DRI Aviation Wingtips: Episode 27

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Hello everyone, and welcome to another episode of the Wingtips podcast.
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My name is Britney Clark and I am Manager Litigation
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Council for Jet Blue Airways Corporation. Wingtips is brought to
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you by the DRI Aviation Law Committee. In each episode,
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we speak to fellow DRI members and notable aviation industry
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guests about the practice of aviation law and emerging topics
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in aviation. It is my pleasure to introduce Sky Wesley,
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a shareholder at Carl Allison, who will be hosting today's episode,
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featuring two distinguished litigators discussing their experience handling aviation disaster litigation.
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Brittany, thank you for the introduction. I appreciated.
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I'm pleased to introduce our guest today, who I am
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sure will be very familiar to a lot of our listeners. First,
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let me introduce Emmett Schwartzman. Emmett is the Assistant vice
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president and Global Director for Litigation and Complex Claims for
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Great American Insurance Companies Aviation Division. Emmett is an attorney
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with over forty years of experience focused on aviation claims
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and complex litigation defense. Prior to joining Great Americans Aviation Division,
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Emmett was in private practice in New Orleans and Miami.
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Emmett has an extensive experience defending catastrophic aviation cases throughout
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his career, including handling the nineteen eighty two Kenner Louisiana
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crash and the American Airlines Cali, Columbia crash in nineteen
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ninety five.
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Our second guest today is Art Wilner.
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Art is a partner with the law firm leader Berken
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Coleo in Silverstein in Los Angeles, California. Art is more
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than four decades of experience handle high exposure complex litigation
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cases arising out of major airline and general aviation accidents.
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Art has represented major regional, domestic and foreign air carriers,
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pilots and component part manufacturers, and catastrophic accident cases. Art
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is also a former Vice president of the United States
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Aviation Underwriters, Inc. Where he oversaw outside council and the
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defense of high exposure airline litigation and prepared witnesses to
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testify before the NTSB.
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Art is also advised senior.
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Airline management on litigation and disaster planning issues arising from
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potential catastrophic accidents. Our topic today is going to be
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something that I'll I'm sure it'll be very interesting to
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our listeners. We're going to be discussing in catastrophic airline crashes,
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how the number and severity of catastrophic crashes has changed
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over time, and responses to catastrophic crashes Art Emmon.
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As we were preparing for.
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This podcast, I was interested to learn in the way
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that aviation leglandustry has changed over time. Can we start
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off by just kind of describing the aviation industry and
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what it was like back in the early eighties.
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Sky. This is Emmett, and thank you for the kind introduction.
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It is disturbing to hear that I've been doing this
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for over forty years and appreciate you reminding me of that.
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I got thrown into the mix in nineteen eighty two
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as a summer associate at Deutsch Kerrigan and Styles in
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New Orleans when PanAm crashed into a residential neighborhood in Kenner, Louisiana,
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where the airport is located, and it was catastrophic. It
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was horrible, and we got the assignment at Deutsch Kerrigan.
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But you know what, it wasn't unusual. It was at
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the time the second worst aviation disaster in the United
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States with over let's see one hundred and sixty one
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fatalities plus burn victims and tremendous property destruction. But as
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Art can tell you, it's not like now where an
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aviation disaster is a rare event. And we can get
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into some statistics as we go on here, But in
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the nineteen eighties and into the nineteen nineties, it was
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a regular occurrence to have aviation disasters. And in nineteen
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eighty two alone, we had two major ones. Air Florida
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Flight ninety on January thirteen, eighty two that killed seventy
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eight people, and then we had the Kinner, Louisiana accident
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just a few months later in July. But it was just,
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I don't want to call it routine, but it was
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a regular cadence of accidents where you just knew another
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one was coming. You just didn't know exactly when Art,
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you started a little before me, I started in eighty two.
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Is that your same sense back then?
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And there's no question about it, And you know, I
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think part of this is it has to be viewed
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as a percent versus reality issue. Even back during the
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nineteen eighties, when, as as Emma correctly points out accidents
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were relatively relatively common. At least they weren't unusual, you know,
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during the two thousands, and really from two thousand until
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until now, they've become so rare that I'm not sure
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that anyone who didn't live through the days, you know,
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thirty to forty and more years ago, can possibly, you know,
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appreciate how the industry has changed in terms of safety,
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the lessons that have been learned from accidents, and where
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we are today versus where we were then. And I
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think I think it was I think that point was
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highlighted back in twenty twenty five when we had the
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American Airlines accident out in Washington, d C. And I
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believe not long after that, Delta had an accident up
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in Canada, and the reaction, the public reaction and the
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reaction in the media was oh my god, the system
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isn't safe. But there was no appreciation of what it
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used to be like. But I'll also add that even
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though the rate of accidents back in the nineteen eighties,
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for example, was far greater than it has been during
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the past twenty five years, we all viewed the system
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as very safe. I think it was back in the
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nineteen eighties, when you know, on your average flight you
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would land and the flight it's part of the flight.
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At Hen's announcement de planning announcement was you've just completed
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the safest part of your journey, and we all understood
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that that was true, notwithstanding the fact that accidents were happening.
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And they were definitely happening. I'd like to just rattle
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off from what was going on when I started my
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career as a young twenty four year old defense attorney.
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Eighty two, I've already rattled off two catastrophic accidents, and
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then it just keeps coming. And I don't think unless
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I just tell you and recount the accidents, no one
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listening is going to really have a full appreciation of
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how frequent and how extreme they sometimes were. You know,
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nineteen eighty three, we've got Cincinnati accident. Air Canada seven
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ninety seven Flight twenty three killed in a fire. And then,
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oh my goodness, we get into the worst year of
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the nineteen eighties for air safety, Delta one nine in Dallas,
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one hundred and thirty seven people killed. And then three
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weeks later we've got eight people killed in Maine in
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a regional carrier accident. And then September nineteen eighty five,
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Midwest Express goes down after takeoff, killing thirty one people.
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September twenty three and eighty five, we've got another regional
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in Virginia killing fourteen March and I'm sorry, right, And
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then if we expand this out globally, beyond the borders
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of the United States, we've got Japan Airlines five hundred
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and twenty fatalities. This is all in nineteen eighty five.
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Air India three hundred and twenty nine fatalities, erow Air
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two hundred and fifty six fatalities, Aeroflot two hundred fatalities,
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Iberia one hundred and forty eight fatalities. That's all in
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nineteen eighty five.
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Sobering, and you know, and just to put a point
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on on this, you know, back in those days, I
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was I was still working in house at USAIG, and
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you know, I was in the airline claims department, and
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we had a go team so that whenever one of
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our insurance had an accident, you know, most of the
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people in the department would be out the door and
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traveling to the accident's site or to the airline's headquarters
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or both in order to assist the air carrier in
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dealing with the accident and briefing them on what to expect.
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But from I think it was late nineteen eighty seven
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when continent from the Continental Airlines accident in Denver in
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November of nineteen eighty seven until early nineteen ninety one
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the US Air sky West accident out here in LA.
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During that three four year period, we were responding to
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a major disaster on average every three months, and granted
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that included some terrorist attacks, but nonetheless these were these
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were major designs asters, and you know, we would we
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would essentially come home, come back from being on scene
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at an accident site, you know, do our laundry, read
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our mail, and then two weeks later or a few
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weeks later, there would be another one. It was. It
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was that frequent during that period of time.
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And I think you had mentioned to me how airlines
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really weren't that prepared for these kind of mass disasters.
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Well, you know, they were, they were prepared, but they
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they never and and I guess this is human nature,
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and maybe it's corporate nature as well. I think everyone,
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every every airline assumed that it would be the other
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the other guy who had the accident, which is why
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each year we would we would schedule meetings with each
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of our airline insureds to explain to them this is look. Obviously,
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chances are you're not going to have an accident, and
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I know you think it's going to be the other
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carrier that's going to have one, but you need to
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be prepared and this is what you can expect to
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happen during the hours and days following an accident and beyond,
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including the NTSB investigation and public hearing, as well as
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the litigation, which you know I asson we'll talk about
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a little bit a little bit later.
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We didn't have care teams and we certainly didn't have
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the Passenger Assistance Act in place until really nineteen ninety six.
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I think I think that's true, and it's not.
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Like the things got much better. In fact, I think
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they really got worse in the nineties, and that's that's frightening.
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The worst year in the nineties was ninety six. My
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big experience was the American Airlines Cali, Columbia accident that
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was in December ninety five, and that was flying into
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a mountain in Colombia. But ninety six Value jet one
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hundred and ten fatalities in the Everglades, and most most
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people of a certain age remember twa flight eight hundred
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with two hundred thirty fatalities. Just just the the magnitude
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of these wide body flights with so many passengers on
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board was was staggering, right. But we we as as
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a attorneys at the time, you were an attorney at
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the time in the nineties, and as was I. Ah,
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this this was this was part of an aviation practice,
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was mass disaster defense. And we would attend the SMU
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Air Loss Symposium annually in Dallas, and there was a
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whole section of the program devoted to updates on typically
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four or five air disaster litigation litigation UH warriors UH.
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And you'd have the planets bar, and you'd have the
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defense bar talking about each accident. And we don't do
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that anymore. It's been years since that's been a subject
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at SMU. We may see something from American Eagle in
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Washington going forward, but the nineties were just horrible, but
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it kept it kept the cadence going until really two
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thousand and two. And I'm excluding nine to eleven from
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our discussion here because it's just such an aberration, but
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I think we cannot forget that. In two thousand and
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two there was American Airlines five eighty seven accident at
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flight five eighty seven and JFK, and there were two
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hundred and fifty one passengers killed, nine crew and five
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on the ground. So that was pretty much the end
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of the history of just mass disasters that we in
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the Defense bar and those in the planetfs bar we're
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working on in terms of litigation. And after that, in
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the two thousands, you know, there were a handful of incidents,
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the most significant we're far less, far less significant than
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what we experienced in the eighties. For example, you had
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the Delta comm Air flight in Lexington, Kentucky that took
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off on a closed runway and you lost fifty nine passengers.
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And then there was the Continental Express Colgan Air in Buffalo,
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and that was a fifty fatality accident. But we did
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not have with the exception of that JFK American Airlines accident,
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we didn't have the mass casualties. I mean, nine fifties
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is certainly significant, but not in comparison to the horrific
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accidents that we had in the eighties and nineties. Maybe
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you can discuss the difference between the two thousands and
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the eighties and nineties as it relates to lawyer experience, right.
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Well, I think that it's I mean, there were start
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there are stark differences, and I mean in some resons,
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in some respects, it's hard to compare because because the
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drop off over the last twenty twenty five years has
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been so significant that the points of comparison aren't necessarily there.
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But that that said, for example, back during the eighties,
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because there were there there was so many accidents, and
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there was there was an aviation for example, an aviation
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PLANEFFS bar at the time, and there still is obviously,
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but you know, after accidents back in those days, it
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was not unusual to see three, four or five planeiff
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firms with really the lion's share of of of of
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the passenger claims and lawsuits. And so it enabled it
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enabled us, you know, within the insurance company in the
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claims department, dealing with those attorneys as well as defense
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counsel to establish something something of a predictability in terms
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of getting cases resolved. You know, if you sat down
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in nineteen eighty eight with you know, with at a
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settlement meeting with as a defense attorney or as a
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claims person with with with with the plane's attorney. I mean,
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you could discuss the value of a claim with a
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fair amount of certainty because you had a wealth of
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other claims that had arisen over the over the prior
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several years that there were reference points for you, and
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so I think back then it was somewhat easier to
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to get cases settled because of the of that sort
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of predictability. I'm not sure that exists now for a
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variety of reasons. I think litigation has so changed over
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the past forty years that it's a whole different ballgame.
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In addition to the fact that because thankfully we haven't
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had the frequency of accidents and the volume of litigation
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in recent years that we used to have, the predictability
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of verdicts and settlements is I don't believe is there
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any any longer. But it's not. But it's not just
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because of the relationship between defense and plan of attorneys.
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I think a lot of it has to do with
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the kind of verdicts that juries come back with these days.
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In general, the existence of a d R these days,
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which frankly didn't exist at all forty years ago, the
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courtroom technology that obviously you know, was non existent for
256
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all intents and purposes back in the eighties, and and
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today it's an entirely different environment.
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So I remember the crude animation we were using in
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pan Am in New Orleans in the early mid eighties.
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Well, just the thing not good, well, but it seemed
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good at the time. I mean think it's almost like,
262
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imagine the difference between playing pac Man back in nineteen
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eighty four versus you know, what you were able to
264
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do on your handheld, you know, smartphone today. It's it's
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like being on a different planet.
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But don't you don't you agree that certainly, in the
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eighties and nineties, just because the death or injury was
268
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from an air accident, the value of the claim routinely
269
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was more than if it were an auto accident.
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There's no there's there's no question about it. And the
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example that I used to give all the time was
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if you, if you and this it didn't even involve
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the aviation accidents, just aviation incidents. If you took a
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banana peel and left it in the produce aisle of
275
00:23:44.440 --> 00:23:47.160
your local supermarket and someone slipped and fell on it
276
00:23:47.200 --> 00:23:50.359
and filed a lawsuit. It was just a stupid slip
277
00:23:50.400 --> 00:23:52.720
on a banana peel case. If you took the same
278
00:23:52.759 --> 00:23:54.519
banana peel and put it in the aisle of the
279
00:23:54.599 --> 00:23:57.720
United Airlines wide body and someone slipped and fell on it,
280
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well then it becomes Then it became an aviation case.
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And I think I think most planet attorneys would agree
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that they valued cases. They would have they would have
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valued the bananapeel case entirely differently if it occurred on
284
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on a commercial airline as opposed to in your in
285
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your local supermarket.
286
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And I'm thinking now, because air disasters are so rare
287
00:24:34.519 --> 00:24:39.079
that the value has been boosted even more because of
288
00:24:39.119 --> 00:24:45.200
the drama associated with it and the lack of almost
289
00:24:45.880 --> 00:24:56.240
immunization uh to the experience of an air air disaster.
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People in the eighties and nineties it was on the
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news regularly. Now it's just and you were numb almost
292
00:25:04.799 --> 00:25:08.480
to it. It was always dramatic, but it was like, oh,
293
00:25:08.599 --> 00:25:13.039
another accident. Now it would be oh my god, an
294
00:25:13.079 --> 00:25:19.079
air disaster. Well, that increases the value dramatically.
295
00:25:19.000 --> 00:25:21.319
Well, and and and one of the differences, now, let
296
00:25:21.359 --> 00:25:24.839
let's put let's put put let's put aside, you know,
297
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major disasters where the passengers are almost completely wiped out.
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I mean, let's just talk about, you know, an in
299
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flight incident, you know, an engine fire for example, or
300
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a bad turbulence incident. You know nowadays, and we see
301
00:25:46.680 --> 00:25:53.119
this routinely nowadays, when when an incident is occurring in
302
00:25:53.119 --> 00:25:57.839
real time, you'll have passengers who are video taping the
303
00:25:58.640 --> 00:26:06.000
what's happening with their phones, and that that's a game changer.
304
00:26:06.759 --> 00:26:10.160
Evidence has changed extremely well.
305
00:26:10.200 --> 00:26:15.240
For I'll give you an example. Back in twenty fourteen,
306
00:26:17.880 --> 00:26:21.720
you know, a domestic carrier had an engine fire incident
307
00:26:21.960 --> 00:26:27.240
here in southern California following takeoff, about ten minutes after takeoff,
308
00:26:27.319 --> 00:26:34.799
maybe less and smoke began getting sucked into the passenger
309
00:26:34.839 --> 00:26:39.799
cabin and the pilots were able to turn the airplane
310
00:26:39.799 --> 00:26:47.519
around and land safely. They had an emergency evacuation that
311
00:26:47.720 --> 00:26:53.400
was conducted flawlessly. There were no and I represented the
312
00:26:53.440 --> 00:26:58.200
carrier in that in that litigation. There were, as I recall,
313
00:26:58.359 --> 00:27:01.559
no physical injuries or if any, maybe there were some
314
00:27:01.839 --> 00:27:08.799
bumps and bruises coming off the slide, but they were
315
00:27:08.880 --> 00:27:13.599
all these videos of what was going on in the
316
00:27:13.599 --> 00:27:17.480
cabin at the time, and you can see, you can
317
00:27:17.519 --> 00:27:21.519
see the smoke that's in the cabin, and you hear
318
00:27:21.559 --> 00:27:26.279
the comments and the crying, and you can feel and
319
00:27:26.359 --> 00:27:31.480
appreciate what the passengers were going through. So from an
320
00:27:31.480 --> 00:27:37.519
evidentiary standpoint, it's very, very different now than it was
321
00:27:37.640 --> 00:27:42.599
back then. And I'll and you know, and i'll i'll
322
00:27:42.599 --> 00:27:47.599
compare that to, for example, the Ohio air Lines accident
323
00:27:47.680 --> 00:27:52.000
that occurred in nineteen eighty eight, where a significant portion
324
00:27:52.119 --> 00:27:58.079
of the fuselage tore off during in mid flight at
325
00:27:58.079 --> 00:28:03.480
twenty four thousand feet and the airplane basically turned into
326
00:28:03.480 --> 00:28:08.319
a convertible for the first ten or twelve rows of
327
00:28:09.000 --> 00:28:15.839
the passenger cabin, and I probably met I was still
328
00:28:15.880 --> 00:28:19.279
at USAIG at the time. I probably met with almost
329
00:28:19.680 --> 00:28:22.279
every passenger who had been on that flight and heard
330
00:28:22.319 --> 00:28:30.079
their story, and they were pretty frightening stories. But we
331
00:28:30.079 --> 00:28:32.759
were able to get all of those cases settled. None
332
00:28:32.799 --> 00:28:36.759
went a trial. They settled for amounts that would be
333
00:28:36.839 --> 00:28:44.200
embarrassing to even talk about in today's environment. It would
334
00:28:44.200 --> 00:28:47.720
be a completely different ball game if if that incident
335
00:28:47.759 --> 00:28:53.559
happened today, you would have, you know, one hundred videos
336
00:28:54.319 --> 00:28:58.440
among the passengers where you would see all the stuff
337
00:28:58.480 --> 00:29:03.680
flying around the cab and then you know the ocean
338
00:29:03.680 --> 00:29:04.960
below and the sky above.
339
00:29:05.200 --> 00:29:10.640
So let's just forget about period. Different surveillance cameras everywhere
340
00:29:11.319 --> 00:29:16.119
right on the ground, and you're going to have a
341
00:29:16.160 --> 00:29:19.160
pretty good sense of what happened. That's right for a
342
00:29:19.200 --> 00:29:22.440
lot of accidents. And I go back, were you were
343
00:29:22.440 --> 00:29:27.359
you working in nineteen seventy nine, No.
344
00:29:27.400 --> 00:29:30.960
That was that was that I'm assuming you're referring to
345
00:29:31.000 --> 00:29:35.480
the American Airlines Chicago right accident, and that was just
346
00:29:35.519 --> 00:29:39.119
before I joined USAIG. Although when I when I went
347
00:29:39.119 --> 00:29:43.960
to work at USAIG as a summer clerk in nineteen eighty,
348
00:29:44.359 --> 00:29:46.200
I had worked on that accident.
349
00:29:47.119 --> 00:29:51.599
Because there's only there's only one greeny, black and white
350
00:29:52.160 --> 00:29:57.279
picture that a someone at the airport happened to coincidentally
351
00:29:57.359 --> 00:30:01.799
take of that flight, and that's the only evidence we
352
00:30:01.920 --> 00:30:07.480
have of it, of the aircraft inverting after it lost
353
00:30:08.279 --> 00:30:15.960
lost an engine. Now we'd have clear digital color surveillance
354
00:30:17.160 --> 00:30:18.440
video of the whole thing.
355
00:30:19.400 --> 00:30:24.799
Well, and you know, from a litigation standpoint, one thing
356
00:30:24.960 --> 00:30:30.200
that's almost become routine these days, and I believe was
357
00:30:30.240 --> 00:30:33.119
non I don't think it had been invented yet back
358
00:30:33.160 --> 00:30:39.400
in the day. Was jury research. And so for example,
359
00:30:39.920 --> 00:30:43.079
you following, while we were while we were litigating the
360
00:30:43.119 --> 00:30:46.880
cases out of that engine fire in twenty fourteen that
361
00:30:46.960 --> 00:30:51.839
I had mentioned, you know, we ran mock trials and
362
00:30:54.279 --> 00:30:57.680
we were able to see how the juror the mock
363
00:30:57.799 --> 00:31:03.759
jurors were evaluated the cases, and they were a real
364
00:31:03.799 --> 00:31:06.200
eye opener. The stuff we were listening to were real
365
00:31:06.240 --> 00:31:11.880
eye openers. But we didn't have that back in the
366
00:31:11.920 --> 00:31:14.079
nineteen eighties or even for most of the I think
367
00:31:14.119 --> 00:31:18.359
of the nineteen nineties. So it's it's a very very
368
00:31:18.359 --> 00:31:21.599
different it's a very very different environment now than it
369
00:31:21.759 --> 00:31:28.240
was back then. And I think we're we're about to enter.
370
00:31:28.400 --> 00:31:30.920
I think we're in on the on the threshold of
371
00:31:31.119 --> 00:31:38.519
entering an entirely new environment, for example, with AI and
372
00:31:38.599 --> 00:31:45.880
how that's going to impact accident investigations, accident reconstruction, what
373
00:31:45.960 --> 00:31:51.079
experts do. And you know, I think ten years from now,
374
00:31:51.640 --> 00:31:53.839
we might we might be saying this is a whole
375
00:31:53.880 --> 00:31:57.240
new ballgame compared to you know, twenty twenty six.
376
00:31:58.200 --> 00:32:01.480
Well, you know what our jury research was in American
377
00:32:01.519 --> 00:32:05.400
Airlines nine to sixty five, the Kelly Columbia nineteen ninety
378
00:32:05.480 --> 00:32:11.000
five accident. Our jury research was ten exemplar trials that
379
00:32:11.200 --> 00:32:14.599
the jury trials that the judge ordered. Each side picked
380
00:32:14.640 --> 00:32:22.359
five exemplar plaintiffs and we tried ten exemplar cases to
381
00:32:22.400 --> 00:32:27.720
see what a Miami jury would award. And it got
382
00:32:27.759 --> 00:32:33.039
those cases quickly settled because the fancy New York lawyers
383
00:32:33.279 --> 00:32:39.200
for the plaintiffs thought the cases had more value than
384
00:32:39.240 --> 00:32:41.480
they did, and they thought of Miami jury was going
385
00:32:41.519 --> 00:32:44.759
to be very generous, and they weren't. And we even
386
00:32:44.799 --> 00:32:47.279
got a defense verdict on one of them, which is
387
00:32:47.319 --> 00:32:52.960
a whole nother story. But those were damages only where
388
00:32:52.960 --> 00:32:58.359
we did not contest liability to give you, and I
389
00:32:58.359 --> 00:33:02.079
think it's fair to say that jury verdicts have gotten
390
00:33:02.319 --> 00:33:08.440
bigger since the eighties and nineties for everything. But I'll
391
00:33:08.440 --> 00:33:13.920
give you a test here. There was, and you probably
392
00:33:13.960 --> 00:33:16.279
remember the name. We're not going to mention the name
393
00:33:16.279 --> 00:33:23.559
of the family. There was a ground fatality case in
394
00:33:23.680 --> 00:33:31.359
the Kenner, Louisiana accident. Husband lost his wife and three children.
395
00:33:31.720 --> 00:33:37.480
His whole family were destroyed, his house was destroyed, and
396
00:33:37.519 --> 00:33:40.680
they were killed when he went out to get an
397
00:33:40.680 --> 00:33:45.759
aspirant at the local convenience store. What do you think
398
00:33:45.960 --> 00:33:50.400
if you recall the jury returned in federal court in
399
00:33:50.480 --> 00:33:54.519
New Orleans and probably nineteen eighty four for that loss
400
00:33:54.960 --> 00:33:56.240
his entire family.
401
00:33:57.480 --> 00:34:00.960
Well, I remember that. I remember that case, but I
402
00:34:01.359 --> 00:34:06.480
don't remember the The verdict numbers.
403
00:34:05.960 --> 00:34:10.880
One dollars, right, it's shocking.
404
00:34:11.639 --> 00:34:15.719
Now, it certainly, yeah, right now it seems shocking.
405
00:34:16.480 --> 00:34:19.199
And even taking into account inflation and all of that.
406
00:34:20.119 --> 00:34:23.039
And and and then there's the I think we've we've
407
00:34:23.079 --> 00:34:32.480
discussed often your boss at US Aviation Underwriters, who was
408
00:34:32.559 --> 00:34:42.000
on a PBS documentary in nineteen eighty three called Frontline,
409
00:34:42.119 --> 00:34:45.800
and they're still doing the front Lines. But there was
410
00:34:45.800 --> 00:34:51.519
a segment on there and it was a the father
411
00:34:51.760 --> 00:34:59.000
of a deceased ground fatality, a little girl, and there
412
00:34:59.159 --> 00:35:07.639
was a sad story that the gentleman told that he
413
00:35:07.719 --> 00:35:11.960
thought the insurer was nice and they were getting along
414
00:35:12.039 --> 00:35:16.199
until they offered not enough money for the death of
415
00:35:16.280 --> 00:35:22.239
his daughter. And he claimed that the senior VP for
416
00:35:22.400 --> 00:35:26.840
the insurer told him that miners just aren't worth that
417
00:35:27.039 --> 00:35:32.440
much in Louisiana. And in fact that may not have
418
00:35:32.719 --> 00:35:37.679
been how it was phrased, but that was the truth
419
00:35:38.199 --> 00:35:43.960
in Louisiana. The highest award that the Supreme Court in
420
00:35:44.039 --> 00:35:49.880
Louisiana would award would affirm in the mid eighties for
421
00:35:50.079 --> 00:35:55.800
a minor was wait for it, about one hundred and
422
00:35:55.840 --> 00:36:02.000
seventy five thousand dollars. That was a bone of contention.
423
00:36:03.840 --> 00:36:11.079
And we know now that you would never ever see
424
00:36:11.199 --> 00:36:18.760
that kind of cap on a miners for a miner's death.
425
00:36:19.199 --> 00:36:23.079
But it just it was a different time. Things were
426
00:36:24.920 --> 00:36:29.920
the verdicts were lower, the courts were more conservative about
427
00:36:29.920 --> 00:36:37.599
what they would informally cap out awards at. And now
428
00:36:37.679 --> 00:36:41.880
we've got the story of nuclear verdicts and that combined
429
00:36:41.920 --> 00:36:46.360
with an aviation accident, just by it being associated with
430
00:36:46.400 --> 00:36:53.639
an airplane, seems to make the numbers, let's put it
431
00:36:53.679 --> 00:36:56.719
this way, exponentially more than they were in the.
432
00:36:56.719 --> 00:37:00.599
Eighties, right, And I have to believe and you would
433
00:37:00.679 --> 00:37:03.239
know this better than I do now, but you know
434
00:37:03.320 --> 00:37:05.880
I was obviously involved in it years ago, and that
435
00:37:06.000 --> 00:37:09.239
has to go into the insurer's decision on how to
436
00:37:09.599 --> 00:37:11.119
how to set reserves.
437
00:37:12.280 --> 00:37:17.000
And I think, I think, and we've had some discussions
438
00:37:17.000 --> 00:37:22.920
over the weeks on this, we are lacking and in
439
00:37:24.719 --> 00:37:32.880
a defense bar for the aviation community that lacks mass
440
00:37:33.320 --> 00:37:41.480
disaster aviation experience, they are our bar currently is very
441
00:37:41.519 --> 00:37:46.920
skilled in aviation, general aviation products, liability, one off kind
442
00:37:46.960 --> 00:37:52.119
of things. But we just don't have the depth of
443
00:37:52.239 --> 00:37:58.320
experience and knowledge of how to manage and value a
444
00:38:00.360 --> 00:38:06.480
mass disaster aviation loss. We don't have it, and there's
445
00:38:06.519 --> 00:38:11.039
some except for you, of course, naturally, right right, You're
446
00:38:11.119 --> 00:38:14.679
the only one that has that experience. But it requires
447
00:38:14.679 --> 00:38:20.559
someone who did this kind of work when planes were
448
00:38:20.639 --> 00:38:23.159
dropping out of the air like crazy, and it's not
449
00:38:23.280 --> 00:38:28.840
like it just started in the eighties and nineties. Sixties
450
00:38:28.880 --> 00:38:34.519
and seventies were dreadful, and I think you had a
451
00:38:34.639 --> 00:38:39.199
pretty good knowledge walking into US aviation when you did
452
00:38:39.239 --> 00:38:45.480
in nineteen eighty of the tenor Reef disaster. What was
453
00:38:45.519 --> 00:38:47.559
the fatality count on that one?
454
00:38:49.079 --> 00:38:51.599
My recollection was over over five hundred and it was
455
00:38:52.559 --> 00:38:57.320
a runway collision between a pan M and a KLM
456
00:38:57.400 --> 00:38:58.360
seven forty seven.
457
00:39:00.039 --> 00:39:03.719
Can you imagine having to manage manage that now with
458
00:39:04.199 --> 00:39:06.199
zero experience?
459
00:39:06.519 --> 00:39:11.079
And I guess, I guess the the flip side is
460
00:39:11.119 --> 00:39:14.119
that you know, it's a good thing that sure there
461
00:39:14.360 --> 00:39:17.480
there there aren't a lot of attorneys out there who
462
00:39:18.079 --> 00:39:21.760
who have that depth of experience, because it means that
463
00:39:21.800 --> 00:39:25.360
the system is so much safer than it was back then.
464
00:39:26.400 --> 00:39:29.519
You know, there isn't a need for for that kind
465
00:39:29.559 --> 00:39:30.800
of experience, and.
466
00:39:32.280 --> 00:39:36.639
The volume of litigation certainly has has been reduced that that.
467
00:39:36.639 --> 00:39:44.119
That's right, But I don't think that we should equate
468
00:39:45.880 --> 00:39:51.039
general aviation experience with mass toward experience.
469
00:39:51.239 --> 00:39:52.599
Yeah, I would agree with that.
470
00:39:53.679 --> 00:39:56.800
Do you do you think and this was a trend
471
00:39:56.960 --> 00:40:01.559
in the eighties and nineties h the airlines generally and
472
00:40:01.599 --> 00:40:05.599
their insurers were not contesting liability. Do you think that's
473
00:40:05.760 --> 00:40:08.679
that would continue now? Because I see I think there's
474
00:40:08.880 --> 00:40:12.679
liability contested in the American Eagle accident. Am I correct?
475
00:40:12.760 --> 00:40:13.400
If you know?
476
00:40:14.039 --> 00:40:16.599
I don't. I don't know. I'm not working on that,
477
00:40:18.440 --> 00:40:20.559
so I couldn't say I.
478
00:40:20.960 --> 00:40:25.199
Know that the finger has been pointed to the government
479
00:40:25.199 --> 00:40:29.000
of the military. So I don't know. And someone who's
480
00:40:29.039 --> 00:40:34.079
listening to this podcast probably knows more than I. But
481
00:40:34.199 --> 00:40:38.239
one of the one of the strategies was not to
482
00:40:38.320 --> 00:40:44.960
contest liability and to try cases on damages only. And oftentimes,
483
00:40:45.639 --> 00:40:50.000
when you take out the drama of how the accident
484
00:40:50.119 --> 00:40:54.480
happened and why it happened with multiple defendants pointing the
485
00:40:54.559 --> 00:41:01.920
fingers at each other, the verdict may be lower just
486
00:41:01.960 --> 00:41:06.679
because you don't have the drama of the of the
487
00:41:06.760 --> 00:41:07.719
accident itself.
488
00:41:07.960 --> 00:41:11.920
And you're, well, you know, I can't say what's going
489
00:41:11.960 --> 00:41:14.000
on in the American airal ancilty. I have no idea
490
00:41:14.039 --> 00:41:17.440
what's going on in that litigation. I just I just
491
00:41:17.599 --> 00:41:23.440
know that in the cases that I worked on years ago,
492
00:41:25.360 --> 00:41:28.639
there was no finger pointing, at least not in court.
493
00:41:30.360 --> 00:41:38.519
You know, the potential defendants AH would reach agreements on
494
00:41:38.519 --> 00:41:42.639
on on on how damages would ultimately be be split.
495
00:41:43.480 --> 00:41:48.480
But I'm hard pressed to think of any major disaster
496
00:41:49.760 --> 00:41:51.920
that I, at least that that I was involved in
497
00:41:52.760 --> 00:41:58.039
where the defendants were pointing fingers at each other in
498
00:41:58.119 --> 00:42:03.559
open court. Yeah. And and then the obvious reason, and
499
00:42:03.559 --> 00:42:06.639
and that's still my philosophy. The obvious reason is that
500
00:42:06.719 --> 00:42:09.800
it only inure us to the benefit of of of
501
00:42:09.800 --> 00:42:12.079
of the planets, and it inflates the value of the case.
502
00:42:12.800 --> 00:42:18.320
Sure, And I think there was a different environment in
503
00:42:18.400 --> 00:42:23.559
the eighties and early nineties when it comes to this
504
00:42:23.639 --> 00:42:31.360
is a bad word solicitation, uh and PLAINUS lawyers trying
505
00:42:31.400 --> 00:42:35.719
to get get as many claims in their portfolio as
506
00:42:35.719 --> 00:42:38.480
they could after an accident in any way that they could.
507
00:42:39.880 --> 00:42:42.760
There was a race. There was There was a race
508
00:42:42.920 --> 00:42:46.920
to be the first to file and to be able
509
00:42:46.920 --> 00:42:51.199
to stand on the courthouse steps with the news cameras
510
00:42:51.199 --> 00:42:53.920
around you saying, you know, we we you know, two
511
00:42:53.960 --> 00:42:56.320
days after the accident, we just we just filed on
512
00:42:56.400 --> 00:42:57.559
behalf of this family.
513
00:43:00.519 --> 00:43:00.679
You know.
514
00:43:00.840 --> 00:43:03.840
There was a feeling amongst some Planet's attorneys that that was,
515
00:43:04.719 --> 00:43:06.639
you know, beneficial to them in the long.
516
00:43:06.559 --> 00:43:11.639
Run, and the more claims that they collected, the better
517
00:43:11.760 --> 00:43:13.960
chance they would have to be on the plane of
518
00:43:13.960 --> 00:43:22.119
Steering committee, multi multi district litigation that had a monetary
519
00:43:22.199 --> 00:43:27.079
value to them as well. But it seems like that
520
00:43:27.239 --> 00:43:32.920
had the focus. That kind of solicitation seems to have waned,
521
00:43:33.360 --> 00:43:39.639
especially after the nineteen ninety six Air Disaster and Family
522
00:43:39.679 --> 00:43:44.800
Assistant Assistants Act, where they pretty much federal government barred
523
00:43:46.280 --> 00:43:51.320
solicitation for forty five days and that included communications from
524
00:43:51.400 --> 00:43:55.800
the insubar or airline to the next of kin.
525
00:43:56.559 --> 00:43:59.559
I think, yeah, I think I think that's true. And
526
00:43:59.599 --> 00:44:05.880
I think that Planet's attorneys, good Planets attorneys in general,
527
00:44:06.360 --> 00:44:10.719
who don't who aren't part of the legacy Planeoff's aviation
528
00:44:10.920 --> 00:44:14.760
bar I think are are are far more sophisticated today
529
00:44:15.400 --> 00:44:18.519
than they were back then and are way less likely
530
00:44:20.679 --> 00:44:26.320
to simply refer cases that might come in the door
531
00:44:27.599 --> 00:44:34.360
out to the better known, longstanding plaintiff aviation firms. I
532
00:44:34.400 --> 00:44:39.000
think I think there are more individual plainoff lawyers out
533
00:44:39.039 --> 00:44:47.280
there today who correctly recognize that there's no great magic
534
00:44:47.320 --> 00:44:53.440
to handling these cases and uh, and there's no reason
535
00:44:53.480 --> 00:44:57.440
to refer them out, and they can they can handle
536
00:44:57.440 --> 00:44:59.480
them perfectly well on their own.
537
00:45:01.280 --> 00:45:08.440
But there was a especially when air disasters were so
538
00:45:08.599 --> 00:45:15.920
frequent and you had so much litigation with regular opposing counsel,
539
00:45:16.800 --> 00:45:19.840
there was a and i'll go out on the limit
540
00:45:19.960 --> 00:45:22.599
say the element of collegiality.
541
00:45:23.440 --> 00:45:25.719
And there's still an question about it. Yeah, I think
542
00:45:25.719 --> 00:45:28.800
I think that's that's definitely true. Certainly back then there was.
543
00:45:30.559 --> 00:45:34.960
It was we were frequent flyers, no pun intended, and
544
00:45:35.320 --> 00:45:41.400
we knew each other and maybe I think we got
545
00:45:41.480 --> 00:45:46.639
business taken care of in terms of settlements. H And
546
00:45:46.679 --> 00:45:52.880
there was not a lot of fights that were not
547
00:45:54.440 --> 00:45:59.800
legitimate fight, I guess is what I'm saying. The the
548
00:46:00.440 --> 00:46:05.920
the fights were on substance the law, And you know,
549
00:46:06.719 --> 00:46:10.360
I think lawyers may lack now and maybe I'm sounding
550
00:46:10.440 --> 00:46:23.960
like an very geriatric kind of lawyer. Warsaw Convention, Montreal Convention,
551
00:46:24.840 --> 00:46:28.199
Death on the High Seas Act, all kinds of treaties,
552
00:46:28.599 --> 00:46:34.960
choice of law. This was all regular routine work that
553
00:46:35.000 --> 00:46:39.320
you did every day. And I'm not sure we have
554
00:46:39.599 --> 00:46:46.440
that depth of experience in plain or defense bar. Now
555
00:46:46.480 --> 00:46:51.880
there's some, but when you have the volume of say,
556
00:46:52.039 --> 00:47:02.440
choice of law and forum non convenience, you learn a
557
00:47:02.480 --> 00:47:11.159
lot more than I think is evident now in a
558
00:47:11.280 --> 00:47:15.440
bar that has not had that eighties and nineties volume
559
00:47:16.159 --> 00:47:18.920
of experience. Not to say they can't do it and
560
00:47:19.000 --> 00:47:25.880
don't do it, but it was just so prevalent. We
561
00:47:26.039 --> 00:47:29.480
just did it every day. I was one of the
562
00:47:29.639 --> 00:47:32.360
lawyers that happened to like choice of law. I thought
563
00:47:32.400 --> 00:47:36.440
it was fun and interesting and we'll always remember the
564
00:47:36.519 --> 00:47:43.360
significant relationships test on case after case after case, you know,
565
00:47:43.440 --> 00:47:46.880
we had, and I don't think we've had anything like
566
00:47:46.960 --> 00:47:51.920
this in recent years. One of the things that I
567
00:47:52.039 --> 00:47:58.039
was working on in New Orleans, we're over two hundred
568
00:47:58.320 --> 00:48:05.280
ground property damn and mental anguish cases, and I'm talking
569
00:48:05.320 --> 00:48:10.239
about people that were near the accident and claimed mental
570
00:48:10.280 --> 00:48:15.599
anguish because they thought it could have been them, or
571
00:48:15.639 --> 00:48:19.920
they were worried that someone they knew might have been injured.
572
00:48:21.960 --> 00:48:24.280
Or we had the people claiming that the crack and
573
00:48:24.360 --> 00:48:28.880
their driveway four blocks from the accident, or their sheet
574
00:48:28.960 --> 00:48:33.119
rock was caused by the vibration from the impact of
575
00:48:33.159 --> 00:48:40.880
the plane crash. Those were extremely interesting claims, and that
576
00:48:40.960 --> 00:48:46.599
also includes first responders who claimed mental anguish. Those were
577
00:48:46.599 --> 00:48:50.599
all dismissed at the trial level.
578
00:48:54.400 --> 00:48:59.000
But well, look, I don't I think I can say
579
00:48:59.039 --> 00:49:04.360
that after more than forty years of doing this, it's
580
00:49:04.360 --> 00:49:08.920
an extremely interesting area of the law, and you know,
581
00:49:09.159 --> 00:49:13.039
I feel very fortunate to have spent the bulk of
582
00:49:13.079 --> 00:49:15.599
my career working on it.
583
00:49:17.280 --> 00:49:23.159
Did you, And we'll get personal now, what was your
584
00:49:23.280 --> 00:49:27.119
introduction to aviation? How did you get into it? Because
585
00:49:27.480 --> 00:49:29.480
I don't know. In high school, were you thinking I
586
00:49:29.519 --> 00:49:31.159
really want to be an aviation lawyer?
587
00:49:31.840 --> 00:49:34.280
No, it was just it was just, you know, pure,
588
00:49:34.800 --> 00:49:38.199
pure chance. When I was a first year law student
589
00:49:38.760 --> 00:49:43.800
at Saint John's in nineteen seventy eight seventy nine, the
590
00:49:43.840 --> 00:49:49.840
school allowed you to take one two credit elective and
591
00:49:50.559 --> 00:49:55.519
they were offering a course in aviation law, which sounded
592
00:49:55.679 --> 00:50:00.000
interesting in my mind. Everyone else was taking family law,
593
00:50:00.079 --> 00:50:04.679
which seemed way more useful. So I took aviation law,
594
00:50:05.320 --> 00:50:10.679
and the school also had an alumni counseling program where
595
00:50:11.360 --> 00:50:15.599
they would match you up with somebody in the field
596
00:50:15.800 --> 00:50:20.559
who an alumnus, and I just happened to get matched
597
00:50:20.639 --> 00:50:25.559
up with John Brennan, the CEO at the time of
598
00:50:25.800 --> 00:50:30.119
US Aviation Underwriters, who invited me over to his office
599
00:50:30.159 --> 00:50:33.840
and gave me the whole morning to talk about the field,
600
00:50:34.320 --> 00:50:39.519
and it piqued my interest, and then after graduation I
601
00:50:39.599 --> 00:50:43.920
went to work for them. So it was just dumb
602
00:50:44.039 --> 00:50:48.960
luck and it worked out well. It completely set me
603
00:50:49.000 --> 00:50:50.599
in that in this direction in my career.
604
00:50:53.840 --> 00:50:59.440
I had not a similar story. I was working as
605
00:50:59.480 --> 00:51:03.280
a summer associate at the law firm in New Orleans
606
00:51:03.960 --> 00:51:11.639
and working on really not interesting stuff like trucking accidents
607
00:51:11.679 --> 00:51:16.199
and July nine, nineteen eighty two, I'm going home from
608
00:51:16.360 --> 00:51:19.960
one Shell Square in downtown New Orleans for Friday afternoon
609
00:51:20.440 --> 00:51:24.440
the weekend, and long before the Internet, long before email,
610
00:51:24.559 --> 00:51:28.119
long before cell phones, it was all word of mouth.
611
00:51:28.199 --> 00:51:31.679
And someone in the elevator said, did you hear about
612
00:51:31.679 --> 00:51:38.800
the plane crash? And I'm kind of interested? Then say
613
00:51:38.840 --> 00:51:45.679
what happened? Not sure it was at the airport, and Kenner.
614
00:51:46.400 --> 00:51:52.400
I said, I remember the stupid response I gave at
615
00:51:52.400 --> 00:51:55.880
that time as a young twenty four year old. Was
616
00:51:55.920 --> 00:52:00.639
there any loss of life? And I think They said
617
00:52:00.960 --> 00:52:04.559
I think so, and just vague, vague information. So I
618
00:52:04.599 --> 00:52:07.519
go home, turn on the TV and it's live while
619
00:52:07.559 --> 00:52:11.920
the wall coverage back then as best they could do
620
00:52:12.000 --> 00:52:15.800
with the technology they had back then, and I watched
621
00:52:15.840 --> 00:52:19.960
it for the entire weekend. Then went to work on
622
00:52:20.039 --> 00:52:24.440
Monday morning and there were paper memos on her desk.
623
00:52:25.119 --> 00:52:28.440
I had a cubicle and it said that the firm
624
00:52:28.519 --> 00:52:33.039
had been assigned the defense of pan Am and it's
625
00:52:33.239 --> 00:52:41.880
insure US Aviation underwriters. And something clicked in my head
626
00:52:41.920 --> 00:52:44.679
at that time. I guess maybe I wasn't thrilled with
627
00:52:44.800 --> 00:52:51.079
working on trucking accidents. And I went to somebody and
628
00:52:51.119 --> 00:52:55.000
I said, I want to volunteer to work on this accident,
629
00:52:55.760 --> 00:53:00.360
and they said sure. Much to my surprise, it was
630
00:53:00.440 --> 00:53:03.880
all hands on deck. It was a sixty lawyer firm.
631
00:53:04.239 --> 00:53:07.400
There were one hundred and sixty deaths, there were burn cases.
632
00:53:07.880 --> 00:53:13.400
They needed every able body to work on it. And
633
00:53:13.519 --> 00:53:19.599
I jumped into it and here we are, yeah, here
634
00:53:19.599 --> 00:53:25.239
we are, yeah, And you know the listeners should know
635
00:53:25.719 --> 00:53:31.039
that that is how I met you. That's right, you were.
636
00:53:32.920 --> 00:53:35.880
I think we're we can both count ourselves as being
637
00:53:35.960 --> 00:53:39.360
very fortunate in how things turned out.
638
00:53:40.559 --> 00:53:46.239
Indeed, and I'm still passionate about it. I got less
639
00:53:46.239 --> 00:53:52.719
passionate about being a full time partner litigator and a
640
00:53:52.719 --> 00:53:59.320
big law firm by twenty eighteen. Jumped over to Great
641
00:53:59.360 --> 00:54:04.880
American AH to do the claims side of it on
642
00:54:04.920 --> 00:54:12.639
the insurance level. And that's a whole different perspective of
643
00:54:12.639 --> 00:54:16.719
of aviation law when you see it from the insurer's perspective.
644
00:54:18.159 --> 00:54:25.400
But I feel like today's today's generation, I gotta hate
645
00:54:25.400 --> 00:54:32.360
saying that millennials and gen z who hear about a
646
00:54:32.360 --> 00:54:38.239
plane accident now, it is so astonishing that something like
647
00:54:38.280 --> 00:54:42.639
that happens now, and we're very fortunate that.
648
00:54:42.480 --> 00:54:43.119
That is a.
649
00:54:45.039 --> 00:54:50.119
That is the exception to the rule. But the frequency
650
00:54:50.199 --> 00:54:56.159
of accidents was fatality accidents, I think that I think
651
00:54:56.159 --> 00:55:01.239
I saw a number one one every one point six
652
00:55:01.320 --> 00:55:05.199
months or something like that in the eighties and nineties,
653
00:55:06.840 --> 00:55:12.719
and then your catastrophic I think you had about fifteen
654
00:55:13.760 --> 00:55:18.199
or sixteen in each decade. So it was it was very,
655
00:55:18.360 --> 00:55:23.960
very common, and the frightening thing is that if I
656
00:55:24.119 --> 00:55:30.000
throw out a flight number to someone like you who
657
00:55:30.239 --> 00:55:33.840
did this work in the eighties and nineties, I bet
658
00:55:33.920 --> 00:55:34.840
you'll remember it.
659
00:55:36.079 --> 00:55:38.559
Right, don't don't, don't, don't start quiz, don't quiz.
660
00:55:42.239 --> 00:55:46.840
But I'll give you one. Because this was the end
661
00:55:46.880 --> 00:55:49.559
of the eighties United two three to two.
662
00:55:50.400 --> 00:55:55.320
Right, That was Sioux City.
663
00:55:55.559 --> 00:56:03.159
That was that was That was another dramatic, catastrophic accident
664
00:56:03.199 --> 00:56:06.039
that ended up being the subject of movies and books
665
00:56:06.039 --> 00:56:11.599
and plays. And you know, I guess we left out
666
00:56:11.639 --> 00:56:14.559
and we haven't talked about the Miracle on the Hudson,
667
00:56:17.880 --> 00:56:23.239
and and that's in the eighties and nineties. That probably
668
00:56:23.239 --> 00:56:28.679
would have been a bad result, probably, and instead we
669
00:56:28.719 --> 00:56:32.199
have a feel good story. We had no feel good stories.
670
00:56:32.760 --> 00:56:37.679
Now, well, Aloha was well, Aloha was very much a
671
00:56:37.679 --> 00:56:41.800
feel good story because the crew did an absolutely amazing
672
00:56:41.920 --> 00:56:49.960
job landing that that airplane with with that kind of damage.
673
00:56:50.320 --> 00:56:55.760
Yeah, yeah, there was a convertible. Like you said, technology
674
00:56:55.920 --> 00:56:59.760
was limited to get them back back on the ground.
675
00:57:02.199 --> 00:57:07.000
You know Sully Sullenberger, and he was a hero for
676
00:57:07.079 --> 00:57:10.760
the Miracle on the Hudson. But I think even though
677
00:57:10.800 --> 00:57:14.719
there were one hundred and twelve fatalities on United two
678
00:57:14.880 --> 00:57:19.320
thirty two. That captain who has since passed away, was
679
00:57:19.360 --> 00:57:22.800
an absolute hero as a first officer.
680
00:57:23.159 --> 00:57:24.880
Yeah, I agree.
681
00:57:25.360 --> 00:57:28.840
I mean to navigate, to get your airplane on the
682
00:57:28.840 --> 00:57:37.760
ground with zero hydraulics is another miracle. And you know,
683
00:57:37.880 --> 00:57:42.840
but it ended up in giant litigation and that was
684
00:57:44.000 --> 00:57:47.559
That was eighty nine and there were still plenty more
685
00:57:47.599 --> 00:57:49.679
to come in the nineties.
686
00:57:51.159 --> 00:57:55.000
So Sky, it looked like you were trying to jump
687
00:57:55.079 --> 00:57:55.480
in there.
688
00:57:56.280 --> 00:57:56.320
No.
689
00:57:56.480 --> 00:57:58.000
I was just gonna say, this has been a wonderful
690
00:57:58.159 --> 00:58:01.679
conversation and I'm sure all listeners will really enjoy it.
691
00:58:01.840 --> 00:58:04.159
It definitely makes me very happy to live as a
692
00:58:04.159 --> 00:58:05.840
member of the flying public in.
693
00:58:05.760 --> 00:58:07.000
The era that we do.
694
00:58:07.320 --> 00:58:10.360
It seems like there's been a significant change in attitude.
695
00:58:11.760 --> 00:58:13.559
Just briefly before we end here.
696
00:58:14.400 --> 00:58:16.480
What would you say is the biggest change from the
697
00:58:16.519 --> 00:58:21.639
industry perspective as the attitude towards I guess technology and
698
00:58:22.039 --> 00:58:23.440
just safety generally.
699
00:58:23.920 --> 00:58:28.800
I would I would say, and it's a pretty general
700
00:58:28.840 --> 00:58:35.880
comment that lessons are learned after every accident, and the
701
00:58:36.000 --> 00:58:40.119
lessons that are learned are then implemented in terms of
702
00:58:40.159 --> 00:58:43.360
safety in the industry. And I think a lot of
703
00:58:43.440 --> 00:58:45.760
lessons have been learned over the years, and I think
704
00:58:45.880 --> 00:58:50.360
that largely accounts for why the system is just so safe.
705
00:58:50.400 --> 00:58:56.199
Now. Well, let's not discount technology too well.
706
00:58:56.079 --> 00:58:59.760
That's yes, okay, yeah, abantics are much better.
707
00:59:01.519 --> 00:59:04.440
We had wind shear after wind shaar accident going back
708
00:59:04.440 --> 00:59:10.000
into the seventies and beyond the eighties, and now we
709
00:59:10.119 --> 00:59:17.719
have mandated Doppler radar on aircraft and wind shear detection,
710
00:59:19.000 --> 00:59:23.320
low level wind share detection at airports or mandatory. We've
711
00:59:23.360 --> 00:59:28.440
got cockpit or crew resource management that has changed the
712
00:59:28.519 --> 00:59:36.079
dynamics of what happens in the cockpit and the interaction
713
00:59:36.239 --> 00:59:42.199
between the crew on the flight deck. I could go
714
00:59:42.840 --> 00:59:48.719
on and on with the safety improvements that we've had.
715
00:59:48.960 --> 00:59:51.440
Right, but I guess my point is that these are
716
00:59:51.920 --> 00:59:54.119
these are the results of the lessons that were learned
717
00:59:54.119 --> 00:59:55.559
from prior accidents.
718
00:59:56.599 --> 01:00:00.760
Always, always, and usually it's not as they say, it's
719
01:00:00.760 --> 01:00:07.559
not just one reason why an accident occurred. And the
720
01:00:07.639 --> 01:00:12.360
NTSB makes its recommendations and the FAA does or does
721
01:00:12.400 --> 01:00:19.559
not adopt or those those recommendations. But the reasons for
722
01:00:20.199 --> 01:00:23.920
accidents in the eighties and nineties there were they were
723
01:00:23.960 --> 01:00:29.559
repetitive reasons. We even had you know, mid air collisions
724
01:00:29.840 --> 01:00:33.920
or or collisions on the ground that should never happen
725
01:00:34.440 --> 01:00:39.159
or should just happened in Washington with American Eagle and
726
01:00:39.199 --> 01:00:47.760
the helicopter, but they have done a remarkable job over
727
01:00:47.800 --> 01:00:54.639
the years with just a volume of accidents in the
728
01:00:54.719 --> 01:01:00.599
eighties and nineties that just I think mandated outrage and improvement.
729
01:01:01.280 --> 01:01:04.519
And we have we have gotten there. There's still some
730
01:01:04.559 --> 01:01:11.760
weak points in the system, but the truth is this
731
01:01:11.960 --> 01:01:15.719
is the safest part of your journey ye on on
732
01:01:15.960 --> 01:01:20.000
the airplane and not on the freeway in Los Angeles.
733
01:01:20.800 --> 01:01:24.960
Right, So, Sky, I hope that answered your question.
734
01:01:25.440 --> 01:01:27.000
It did well, all right, and Eman, this has been
735
01:01:27.000 --> 01:01:30.679
an excellent conversation. Thank you both very very much for
736
01:01:30.719 --> 01:01:32.920
all your time and preparing for this and for all
737
01:01:32.960 --> 01:01:36.960
your insights. It's been a pleasure and appreciate all your
738
01:01:36.960 --> 01:01:37.480
help and time.
739
01:01:37.920 --> 01:01:40.599
Thanks very much. It's really been really enjoyable. Appreciate it.
740
01:01:41.119 --> 01:01:43.719
We enjoy it. My wife doesn't like talking about anything
741
01:01:43.760 --> 01:01:47.400
that we just talked about, so we'll leave it at that,
742
01:01:47.559 --> 01:01:49.679
and she will not be listening to the podcast.
743
01:01:50.440 --> 01:01:51.679
I Well, thank you everyone.
744
01:02:02.199 --> 01:02:05.360
A pot pu