Black Triangles, Pilot Reports & the Search for UAP Evidence | JMill & Ryan Graves

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I have a case of a 737 crew having a nose

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and nose past 200ft with a black triangle.

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This one had almost like a glowing
like orange

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golden plasma field on the bottom,
as if almost.

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It was like reentering,
you know, from space.

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Numerous commercial pilots
have had very close near-misses

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with black triangles
in the past 8 or 10 years.

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But we're all in this together
to try to successfully pursue the unknown.

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We that's the assignment is to continue
to explore that space, maintaining an open

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mind of what could be, maybe
while also a reservation of judgment.

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And the focus
was not on little green men, or

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like future humans, or just the
US military or something like that.

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We weren't there two point fingers
it was to figure out what it is. I

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can't make sense of it yet, but all I know
is something remarkable is happening.

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Welcome to the Safe Aerospace podcast.

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My name is Ryan Graves.

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Today I'm joined by Jonathan Miller,
who goes by Jamil.

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He's been helping us out at Americans
for Safe Aerospace.

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For what, about maybe a year and a half
now or so?

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Yeah.

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He's been doing some really good work

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on the UAP
topic at MIT in his professional life.

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And we're going to talk about that.

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We're going to talk about

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what he's been doing to help Eisa out,
specifically in the organization.

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And then we're going to swap roles.

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Jameel is going to ask me some questions,

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and we're going to get into a conversation
about

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what's been happening at ASU
over the past, gosh,

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three years now since the hearing,
what we're building

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and how we're doing it
and how you can help.

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So I think this would be
a good opportunity

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to kind of catch everyone up
to what we've been doing and show you guys

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why we're so excited
about what we're doing.

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Thanks for coming down the awesome Jameel.

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Thanks so much. Yeah.

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Why don't we kick it off with just
a little background about yourself?

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And in addition to,
of course, your credentials

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and your professional background,
what brought you into a as well?

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Sure. Well, it's it's an honor to be here.

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And it's super exciting to be able to
to help kick off

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Americans for Safe Aerospace podcast.

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It's a fascinating organization,
and we've been really growing

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under your leadership.

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It's been a magnet for a lot of us.

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And and in my particular story,
I had reached out to you some time ago

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about saying, okay, I've got

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multiple sort of skills and interests
and how might I be able to help.

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And we were able to to get where
developing

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what we'll talk about later
on like a membership program,

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a lot of technical work at Cetera
to help the exploration of unidentified

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anomalous phenomena from my professional
and personal interests.

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Certainly interested in the field
of what we now call UAP

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sort of adjacent, kind of mysterious
and almost areas for a long time.

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But I've been working
as a program engineer at MIT,

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and as well as doing

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substantial work in the space
of like sort of defense technologies and

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investment in what I would call science
advantaged kinds of companies,

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because to me, that's the best way
that we're able to take what we would call

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yesterday as science fiction to today
start to make it as science fact.

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It takes that that that combination
of science and engineering, business

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and art and everything to be able to,

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to to live in this amazing world
where we have something.

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Here's my prop, you know, that's
that's made of basically like kind of,

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you know, rocks and minerals and stuff
like that and turn it into something

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that is a smartphone that we don't even
have to think about how it works.

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I can really
I can really resonate with that.

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I mean, that's why I wanted to go fly
fighter aircraft, right?

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You guys were taking ideas in the science
fiction realm and turning them

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into a reality in the defense arena, but
I was the one that was right on that edge

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that got to operate those tools,
and that's where I wanted to be.

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That's kind of what set me on this path,
of course, but please continue.

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Oh, it's we are certainly always
surrounded by nowadays

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in the modern world, at least
a substantial amounts of new technologies.

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And it's like, well, you know,
build a technology for technology sake.

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But really to me, it's been so much about,
well, what are the problems?

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Or more like the grand challenges
that we may be able to solve.

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And along the way of sort
of confronting the unknown.

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There's some
sort of happy accidents of discoveries

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like penicillin or something that
that may actually really be super useful.

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We didn't know going forward
exactly what the path should be.

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That's the part of the discovery.

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And so that's led to creation of various
courses, the one that's most, most topical

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being confronting unknowns at MIT,
which we had we conducted in January.

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And you were certainly a key part of that.

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I happen to have as a property
the poster for for that program.

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So and just just so this is you
what what would your title be at MIT

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when you're teaching?

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What's the precise entitle?

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Well, so I'm a lecturer or instructor
or a program

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director
for something like Confronting Unknowns.

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Here's the the problem.

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This is a slightly crinkled,
well-traveled poster from

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from that program that we put together
with the spirit being sensemaking.

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How do we do that?

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That, to me is a a teachable skill.

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And it's you know, since making broadly
and then we start to narrow

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scope on to aerospace as a very critical
kind of like industry or sector,

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and then even,
you know, even use that as the way

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to sort of explore then UAP.

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And so it's, you know, how do we get
better at recognizing that we don't know.

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So this was
this was a three day, two day course.

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Yeah.

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And so who attended this?

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What was kind of the syllabus?
What did you guys talk about?

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So it was a multi-day
sort of intensive workshop, if you will.

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And and the focus was, was not on
especially not on

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is it little green men
or like future humans or just the U.S.

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military or something like that?

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We weren't there to point fingers.

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Fingers.

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It was to build up the the sort of
the intuition and instincts around

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how do various experts in their fields
and domains make sense.

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And so we had speakers and cohort members
who are representing

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not only fine
research institutions like MIT,

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but also folks from the intelligence
community or, say, program directors

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from big aerospace companies
and all walks of life in between there.

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And how do those individuals in technical,
non-technical, misinformation,

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disinformation roles, how
to all of those folks try to make sense

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in their particular fields
and through that learning that

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and that shared sort of vocabulary
development, then we, you know,

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the hypothesis, we may then all be able
to make more sense of UAP

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as a big constellation
of multiple sort of challenges.

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Was there was there an outcome from this
that you're you're targeting what's really

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what's next for this?

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Of course it's it's,
you know, the story is being written.

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And so part of that story
is the imminent release,

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when this episode will air,
will be near the publication of a paper

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that's resulted
and been sort of collaboratively author by

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probably nearly about half of the cohort
members who who stayed on, volunteered

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a lot of time in research to be able
to produce the Confronting Unknowns paper.

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And so that will be likely
the first of a series.

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There's so many different rabbit holes
to be, to be threaded

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to pull from legislation
and policy development to, of course,

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new forms of sensors and
and how might frontier

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artificial intelligence models
and other things be useful to to apply to

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this sort of like weak but very critical
kind of signal that the UAP tends to have.

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So, you know, for
if folks are interested, there's

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running a pleasantly infrequent

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mailing list at, at sensemaking W.T.

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f that is the website. Website.

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No, no. Just sense making TF.

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Yeah. Very cool. Awesome. Yeah.

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Recommend checking that out and hopefully
we'll see a another course next year.

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I was hoping to attend a person this year.

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However there is a massive Texas to
to Boston snowstorm

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which dumped bought like 12in of snow
in Boston that day.

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So if if maybe maybe three x
that in some spots I think.

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So if you're willing the brave
brave the winter

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at least I would look forward
to being there next year.

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Just paying that course.

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I mean, it's something
I spend so much time thinking

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about on this problem, right?

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It's it's somewhat trivial.

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I think if you have a well-defined

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requirement or problem
space and detection profile for something.

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Right.

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You know, it's easy enough, I suppose,
to send some spies in and monitor,

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you know, Russian MiG development and
then build a model for how to detect that.

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But when you have something
that is not fitting what you're expecting

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or is very low signal or non-repeating,
then you have to look for the signal

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in the noise.

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And that's really the opposite of the way
that we typically do signal analysis,

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finding those spar sporadic ones that
you don't have a large training set on.

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And it's actually a unique
area of of machine learning to study

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some of these low signal model generation
capabilities.

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But, you know, you solve that two ways
with cleverer models or with more data,

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right.

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And so, you know, you can work on both
ends of those streams to get answers.

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And one thing
I don't think we're going to be in short

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supply of in
the future is different data sets.

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One often refrain
I hear in the startup community

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here in Austin and elsewhere,
you know, it's how can you

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how can you generate a new unique data
set that you have some mode around?

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Right.

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So if you happen to have a lot of video
and data systems

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that happen to have been inside
of tornadoes, right,

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that maybe
didn't have a very large market,

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but that's a very unique data
set that AI models could ingest.

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It just has been you know,

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we haven't had the tools necessary
to understand those large data sets.

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So there's a lot of really unique
data plays going on

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in the startup community to be able
to generate those very large data sets.

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And I think that provides
a unique opportunity for the UAP space

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where these companies
could potentially collaborate

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with the up space
in order to make certain areas

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of their data sets available
or expose for testing

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with relationships in place,
of course, to ensure that no data is being

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leaked, that would be inappropriate,

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but I think there's a lot of potential
from that, and that doesn't

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even count, of course, building
specific systems for this.

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Very cool.

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Yeah, I agree on that.

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I do, because, you know, one of the hats
I wear, it's kind of a complementary

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kind of hat to the day job is, is I'm

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a doctor of engineering student
at Penn State and, and Penn State.

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I found to be a very receptive community
to some of the research work that we're

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that we're putting together

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of which part of that is,
is sort of sense making and in this case,

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human machine teaming to with the focus
being on on anomaly detection

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and said that that weak signal,
particularly in fields and domains

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where you get it
wrong, it's a it's a bad situation. Right.

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So there's really sort of poignant,
kind of situations.

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And so from not only technical names,
as you've discussed,

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and I think there's a lot we could, you
know, could pull the thread on for that.

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But but also in the way
that, say, information is generated

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or consumed and information warfare
where it's where it is

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used by everybody in various ways
and manipulated,

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even ways of being able to say,
how might we measure that from,

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you know, live open source intelligence
kind of kind of means and use that

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to help us not necessarily figure out
the answer, but to recognize that, well,

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there's a big like, information vacuum
that's forming,

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and that puts our kind of guard hairs up
so that then that will help us

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as sense, in my opinion,
that helps us as sense makers to deploy

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the art of sense making,
which is a little bit more like gut based.

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And we might be able to get better
at helping make decisions at machine speed

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if we can get some of our tooling
and infrastructure better to

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to also be measuring live system, live,
live occurrences like that.

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So, you know, speaking of sense making,
we didn't bring it up yet.

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Maybe we should have.

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But today's kind of a special day.

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The government Department of War,
specifically,

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I think, in conjunction with the FBI

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and NASA, have started to release

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previously classified UAP

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videos and sensor captures and documents.

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Some are historical,
some of them are more modern.

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00:12:22,600 --> 00:12:25,800
As part of President Trump's
promise to, quote unquote,

229
00:12:25,800 --> 00:12:29,100
declassify everything in this space
just to kind of set the stage.

230
00:12:29,100 --> 00:12:31,133
And by the time this airs,
this will probably be old news,

231
00:12:31,133 --> 00:12:34,133
but I understand that this information
will likely come in.

232
00:12:34,366 --> 00:12:35,500
This is the first one.

233
00:12:35,500 --> 00:12:39,533
And to expect the
the second within 30 days,

234
00:12:39,566 --> 00:12:42,600
there's indications that things
will get progressively more interesting.

235
00:12:42,833 --> 00:12:45,766
I'll say, for those that haven't checked
the website out, and I'm sure you will

236
00:12:45,766 --> 00:12:50,200
by the time this airs, you know, it's it's
a lot of files, a lot of information.

237
00:12:50,200 --> 00:12:51,533
This is just the beginning.

238
00:12:51,533 --> 00:12:55,333
When we think about sense making,
if the government is going to continue

239
00:12:55,366 --> 00:12:59,166
on this path to release,
at least right now,

240
00:12:59,200 --> 00:13:02,533
ambiguous data and perhaps less ambiguous
data in the future.

241
00:13:03,166 --> 00:13:06,033
What are your thoughts on on sense
making now?

242
00:13:06,033 --> 00:13:08,633
Should should we invest in understanding
what's happening now?

243
00:13:08,633 --> 00:13:11,800
Should we sit back and just kind of wait
to see how these progress?

244
00:13:11,933 --> 00:13:12,900
It's an interesting time.

245
00:13:12,900 --> 00:13:14,400
We're getting flooded with new data

246
00:13:14,400 --> 00:13:16,600
that's ambiguous,
and I wonder how you think about that.

247
00:13:16,600 --> 00:13:20,500
Yes, it's
certainly I think the, the dual of

248
00:13:20,533 --> 00:13:24,500
of maintaining an open
mind of what could be maybe while

249
00:13:24,500 --> 00:13:29,900
also a reservation of judgment,
but being able to recognize that, okay,

250
00:13:29,966 --> 00:13:34,400
there are still more grainy and grayscale
than than most of us would prefer

251
00:13:34,566 --> 00:13:37,000
in this sort of like 4K world
that we live in,

252
00:13:37,000 --> 00:13:40,333
but that we have more tangible evidence

253
00:13:40,333 --> 00:13:44,100
and sometimes corroboration to, to to say,
you know what

254
00:13:44,133 --> 00:13:49,100
some of these stories that are,
I would the more recent kind of things

255
00:13:49,100 --> 00:13:52,400
like a 2023 kind of report over,

256
00:13:53,233 --> 00:13:56,800
you know, if we saw solve
or get more information on like a 1960

257
00:13:56,833 --> 00:13:58,033
something event,

258
00:13:58,033 --> 00:14:01,333
I think the public in general
is going to be like, okay,

259
00:14:02,000 --> 00:14:03,133
I mean, that's nice, but

260
00:14:03,133 --> 00:14:07,433
but if it's something more recent,
for example, with the, the new Jersey

261
00:14:07,533 --> 00:14:11,033
sort of drone incidences
or flap circa 2024

262
00:14:11,566 --> 00:14:15,166
with echoes in that region
and other other regions more recently,

263
00:14:15,200 --> 00:14:19,533
that's more useful because we know
there are still people alive

264
00:14:19,633 --> 00:14:20,833
that are directly,

265
00:14:20,833 --> 00:14:24,300
you know, in near adjacent kind of jobs
that have those kind of experiences.

266
00:14:24,366 --> 00:14:27,333
And it's just a that's something
that with these kind of hopefully

267
00:14:27,333 --> 00:14:30,566
multiple data tranches,
it's listed as release zero one.

268
00:14:30,566 --> 00:14:34,500
So we're hopeful that that will enumerate
into hopefully double digits.

269
00:14:35,533 --> 00:14:36,600
Let's simplify this

270
00:14:36,600 --> 00:14:39,600
for the the average person
that's starting to see this flood out.

271
00:14:39,633 --> 00:14:43,033
You know, you're in this position
where maybe you've been on the fence.

272
00:14:43,200 --> 00:14:45,700
Yeah. There's
been some people that came forward.

273
00:14:45,700 --> 00:14:46,700
They seem credible.

274
00:14:46,700 --> 00:14:50,400
But you went back to your business
and now this is happening.

275
00:14:50,766 --> 00:14:54,533
You know, I think a lot of people
are going to have more confusion

276
00:14:54,533 --> 00:14:58,100
in the short term than certainty on this,
especially as they kind of start

277
00:14:58,100 --> 00:15:01,166
to dip their toe into this conversation
early on.

278
00:15:01,533 --> 00:15:04,533
Do you have any advice
for those types of those types of people?

279
00:15:04,600 --> 00:15:08,733
Well, the one is is
I aspire and my collaborators fire

280
00:15:08,766 --> 00:15:13,366
that that the paper that confronting
unknowns paper that we're releasing its

281
00:15:13,400 --> 00:15:18,166
it will be free and open source
that will help provide a combination of

282
00:15:18,333 --> 00:15:21,500
I as you know average Joe would be it's

283
00:15:21,500 --> 00:15:24,833
okay to be interested
in this the stigma, the stigma.

284
00:15:26,366 --> 00:15:27,433
Because that era

285
00:15:27,433 --> 00:15:30,333
seems to be having turned a leaf
and you've experienced,

286
00:15:30,333 --> 00:15:33,433
you know, multiple eras in UAP land.

287
00:15:34,133 --> 00:15:38,133
And so now, particularly for Americans
for safe aerospace orientation,

288
00:15:38,166 --> 00:15:42,300
which is there's now
more protocol and procedure that's

289
00:15:42,633 --> 00:15:46,333
less hush hush
from the FAA and other organizations.

290
00:15:46,333 --> 00:15:50,166
And so for the average Joe, it's yes,
still go, you know,

291
00:15:50,200 --> 00:15:51,366
still invest in your for luck.

292
00:15:51,366 --> 00:15:54,233
If you can go get the groceries,
take care of the kids.

293
00:15:54,233 --> 00:15:55,333
It's not like Chicken Little.

294
00:15:55,333 --> 00:15:56,333
The sky is falling.

295
00:15:56,333 --> 00:15:59,333
But if you have an interest
and potentially even if you have skills,

296
00:15:59,366 --> 00:16:03,433
there are becoming more venues
to to use that

297
00:16:03,433 --> 00:16:07,033
and potentially more funding
in other ways of being resources.

298
00:16:07,600 --> 00:16:11,200
And so that the stigma aspect
is very important

299
00:16:11,700 --> 00:16:14,966
to recognize that we are not alone
as, as people.

300
00:16:15,766 --> 00:16:19,366
In terms of collaborations
with other from research institutions

301
00:16:19,366 --> 00:16:23,700
to large companies, small companies,
foundations that have expressed interest

302
00:16:23,700 --> 00:16:28,733
to to us privately and publicly that
these are areas that need to be explored

303
00:16:28,766 --> 00:16:34,000
and more content
coming from the Defense Department

304
00:16:34,000 --> 00:16:38,633
or from our own sort of internal database
that we that we continue

305
00:16:38,633 --> 00:16:42,500
to publish and share,
that helps the noise environment

306
00:16:42,500 --> 00:16:46,133
to have more credible signal in there.

307
00:16:46,133 --> 00:16:49,966
So if we can get that ratio of signal
to noise higher,

308
00:16:50,000 --> 00:16:54,000
I think it helps all of us
make a little more sense that okay.

309
00:16:54,033 --> 00:16:56,533
Yeah, maybe it's it's not it's not taboo.

310
00:16:56,533 --> 00:17:00,700
It's certainly not a lot of people of
who are not discounting this.

311
00:17:00,700 --> 00:17:02,433
They're taking things extremely seriously.

312
00:17:02,433 --> 00:17:03,700
We know.

313
00:17:03,700 --> 00:17:05,900
It's incredible
how much that has changed. I mean,

314
00:17:07,000 --> 00:17:08,833
every day I'm still surprised.

315
00:17:08,833 --> 00:17:11,966
But, you know, I often have to
I feel like I need to enter

316
00:17:12,133 --> 00:17:14,500
certain conversations,
almost apologetically,

317
00:17:14,500 --> 00:17:18,500
that I'm now broaching the conversation
of UAP with them, but often surprised

318
00:17:18,500 --> 00:17:22,233
to see that they're eager to engage
in that conversation.

319
00:17:22,366 --> 00:17:24,000
So, yeah, things certainly have changed.

320
00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:24,766
So yes, you know,

321
00:17:24,766 --> 00:17:25,200
if you're

322
00:17:25,200 --> 00:17:27,300
if you're just listening this now
and if you have not seen it,

323
00:17:27,300 --> 00:17:29,033
the internet's really blowing up today
with all,

324
00:17:29,033 --> 00:17:31,333
all the different content videos,
you know.

325
00:17:31,333 --> 00:17:33,366
And now it's it's in the zoo. Right.

326
00:17:33,366 --> 00:17:35,300
So now there's going to be all sorts of,

327
00:17:35,300 --> 00:17:38,066
you know, armchair analysis
that's going to go on.

328
00:17:38,066 --> 00:17:40,600
Information
space is going to get pretty messy.

329
00:17:40,600 --> 00:17:43,300
I'm confident
that things will continue to progress.

330
00:17:43,300 --> 00:17:46,600
More data will come forward
that will increase the clarity.

331
00:17:46,833 --> 00:17:50,800
But even if the, you know,
the president were to get on on stage

332
00:17:50,800 --> 00:17:54,600
behind a podium and make some type
of definitive declaration,

333
00:17:54,600 --> 00:17:55,966
the mission that American Safe

334
00:17:55,966 --> 00:17:59,733
Aerospace doesn't, doesn't change
or stop at that point, right.

335
00:17:59,800 --> 00:18:05,133
The relevance of ensuring
that we avoid mishaps and that we secure

336
00:18:05,166 --> 00:18:08,933
our borders and our airspace from unknown
intrusions is still relevant.

337
00:18:08,966 --> 00:18:13,966
It's just now that we've better identify
what's causing the risk to grow right now.

338
00:18:14,033 --> 00:18:19,300
So maybe this is a good time to maybe turn
turn the tables a little bit and talk

339
00:18:19,300 --> 00:18:24,066
a little bit about, you know, what ASA
has been up to over the past few years.

340
00:18:24,166 --> 00:18:27,433
I'll try not to bore you guys too much,
because I think the exciting stuff is,

341
00:18:27,500 --> 00:18:30,700
you know, what's to come,
especially with with new data

342
00:18:30,733 --> 00:18:34,100
coming in and new people being excited
to help us figure this out.

343
00:18:34,100 --> 00:18:38,300
So we'll maybe take a quick break
and then we'll switch back up to that.

344
00:18:38,366 --> 00:18:39,300
Sure thing.

345
00:18:39,300 --> 00:18:42,333
So welcome back for the Safe
Aerospace Podcast.

346
00:18:42,366 --> 00:18:47,366
Before we jump into sort of the world
of Ryan Graves and American heroes

347
00:18:47,366 --> 00:18:51,500
space from, say, the 2023 hearings
that were seminal for

348
00:18:51,600 --> 00:18:55,000
for the field or, you know, the challenge
area up to to present.

349
00:18:55,166 --> 00:18:58,166
I want to Ryan, I want to give you
a little a little special gift.

350
00:18:58,333 --> 00:19:03,300
I happen to run a podcast called
Tuff Tech today, and I wanted to present

351
00:19:03,300 --> 00:19:06,300
with you, stickers of our special

352
00:19:06,333 --> 00:19:10,000
anvil
that's being lifted by by balloons in.

353
00:19:10,000 --> 00:19:12,500
It's our special symbol about,

354
00:19:12,500 --> 00:19:14,833
something
I think is super important in this field

355
00:19:14,833 --> 00:19:19,333
is is optimism and willingness
to to kind of think about

356
00:19:19,566 --> 00:19:24,566
what could be and how they think I can
of like Thomas the tank of that.

357
00:19:24,833 --> 00:19:25,833
Sometimes it can feel lonely.

358
00:19:25,833 --> 00:19:29,800
Sometimes it can feel like you have allies
and sometimes in the same day.

359
00:19:30,233 --> 00:19:33,700
But we're all in this together
to try to successfully pursue the unknown.

360
00:19:33,700 --> 00:19:36,633
It's not like we sell
the unknown, it's we.

361
00:19:36,633 --> 00:19:39,900
That's the assignment
is to continue to explore that space.

362
00:19:39,933 --> 00:19:42,833
And yeah. So thank you.

363
00:19:42,833 --> 00:19:46,300
So let's get folks back into your story.

364
00:19:46,566 --> 00:19:49,566
Most most listeners
I suspect, know your story.

365
00:19:49,700 --> 00:19:53,533
But for someone who may be new today
and to help sort of anchor

366
00:19:53,700 --> 00:19:57,766
the first episode of the podcast,
walk us through it, let's say

367
00:19:57,833 --> 00:20:02,300
maybe some of the 2014
kind of experiences circling active duty

368
00:20:02,333 --> 00:20:06,166
and then into what
led to a seminal hearing.

369
00:20:06,200 --> 00:20:09,433
Yeah, you know,
I won't go into too much detail.

370
00:20:09,500 --> 00:20:13,233
I know people have probably heard
my story before, but I was in F-18

371
00:20:13,233 --> 00:20:15,166
pile of the Navy,
and we had just come back

372
00:20:15,166 --> 00:20:19,133
from our first deployment off the coast
of Virginia Beach while we were deployed

373
00:20:19,133 --> 00:20:22,133
to the Middle East,
but we came back to our base

374
00:20:22,300 --> 00:20:25,833
off the coast of Virginia Beach
and began upgrading our radars.

375
00:20:25,833 --> 00:20:28,000
And that's when we gain detecting.

376
00:20:28,000 --> 00:20:30,900
And we didn't know at the time,
but potentially UAP, UAP

377
00:20:30,900 --> 00:20:34,233
that were exhibiting flight
characteristics that we wouldn't expect,

378
00:20:34,233 --> 00:20:38,233
very fast beads, very sharp turns,
remaining fleet stationary.

379
00:20:38,233 --> 00:20:41,400
And this was happening every day,
but no one was reporting it.

380
00:20:41,733 --> 00:20:44,133
There was a stigma
about what it could have been.

381
00:20:44,133 --> 00:20:45,300
No one wanted to talk about it.

382
00:20:45,300 --> 00:20:48,366
And so even though they were near-misses,
these things

383
00:20:48,366 --> 00:20:51,433
coming within 50ft of our cockpit,
people weren't reporting it.

384
00:20:51,433 --> 00:20:56,733
And, you know, that struck a nerve with me
because as tactical aviators

385
00:20:56,733 --> 00:21:01,400
were such a tension, the detail, you know,
not just how we're going to drop a bomb

386
00:21:01,433 --> 00:21:04,433
or land on the aircraft carrier,
but all of the things

387
00:21:04,433 --> 00:21:08,500
that enable that to happen
the safety precautions, the briefings,

388
00:21:08,533 --> 00:21:12,400
the administrative tasks to get the jet
ready in that position, all those things

389
00:21:12,400 --> 00:21:17,333
matter just as much as as that
last pickle press to drop the weapon.

390
00:21:17,633 --> 00:21:18,000
Right.

391
00:21:18,000 --> 00:21:22,733
And so to ignore this one
particular avenue that was so critical

392
00:21:22,766 --> 00:21:27,500
a mishap, an air to mid-air risk,
then it makes sense to me.

393
00:21:27,500 --> 00:21:30,733
And I didn't know why we weren't
willing to talk about that.

394
00:21:30,733 --> 00:21:35,133
But, you know, in that community, it's
very, you know, it's very competitive.

395
00:21:35,166 --> 00:21:36,400
People want to be the best.

396
00:21:36,400 --> 00:21:40,366
And this, at the end of the day, is a side
quest and not really why we're there.

397
00:21:40,366 --> 00:21:43,400
So I understand why
people didn't prioritize it.

398
00:21:43,600 --> 00:21:46,100
But ultimately this kept happening
for a number of years.

399
00:21:46,100 --> 00:21:50,233
More near misses and culminating in us
capturing some video off the coast of

400
00:21:50,233 --> 00:21:54,366
Jacksonville, Florida that were released
in the New York Times in 2017.

401
00:21:54,566 --> 00:21:57,366
And when I saw that, I realized
that the issues that we were having on

402
00:21:57,366 --> 00:22:00,500
the East Coast were isolated
and they weren't getting resolved.

403
00:22:01,133 --> 00:22:05,133
And that's what led me to reach out
and start speaking out,

404
00:22:05,233 --> 00:22:08,233
at least privately at first,
in order to help them understand

405
00:22:08,300 --> 00:22:11,400
that this was a larger issue
than just 1 or 2 incidences.

406
00:22:11,766 --> 00:22:14,766
And of course, that accelerated.

407
00:22:14,800 --> 00:22:18,100
I went public on it
and did a few interviews,

408
00:22:18,166 --> 00:22:22,766
which snowballed a bit and landed me
ultimately on a Congress in 2023

409
00:22:22,900 --> 00:22:26,133
where I testified
not only to what we were seeing ourselves,

410
00:22:26,500 --> 00:22:30,300
the pilots in our squadron,
but also by that time,

411
00:22:30,433 --> 00:22:33,300
all the hundreds of reports
now thousands that

412
00:22:33,300 --> 00:22:37,033
we've received at Americans for Safe
Aerospace, other pilots,

413
00:22:37,366 --> 00:22:41,033
both in the military
and commercial center, operators,

414
00:22:41,400 --> 00:22:44,900
regular soldiers,
civilians everywhere in between.

415
00:22:44,933 --> 00:22:46,633
You know,
they're all having these experiences.

416
00:22:46,633 --> 00:22:49,033
Of course,
some of those witnesses are more valuable

417
00:22:49,033 --> 00:22:52,100
because they have a high likelihood
of coming with sensor data,

418
00:22:52,166 --> 00:22:55,233
someone that just sees something
in their backyard or soldier

419
00:22:55,233 --> 00:22:59,333
on the ground with no sensors,
that sees something, provides some useful

420
00:22:59,433 --> 00:23:03,000
information and aggregate,
and we can start to see some trends.

421
00:23:03,200 --> 00:23:05,100
So it's all valuable and it's all wasted

422
00:23:05,100 --> 00:23:07,633
if we're not collecting that
and losing the opportunity

423
00:23:07,633 --> 00:23:11,000
that each one of those provides
us to better understand the situation.

424
00:23:11,000 --> 00:23:14,900
And so at the hearing, it was really,
you know, I felt my responsibility

425
00:23:14,900 --> 00:23:19,533
to share and make clear
that this was a widespread issue.

426
00:23:19,533 --> 00:23:23,633
This was something that was affecting
all, all levels of aviation

427
00:23:23,833 --> 00:23:27,600
and that it represented
not only that aviation safety risk,

428
00:23:27,600 --> 00:23:31,433
but also a national security
risk of having objects operating

429
00:23:31,700 --> 00:23:35,533
over our continental United States
and our airspace that are unattributed,

430
00:23:35,533 --> 00:23:39,833
whether it's exhibiting advanced
capabilities or not, that, at a minimum,

431
00:23:39,933 --> 00:23:44,333
is a potential air
traffic threat for aviators and at worst,

432
00:23:44,366 --> 00:23:47,833
it's intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance or potentially

433
00:23:47,833 --> 00:23:53,400
a weaponized drone, as we've seen to be
so effective in Ukraine and elsewhere.

434
00:23:53,733 --> 00:23:58,033
So the answer of ultimately what they are
in some ways, to me is irrelevant.

435
00:23:58,033 --> 00:24:01,300
It's more about mitigating the risk,
you know, that they oppose.

436
00:24:01,300 --> 00:24:04,400
And so that's why
I wanted to speak out about it.

437
00:24:04,400 --> 00:24:08,100
Now, I've learned such,
you know, information from the reports

438
00:24:08,100 --> 00:24:12,166
that we receive that,
you know, my thinking has matured.

439
00:24:12,300 --> 00:24:16,900
I'll say my model has updated,
and unfortunately, it's updated towards

440
00:24:17,100 --> 00:24:22,133
less certainty in any one answer,
but a very big signal, if you will,

441
00:24:22,133 --> 00:24:25,766
that there's something that is exhibiting
capabilities beyond the state of the art.

442
00:24:26,400 --> 00:24:29,800
Maybe that's the easy answer of it
being aliens from another star system.

443
00:24:29,800 --> 00:24:32,033
Maybe that's a more complex answer.

444
00:24:32,033 --> 00:24:34,833
Maybe it's something
we're not thinking of yet, but

445
00:24:34,833 --> 00:24:37,633
I believe the only way forward
in that conversation

446
00:24:37,633 --> 00:24:41,800
is through the work that we're building
towards Americans for Safe Aerospace,

447
00:24:41,966 --> 00:24:45,966
both from a technical standpoint
as well as reducing the stigma.

448
00:24:46,033 --> 00:24:49,900
Some of the big steps we took immediately
following that hearing were to advise

449
00:24:49,900 --> 00:24:53,233
Congress on legislation
that would protect pilots,

450
00:24:53,233 --> 00:24:56,233
that would enable them to report
without fear of retribution

451
00:24:56,233 --> 00:24:59,500
from their employees,
from their management at the airlines.

452
00:25:00,166 --> 00:25:04,900
Any pilots are reprimanded for speaking
about this, either directly or indirectly.

453
00:25:05,033 --> 00:25:06,733
And so there's there's zero incentive.

454
00:25:06,733 --> 00:25:08,100
And pilots often tell me like, hey,

455
00:25:08,100 --> 00:25:10,800
I'm getting out in three years,
I'm retiring in five years.

456
00:25:10,800 --> 00:25:12,233
I'll talk to you then.

457
00:25:12,233 --> 00:25:13,966
I have been doing this
long enough that they have.

458
00:25:13,966 --> 00:25:18,233
But but I wish they could have talked
to me sooner or felt more comfortable.

459
00:25:18,233 --> 00:25:21,933
And the legislation that we've ised
on the Safe Airspace for Americans Act

460
00:25:21,966 --> 00:25:26,500
would classify these
as established aviation safety risk,

461
00:25:26,500 --> 00:25:31,700
which would then protect pilots
under existing workplace protection laws.

462
00:25:31,966 --> 00:25:35,600
So it's such that their employer
can't forbid them

463
00:25:35,600 --> 00:25:39,500
from communicating safety hazards
in their workplace.

464
00:25:40,133 --> 00:25:43,700
And so it uses existing frameworks
in order to enable that.

465
00:25:44,166 --> 00:25:47,166
It was introduced in 2024.

466
00:25:47,166 --> 00:25:49,133
It was not voted
on. It couldn't get attached.

467
00:25:49,133 --> 00:25:50,566
It has been reintroduced.

468
00:25:50,566 --> 00:25:53,633
And we are working to have that included
potentially

469
00:25:53,633 --> 00:25:57,033
in the 2027 NDAA.

470
00:25:57,400 --> 00:25:59,600
But perhaps more exciting,

471
00:25:59,600 --> 00:26:02,600
and this is maybe catching us up
a little bit more modern times.

472
00:26:02,600 --> 00:26:05,166
There's been a lot going on
at the state level.

473
00:26:05,166 --> 00:26:09,433
There has been energy,
starting with new Jersey in passing

474
00:26:09,766 --> 00:26:13,900
pretty substantive UAP legislation
in new Jersey.

475
00:26:13,900 --> 00:26:16,800
They did provide a budget amount of money

476
00:26:16,800 --> 00:26:20,566
in order to perform a research program
research study.

477
00:26:21,166 --> 00:26:24,700
In conjunction
with the public organization Vermont has

478
00:26:24,900 --> 00:26:27,800
is exploring their own legislation
that would standardize

479
00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:31,833
collection across the state
for analysis and eventual reporting.

480
00:26:31,833 --> 00:26:35,233
Connecticut Is has also proposed
their own legislation

481
00:26:35,233 --> 00:26:39,200
that's going back and forth again
with the budget for research there.

482
00:26:39,400 --> 00:26:42,333
About seven
other states that I'm aware of that are

483
00:26:43,600 --> 00:26:45,933
on legislation right now.

484
00:26:45,933 --> 00:26:47,633
This could be a very strong trend.

485
00:26:47,633 --> 00:26:50,633
This might provide
the institutional framework

486
00:26:50,633 --> 00:26:53,900
for there to be a standardized
reporting system.

487
00:26:54,200 --> 00:26:55,233
And, you know,

488
00:26:55,233 --> 00:26:59,033
people might say, why does this, you know,
why does this matter at the state level?

489
00:26:59,100 --> 00:27:03,100
Is it because it's too hard
at the federal level, maybe a little bit.

490
00:27:03,200 --> 00:27:08,366
You know, it is a mess and hard to get
legislation through at the federal level.

491
00:27:08,533 --> 00:27:12,000
But there's also things
that can be addressed at the state level.

492
00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:14,733
That is not right
at the federal level. Right.

493
00:27:14,733 --> 00:27:16,533
So what about state police?

494
00:27:16,533 --> 00:27:17,766
What about local police?

495
00:27:17,766 --> 00:27:20,533
What about state
critical infrastructure? Right.

496
00:27:20,533 --> 00:27:22,966
How do these groups talk and mitigate
this?

497
00:27:22,966 --> 00:27:24,533
It's not just detecting. Right.

498
00:27:24,533 --> 00:27:26,000
What do you do after you've detected?

499
00:27:26,000 --> 00:27:26,966
How do you respond to that.

500
00:27:26,966 --> 00:27:29,566
Because if it is a threat,
we need to actually respond to it

501
00:27:29,566 --> 00:27:33,533
and not just catalog it for a report
that comes out, you know, in 24 months.

502
00:27:33,566 --> 00:27:33,900
Right?

503
00:27:33,900 --> 00:27:35,300
So there.

504
00:27:35,300 --> 00:27:38,000
There needs to be a closed loop system
for this.

505
00:27:38,000 --> 00:27:41,333
And by having these states
start to implement this,

506
00:27:41,333 --> 00:27:44,566
I think we can start
looking towards a future where we have

507
00:27:44,766 --> 00:27:48,366
an interstate agreement
for how to collaborate, both

508
00:27:48,366 --> 00:27:52,766
from a data collection
and dating data sharing perspective.

509
00:27:52,966 --> 00:27:57,700
That's something that in some of my work
and my colleagues is sort of exposed.

510
00:27:57,700 --> 00:28:00,700
Is that the institutional level
this could be at,

511
00:28:00,700 --> 00:28:04,800
could be state or even federal
is that there's there's the vocabulary for

512
00:28:04,833 --> 00:28:08,233
we know what something is and there's
a vocabulary for there is no threat.

513
00:28:08,233 --> 00:28:09,833
But apparently there's a

514
00:28:10,833 --> 00:28:11,566
lack of

515
00:28:11,566 --> 00:28:14,400
institutional vocabulary
in the middle of that.

516
00:28:14,400 --> 00:28:18,133
And so
and that if that without that vocabulary,

517
00:28:18,166 --> 00:28:22,300
it causes something that may not look like
it's, it may be flying in somewhere

518
00:28:22,300 --> 00:28:26,733
where it's not supposed to be, but there's
no visible weapon payload or something.

519
00:28:26,733 --> 00:28:28,733
So it's like, well, what is that?

520
00:28:28,733 --> 00:28:32,900
And that lack of vocabulary causes a

521
00:28:33,033 --> 00:28:36,600
lack of the cascades
that would help to get some sort of like

522
00:28:36,633 --> 00:28:40,500
an integrated communication system
so that there are ways to help fill

523
00:28:40,566 --> 00:28:44,633
the emergent information vacuum,
which could lead to massive stereo

524
00:28:44,633 --> 00:28:45,500
or could lead to,

525
00:28:45,500 --> 00:28:48,700
you know, people shooting at things that
they probably shouldn't be shooting at.

526
00:28:48,700 --> 00:28:52,300
And so that's where I think
it's a proud Pennsylvanian

527
00:28:52,433 --> 00:28:54,166
that the Commonwealth
I know that there's there's

528
00:28:54,166 --> 00:28:56,333
additional work
being there, as well as one of those.

529
00:28:56,333 --> 00:29:00,166
I think that the seven other states that
you had mentioned in international work

530
00:29:00,166 --> 00:29:04,000
as well, to, to try to get legislation
is always a little lagging,

531
00:29:04,300 --> 00:29:07,633
but try to get it sort of cut up
to some sort of modern time, because,

532
00:29:08,433 --> 00:29:11,433
again, you've gone through the eras of
when it was

533
00:29:11,700 --> 00:29:14,566
not something one talked about, of that
there are unknown objects,

534
00:29:14,566 --> 00:29:18,766
and even saying, I don't know
is a very hard thing for anybody to say.

535
00:29:18,900 --> 00:29:24,833
And then now where it's, it's seemed like
we've turned a curve here.

536
00:29:24,933 --> 00:29:28,366
And Americans perceive aerospace
being a view.

537
00:29:28,366 --> 00:29:32,233
It maybe a little biased, but like one of
the most trusted kind of organizations,

538
00:29:32,333 --> 00:29:33,833
particularly for free aviators.

539
00:29:33,833 --> 00:29:36,833
And then so the ecosystem around him
or her

540
00:29:37,133 --> 00:29:40,966
to be able to say, I did see something,
I don't know what it is.

541
00:29:40,966 --> 00:29:42,733
And yes, I'm concerned about my job,

542
00:29:42,733 --> 00:29:47,166
but we now have more protections in place
for that to for that data to go in.

543
00:29:47,200 --> 00:29:47,600
Yeah.

544
00:29:47,600 --> 00:29:52,033
And you know, we've, we've continued
to receive a lot of reports at ASA. And

545
00:29:53,000 --> 00:29:53,333
you know,

546
00:29:53,333 --> 00:29:57,733
we've had to take kind of an intelligence
mindset around, if you will, confidence

547
00:29:57,733 --> 00:30:03,433
level corroboration
low on scientifically validated

548
00:30:04,000 --> 00:30:07,100
measurements or calculations, right
when it holds up in a lab.

549
00:30:07,100 --> 00:30:09,100
But you can make decisions off of it.

550
00:30:09,100 --> 00:30:10,233
Type information.

551
00:30:10,233 --> 00:30:13,700
And, you know, we've worked that
I think to good effect and

552
00:30:14,033 --> 00:30:18,100
really identified a lot of really strong,
you know, cases and people

553
00:30:18,100 --> 00:30:21,366
that were excited to bring forward
on this podcast here in the near future.

554
00:30:21,966 --> 00:30:23,600
But, you know, we have a thousand report.

555
00:30:23,600 --> 00:30:24,600
What's that really mean?

556
00:30:24,600 --> 00:30:27,566
You know, as it's fleshed out now,
I would say probably

557
00:30:27,566 --> 00:30:30,933
at this stage, probably about 80 of those
or so, maybe a little bit more

558
00:30:31,500 --> 00:30:35,366
or what we consider, you know,
very high quality cases similar to,

559
00:30:36,566 --> 00:30:37,833
you know, an example,

560
00:30:37,833 --> 00:30:41,833
a comparable example might be the TikTok
incident with Commander Frazier,

561
00:30:41,833 --> 00:30:43,366
where there are multiple,

562
00:30:43,366 --> 00:30:47,533
highly trained observers
that have corroborating sense of data

563
00:30:47,566 --> 00:30:50,766
that they either saw
or might potentially still exist.

564
00:30:51,033 --> 00:30:52,633
We have dozens of those.

565
00:30:52,633 --> 00:30:52,933
Right.

566
00:30:52,933 --> 00:30:57,766
And over the past several years
since the hearing, we've collected

567
00:30:57,766 --> 00:31:02,366
and collated and studied
some of these cases, and we've shared

568
00:31:02,500 --> 00:31:05,566
those cases with congressional members
and the House

569
00:31:05,566 --> 00:31:09,733
and the Senate, different committees
with federal law enforcement and the FBI.

570
00:31:09,800 --> 00:31:10,900
And we only share

571
00:31:10,900 --> 00:31:14,900
this type of information
explicitly with the witnesses permission.

572
00:31:15,133 --> 00:31:18,966
And so when you come to Assa
and you say your information

573
00:31:18,966 --> 00:31:22,766
and we schedule a call, we talk,
we make it very clear

574
00:31:22,766 --> 00:31:26,633
that if you would like, the option exists
for this information

575
00:31:26,633 --> 00:31:30,200
to be processed, forwarded through
to some of these other stakeholders.

576
00:31:30,200 --> 00:31:32,033
If if they give their permission.

577
00:31:32,033 --> 00:31:35,966
And, you know, the vast majority of people
do take us up on on that offer,

578
00:31:36,100 --> 00:31:40,100
because I think for maybe the first time
on this conversation,

579
00:31:40,133 --> 00:31:44,633
people feel like the time is right,
like action can actually be taken.

580
00:31:44,633 --> 00:31:47,133
This information matters
and there's people waiting for it.

581
00:31:47,133 --> 00:31:49,333
And it's true. People are.

582
00:31:49,333 --> 00:31:51,766
And just today, I think we're starting
to see the outcropping

583
00:31:51,766 --> 00:31:54,733
of some of that
with the releases that came out.

584
00:31:54,733 --> 00:31:58,433
But ultimately, as effective
as that's been to motivate

585
00:31:58,433 --> 00:32:03,100
a lot of the efforts that we are hearing
or perhaps you're not hearing about yet

586
00:32:03,100 --> 00:32:06,600
across various agencies, in the executive
branch and elsewhere,

587
00:32:06,800 --> 00:32:09,700
we haven't necessarily
shared those cases with the public,

588
00:32:09,700 --> 00:32:13,500
and they're also not of a scientific
quality that would allow us to do

589
00:32:13,533 --> 00:32:15,566
real, rigorous study on it.

590
00:32:15,566 --> 00:32:19,933
And so,
you know that as weakness, we've started

591
00:32:20,033 --> 00:32:25,333
to design a much more comprehensive,
scientifically structured

592
00:32:26,033 --> 00:32:29,033
methodology, both for collecting

593
00:32:29,033 --> 00:32:31,800
and supplementing additional information

594
00:32:31,800 --> 00:32:35,700
to to the reports as available
and then analyzing

595
00:32:35,700 --> 00:32:40,166
the outcroppings of that, both in whole
and on a case by case basis.

596
00:32:40,500 --> 00:32:42,700
And that work is not public yet.

597
00:32:42,700 --> 00:32:46,966
We will be offering that
to the members of our website.

598
00:32:47,033 --> 00:32:48,300
I'm pretty excited about it.

599
00:32:48,300 --> 00:32:48,966
It's going to allow you

600
00:32:48,966 --> 00:32:52,400
to have a complete picture
of the when and the where of the reports.

601
00:32:52,600 --> 00:32:56,500
Anyone report will be supplemented
with basically

602
00:32:56,500 --> 00:33:00,500
any publicly available information that's
possible to scrape from the internet,

603
00:33:00,566 --> 00:33:04,600
test data, satellite data, air
traffic data, and allow us to more

604
00:33:04,600 --> 00:33:06,000
or less quantify

605
00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:09,833
whether this is likely a prosaic sighting,
or whether this doesn't

606
00:33:09,833 --> 00:33:12,833
have an explanation
that we can assign to it right now.

607
00:33:13,333 --> 00:33:16,333
Allow us to kind of rack and stack
and have what I think

608
00:33:16,333 --> 00:33:20,133
is probably the first time a single place
where you could have confidence

609
00:33:20,133 --> 00:33:24,200
in the publicly reviewable logic train

610
00:33:24,200 --> 00:33:28,500
that provided, you know,
the ranked assessment of one report.

611
00:33:28,500 --> 00:33:31,733
So when you look at it,
you could say, okay, this is anomalous.

612
00:33:32,033 --> 00:33:34,300
Here's the ranking and here's why.

613
00:33:34,300 --> 00:33:37,200
Through all the supplementation
and reasoning that

614
00:33:37,200 --> 00:33:40,233
went behind that for any one report
and make that live.

615
00:33:40,233 --> 00:33:44,966
So as new information comes in, as new
analysis is done, that can be updated.

616
00:33:44,966 --> 00:33:48,700
And, you know, my hope with that
is that now there's a place where people

617
00:33:48,700 --> 00:33:53,400
can actually focus their energy
on the actual mystery and the good cases

618
00:33:53,400 --> 00:33:57,133
versus spending their time
sweating over something that was debunked,

619
00:33:57,166 --> 00:34:00,633
you know, 15 years ago,
but is being resurfaced on X right now.

620
00:34:00,800 --> 00:34:03,433
And, you know, we're going to be able
to use that as a source

621
00:34:03,433 --> 00:34:07,366
for justification for policy positions
that we might want to take.

622
00:34:07,533 --> 00:34:10,400
That will be evidence
that will continue to drive

623
00:34:10,400 --> 00:34:14,200
the conversation forward in DC
and in academia and elsewhere.

624
00:34:14,233 --> 00:34:15,300
And ultimately,

625
00:34:15,300 --> 00:34:19,500
we'll be sharing all that information
with their members at Safe Aerospace.

626
00:34:19,500 --> 00:34:24,466
Org, so that them and the media
and anyone else can utilize that to

627
00:34:24,500 --> 00:34:25,933
to better understand it.

628
00:34:25,933 --> 00:34:27,933
So that's that's the vision.

629
00:34:27,933 --> 00:34:29,533
Now, you know,
what's the reality right now

630
00:34:29,533 --> 00:34:31,666
we're actually make
a pretty good progress.

631
00:34:31,666 --> 00:34:34,533
It's our hope
to have a first version of this

632
00:34:34,533 --> 00:34:37,533
that we're going to be demoing
at the end of July.

633
00:34:37,900 --> 00:34:41,566
ASA is going to Oshkosh at Ryan.

634
00:34:41,566 --> 00:34:43,433
Better than I didn't plan that.

635
00:34:43,433 --> 00:34:45,666
But yeah, they expected.

636
00:34:45,666 --> 00:34:46,600
For those not familiar.

637
00:34:46,600 --> 00:34:50,900
Oshkosh is the world's
largest aircraft flying kind of like a,

638
00:34:51,600 --> 00:34:55,600
kind of like the Olympics of airshows,
perhaps is one way or I don't know.

639
00:34:55,633 --> 00:34:57,200
How would you describe it?

640
00:34:57,200 --> 00:34:57,666
Maybe.

641
00:34:57,666 --> 00:34:59,333
It's certainly a marathon,

642
00:34:59,333 --> 00:35:02,766
whether as a, as a, as a participant,
a audience member, or

643
00:35:03,900 --> 00:35:06,000
if one's
actually flying in, its the world's

644
00:35:06,000 --> 00:35:09,200
busiest airport for,
for the span of that one week or so.

645
00:35:09,900 --> 00:35:12,833
And it's very loud, it's very fun.

646
00:35:12,833 --> 00:35:17,133
It's to as Oshkosh, the shorthand
and its location, but it's the EAA.

647
00:35:17,333 --> 00:35:22,366
So Experimental Aircraft Association's air
venture program or endeavor.

648
00:35:22,366 --> 00:35:25,633
And that is
is something that if you could be there.

649
00:35:25,766 --> 00:35:27,300
We this will be the first time

650
00:35:27,300 --> 00:35:31,133
that AZA has has a booth
and has a formal presence there.

651
00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:34,300
Many members,
as sort of aviation enthusiasts

652
00:35:34,300 --> 00:35:37,433
have been there and sort of skunkworks
or grassroots kind of way,

653
00:35:37,533 --> 00:35:42,433
but it's going to be something
that for folks who can participate, it's

654
00:35:43,033 --> 00:35:45,533
we we intend to have a,

655
00:35:45,533 --> 00:35:50,400
you know, a look at some of the,
the this kind of mapping

656
00:35:50,400 --> 00:35:54,233
and, and report sort of pipelining
that we've been building.

657
00:35:54,300 --> 00:35:57,833
And this may be a little plug for,
for membership is, is that we

658
00:35:58,000 --> 00:35:59,833
super push it if you like and subscribe.

659
00:35:59,833 --> 00:36:04,000
That really helps with with the attention
that we know the subject needs

660
00:36:04,033 --> 00:36:07,800
a sort of credible, grounded,
bad, aviation fun but grounded kind of

661
00:36:07,833 --> 00:36:10,000
way of looking at this, these challenges.

662
00:36:10,000 --> 00:36:13,000
But then membership is a way
to help support the building

663
00:36:13,033 --> 00:36:16,533
out of this kind of infrastructure
that we need to be able to get

664
00:36:16,766 --> 00:36:19,633
from a report in the door
or in the database to

665
00:36:19,633 --> 00:36:23,600
then not just sit there, but
to be kind of like to use mining examples,

666
00:36:23,600 --> 00:36:28,833
like the beneficiation process to go from
raw or to, you know, where are the gems.

667
00:36:29,366 --> 00:36:30,100
Actual data?

668
00:36:30,100 --> 00:36:30,800
Yeah, absolutely.

669
00:36:30,800 --> 00:36:32,800
Because that's something
that's been missing in

670
00:36:32,800 --> 00:36:36,300
at least in the open source
kind of way for seemingly ever,

671
00:36:37,033 --> 00:36:39,366
or least in the past 70 years or so.

672
00:36:39,366 --> 00:36:43,733
And so, it's not like,
you know, pushing for disclosure per se.

673
00:36:43,766 --> 00:36:47,333
It's pushing for, well,
it's like explore and sort of and make it

674
00:36:47,333 --> 00:36:51,900
so that folks who if you do see something,
you do have a way to be able to

675
00:36:51,966 --> 00:36:55,233
to share that so
you don't feel alone or something, right?

676
00:36:55,933 --> 00:36:59,000
For me at least, it's
like I don't want someone to be scared

677
00:36:59,000 --> 00:37:00,933
and in a corner without reading that,
you know,

678
00:37:00,933 --> 00:37:04,500
there are allies out here
that are really trying to be,

679
00:37:05,033 --> 00:37:08,500
that are being very serious
and or who are trustworthy to earn that.

680
00:37:08,533 --> 00:37:09,300
Well, yeah.

681
00:37:09,300 --> 00:37:13,333
So if you are at Oshkosh
or want to come now, look forward

682
00:37:13,333 --> 00:37:15,700
to seeing you at our booth.
I'm thinking the best way to share that.

683
00:37:15,700 --> 00:37:18,000
But we, you know, please go to Safe
Aerospace.

684
00:37:18,000 --> 00:37:21,800
Org. We'll have a news article
about how you can find us there.

685
00:37:21,833 --> 00:37:22,800
What events will be doing.

686
00:37:22,800 --> 00:37:26,100
We'll have we'll be having event
at a local distillery,

687
00:37:26,600 --> 00:37:29,900
which I'm sure will be a lot of fun,
and we can have some fun conversations.

688
00:37:30,333 --> 00:37:32,333
And of course, we'll be talking
to a lot of pilots.

689
00:37:32,333 --> 00:37:35,900
There were 750,000 people at Oshkosh
last year.

690
00:37:35,900 --> 00:37:37,433
They'll probably be more this year.

691
00:37:37,433 --> 00:37:41,033
And I suspect that there are a lot of UAP
stories between

692
00:37:41,100 --> 00:37:43,600
the aviators there in the crowd,
and we're going to be there,

693
00:37:43,600 --> 00:37:45,733
and hopefully we're going to capture
some on camera

694
00:37:45,733 --> 00:37:49,033
and share them with you
and add them to our database here.

695
00:37:49,600 --> 00:37:51,300
Yeah, it'll be epic.

696
00:37:51,300 --> 00:37:52,333
It's a lot of people.

697
00:37:52,333 --> 00:37:55,100
It's a lot of hardware
and it's a lot of fun.

698
00:37:55,100 --> 00:37:58,000
Let's hope the Wisconsin weather gods

699
00:37:58,000 --> 00:37:59,566
don't turn it into a slosh

700
00:37:59,566 --> 00:38:02,566
like it has been in sometimes in the past
and some other other,

701
00:38:02,566 --> 00:38:04,400
but it's going to be. It'll be great.

702
00:38:04,400 --> 00:38:08,300
So excited to to see you in many of you
listeners and viewers there.

703
00:38:08,333 --> 00:38:08,700
Well yeah.

704
00:38:08,700 --> 00:38:12,366
So the you know we're going to demo
hopefully this system there.

705
00:38:12,366 --> 00:38:15,366
You'll be able to come by and check it out
will be accepting report.

706
00:38:15,400 --> 00:38:21,233
And now that will give us
this scientifically structured process

707
00:38:21,400 --> 00:38:23,133
that's traceable,

708
00:38:23,133 --> 00:38:27,200
that we can truly understand the reasoning
across the whole pipeline of data

709
00:38:27,300 --> 00:38:28,566
and do real time,

710
00:38:28,566 --> 00:38:31,433
you know, signal analysis for,
for lack of a better word, right, like

711
00:38:31,433 --> 00:38:35,100
just really be able to update the data
in real time, share the outputs of that

712
00:38:35,333 --> 00:38:39,366
with our members, share that with
the different stakeholders in the space.

713
00:38:39,366 --> 00:38:43,533
Share that with the pilot unions
and the commercial airlines

714
00:38:43,633 --> 00:38:44,900
that the where of the risks

715
00:38:44,900 --> 00:38:47,633
that pilots are exposed to now,
because it is significant.

716
00:38:47,633 --> 00:38:51,433
We receive a lot of reports,
and the government itself receives more

717
00:38:51,433 --> 00:38:55,333
reports through the standardized procedure
that now exists.

718
00:38:55,700 --> 00:38:58,833
When a pilot sees a report, the expected

719
00:38:58,900 --> 00:39:01,900
behavior is that they will report that
to air traffic control.

720
00:39:02,233 --> 00:39:03,966
Air traffic control assesses that.

721
00:39:03,966 --> 00:39:07,100
And then there is a standardized
reporting form that the manager of

722
00:39:07,133 --> 00:39:10,133
that facility
is expected to fill out and submit.

723
00:39:10,366 --> 00:39:12,300
That goes to various places.

724
00:39:12,300 --> 00:39:16,700
I understand that that is being utilized
to some degree, and that there are

725
00:39:16,966 --> 00:39:18,200
a number of just say,

726
00:39:18,200 --> 00:39:21,233
I'll just leave it out there, single digit
number of these events per day

727
00:39:21,966 --> 00:39:24,966
in the United States
where commercial pilots are,

728
00:39:25,100 --> 00:39:26,733
are reporting this through that mechanism.

729
00:39:26,733 --> 00:39:29,600
So this is something
that's still extremely relevant.

730
00:39:29,600 --> 00:39:32,733
And we need to make sure that the airlines
and the pilots

731
00:39:32,933 --> 00:39:36,566
that are oblivious to this right now
have access to that information

732
00:39:36,566 --> 00:39:39,100
so that they can make safe decisions
with their aircraft. Right.

733
00:39:39,100 --> 00:39:40,700
That's what at the end day all about.

734
00:39:40,700 --> 00:39:43,500
And so that database
is going to be really effective.

735
00:39:43,500 --> 00:39:45,733
You guys are watching the podcast now.

736
00:39:45,733 --> 00:39:48,733
Obviously that's something else
that we've been working on.

737
00:39:48,766 --> 00:39:52,566
We've been collecting all these
all these reports, all these stories from,

738
00:39:52,933 --> 00:39:54,400
you know, again, very credible people.

739
00:39:54,400 --> 00:39:59,166
And those reports have had an incredible
effect shifting the conversation in DC.

740
00:39:59,166 --> 00:40:00,700
And it's like, hey, let's now's the time.

741
00:40:00,700 --> 00:40:02,966
Let's, let's share
those, you know, with the public.

742
00:40:02,966 --> 00:40:04,933
And so that's,
that's exactly what we're doing.

743
00:40:04,933 --> 00:40:06,433
This is a bit of a warm up, you know,

744
00:40:06,433 --> 00:40:10,333
catch everyone up, reintroduce ourselves,
let you stand what we've been doing.

745
00:40:10,333 --> 00:40:13,333
But we're going to be getting right
into pilots,

746
00:40:14,000 --> 00:40:16,733
air traffic controllers or sightings.

747
00:40:16,733 --> 00:40:20,433
And not just that, we've also partnered
with an organization

748
00:40:20,500 --> 00:40:24,200
away to drop their name until everything's
all signed, but we're going to be

749
00:40:24,200 --> 00:40:28,800
creating short animated
videos of the cases themselves, right?

750
00:40:28,833 --> 00:40:31,633
So you don't just have to listen to them
describe it.

751
00:40:31,633 --> 00:40:32,633
The guests,

752
00:40:32,633 --> 00:40:36,700
the witness, will have had a hand
in creating those short videos,

753
00:40:36,900 --> 00:40:39,900
so you'll kind of get to see it
from their perspective,

754
00:40:39,933 --> 00:40:41,100
and then you'll get to listen

755
00:40:41,100 --> 00:40:44,166
to the guest for our members,
if you sign up at Safe Aerospace.

756
00:40:44,166 --> 00:40:49,733
Org and join our membership program,
you can receive those interviews early.

757
00:40:49,766 --> 00:40:54,333
They'll also be invited to join the guests
after the interview for and ask me

758
00:40:54,333 --> 00:40:57,333
anything where they can get in there
after they've listened to the case.

759
00:40:57,333 --> 00:40:59,766
And of course,
probably have a million questions

760
00:40:59,766 --> 00:41:01,000
and make sure they have the opportunity

761
00:41:01,000 --> 00:41:04,000
to get in there
and ask those questions with the witness.

762
00:41:04,100 --> 00:41:05,900
So, you know,
why is that important? Right?

763
00:41:05,900 --> 00:41:10,100
You know, a lot of people have podcast,
but it's much bigger than a podcast.

764
00:41:10,133 --> 00:41:10,566
You know,

765
00:41:10,566 --> 00:41:13,966
these stories are really important
and they will change minds

766
00:41:13,966 --> 00:41:15,200
and people's perspective.

767
00:41:15,200 --> 00:41:18,033
And they're not doing any good
either on the shelf

768
00:41:18,033 --> 00:41:22,000
or in an analyst spreadsheet
in the government somewhere.

769
00:41:22,100 --> 00:41:23,933
And so we want to share them.

770
00:41:23,933 --> 00:41:28,100
We want to demonstrate the people
how to actually have a rational,

771
00:41:28,133 --> 00:41:31,200
reasonable conversation
about these experiences,

772
00:41:31,366 --> 00:41:32,800
build that corpus of knowledge.

773
00:41:32,800 --> 00:41:37,433
And when we do that, you know,
we've learned that at Safe Aerospace

774
00:41:37,433 --> 00:41:38,966
that more people report,

775
00:41:38,966 --> 00:41:42,366
we talk about a pilot with a commercial,
a case with a commercial pilot,

776
00:41:42,366 --> 00:41:45,800
and we'll have other commercial pilots
decide to reach out after hearing that

777
00:41:45,800 --> 00:41:48,800
or someone that seen something similar.

778
00:41:48,833 --> 00:41:52,933
And so the hope and here's looking at you,
you know,

779
00:41:53,233 --> 00:41:55,166
if you have seen something, report it.

780
00:41:55,166 --> 00:41:57,966
Go to safe aerospace dog slash reports.

781
00:41:58,933 --> 00:42:00,833
Submit your report.

782
00:42:00,833 --> 00:42:01,700
We'll assess it.

783
00:42:01,700 --> 00:42:05,766
We'll reach out to you, get more details
and debrief with you and provide you

784
00:42:05,766 --> 00:42:09,633
the same options we've provided others
about potentially submitting these reports

785
00:42:09,633 --> 00:42:11,233
to some of these other stakeholders.

786
00:42:11,233 --> 00:42:13,966
If you prefer to keep that private,
that's completely fine.

787
00:42:13,966 --> 00:42:17,633
Maybe have you on the podcast
to discuss your case publicly.

788
00:42:17,766 --> 00:42:21,400
And so, you know,
now we have both this distribution

789
00:42:21,400 --> 00:42:25,800
platform to share these cases
and also a more sophisticated system

790
00:42:25,800 --> 00:42:27,600
to accept these reports
and understand them.

791
00:42:27,600 --> 00:42:30,000
And that's going to give us this
this loop that I think

792
00:42:30,000 --> 00:42:31,900
is really going to run away and provide

793
00:42:31,900 --> 00:42:33,966
not just us, a better understanding,
but everyone else,

794
00:42:33,966 --> 00:42:36,600
because we're going to be riding
along with you on this.

795
00:42:36,600 --> 00:42:39,966
The two things there
that I want to point out is for

796
00:42:39,966 --> 00:42:43,600
for audience members about like Ryan's
saying, you know, report it.

797
00:42:43,600 --> 00:42:46,900
And someone may be like, well, but
but what, you know, information security,

798
00:42:46,933 --> 00:42:47,733
like how,

799
00:42:47,733 --> 00:42:51,133
you know, will my name be attached to this
if you're not ready for that?

800
00:42:51,433 --> 00:42:55,233
And so something just to, to, to reinforce
is that the behind the scenes work

801
00:42:55,233 --> 00:42:58,600
which we will have, you know,
sort of future guests and talks of various

802
00:42:58,600 --> 00:43:03,200
members from, from the ASA community
that will drive this deeper.

803
00:43:03,200 --> 00:43:08,400
But we're achieving what I might say,
like a level of compliance in many ways to

804
00:43:08,733 --> 00:43:13,433
at the for the database
to be able to ensure that the reporter

805
00:43:13,933 --> 00:43:17,900
or report person, the submitter and his
or any identifying information

806
00:43:17,900 --> 00:43:21,500
they choose to share that that
that there's ways to be protecting that

807
00:43:21,500 --> 00:43:25,533
and decoupling it from the report itself
so that if you're submitting something,

808
00:43:25,566 --> 00:43:26,933
you're not going to be seeing it

809
00:43:26,933 --> 00:43:29,033
like on The New York Times and,
you know, tomorrow

810
00:43:29,033 --> 00:43:30,766
kind of thing with your name
attached to that.

811
00:43:30,766 --> 00:43:32,533
It's that's not that's not how we roll.

812
00:43:32,533 --> 00:43:34,600
And we also we also.

813
00:43:34,600 --> 00:43:37,233
Have a separate field
where location. Right.

814
00:43:37,233 --> 00:43:40,333
You tell us you saw it at your house
and give us your address that doesn't

815
00:43:40,333 --> 00:43:44,000
go into a final report or like be dropping
your, you know, exact home.

816
00:43:44,200 --> 00:43:45,633
All of that is coursed out

817
00:43:45,633 --> 00:43:49,733
so that there's an uncertainty
in the reporting locations such that,

818
00:43:49,766 --> 00:43:53,333
you know, no individual witnesses
giving away any personal information.

819
00:43:54,100 --> 00:43:54,766
So yeah, thanks.

820
00:43:54,766 --> 00:43:57,533
Thanks for for raising that issue.
Would it be?

821
00:43:57,533 --> 00:44:01,533
I think it would be maybe interesting
because we've touched on

822
00:44:01,533 --> 00:44:06,433
some of the of where ASA is,
and we're a lot more to go into on that.

823
00:44:06,433 --> 00:44:08,300
But and also a little bit of the vision
of where it's

824
00:44:08,300 --> 00:44:11,300
going in the shorter and longer term
with what we're building.

825
00:44:11,400 --> 00:44:14,400
But could you take us
and give us a look at what you think, ace?

826
00:44:14,566 --> 00:44:17,633
Like, say, when you founded
the organization, what you thought

827
00:44:17,700 --> 00:44:22,500
Asa would be and a little bit of that
the delta of now what what it is today.

828
00:44:22,600 --> 00:44:23,133
Yeah.

829
00:44:23,133 --> 00:44:26,133
You know, when we started the organization

830
00:44:26,166 --> 00:44:29,166
originally we weren't
really receiving that many reports.

831
00:44:29,633 --> 00:44:34,633
And so the idea of starting the 501 C
three nonprofit was to really just have

832
00:44:34,633 --> 00:44:38,633
the same organizational tools that
anyone else operating in DC could use,

833
00:44:38,733 --> 00:44:41,833
have a have a platform
to share the public messaging

834
00:44:41,933 --> 00:44:44,366
with the public
in order to reduce the stigma,

835
00:44:44,366 --> 00:44:48,300
just produce maybe some small thought
pieces on the recommendations

836
00:44:48,300 --> 00:44:50,633
we had for moving forward.
That would be productive.

837
00:44:50,633 --> 00:44:53,033
But once we started receiving
so many reports

838
00:44:53,033 --> 00:44:56,566
that had useful information
attached to it, that turned this

839
00:44:56,566 --> 00:45:01,533
into understanding things from the scope
of my experience to having a broader

840
00:45:01,533 --> 00:45:06,300
understanding of this widespread problem
that wasn't just a Navy fighter

841
00:45:06,300 --> 00:45:11,333
pilot problem or a US problem,
but a global concern.

842
00:45:11,766 --> 00:45:13,833
And so that really,
you know, informed our,

843
00:45:14,800 --> 00:45:18,400
our solution space of of where we could go
and what would be useful.

844
00:45:18,533 --> 00:45:21,800
You know, we talked with so many pilots,
both individually from their reports

845
00:45:21,800 --> 00:45:24,800
as well as organizations and unions,

846
00:45:25,133 --> 00:45:29,033
and there was still a lot of discomfort
around talking about this.

847
00:45:29,800 --> 00:45:32,533
And so, you know, ultimately, over time,

848
00:45:32,533 --> 00:45:37,000
having this large corpus of information
that was mind changing, right?

849
00:45:37,033 --> 00:45:40,300
It would change people's mind to hear this
many credible reports.

850
00:45:40,300 --> 00:45:41,333
How do we leverage that?

851
00:45:41,333 --> 00:45:42,833
How do we expand that,

852
00:45:42,833 --> 00:45:46,733
and how do we put the technical
rigor behind it such that the information

853
00:45:46,733 --> 00:45:51,233
isn't just doesn't just feel good,
but is something that can be studied

854
00:45:51,400 --> 00:45:56,433
in a formalized way that allows us
to progress along a path of increasing

855
00:45:56,433 --> 00:46:01,500
knowledge versus just, you know, kind of
jumping from one question to another.

856
00:46:01,533 --> 00:46:02,700
Right.

857
00:46:02,700 --> 00:46:05,400
And, you know,
I think what we've put together

858
00:46:05,400 --> 00:46:09,766
on the database side and are continuing to
do so is a huge step in that.

859
00:46:10,000 --> 00:46:13,533
And I think, you know, frankly,
the timing couldn't be better.

860
00:46:13,566 --> 00:46:16,733
As I said, I don't think
this conversation, you know, ASA

861
00:46:16,733 --> 00:46:19,933
doesn't just go away
if just quote unquote disclosure happens,

862
00:46:19,966 --> 00:46:22,600
you know, in a week or something,
the same problems will exist,

863
00:46:22,600 --> 00:46:26,500
the same need for risk
mitigation will exist.

864
00:46:26,566 --> 00:46:29,966
So we need to plan for the future,
you know, five, eight years from now,

865
00:46:30,000 --> 00:46:33,800
not necessarily trying to plan in 6
or 12 month increments.

866
00:46:33,800 --> 00:46:37,166
And I think, you know, it's bigger
than just

867
00:46:37,566 --> 00:46:41,400
the reports that we receive
and our analysis of it.

868
00:46:41,600 --> 00:46:44,600
What other tools
can we bring into the conversation

869
00:46:45,033 --> 00:46:49,100
to supplement those report
or to generate new reports?

870
00:46:49,100 --> 00:46:53,300
And you know, what I'm talking about here
is real time sensor

871
00:46:53,433 --> 00:46:57,700
detections in American aerospace,
I think, need to move towards a modality

872
00:46:57,700 --> 00:47:01,900
where the were receiving
the most current information possible.

873
00:47:01,900 --> 00:47:07,566
And I think that we do that through
a sensor network across the United States.

874
00:47:08,000 --> 00:47:10,000
Now that sounds ambitious.

875
00:47:10,000 --> 00:47:12,933
There are there's something called
the price performance curve.

876
00:47:12,933 --> 00:47:13,533
Right.

877
00:47:13,533 --> 00:47:14,800
The performance gets better.

878
00:47:14,800 --> 00:47:16,033
The cost goes up.

879
00:47:16,033 --> 00:47:18,933
As the cost goes down,
the performance is less good.

880
00:47:18,933 --> 00:47:23,400
What is the minimally viable spot
on the the that curve

881
00:47:23,800 --> 00:47:28,833
that enables us to get low quality
sensor kits to individuals

882
00:47:28,833 --> 00:47:30,800
such that
they can put them in their backyard

883
00:47:30,800 --> 00:47:33,800
and grow a network
organically on that side.

884
00:47:33,900 --> 00:47:38,300
What are the other stops up
that cost performance curve

885
00:47:38,333 --> 00:47:42,000
that allow us to have more exquisite
detection capabilities

886
00:47:42,000 --> 00:47:45,933
and analytical capabilities that you can't
get at those cheaper ranges,

887
00:47:46,000 --> 00:47:49,000
but perhaps you can't deploy
as many of them, right?

888
00:47:49,000 --> 00:47:51,533
What does that configuration look like?

889
00:47:51,533 --> 00:47:54,566
What's optimal
and what is needed to actually add value

890
00:47:54,566 --> 00:47:58,600
and understanding into this conversation
in that scientifically structured way?

891
00:47:59,100 --> 00:48:02,733
And, you know, the database
that we're designing and building out

892
00:48:02,733 --> 00:48:07,333
will have that interface, maybe
not on day zero, but shortly afterwards

893
00:48:07,333 --> 00:48:10,433
where we'll be able
to, starting with limited modalities,

894
00:48:10,500 --> 00:48:15,400
be able to ingest sensor data from kits
that we've been designing

895
00:48:15,400 --> 00:48:18,600
and as well as look to the rest of the
the UAP

896
00:48:19,100 --> 00:48:21,700
science and engineering community

897
00:48:21,700 --> 00:48:22,700
to see if they would like to

898
00:48:22,700 --> 00:48:27,633
integrate their sensors into those
into that backbone as well, creating a

899
00:48:27,933 --> 00:48:31,566
a centralized analytical engine
that will be able to both ingest

900
00:48:31,566 --> 00:48:37,166
a witness data, publicly available data
and hardware based real time data

901
00:48:37,300 --> 00:48:41,000
and turn it all into a single fuzed
picture of what's happening in the sky.

902
00:48:41,433 --> 00:48:46,700
And that's, I think,
what's going to lead us to a increase.

903
00:48:47,100 --> 00:48:49,633
I hesitate to use the word plethora,
but I'll use it.

904
00:48:49,633 --> 00:48:53,200
A plethora of multimodal, correlated data

905
00:48:54,166 --> 00:48:55,433
of a quality that I don't

906
00:48:55,433 --> 00:48:58,433
think we have right now
outside of the military.

907
00:48:59,300 --> 00:49:02,500
And so when I look to five years down

908
00:49:02,500 --> 00:49:06,233
the future,
I see ace as the brain of that operation.

909
00:49:06,433 --> 00:49:10,333
But that brain is helping to support
a whole ecosystem

910
00:49:10,400 --> 00:49:14,000
of hardware innovators
that want to deploy these systems

911
00:49:14,833 --> 00:49:17,166
across the United States,
across the world, potentially.

912
00:49:17,166 --> 00:49:22,500
There's some super exciting things
that can be done with that because like,

913
00:49:22,533 --> 00:49:24,933
for example,
I have like a weather station,

914
00:49:24,933 --> 00:49:27,933
a personal weather station
that run, run at my homestead.

915
00:49:27,933 --> 00:49:31,900
And that's something that okay, we take
barometer, you know, and then we got some,

916
00:49:31,933 --> 00:49:36,100
you know, like wind direction and
some other normal meteorological things.

917
00:49:36,400 --> 00:49:39,500
And so then if what will it look like?

918
00:49:39,766 --> 00:49:44,233
It may not be that atypical in
a couple of years that we may be able to

919
00:49:44,300 --> 00:49:47,533
if we're like sort of citizen scientists
and you want to contribute your data

920
00:49:47,533 --> 00:49:51,833
to this kind of network
that you'd also add on some sensor

921
00:49:51,833 --> 00:49:55,733
or sensors that we find
are also very useful for, for helping to,

922
00:49:55,800 --> 00:49:58,233
to do anomaly detection, particularly
for different kinds of object.

923
00:49:58,233 --> 00:50:01,233
Maybe it's infrared, maybe it's whatever,
some sort of like, you know,

924
00:50:01,333 --> 00:50:05,500
phased array thing that is cost
effective enough for someone.

925
00:50:05,900 --> 00:50:06,566
Yeah. Yeah.

926
00:50:06,566 --> 00:50:09,100
There's a there's a
and so that's super tight.

927
00:50:09,100 --> 00:50:12,966
And I expect that, one of our future
episodes will be featuring

928
00:50:13,233 --> 00:50:17,366
some of the team members and core team
members with NASA who have certainly like

929
00:50:17,400 --> 00:50:21,400
ten x 100 x, the kind of like sensor
payload that you would find from

930
00:50:21,766 --> 00:50:24,700
in someone's backyard that are these
these individuals

931
00:50:24,700 --> 00:50:28,100
are extremely technically competent
and really looking at trying to like

932
00:50:28,166 --> 00:50:32,133
if we can what what phenomena, physics
phenomena can we exploit

933
00:50:32,500 --> 00:50:34,533
and then how do we make sense of all that
data come in.

934
00:50:34,533 --> 00:50:35,900
If you collect it, that's one part.

935
00:50:35,900 --> 00:50:38,700
Then you've got to sort of process
that that gets into some of the the like

936
00:50:38,700 --> 00:50:41,900
sort of weak signal kind of models
that we talked about earlier in the show.

937
00:50:41,933 --> 00:50:45,100
And so it's I know I'm
personally super excited about that.

938
00:50:45,100 --> 00:50:48,100
And I think a lot of the audience members,
you may also be like,

939
00:50:48,200 --> 00:50:51,966
oh, maybe that's a way that that I, down
the road can be able to contribute

940
00:50:51,966 --> 00:50:55,900
is to explore this and how
how much you know, how how cool can it

941
00:50:55,900 --> 00:51:00,166
be to use like a Raspberry
Pi to, to help explore the phenomena

942
00:51:00,366 --> 00:51:03,366
well and actually share it out
to the rest of the community?

943
00:51:03,433 --> 00:51:05,500
It's empowering that way. Yeah.

944
00:51:05,500 --> 00:51:06,533
So I mean, so

945
00:51:07,766 --> 00:51:08,766
it's come a long way and

946
00:51:08,766 --> 00:51:11,766
it's in its relatively short life,
but now it's it's a

947
00:51:11,800 --> 00:51:16,800
it's a nonprofit vehicle to help
get us into this.

948
00:51:16,833 --> 00:51:19,300
Well,
we think really sort of strategic position

949
00:51:19,300 --> 00:51:24,033
to not just talk about the issues
but and start to positively influence

950
00:51:24,033 --> 00:51:26,900
policy development,
but also to be building

951
00:51:26,900 --> 00:51:30,500
the infrastructure, physical
and otherwise, around around this.

952
00:51:30,566 --> 00:51:34,233
A critic may say, well, but Ace has got
I don't know, is there some sort of

953
00:51:34,300 --> 00:51:36,333
like vested interest in in this?

954
00:51:36,333 --> 00:51:39,933
How how might we as an organization
and as individuals

955
00:51:39,966 --> 00:51:43,233
so avoid some of the kind of confirmation
bias as or other sort of,

956
00:51:43,300 --> 00:51:46,933
you know, like thumb on the scale
kind of kind of claims that someone may.

957
00:51:46,966 --> 00:51:48,166
Yeah. I mean.

958
00:51:48,166 --> 00:51:51,933
I guess the answer is, I damn right
I got a vested interest.

959
00:51:51,933 --> 00:51:54,133
I want to know what the fuck's going
on, you know, like.

960
00:51:54,133 --> 00:51:56,166
So I mean, that's. My best interest.

961
00:51:56,166 --> 00:51:59,400
So ultimately you wouldn't be able
to have volunteered

962
00:51:59,500 --> 00:52:03,233
and donated as much time as I have
over the past four years and less.

963
00:52:03,400 --> 00:52:05,700
You're passionate
about getting down to the bottom of this.

964
00:52:05,700 --> 00:52:10,133
But, you know, with any endeavor,
you know, if you are not operating

965
00:52:10,400 --> 00:52:11,333
in a way that,

966
00:52:11,333 --> 00:52:14,600
you know, rubs up against reality,
then you're just deluding yourself, right?

967
00:52:14,633 --> 00:52:19,166
And so I actually do have a real vested
interest in figuring this out.

968
00:52:19,166 --> 00:52:22,966
And that means I need to really understand
this from a scientific,

969
00:52:23,000 --> 00:52:24,033
you know, perspective.

970
00:52:24,033 --> 00:52:28,100
Actually, you know, what is really
happening here, what is the reality of it.

971
00:52:28,100 --> 00:52:31,433
And that that dictates that I must use
best scientific principles

972
00:52:31,433 --> 00:52:32,133
in order to move forward.

973
00:52:32,133 --> 00:52:34,900
I'm not a scientist. I'm not.
I don't have a PhD.

974
00:52:34,900 --> 00:52:37,166
I have a bachelor's
degree in aerospace engineering.

975
00:52:37,166 --> 00:52:38,833
So I can talk some of the talk.

976
00:52:38,833 --> 00:52:42,500
But at the end of the day,
you know, this isn't a one person task.

977
00:52:42,566 --> 00:52:45,200
And that's why, you know,
I've consistently and we've consistently

978
00:52:45,200 --> 00:52:49,566
looked at academia both to motivate
and to potentially partner.

979
00:52:49,900 --> 00:52:52,900
I've spoken at of universities,

980
00:52:52,900 --> 00:52:55,566
you know, tier
one schools around the country on this.

981
00:52:55,566 --> 00:52:59,600
There is interest, but there is
this old guard that still is a bit tepid

982
00:52:59,600 --> 00:53:03,000
of sinking their feet into this,
you know, amongst the professorship,

983
00:53:03,000 --> 00:53:06,500
as I'm sure you can relate to,
but one that is changing.

984
00:53:06,500 --> 00:53:07,766
We are seeing progress there.

985
00:53:07,766 --> 00:53:10,166
But, you know, Ayeza is going to have
to rely on partnering

986
00:53:10,166 --> 00:53:14,133
with those organizations
to make sure that the work done on

987
00:53:14,133 --> 00:53:17,366
this is done
agnostic through third parties.

988
00:53:17,366 --> 00:53:18,833
And that's the goal, right?

989
00:53:18,833 --> 00:53:22,366
If I if we get to a point
where our data is of such high quality

990
00:53:23,033 --> 00:53:26,933
and scientifically valid, it's traceable
and the data

991
00:53:26,966 --> 00:53:28,633
has been collected in a standardized way

992
00:53:28,633 --> 00:53:33,500
that is useful to the scientific analysis
that an academic would like to pursue.

993
00:53:33,733 --> 00:53:34,900
That's where we want to get.

994
00:53:34,900 --> 00:53:39,100
And then I'm happy to make that data
readily available to many institutions

995
00:53:39,100 --> 00:53:42,100
so that they can do their analysis
and tell us,

996
00:53:42,200 --> 00:53:45,333
you know, hopefully fulfill my my desire
to know what's going on.

997
00:53:45,500 --> 00:53:50,200
And that's something that I think is about
like, I want to know what's going on.

998
00:53:50,200 --> 00:53:52,000
Yes, I have a vested interest in this.

999
00:53:52,000 --> 00:53:53,733
And and I see a parallel

1000
00:53:53,733 --> 00:53:57,700
in some of the academic community
where there may be professors.

1001
00:53:57,966 --> 00:54:01,000
Some certainly are quiet about it,
but very interested.

1002
00:54:01,166 --> 00:54:04,300
There's a little more, more visible
in the public realm.

1003
00:54:04,533 --> 00:54:06,100
Where they are on the ten year letter.

1004
00:54:06,100 --> 00:54:07,800
That certainly makes a big difference.

1005
00:54:07,800 --> 00:54:11,500
You know, not not all
professors are tweed jack

1006
00:54:11,566 --> 00:54:13,966
that wearing pipe smoke and folks
who wax philosophy,

1007
00:54:13,966 --> 00:54:16,966
maybe the philosophy professors are,
but for the rest of the rest of them,

1008
00:54:17,133 --> 00:54:17,900
I'm not so much.

1009
00:54:17,900 --> 00:54:20,900
I've heard it, you know, commentary
within the academic circles like, well,

1010
00:54:20,900 --> 00:54:24,200
but isn't, you know, professor So-and-so,
he or she doesn't.

1011
00:54:24,333 --> 00:54:27,333
Aren't they, like, aren't
they just exhibiting their opinion

1012
00:54:27,500 --> 00:54:30,633
about the phenomena in some way and all?

1013
00:54:30,633 --> 00:54:33,766
There are going to be based
on that opinion.

1014
00:54:33,766 --> 00:54:36,766
And I'm like, there's a healthy aspect.

1015
00:54:36,766 --> 00:54:39,733
We want to have skepticism,
but not to to our own,

1016
00:54:39,733 --> 00:54:43,200
like dismissal
and not recognizing blinders on.

1017
00:54:43,200 --> 00:54:45,966
Ostrich algorithm of
just put your head in the sand.

1018
00:54:45,966 --> 00:54:49,200
It's yeah, there's an opinion about that.

1019
00:54:49,366 --> 00:54:51,766
I think there might be something there.

1020
00:54:51,766 --> 00:54:57,166
And then I will design an experiment to
hopefully get some sort of clarification.

1021
00:54:57,166 --> 00:55:00,333
That's the point of the scientific
process, is to establish a hypothesis

1022
00:55:00,533 --> 00:55:04,633
and then the methodology
and how other folks evaluate that and say,

1023
00:55:05,200 --> 00:55:05,933
okay, yeah.

1024
00:55:05,933 --> 00:55:11,166
And and to the point that hopefully
within the various sort of domains of UAP

1025
00:55:11,400 --> 00:55:14,400
that we can get to where
like many other scientific instrument

1026
00:55:14,433 --> 00:55:17,900
groups like say in medicine,
where can we get to the point where

1027
00:55:17,900 --> 00:55:21,233
we have some sort of a sensor package
or a case package,

1028
00:55:21,400 --> 00:55:25,000
and we can sort of delete
all the proper nouns, like the name

1029
00:55:25,000 --> 00:55:28,033
and stuff, of who submitted it
and that, that detail,

1030
00:55:28,133 --> 00:55:33,033
and then just send this data payload
to some other researcher group and say,

1031
00:55:33,633 --> 00:55:35,033
what do you think about this?

1032
00:55:35,033 --> 00:55:37,700
And, and then get their kind of
independent assessment

1033
00:55:37,700 --> 00:55:38,700
in the medical community.

1034
00:55:38,700 --> 00:55:40,333
We do that all the time

1035
00:55:40,333 --> 00:55:44,533
to to get a second or third opinion
on, say, a radiological image.

1036
00:55:44,633 --> 00:55:45,133
Yeah.

1037
00:55:45,133 --> 00:55:46,633
You know, at the end of the day,

1038
00:55:46,633 --> 00:55:49,966
you know, I'll even make it even simpler
for our listeners.

1039
00:55:50,333 --> 00:55:56,166
You don't need to do publish a paper
or do some type of study that reaches this

1040
00:55:56,166 --> 00:56:01,166
conclusion that your foes equal aliens or,
you know, they're from here.

1041
00:56:01,166 --> 00:56:04,000
You can do an analysis,
and I'll use an interesting example

1042
00:56:04,000 --> 00:56:06,433
that pops to mind,
because a recent conversation with Gary

1043
00:56:06,433 --> 00:56:10,166
Nolan, you can do a detailed
material analysis on something

1044
00:56:10,166 --> 00:56:13,633
proposed to be exotic and study the

1045
00:56:14,166 --> 00:56:18,200
crystal alignment and formation
and striations in the material,

1046
00:56:18,400 --> 00:56:21,700
blah, blah, blah, and,
and publish the results of that,

1047
00:56:21,700 --> 00:56:24,300
but not necessarily reach a conclusion
of what that data means.

1048
00:56:24,300 --> 00:56:24,800
Right.

1049
00:56:24,800 --> 00:56:28,766
You can present the data
in a scientifically valid way,

1050
00:56:28,766 --> 00:56:32,333
but you don't have to reach a conclusion
necessarily of what that means, right?

1051
00:56:32,366 --> 00:56:36,233
You can present the data clean and allow
allow them to then make an interpretation

1052
00:56:36,233 --> 00:56:37,566
of what that data means.

1053
00:56:37,566 --> 00:56:39,233
And I don't think there's enough of that.

1054
00:56:39,233 --> 00:56:43,600
There's too much of that is a UAP
that is not a UAP.

1055
00:56:44,400 --> 00:56:46,200
And here's some quick analysis.

1056
00:56:46,200 --> 00:56:50,800
But if you if you can really just study
what's in front of you

1057
00:56:50,833 --> 00:56:54,900
for what the contents of it provide,
what can you know about it versus

1058
00:56:54,966 --> 00:56:56,000
then therefore

1059
00:56:56,000 --> 00:57:00,500
drawing a conclusion to therefore must
be aliens or something of that nature.

1060
00:57:00,500 --> 00:57:03,533
And you see that a little bit
where people are really decomposing

1061
00:57:03,533 --> 00:57:06,733
some of the cases
I know the Kimble case I was involved with

1062
00:57:07,000 --> 00:57:10,800
has been through rigorous,
you know, modeling and analysis,

1063
00:57:11,033 --> 00:57:12,733
and I don't think that's that's done
enough.

1064
00:57:12,733 --> 00:57:15,533
And I think that's something that can be
probably

1065
00:57:15,533 --> 00:57:18,733
I don't want to use a word automated,
but I'll just say structured.

1066
00:57:19,033 --> 00:57:23,233
And right now it's like a 6 to 8 months
a year process for people to say, yeah,

1067
00:57:23,300 --> 00:57:23,800
look at that.

1068
00:57:23,800 --> 00:57:24,233
And guess what?

1069
00:57:24,233 --> 00:57:30,433
People and do this kind of volunteerism
to understand these, you know,

1070
00:57:30,500 --> 00:57:32,766
if we were truly talking about something
remarkable here,

1071
00:57:32,766 --> 00:57:34,566
that's not how this is going to progress,
right?

1072
00:57:34,566 --> 00:57:38,300
We need to have some real systems
involved with this, some standardization,

1073
00:57:38,566 --> 00:57:41,333
building some architectures
and softwares around this

1074
00:57:41,333 --> 00:57:44,566
that are going to allow us to analyze this
like we would any other problem

1075
00:57:45,166 --> 00:57:48,166
that we try to attack,
whether it be semiconductor manufacturing

1076
00:57:48,166 --> 00:57:51,500
or whether modeling
or, you know, the price of,

1077
00:57:52,533 --> 00:57:54,100
you know, comparable issues on eBay.

1078
00:57:54,100 --> 00:57:54,300
Right?

1079
00:57:54,300 --> 00:57:55,833
We measure everything, right?

1080
00:57:55,833 --> 00:57:58,500
We need to measure this to. Yes.

1081
00:57:58,500 --> 00:57:59,933
It's something that I found

1082
00:57:59,933 --> 00:58:03,800
useful is like well, within
it was one of our guest speakers with

1083
00:58:03,900 --> 00:58:05,933
within the Confronting
Knowns course at MIT.

1084
00:58:05,933 --> 00:58:09,600
A research scientist from the Haystack
Observatory is described

1085
00:58:09,600 --> 00:58:13,766
how how to develop
new algorithms and technologies.

1086
00:58:14,100 --> 00:58:18,766
And within the geophysics community,
it's well, if we think there's a couple

1087
00:58:18,800 --> 00:58:21,800
interesting pixels
on a huge iMac sized screen

1088
00:58:21,833 --> 00:58:24,433
and we think there's a couple pixels
are a little anomalous,

1089
00:58:24,433 --> 00:58:27,166
how do we or are they just like dead
pixels or something, like,

1090
00:58:27,166 --> 00:58:28,133
how do we test that?

1091
00:58:28,133 --> 00:58:31,366
And the ways of being able
to tease that out in a systematic way to

1092
00:58:31,400 --> 00:58:35,333
to multiple independent groups
and see, say, try legacy

1093
00:58:35,333 --> 00:58:39,166
or new algorithms against it
and let's come back in six months and see,

1094
00:58:39,500 --> 00:58:43,000
do we all get the same result within 70%?

1095
00:58:43,000 --> 00:58:45,800
And if yes, then okay,
there's something there.

1096
00:58:45,800 --> 00:58:47,700
We just have to figure out what it is.

1097
00:58:47,700 --> 00:58:50,700
And if we were to, in six months,
get completely different things,

1098
00:58:50,700 --> 00:58:52,900
then the algorithms are generating

1099
00:58:52,900 --> 00:58:56,600
artifacts or we're doing some sort
of like mosaic effect on that.

1100
00:58:56,900 --> 00:59:01,500
I want to use this time, Ryan,
to to dig into something

1101
00:59:01,500 --> 00:59:05,800
I know we're all here for,
which is a bit more about the cases

1102
00:59:05,933 --> 00:59:07,700
that we've been been exploring.

1103
00:59:07,700 --> 00:59:09,700
And so, you know, with without, you know,

1104
00:59:09,700 --> 00:59:11,566
too much specifics, whatever,
whatever we can share.

1105
00:59:11,566 --> 00:59:15,233
Let's look at some of the cases lately
that that have surprised you or some,

1106
00:59:15,400 --> 00:59:17,966
some patterns that you're starting to see.
Yeah.

1107
00:59:17,966 --> 00:59:21,500
I mean, gosh, it's,
it's a weird position to be in.

1108
00:59:21,500 --> 00:59:23,900
The received
so many crazy reports like this.

1109
00:59:24,900 --> 00:59:25,766
A lot for the head.

1110
00:59:25,766 --> 00:59:26,200
Yeah.

1111
00:59:26,200 --> 00:59:29,133
I mean, just gosh,
it just raises so many questions.

1112
00:59:29,133 --> 00:59:33,333
But you know, let me try to give a kind of
like status of the playing field as,

1113
00:59:33,500 --> 00:59:37,133
as I kind of see it,
you know, so, you know, there seems to be,

1114
00:59:37,166 --> 00:59:41,033
I would say maybe like three kind
of categories of phenomenon.

1115
00:59:41,100 --> 00:59:44,900
Maybe, there's the spheres sometimes

1116
00:59:44,933 --> 00:59:47,966
or metallic spheres in the daytime
sometimes they're a bit elongated.

1117
00:59:48,000 --> 00:59:52,700
I'd even maybe wrap the TikTok into that
as well, like a much larger

1118
00:59:53,133 --> 00:59:54,400
elongated sphere. Right.

1119
00:59:54,400 --> 00:59:59,833
And nighttime,
these can represent as orange or,

1120
01:00:00,900 --> 01:00:03,900
white or blue or green.

1121
01:00:03,900 --> 01:00:06,000
A lot of different colors
have been reported,

1122
01:00:06,000 --> 01:00:09,900
as well as some rainbow
effects of the object changing color.

1123
01:00:09,966 --> 01:00:12,133
You know,
these are kind of fit two categories.

1124
01:00:12,133 --> 01:00:13,900
One, they're very far away.

1125
01:00:13,900 --> 01:00:15,766
And it's really hard
to make out much detail.

1126
01:00:15,766 --> 01:00:19,366
So they generally present as an orb
or a point source of light,

1127
01:00:19,600 --> 01:00:23,733
or they are in closer proximity
or to different phenomena, of course.

1128
01:00:23,733 --> 01:00:28,033
And you can physically make out it's
there's an interior structure.

1129
01:00:28,366 --> 01:00:32,933
Now, are these the same objects
I have some reason to believe they are.

1130
01:00:32,966 --> 01:00:34,600
And I'll share that with you in a moment.

1131
01:00:34,600 --> 01:00:39,900
But these, like I said, are often seen
very high altitudes, potentially in orbit,

1132
01:00:39,966 --> 01:00:44,400
performing in ways that are not consistent
with how things behave in orbit.

1133
01:00:44,400 --> 01:00:45,500
And of course,

1134
01:00:46,433 --> 01:00:48,700
as I think many of us are aware now,

1135
01:00:48,700 --> 01:00:52,900
the proliferation of satellites
and low Earth orbit vis a vis

1136
01:00:53,400 --> 01:00:59,000
Starlink and other providers,
there is a lot of strange visual artifacts

1137
01:00:59,033 --> 01:01:02,033
that exist now for pilots

1138
01:01:02,100 --> 01:01:05,100
and others that didn't exist
just a few years ago,

1139
01:01:05,400 --> 01:01:09,100
where it appears like
the object is rapidly changing position,

1140
01:01:09,100 --> 01:01:13,633
when in fact that object
is blinking out along its linear path.

1141
01:01:13,733 --> 01:01:18,300
And then a number object
basically blinks into indivisibility

1142
01:01:18,533 --> 01:01:19,533
almost at the same point.

1143
01:01:19,533 --> 01:01:22,733
And that's because there's a band
above the earth that you can't see

1144
01:01:22,733 --> 01:01:26,233
that defines where the sunlight
allows for reflectivity.

1145
01:01:26,600 --> 01:01:31,233
So if you're in that band as a satellite
traverses enter that band, become visible.

1146
01:01:31,500 --> 01:01:34,700
You're like, it blinked out of nowhere,
and then it reaches the end of that band.

1147
01:01:34,733 --> 01:01:37,900
It blinks out,
and sometimes satellites can arrive

1148
01:01:37,900 --> 01:01:42,800
from a different direction,
and one blinks in and it blinks out.

1149
01:01:42,800 --> 01:01:43,433
And just as this

1150
01:01:43,433 --> 01:01:46,433
one blinks out, the other one blinks in
from the other direction, kind of,

1151
01:01:46,533 --> 01:01:49,200
and it looks like it changed direction
and the angles aren't clear.

1152
01:01:49,200 --> 01:01:50,800
Severe as I'm making out with my hands.

1153
01:01:50,800 --> 01:01:52,933
But, so it gives the appearance

1154
01:01:52,933 --> 01:01:56,166
that the object is rapidly
changing position when it's not.

1155
01:01:56,633 --> 01:01:57,733
And there's many other different

1156
01:01:57,733 --> 01:02:01,366
effects like that,
but there are some ways to identify

1157
01:02:01,566 --> 01:02:05,000
that it's not startling,
such as it being consistently visible

1158
01:02:05,133 --> 01:02:09,100
and illuminated in
and outside of that band for long extended

1159
01:02:09,100 --> 01:02:12,833
periods of time, or at times when the sun
is completely behind the Earth

1160
01:02:12,900 --> 01:02:16,700
and while it's fully illuminated,
making those maneuvers.

1161
01:02:17,100 --> 01:02:20,366
And that might sound a bit nuanced,
but it can be as easy as

1162
01:02:20,933 --> 01:02:24,100
somewhat tricky ambiguous case
I described versus

1163
01:02:24,133 --> 01:02:27,133
watching these things circle
each other for hours during a flight.

1164
01:02:27,133 --> 01:02:27,400
Right?

1165
01:02:27,400 --> 01:02:30,366
And obviously satellites don't do that,
and they certainly don't stay in

1166
01:02:30,366 --> 01:02:33,366
one piece of the sky like that
unless they're very far away.

1167
01:02:33,433 --> 01:02:36,900
And if they were very far away,
the amount of space

1168
01:02:36,900 --> 01:02:40,033
they would be maneuvering to cover
that is so large

1169
01:02:40,033 --> 01:02:43,166
that these things would be tens
of thousands of miles per hour.

1170
01:02:43,166 --> 01:02:45,500
I can I don't even know,
probably hundreds of thousands of miles.

1171
01:02:45,500 --> 01:02:49,900
So, you know, they that's kind of
some of the uncertainty that we deal with.

1172
01:02:49,900 --> 01:02:54,033
Now, what are those are those advanced
technologies, some kind of space

1173
01:02:54,033 --> 01:02:57,200
combat systems that we're not aware of
that are operating?

1174
01:02:57,233 --> 01:03:00,633
Is there some other type of optical
illusion that we're not familiar with?

1175
01:03:00,966 --> 01:03:02,233
Low probability on that.

1176
01:03:02,233 --> 01:03:04,000
But we can throw it on the table.

1177
01:03:04,000 --> 01:03:06,966
So that's, you know, one kind of question
mark area.

1178
01:03:06,966 --> 01:03:09,600
Again we're seeing these things as well

1179
01:03:09,600 --> 01:03:13,533
Co altitude with aircraft sometimes
joining on aircraft along their wing,

1180
01:03:14,100 --> 01:03:17,200
moving up and down, repositioning
to the other side of the flight

1181
01:03:17,233 --> 01:03:18,800
for like an hour and a half. Right.

1182
01:03:18,800 --> 01:03:21,733
And that's of course
a whole different type of experience.

1183
01:03:21,733 --> 01:03:26,500
In some of those cases, when the aircraft
starts to sent down to land,

1184
01:03:26,533 --> 01:03:27,700
these things will climb

1185
01:03:27,700 --> 01:03:30,733
until they're no longer visible
and some of them go down towards the ocean

1186
01:03:30,733 --> 01:03:31,400
and park there.

1187
01:03:31,400 --> 01:03:34,533
And the pilots have reported
like seeing the water illuminated

1188
01:03:34,600 --> 01:03:36,966
with a different color
light from these objects.

1189
01:03:36,966 --> 01:03:41,833
They're appearing at lower altitudes
as well, at approach altitudes

1190
01:03:41,833 --> 01:03:46,400
for aircraft, seeing them at 1500
or 2000ft on approaches in the airports,

1191
01:03:46,500 --> 01:03:50,500
much more congested, busy
and dangerous part of the flight.

1192
01:03:50,733 --> 01:03:55,000
And so, you know,
to kind of tie in something interesting,

1193
01:03:56,033 --> 01:03:59,200
you know, often any of those
three categories are just described to you

1194
01:03:59,200 --> 01:04:03,900
or kind of seen individually,
a pilot on approach or a commercial pilot

1195
01:04:03,933 --> 01:04:07,566
has these things on this wing
or they're seeing them high above.

1196
01:04:08,133 --> 01:04:11,433
I've had interesting cases
where witnesses, groups of them

1197
01:04:11,700 --> 01:04:15,100
have observed that very high altitude
maneuvering

1198
01:04:15,366 --> 01:04:18,233
for extended periods of time, 30,
40 minutes,

1199
01:04:18,233 --> 01:04:22,233
and then watched as he seems
to send it down all the way down

1200
01:04:22,233 --> 01:04:26,033
from where L2 they were,
to about 20ft over the witness.

1201
01:04:26,333 --> 01:04:29,700
And in this particular case,
there's about 25 U.S.

1202
01:04:29,700 --> 01:04:32,400
Marines that were exposed to this.

1203
01:04:32,400 --> 01:04:35,700
This object came
it was about 15ft in diameter,

1204
01:04:35,933 --> 01:04:37,633
consistent with the same size objects

1205
01:04:37,633 --> 01:04:39,233
we were seeing off the coast
of Virginia Beach.

1206
01:04:39,233 --> 01:04:44,800
And it was described as a disco ball,
more or less object, so multifaceted,

1207
01:04:44,833 --> 01:04:48,733
collecting a lot of light, also emitting
its own light out of some of these panels.

1208
01:04:48,766 --> 01:04:50,766
I think that's an extremely interesting
case.

1209
01:04:50,766 --> 01:04:51,766
And there's others like it

1210
01:04:51,766 --> 01:04:55,433
where people have observed these
very high altitudes, but also watch them

1211
01:04:55,566 --> 01:05:00,100
to send all the way down to
within visual range and had interactions.

1212
01:05:00,633 --> 01:05:03,100
At the end of this, these things
climb back up.

1213
01:05:03,100 --> 01:05:05,533
So that's,
you know, a whole complicated category.

1214
01:05:05,533 --> 01:05:08,033
And there's much more
we could talk about under those.

1215
01:05:08,033 --> 01:05:11,433
Interestingly, you know, maybe
a little bit more on the softer side.

1216
01:05:11,433 --> 01:05:13,300
But for those cases with those

1217
01:05:13,300 --> 01:05:16,900
those fears, interestingly,
about 30% of the witnesses

1218
01:05:16,900 --> 01:05:21,633
that we've received information from on
those have had a intuition

1219
01:05:21,633 --> 01:05:22,966
that they were about to see something,

1220
01:05:22,966 --> 01:05:26,200
maybe turned off the TV and walked outside
or pulled over their car,

1221
01:05:27,000 --> 01:05:29,966
looked in a certain direction,
maybe even made a comment to someone

1222
01:05:29,966 --> 01:05:31,566
right before about how crazy it would be

1223
01:05:31,566 --> 01:05:34,166
if we just saw one,
and then boom, there it was.

1224
01:05:34,166 --> 01:05:34,833
It's data.

1225
01:05:34,833 --> 01:05:38,600
I don't know what it means,
but it's a pretty, pretty strong signal.

1226
01:05:38,933 --> 01:05:40,700
We'll see how to unpack that.

1227
01:05:40,700 --> 01:05:45,766
I think it's a it's a call for the folks
of the amenities, folks who are like,

1228
01:05:46,100 --> 01:05:49,733
there's a there's definitely a role for
for that kind of expertise.

1229
01:05:49,900 --> 01:05:50,633
Absolutely.

1230
01:05:50,633 --> 01:05:54,466
Within UAP, it's
not just let's make swanky or sensors.

1231
01:05:54,933 --> 01:05:57,400
It's there's a lot to it's multi-domain.
Yeah.

1232
01:05:57,400 --> 01:06:01,166
And so that's the spheres, you know,
and then you know, ever reoccurring

1233
01:06:01,200 --> 01:06:06,000
or black triangles, as I'm sure people
interested in a topic I've heard before,

1234
01:06:06,566 --> 01:06:07,766
this is a phenomenon

1235
01:06:07,766 --> 01:06:11,100
that has been described,
I think back to at least the 50s, where

1236
01:06:11,200 --> 01:06:15,366
about 100 yards to a side triangle,
black triangle, thin gun,

1237
01:06:15,533 --> 01:06:20,133
metal stock or sheer black color,
they're almost always described

1238
01:06:20,133 --> 01:06:23,733
with purple or blue lights at the corners

1239
01:06:23,733 --> 01:06:27,733
of the triangle on the bottom,
presumably some type of propulsion device,

1240
01:06:28,033 --> 01:06:32,800
and very often with a
a red light in the center of the craft.

1241
01:06:32,833 --> 01:06:34,966
Numerous commercial pilots
have reported this.

1242
01:06:34,966 --> 01:06:39,333
Numerous commercial pilots have had very
close near-misses with black triangles.

1243
01:06:39,366 --> 01:06:42,566
I have a case of a 737 crew

1244
01:06:43,000 --> 01:06:46,300
having a nose and nose past 200ft

1245
01:06:46,933 --> 01:06:50,800
with a black triangle, very similar to how
I just described this one had almost

1246
01:06:50,800 --> 01:06:56,833
like a glowing like orange golden plasma
field on the bottom, as if almost.

1247
01:06:57,033 --> 01:07:01,000
It was like reentering, you know,
from space one might expect or imagined.

1248
01:07:01,000 --> 01:07:02,200
That's how he described it.

1249
01:07:02,200 --> 01:07:05,233
And, you know, there's a half dozen
other cases of black triangles

1250
01:07:05,233 --> 01:07:08,766
having your passes near misses
with commercial air traffic in the past,

1251
01:07:08,933 --> 01:07:10,366
I think 8 or 10 years.

1252
01:07:10,366 --> 01:07:14,000
And so those always continue to pop up
a lot of report to those on ground.

1253
01:07:14,100 --> 01:07:16,200
People always ask me what
I think they are.

1254
01:07:16,200 --> 01:07:19,766
You know,
I will say that they do seem to land

1255
01:07:19,766 --> 01:07:24,166
a lot on military bases
and NASA basis, for whatever reason.

1256
01:07:24,366 --> 01:07:27,366
And yet,
like I said, have remained unchanged

1257
01:07:27,366 --> 01:07:31,000
in their appearance in operation
since the 50s or so.

1258
01:07:31,100 --> 01:07:34,100
I don't know how to square
those two pieces of information.

1259
01:07:34,166 --> 01:07:35,933
And, you know, then there seems to be just

1260
01:07:35,933 --> 01:07:39,733
this whole other category of stuff
that is extraneous, right?

1261
01:07:39,766 --> 01:07:43,100
Almost like everyone's individual, as if,
you know, it's hard

1262
01:07:43,100 --> 01:07:47,400
to make sense of the shape, you know,
like maybe there's appendages or just,

1263
01:07:47,800 --> 01:07:50,366
you know, boxes and things
that just like the brain doesn't

1264
01:07:50,366 --> 01:07:52,900
look at it and make sense of
of what the operation is.

1265
01:07:52,900 --> 01:07:55,800
It doesn't look like anything
that we would expect.

1266
01:07:55,800 --> 01:07:59,300
Or maybe we interpret it as something like
Jetpack Man, if you will.

1267
01:07:59,300 --> 01:08:02,100
There's one that kind of
looks like a guy riding in a jetpack.

1268
01:08:02,100 --> 01:08:05,200
Is that a guy who jetpack, or is it
something that we don't understand

1269
01:08:05,200 --> 01:08:08,966
how it works and can't point to anything
and say, well, that looks like that.

1270
01:08:08,966 --> 01:08:09,900
That looks like a camera.

1271
01:08:09,900 --> 01:08:12,366
That looks like an antenna, right.

1272
01:08:12,366 --> 01:08:14,600
And there's many,
many such cases like that.

1273
01:08:14,600 --> 01:08:14,966
Gosh.

1274
01:08:14,966 --> 01:08:18,300
And, you know, I could probably go
on all day, very large spheres the size

1275
01:08:18,300 --> 01:08:21,933
of, you know, football stadiums
being seen over aircraft carriers,

1276
01:08:22,366 --> 01:08:25,966
Russians
apparently waiting for black triangles

1277
01:08:25,966 --> 01:08:29,333
to appear out of nowhere over their ships
in the middle of the Atlantic

1278
01:08:29,800 --> 01:08:32,100
while the U.S. watches.

1279
01:08:32,100 --> 01:08:34,633
I mean, I can't make sense of it yet,

1280
01:08:34,633 --> 01:08:37,700
but all I know is something
remarkable is happening, you know?

1281
01:08:38,133 --> 01:08:40,366
And I know I'm
not the only one that feels that way.

1282
01:08:40,366 --> 01:08:42,033
I know, at least at some level.

1283
01:08:42,033 --> 01:08:47,300
That's why you're here at American Pharoah
space to help get these answers as well.

1284
01:08:47,633 --> 01:08:51,833
And I think, you know, when people take
just a few minutes to just think about

1285
01:08:51,833 --> 01:08:56,866
the risk of understanding this, right,
or the risk of ignoring it.

1286
01:08:57,100 --> 01:08:58,000
Right.

1287
01:08:58,000 --> 01:09:01,433
They'll understand that, you know,
this should be information

1288
01:09:01,433 --> 01:09:05,033
that they prioritize into their,
you know, daily operations.

1289
01:09:05,033 --> 01:09:06,600
And for the average person,

1290
01:09:06,600 --> 01:09:10,500
that might not be much thought,
but for the, the pilots and,

1291
01:09:11,100 --> 01:09:15,133
the service members out there,
this is something that not only you might

1292
01:09:15,133 --> 01:09:18,866
just bump into prosaically,
but it also might be something that poses

1293
01:09:19,000 --> 01:09:24,300
a significant risk to your life
and operations as a pilot or someone else.

1294
01:09:24,400 --> 01:09:28,000
So, you know,
I think, if nothing else, you know, as

1295
01:09:28,100 --> 01:09:32,633
perhaps we close off this episode,
you know, I want to make a plea.

1296
01:09:33,200 --> 01:09:35,333
Well, first, actually,
I would like to thank,

1297
01:09:35,333 --> 01:09:36,866
you know, the hundreds of pilots

1298
01:09:36,866 --> 01:09:39,633
that have already come forward
that have already said,

1299
01:09:39,633 --> 01:09:42,966
you know, screw the stigma of showed,
you know, the backbone

1300
01:09:43,033 --> 01:09:45,800
and the fortitude to say,
hey, this is important.

1301
01:09:45,800 --> 01:09:50,933
And I'm not going to let my fear of what
my boss is going to say or what my, my

1302
01:09:51,033 --> 01:09:54,033
friends and colleagues are going to say,
I'm not going to let that stop me

1303
01:09:54,333 --> 01:09:58,200
from the responsibilities
that I have as a pilot to report unsafe

1304
01:09:58,200 --> 01:10:02,133
conditions as I observe them,
not just for myself or for my passengers,

1305
01:10:02,200 --> 01:10:03,933
but for the air crew behind me.

1306
01:10:03,933 --> 01:10:06,100
That's going to be on that same route,
or for the guy

1307
01:10:06,100 --> 01:10:09,100
that's going to take his jet out
and use that area after you.

1308
01:10:09,133 --> 01:10:13,566
We all know that we have a responsibility
to share that as as aviators.

1309
01:10:14,033 --> 01:10:15,300
And so let's act on it.

1310
01:10:15,300 --> 01:10:18,766
And, you know, we're here
for you and Americans for Safe Aerospace

1311
01:10:18,766 --> 01:10:22,200
to have these conversations
to get the story out there,

1312
01:10:22,200 --> 01:10:25,633
whether it's through the podcast
or just adding the data to our database

1313
01:10:25,633 --> 01:10:29,766
so that we can better understand it
and help share that information for you.

1314
01:10:29,766 --> 01:10:32,766
So if you're a current pilot,

1315
01:10:32,766 --> 01:10:36,333
former pilot
veteran, we'd love to talk to you.

1316
01:10:36,366 --> 01:10:38,866
We'd love to hear
what's going on. It is important.

1317
01:10:38,866 --> 01:10:42,766
It is being used
and it is changing the world right now.

1318
01:10:42,800 --> 01:10:45,533
So come be a part of it. Come help us out.

1319
01:10:45,533 --> 01:10:46,533
For those that haven't

1320
01:10:46,533 --> 01:10:50,566
had their experience yet,
I'll say if you would like to help us

1321
01:10:50,566 --> 01:10:53,633
out, like and subscribe to this.

1322
01:10:53,633 --> 01:10:56,700
This will get us to make more content
and every one of those

1323
01:10:56,700 --> 01:10:59,500
likes and subscribes
doesn't just help this channel,

1324
01:10:59,500 --> 01:11:02,400
it helps our whole organization build
and do the work that you've heard

1325
01:11:02,400 --> 01:11:03,233
about today.

1326
01:11:03,233 --> 01:11:06,166
I've been working on this for four years.

1327
01:11:06,166 --> 01:11:08,433
We've been getting our hands real dirty.

1328
01:11:08,433 --> 01:11:13,133
We're coming out on the other side
with some really interesting capabilities,

1329
01:11:13,133 --> 01:11:17,533
with some, I think, knowledge that is
really moving the conversation forward.

1330
01:11:17,766 --> 01:11:20,633
And, you know, at the end of the day,

1331
01:11:20,633 --> 01:11:24,700
we're just at the absolute
start of the start,

1332
01:11:24,833 --> 01:11:27,500
I think in this conversation. Right.

1333
01:11:27,500 --> 01:11:31,333
We are absolutely
just about to run through that start line.

1334
01:11:31,400 --> 01:11:33,533
This is going to be a long conversation.

1335
01:11:33,533 --> 01:11:36,766
This isn't something that is going away
in a couple of years.

1336
01:11:37,133 --> 01:11:40,633
And so if you want to be a part
of that conversation now and help us out,

1337
01:11:40,933 --> 01:11:43,633
we're here for you. Ryan has demonstrated

1338
01:11:45,033 --> 01:11:46,633
what it takes to be a leader,

1339
01:11:46,633 --> 01:11:50,733
and something that I'd like to add to that
is that being a leader is one thing,

1340
01:11:50,733 --> 01:11:55,700
and being the follower is that that
first followers super critical.

1341
01:11:56,066 --> 01:11:59,200
And there have been, as you mentioned,
there's there have been many pilots

1342
01:11:59,533 --> 01:12:03,233
in aircrew and other folks who have
followed up and saw your leadership

1343
01:12:03,233 --> 01:12:06,933
and said, I'm going to follow that path
that you started to lay.

1344
01:12:07,733 --> 01:12:12,133
And we we need more of you
all to, to to be able to do that.

1345
01:12:12,133 --> 01:12:14,366
And so I think to close out, it's
that we're,

1346
01:12:14,366 --> 01:12:17,866
you know, with Americans for Safe
Aerospace, we're, we're, we're

1347
01:12:18,333 --> 01:12:22,366
people building, striving to build
the most kind of rigorous look at what

1348
01:12:22,433 --> 01:12:25,933
maybe going on in our, in our skies
and our sees all domain.

1349
01:12:26,600 --> 01:12:29,133
And to tell you what what

1350
01:12:29,133 --> 01:12:32,133
what they know what the builders
to tell you what they know.

1351
01:12:32,233 --> 01:12:37,633
And also importantly, to
to tell us what we don't know yet.

1352
01:12:38,400 --> 01:12:39,100
And so.

1353
01:12:39,100 --> 01:12:40,033
And we'll build it together,

1354
01:12:40,033 --> 01:12:43,166
you know, we'll be bringing on the people
that are doing this work.

1355
01:12:43,166 --> 01:12:45,866
We'll be looking for volunteers
through this channel, and,

1356
01:12:45,866 --> 01:12:48,200
you know, we'll make a mess
and embarrass ourselves sometimes.

1357
01:12:48,200 --> 01:12:52,033
But, we'll we'll build it together
and we'll use it together at the end.

1358
01:12:52,533 --> 01:12:56,400
Well, with that,
that's the Safe Aerospace podcast.

1359
01:12:56,433 --> 01:12:59,033
Ryan, it's so great to to be with you.

1360
01:12:59,033 --> 01:13:00,133
Thanks for coming out.

1361
01:13:00,133 --> 01:13:02,600
Thanks for letting me ask you questions
and for any of you.

1362
01:13:02,600 --> 01:13:04,233
And me. Thank you sir. Thanks everyone.