WEBVTT
1
00:00:01.760 --> 00:00:04.799
On July nineteenth, twenty twenty four, the world was shaken
2
00:00:04.879 --> 00:00:08.400
by what many are calling the worst cyber event in history.
3
00:00:09.759 --> 00:00:13.800
Roughly eight point five million computers were affected, over nine
4
00:00:13.919 --> 00:00:17.760
thousand flights were delayed, and massive shutdowns were felt across
5
00:00:17.839 --> 00:00:18.440
the world.
6
00:00:19.199 --> 00:00:24.640
Breaking news, a massive global technical outage has not critical
7
00:00:24.719 --> 00:00:28.199
computer infrastructure offline all across the country, and in fact, all
8
00:00:28.199 --> 00:00:29.320
around the world.
9
00:00:29.600 --> 00:00:31.960
Every one of them suffering at the hands of the
10
00:00:32.000 --> 00:00:34.240
same blue screen of death.
11
00:00:34.920 --> 00:00:39.359
Businesses, hospitals, airlines, government offices all knocked offline because of
12
00:00:39.399 --> 00:00:41.079
a simple software update.
13
00:00:41.799 --> 00:00:46.520
Thousands of people suddenly stranded at airports, Countless medical procedures
14
00:00:46.560 --> 00:00:50.039
canceled and delayed. The effects went far and beyond what
15
00:00:50.159 --> 00:00:54.679
anyone could have expected, instantly highlighting our heavy reliance on
16
00:00:54.759 --> 00:00:58.399
technology and how swiftly everything could crumble.
17
00:00:59.039 --> 00:01:01.520
To give you another vision, here is a time lapse
18
00:01:01.560 --> 00:01:05.000
showing the number of active flights nationwide overnight as the
19
00:01:05.000 --> 00:01:08.200
outage became more widespread. You can see the quick shrinkage
20
00:01:08.319 --> 00:01:12.599
as more airlines grounded planes and canceled flightlightlightlightlight.
21
00:01:14.000 --> 00:01:17.560
Who exactly is responsible for this? What happened, how did
22
00:01:17.560 --> 00:01:20.239
they respond, and ultimately what can we learn from it.
23
00:01:20.519 --> 00:01:24.719
The story centers primarily around an Austin, Texas based cybersecurity
24
00:01:24.760 --> 00:01:29.840
company known as CrowdStrike, but more specifically the antivirus software
25
00:01:30.000 --> 00:01:32.959
known as CrowdStrike. Falcon received an update to what's called
26
00:01:33.000 --> 00:01:35.959
a vulnerability scanner, the part of the program designed to
27
00:01:36.000 --> 00:01:40.439
assess devices and networks for weaknesses and well vulnerabilities. Essentially,
28
00:01:40.519 --> 00:01:43.840
they released an update containing in error. Since launched, the
29
00:01:43.840 --> 00:01:46.319
program has built up a client base of over thirty
30
00:01:46.439 --> 00:01:49.879
thousand users, roughly three hundred of which being Fortune five
31
00:01:49.959 --> 00:01:53.120
hundred companies, as well as countless high profile and high
32
00:01:53.200 --> 00:01:57.879
risk customers like banks, airlines, and healthcare. However, to this point,
33
00:01:57.920 --> 00:02:02.159
CrowdStrike has played a trustworthy and powerful role in the
34
00:02:02.200 --> 00:02:05.920
fight for cybersecurity. They were hired to investigate such scandals
35
00:02:05.920 --> 00:02:09.280
as the twenty fifteen and twenty sixteen Democratic National Committee
36
00:02:09.280 --> 00:02:12.680
cyber attacks, and even the twenty fourteen Sony Pictures hack
37
00:02:12.960 --> 00:02:17.039
that saw a massive leak of personal information surrounding Sony employees.
38
00:02:17.439 --> 00:02:20.199
In April of twenty twenty four, three months before the
39
00:02:20.199 --> 00:02:23.240
big crash that would lose companies millions of dollars, the
40
00:02:23.280 --> 00:02:26.319
company would begin seeing some crashes, and while they weren't
41
00:02:26.400 --> 00:02:29.000
merely as severe as they would be later on, and
42
00:02:29.080 --> 00:02:32.080
they only affected Linux users. They were all caused by
43
00:02:32.120 --> 00:02:36.639
the same problem routine software updates. However, just because a
44
00:02:36.719 --> 00:02:40.080
small number of users were affected by these aforementioned crashes,
45
00:02:40.120 --> 00:02:42.840
in the long run, this should have absolutely been raising
46
00:02:42.879 --> 00:02:46.280
red flags within the company, especially in regards to their
47
00:02:46.360 --> 00:02:51.000
QA process, whether due to mismanagement, oversight, or incompetence. CrowdStrike
48
00:02:51.080 --> 00:02:54.599
didn't seem to notice these foundational cracks, that is, until
49
00:02:54.599 --> 00:03:00.759
they had no other choice. This is an end. DCWS
50
00:03:00.800 --> 00:03:02.159
special reports.
51
00:03:02.319 --> 00:03:07.080
A massive global technical outage tied to CrowdStrike, which is
52
00:03:07.120 --> 00:03:12.319
a major cybersecurity provider, has noted critical computer infrastructure offline
53
00:03:12.360 --> 00:03:14.719
all across the country and in fact all around the world.
54
00:03:14.960 --> 00:03:19.039
Video footage began emerging of countless passengers at LAX sleeping
55
00:03:19.039 --> 00:03:22.360
on the floor, exhausted from flight after flight being delayed
56
00:03:22.599 --> 00:03:26.520
in a never ending cycle of disappointment. Banks became unable
57
00:03:26.560 --> 00:03:29.639
to access their customer's account information. Doctors in the UK
58
00:03:29.800 --> 00:03:33.719
were barred from accessing critical programs responsible for accessing blood
59
00:03:33.719 --> 00:03:37.360
tests and patient histories. In New York City, emergency systems
60
00:03:37.360 --> 00:03:39.759
such as nine to one one were down across the state.
61
00:03:39.960 --> 00:03:43.360
Even extending as far as Alaska, where citizens couldn't contact
62
00:03:43.360 --> 00:03:48.280
police or emergency services. Things were bad. CrowdStrike stock dropped
63
00:03:48.280 --> 00:03:50.560
from a market cap of ninety four billion all the
64
00:03:50.560 --> 00:03:53.439
way down to fifty three billion, losing the company just
65
00:03:53.520 --> 00:03:57.520
short of forty billion dollars in market value. Even Microsoft,
66
00:03:57.520 --> 00:04:00.719
who played no role in this besides Windows, the operating
67
00:04:00.719 --> 00:04:03.520
system I Falcon had been installed on, dropped six percent.
68
00:04:03.840 --> 00:04:06.960
One tech analyst for Webbush Securities went on record estimating
69
00:04:06.960 --> 00:04:09.680
CrowdStrike could lose about five percent of its customer base,
70
00:04:09.719 --> 00:04:11.879
which might not sound like a lot, but considering this
71
00:04:11.919 --> 00:04:14.800
is a seventy two billion dollar company and adding up
72
00:04:14.840 --> 00:04:17.519
the amount of money they may owe in legal fees, lawsuits,
73
00:04:17.519 --> 00:04:20.120
and refunds, this is not going to be something CrowdStrike
74
00:04:20.160 --> 00:04:22.319
can just walk off, at least not for a while,
75
00:04:22.480 --> 00:04:25.360
which really begs the question of what their testing process
76
00:04:25.399 --> 00:04:28.720
really is and why basic errors like this weren't caught
77
00:04:28.759 --> 00:04:31.920
by something like automated testing. If so many computers were
78
00:04:31.959 --> 00:04:35.920
affected so immediately, with CrowdStrike seeing such a sudden uptick
79
00:04:35.920 --> 00:04:39.120
in crashes beginning even months before the July twenty fifth incident,
80
00:04:39.279 --> 00:04:41.639
they've got to figure out what's slipping in the office
81
00:04:41.680 --> 00:04:45.639
and fix it immediately. But how did CrowdStrike respond to this? Well,
82
00:04:45.639 --> 00:04:48.560
many believe the response from CEO George Kurtz as well
83
00:04:48.560 --> 00:04:51.839
as COSO Sean Henry to have been more timely, direct,
84
00:04:52.000 --> 00:04:53.800
and confident than we may have expected.
85
00:04:54.040 --> 00:04:57.519
How is it that one single software bug can have
86
00:04:57.680 --> 00:05:00.000
such a profound and immediate impact.
87
00:05:00.519 --> 00:05:04.000
Well, when you look at the complexity of cybersecurity, you're
88
00:05:04.000 --> 00:05:06.720
always trying to state, what, excuse me.
89
00:05:06.639 --> 00:05:09.360
One step ahead of the adversaries.
90
00:05:10.319 --> 00:05:12.839
Excuse me, man, it's one second thief.
91
00:05:15.319 --> 00:05:18.360
Kurtz went on the Today Show showing face and owning
92
00:05:18.399 --> 00:05:20.759
up to everything that happened, as well as releasing a
93
00:05:20.800 --> 00:05:23.439
statement on the company's website in which he would write.
94
00:05:23.639 --> 00:05:26.079
I want to sincerely apologize directly to all of you
95
00:05:26.160 --> 00:05:29.639
for today's outage. All of CrowdStrike understands the gravity and
96
00:05:29.680 --> 00:05:33.000
impact of the situation. We quickly identified the issue and
97
00:05:33.000 --> 00:05:36.319
deployed a fix, allowing us to focus diligently on restoring
98
00:05:36.360 --> 00:05:38.399
customer systems as our highest priority.
99
00:05:38.839 --> 00:05:40.480
He would go on to offer a link to the
100
00:05:40.480 --> 00:05:43.360
company's support portal to work with the company's tech support
101
00:05:43.399 --> 00:05:46.600
and representatives, and offered full transparency on how this all
102
00:05:46.600 --> 00:05:49.480
occurred and what steps were being taken to prevent anything
103
00:05:49.560 --> 00:05:53.560
like this from happening again. This is honestly a great response.
104
00:05:53.920 --> 00:05:57.319
They immediately began working to fix the problem, offered solutions
105
00:05:57.360 --> 00:06:00.160
to those still affected, showed face on the news, and
106
00:06:00.199 --> 00:06:04.800
worked diligently to take responsibility and remain accessible through the struggle.
107
00:06:05.040 --> 00:06:07.480
While it's important to do everything you can with your
108
00:06:07.519 --> 00:06:10.920
own company to prevent catastrophe, it's also paramount that we
109
00:06:11.040 --> 00:06:15.600
understand how we can bounce back, take ownership, and ultimately recover.
110
00:06:15.920 --> 00:06:18.720
In the case of CrowdStrike, this recovery is already on
111
00:06:18.800 --> 00:06:22.000
its way, with company stock rising nearly three percent since
112
00:06:22.040 --> 00:06:24.319
the incident, and they don't seem to be losing as
113
00:06:24.319 --> 00:06:28.279
many customers as some previously estimated. Mission Critical Systems CEO
114
00:06:28.439 --> 00:06:30.879
Ken Mitra would tell CRN.
115
00:06:30.800 --> 00:06:33.480
I haven't had a customer say hey, we're going to
116
00:06:33.560 --> 00:06:37.319
rip and replace CrowdStrike. That hasn't happened. They still have
117
00:06:37.480 --> 00:06:41.000
really really good technology and they kind of dominate the market.
118
00:06:41.160 --> 00:06:45.759
Will they recover and go on to do bigger things? Yes, absolutely, But.
119
00:06:45.759 --> 00:06:48.839
While CrowdStrike may have dodged a bullet in the long term,
120
00:06:48.920 --> 00:06:51.360
their short term costs are adding up by the day,
121
00:06:51.600 --> 00:06:53.879
and it's hard to say how well they would be
122
00:06:53.920 --> 00:06:56.560
recovering right now had it not been for the swift,
123
00:06:56.759 --> 00:06:59.959
direct and honest response from those in charge, and of course,
124
00:07:00.399 --> 00:07:03.399
the actual ability to fix the problem. If you like
125
00:07:03.480 --> 00:07:05.680
this story and want more like it, tap that like
126
00:07:05.720 --> 00:07:07.959
button somewhere down there and subscribe for more
1
00:00:01.760 --> 00:00:04.799
On July nineteenth, twenty twenty four, the world was shaken
2
00:00:04.879 --> 00:00:08.400
by what many are calling the worst cyber event in history.
3
00:00:09.759 --> 00:00:13.800
Roughly eight point five million computers were affected, over nine
4
00:00:13.919 --> 00:00:17.760
thousand flights were delayed, and massive shutdowns were felt across
5
00:00:17.839 --> 00:00:18.440
the world.
6
00:00:19.199 --> 00:00:24.640
Breaking news, a massive global technical outage has not critical
7
00:00:24.719 --> 00:00:28.199
computer infrastructure offline all across the country, and in fact, all
8
00:00:28.199 --> 00:00:29.320
around the world.
9
00:00:29.600 --> 00:00:31.960
Every one of them suffering at the hands of the
10
00:00:32.000 --> 00:00:34.240
same blue screen of death.
11
00:00:34.920 --> 00:00:39.359
Businesses, hospitals, airlines, government offices all knocked offline because of
12
00:00:39.399 --> 00:00:41.079
a simple software update.
13
00:00:41.799 --> 00:00:46.520
Thousands of people suddenly stranded at airports, Countless medical procedures
14
00:00:46.560 --> 00:00:50.039
canceled and delayed. The effects went far and beyond what
15
00:00:50.159 --> 00:00:54.679
anyone could have expected, instantly highlighting our heavy reliance on
16
00:00:54.759 --> 00:00:58.399
technology and how swiftly everything could crumble.
17
00:00:59.039 --> 00:01:01.520
To give you another vision, here is a time lapse
18
00:01:01.560 --> 00:01:05.000
showing the number of active flights nationwide overnight as the
19
00:01:05.000 --> 00:01:08.200
outage became more widespread. You can see the quick shrinkage
20
00:01:08.319 --> 00:01:12.599
as more airlines grounded planes and canceled flightlightlightlightlight.
21
00:01:14.000 --> 00:01:17.560
Who exactly is responsible for this? What happened, how did
22
00:01:17.560 --> 00:01:20.239
they respond, and ultimately what can we learn from it.
23
00:01:20.519 --> 00:01:24.719
The story centers primarily around an Austin, Texas based cybersecurity
24
00:01:24.760 --> 00:01:29.840
company known as CrowdStrike, but more specifically the antivirus software
25
00:01:30.000 --> 00:01:32.959
known as CrowdStrike. Falcon received an update to what's called
26
00:01:33.000 --> 00:01:35.959
a vulnerability scanner, the part of the program designed to
27
00:01:36.000 --> 00:01:40.439
assess devices and networks for weaknesses and well vulnerabilities. Essentially,
28
00:01:40.519 --> 00:01:43.840
they released an update containing in error. Since launched, the
29
00:01:43.840 --> 00:01:46.319
program has built up a client base of over thirty
30
00:01:46.439 --> 00:01:49.879
thousand users, roughly three hundred of which being Fortune five
31
00:01:49.959 --> 00:01:53.120
hundred companies, as well as countless high profile and high
32
00:01:53.200 --> 00:01:57.879
risk customers like banks, airlines, and healthcare. However, to this point,
33
00:01:57.920 --> 00:02:02.159
CrowdStrike has played a trustworthy and powerful role in the
34
00:02:02.200 --> 00:02:05.920
fight for cybersecurity. They were hired to investigate such scandals
35
00:02:05.920 --> 00:02:09.280
as the twenty fifteen and twenty sixteen Democratic National Committee
36
00:02:09.280 --> 00:02:12.680
cyber attacks, and even the twenty fourteen Sony Pictures hack
37
00:02:12.960 --> 00:02:17.039
that saw a massive leak of personal information surrounding Sony employees.
38
00:02:17.439 --> 00:02:20.199
In April of twenty twenty four, three months before the
39
00:02:20.199 --> 00:02:23.240
big crash that would lose companies millions of dollars, the
40
00:02:23.280 --> 00:02:26.319
company would begin seeing some crashes, and while they weren't
41
00:02:26.400 --> 00:02:29.000
merely as severe as they would be later on, and
42
00:02:29.080 --> 00:02:32.080
they only affected Linux users. They were all caused by
43
00:02:32.120 --> 00:02:36.639
the same problem routine software updates. However, just because a
44
00:02:36.719 --> 00:02:40.080
small number of users were affected by these aforementioned crashes,
45
00:02:40.120 --> 00:02:42.840
in the long run, this should have absolutely been raising
46
00:02:42.879 --> 00:02:46.280
red flags within the company, especially in regards to their
47
00:02:46.360 --> 00:02:51.000
QA process, whether due to mismanagement, oversight, or incompetence. CrowdStrike
48
00:02:51.080 --> 00:02:54.599
didn't seem to notice these foundational cracks, that is, until
49
00:02:54.599 --> 00:03:00.759
they had no other choice. This is an end. DCWS
50
00:03:00.800 --> 00:03:02.159
special reports.
51
00:03:02.319 --> 00:03:07.080
A massive global technical outage tied to CrowdStrike, which is
52
00:03:07.120 --> 00:03:12.319
a major cybersecurity provider, has noted critical computer infrastructure offline
53
00:03:12.360 --> 00:03:14.719
all across the country and in fact all around the world.
54
00:03:14.960 --> 00:03:19.039
Video footage began emerging of countless passengers at LAX sleeping
55
00:03:19.039 --> 00:03:22.360
on the floor, exhausted from flight after flight being delayed
56
00:03:22.599 --> 00:03:26.520
in a never ending cycle of disappointment. Banks became unable
57
00:03:26.560 --> 00:03:29.639
to access their customer's account information. Doctors in the UK
58
00:03:29.800 --> 00:03:33.719
were barred from accessing critical programs responsible for accessing blood
59
00:03:33.719 --> 00:03:37.360
tests and patient histories. In New York City, emergency systems
60
00:03:37.360 --> 00:03:39.759
such as nine to one one were down across the state.
61
00:03:39.960 --> 00:03:43.360
Even extending as far as Alaska, where citizens couldn't contact
62
00:03:43.360 --> 00:03:48.280
police or emergency services. Things were bad. CrowdStrike stock dropped
63
00:03:48.280 --> 00:03:50.560
from a market cap of ninety four billion all the
64
00:03:50.560 --> 00:03:53.439
way down to fifty three billion, losing the company just
65
00:03:53.520 --> 00:03:57.520
short of forty billion dollars in market value. Even Microsoft,
66
00:03:57.520 --> 00:04:00.719
who played no role in this besides Windows, the operating
67
00:04:00.719 --> 00:04:03.520
system I Falcon had been installed on, dropped six percent.
68
00:04:03.840 --> 00:04:06.960
One tech analyst for Webbush Securities went on record estimating
69
00:04:06.960 --> 00:04:09.680
CrowdStrike could lose about five percent of its customer base,
70
00:04:09.719 --> 00:04:11.879
which might not sound like a lot, but considering this
71
00:04:11.919 --> 00:04:14.800
is a seventy two billion dollar company and adding up
72
00:04:14.840 --> 00:04:17.519
the amount of money they may owe in legal fees, lawsuits,
73
00:04:17.519 --> 00:04:20.120
and refunds, this is not going to be something CrowdStrike
74
00:04:20.160 --> 00:04:22.319
can just walk off, at least not for a while,
75
00:04:22.480 --> 00:04:25.360
which really begs the question of what their testing process
76
00:04:25.399 --> 00:04:28.720
really is and why basic errors like this weren't caught
77
00:04:28.759 --> 00:04:31.920
by something like automated testing. If so many computers were
78
00:04:31.959 --> 00:04:35.920
affected so immediately, with CrowdStrike seeing such a sudden uptick
79
00:04:35.920 --> 00:04:39.120
in crashes beginning even months before the July twenty fifth incident,
80
00:04:39.279 --> 00:04:41.639
they've got to figure out what's slipping in the office
81
00:04:41.680 --> 00:04:45.639
and fix it immediately. But how did CrowdStrike respond to this? Well,
82
00:04:45.639 --> 00:04:48.560
many believe the response from CEO George Kurtz as well
83
00:04:48.560 --> 00:04:51.839
as COSO Sean Henry to have been more timely, direct,
84
00:04:52.000 --> 00:04:53.800
and confident than we may have expected.
85
00:04:54.040 --> 00:04:57.519
How is it that one single software bug can have
86
00:04:57.680 --> 00:05:00.000
such a profound and immediate impact.
87
00:05:00.519 --> 00:05:04.000
Well, when you look at the complexity of cybersecurity, you're
88
00:05:04.000 --> 00:05:06.720
always trying to state, what, excuse me.
89
00:05:06.639 --> 00:05:09.360
One step ahead of the adversaries.
90
00:05:10.319 --> 00:05:12.839
Excuse me, man, it's one second thief.
91
00:05:15.319 --> 00:05:18.360
Kurtz went on the Today Show showing face and owning
92
00:05:18.399 --> 00:05:20.759
up to everything that happened, as well as releasing a
93
00:05:20.800 --> 00:05:23.439
statement on the company's website in which he would write.
94
00:05:23.639 --> 00:05:26.079
I want to sincerely apologize directly to all of you
95
00:05:26.160 --> 00:05:29.639
for today's outage. All of CrowdStrike understands the gravity and
96
00:05:29.680 --> 00:05:33.000
impact of the situation. We quickly identified the issue and
97
00:05:33.000 --> 00:05:36.319
deployed a fix, allowing us to focus diligently on restoring
98
00:05:36.360 --> 00:05:38.399
customer systems as our highest priority.
99
00:05:38.839 --> 00:05:40.480
He would go on to offer a link to the
100
00:05:40.480 --> 00:05:43.360
company's support portal to work with the company's tech support
101
00:05:43.399 --> 00:05:46.600
and representatives, and offered full transparency on how this all
102
00:05:46.600 --> 00:05:49.480
occurred and what steps were being taken to prevent anything
103
00:05:49.560 --> 00:05:53.560
like this from happening again. This is honestly a great response.
104
00:05:53.920 --> 00:05:57.319
They immediately began working to fix the problem, offered solutions
105
00:05:57.360 --> 00:06:00.160
to those still affected, showed face on the news, and
106
00:06:00.199 --> 00:06:04.800
worked diligently to take responsibility and remain accessible through the struggle.
107
00:06:05.040 --> 00:06:07.480
While it's important to do everything you can with your
108
00:06:07.519 --> 00:06:10.920
own company to prevent catastrophe, it's also paramount that we
109
00:06:11.040 --> 00:06:15.600
understand how we can bounce back, take ownership, and ultimately recover.
110
00:06:15.920 --> 00:06:18.720
In the case of CrowdStrike, this recovery is already on
111
00:06:18.800 --> 00:06:22.000
its way, with company stock rising nearly three percent since
112
00:06:22.040 --> 00:06:24.319
the incident, and they don't seem to be losing as
113
00:06:24.319 --> 00:06:28.279
many customers as some previously estimated. Mission Critical Systems CEO
114
00:06:28.439 --> 00:06:30.879
Ken Mitra would tell CRN.
115
00:06:30.800 --> 00:06:33.480
I haven't had a customer say hey, we're going to
116
00:06:33.560 --> 00:06:37.319
rip and replace CrowdStrike. That hasn't happened. They still have
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really really good technology and they kind of dominate the market.
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Will they recover and go on to do bigger things? Yes, absolutely, But.
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While CrowdStrike may have dodged a bullet in the long term,
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their short term costs are adding up by the day,
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and it's hard to say how well they would be
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recovering right now had it not been for the swift,
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direct and honest response from those in charge, and of course,
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the actual ability to fix the problem. If you like
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this story and want more like it, tap that like
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button somewhere down there and subscribe for more
