smashing it. And it has done a good job at smashing all sorts of countries left, right and center. And now of course it's intent on smashing Iran. you know, in the Israeli narrative, let's assume that it, I don't think it will, but anyway, let's assume it does smash Iran. Turkey is basically the only one left to smash. ⁓
Ezgi Basaran: Mm-hmm.
nathalie: I think that's correct. And I think it's also correct that, course, as we know, the Israel lobby in the United States, in Europe is very powerful. So it would only make intuitive sense to connect these two things. Now, the reason why I'm ⁓ not going to do it myself is that I actually haven't done the research on this. And so one would actually need to... dig and see whether these two intuitive points are actually connected to one another. But let's say as a working hypothesis, I found find it very plausible and it doesn't surprise me in the slightest. But as I said, one would need to verify this. And I think it also explains, as you were saying, why some leaders that are particularly prone to being pro-Israel have maybe as a bit of a slip of the tongue, now kind of frame Turkey as an adversary. ⁓ I hadn't made that connection myself, but as I said, I find it quite plausible.
Ezgi Basaran: Can you hear me? I'm so sorry. Final question. If ⁓ something similar happens, I mean, ⁓ in your documentary, ⁓ there's this ⁓ really nice ⁓ touch about ⁓ European civic ⁓ energy. mean, people on the streets for climate change, for Gaza and everything, and Hungarian voters showing up, you know.
nathalie: No. Okay.
Ezgi Basaran: in record numbers ⁓ to take Orban out. If something similar happens in Turkey and one could argue that ⁓ Ekremi Mamoldo's ⁓ mayoralty in Istanbul and protests around his prosecution are an early version of it, would the EU recognize it for what it is? ⁓ the idea that Turkey is no longer and will never be part of that democratic EU story. ⁓ So it would just ⁓ miss it again. And that would be the ⁓ attempt ⁓ of Turkey trying to be part of that story. What do you think?
nathalie: I think, Esgi, that, I mean, of course, you know, the EU is many, many things and many people. ⁓ I am absolutely confident that the kind of people that ⁓ look at that energy, be it the climate activists, the Gaza protests, the Hungarians showing in great numbers at the polls, the people that look at that, and feel energised by it and look at that as an element that would give them hope would also and equally look at something like that in Turkey. And as you say, as in many respects, has already been seen in exactly the same way. Now, does that mean that this is all Europeans, all European leaders? No, but there are many European leaders that have tried to criminalise, for example, ⁓ the Gaza protests. Yeah. So it's not as if, ⁓ you know, there is one EU. And so probably the EU, you know, the face of the EU that would be ⁓ very skeptical of whatever, know, Gaza protests would also be less inclined to be and to read something similar happening in Turkey as the evidence of ⁓ whatever, you know, a democratic face of Turkey coming to the fore. But
Ezgi Basaran: Yes.
nathalie: That is not everyone, right? And so as I say, those, I'm absolutely convinced that those that would read a certain kind of civic mobilization in Europe in a certain way would look at the same thing in Turkey in exactly the same way. The point is that we're not, you know, that there are many faces of Europe in the same way as there are many faces of Turkey.
Ezgi Basaran: Natalie, thank you. think there are very few people who can hold ⁓ the EU up to its own light without ⁓ either flattering it or writing it off and you're one of them. Thank you very much for your time and for this conversation.
nathalie: Thank you so much. been a real pleasure.
Ezgi Basaran: So. Thank you, thank you. Hope to see you in Oxford sometime.
nathalie: Okay my dear, lovely talking to you. Absolutely, absolutely.
Ezgi Basaran: Thank you so much. See you soon. Bye.
nathalie: Big kiss. Ciao, my scheme.