Identity (Cont’d)

Tying up some loose ends….

In this episode, host Dr. Laurance Splitter provides further clarification of the concept of quantitative, or strict, identity. Objects and people can and do change – we call this “qualitative change” – but such change makes sense only on the assumption that the objects in question remain “the same objects”, i.e. literally identical. We see this idea in such intuitive examples as “That individual was slim and healthy 20 years ago, but is now overweight and unwell”. This point applies both to people (or human beings) and objects. In simple logical terms, quantitative identity is involved whenever we pick out or refer to something or someone, while qualitative identity (or similarity) is about properties or characteristics that the objects picked out have in common. Logically and grammatically, words or phrases that perform the latter function are called “predicates”.

However, even the simple act of picking something out has a conceptual component, because we assume that the object picked out is of a certain kind. So, While specifying and defining such kinds is not always a trivial matter, we need to do this, otherwise we would have no basis on which to assert that the object in question continues to exist (albeit through qualitative change) or ceases to exist. The oak tree survives being lopped, or losing its leaves, but not being chopped down and turned into firewood. The same holds when the object is a person or human being, although there is a long-standing dispute about which of these classifications, if either, matches the kind of individual that we each are. This dispute bears on another fundamental question about our own identities: are our existence and identity a purely physical matter, or do they have a psychological component (such as consciousness, in John Locke’s terms)?

Noting that words standing for kinds are, themselves, predicates, Laurance explains that like all predicates, we normally take for granted that more than one object or person will belong to a given kind, which he summarizes by claiming that when we refer to something – i.e. one particular individual – we are assuming that that individual is one among others, i.e. one among others of the same kind. When the kind in question includes such individuals as you and me, we can add that regarding ourselves and one another as persons involves being aware of ourselves as one among others. Arguably, no other object has this level of awareness. While this sophisticated attribute is one that distinguishes us from non persons (language might be another), it also confirms our status as moral beings who can be held responsible and accountable for their actions. This point is in line with the long-standing historical claim that morality and personhood go together (although we are left with questions about the moral status of a human fetus or someone with severe dementia, on the one hand, and higher mammals, aliens and, needless to say, AI, on the other).

Laurance then points out that regarding ourselves as one among others – i.e. any others – offers a relational perspective on who we are, that avoids the extremes of individualism and collectivism, as previously described. Freed from the hopeless task of trying to find those specific qualities that define persons uniquely by grouping them with others, each of us is who we are for as long as we exist. And we can, at least to an extent, view the qualitative changes that we undergo – whether by choice or otherwise – with a sense of equanimity, because none of them defines us.

Laurance then offers a suggestion about how we might interpret the concept of social identity, once we accept that our own individual identities are not given in social – i.e. qualitative – terms. He also expresses some residual doubt that the deeper questions about our own status as persons have been completely answered. Does my understanding of my own subjective awareness allow me to perceive or experience myself actually engaged in the process of picking something out? Might I still demand to “see” this self which is consciously making decisions and choices based on such psychological factors as my beliefs, my desires, and my intentions?

Finally, Laurance looks at the challenges confronting those whose “tribal” convictions prevent them from acknowledging that those with whom they disagree on fundamental issues are, indeed, persons and deserve to be treated as such. 

Connect with Dr. Laurance Splitter: LinkedIn