Open Source Intelligence

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Hey. This is Jason Edison from Intel techniques,
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and you are listening to, firewalls don't stop
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dragons.
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Hello, everybody. Welcome back to firewalls don't stop
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dragons. I'm your host Carrie Parker. Today we
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have episode 386
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for 07/22/2024.
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And, man, do we have an amazing interview
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for you today? I have been looking forward
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to 1 for a long time.
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There's been some, honestly, There's been some great
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interviews this year if I say so myself.
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But this is this a really fun 1.
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Jason was an amazing
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interview guest. And the topic matter I think
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was just fascinating.
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We're going to talk about Open source intelligence
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or os
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today.
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Jason is the perfect person to talk to
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you about this because he works, this from
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both sides.
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His day job working
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for basically law enforcement
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is finding people using open source intelligence and
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kinda his night job or off job is
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helping people to not get found by stalker
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and
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abusive of spouses or just people who want
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to up their privacy game. So he's just
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an absolutely perfect person to talk to you
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about this subject.
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And we're gonna talk about some things that
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I bet most of you are not that
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familiar with. And we'll be surprised to find
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out
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how much information about you is, out there,
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and is readily available to anybody who knows
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how to look for it. So the interview
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was a little bit long so I'm gonna
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keep the preview very short Just real quick,
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we talked about a few terms, but I
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wanna throw out real quick. We talk about
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Fo, and that's F0IA
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or Freedom of Information Act.
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That is a law that allows people to
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request information from their government
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in the spirit of transparency
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which I think is a noble goal, but
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it turns out that
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you can actually request information just on other
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people that might have public records,
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And most of these
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agencies will gladly turn that over. He also
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mentions in kind of the same breath, A
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think called a Pd or a public disclosure
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request.
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That is,
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along the same lines as a 4 year
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request, I guess, different places called different things.
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And finally, we talk about docs. Thing and
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we will explain what that term means, but
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it comes from the term documents
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and basically getting the information about somebody public
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documents on people So that's really all I
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need to set this up. Let's get right
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to my interview with Jason Ep.
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Jess Edison is a 25 year veteran for
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a major Us police department where he serves
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as the technical lead for the agency's criminal
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intelligence and cyber crime sections. Prior to this,
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you ran undercover an electronic surveillance operations for
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long term organized crime
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investigations, And last but certainly not least, Jason
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runs the Open source intelligence, privacy and security
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training programs
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at intel techniques dot com. Welcome to the
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show, Jason. Hey, Carrie. How's is it going?
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I'm so looking forward to this... I've been
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following you guys for a while.
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You guys literally wrote the book on privacy.
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Michael Ba allen and yourself. I I... I'm
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not sure what how you that up, but
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you guys have had some great tools and
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some great articles and
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I've been a following that for a long
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time. So I'm really, really psyche to get
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you on the show. And I've been wanting
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to do a show focused on open source
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intelligence.
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And I can't think of a better person
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to do that with. So thank you for
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being here. So why don't you tell start,
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you know, stop a little bit more about
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your background, Tell us? You know, what sorts
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of things you do for the police department?
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And I'm very curious to know what it's
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like to run undercover electronic surveillance? What is
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that... What does that work and entail exactly?
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Sure. And I always like to start off
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by giving a little bit of a background.
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It is weird for those of us in
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the privacy industry to talk about ourselves publicly.
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But
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on the intelligence side, we always say information
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does not become intelligence until you have context
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for it. Right? And so it's important that
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when people are listening to my 2 cents
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worth, on some of the topics we're gonna
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cover today that they understand where I come
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from because that's going to bring into play
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my own perspectives, maybe my own biases, those
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different things. So My background is primarily in
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law enforcement in the Us. I started in
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the mid nineties and have worked everything. From
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being a patrol officer to street crimes like,
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doing undercover street buys.
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In the early 2 thousands, I... Worked into
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a task force position with the Fbi and
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worked organized crime for about 7 years, primarily
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doing field surveillance, electronic surveillance under undercover work,
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long term undercover cases.
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And then 20 10, I moved to our
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intelligence unit and have been doing intelligence in
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cyber crime
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investigations ever since.
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And then on the side, my second career,
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I work for Michael Biz
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at intel techniques,
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teaching bull offensive and defensive cyber. So basically,
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Open source intelligence, so we teach a lot
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of 3 letter agencies, private sector intelligence teams,
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all sorts of folks how to gather
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information off of the Internet effectively.
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And then we also go out and do
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a lot of cyber training. So we I
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take what I've learned from investigating,
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cyber crimes and in trading cyber crime groups,
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and we go out and do keynote notes
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and Do kind of a version of what
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you do with this podcast of trying to
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spread awareness.
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I've brought this up a couple times, but
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I really wanna get... Give this from a
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pro. What is Os? How do you define
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open source intelligence?
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What does that turn mean And what are
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maybe... And what are to kinda bring it
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home, what are some common sources
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of Os and and how do you access
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them?
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Sure.
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So open source intelligence is just a fancy
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way of saying being good at searching on
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the Internet. In the and technically, it's even
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more than just searching on the Internet. The
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origins of Os or open source intelligence was,
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like, collecting newspaper articles going to the library
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and pulling up micro fees. You know? It's
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basically being good at research. But in the
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modern age,
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95 percent of that research is going to
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be on the Internet because we can get
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to so much
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information so quickly.
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So that is sort of the textbook version
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of what it is. What I always like
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to add in there because I think there's
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a pretty big spectrum.
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Of, I guess, quality of open source intelligence
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work is
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you... If you're going to do this as
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a
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profession and not just a hobby
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You need to also build up basic intelligence
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skills, which is things like gaining that context
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for what you find, fact checking.
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Sourcing.
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And basically being accountable for the research you
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do. And that's 1 of the big differences
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See these days is there's a lot of
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people doing
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online research open source intelligence,
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but
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I
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professionals, we should all be checking our work,
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showing our work and being accountable for our
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work. So I was like to add in
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that extra east because sometimes when people come
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in
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and go through our training,
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you know, I can I can teach them
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all the technical skills pretty easy, piece But
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sometimes the more important things are procedural,
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ethics,
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and all of those other things that sometimes
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we forget about? Right? It it all falls
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under that with great power comes great responsibility.
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And it sounds a little like journalism honestly.
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Yes. Yeah. And we we train a fair
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number of large,
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yeah, news agencies and journalists and attorneys. Like,
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we have a pretty diverse range of people
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that we train, our bread and butter are
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definitely in, like, government,
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military,
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intelligence teams at Fortune 500 companies, all of
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that. But
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really os is something that could be used
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in any field. Like, literally, I ran my
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2 kids through my classes
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just to help them at being better at
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doing things like researching their papers that the
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right oh tool.
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I and I got I got a lot
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of rolls when I did that, and I
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think mostly what my daughter got out of
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it was figuring out how to writ music
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and things off of the Internet, But it
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was still
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it was still kinda fun to go through
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it with them. Yeah. And I I'd just...
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You know,
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I can't tell you how many times when
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I tell people, like, well, you know, when
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do Google searches. You can do things like
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minus in front of words to ignore those
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and put quotes around things that have spaces
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in them or if you wanna make sure
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it's they exactly the way you type it.
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And there there's a lot of simple things
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like that. People are like, oh, wow, really?
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You know, there's there's a lot there's a
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lot of kinda hidden features even it just
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a straight up Google slash, you know, duck
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search that a lot of people I don't
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think Understand. But, yeah. This is this is
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always obviously way beyond it. I'm just making
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the point that there's a lot of things
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that that are
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that are available to people that that they
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don't even understand it there. So so what
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what company are you talking about? When you
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go searching, you... I I assume you're doing
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more than just a Google search. So what
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other...
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Types of sites good... I mean, if you've
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got a
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on your website, You've got, like, multiple dozen
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links to search sites. So what other places
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do you search looking for people info.
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Yeah. You know, surprisingly or maybe not surprisingly.
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Google is super effective. So there's a fair
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number of operations and investigations where I can
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find everything I need just using a browser
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in Google. And that actually is my preference
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because, you know, again, at the end of
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the day, I have to be accountable for
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my research, and a lot of my work
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ends up in court Right? Mh So when
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I have to testify to something, it's actually
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real nice if I get asked, like, hey,
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detective edison.
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What secret spy tools did you use like
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this, and I can look at the jury
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and say, well, I use this secret spy
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tool called Google? You might be familiar with
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it. And so as much as possible, it's
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actually nice to kinda stay in the shallow
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end of the pool and use
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tools that we can show are completely publicly
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available.
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Now,
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obviously, sometimes we have to go beyond the
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scope of Google
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to broaden our results
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and, you know, it really depends on the
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engagement we're doing. But if doing a homicide
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or we're doing a domestic terrorism case or
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something like that. We're gonna kick over every
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stone. Right? Like, we're we're not gonna stop
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20 minutes in. We're I I think my
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longest case was about 3 and a half
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years.
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And for that, we want those depth of
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resources.
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And as you mentioned on our site until
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techniques are com. We actually have a public
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facing dashboard and our our tools tab, which
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everyone... We built that for everyone who goes
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through our training, but anyone could use it.
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Right? Like, let's say I wanted to check
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my own
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exposure on the Internet. You could go on
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00:10:32,597 --> 00:10:34,760
there. And put in your email address, your
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phone number and those sorts of things,
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and basically hunt yourself, research yourself
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And not only will that give you an
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idea of the types of tools that people
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coming after you are using?
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But it shows you your online exposures, which
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then you could use to do what we
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call a privacy cleanup.
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So I would encourage everyone. These are free
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publicly available. Their open source. Our source code
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is right on the page.
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We do not collect anything. This is just
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there as a free resource for the people
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who do our training programs, but we've made
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it available to everyone. So no strings attached.
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If you wanna know what Os is about
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and try your hand at it, you could
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just hop onto our dashboard and play around.
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I will add this warning though.
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Anytime you do what we call a self
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assessment, that is checking your own
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exposure.
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We don't do that on, like, our work.
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Computer. We don't do that on a public
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computer. We would wanna do that on our
321
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personal private computer because I don't want my
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employer, and in my case my employer's the
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government. So anything I do in my government
324
00:11:40,416 --> 00:11:43,607
equipment is subject to Fo. Right? Mh. So
325
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if you're gonna hunt your vulnerabilities,
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be smart about it. Do it on your
327
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private computer. And then what I do is
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I just have a little privacy journal where
329
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I go through and start taking notes by
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hand. Hey. This site has my phone number.
331
00:11:57,477 --> 00:11:59,554
This site has my date of birth, and
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then I do the same for my kids.
333
00:12:02,111 --> 00:12:03,331
Wow, so,
334
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I've often heard the term do, and I
335
00:12:05,790 --> 00:12:07,141
I think I could probably define that, but
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I wanna I wanna hear you define that...
337
00:12:09,208 --> 00:12:10,956
It sounds like what you're basically recommended it
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is you try to docs yourself. To see
339
00:12:13,275 --> 00:12:15,420
what's out there. Let's talk about that term
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and and and if that's what you meant.
341
00:12:17,723 --> 00:12:20,900
Yeah. So the do is basically a loaded
342
00:12:20,900 --> 00:12:21,956
term. It is basically
343
00:12:22,424 --> 00:12:25,681
using open source intelligence to do harm. So
344
00:12:25,681 --> 00:12:29,018
you're not exactly docks yourself. But what what
345
00:12:29,018 --> 00:12:30,869
you are doing is you're
346
00:12:31,417 --> 00:12:34,199
attacking yourself from the position of someone who
347
00:12:34,199 --> 00:12:36,265
is a cyber criminal or a doctor. So
348
00:12:36,265 --> 00:12:38,332
what do, how that usually happens is,
349
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me and a bunch of other kinda idiots
350
00:12:41,936 --> 00:12:44,808
on the Internet, see someone, like a public
351
00:12:44,808 --> 00:12:47,215
figure or you know, a lot of times
352
00:12:47,215 --> 00:12:48,890
the do has to do with what I
353
00:12:48,890 --> 00:12:50,245
call the Ism, racism,
354
00:12:50,804 --> 00:12:53,355
sexism. There's almost always some sort of bias
355
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involved. And so,
356
00:12:55,363 --> 00:12:56,953
you know, I'm on the Internet with my
357
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group of idiots and we're like, hey,
358
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this person dared to say this thing or
359
00:13:01,643 --> 00:13:04,187
this person is evil. We we should get
360
00:13:04,187 --> 00:13:04,346
them.
361
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And then we basically,
362
00:13:06,824 --> 00:13:08,095
like lord of the flies.
363
00:13:08,572 --> 00:13:10,875
Pile on, dig through their life cyber stock
364
00:13:10,875 --> 00:13:12,941
them, and then we post all the personal
365
00:13:12,941 --> 00:13:15,983
stuff online to make them fearful or uncomfortable.
366
00:13:16,303 --> 00:13:18,620
So that is the key component. It is
367
00:13:18,620 --> 00:13:21,337
done with the intent to create fear. It
368
00:13:21,337 --> 00:13:22,936
is done to harass.
369
00:13:23,415 --> 00:13:25,982
Right? Mh. And I I think sometimes these
370
00:13:25,982 --> 00:13:27,974
things are cloaked in this idea of oh,
371
00:13:28,133 --> 00:13:30,204
It's the great good because they're evil, so
372
00:13:30,204 --> 00:13:32,366
we should out them. But man, that is
373
00:13:32,366 --> 00:13:34,533
a dangerous road to go on where we're
374
00:13:34,589 --> 00:13:37,130
standing judgment of other people often and without
375
00:13:37,130 --> 00:13:39,376
all the details. And sometimes it's just flat
376
00:13:39,432 --> 00:13:39,988
malicious. Right?
377
00:13:41,037 --> 00:13:43,907
Both Michael, my partner, Michael and I had
378
00:13:44,226 --> 00:13:46,059
a bunch of people on 4 chan come
379
00:13:46,059 --> 00:13:48,052
after as several years ago and decide, we're
380
00:13:48,052 --> 00:13:50,374
gonna docs because they're teaching people how to
381
00:13:50,374 --> 00:13:53,792
investigate us. And, like, literally, they were calling
382
00:13:53,792 --> 00:13:56,986
in social engineering our employers. They were you
383
00:13:56,986 --> 00:13:59,207
know, doing everything short of digging through our
384
00:13:59,207 --> 00:13:59,445
trash.
385
00:14:00,080 --> 00:14:02,539
Now, my partner, Michael is pretty much the
386
00:14:02,539 --> 00:14:04,681
invisible man, so they had 0 luck there
387
00:14:04,681 --> 00:14:06,794
for Like, their their skills
388
00:14:07,174 --> 00:14:09,355
were not up to par with their
389
00:14:09,894 --> 00:14:11,575
kind of their narrative around the whole thing,
390
00:14:11,735 --> 00:14:13,495
so they weren't really able to take that
391
00:14:13,495 --> 00:14:15,440
very. Far, but there are definitely
392
00:14:15,972 --> 00:14:17,639
a lot of people who fall victim to
393
00:14:17,639 --> 00:14:20,498
detox and we're lot of damages done. A
394
00:14:20,498 --> 00:14:22,840
lot of them are far on the privacy
395
00:14:22,897 --> 00:14:24,567
side of our business where we do a
396
00:14:24,567 --> 00:14:26,714
lot of cleanup ups or move people. Like,
397
00:14:26,873 --> 00:14:29,815
literally, people getting cyber stocked so badly, we
398
00:14:29,815 --> 00:14:31,326
have to move them to a different home.
399
00:14:32,139 --> 00:14:33,980
We see a lot of this boxing as
400
00:14:33,980 --> 00:14:36,159
part of cyber harassment and
401
00:14:36,539 --> 00:14:39,179
things like ex. Right? If I can go
402
00:14:39,179 --> 00:14:41,899
in and dig out your personal photos, then
403
00:14:42,057 --> 00:14:44,435
I can start an ex scheme to you.
404
00:14:44,672 --> 00:14:47,209
We see that a lot both on our...
405
00:14:47,526 --> 00:14:49,316
For high profile targets
406
00:14:49,693 --> 00:14:52,324
and clients, but also just on everyday people.
407
00:14:52,483 --> 00:14:53,839
I see it in my day job too
408
00:14:53,839 --> 00:14:56,231
as a detective. Ex is a big deal.
409
00:14:56,963 --> 00:14:58,553
You'd already basically, I mentioned, You're you're kinda
410
00:14:58,553 --> 00:14:59,689
of basically playing,
411
00:15:00,222 --> 00:15:01,653
like, often offense during the day in defense
412
00:15:01,653 --> 00:15:02,527
at night kind of thing.
413
00:15:03,243 --> 00:15:04,674
You're you're doing both sides of this thing.
414
00:15:04,912 --> 00:15:05,412
So
415
00:15:06,438 --> 00:15:08,511
how how does each 1 of those inform
416
00:15:08,511 --> 00:15:08,989
the other?
417
00:15:09,786 --> 00:15:10,982
And and I'll go ahead and bring up
418
00:15:10,982 --> 00:15:11,939
the question you kind of alluded allude to,
419
00:15:12,098 --> 00:15:13,533
you know, someone who works for the government
420
00:15:13,533 --> 00:15:14,170
in intelligence,
421
00:15:14,983 --> 00:15:16,578
and who is also a privacy you have
422
00:15:16,578 --> 00:15:18,413
to get? You know, what are what are
423
00:15:18,413 --> 00:15:20,566
your thoughts on master surveillance? What do... How
424
00:15:20,566 --> 00:15:22,401
how do you do both? And how do
425
00:15:22,401 --> 00:15:23,916
they... How do how do they affect each
426
00:15:23,916 --> 00:15:25,282
other from you play both sides.
427
00:15:26,155 --> 00:15:28,297
Yeah. And I I think the short answer
428
00:15:28,297 --> 00:15:31,549
is just like anything else, having experience on
429
00:15:31,549 --> 00:15:33,872
both the offensive... When and defensive sides is
430
00:15:33,872 --> 00:15:36,825
huge. Right? Because you can anticipate a tax.
431
00:15:37,065 --> 00:15:40,438
You know what sort of, a threat model
432
00:15:40,737 --> 00:15:43,386
you are in and what sort of attack
433
00:15:43,386 --> 00:15:46,020
surface you have because you've been the attacker
434
00:15:46,020 --> 00:15:48,733
before. Right? And folks who work in the
435
00:15:48,733 --> 00:15:51,062
info sec field, folks who work in military,
436
00:15:51,381 --> 00:15:54,251
anything where we do things, like red teaming
437
00:15:54,251 --> 00:15:56,642
where Red teaming is basically where you and
438
00:15:56,722 --> 00:15:58,635
I works together, and we attack each other,
439
00:15:58,889 --> 00:16:01,287
so we get used to defending against the
440
00:16:01,287 --> 00:16:03,764
attacks. Right? Mh. That's like a real simple
441
00:16:03,764 --> 00:16:05,602
example. That the whole idea of a red
442
00:16:05,602 --> 00:16:08,134
team is attack ourselves so that we learn
443
00:16:08,254 --> 00:16:10,317
both sides of that equation and can test
444
00:16:10,317 --> 00:16:13,174
our defenses. So there's definite advantages there.
445
00:16:13,809 --> 00:16:16,110
1 training I went to years ago, I
446
00:16:16,269 --> 00:16:17,558
I was going through a boot cam to
447
00:16:17,558 --> 00:16:19,576
do my certified ethical hacker
448
00:16:20,115 --> 00:16:21,334
certification. And
449
00:16:22,033 --> 00:16:23,790
about halfway through this class. I'm looking around
450
00:16:23,790 --> 00:16:26,692
the room for I am the only non
451
00:16:27,224 --> 00:16:29,606
engineer in the room. Like, there's 30 people
452
00:16:29,606 --> 00:16:31,670
from Info sec, and I I just remember
453
00:16:31,670 --> 00:16:34,626
thinking I am by far the person in
454
00:16:34,626 --> 00:16:37,971
room. Like, these were super smart experience people.
455
00:16:38,768 --> 00:16:40,680
And I... Still so All beat myself up
456
00:16:40,680 --> 00:16:43,070
of like, oh, my gosh. And then... Oh,
457
00:16:43,244 --> 00:16:45,313
By the last day, I had a realization.
458
00:16:46,428 --> 00:16:48,520
Everyone in that room had superior technical
459
00:16:49,055 --> 00:16:52,574
experience and skills. But it became clear because
460
00:16:52,574 --> 00:16:54,647
all the water cooler talking and all the
461
00:16:54,647 --> 00:16:55,944
discussions of
462
00:16:56,560 --> 00:16:59,111
anytime cyber crime came up, even though it
463
00:16:59,111 --> 00:16:59,510
wasn't...
464
00:16:59,922 --> 00:17:03,016
Information security class and about hacking,
465
00:17:04,364 --> 00:17:06,610
no 1 else in the room had ever
466
00:17:06,918 --> 00:17:11,056
had any experience working with, exposure to crime,
467
00:17:11,215 --> 00:17:13,124
like criminals Mh. Like, people that had their
468
00:17:13,124 --> 00:17:15,532
cars proud but nobody had spent time with
469
00:17:15,532 --> 00:17:18,408
criminals. Nobody had infiltrated criminal work. And what
470
00:17:18,568 --> 00:17:20,485
I have the sudden realization was that...
471
00:17:21,299 --> 00:17:24,176
My experience on the investigative side was a
472
00:17:24,176 --> 00:17:27,153
huge benefit to me on the defensive side
473
00:17:27,212 --> 00:17:30,265
because I understand the culture of organized crime.
474
00:17:30,505 --> 00:17:31,884
I understand the culture
475
00:17:32,345 --> 00:17:33,464
of the enemy,
476
00:17:34,025 --> 00:17:35,244
and that is huge
477
00:17:35,545 --> 00:17:38,045
because in in intelligence, we call that cultural
478
00:17:38,265 --> 00:17:40,597
intelligence, organized And I've really come to over
479
00:17:40,597 --> 00:17:41,077
the years,
480
00:17:41,876 --> 00:17:44,832
appreciate how that is a very very important
481
00:17:44,832 --> 00:17:45,332
thing
482
00:17:45,710 --> 00:17:45,950
is,
483
00:17:47,005 --> 00:17:49,404
understanding the adversary. What are their goals? What
484
00:17:49,404 --> 00:17:52,125
are their methods? What are their tendencies? Because
485
00:17:52,125 --> 00:17:53,804
1 of the things we use most in
486
00:17:53,804 --> 00:17:54,304
intelligence
487
00:17:54,605 --> 00:17:55,105
is
488
00:17:55,419 --> 00:17:57,972
people are generally predictable because we tend to
489
00:17:57,972 --> 00:18:00,047
do things and patterns. But if you don't
490
00:18:00,047 --> 00:18:01,085
understand someone's culture,
491
00:18:01,643 --> 00:18:03,055
1, you're not going to be able to
492
00:18:03,332 --> 00:18:05,550
see those patterns into, you're not going to
493
00:18:05,550 --> 00:18:06,422
understand what they mean.
494
00:18:07,294 --> 00:18:09,829
And then as far as government master surveillance,
495
00:18:10,559 --> 00:18:12,876
So that's real interesting for me because I
496
00:18:12,876 --> 00:18:13,855
used to literally
497
00:18:14,234 --> 00:18:17,291
do electronics surveillance, like putting out cameras, putting
498
00:18:17,350 --> 00:18:20,159
hidden you know, recording devices on undercover
499
00:18:20,717 --> 00:18:21,994
inform, things like that.
500
00:18:22,712 --> 00:18:24,708
And now I also work on the private
501
00:18:24,708 --> 00:18:27,194
sector quite a bit for, doing privacy, and
502
00:18:27,354 --> 00:18:29,824
I really care about privacy for myself.
503
00:18:30,620 --> 00:18:32,713
And so this could be a 5 hour
504
00:18:32,851 --> 00:18:34,843
conversation about this. But I will just tell
505
00:18:34,843 --> 00:18:36,211
you having work both sides.
506
00:18:37,085 --> 00:18:38,992
I am not for me and my family
507
00:18:38,992 --> 00:18:42,353
worried about what most people consider mass government
508
00:18:42,568 --> 00:18:44,316
surveillance, like the cameras and all those things,
509
00:18:44,555 --> 00:18:45,785
both what a lot of people
510
00:18:46,238 --> 00:18:49,019
don't realize because a lot of people's idea
511
00:18:49,019 --> 00:18:51,005
of what we do, especially in law enforcement
512
00:18:51,005 --> 00:18:53,966
is driven off. The Internet and shows and
513
00:18:53,966 --> 00:18:56,198
things like that. Yeah. There's no 1 I
514
00:18:56,198 --> 00:18:58,030
work with who shows up at work and
515
00:18:58,030 --> 00:18:59,067
it's, like, you know,
516
00:19:00,359 --> 00:19:02,839
tapping their fingers together like mister Burns on
517
00:19:02,839 --> 00:19:05,240
the simpsons, deciding how we can, you know,
518
00:19:05,400 --> 00:19:06,679
do master surveillance on people,
519
00:19:07,653 --> 00:19:10,119
The reality is it's a lot of not
520
00:19:10,119 --> 00:19:12,585
having enough resources having too many tasks to
521
00:19:12,585 --> 00:19:15,449
do. We can't even catch all the bank
522
00:19:15,449 --> 00:19:15,926
robbers.
523
00:19:16,419 --> 00:19:18,405
And, you know, murderers and all of those
524
00:19:18,405 --> 00:19:20,709
things. Nobody's got the time to spy on
525
00:19:20,709 --> 00:19:23,489
the masses. Right? So that that has been
526
00:19:23,489 --> 00:19:25,411
my experience. I'm not... And you know, I
527
00:19:25,411 --> 00:19:27,877
can't say that there's no hidden secret government
528
00:19:27,877 --> 00:19:30,661
groups somewhere not doing things, But I've worked
529
00:19:30,661 --> 00:19:33,138
with almost every... Let our agency. I work
530
00:19:33,138 --> 00:19:35,516
with all the largest police agencies in the
531
00:19:35,516 --> 00:19:37,839
nation, and a lot of the private sector
532
00:19:38,053 --> 00:19:38,553
intelligence
533
00:19:38,925 --> 00:19:41,404
agencies. We And so I will tell you
534
00:19:41,404 --> 00:19:43,710
having kind of a foot in both sides.
535
00:19:44,665 --> 00:19:47,074
I am more concerned about the massive
536
00:19:47,687 --> 00:19:47,926
collection.
537
00:19:48,498 --> 00:19:50,492
Of just day to day data off of
538
00:19:50,492 --> 00:19:52,885
things like the Internet and taxes and every...
539
00:19:53,284 --> 00:19:55,438
And so on the government side, when I
540
00:19:55,438 --> 00:19:57,113
meet with decision makers,
541
00:19:58,323 --> 00:20:00,937
The drum that I keep beating is we
542
00:20:00,937 --> 00:20:04,027
need to stop collecting so much because we
543
00:20:04,027 --> 00:20:05,057
can't protect it.
544
00:20:05,789 --> 00:20:08,346
I am more concerned as a citizen of
545
00:20:08,346 --> 00:20:10,523
the government getting my data breached
546
00:20:11,142 --> 00:20:13,709
than them putting cameras out. Something like that.
547
00:20:13,947 --> 00:20:15,854
Because I know that is much more likely
548
00:20:15,854 --> 00:20:18,872
to affect me. Right? Now if your threat
549
00:20:18,872 --> 00:20:21,390
model is that the government's, your enemy or
550
00:20:21,509 --> 00:20:23,020
you know, then that probably is going to
551
00:20:23,020 --> 00:20:25,645
be a different perspective for you. But for
552
00:20:25,645 --> 00:20:28,603
me, it's things like, shortly after Covid, there
553
00:20:28,603 --> 00:20:30,058
was a massive nationwide
554
00:20:30,672 --> 00:20:33,853
unemployment scam going on where millions of people
555
00:20:33,853 --> 00:20:35,126
had their identity stolen.
556
00:20:35,618 --> 00:20:37,944
And that was just more incompetence
557
00:20:38,635 --> 00:20:41,994
and lack of resources. So my biggest issue
558
00:20:42,050 --> 00:20:44,273
with the government as far as working there
559
00:20:44,273 --> 00:20:46,825
is, We do not do a good job
560
00:20:46,825 --> 00:20:48,964
of predicting the data we have, and we
561
00:20:48,964 --> 00:20:52,388
need to stop collecting so much. Right? It's
562
00:20:52,388 --> 00:20:53,821
kinda similar to where you go to your
563
00:20:53,821 --> 00:20:56,289
doctor's office, and what I have started saying
564
00:20:56,289 --> 00:20:57,484
when I go to see a doctor is
565
00:20:57,484 --> 00:20:58,997
when they asked for my Social security number,
566
00:20:59,235 --> 00:21:00,111
I politely decline.
567
00:21:00,923 --> 00:21:03,156
They do not need my social security number.
568
00:21:03,396 --> 00:21:06,209
That was a tax number. Right? Mh. So
569
00:21:06,427 --> 00:21:08,660
I think if we can all start bringing
570
00:21:08,660 --> 00:21:11,543
these issues up of, like, why are all
571
00:21:11,543 --> 00:21:12,043
these
572
00:21:12,498 --> 00:21:14,645
organizations, private and public collecting so much in
573
00:21:14,645 --> 00:21:16,020
the first place because
574
00:21:16,554 --> 00:21:18,701
anyone who works in information security?
575
00:21:19,194 --> 00:21:21,214
Or works on my side of the house
576
00:21:21,434 --> 00:21:23,595
knows. We can't protect it all. Like, the
577
00:21:23,595 --> 00:21:25,514
days of putting up walls is over.
578
00:21:26,234 --> 00:21:26,690
So
579
00:21:27,365 --> 00:21:29,773
I just think the first step is encouraging
580
00:21:30,228 --> 00:21:33,487
the that the government just collect and control
581
00:21:33,487 --> 00:21:35,714
less. And then I think I have to
582
00:21:35,714 --> 00:21:37,399
remind us all, we have a role in
583
00:21:37,399 --> 00:21:39,785
this. We have been led into a culture
584
00:21:39,785 --> 00:21:43,126
of constantly trading our data for stuff.
585
00:21:44,015 --> 00:21:46,080
And, like, we gotta stop using free apps,
586
00:21:46,318 --> 00:21:48,462
we have to start realizing that if you
587
00:21:48,462 --> 00:21:50,367
wanna a private service, you probably have to
588
00:21:50,367 --> 00:21:50,923
pay for it.
589
00:21:51,734 --> 00:21:52,234
And
590
00:21:52,611 --> 00:21:55,402
understand the long term cost of all these
591
00:21:55,402 --> 00:21:57,954
free things. The free coupons and the free
592
00:21:57,954 --> 00:22:00,427
apps and the free raffle and the free,
593
00:22:00,586 --> 00:22:03,473
you know, Anything that is free is probably
594
00:22:03,473 --> 00:22:05,626
a bad idea. So I think we do
595
00:22:05,626 --> 00:22:07,801
have to acknowledge our role in this is
596
00:22:08,179 --> 00:22:10,890
we can't freely give up all this stuff
597
00:22:10,890 --> 00:22:13,785
to these companies and agencies that we don't
598
00:22:13,785 --> 00:22:14,105
trust,
599
00:22:14,664 --> 00:22:17,384
and then really just sit back and complain.
600
00:22:17,865 --> 00:22:19,865
We need to stop giving it to them
601
00:22:19,865 --> 00:22:22,187
and also maybe stop giving them our business.
602
00:22:23,219 --> 00:22:25,363
Yeah. Right. Right. This goes back to something
603
00:22:25,522 --> 00:22:26,554
I I'd like to say a lot it
604
00:22:26,554 --> 00:22:28,222
which is the only data that can't be
605
00:22:28,222 --> 00:22:29,492
abused or stolen on this data that doesn't
606
00:22:29,492 --> 00:22:31,972
exist. Oh if it exists, it's just it's
607
00:22:31,972 --> 00:22:34,597
just waiting for somebody somehow to either stumble
608
00:22:34,597 --> 00:22:36,744
across it or to hack into it. And
609
00:22:36,744 --> 00:22:38,415
the other thing, I just recently interviewed Byron,
610
00:22:38,669 --> 00:22:40,344
who wrote a great called means of control.
611
00:22:40,902 --> 00:22:43,375
And his point was about a lot of
612
00:22:43,375 --> 00:22:46,906
the corporate data collection, in further of targeted
613
00:22:46,964 --> 00:22:48,320
behavioral advertising and things like that.
614
00:22:49,373 --> 00:22:50,353
That is allowing
615
00:22:50,811 --> 00:22:53,927
the law enforcement and intelligence agencies both ours
616
00:22:53,927 --> 00:22:54,427
and
617
00:22:55,285 --> 00:22:55,525
abroad,
618
00:22:56,256 --> 00:22:58,717
to have access to massive amounts of data
619
00:22:58,717 --> 00:23:00,464
on all of us and in the Us
620
00:23:00,464 --> 00:23:01,893
bypassing the fourth amendment to do so because
621
00:23:01,893 --> 00:23:03,664
they could just buy it. So
622
00:23:03,974 --> 00:23:06,451
as somebody worked inside, and, you know, I
623
00:23:06,531 --> 00:23:08,449
I always think of James Comey saying they're
624
00:23:08,449 --> 00:23:09,088
were going dark.
625
00:23:09,887 --> 00:23:11,725
For and somebody worked both sides of this,
626
00:23:12,297 --> 00:23:13,806
the the people that you work with or
627
00:23:13,806 --> 00:23:15,973
the people who advise, the people you train
628
00:23:16,108 --> 00:23:17,220
within the system.
629
00:23:18,411 --> 00:23:20,475
Are there other people that understand the privacy
630
00:23:20,475 --> 00:23:22,244
risks of this stuff 2 or do they...
631
00:23:23,125 --> 00:23:24,725
You know, you're you're 1 of the unique
632
00:23:24,725 --> 00:23:26,005
people I would have to think that I've
633
00:23:26,005 --> 00:23:26,505
seen
634
00:23:26,805 --> 00:23:28,404
both sides of this and understand the harms
635
00:23:28,404 --> 00:23:30,093
that could come from it. What what about
636
00:23:30,093 --> 00:23:31,759
other people you've worked with and? What's what's
637
00:23:31,759 --> 00:23:33,584
the culture like on the inside for for
638
00:23:33,584 --> 00:23:34,219
that point of view?
639
00:23:35,488 --> 00:23:38,214
Yeah. So... I mean, things have really changed
640
00:23:38,214 --> 00:23:40,615
over the last 15 years. So when I
641
00:23:40,615 --> 00:23:42,214
first started in intelligence,
642
00:23:42,615 --> 00:23:44,134
I mean, it pretty much was the Wild
643
00:23:44,134 --> 00:23:47,981
west. Right? Like, it nobody privatized anything. Everything
644
00:23:47,981 --> 00:23:50,293
was out there. So especially on the open
645
00:23:50,293 --> 00:23:52,287
source intelligence side. It was just kind of
646
00:23:52,287 --> 00:23:53,882
like everything was freely available.
647
00:23:54,853 --> 00:23:57,421
There has been quite a bit of
648
00:23:57,955 --> 00:23:59,887
progression along privacy
649
00:24:00,341 --> 00:24:02,648
lines and security lines as far as data
650
00:24:02,648 --> 00:24:02,807
collection.
651
00:24:03,539 --> 00:24:05,772
And the use of that. So what I
652
00:24:05,772 --> 00:24:07,708
find now is we're in this kind of
653
00:24:08,165 --> 00:24:10,797
strange place where a lot of the agencies,
654
00:24:10,956 --> 00:24:12,631
at least on the public side across the
655
00:24:12,631 --> 00:24:15,199
country are in really disparate parts of the
656
00:24:15,199 --> 00:24:17,831
spectrum. So for example, the the agency that
657
00:24:17,911 --> 00:24:20,064
I work at, I can't use any of
658
00:24:20,064 --> 00:24:22,457
these services. I can't... We're just not allowed
659
00:24:22,457 --> 00:24:24,618
to. It's against policy. We have an ordinance
660
00:24:24,618 --> 00:24:27,159
in our city. We have a high level
661
00:24:27,159 --> 00:24:30,810
of scrutiny around anything that involves data sharing,
662
00:24:30,969 --> 00:24:32,974
data collection, policy of those things.
663
00:24:33,693 --> 00:24:36,010
The the upside is that's a good level
664
00:24:36,010 --> 00:24:37,768
of control so that we don't start just
665
00:24:37,768 --> 00:24:40,246
doing whatever we want. The downside is, sometimes
666
00:24:40,246 --> 00:24:42,919
these things can be reaching these policies. So
667
00:24:42,980 --> 00:24:45,400
we're using super outdated technology,
668
00:24:45,779 --> 00:24:47,859
which can have a security cost. Right? And
669
00:24:47,859 --> 00:24:49,380
and an effectiveness cost.
670
00:24:49,873 --> 00:24:51,857
So for us on the inside, it's this
671
00:24:51,857 --> 00:24:54,715
constant balance of, we have to retain enough
672
00:24:54,715 --> 00:24:57,414
capability to protect people, but at the same
673
00:24:57,414 --> 00:24:59,815
time, we need to make... Maintain or gain
674
00:24:59,815 --> 00:25:00,851
back public trust.
675
00:25:01,489 --> 00:25:03,721
And depending on what part of the country
676
00:25:03,721 --> 00:25:05,953
you live in, people's level of care on
677
00:25:05,953 --> 00:25:07,584
that is different, the
678
00:25:07,962 --> 00:25:09,957
politicians drive all of this, and I think
679
00:25:09,957 --> 00:25:11,952
that's a lot of times what people forget
680
00:25:11,952 --> 00:25:14,347
is, like, I work for a very large
681
00:25:14,347 --> 00:25:15,145
police department.
682
00:25:15,638 --> 00:25:17,870
There's very few decisions I make during my
683
00:25:17,870 --> 00:25:20,102
day that isn't dictated by a chain of
684
00:25:20,102 --> 00:25:23,211
command. Right? So a lot of what is,
685
00:25:23,944 --> 00:25:25,944
assigned to us as tasks, a lot of
686
00:25:25,944 --> 00:25:28,105
the tools we get are actually decided at
687
00:25:28,105 --> 00:25:29,464
a very high level.
688
00:25:30,265 --> 00:25:32,278
So as far as what people in the
689
00:25:32,278 --> 00:25:34,516
community can do is you have to let
690
00:25:34,516 --> 00:25:36,294
your elected officials know
691
00:25:36,673 --> 00:25:38,991
that maybe you don't like the idea of
692
00:25:38,991 --> 00:25:41,320
license plate readers. Maybe you don't like the
693
00:25:41,320 --> 00:25:43,941
idea. And basically at a community level, you
694
00:25:43,941 --> 00:25:46,561
need to make your voices heard, and I
695
00:25:46,561 --> 00:25:48,070
mean, my feeling is we're in the police
696
00:25:48,070 --> 00:25:50,000
department. If people don't
697
00:25:50,388 --> 00:25:52,290
want us to have a tool and that
698
00:25:52,290 --> 00:25:55,302
limits our effectiveness. That is their choice. Right?
699
00:25:55,778 --> 00:25:57,467
And everything should just be transparent.
700
00:25:58,013 --> 00:26:00,714
I think I probably... My perspective is a
701
00:26:00,714 --> 00:26:03,177
little skewed because I work in 1 of
702
00:26:03,177 --> 00:26:03,836
the more
703
00:26:04,369 --> 00:26:04,869
restrictive
704
00:26:05,322 --> 00:26:06,196
agencies in the country.
705
00:26:06,927 --> 00:26:09,632
But I do travel around, and I will
706
00:26:09,632 --> 00:26:12,097
tell you there is more and more attention
707
00:26:12,097 --> 00:26:14,364
being paid to the privacy
708
00:26:14,742 --> 00:26:16,817
implications of these things. But it is going
709
00:26:16,817 --> 00:26:19,473
to vary from community to community, and
710
00:26:19,851 --> 00:26:22,006
my guess is a lot of that base
711
00:26:22,006 --> 00:26:24,574
is based in the politics of different communities.
712
00:26:25,212 --> 00:26:27,763
And then at the national level, everything is
713
00:26:27,763 --> 00:26:29,917
much more murky. But I will just say,
714
00:26:30,076 --> 00:26:31,671
I I was at the Fbi for 7
715
00:26:31,671 --> 00:26:33,444
years, the people there,
716
00:26:34,244 --> 00:26:35,865
spend a lot of time
717
00:26:36,484 --> 00:26:38,644
checking, you know, dot their eyes crossing their
718
00:26:38,644 --> 00:26:40,825
t's, asking for permission. There's
719
00:26:41,219 --> 00:26:44,172
a lot more worried about violating a rule
720
00:26:44,172 --> 00:26:46,566
or a policy or doing something inappropriate than
721
00:26:46,566 --> 00:26:49,280
they are at getting the new fancy shiny
722
00:26:49,280 --> 00:26:51,130
tool. And I know that puppies aren't gonna
723
00:26:51,130 --> 00:26:53,203
match up with people's perspectives. I'm just telling
724
00:26:53,203 --> 00:26:56,713
you that was my experience there is everything
725
00:26:56,713 --> 00:26:59,127
was very slow bureaucratic and
726
00:27:00,235 --> 00:27:00,712
cautious.
727
00:27:01,586 --> 00:27:03,494
So when I hear those stories, I'm not
728
00:27:03,494 --> 00:27:05,640
saying that none of that stuff ever happens
729
00:27:05,640 --> 00:27:07,721
that people see on the Internet. But that
730
00:27:07,721 --> 00:27:10,027
has not been my experience from the inside.
731
00:27:10,185 --> 00:27:10,663
So again,
732
00:27:11,298 --> 00:27:12,411
I love my privacy.
733
00:27:13,047 --> 00:27:15,450
I'm not so worried about the government, I'm
734
00:27:15,450 --> 00:27:18,569
just worried about collection across the board. And
735
00:27:18,569 --> 00:27:21,210
then I'm worried about how cyber criminals are
736
00:27:21,210 --> 00:27:22,464
going to use that because
737
00:27:22,904 --> 00:27:25,404
statistically, what's gonna happen to me is identity
738
00:27:25,464 --> 00:27:28,284
theft, getting my accounts taken over, ex,
739
00:27:28,744 --> 00:27:29,244
harassment.
740
00:27:29,865 --> 00:27:31,944
Like that is what is, you know,
741
00:27:32,598 --> 00:27:34,832
ruining people's lives day today. That is what
742
00:27:34,912 --> 00:27:36,826
I'm concerned about for my kids.
743
00:27:37,703 --> 00:27:40,973
So I try and strike that balance because
744
00:27:41,053 --> 00:27:42,744
I do have that perspective from both sides,
745
00:27:42,904 --> 00:27:45,304
there should be accountability for any sort of
746
00:27:45,304 --> 00:27:47,865
government surveillance. And then what I keep saying
747
00:27:47,865 --> 00:27:49,944
too is we need to constantly make the
748
00:27:49,944 --> 00:27:51,625
conversation around appropriate use.
749
00:27:52,199 --> 00:27:54,754
I will also say, like, on the electronic
750
00:27:54,754 --> 00:27:55,552
surveillance side,
751
00:27:56,111 --> 00:27:58,267
there's almost nothing I can do to get
752
00:27:58,267 --> 00:28:00,502
your private data that I don't need a
753
00:28:00,502 --> 00:28:03,313
judge to approve. Right? And again, that might
754
00:28:03,313 --> 00:28:04,911
be a little different at the federal level.
755
00:28:05,391 --> 00:28:07,069
But if I wanna, you know,
756
00:28:07,948 --> 00:28:11,559
collect any of your actual private data. Or
757
00:28:11,559 --> 00:28:13,494
if I wanna hide it a hidden microphone
758
00:28:13,552 --> 00:28:15,387
or do all those things, I'm going to
759
00:28:15,387 --> 00:28:16,663
need to get an approval from a judge.
760
00:28:16,902 --> 00:28:19,055
So a lot of the things people think
761
00:28:19,055 --> 00:28:20,411
that we can do willy nilly,
762
00:28:21,063 --> 00:28:24,825
are actually already protected by a level of
763
00:28:24,882 --> 00:28:26,871
authority or a court approval. At least in
764
00:28:26,871 --> 00:28:29,440
the Us. I know it varies vastly around
765
00:28:29,656 --> 00:28:31,901
right. I think people would be surprised about
766
00:28:31,901 --> 00:28:32,401
how
767
00:28:32,857 --> 00:28:35,247
restricted we are because that's not the narrative
768
00:28:35,247 --> 00:28:35,964
on the Internet.
769
00:28:37,174 --> 00:28:38,926
Alright. So let me let me dig a
770
00:28:38,926 --> 00:28:40,439
little deeper on that and push back a
771
00:28:40,439 --> 00:28:41,952
little bit. It... What I'm hearing is, I'm
772
00:28:41,952 --> 00:28:44,103
and I wanna understand where this is coming
773
00:28:44,103 --> 00:28:45,297
from. Is this...
774
00:28:46,669 --> 00:28:49,066
Because folks in law enforcement are trained to
775
00:28:49,066 --> 00:28:52,262
be rule followers, and therefore, they they they
776
00:28:52,262 --> 00:28:53,940
follow the rules that are there, and how...
777
00:28:54,180 --> 00:28:56,030
And look to their leaders to help them
778
00:28:56,030 --> 00:28:58,662
interpret those rules and go by? Because this
779
00:28:58,662 --> 00:29:00,018
happens a lot in law enforcement from what
780
00:29:00,097 --> 00:29:01,852
I've read. Someone says, hey, could we do
781
00:29:01,852 --> 00:29:03,128
this and it goes up the chain and
782
00:29:03,128 --> 00:29:04,976
some lawyer signs off of in like, oh,
783
00:29:05,215 --> 00:29:06,965
blair signed up. We're good. Let's do this.
784
00:29:07,601 --> 00:29:08,953
And I and I think to some extent,
785
00:29:09,033 --> 00:29:10,703
this is kind of what's don't snowed and
786
00:29:10,703 --> 00:29:12,868
exposed is and they figured out some kind
787
00:29:12,868 --> 00:29:16,533
of creative ways to follow the rules, and
788
00:29:16,613 --> 00:29:18,366
I'm doing your quotes that you can't see.
789
00:29:19,097 --> 00:29:19,836
But really
790
00:29:20,210 --> 00:29:22,594
broke the spirit of those rules. What what
791
00:29:22,594 --> 00:29:23,730
does your take on
792
00:29:24,183 --> 00:29:25,931
on on that? Is it is it... Is
793
00:29:25,931 --> 00:29:27,734
it the most people wanna make sure that
794
00:29:28,013 --> 00:29:29,528
their finding stuff that's gonna stand up in
795
00:29:29,528 --> 00:29:31,043
court that's gonna be ad miss, so they
796
00:29:31,043 --> 00:29:33,036
can get the bad guys, and they wanna
797
00:29:33,036 --> 00:29:35,029
make sure that some lawyers... Somewhere signed up
798
00:29:35,029 --> 00:29:36,246
on the policy or
799
00:29:36,718 --> 00:29:38,654
are there really people in
800
00:29:39,031 --> 00:29:40,546
the law enforcement who say, you know what?
801
00:29:40,786 --> 00:29:42,540
This is... This might be legal, but it's
802
00:29:42,540 --> 00:29:45,172
not right. Or this this this seems shady.
803
00:29:45,411 --> 00:29:48,138
With with so what's your take? Yeah. So
804
00:29:48,138 --> 00:29:50,212
we actually have these conversations quite a bit.
805
00:29:50,371 --> 00:29:53,083
And and to clarify, because of my role
806
00:29:53,083 --> 00:29:54,758
in my agency is a little bit more
807
00:29:54,758 --> 00:29:56,928
of a lead role. Right? Because I've been
808
00:29:56,928 --> 00:29:58,846
doing it for a long time. So I
809
00:29:58,846 --> 00:30:01,164
am part of a lot of these conversations
810
00:30:01,164 --> 00:30:05,214
with commanders, city leaders about surveillance. Right? Cool
811
00:30:05,413 --> 00:30:07,556
we have a lot of discussions about this.
812
00:30:08,112 --> 00:30:10,518
And I will say, I've definitely witnessed
813
00:30:10,891 --> 00:30:12,820
kind what you're talking about, which is
814
00:30:13,687 --> 00:30:16,077
I'll I'll give you an imaginary example that
815
00:30:16,077 --> 00:30:16,577
reflects
816
00:30:16,954 --> 00:30:19,105
similar situations that I've seen in real life.
817
00:30:19,823 --> 00:30:20,323
So
818
00:30:20,794 --> 00:30:23,981
we have our child exploitation unit. Right? And
819
00:30:23,981 --> 00:30:27,110
there is no unit and law enforcement that
820
00:30:27,327 --> 00:30:29,989
we can... You know, more so get universally
821
00:30:30,204 --> 00:30:33,223
behind. Right? Yeah And so I'm using that
822
00:30:33,223 --> 00:30:35,607
as an example because that is the example
823
00:30:35,607 --> 00:30:36,584
where everybody,
824
00:30:36,894 --> 00:30:39,604
in the community online, everyone agrees, like, yeah,
825
00:30:39,843 --> 00:30:41,756
We need to catch these predators type of
826
00:30:41,756 --> 00:30:41,995
deal.
827
00:30:43,111 --> 00:30:44,545
1 of the dangers of doing that kind
828
00:30:44,545 --> 00:30:45,514
of work is,
829
00:30:46,229 --> 00:30:48,851
1, the detectives get burned out so quickly
830
00:30:48,851 --> 00:30:50,360
because they have to see such horrible things.
831
00:30:50,916 --> 00:30:51,552
But 2,
832
00:30:52,284 --> 00:30:54,122
You always have to be careful every time,
833
00:30:54,522 --> 00:30:56,620
anytime you have an emotional investment.
834
00:30:57,159 --> 00:30:57,659
Now
835
00:30:58,197 --> 00:31:00,035
every time I meet a victim, I have
836
00:31:00,035 --> 00:31:02,595
some level of emotional investment. Right? Because they've
837
00:31:02,595 --> 00:31:04,978
been, you know, rates stabbed robbed all these
838
00:31:04,978 --> 00:31:07,361
horrible things, but there's no level of empathy
839
00:31:07,361 --> 00:31:09,028
that's gonna be deeper than, you know, when
840
00:31:09,028 --> 00:31:10,085
a child's harmed
841
00:31:10,554 --> 00:31:11,294
And so
842
00:31:11,673 --> 00:31:13,850
what you can see in those cases sometimes
843
00:31:14,149 --> 00:31:14,649
is
844
00:31:15,188 --> 00:31:16,247
detectives or officers.
845
00:31:16,785 --> 00:31:18,875
I don't often see them color outside the
846
00:31:18,875 --> 00:31:20,869
lines, but I could see them, like you
847
00:31:20,869 --> 00:31:23,262
said, like, technically, we can do this thing.
848
00:31:23,740 --> 00:31:25,176
And if we're ever gonna do it, it
849
00:31:25,176 --> 00:31:27,010
shouldn't we do it to protect this child.
850
00:31:27,424 --> 00:31:29,342
Like that type... That's... Yeah. Right. That's the...
851
00:31:29,582 --> 00:31:31,101
In and I think that's where people would
852
00:31:31,101 --> 00:31:32,539
start to be, like, oh, that can be
853
00:31:32,539 --> 00:31:33,338
a slippery slow.
854
00:31:34,057 --> 00:31:36,135
Now in my organization, we have so many
855
00:31:36,135 --> 00:31:37,106
checks and balances.
856
00:31:37,504 --> 00:31:38,004
So
857
00:31:39,015 --> 00:31:41,799
anytime anything is on the fence, it gets
858
00:31:41,799 --> 00:31:43,231
kicked up to us and those of us
859
00:31:43,231 --> 00:31:46,285
who have been doing this longer. And just
860
00:31:46,285 --> 00:31:47,825
as my offensive
861
00:31:48,205 --> 00:31:49,984
experience helps my privacy
862
00:31:50,845 --> 00:31:54,207
perspective vice versa. Right? So I'm usually the
863
00:31:54,207 --> 00:31:56,436
person in our agency who is bringing up
864
00:31:56,436 --> 00:31:59,542
the privacy concern, and we have those conversations
865
00:31:59,542 --> 00:32:02,422
about you know, yes, technically, we can do
866
00:32:02,422 --> 00:32:05,049
this, but should we do it? Yeah. And
867
00:32:05,049 --> 00:32:07,118
when people come into my squad and we
868
00:32:07,118 --> 00:32:08,724
train that up. Train them up. That's 1
869
00:32:08,724 --> 00:32:10,474
of the first things I try and teach
870
00:32:10,474 --> 00:32:13,656
them is it's not... The first question should
871
00:32:13,656 --> 00:32:15,342
not be how can I do This? The
872
00:32:15,342 --> 00:32:17,810
first question should be should. I do this.
873
00:32:18,526 --> 00:32:18,765
Now,
874
00:32:19,402 --> 00:32:22,052
I'm not gonna say that that is something
875
00:32:22,427 --> 00:32:22,927
universal
876
00:32:23,239 --> 00:32:24,912
through law enforcement that people are doing, but
877
00:32:24,912 --> 00:32:26,904
it is something we're trying to promote. And
878
00:32:26,904 --> 00:32:29,374
just like everything else. Right? Cultures are are
879
00:32:29,374 --> 00:32:30,011
slow to change.
880
00:32:30,664 --> 00:32:33,057
But I will say most groups I've worked
881
00:32:33,057 --> 00:32:33,935
with naturally,
882
00:32:34,493 --> 00:32:36,988
seem very professional, very responsible.
883
00:32:37,779 --> 00:32:40,570
But we always will have a bad apple
884
00:32:40,570 --> 00:32:42,803
here, a bad apple there, or... I mean,
885
00:32:42,962 --> 00:32:45,275
we've all... Everyone who's listening to this has
886
00:32:45,275 --> 00:32:48,554
worked with people. Right? And in any organization,
887
00:32:48,792 --> 00:32:50,062
you're gonna have some people who are bad
888
00:32:50,062 --> 00:32:52,921
at their job. Right? Like, it just... There's
889
00:32:52,921 --> 00:32:55,009
no getting around it. So
890
00:32:55,399 --> 00:32:58,451
I do occasionally find myself cleaning up messes
891
00:32:58,669 --> 00:33:01,301
where someone got a technology they shouldn't have
892
00:33:01,301 --> 00:33:02,838
been able to get or someone
893
00:33:03,375 --> 00:33:04,491
colored outside the lines.
894
00:33:05,224 --> 00:33:06,901
And my feeling on that is we just
895
00:33:06,901 --> 00:33:09,056
have to own it. Right? Here's what happened?
896
00:33:09,455 --> 00:33:11,611
Yes. This was this was a big mess
897
00:33:11,611 --> 00:33:14,027
up, and yes, there needs to be accountability.
898
00:33:14,579 --> 00:33:16,805
We own it, have the conversation, learn from
899
00:33:16,805 --> 00:33:17,759
it and move on.
900
00:33:18,395 --> 00:33:21,417
So it is it is definitely an issue,
901
00:33:21,576 --> 00:33:22,553
but I think
902
00:33:23,022 --> 00:33:24,851
overall, my feeling is we're going in a
903
00:33:24,851 --> 00:33:28,349
good direction. We definitely have much more accountability
904
00:33:28,349 --> 00:33:30,178
and constraints than we had 10 years ago.
905
00:33:32,495 --> 00:33:34,399
Yeah. And I... To me, it almost feels
906
00:33:34,399 --> 00:33:34,637
like...
907
00:33:35,509 --> 00:33:36,938
And I guess you've been around long, if
908
00:33:36,938 --> 00:33:37,969
you may have seen this Be curious to
909
00:33:37,969 --> 00:33:38,921
know if you notice the change.
910
00:33:39,654 --> 00:33:42,291
After 09:11, there was definitely this notion of
911
00:33:42,291 --> 00:33:45,088
never again. And I I think that our
912
00:33:45,088 --> 00:33:47,245
intelligence law enforcement, certainly federal level.
913
00:33:48,137 --> 00:33:50,043
Felt that they were... That they missed it.
914
00:33:50,360 --> 00:33:52,028
That this is something they possibly could have
915
00:33:52,028 --> 00:33:54,568
prevented or mitigated and they didn't. And so
916
00:33:54,647 --> 00:33:55,918
I I think that was a lot of
917
00:33:55,918 --> 00:33:57,005
egg on the face of
918
00:33:57,442 --> 00:33:58,953
of those agencies And I think a lot
919
00:33:58,953 --> 00:34:01,180
of them over rotated the fact, okay. I'm
920
00:34:01,180 --> 00:34:02,929
never gonna let anything bad happen again, and
921
00:34:03,327 --> 00:34:04,679
I'll do whatever to make that happen. And
922
00:34:04,758 --> 00:34:05,338
I think
923
00:34:06,282 --> 00:34:07,949
I... While I understand it, it it it
924
00:34:07,949 --> 00:34:09,775
feels like being parent and your parent, and
925
00:34:09,775 --> 00:34:11,203
and in the so you, you know, you
926
00:34:11,203 --> 00:34:12,393
don't want anything bad to ever having your
927
00:34:12,393 --> 00:34:14,238
kids. But that doesn't mean you lock them
928
00:34:14,238 --> 00:34:15,911
in a box and put and put a
929
00:34:15,911 --> 00:34:17,105
camera on them all day long, so nothing
930
00:34:17,105 --> 00:34:18,379
could ever happen to them. Right? I mean,
931
00:34:18,458 --> 00:34:20,608
there's Yeah. There's freedom issues around that. And
932
00:34:20,608 --> 00:34:23,014
there's there's... Quality of life issues are around
933
00:34:23,014 --> 00:34:25,088
that. And and I think that as as
934
00:34:25,088 --> 00:34:26,625
a people, we need to
935
00:34:27,082 --> 00:34:28,619
say, you know what's it's okay
936
00:34:29,236 --> 00:34:31,331
if you don't catch everybody because
937
00:34:31,644 --> 00:34:33,480
to catch everybody, you would have to make
938
00:34:33,480 --> 00:34:35,635
our lives miserable, and we don't... And that's
939
00:34:35,635 --> 00:34:37,790
all all life worth living. So so I
940
00:34:37,790 --> 00:34:39,387
will tell you on our side,
941
00:34:40,439 --> 00:34:42,994
it is like, there is no time in
942
00:34:42,994 --> 00:34:45,149
my career where it's felt okay to not
943
00:34:45,149 --> 00:34:45,947
catch someone.
944
00:34:46,426 --> 00:34:48,741
Like it that is... I appreciate, like, that
945
00:34:48,741 --> 00:34:50,671
sentiment, but the reality is,
946
00:34:51,628 --> 00:34:54,420
basically, you know, again, probably like a lot
947
00:34:54,420 --> 00:34:55,079
of other
948
00:34:55,536 --> 00:34:56,015
jobs.
949
00:34:56,653 --> 00:34:58,887
You tend to be held accountable when you
950
00:34:58,887 --> 00:35:02,017
mess up but you tend to not really
951
00:35:02,017 --> 00:35:04,255
get credit when you're successful, Like, it's our
952
00:35:04,255 --> 00:35:06,012
mistakes that mostly rise to the surface.
953
00:35:06,732 --> 00:35:08,822
And... But I I will add this. It
954
00:35:08,822 --> 00:35:10,249
is definitely a balance.
955
00:35:10,724 --> 00:35:13,603
And, you know, the kind of the similarity
956
00:35:13,737 --> 00:35:15,402
I would use or the metaphor would be,
957
00:35:16,529 --> 00:35:19,086
in the security world, 1 of our biggest
958
00:35:19,086 --> 00:35:22,703
obstacles is the balance between convenience and security
959
00:35:22,922 --> 00:35:26,211
because they're dia opposed. Right? Mh. And this
960
00:35:26,211 --> 00:35:28,361
is a almost the same deal.
961
00:35:29,317 --> 00:35:32,343
We could definitely protect everyone more if we
962
00:35:32,343 --> 00:35:35,695
have more tools, and more regulation and more
963
00:35:35,695 --> 00:35:37,755
all of these things. But again, I don't
964
00:35:37,755 --> 00:35:39,896
wanna live in that world either. So I
965
00:35:39,896 --> 00:35:41,614
think there definitely is a bounce there in
966
00:35:41,734 --> 00:35:43,963
then I think with the conversation is where
967
00:35:43,963 --> 00:35:45,873
should that balance be? Right?
968
00:35:46,509 --> 00:35:47,009
And
969
00:35:48,021 --> 00:35:49,349
I think there's a lot of work. Then
970
00:35:49,707 --> 00:35:51,137
still to do there. And then, you know,
971
00:35:51,296 --> 00:35:53,043
we have issues about, you know, a lot
972
00:35:53,043 --> 00:35:55,824
of historical in equity. We have all sorts
973
00:35:55,824 --> 00:35:57,492
of things we need to address and deal
974
00:35:57,492 --> 00:35:59,336
with And at the end of the day,
975
00:35:59,575 --> 00:36:01,245
we... I think the most important thing is
976
00:36:01,245 --> 00:36:02,995
we all just acknowledge wow. This is a
977
00:36:02,995 --> 00:36:04,507
really complex thing.
978
00:36:05,319 --> 00:36:07,317
Yeah. And then, I'll just throw and another
979
00:36:07,317 --> 00:36:09,155
thing that's really odd about working for the
980
00:36:09,155 --> 00:36:09,554
government.
981
00:36:10,354 --> 00:36:11,253
Your top
982
00:36:11,632 --> 00:36:12,532
level leaders
983
00:36:13,231 --> 00:36:14,370
rotate through constantly.
984
00:36:14,842 --> 00:36:17,302
And some of them have no experience in
985
00:36:17,302 --> 00:36:19,865
your job. Like, mh. It is the strangest
986
00:36:20,001 --> 00:36:22,302
thing to have decisions sent down to you
987
00:36:22,302 --> 00:36:24,866
from people, who have 0 experience.
988
00:36:25,664 --> 00:36:26,403
And so
989
00:36:27,340 --> 00:36:29,415
that to me, you know, I've I've been
990
00:36:29,415 --> 00:36:31,671
doing my job for over 25 years
991
00:36:32,144 --> 00:36:34,144
I've seen a lot of that. And, you
992
00:36:34,144 --> 00:36:35,905
know, oh, we have a new elected official.
993
00:36:36,065 --> 00:36:37,985
So now we're gonna do things a different
994
00:36:37,985 --> 00:36:39,184
way. And
995
00:36:39,585 --> 00:36:41,425
I always say at work, like, could we
996
00:36:41,425 --> 00:36:43,993
plea finish some things before we start new
997
00:36:43,993 --> 00:36:44,312
things,
998
00:36:44,870 --> 00:36:47,104
we could be much more fiscal responsible if
999
00:36:47,104 --> 00:36:49,192
we weren't chasing each new ease you know,
1000
00:36:49,589 --> 00:36:52,767
officials big idea. Right. So government definitely has
1001
00:36:52,767 --> 00:36:55,468
a lot of problems. But in my experience,
1002
00:36:56,358 --> 00:36:58,512
I I think are... We have bigger issues
1003
00:36:58,512 --> 00:37:02,181
with just being not having enough resources,
1004
00:37:02,659 --> 00:37:04,335
you know, not being good at our job,
1005
00:37:04,574 --> 00:37:05,871
being inefficient
1006
00:37:06,184 --> 00:37:07,965
and kinda of being chaotic.
1007
00:37:08,744 --> 00:37:09,805
Obviously, the bureaucracy.
1008
00:37:10,905 --> 00:37:12,985
And I think those day to day are
1009
00:37:12,985 --> 00:37:15,144
the issues I see that I think we
1010
00:37:15,144 --> 00:37:17,699
should work on. And I think the other
1011
00:37:17,699 --> 00:37:19,466
issues, like the big
1012
00:37:20,155 --> 00:37:22,744
ideological issues. We just need to keep having
1013
00:37:23,103 --> 00:37:24,853
conversations. And like I said, everyone in their
1014
00:37:24,853 --> 00:37:25,353
communities
1015
00:37:25,967 --> 00:37:28,434
share your thoughts on it. Right? Because again,
1016
00:37:28,593 --> 00:37:30,583
those elected officials are the ones who are
1017
00:37:30,583 --> 00:37:32,827
gonna give me my marching or. Right? They're
1018
00:37:32,827 --> 00:37:34,103
gonna tell me what I can do, what
1019
00:37:34,183 --> 00:37:35,858
I can't do all of these things. Right?
1020
00:37:36,177 --> 00:37:36,677
And
1021
00:37:37,055 --> 00:37:39,687
what people don't realize too is often behind
1022
00:37:39,687 --> 00:37:41,282
the scenes what they don't see is that
1023
00:37:41,282 --> 00:37:44,328
same elected official meeting with me saying, hey,
1024
00:37:45,205 --> 00:37:46,561
I kinda want you to go put all
1025
00:37:46,561 --> 00:37:48,417
these cameras out or do all these things
1026
00:37:48,475 --> 00:37:50,868
because, you know, the people in my community
1027
00:37:50,868 --> 00:37:51,825
are being targeted.
1028
00:37:52,238 --> 00:37:55,649
Right? And so there's definitely a juggling act
1029
00:37:55,649 --> 00:37:57,870
we do trying to strike that balance, and
1030
00:37:57,870 --> 00:38:00,348
we're not always successful. You know, sometimes, I
1031
00:38:00,348 --> 00:38:01,940
feel like maybe we're over reaching a little
1032
00:38:01,940 --> 00:38:04,088
bit. Sometimes I feel like we're under reaching
1033
00:38:04,088 --> 00:38:05,839
and just not effective. So
1034
00:38:06,476 --> 00:38:08,545
I like the idea of each community.
1035
00:38:08,878 --> 00:38:11,905
Figuring out and sharing what they're... What they
1036
00:38:11,905 --> 00:38:15,010
want. Right? Because not all communities are the
1037
00:38:15,010 --> 00:38:17,375
same. Maybe some communities are more comfortable in
1038
00:38:17,494 --> 00:38:18,630
you know, prioritize
1039
00:38:19,085 --> 00:38:20,199
safety over privacy.
1040
00:38:20,676 --> 00:38:22,427
You know, for me, I'm about 50 50.
1041
00:38:22,824 --> 00:38:25,154
You know? I I want a reasonable
1042
00:38:26,007 --> 00:38:28,809
amount of, of support from the government. I
1043
00:38:28,809 --> 00:38:30,401
don't want them in all the aspects of
1044
00:38:30,401 --> 00:38:33,109
my life. And generally, I think regulation and
1045
00:38:33,109 --> 00:38:35,122
things like that is not a very efficient
1046
00:38:35,353 --> 00:38:36,386
way to get things done.
1047
00:38:37,420 --> 00:38:38,691
But I think I I think you make
1048
00:38:38,691 --> 00:38:39,883
a good point. And I will call call
1049
00:38:39,883 --> 00:38:41,790
out that I... That that is why that
1050
00:38:41,790 --> 00:38:44,150
is why politics and voting matter because
1051
00:38:44,667 --> 00:38:46,440
as weird as it is, I can certainly
1052
00:38:46,497 --> 00:38:48,088
understand for your perspective or having a political
1053
00:38:48,088 --> 00:38:49,441
point to you may or may not have
1054
00:38:49,441 --> 00:38:52,226
any real experience in the job that they're
1055
00:38:52,226 --> 00:38:54,394
leading or in the organization that they're leading,
1056
00:38:55,994 --> 00:38:57,755
you can as a voter as a citizen,
1057
00:38:58,075 --> 00:38:59,595
make sure that the policy is set at
1058
00:38:59,595 --> 00:39:01,035
that... The policies are set at that level.
1059
00:39:01,275 --> 00:39:03,204
And so if you if you wanna change
1060
00:39:03,204 --> 00:39:05,193
policies, that is your avenue to do so.
1061
00:39:05,989 --> 00:39:07,977
And so I guess, maybe that's why they
1062
00:39:07,977 --> 00:39:08,852
set it up the way they do. Don't
1063
00:39:08,932 --> 00:39:09,170
I don't know.
1064
00:39:10,302 --> 00:39:11,440
Okay. We could fly,
1065
00:39:11,817 --> 00:39:13,891
on this kind stuff for hours. Absolutely. They
1066
00:39:13,891 --> 00:39:15,725
probably better done over several drinks at a
1067
00:39:15,725 --> 00:39:18,516
bar. So. Let's let's move on to some
1068
00:39:18,516 --> 00:39:20,687
more practical matters. If if I wanna do
1069
00:39:20,687 --> 00:39:22,284
a full dossier on somebody, and, you know,
1070
00:39:22,363 --> 00:39:23,481
okay. Fine. Let's say it's me.
1071
00:39:24,359 --> 00:39:26,435
Just just to see what's out there, and
1072
00:39:26,435 --> 00:39:28,511
maybe to make, you know, settle people's nerves
1073
00:39:28,511 --> 00:39:29,561
about the other I think of it. So
1074
00:39:29,561 --> 00:39:30,934
if I if I to a full dossier
1075
00:39:31,070 --> 00:39:32,419
myself. If I wanna find out what's out
1076
00:39:32,419 --> 00:39:34,030
there. What information
1077
00:39:34,563 --> 00:39:36,389
is most helpful as a starting point? Is
1078
00:39:36,389 --> 00:39:38,232
it my of email address? Is it my
1079
00:39:38,232 --> 00:39:40,619
full name? Is it my cell phone number,
1080
00:39:41,096 --> 00:39:43,960
social media handles? Maybe social security and would
1081
00:39:43,960 --> 00:39:45,573
them might be harder to get. What
1082
00:39:45,963 --> 00:39:47,946
what what information is is best at a
1083
00:39:47,946 --> 00:39:49,612
starting point which could be most revealing and
1084
00:39:49,612 --> 00:39:51,358
then kinda walk me through the progression of
1085
00:39:51,358 --> 00:39:53,182
how I would... How Would go about how
1086
00:39:53,182 --> 00:39:53,738
you would go about.
1087
00:39:54,389 --> 00:39:56,630
Saying, okay. I'm gonna I'm gonna do a
1088
00:39:56,630 --> 00:39:58,150
full thing on Kerry parker. What would I
1089
00:39:58,150 --> 00:39:58,309
do?
1090
00:39:59,429 --> 00:40:00,569
Yeah. So
1091
00:40:01,030 --> 00:40:02,389
a good way to think about this is.
1092
00:40:03,043 --> 00:40:05,908
Every time you create an account online. Every
1093
00:40:05,908 --> 00:40:06,885
time you
1094
00:40:07,261 --> 00:40:09,410
get an app. Every time you do anything
1095
00:40:09,410 --> 00:40:11,797
that involves the Internet, What does it usually
1096
00:40:11,797 --> 00:40:13,724
ask you for? And it's almost always gonna
1097
00:40:13,724 --> 00:40:15,317
ask you for an email address or a
1098
00:40:15,317 --> 00:40:15,875
phone number.
1099
00:40:16,512 --> 00:40:17,012
Therefore,
1100
00:40:17,708 --> 00:40:20,430
almost all online accounts in court content tied
1101
00:40:20,430 --> 00:40:22,202
to individuals are associated,
1102
00:40:22,975 --> 00:40:25,996
almost always with an email address. And because
1103
00:40:25,996 --> 00:40:28,318
email addresses tend to be unique, content Right?
1104
00:40:28,558 --> 00:40:30,153
Like, you don't have 10 people with the
1105
00:40:30,153 --> 00:40:32,865
same email addresses. The combination of that being
1106
00:40:32,865 --> 00:40:35,736
so ubiquitous and being a unique identifier almost
1107
00:40:35,736 --> 00:40:38,644
always makes that. I would say my favorite
1108
00:40:38,940 --> 00:40:41,805
lead like investigative lead or intelligence lead.
1109
00:40:42,362 --> 00:40:44,511
Now phone numbers are very important too because
1110
00:40:44,511 --> 00:40:46,856
every all the credit sector
1111
00:40:47,232 --> 00:40:49,539
on the tech side wants people in the
1112
00:40:49,539 --> 00:40:51,392
mobile ecosystem. So
1113
00:40:51,767 --> 00:40:55,052
almost every major social media platform is forcing
1114
00:40:55,124 --> 00:40:58,317
people into giving phone numbers. Because they want
1115
00:40:58,317 --> 00:40:59,912
to me on your mobile phone. They want
1116
00:40:59,912 --> 00:41:01,588
to me in your face every 30 seconds
1117
00:41:01,588 --> 00:41:04,574
all day long. Right? People So phone numbers
1118
00:41:04,951 --> 00:41:06,942
can be useful. 1 of the challenges with
1119
00:41:06,942 --> 00:41:10,684
phone numbers doing Os work is there in
1120
00:41:10,684 --> 00:41:13,493
so many different. Formats. Mh. So when you're
1121
00:41:13,493 --> 00:41:14,851
trying to search for them, it can be
1122
00:41:14,851 --> 00:41:16,449
pretty rough. And this is 1 of the
1123
00:41:16,449 --> 00:41:18,766
reasons I I prefer an email address because
1124
00:41:18,766 --> 00:41:21,259
sometimes they'll have parenthesis. Sometimes they'll of dots
1125
00:41:21,259 --> 00:41:21,998
and hyphen.
1126
00:41:22,697 --> 00:41:25,173
The plus or plus country code. Yeah. Exactly.
1127
00:41:25,413 --> 00:41:28,463
And then the other issue is of because
1128
00:41:28,463 --> 00:41:30,536
it's so easy to port numbers now and
1129
00:41:30,536 --> 00:41:33,170
people use V numbers, voice over Ip numbers
1130
00:41:33,170 --> 00:41:33,989
so often
1131
00:41:34,366 --> 00:41:36,475
that We get a lot of
1132
00:41:37,409 --> 00:41:39,320
misinformation when we search at phone numbers. Because
1133
00:41:39,320 --> 00:41:41,073
the phone number I have on my burner
1134
00:41:41,073 --> 00:41:43,622
app this year might have... Have been your
1135
00:41:43,622 --> 00:41:45,070
cell number last year.
1136
00:41:45,786 --> 00:41:48,092
So the numbers are a lot more dynamic.
1137
00:41:48,648 --> 00:41:51,590
Mh. And then, obviously, any sort of social
1138
00:41:51,590 --> 00:41:54,135
media lead. So usually might... If I your
1139
00:41:54,135 --> 00:41:55,664
email usually, that will get me to your
1140
00:41:55,664 --> 00:41:58,293
social media accounts, but obviously, 5 year Twitter,
1141
00:41:58,453 --> 00:41:59,807
Facebook, all of those things.
1142
00:42:00,524 --> 00:42:02,675
If you... As far as names, and that
1143
00:42:02,675 --> 00:42:04,784
could be a real name or a username,
1144
00:42:05,323 --> 00:42:08,119
they're only valuable from an offensive perspective if
1145
00:42:08,119 --> 00:42:10,677
they're unique. Right? So if you're Dan Smith,
1146
00:42:11,076 --> 00:42:13,083
like that does nothing me unless I can
1147
00:42:13,083 --> 00:42:14,672
narrow it down, like geographically.
1148
00:42:15,149 --> 00:42:17,533
Same. If you're sniper 22,
1149
00:42:17,851 --> 00:42:19,520
that's probably not gonna do a lot too
1150
00:42:19,520 --> 00:42:21,295
for for me. But if you have a
1151
00:42:21,295 --> 00:42:22,514
very unique username
1152
00:42:22,974 --> 00:42:26,414
or a unique real, and especially if I
1153
00:42:26,414 --> 00:42:29,219
get any kind of other filtering factors such
1154
00:42:29,219 --> 00:42:31,998
as your hometown. Then I'm gonna be pretty
1155
00:42:31,998 --> 00:42:34,459
much good to go. So typically, how we
1156
00:42:34,459 --> 00:42:36,523
do these things, we take whatever, we call
1157
00:42:36,523 --> 00:42:37,054
it seal
1158
00:42:37,734 --> 00:42:40,375
information. It is our lead. Right? Like, you...
1159
00:42:40,614 --> 00:42:43,094
Let's say you sent in an email threat
1160
00:42:43,094 --> 00:42:44,947
to a public official. They give me a
1161
00:42:44,947 --> 00:42:46,463
copy of the email. I'm gonna look at
1162
00:42:46,463 --> 00:42:48,797
the body of the text for any vernacular
1163
00:42:48,855 --> 00:42:51,088
that's interesting. But largely, the first thing I'm
1164
00:42:51,088 --> 00:42:52,603
going to do is I'm gonna search that
1165
00:42:52,603 --> 00:42:54,714
email address. I'm gonna see what its
1166
00:42:55,093 --> 00:42:57,411
reputation is? And that means how long has
1167
00:42:57,411 --> 00:42:59,009
it been seen on the Internet. Where has
1168
00:42:59,009 --> 00:43:00,607
it been used? Then I'm gonna find the
1169
00:43:00,607 --> 00:43:03,018
social media accounts. And then I'm gonna burst
1170
00:43:03,018 --> 00:43:06,848
image search, your profile photos. Right? Because what
1171
00:43:06,848 --> 00:43:09,401
is a profile photo? It's the photo everyone
1172
00:43:09,401 --> 00:43:11,815
uses on their accounts because it looks better
1173
00:43:11,815 --> 00:43:14,295
than they actually look in real life. Right?
1174
00:43:15,014 --> 00:43:17,335
So we have all those techniques, and then
1175
00:43:17,335 --> 00:43:19,583
that's called pivoting all So basically, I... If
1176
00:43:19,822 --> 00:43:22,208
Find 1 of your accounts, I'll collect other
1177
00:43:22,208 --> 00:43:24,833
leads off of that and pivot, search on
1178
00:43:24,833 --> 00:43:25,151
those.
1179
00:43:25,643 --> 00:43:28,339
And pretty soon. I've got a Dossier or
1180
00:43:28,339 --> 00:43:30,956
a report, listing all your accounts, your addresses,
1181
00:43:31,114 --> 00:43:33,748
your employer, your family members, all of those
1182
00:43:33,748 --> 00:43:35,982
things. And that would usually be referred to
1183
00:43:35,982 --> 00:43:38,376
as like a due diligence reports. Like, something
1184
00:43:38,376 --> 00:43:40,051
you would do when your background someone,
1185
00:43:40,862 --> 00:43:42,690
but often what we tell people to do
1186
00:43:42,690 --> 00:43:45,414
on the privacy side is, do your own
1187
00:43:45,709 --> 00:43:47,377
intelligence report on yourself.
1188
00:43:47,949 --> 00:43:50,269
I hop onto our site, use our tools,
1189
00:43:51,309 --> 00:43:53,250
start collecting all your exposures.
1190
00:43:54,349 --> 00:43:56,110
Absolutely make sure you store this in a
1191
00:43:56,110 --> 00:43:58,121
safe location. Don't put it in the cloud,
1192
00:43:58,360 --> 00:44:00,513
don't put it online. I like putting it
1193
00:44:00,513 --> 00:44:01,789
in a paper journal, and I could say,
1194
00:44:01,869 --> 00:44:03,782
okay. These 10 sites have my home address.
1195
00:44:03,942 --> 00:44:06,255
These 2 sites have my phone number. These
1196
00:44:06,255 --> 00:44:08,336
put 5 sites have my kids names. Right?
1197
00:44:08,574 --> 00:44:10,879
Mh. And then we would go through and
1198
00:44:10,879 --> 00:44:13,342
triage that. And then on our site, we
1199
00:44:13,342 --> 00:44:16,784
also have a full free guide on how
1200
00:44:16,784 --> 00:44:19,444
to request that your data be taken off
1201
00:44:19,505 --> 00:44:21,744
people search engines, and people search engines are
1202
00:44:21,744 --> 00:44:24,065
essentially sites populated by data brokers,
1203
00:44:25,117 --> 00:44:27,269
So we've got the top 200 data brokers.
1204
00:44:27,428 --> 00:44:28,942
We tell you how you can go out
1205
00:44:28,942 --> 00:44:31,571
and have your information removed or at least
1206
00:44:31,571 --> 00:44:31,890
try.
1207
00:44:32,448 --> 00:44:34,382
But I'll warn everyone. No 1
1208
00:44:35,014 --> 00:44:37,411
Well, definitely no 1 my age. Right? And
1209
00:44:37,491 --> 00:44:38,930
I started in the nineties, so you can
1210
00:44:38,930 --> 00:44:40,208
probably guess how will that. No 1 my
1211
00:44:40,208 --> 00:44:41,806
age is gonna clean all their information off
1212
00:44:41,806 --> 00:44:43,245
the Internet. It's just not possible.
1213
00:44:44,058 --> 00:44:46,213
But you can clean a lot of it,
1214
00:44:46,612 --> 00:44:48,287
and it's definitely the type of thing we
1215
00:44:48,287 --> 00:44:49,644
recommend people do themselves.
1216
00:44:50,202 --> 00:44:52,292
And it's also a good way. You know,
1217
00:44:52,371 --> 00:44:53,887
you talked about knowing both sides.
1218
00:44:54,445 --> 00:44:55,641
This is a way. If you do your
1219
00:44:55,641 --> 00:44:57,556
yourself assessment, you can use the tools off
1220
00:44:57,556 --> 00:45:00,347
our site, you can kinda try your hand
1221
00:45:00,347 --> 00:45:03,330
at doing a little o source intelligence while
1222
00:45:03,784 --> 00:45:05,850
improving your personal privacy and security,
1223
00:45:06,407 --> 00:45:08,870
because you're gonna basically figure out what your
1224
00:45:08,870 --> 00:45:11,519
fin exposure is. Right? Your tax surface.
1225
00:45:11,998 --> 00:45:13,914
And then we're gonna, you know, give you
1226
00:45:13,914 --> 00:45:16,787
some free documents and go buys and guides
1227
00:45:16,787 --> 00:45:17,825
to help you clean those up.
1228
00:45:18,956 --> 00:45:20,630
What are some ways the people over share?
1229
00:45:20,949 --> 00:45:22,622
I'm thinking particularly social media, but it may
1230
00:45:22,622 --> 00:45:24,454
happen other places too. You know, 1 of
1231
00:45:24,454 --> 00:45:26,701
the reasons that I always hate the idea
1232
00:45:26,701 --> 00:45:28,636
of the 3 security questions
1233
00:45:29,093 --> 00:45:31,644
you know, for account recovery is most of
1234
00:45:31,644 --> 00:45:33,239
that information you can probably find on somebody's
1235
00:45:33,318 --> 00:45:34,036
Facebook feed.
1236
00:45:34,688 --> 00:45:36,118
What town they grew up in? What was
1237
00:45:36,118 --> 00:45:38,342
their dog's name in high school? What was,
1238
00:45:38,421 --> 00:45:40,883
you know, what's their maiden name? You know,
1239
00:45:40,963 --> 00:45:42,630
what... You, a lot of that information, what
1240
00:45:42,630 --> 00:45:43,901
school do they go to an elementary school?
1241
00:45:44,234 --> 00:45:45,821
You know, some people over share a lot
1242
00:45:45,821 --> 00:45:47,250
of that stuff. And and I would think
1243
00:45:47,250 --> 00:45:48,360
that a lot of information, if you knew
1244
00:45:48,360 --> 00:45:49,313
what you were doing, you could find it.
1245
00:45:49,472 --> 00:45:51,321
So how do people trip up
1246
00:45:52,505 --> 00:45:54,413
in in the Os world and give away
1247
00:45:54,413 --> 00:45:56,082
too much information. What are some common ways
1248
00:45:56,082 --> 00:45:56,957
that people over share?
1249
00:45:58,229 --> 00:45:59,740
I think social media is at the top.
1250
00:45:59,993 --> 00:46:02,533
I mean, really everything you do on social
1251
00:46:02,533 --> 00:46:05,390
media is exposing you. Right? Unless you are
1252
00:46:05,390 --> 00:46:08,661
doing it under a... Fake identity like an
1253
00:46:08,661 --> 00:46:10,727
alias or we call those burner accounts or
1254
00:46:10,727 --> 00:46:13,269
puppet accounts. And even then you're still gonna
1255
00:46:13,269 --> 00:46:15,270
probably be connected to people in your lives
1256
00:46:15,270 --> 00:46:17,175
and those human connections are things that can
1257
00:46:17,175 --> 00:46:18,048
be exploited.
1258
00:46:18,603 --> 00:46:21,619
So 1 of the, you know, most prolific
1259
00:46:21,619 --> 00:46:24,096
cyber crimes obviously are things like for fishing
1260
00:46:24,096 --> 00:46:26,005
and things like that. And sometimes what people
1261
00:46:26,005 --> 00:46:27,221
don't realize is
1262
00:46:27,675 --> 00:46:30,434
the person who targets you, you have maybe
1263
00:46:30,633 --> 00:46:33,248
come into their cross hairs because they've already
1264
00:46:33,248 --> 00:46:35,309
victim someone else in your life and because
1265
00:46:35,309 --> 00:46:38,336
all of our interconnection are online, we like,
1266
00:46:38,495 --> 00:46:41,194
if someone in my group gets exposed, we're
1267
00:46:41,194 --> 00:46:44,290
all typically then attacked. Right? It's definitely a
1268
00:46:44,290 --> 00:46:46,132
a weakest link. Thing.
1269
00:46:46,769 --> 00:46:48,360
So I mean it's sort of a tough
1270
00:46:48,360 --> 00:46:50,907
question because the honest answer is all the
1271
00:46:50,907 --> 00:46:54,032
over sharing online is problematic from a defensive
1272
00:46:54,248 --> 00:46:54,748
perspective
1273
00:46:55,380 --> 00:46:57,300
the thing is, though, and I... I'm not
1274
00:46:57,300 --> 00:46:59,380
the guy who's around when I'm doing my,
1275
00:46:59,460 --> 00:47:01,140
you know, my keynote and my privacy events.
1276
00:47:01,380 --> 00:47:02,739
I'm not the guy who says, if you're
1277
00:47:02,739 --> 00:47:04,590
on the Internet, You're dumb. You need to
1278
00:47:04,590 --> 00:47:05,622
get off the internet. Right?
1279
00:47:06,416 --> 00:47:06,916
So
1280
00:47:07,686 --> 00:47:09,670
I acknowledge... Like, because I'm a middle of
1281
00:47:09,670 --> 00:47:11,893
the road guy. I mean, honestly, once you
1282
00:47:11,893 --> 00:47:13,818
have kids, your ability, d to be private
1283
00:47:13,818 --> 00:47:16,615
as. Right. Shy anyway. Right. Right. Because you
1284
00:47:16,615 --> 00:47:19,012
got all the, you know, soccer leagues and
1285
00:47:19,012 --> 00:47:22,063
pot legs and and other parents could But
1286
00:47:22,063 --> 00:47:23,438
what I would say is
1287
00:47:24,769 --> 00:47:27,954
having your accounts is fine, but so few
1288
00:47:27,954 --> 00:47:29,920
of us go through and check all the
1289
00:47:30,039 --> 00:47:32,984
privacy and security settings. Mh. And the nice
1290
00:47:32,984 --> 00:47:34,576
thing is, in the last 10 years, the
1291
00:47:34,576 --> 00:47:37,203
privacy and security settings have become much more
1292
00:47:37,203 --> 00:47:37,601
intuitive,
1293
00:47:38,172 --> 00:47:39,602
but we still have to check them because
1294
00:47:39,602 --> 00:47:41,985
we all know every time Microsoft doesn't update
1295
00:47:41,985 --> 00:47:45,638
or Meta doesn't update. Like, magically boxes get
1296
00:47:45,638 --> 00:47:47,329
unchecked. Right? Yeah We
1297
00:47:47,798 --> 00:47:50,029
check all those. So I don't think it's
1298
00:47:50,029 --> 00:47:52,578
generally a problem to have social media and
1299
00:47:52,578 --> 00:47:54,570
things like that. Social media is definitely your
1300
00:47:54,570 --> 00:47:56,641
probably your biggest exposure for most people.
1301
00:47:57,213 --> 00:48:00,235
If you go in and lock it down
1302
00:48:00,235 --> 00:48:02,884
so that you are controlling who can see
1303
00:48:02,940 --> 00:48:03,179
what?
1304
00:48:04,148 --> 00:48:05,656
We don't. I will tell you on the
1305
00:48:05,656 --> 00:48:06,632
offensive side
1306
00:48:07,005 --> 00:48:08,911
because, right, I'm a good guy. We don't
1307
00:48:08,911 --> 00:48:11,688
hack people. We're not cracking code. We're not
1308
00:48:11,688 --> 00:48:13,849
doing any of that stuff. So if it's
1309
00:48:13,849 --> 00:48:17,349
private, it's private. Right? Mh. And I I
1310
00:48:17,349 --> 00:48:18,940
have people that come to me for training
1311
00:48:18,940 --> 00:48:20,468
and and they're, like, tell... How to get
1312
00:48:20,468 --> 00:48:21,983
to all the stuff that's private and the
1313
00:48:21,983 --> 00:48:23,976
first thing I say is, if it's private,
1314
00:48:24,136 --> 00:48:26,289
even if we could get to it, legally
1315
00:48:26,289 --> 00:48:28,681
we can't get to. Right? So unless we
1316
00:48:28,681 --> 00:48:30,855
get owns warrant or a subpoena or something
1317
00:48:30,855 --> 00:48:31,894
like that from a court.
1318
00:48:32,534 --> 00:48:34,775
It doesn't matter that, you know, figuring out
1319
00:48:34,775 --> 00:48:36,934
the technique because we are not hackers,
1320
00:48:37,349 --> 00:48:39,750
Right? We are not breaking into people's account.
1321
00:48:40,070 --> 00:48:42,550
What we are is very, very good at
1322
00:48:42,550 --> 00:48:44,329
finding the stuff that is
1323
00:48:44,710 --> 00:48:45,109
public.
1324
00:48:45,761 --> 00:48:48,299
So right. Your best move on the defensive
1325
00:48:48,299 --> 00:48:51,076
side is make as much not public as
1326
00:48:51,076 --> 00:48:51,472
possible.
1327
00:48:51,948 --> 00:48:55,239
Right? So checking settings, I often say, you
1328
00:48:55,239 --> 00:48:56,440
know, when I'm talking to groups.
1329
00:48:57,799 --> 00:48:59,639
If you do just a few things, you
1330
00:48:59,639 --> 00:49:02,233
can mitigate 98 percent of your privacy and
1331
00:49:02,450 --> 00:49:04,921
security exposures. So 1 thing is checking all
1332
00:49:04,921 --> 00:49:07,631
your accounts and device settings, Just checking them
1333
00:49:07,631 --> 00:49:09,146
and making logical choices,
1334
00:49:09,719 --> 00:49:11,318
do it periodically as you said because they
1335
00:49:11,318 --> 00:49:14,434
change. Yes. And then as you know, using
1336
00:49:14,434 --> 00:49:17,231
a password manager and having unique long past
1337
00:49:17,231 --> 00:49:18,590
phrases on all your accounts.
1338
00:49:19,242 --> 00:49:21,544
Eliminates another, like, 50 percent of all attacks.
1339
00:49:21,703 --> 00:49:23,687
And then if you have multi factor authentication.
1340
00:49:23,925 --> 00:49:26,148
If you do all 3 of those things,
1341
00:49:26,639 --> 00:49:28,228
And then the fourth 1 I always tack
1342
00:49:28,228 --> 00:49:30,215
on to is listening to your gut.
1343
00:49:30,850 --> 00:49:32,304
So anything that
1344
00:49:32,678 --> 00:49:35,644
communication that is urgent, is almost certainly fishing
1345
00:49:35,644 --> 00:49:36,525
or a scam. Right?
1346
00:49:37,164 --> 00:49:38,445
If you do those 4 things,
1347
00:49:39,005 --> 00:49:41,105
check your settings on accounts and devices
1348
00:49:41,499 --> 00:49:45,175
password manager, all new, long, unique passcode on
1349
00:49:45,175 --> 00:49:45,654
your accounts.
1350
00:49:46,453 --> 00:49:48,051
Mfa on every account that takes it and
1351
00:49:48,051 --> 00:49:51,014
listen to your gut. Your 98 percent bulletproof
1352
00:49:51,014 --> 00:49:53,639
on the Internet. So, you know, because a
1353
00:49:53,639 --> 00:49:55,070
lot of the groups I talked to you
1354
00:49:55,070 --> 00:49:55,570
aren't
1355
00:49:56,279 --> 00:49:59,148
like, technically advanced folks. Right? They're from the
1356
00:49:59,148 --> 00:50:01,857
insurance industry or accountants or those different things.
1357
00:50:02,494 --> 00:50:03,863
That's what I always like to leave them
1358
00:50:03,863 --> 00:50:05,692
with, and that's the same advice I give
1359
00:50:05,692 --> 00:50:07,919
my mother lots, the same advice I give
1360
00:50:07,919 --> 00:50:10,066
friends who don't work in this industry. If
1361
00:50:10,066 --> 00:50:11,418
you do those 4 things, you don't have
1362
00:50:11,418 --> 00:50:13,428
to overcome them locate it. Because what I
1363
00:50:13,428 --> 00:50:14,327
found is,
1364
00:50:14,706 --> 00:50:16,704
you know, if you try to do extreme
1365
00:50:16,704 --> 00:50:18,402
privacy like Michael
1366
00:50:19,340 --> 00:50:19,740
Biz patel.
1367
00:50:20,713 --> 00:50:22,631
1, you're probably gonna fail. 2, you're gonna
1368
00:50:22,631 --> 00:50:23,530
be super frustrated.
1369
00:50:24,229 --> 00:50:27,677
3, he works on that every single. Day.
1370
00:50:27,915 --> 00:50:31,248
It is a lifestyle. So I think setting
1371
00:50:31,248 --> 00:50:33,098
reasonable goals and reasonable
1372
00:50:33,630 --> 00:50:34,844
expectations in
1373
00:50:35,313 --> 00:50:37,788
in the metaphor I was used is I
1374
00:50:37,788 --> 00:50:40,183
love hiking. Right? That's my favorite personal hobby.
1375
00:50:40,423 --> 00:50:42,339
I know, again, weird to talk about private
1376
00:50:42,339 --> 00:50:44,988
things in the public space, but for context,
1377
00:50:45,228 --> 00:50:47,701
I love hiking. So where I typically hike
1378
00:50:47,701 --> 00:50:49,695
his bear country, and I have friends who
1379
00:50:49,695 --> 00:50:51,871
carry, like 40 fours is in their belt
1380
00:50:52,024 --> 00:50:53,379
and that always makes me laugh a little
1381
00:50:53,379 --> 00:50:56,168
bit because even in law enforcement, most people
1382
00:50:56,168 --> 00:50:58,160
can't hit shoot very well under heavy stress.
1383
00:50:58,558 --> 00:51:00,730
Nobody's gonna... Hit a bear when it's running
1384
00:51:00,809 --> 00:51:03,369
Adam unless they train all the time. So
1385
00:51:03,369 --> 00:51:04,670
my rule of thumb is
1386
00:51:05,050 --> 00:51:06,969
hike in a group. Don't be the slowest
1387
00:51:06,969 --> 00:51:09,005
runner. Right? So cyber
1388
00:51:09,304 --> 00:51:10,105
is the same.
1389
00:51:10,744 --> 00:51:13,864
It's not about being completely bulletproof. It's about
1390
00:51:13,864 --> 00:51:16,585
just being better protected than everyone else.
1391
00:51:17,717 --> 00:51:19,071
Well, I... And the other thing I wanna
1392
00:51:19,071 --> 00:51:19,868
a call back to you that you said
1393
00:51:19,868 --> 00:51:21,142
that I think is it's important that I
1394
00:51:21,142 --> 00:51:22,757
like to call attention to do is that
1395
00:51:22,974 --> 00:51:25,523
privacy and security are we things not me
1396
00:51:25,523 --> 00:51:27,613
things. They we... That your security and your
1397
00:51:27,613 --> 00:51:29,871
privacy overlap mine. If you
1398
00:51:30,730 --> 00:51:32,967
if you mess up, then you you make
1399
00:51:32,967 --> 00:51:35,045
me vulnerable. But by the same token, if
1400
00:51:35,045 --> 00:51:37,522
if If you do better, you make things
1401
00:51:37,522 --> 00:51:38,156
better for me too,
1402
00:51:38,949 --> 00:51:41,011
and in vice versa. So it's important that
1403
00:51:41,090 --> 00:51:42,597
I think that even if you don't worry
1404
00:51:42,597 --> 00:51:45,161
about yourself, It's important to understand that everybody
1405
00:51:45,161 --> 00:51:47,555
in your social graph is also affected by
1406
00:51:47,555 --> 00:51:48,512
what you do or don't do.
1407
00:51:49,710 --> 00:51:51,785
It and it does spread like in a...
1408
00:51:51,959 --> 00:51:54,672
Good way. Right? Like we Right. Like, my
1409
00:51:54,672 --> 00:51:57,785
oldest is in college now. And for her,
1410
00:51:58,264 --> 00:51:59,994
the things she used to I at me
1411
00:52:00,114 --> 00:52:01,383
or every once in a while, I'll see,
1412
00:52:01,463 --> 00:52:04,081
like, kinda pop up, just some things she
1413
00:52:04,081 --> 00:52:06,223
picked up, Like, when she was in, you
1414
00:52:06,223 --> 00:52:08,047
know, a sophomore in high school, while she
1415
00:52:08,047 --> 00:52:10,238
could... Or cared about was getting to Netflix
1416
00:52:10,297 --> 00:52:13,573
without dad's firewall blocking her. But now, I
1417
00:52:13,573 --> 00:52:15,970
see her interacting, like, with her friends and
1418
00:52:15,970 --> 00:52:17,983
helping people with their password managers and all
1419
00:52:17,983 --> 00:52:19,820
of those things. So I think even if
1420
00:52:19,820 --> 00:52:21,040
you don't see it in the moment
1421
00:52:21,419 --> 00:52:23,736
by walking the walk in our friend groups
1422
00:52:23,736 --> 00:52:24,795
and family groups
1423
00:52:25,108 --> 00:52:28,290
like we are infecting those around us with
1424
00:52:28,290 --> 00:52:29,881
good digital hygiene habits.
1425
00:52:30,677 --> 00:52:30,915
Right.
1426
00:52:32,202 --> 00:52:33,948
Okay. So we we talked about social media
1427
00:52:33,948 --> 00:52:35,773
and things that we actually kinda actively do.
1428
00:52:35,931 --> 00:52:37,518
But there's another area of that I wanna
1429
00:52:37,518 --> 00:52:38,787
make sure we talk about, and that's something
1430
00:52:38,787 --> 00:52:40,136
big... I think a lot of people don't...
1431
00:52:40,628 --> 00:52:42,137
I have a good grasp on. That is
1432
00:52:42,137 --> 00:52:44,441
public records like government public records.
1433
00:52:44,997 --> 00:52:46,506
This is the reason why if you're get
1434
00:52:46,506 --> 00:52:47,936
in a car accident, All of a sudden
1435
00:52:47,936 --> 00:52:49,781
you're getting all these you know, email some
1436
00:52:49,781 --> 00:52:52,331
lawyers wanting to represent you or, yeah, you
1437
00:52:52,331 --> 00:52:54,642
know, when you get divorced or buy a
1438
00:52:54,642 --> 00:52:56,157
new house, you get all these things for
1439
00:52:56,316 --> 00:52:57,922
He lock, And, you know, it... There are
1440
00:52:57,922 --> 00:52:59,854
public records that expose you. So
1441
00:53:00,309 --> 00:53:02,139
in in the old days though, when I
1442
00:53:02,139 --> 00:53:03,490
say old days, I mean, like, you know,
1443
00:53:03,650 --> 00:53:04,854
because when we were young, You know, maybe
1444
00:53:04,854 --> 00:53:06,280
were 20, 30 years ago, you would have
1445
00:53:06,280 --> 00:53:08,024
to to get a public record, they were
1446
00:53:08,024 --> 00:53:09,847
public, but you'd have to, like, physically walk
1447
00:53:09,847 --> 00:53:12,005
down to the county courthouse when file a
1448
00:53:12,005 --> 00:53:13,755
form, wait a few minutes, maybe for lucky
1449
00:53:13,755 --> 00:53:15,345
and get and get a copy of something
1450
00:53:15,345 --> 00:53:16,936
and and maybe Pay fee. Or, you know,
1451
00:53:17,015 --> 00:53:19,242
maybe you could actually maybe even back then
1452
00:53:19,242 --> 00:53:21,569
you could send a mail. You something through
1453
00:53:21,569 --> 00:53:23,563
snail mail to to get a record. But
1454
00:53:23,563 --> 00:53:24,918
today, they're all online. And a lot of
1455
00:53:24,918 --> 00:53:27,470
times they're all free. What is the implication
1456
00:53:27,470 --> 00:53:28,826
to our privacy for that?
1457
00:53:29,478 --> 00:53:31,547
Like, what kind of public records maybe we
1458
00:53:31,547 --> 00:53:33,536
not thinking about that the where we could
1459
00:53:33,536 --> 00:53:34,332
be exposed.
1460
00:53:34,809 --> 00:53:36,400
The that are freely available? Your voting record,
1461
00:53:36,480 --> 00:53:39,281
for example, property taxes? There's so many things
1462
00:53:39,281 --> 00:53:42,093
that are online. Help us understand what that
1463
00:53:42,311 --> 00:53:44,485
that attack service looks like. And then
1464
00:53:45,181 --> 00:53:46,695
should we... Do we make a mistake? Like,
1465
00:53:47,189 --> 00:53:48,387
is it a bad thing to have all
1466
00:53:48,387 --> 00:53:50,145
this personal stuff that available show? We be
1467
00:53:50,145 --> 00:53:52,302
rate limiting people, so they're not being scraped
1468
00:53:52,302 --> 00:53:53,820
or, you know, I don't know what other
1469
00:53:53,820 --> 00:53:54,460
defenses is against this?
1470
00:53:55,275 --> 00:53:57,355
Yeah. I've I have strong feelings about this.
1471
00:53:57,515 --> 00:53:58,015
So,
1472
00:53:58,394 --> 00:54:00,474
I actually spend a lot of time in
1473
00:54:00,474 --> 00:54:01,295
my days
1474
00:54:01,755 --> 00:54:05,275
responding to things like, Fo. Right? Because. My
1475
00:54:05,275 --> 00:54:07,842
state that I'm in has a a pretty
1476
00:54:08,137 --> 00:54:09,330
overly broad,
1477
00:54:10,125 --> 00:54:11,579
fo and public disclosure
1478
00:54:11,954 --> 00:54:12,272
law.
1479
00:54:12,844 --> 00:54:15,228
And so we basically give everything. So anyone
1480
00:54:15,228 --> 00:54:18,192
can basically request anything they want from my
1481
00:54:18,248 --> 00:54:20,156
agency and we red reject almost nothing.
1482
00:54:21,049 --> 00:54:24,346
And that can be very problematic right? Because
1483
00:54:24,565 --> 00:54:26,403
if you're 1 of our customers, and in
1484
00:54:26,403 --> 00:54:28,101
my case, that might mean you're a victim
1485
00:54:28,161 --> 00:54:28,880
or a witness.
1486
00:54:29,534 --> 00:54:32,004
We're gonna just give away your details. Right?
1487
00:54:32,243 --> 00:54:34,473
So you're the the witness of a shooting.
1488
00:54:34,633 --> 00:54:36,679
You haven't done anything wrong, but we collected
1489
00:54:36,878 --> 00:54:39,185
your personal information so we can contact you
1490
00:54:39,185 --> 00:54:40,617
interview and, you know, have you as a
1491
00:54:40,617 --> 00:54:41,412
witness in court.
1492
00:54:42,765 --> 00:54:44,529
I think 1 of the all the high
1493
00:54:44,529 --> 00:54:46,856
level issues that has caused
1494
00:54:47,230 --> 00:54:48,763
a disparity in
1495
00:54:49,851 --> 00:54:50,351
transparency,
1496
00:54:50,979 --> 00:54:54,034
versus privacy is that years ago most government
1497
00:54:54,332 --> 00:54:58,004
agencies decided transparency was the most important thing.
1498
00:54:58,643 --> 00:54:59,974
So their idea was
1499
00:55:00,411 --> 00:55:02,237
everyone should be able to see everything because
1500
00:55:02,237 --> 00:55:04,007
that's transparency and accountability.
1501
00:55:04,777 --> 00:55:06,070
Well, those laws
1502
00:55:06,682 --> 00:55:08,769
were meant so that we could hold
1503
00:55:09,079 --> 00:55:10,835
are top level officials accountable.
1504
00:55:11,393 --> 00:55:13,309
It... They were not meant so that your
1505
00:55:13,309 --> 00:55:16,182
neighbor could dig into your police report and
1506
00:55:16,182 --> 00:55:18,827
see your details And so what I found
1507
00:55:18,827 --> 00:55:21,135
is and this is anecdotal, but in my
1508
00:55:21,135 --> 00:55:24,000
experience, most of the requests we get are
1509
00:55:24,000 --> 00:55:27,118
not about holding top level government to... Know,
1510
00:55:27,277 --> 00:55:29,426
the most powerful people accountable.
1511
00:55:30,063 --> 00:55:32,848
It's a lot of, like, little petty I'm
1512
00:55:32,848 --> 00:55:34,773
digging into your stuff and I'm, you you
1513
00:55:34,773 --> 00:55:36,444
know, pulling up your voter records I'm pulling
1514
00:55:36,444 --> 00:55:38,592
up all this. Voter records are a huge
1515
00:55:38,592 --> 00:55:40,580
issue because in a lot of states, they
1516
00:55:40,580 --> 00:55:42,988
either sell them, or you can go download
1517
00:55:42,988 --> 00:55:43,628
them for free,
1518
00:55:44,187 --> 00:55:47,324
and you're required to provide your a true
1519
00:55:47,783 --> 00:55:49,941
residential address or you're committing a crime when
1520
00:55:49,941 --> 00:55:52,186
you register or to vote which means you
1521
00:55:52,186 --> 00:55:53,640
can basically find
1522
00:55:54,014 --> 00:55:56,556
anyone's home address in any of those states
1523
00:55:56,556 --> 00:55:57,986
if they have a unique name at all.
1524
00:55:58,718 --> 00:56:00,634
And a lot of states are now starting
1525
00:56:00,634 --> 00:56:02,550
to also share things like dates of birth,
1526
00:56:02,789 --> 00:56:05,663
and, which is a credential. Right? There's a
1527
00:56:05,663 --> 00:56:07,100
lot of things where you give that up,
1528
00:56:07,593 --> 00:56:09,821
to verify that you are who you say
1529
00:56:09,821 --> 00:56:12,447
you are. So... Right. It is a huge
1530
00:56:12,447 --> 00:56:14,755
problem. The difference between now and 20 years
1531
00:56:14,755 --> 00:56:16,847
ago is it's just all more accessible
1532
00:56:17,237 --> 00:56:20,257
online. And so again, I'll repeat the earlier
1533
00:56:20,257 --> 00:56:22,006
piece. I think as government, we need to
1534
00:56:22,006 --> 00:56:24,334
collect last, but also, we need
1535
00:56:25,044 --> 00:56:29,439
drastic changes in our Pd fo laws so
1536
00:56:29,439 --> 00:56:32,096
that we're still able to hold the powerful
1537
00:56:32,156 --> 00:56:33,035
people accountable,
1538
00:56:33,449 --> 00:56:35,438
But we're not making it easy to mine
1539
00:56:35,438 --> 00:56:38,245
the data of just the general citizens.
1540
00:56:38,621 --> 00:56:40,530
Right? It it wasn't meant to be that,
1541
00:56:40,690 --> 00:56:41,883
but that's how it's being used.
1542
00:56:42,934 --> 00:56:43,173
Wow.
1543
00:56:44,131 --> 00:56:46,707
Okay. So you kinda of made the
1544
00:56:47,324 --> 00:56:49,320
the thought that there's there's so much data
1545
00:56:49,320 --> 00:56:50,917
out there, and it it it could be
1546
00:56:50,917 --> 00:56:52,056
hard to get through, but
1547
00:56:52,368 --> 00:56:53,479
we've got tools for that now. I mean,
1548
00:56:53,558 --> 00:56:54,931
we've got computers. We've got Ai
1549
00:56:55,939 --> 00:56:57,606
for for that now. So where we used
1550
00:56:57,606 --> 00:56:59,272
to have these massive haystack stacks and there
1551
00:56:59,272 --> 00:57:01,271
might be some needles in there somewhere, and
1552
00:57:01,271 --> 00:57:03,016
I and I've heard arguments that 1 of
1553
00:57:03,016 --> 00:57:05,078
the downsides to mass surveillance that we collect
1554
00:57:05,078 --> 00:57:07,061
so much data that we actually lose the
1555
00:57:07,061 --> 00:57:08,727
good stuff instead of focusing
1556
00:57:09,297 --> 00:57:11,759
criminals, for example, are focusing on, you know,
1557
00:57:11,997 --> 00:57:13,744
trying to smartly gather the data. If we
1558
00:57:13,744 --> 00:57:15,253
just hoover up everything. All of a sudden,
1559
00:57:15,332 --> 00:57:17,054
we've got too much to sift through on,
1560
00:57:17,494 --> 00:57:18,773
I'm not sure how much that argument is
1561
00:57:18,773 --> 00:57:21,170
gonna gotta gonna be around much longer, because
1562
00:57:21,170 --> 00:57:23,328
we actually had the compute power and things
1563
00:57:23,328 --> 00:57:25,726
like Ai that is really good about sift
1564
00:57:25,726 --> 00:57:27,735
through data and finding patterns and things.
1565
00:57:28,531 --> 00:57:30,760
So how much of the kind of work
1566
00:57:30,760 --> 00:57:31,658
that you do
1567
00:57:32,671 --> 00:57:34,683
can be automated today or
1568
00:57:35,155 --> 00:57:37,635
in the very near future such that attacks
1569
00:57:37,635 --> 00:57:39,235
by fishers and things like that could be
1570
00:57:39,235 --> 00:57:39,954
much more automated.
1571
00:57:41,394 --> 00:57:42,535
Yeah. So
1572
00:57:42,849 --> 00:57:44,289
first of all, Just wanna say you're absolutely
1573
00:57:44,289 --> 00:57:46,289
right. Like, on the government side, especially the
1574
00:57:46,289 --> 00:57:48,690
law enforcement side, we should be using a
1575
00:57:48,690 --> 00:57:52,481
scalpel, not a hatch it. So I absolutely
1576
00:57:52,538 --> 00:57:55,003
agree. We should be collecting only what we
1577
00:57:55,003 --> 00:57:58,581
need, not collecting hoover up everything. That is
1578
00:57:58,581 --> 00:58:00,900
definitely part of... The problem because also it's
1579
00:58:00,900 --> 00:58:03,280
just super inefficient. You're exactly right on that.
1580
00:58:03,518 --> 00:58:06,454
Right? Now now I'm creating just massive number
1581
00:58:06,454 --> 00:58:08,175
of haystack stacks I have to dig through
1582
00:58:08,294 --> 00:58:08,373
through.
1583
00:58:09,249 --> 00:58:10,921
Ai is interesting. Like,
1584
00:58:11,717 --> 00:58:13,548
I am not a big believer in Ai.
1585
00:58:13,787 --> 00:58:15,539
I think most of the things touted as
1586
00:58:15,698 --> 00:58:17,543
Ai true You know, we've got the large
1587
00:58:17,543 --> 00:58:19,692
language models, But I think it is a
1588
00:58:19,692 --> 00:58:20,590
lot of marketing
1589
00:58:21,045 --> 00:58:22,818
around a lot of this stuff. I think
1590
00:58:23,035 --> 00:58:24,885
most of these are not fully. Baked. I
1591
00:58:24,885 --> 00:58:27,045
think we're, you know, still some years away
1592
00:58:27,045 --> 00:58:28,005
from them being useful.
1593
00:58:28,644 --> 00:58:31,364
I see some people talking about using Ai
1594
00:58:31,364 --> 00:58:34,256
for open source intelligence work. I haven't been
1595
00:58:34,256 --> 00:58:37,052
impressed by any of it. And I think
1596
00:58:37,052 --> 00:58:38,111
1 of the
1597
00:58:38,490 --> 00:58:41,211
unintended consequences of Ai is going to be
1598
00:58:41,211 --> 00:58:44,655
massive data pollution on the Internet because we
1599
00:58:44,712 --> 00:58:47,850
already have an over on overwhelming issue with
1600
00:58:48,541 --> 00:58:49,200
misinformation and
1601
00:58:49,812 --> 00:58:52,139
disinformation. Yeah. And now it's just becoming
1602
00:58:52,989 --> 00:58:56,610
exponentially easier to create massive amounts of content
1603
00:58:57,467 --> 00:59:01,320
with no accountability, no sourcing, you no, quality
1604
00:59:01,538 --> 00:59:01,858
control,
1605
00:59:02,416 --> 00:59:04,899
and so We all know that currently, like,
1606
00:59:04,978 --> 00:59:07,442
your results on the Internet, you know, sometimes
1607
00:59:07,442 --> 00:59:09,453
they're just trash. Right? They're just
1608
00:59:09,827 --> 00:59:11,997
obviously wrong. Yeah. And
1609
00:59:12,784 --> 00:59:15,011
Personally, you know, as someone who searches on
1610
00:59:15,091 --> 00:59:16,761
Google and places every single day.
1611
00:59:17,557 --> 00:59:19,387
I have felt over the last couple years,
1612
00:59:19,784 --> 00:59:21,398
my results are just getting
1613
00:59:21,708 --> 00:59:22,685
more and more
1614
00:59:24,092 --> 00:59:27,510
less specific, less focus, more water down, more
1615
00:59:27,510 --> 00:59:27,987
garbage,
1616
00:59:28,543 --> 00:59:29,043
and
1617
00:59:29,354 --> 00:59:30,014
I'm getting
1618
00:59:30,393 --> 00:59:32,471
exactly the opposite of what I want, which
1619
00:59:32,471 --> 00:59:34,629
is I wanna be working with that scalpel.
1620
00:59:34,869 --> 00:59:36,727
I wanna get just a little bit of
1621
00:59:36,946 --> 00:59:38,225
information I want.
1622
00:59:38,879 --> 00:59:39,379
So
1623
00:59:39,837 --> 00:59:43,451
it I think Ai has limited usefulness
1624
00:59:44,148 --> 00:59:46,623
on the offensive side of work on the
1625
00:59:46,623 --> 00:59:48,220
intelligence gathering currently.
1626
00:59:49,030 --> 00:59:51,199
I'm keeping an eye on it. I'm more
1627
00:59:51,255 --> 00:59:53,241
concerned about it from a cyber crime perspective
1628
00:59:53,241 --> 00:59:55,306
because I am seeing it being used by
1629
00:59:55,306 --> 00:59:56,577
cyber and campaigns.
1630
00:59:57,307 --> 00:59:59,375
Because now you can use... You know, maybe
1631
00:59:59,454 --> 01:00:00,829
I don't even speak your language.
1632
01:00:01,681 --> 01:00:03,351
And, you know, 2 years ago, what I
1633
01:00:03,351 --> 01:00:05,260
would have done is go on some criminal.
1634
01:00:05,434 --> 01:00:07,668
Forum and pay someone 10 dollars a bitcoin
1635
01:00:07,668 --> 01:00:10,619
to write that ransom email. But now I
1636
01:00:10,619 --> 01:00:12,453
can just use Ai. It will Yeah. Help
1637
01:00:12,453 --> 01:00:14,229
me with the code for the ransom.
1638
01:00:14,606 --> 01:00:17,650
It will right than ransom where. When I
1639
01:00:17,650 --> 01:00:19,721
do keynote, that's 1 of the demos I
1640
01:00:19,721 --> 01:00:21,952
do is I have the... Now the Ai
1641
01:00:21,952 --> 01:00:23,799
writes up, a ransom note that we're going
1642
01:00:23,799 --> 01:00:26,109
win to send because we walk our audience
1643
01:00:26,109 --> 01:00:28,181
through how we do a massive phishing campaign.
1644
01:00:28,818 --> 01:00:29,318
So
1645
01:00:29,695 --> 01:00:32,731
the this... Ai is just building on what
1646
01:00:32,731 --> 01:00:34,879
we were already seeing in the crime as
1647
01:00:34,879 --> 01:00:35,617
a service
1648
01:00:36,071 --> 01:00:38,457
industry. Right? Because I I think you probably
1649
01:00:38,457 --> 01:00:40,542
talked about that on here for where... Oh,
1650
01:00:40,701 --> 01:00:42,615
yeah. You don't even need technical skills now.
1651
01:00:42,775 --> 01:00:43,971
And this has been true for a while.
1652
01:00:44,449 --> 01:00:47,239
You can use bitcoin or crypto and buy
1653
01:00:47,239 --> 01:00:48,730
just about every or
1654
01:00:49,484 --> 01:00:52,448
skill and tool in part of a cyber
1655
01:00:52,583 --> 01:00:55,047
crime campaign pain. And now Ai just makes
1656
01:00:55,047 --> 01:00:55,523
it easier.
1657
01:00:56,573 --> 01:00:58,247
Gotta wrap this up unfortunately. So... But let's
1658
01:00:58,247 --> 01:01:00,081
wrap this up as practical advice. We've already
1659
01:01:00,081 --> 01:01:01,675
talked about some things some of the top...
1660
01:01:01,914 --> 01:01:03,429
You gave your top 4 choices for things
1661
01:01:03,429 --> 01:01:05,274
that you tell people to do. Let's let's
1662
01:01:05,274 --> 01:01:06,859
talk about a few more things. For example,
1663
01:01:07,255 --> 01:01:07,993
can you
1664
01:01:08,682 --> 01:01:11,139
delete or limit access to all the data
1665
01:01:11,139 --> 01:01:12,899
that's already out there? You've got a list
1666
01:01:12,899 --> 01:01:14,726
or a great list for data removal tool.
1667
01:01:15,680 --> 01:01:17,268
On your site, were you actually given it's...
1668
01:01:17,507 --> 01:01:19,334
There's a lot of sites. Like, literally, I
1669
01:01:19,334 --> 01:01:20,287
think multiple dozen.
1670
01:01:21,098 --> 01:01:22,452
Websites that you tell us to go to
1671
01:01:22,452 --> 01:01:24,046
it. But you do say, of course, that
1672
01:01:24,046 --> 01:01:25,879
there's also maybe these dozen are actually the
1673
01:01:25,879 --> 01:01:27,233
top ones and some of those scroll down.
1674
01:01:27,711 --> 01:01:28,211
So
1675
01:01:28,525 --> 01:01:29,485
how do we know where to go it?
1676
01:01:29,644 --> 01:01:30,925
And then some people to look at that
1677
01:01:30,925 --> 01:01:32,204
and say, well, why don't I just go
1678
01:01:32,204 --> 01:01:33,805
to, like, delete me or in Cog or
1679
01:01:33,805 --> 01:01:34,765
some of these other ones that are offering
1680
01:01:34,765 --> 01:01:36,285
to do it for me. Yeah. Cost money,
1681
01:01:36,445 --> 01:01:38,460
but I don't wanna do it. What Should
1682
01:01:38,619 --> 01:01:39,820
I just pay someone else to do these
1683
01:01:39,820 --> 01:01:39,980
things?
1684
01:01:40,699 --> 01:01:42,780
Yeah. That's a good question. So I get
1685
01:01:42,780 --> 01:01:45,500
asked about life lock all the time, delete
1686
01:01:45,500 --> 01:01:47,505
me all of that? So a few years
1687
01:01:47,505 --> 01:01:49,094
ago, I tested some of these. I actually
1688
01:01:49,094 --> 01:01:51,237
put signed up, paid for and went through
1689
01:01:51,237 --> 01:01:53,246
some of those so that I could speak
1690
01:01:53,539 --> 01:01:55,500
confidently and from a place of knowledge
1691
01:01:56,018 --> 01:01:58,411
about them. And I'll tell you. So these
1692
01:01:58,411 --> 01:02:00,564
services all work the same. You have to
1693
01:02:00,564 --> 01:02:02,239
give them a bunch of your personal information,
1694
01:02:02,558 --> 01:02:04,313
and they say they're gonna scour the Internet.
1695
01:02:04,472 --> 01:02:06,959
Now everyone says also dark net, Ai, and
1696
01:02:06,959 --> 01:02:08,633
they throw out all those buzz words. And
1697
01:02:08,633 --> 01:02:10,307
they're gonna protect you and some of them
1698
01:02:10,307 --> 01:02:12,380
will off I say they'll freeze your credit
1699
01:02:12,380 --> 01:02:14,789
and identity management. All these things. They they
1700
01:02:14,789 --> 01:02:15,670
all make big promises.
1701
01:02:16,309 --> 01:02:18,329
But they all collect a bunch of personal
1702
01:02:18,390 --> 01:02:20,949
information, and then they have scripts and automated
1703
01:02:20,949 --> 01:02:23,324
services that go out, search for it, all
1704
01:02:23,524 --> 01:02:25,221
and then they auto generate
1705
01:02:25,759 --> 01:02:28,472
basically, emails and letters that get sent to
1706
01:02:28,472 --> 01:02:31,027
the data brokers requesting that your data be
1707
01:02:31,027 --> 01:02:31,266
removed.
1708
01:02:32,159 --> 01:02:34,148
They sell this for, like, 200 dollars.
1709
01:02:34,944 --> 01:02:36,240
And so my first
1710
01:02:36,775 --> 01:02:38,605
thing I wanna share on this is, you
1711
01:02:38,605 --> 01:02:39,105
cannot...
1712
01:02:40,055 --> 01:02:42,695
Clean up your privacy effectively for 200 dollars.
1713
01:02:43,335 --> 01:02:45,494
Right? You are absolutely getting what you paid
1714
01:02:45,494 --> 01:02:47,574
for. So the reality is this. So when
1715
01:02:47,735 --> 01:02:49,745
I tested this out, sure, you know, I
1716
01:02:49,745 --> 01:02:50,935
used 1 of these services.
1717
01:02:51,490 --> 01:02:54,132
It removed my information from about a dozen
1718
01:02:54,187 --> 01:02:57,378
different data broker sites. You And in full
1719
01:02:57,378 --> 01:02:59,683
disclosure, I done a little cleanup before that
1720
01:02:59,683 --> 01:03:01,829
myself, so I didn't have a huge amount
1721
01:03:01,829 --> 01:03:04,294
out there. And then if you keep paying
1722
01:03:04,294 --> 01:03:06,139
the money each year, they will... You know,
1723
01:03:06,298 --> 01:03:08,135
look again because what happens is the data
1724
01:03:08,135 --> 01:03:11,009
brokers tend to basically buy new blocks of
1725
01:03:11,009 --> 01:03:13,404
data. Right. And then it just circulates to
1726
01:03:13,404 --> 01:03:15,181
the time. Right. So
1727
01:03:15,893 --> 01:03:17,089
my big takeaway was this.
1728
01:03:17,806 --> 01:03:19,161
1, I had to send them a huge
1729
01:03:19,161 --> 01:03:22,349
amount of personal information. 2, they only remove
1730
01:03:22,349 --> 01:03:24,036
just a little bit of low hanging. Fruit.
1731
01:03:24,275 --> 01:03:25,782
So it was better than nothing,
1732
01:03:26,416 --> 01:03:28,558
but it was not super effective.
1733
01:03:29,113 --> 01:03:30,565
It definitely did not
1734
01:03:30,874 --> 01:03:32,632
wipe all my stuff off the Internet. It
1735
01:03:32,632 --> 01:03:34,231
just did the low hanging fruit.
1736
01:03:34,950 --> 01:03:37,048
My big concern with this is
1737
01:03:37,667 --> 01:03:39,825
what happens when those companies get breached.
1738
01:03:40,478 --> 01:03:42,153
Because you're giving them...
1739
01:03:42,712 --> 01:03:44,546
Like, could... In order for them to search
1740
01:03:44,546 --> 01:03:46,780
for all your exposed info, you have to
1741
01:03:46,780 --> 01:03:49,332
send them your info. And so any of
1742
01:03:49,332 --> 01:03:51,338
it all. Yeah. The Irony. And also when
1743
01:03:51,338 --> 01:03:52,849
you start to look at, you know, some
1744
01:03:52,849 --> 01:03:55,156
of the business dealings, parent companies, all of
1745
01:03:55,156 --> 01:03:57,715
that. Yeah. Yeah. So we... The in our
1746
01:03:57,715 --> 01:03:59,962
business, we advise all of our clients
1747
01:04:00,415 --> 01:04:03,670
against this. We think you should handle your
1748
01:04:03,670 --> 01:04:06,075
own privacy because it's your privacy.
1749
01:04:06,544 --> 01:04:08,858
Right? Why would you trust a third party,
1750
01:04:09,018 --> 01:04:11,333
and I'm telling you anyone for 200 dollars
1751
01:04:11,333 --> 01:04:13,248
cannot do a good job at this. And
1752
01:04:13,248 --> 01:04:15,733
for 200 dollars, how... Much effort are they
1753
01:04:15,733 --> 01:04:18,676
putting into protecting your data. Right? So you
1754
01:04:18,676 --> 01:04:20,210
get what you pay for. So
1755
01:04:20,584 --> 01:04:23,208
let me give you my quick kind of
1756
01:04:23,208 --> 01:04:24,083
8 steps.
1757
01:04:24,814 --> 01:04:26,666
If you want to this weekend,
1758
01:04:27,119 --> 01:04:28,948
start tackling this and how I recommend is,
1759
01:04:29,107 --> 01:04:30,856
like, don't try and do it all in
1760
01:04:30,856 --> 01:04:32,765
a day, spend a couple hours this Sunday,
1761
01:04:33,003 --> 01:04:34,687
Spend a couple hours the next Saturday. But
1762
01:04:34,687 --> 01:04:36,433
this is basically it. Right?
1763
01:04:37,545 --> 01:04:39,449
Start a privacy journal, as I mentioned before.
1764
01:04:39,767 --> 01:04:42,878
Number 2, freeze your credit, but That mitigate
1765
01:04:42,878 --> 01:04:45,181
about 95 percent of identity theft in the
1766
01:04:45,420 --> 01:04:47,405
Us, you are allowed to freeze your credit
1767
01:04:47,405 --> 01:04:49,391
by law. This law changed a few years
1768
01:04:49,391 --> 01:04:50,979
ago. You do not have to pay for
1769
01:04:50,979 --> 01:04:51,138
it.
1770
01:04:52,027 --> 01:04:54,570
We have instructions on this in our privacy
1771
01:04:54,570 --> 01:04:55,921
guide on the site. So you can just
1772
01:04:55,921 --> 01:04:57,273
download it and follow our steps.
1773
01:04:57,988 --> 01:05:00,309
Do self assessment. Log on to our site,
1774
01:05:00,468 --> 01:05:02,617
use our dashboard, search for all of your
1775
01:05:02,617 --> 01:05:05,403
exposures, Put those in your privacy journal. K?
1776
01:05:05,960 --> 01:05:07,893
Now you're gonna go through all your devices
1777
01:05:08,030 --> 01:05:09,637
and just double check all, your settings.
1778
01:05:10,275 --> 01:05:12,903
You're going to get a good password manager.
1779
01:05:13,381 --> 01:05:15,373
I recommend bit warden. That's what I use
1780
01:05:15,373 --> 01:05:17,284
for me and my family. It's open source.
1781
01:05:17,523 --> 01:05:20,175
It's affordable for but pay for your password
1782
01:05:20,175 --> 01:05:20,655
manager,
1783
01:05:21,135 --> 01:05:23,454
like, we wanna move away from free tools,
1784
01:05:23,855 --> 01:05:24,974
especially when they're for security.
1785
01:05:25,535 --> 01:05:26,735
And then you're going to go through all
1786
01:05:26,735 --> 01:05:29,148
your accounts, update them with a good unique
1787
01:05:29,148 --> 01:05:30,986
strong passwords. And then the last step is
1788
01:05:31,465 --> 01:05:33,223
Mfa. You can use Auth, You can use
1789
01:05:33,303 --> 01:05:33,543
Google
1790
01:05:34,182 --> 01:05:34,421
Authenticator.
1791
01:05:35,140 --> 01:05:37,302
And then gonna stop using free apps and
1792
01:05:37,302 --> 01:05:37,802
services.
1793
01:05:38,651 --> 01:05:40,556
And then my... Again, my number 1 thing
1794
01:05:40,556 --> 01:05:40,794
is,
1795
01:05:41,588 --> 01:05:42,858
and this is what I always talk to
1796
01:05:42,858 --> 01:05:45,108
my... They're Daughters about growing up is, I
1797
01:05:45,108 --> 01:05:46,466
was like, you know you're walking down the
1798
01:05:46,466 --> 01:05:46,706
street,
1799
01:05:47,425 --> 01:05:49,023
and you walk past them dude, and the
1800
01:05:49,023 --> 01:05:50,302
hairs go up on the back your and
1801
01:05:50,302 --> 01:05:51,580
neck or the dog g.
1802
01:05:52,313 --> 01:05:55,333
Listen to that. That means something. So my
1803
01:05:55,333 --> 01:05:57,081
number 1 thing is when you get that
1804
01:05:57,081 --> 01:05:58,512
email and when you get that text, and
1805
01:05:58,512 --> 01:06:00,125
it has any sense of
1806
01:06:00,499 --> 01:06:00,999
urgency
1807
01:06:02,103 --> 01:06:03,318
please please please
1808
01:06:03,849 --> 01:06:06,549
stop for 30 seconds in pause and thank
1809
01:06:06,549 --> 01:06:07,605
is this odd
1810
01:06:07,978 --> 01:06:09,984
because it's almost o always going to be
1811
01:06:09,984 --> 01:06:11,764
a scam if it is,
1812
01:06:12,065 --> 01:06:12,224
you know,
1813
01:06:13,025 --> 01:06:14,944
instill a sense of urgency or it wants
1814
01:06:14,944 --> 01:06:16,319
you to click on something or oh and
1815
01:06:16,319 --> 01:06:17,354
something. So
1816
01:06:17,832 --> 01:06:19,743
in my day to day cyber crime, job,
1817
01:06:19,981 --> 01:06:23,405
both doing investigations and mitigation. Fishing is still
1818
01:06:23,405 --> 01:06:25,728
the number 1 and it it causes the
1819
01:06:25,728 --> 01:06:26,466
most ransom.
1820
01:06:27,237 --> 01:06:29,781
That causes more damage than just about any
1821
01:06:29,781 --> 01:06:31,847
other form of cyber crime. I do see
1822
01:06:31,847 --> 01:06:33,616
a lot of like, sex ex as well,
1823
01:06:33,695 --> 01:06:34,972
you know, I send you the email.
1824
01:06:35,769 --> 01:06:38,880
Hey, Carrie. I hacked your computer. To prove
1825
01:06:38,880 --> 01:06:40,337
it here's for your passwords.
1826
01:06:40,714 --> 01:06:42,403
I can see all the porn even looking
1827
01:06:42,403 --> 01:06:43,673
at, and I'm gonna send it to your
1828
01:06:43,673 --> 01:06:44,864
family on Facebook.
1829
01:06:45,340 --> 01:06:47,087
And the reality is I just pulled your
1830
01:06:47,087 --> 01:06:48,833
passwords out of breach data, and didn't hack
1831
01:06:48,833 --> 01:06:51,190
your computer. It's a... It's... I'm bluff looking
1832
01:06:51,468 --> 01:06:53,937
So... But that sex distortion scam we see
1833
01:06:53,937 --> 01:06:55,132
happening all the time. And then of course,
1834
01:06:55,211 --> 01:06:56,247
we're still seeing a lot of...
1835
01:06:57,123 --> 01:06:58,477
And this is 1 of my... This makes
1836
01:06:58,477 --> 01:06:59,353
me so angry.
1837
01:07:00,324 --> 01:07:01,221
Tax un vulnerable
1838
01:07:01,596 --> 01:07:04,062
populations. You know, people call grandma, little Johnny's
1839
01:07:04,062 --> 01:07:05,812
in a Mexican prison send us gift parts.
1840
01:07:05,971 --> 01:07:07,028
We still have
1841
01:07:07,658 --> 01:07:10,050
older victims every single day going into best
1842
01:07:10,050 --> 01:07:11,805
buy to get gift cards because of those
1843
01:07:11,805 --> 01:07:14,516
type of scams. So... But that... That's pretty
1844
01:07:14,516 --> 01:07:17,482
much it. Everyone listening to this can take
1845
01:07:17,482 --> 01:07:19,155
control of their own privacy and security. It
1846
01:07:19,155 --> 01:07:20,590
just takes some work. And what I just
1847
01:07:20,590 --> 01:07:23,140
wanna promise you is it's worth it. Right?
1848
01:07:23,697 --> 01:07:24,197
You
1849
01:07:24,669 --> 01:07:26,742
at the end of doing your own privacy
1850
01:07:26,742 --> 01:07:27,560
cleanup will
1851
01:07:28,017 --> 01:07:28,517
understand
1852
01:07:29,133 --> 01:07:31,445
what situation you're in? How exposed am I?
1853
01:07:31,605 --> 01:07:32,902
What is my threat model
1854
01:07:33,213 --> 01:07:36,083
Like, you will feel more comfortable and safe
1855
01:07:36,083 --> 01:07:38,394
if you do it yourself. Don't pay me
1856
01:07:38,394 --> 01:07:40,067
to do it. Don't pay someone else to
1857
01:07:40,067 --> 01:07:41,835
do it. Just do it yourself, and and
1858
01:07:41,835 --> 01:07:43,987
we've got all the free guides to, walk
1859
01:07:43,987 --> 01:07:45,819
you through it. So you'll have everything you
1860
01:07:45,819 --> 01:07:47,652
need. Well, I will get all those links
1861
01:07:47,652 --> 01:07:48,688
to put up a show notes for for
1862
01:07:48,688 --> 01:07:50,122
the audience, so they will definitely have access
1863
01:07:50,122 --> 01:07:50,735
to those immediately
1864
01:07:51,252 --> 01:07:53,161
Great. 2 particular questions that that I wanna
1865
01:07:53,161 --> 01:07:55,627
ask. First of all, I like to... You
1866
01:07:55,627 --> 01:07:57,297
talked about alias basically We didn't call it
1867
01:07:57,297 --> 01:07:59,705
that, but you'd because... Well, you implied actually
1868
01:07:59,705 --> 01:08:01,063
though it's a good thing. If you've got
1869
01:08:01,462 --> 01:08:03,138
unique email. Most people probably only have 1
1870
01:08:03,138 --> 01:08:03,457
or 2,
1871
01:08:04,255 --> 01:08:06,411
unless they've taken steps. Most people probably have
1872
01:08:06,411 --> 01:08:08,736
1 phone number. Now, it's mobile number, and
1873
01:08:08,736 --> 01:08:09,771
it's and you never change it because you
1874
01:08:09,771 --> 01:08:11,283
ported it everywhere, and it it follows you
1875
01:08:11,283 --> 01:08:13,273
for life, like a social security number. So
1876
01:08:13,273 --> 01:08:14,706
a lot of the things that I've often
1877
01:08:14,706 --> 01:08:16,797
had recommended our Alias. You getting
1878
01:08:17,189 --> 01:08:19,430
throw away numbers, will not throw. Your second
1879
01:08:19,430 --> 01:08:20,789
numbers, our third numbers are at least, so
1880
01:08:20,789 --> 01:08:21,530
you can kinda
1881
01:08:22,390 --> 01:08:22,890
diversify
1882
01:08:23,350 --> 01:08:25,770
your phone number identity as well as using
1883
01:08:25,829 --> 01:08:26,550
email aliases.
1884
01:08:27,523 --> 01:08:28,400
So curious about that.
1885
01:08:29,118 --> 01:08:30,555
1 thing in particular I'm worried about now,
1886
01:08:30,715 --> 01:08:32,949
especially with Ai is I like to buy
1887
01:08:32,949 --> 01:08:34,466
no buy domain names.
1888
01:08:35,037 --> 01:08:36,466
That I could do catch all email addresses
1889
01:08:36,466 --> 01:08:37,735
that I just make up on the fly.
1890
01:08:38,052 --> 01:08:39,481
I'm just... I'm waiting for the day though
1891
01:08:39,481 --> 01:08:40,195
when someone figured out,
1892
01:08:41,068 --> 01:08:42,258
what if we just... What, this is a
1893
01:08:42,258 --> 01:08:44,340
weird domain name so What if all the
1894
01:08:44,340 --> 01:08:45,932
addresses at this domain name or the same
1895
01:08:45,932 --> 01:08:47,923
person? Is is that gonna bite me at
1896
01:08:47,923 --> 01:08:48,322
some point?
1897
01:08:49,277 --> 01:08:51,268
I mean, anything we do that has a
1898
01:08:51,268 --> 01:08:51,666
pattern?
1899
01:08:52,079 --> 01:08:53,911
And can be tied back to anything that
1900
01:08:53,911 --> 01:08:56,698
is officially associated with us whether it be
1901
01:08:56,698 --> 01:08:59,486
financially tied or online or anything else could
1902
01:08:59,486 --> 01:09:00,463
be an exposure
1903
01:09:01,094 --> 01:09:02,690
But let me let me take a step
1904
01:09:02,690 --> 01:09:04,047
back and give you just, I guess, a
1905
01:09:04,047 --> 01:09:04,925
little advice.
1906
01:09:05,722 --> 01:09:06,222
So
1907
01:09:06,600 --> 01:09:09,487
for emails, I use simple login. Which is
1908
01:09:09,487 --> 01:09:12,030
owned by proton. Right? I know you probably
1909
01:09:12,030 --> 01:09:14,017
have a lot of proton users. Yeah. I'm
1910
01:09:14,017 --> 01:09:16,640
a big proton fan, Swiss privacy loss so
1911
01:09:16,640 --> 01:09:17,832
much better than the Us,
1912
01:09:18,484 --> 01:09:21,028
we have vetted them. They've been independently audited.
1913
01:09:21,187 --> 01:09:21,687
So
1914
01:09:22,141 --> 01:09:24,765
simple login was a third party company that
1915
01:09:24,765 --> 01:09:27,010
they acquired a couple years ago. And it
1916
01:09:27,010 --> 01:09:30,289
basically allows me to create an unlimited number
1917
01:09:30,289 --> 01:09:33,170
of temporary burner addresses that just forward to
1918
01:09:33,170 --> 01:09:35,729
my real email address. And the tactic there
1919
01:09:35,729 --> 01:09:38,305
is so many places get breached. Even if
1920
01:09:38,305 --> 01:09:40,145
they don't intentionally misuse your email,
1921
01:09:40,944 --> 01:09:43,744
so much better to use that burner email.
1922
01:09:44,078 --> 01:09:46,646
That just forwards through because now when Jason's
1923
01:09:46,782 --> 01:09:49,010
online hunting you and he finds that burner
1924
01:09:49,010 --> 01:09:51,810
email, it's not associated with anything else so...
1925
01:09:51,970 --> 01:09:53,166
There's nowhere way for it to go... For
1926
01:09:53,166 --> 01:09:55,078
him to go with it. Right? That's that's
1927
01:09:55,078 --> 01:09:57,550
not useful as an investigative lead. So if
1928
01:09:57,709 --> 01:09:58,880
I'm am hunting you
1929
01:09:59,319 --> 01:10:00,298
using aliases,
1930
01:10:00,677 --> 01:10:03,634
whether it be email addresses, or I use
1931
01:10:03,634 --> 01:10:06,030
my pseudo for extra phone numbers,
1932
01:10:06,762 --> 01:10:08,513
so. If I if I need to sign
1933
01:10:08,513 --> 01:10:10,025
up for anything, and they want a phone
1934
01:10:10,025 --> 01:10:10,344
number.
1935
01:10:11,060 --> 01:10:12,810
And and, literally, if you had ask me
1936
01:10:12,810 --> 01:10:14,641
for a phone number prior to doing this
1937
01:10:14,641 --> 01:10:16,569
interview, I would have given you. A V
1938
01:10:16,569 --> 01:10:18,167
number. I would've have given you a burn
1939
01:10:18,167 --> 01:10:20,885
number because it's not that I don't trust
1940
01:10:20,885 --> 01:10:23,921
you, but there's no reason in most cases
1941
01:10:23,921 --> 01:10:27,452
to give anyone my actual cell phone number.
1942
01:10:28,011 --> 01:10:30,009
Because once you have that, there's a lot
1943
01:10:30,009 --> 01:10:31,607
you could do with it. Right? Like, you
1944
01:10:31,607 --> 01:10:33,364
could sim swap it, you could, you know,
1945
01:10:33,859 --> 01:10:37,761
that is, a your true cellular phone number
1946
01:10:37,761 --> 01:10:39,594
is pretty valuable, so we try not to
1947
01:10:39,594 --> 01:10:41,506
give that out as much as possible.
1948
01:10:42,063 --> 01:10:44,698
And then you know, I like to have
1949
01:10:44,698 --> 01:10:45,968
most of my... I do have a couple
1950
01:10:45,968 --> 01:10:48,030
of personal social media accounts. For example, I
1951
01:10:48,030 --> 01:10:49,720
play on a sports team, and they
1952
01:10:50,092 --> 01:10:52,898
absolutely well, only schedule things on Facebook.
1953
01:10:53,297 --> 01:10:55,694
So I do have a Facebook account. It's
1954
01:10:55,694 --> 01:10:58,272
not my name has no photos has no
1955
01:10:58,411 --> 01:10:59,449
association with me.
1956
01:10:59,945 --> 01:11:02,585
But I choose... And I know that's a
1957
01:11:02,585 --> 01:11:05,064
little bit of exposure. But again, that's... I'm
1958
01:11:05,064 --> 01:11:06,265
not the guy who says don't be on
1959
01:11:06,265 --> 01:11:08,756
the Internet. I'm saying, all just be smart
1960
01:11:08,756 --> 01:11:10,511
about it and find that balance. And for
1961
01:11:10,511 --> 01:11:11,149
that balance,
1962
01:11:11,707 --> 01:11:13,542
I choose to have a couple social media
1963
01:11:13,542 --> 01:11:16,253
accounts and just not just check the settings
1964
01:11:16,253 --> 01:11:17,370
and don't over share on them.
1965
01:11:18,104 --> 01:11:19,385
1 more question and and when...
1966
01:11:20,185 --> 01:11:21,465
It's back to kinda what we're talking about
1967
01:11:21,465 --> 01:11:23,064
before, and some the irony of trying to
1968
01:11:23,064 --> 01:11:25,145
protect your identity. When you go to some
1969
01:11:25,145 --> 01:11:26,829
of these sites, And even some of these
1970
01:11:26,829 --> 01:11:28,574
sites, if you were go directly to, let's
1971
01:11:28,574 --> 01:11:30,556
say, Facebook. I gotta close my account, I
1972
01:11:30,556 --> 01:11:31,509
want you to get rid of my all
1973
01:11:31,509 --> 01:11:31,825
my stuff.
1974
01:11:32,539 --> 01:11:33,903
A lot of times, I'll say, well, we
1975
01:11:33,903 --> 01:11:35,096
really need to make sure that you are
1976
01:11:35,096 --> 01:11:36,608
who say are before we do this. So
1977
01:11:36,608 --> 01:11:39,471
upload a photo Id or upload a picture
1978
01:11:39,471 --> 01:11:40,289
of your passport.
1979
01:11:40,919 --> 01:11:43,393
Or, you know, in the process of verifying
1980
01:11:43,393 --> 01:11:45,069
that you are who you say you are
1981
01:11:45,069 --> 01:11:46,746
and that the information that you want to
1982
01:11:46,746 --> 01:11:48,682
have removed, it is accurate,
1983
01:11:49,554 --> 01:11:51,635
they ask you to basically kinda give up
1984
01:11:51,635 --> 01:11:53,154
a lot of information yourself. Is that is
1985
01:11:53,154 --> 01:11:54,515
that just part of the deal like, should
1986
01:11:54,515 --> 01:11:55,255
you hesitate
1987
01:11:55,635 --> 01:11:56,675
when you're going to into on of these
1988
01:11:56,675 --> 01:11:59,006
sites that want all this information to ironically
1989
01:11:59,006 --> 01:12:01,154
remove your data. Is that just par for
1990
01:12:01,154 --> 01:12:01,471
the course?
1991
01:12:02,426 --> 01:12:05,051
Yeah. So you should definitely hesitate.
1992
01:12:05,704 --> 01:12:07,619
That is something for me, like, if on
1993
01:12:07,619 --> 01:12:09,535
my personal burner accounts if I got those,
1994
01:12:09,854 --> 01:12:11,850
I would just walk away. Be like, well,
1995
01:12:12,329 --> 01:12:14,659
no. I'm good. Like, I'll just click that
1996
01:12:14,659 --> 01:12:16,500
account out? I'm just done with your platform,
1997
01:12:17,380 --> 01:12:18,900
especially with places like meta?
1998
01:12:20,020 --> 01:12:21,619
I mean, why do you think they're asking,
1999
01:12:21,953 --> 01:12:25,056
for a face shot or a government Id.
2000
01:12:25,216 --> 01:12:28,636
Right? Obviously, it's for facial recognition, and I
2001
01:12:28,795 --> 01:12:30,680
I do not trust that that is all
2002
01:12:30,958 --> 01:12:33,183
just to verify me. Right? They wanna get
2003
01:12:33,183 --> 01:12:35,488
us in their data database because that data
2004
01:12:35,488 --> 01:12:36,362
is so valuable.
2005
01:12:36,760 --> 01:12:37,260
And
2006
01:12:37,634 --> 01:12:39,675
especially Meta has really been pushing facial record
2007
01:12:39,873 --> 01:12:42,181
condition for a long time. Right? Ever since
2008
01:12:42,181 --> 01:12:43,774
tagging people in photos began.
2009
01:12:44,570 --> 01:12:47,037
So I don't trust that. I don't like
2010
01:12:47,037 --> 01:12:47,537
that
2011
01:12:47,849 --> 01:12:49,448
Now I will give you a little pro
2012
01:12:49,448 --> 01:12:49,688
tip.
2013
01:12:50,407 --> 01:12:53,044
1 thing I do, which probably most people
2014
01:12:53,044 --> 01:12:54,802
don't do is sometimes I go in and
2015
01:12:54,802 --> 01:12:57,199
actually dig through the terms of service.
2016
01:12:57,774 --> 01:12:59,762
And if you start digging through, especially on
2017
01:12:59,762 --> 01:13:02,307
meta, like, if they ask you for your
2018
01:13:02,307 --> 01:13:05,329
government Id, to me, that is a huge
2019
01:13:05,329 --> 01:13:07,578
over reach. Right? Like, they don't have the
2020
01:13:07,578 --> 01:13:09,336
authority for that. And I guess their argument
2021
01:13:09,336 --> 01:13:10,694
would be like, well, you don't have to
2022
01:13:10,694 --> 01:13:12,212
give it to us, but we also don't
2023
01:13:12,212 --> 01:13:13,570
have to let you back into your account.
2024
01:13:14,064 --> 01:13:15,337
But if you look at their terms of
2025
01:13:15,337 --> 01:13:18,362
service, they'll accept a government Id or 2
2026
01:13:18,362 --> 01:13:21,068
forms of secondary Id and secondary Id can
2027
01:13:21,068 --> 01:13:21,226
be.
2028
01:13:22,196 --> 01:13:24,497
Mail, like mail that's been open to an
2029
01:13:24,497 --> 01:13:27,435
address, Mh. A gym card, you know, some
2030
01:13:27,435 --> 01:13:29,657
of those things. So once we start getting
2031
01:13:29,657 --> 01:13:31,736
into non government meant Ids,
2032
01:13:32,133 --> 01:13:33,959
then it becomes a little bit easier to
2033
01:13:33,959 --> 01:13:34,459
provide
2034
01:13:34,912 --> 01:13:37,373
verification for something that may be in an
2035
01:13:37,373 --> 01:13:38,247
alternate name.
2036
01:13:38,820 --> 01:13:40,820
Right? And so you can get a little
2037
01:13:40,820 --> 01:13:42,899
bit creative there. More often than not when
2038
01:13:42,899 --> 01:13:45,140
these situations come up, I just walk away
2039
01:13:45,140 --> 01:13:45,939
from that account.
2040
01:13:46,513 --> 01:13:48,426
Now if it has your personal data on
2041
01:13:48,426 --> 01:13:50,815
it, and they're not allowing you to close
2042
01:13:50,815 --> 01:13:53,046
it, I've not run into that scenario.
2043
01:13:54,097 --> 01:13:56,171
But typically, what I would do is if
2044
01:13:56,171 --> 01:13:58,644
they lock me out is just put in
2045
01:13:58,644 --> 01:14:01,036
and and just hound them about getting the
2046
01:14:01,036 --> 01:14:01,834
account deleted.
2047
01:14:02,552 --> 01:14:03,052
But
2048
01:14:03,524 --> 01:14:05,676
mean, my perspective is maybe not the best
2049
01:14:05,676 --> 01:14:07,826
because I don't really have any social media
2050
01:14:07,826 --> 01:14:09,282
accounts where I post personal
2051
01:14:09,898 --> 01:14:10,136
details.
2052
01:14:10,948 --> 01:14:12,300
So the data I have on there. So
2053
01:14:12,458 --> 01:14:14,049
I guess, I'm kind of addressing it up
2054
01:14:14,049 --> 01:14:15,560
upfront by just being careful what I give
2055
01:14:15,560 --> 01:14:16,514
them in the first place.
2056
01:14:17,389 --> 01:14:18,502
Yeah. I actually struggle with some of that
2057
01:14:18,502 --> 01:14:19,377
to too because a lot of the advice
2058
01:14:19,457 --> 01:14:20,625
I give to other people people's hard. I
2059
01:14:20,743 --> 01:14:22,415
can't check it because I haven't done it
2060
01:14:22,415 --> 01:14:23,927
or I'd stopped doing a long time ago.
2061
01:14:24,246 --> 01:14:26,076
So sometimes have to set up dummy accounts
2062
01:14:26,076 --> 01:14:27,747
or find people I know that do do
2063
01:14:27,747 --> 01:14:29,593
it and Can't Yeah. I know that are
2064
01:14:29,593 --> 01:14:30,468
willing to help me look at their stuff.
2065
01:14:30,627 --> 01:14:32,777
And III should throw out just a little
2066
01:14:32,777 --> 01:14:33,890
bit of warning to your audience.
2067
01:14:34,607 --> 01:14:37,649
Absolutely, we should not lead... Social media accounts
2068
01:14:37,649 --> 01:14:39,562
follow. So we should not walk away from
2069
01:14:39,562 --> 01:14:42,193
them and not close them because we do
2070
01:14:42,193 --> 01:14:44,345
see a lot of crime that's generated of
2071
01:14:44,345 --> 01:14:45,655
these carrie abandon
2072
01:14:46,189 --> 01:14:49,609
Facebook account 5 years ago. I figure out
2073
01:14:49,609 --> 01:14:51,756
his old password through breach data. I get
2074
01:14:51,756 --> 01:14:53,760
control of his account. And now I contact
2075
01:14:53,760 --> 01:14:55,430
all his family and friends and start doing
2076
01:14:55,430 --> 01:14:57,421
a bunch of social engineering campaigns. We see
2077
01:14:57,421 --> 01:14:59,569
a lot of social engineering that are from
2078
01:14:59,569 --> 01:15:01,899
compromised accounts. Mh. So definitely...
2079
01:15:02,530 --> 01:15:04,930
And there is there are sites like a
2080
01:15:04,930 --> 01:15:07,489
account killer and some different sites that will
2081
01:15:07,489 --> 01:15:09,170
help you that. Help you shut down your
2082
01:15:09,170 --> 01:15:09,409
accounts.
2083
01:15:10,530 --> 01:15:11,649
As far as domains,
2084
01:15:12,463 --> 01:15:14,135
I do all my hosting through a company
2085
01:15:14,135 --> 01:15:17,742
called host matters because they're twice as expensive
2086
01:15:17,878 --> 01:15:20,689
as, like a Godaddy or named cheap, but
2087
01:15:21,238 --> 01:15:23,387
you can buy it with privacy dot com
2088
01:15:23,387 --> 01:15:25,934
cards, which are masked credit cards. So you
2089
01:15:25,934 --> 01:15:27,605
don't have to give them any of your
2090
01:15:27,605 --> 01:15:28,481
real information.
2091
01:15:29,371 --> 01:15:31,598
But you are paying them. They're getting paid.
2092
01:15:32,076 --> 01:15:34,542
And they have real people there. And by
2093
01:15:34,542 --> 01:15:36,625
that, what I mean is, you're gonna pay
2094
01:15:36,625 --> 01:15:39,010
with your privacy dot com masked credit card,
2095
01:15:39,170 --> 01:15:40,760
which for people are not familiar. It's basically
2096
01:15:40,760 --> 01:15:43,305
a private version of, like, Paypal almost. Mh.
2097
01:15:43,543 --> 01:15:44,043
And
2098
01:15:44,514 --> 01:15:47,074
they're gonna do a fraud alert, but if
2099
01:15:47,074 --> 01:15:48,594
you contact their customer service,
2100
01:15:49,154 --> 01:15:51,554
usually within 5 minutes a real person is
2101
01:15:51,554 --> 01:15:53,238
on the phone with me, and they... And
2102
01:15:53,238 --> 01:15:55,404
you tell them you're a privacy ent.
2103
01:15:56,174 --> 01:15:58,555
That's why you're using privacy dot com, and
2104
01:15:58,555 --> 01:16:00,141
they will approve it and push it through.
2105
01:16:00,380 --> 01:16:02,306
Phone And I've been using them for a
2106
01:16:02,306 --> 01:16:05,094
few years. It cost twice as much as
2107
01:16:05,094 --> 01:16:07,005
those other companies, but they don't sell our
2108
01:16:07,005 --> 01:16:08,996
data, and it wouldn't even matter if they
2109
01:16:08,996 --> 01:16:10,842
did. Because I don't have to give them
2110
01:16:10,842 --> 01:16:12,114
a real name. I don't have to get...
2111
01:16:12,354 --> 01:16:14,922
The credit card I gave them expired 2
2112
01:16:15,139 --> 01:16:16,832
hours after they used it
2113
01:16:17,145 --> 01:16:19,381
that's the beauty of those masked credit cards.
2114
01:16:19,701 --> 01:16:21,858
So that's my pro tip for domains host
2115
01:16:21,858 --> 01:16:23,775
matters. I don't own stock or anything.
2116
01:16:24,189 --> 01:16:24,587
I'm just...
2117
01:16:25,305 --> 01:16:27,059
I love when I can talk to a
2118
01:16:27,059 --> 01:16:28,016
real person,
2119
01:16:28,734 --> 01:16:31,046
and we have enough of our clients that
2120
01:16:31,046 --> 01:16:32,402
do business there. If you just say or
2121
01:16:32,402 --> 01:16:34,250
privacy and enthusiasts, they'll take care of you.
2122
01:16:34,649 --> 01:16:36,084
And this is this is a big message
2123
01:16:36,084 --> 01:16:36,562
to everyone.
2124
01:16:37,359 --> 01:16:39,752
I have started paying more than I used
2125
01:16:39,752 --> 01:16:41,426
to have to pay for things to get
2126
01:16:41,426 --> 01:16:42,340
the to privacy
2127
01:16:42,955 --> 01:16:43,455
respecting
2128
01:16:43,832 --> 01:16:46,622
version of it. Yeah. I think we've all
2129
01:16:46,622 --> 01:16:48,614
been sold into this idea of everything should
2130
01:16:48,614 --> 01:16:49,651
be cheaper free.
2131
01:16:50,224 --> 01:16:52,296
And that is at the cost of our
2132
01:16:52,296 --> 01:16:54,448
privacy. So if you wanna be a private
2133
01:16:54,448 --> 01:16:56,841
person, you have to be willing to pay
2134
01:16:56,841 --> 01:16:57,739
for your services.
2135
01:16:59,168 --> 01:17:02,122
Yep. Yep. Sad but true. Yep. Alright, Jason.
2136
01:17:02,282 --> 01:17:03,421
We could talk for
2137
01:17:04,198 --> 01:17:06,992
going on forever. Yeah. Absolutely. And and again,
2138
01:17:07,152 --> 01:17:08,604
again, we'll have to find sometime time to
2139
01:17:08,604 --> 01:17:09,965
do it over beer or someday. But Yeah.
2140
01:17:10,524 --> 01:17:10,685
Okay.
2141
01:17:11,324 --> 01:17:13,005
1 last question before we go, And this
2142
01:17:13,005 --> 01:17:15,085
is a softball. What what other their if
2143
01:17:15,085 --> 01:17:16,845
what other stuff can we find at Intel
2144
01:17:16,845 --> 01:17:18,451
tech. I know he, he wrote the book
2145
01:17:18,451 --> 01:17:19,644
called extreme privacy.
2146
01:17:20,519 --> 01:17:22,746
There are now Pdfs that you can subscribe
2147
01:17:22,746 --> 01:17:24,019
to you which I have done that you
2148
01:17:24,019 --> 01:17:26,262
could for different platforms. Nick and it says
2149
01:17:26,262 --> 01:17:28,576
extreme, but I assume that you you could
2150
01:17:28,576 --> 01:17:29,692
learn a lot for them. You'd if you're
2151
01:17:29,692 --> 01:17:31,287
not going full tilt Michael Basil.
2152
01:17:32,085 --> 01:17:34,398
Yeah. So for the extreme privacy book, it
2153
01:17:34,398 --> 01:17:36,646
really is extreme. It's not most people. There's
2154
01:17:36,646 --> 01:17:38,720
probably about a third that is basics, and
2155
01:17:38,720 --> 01:17:40,554
then in a third that's intermediate and the
2156
01:17:40,554 --> 01:17:43,506
third that is crazy, like, becoming a digital
2157
01:17:43,506 --> 01:17:45,180
no and wandering the lands.
2158
01:17:45,755 --> 01:17:47,832
So that is probably on the scope of
2159
01:17:47,832 --> 01:17:49,749
most people, but now we also have these
2160
01:17:49,749 --> 01:17:52,225
smaller digital guidance. So when you go to
2161
01:17:52,225 --> 01:17:52,625
a site,
2162
01:17:53,279 --> 01:17:55,113
what most people are just going to need
2163
01:17:55,113 --> 01:17:56,788
and want is the free stuff. So if
2164
01:17:56,788 --> 01:17:58,783
you go into our resources tab in our
2165
01:17:58,783 --> 01:18:00,554
tools tab, all the free stuff I... Talked
2166
01:18:00,554 --> 01:18:02,071
about is there. So go take all of
2167
01:18:02,071 --> 01:18:04,067
our free stuff. No pressure to get anything
2168
01:18:04,067 --> 01:18:05,823
else. But if you decide you wanna take
2169
01:18:05,823 --> 01:18:07,578
it to the next level, we have guides
2170
01:18:07,578 --> 01:18:08,557
on firewalls
2171
01:18:09,095 --> 01:18:11,590
and We have guides on privacy. We have
2172
01:18:11,590 --> 01:18:14,729
guides on building out your own privacy based
2173
01:18:15,029 --> 01:18:17,750
phone. Right? Mh. So there's all sorts of
2174
01:18:17,750 --> 01:18:19,197
stuff. Then on my side of the house,
2175
01:18:19,515 --> 01:18:21,902
we have online training for open source intelligence.
2176
01:18:22,140 --> 01:18:24,208
I train at Black hat every year. We
2177
01:18:24,208 --> 01:18:27,170
do private events. We do keynote, privacy... Security,
2178
01:18:27,329 --> 01:18:29,510
we do all sorts of consulting. So
2179
01:18:29,810 --> 01:18:31,729
we have a lot of different roles there.
2180
01:18:32,289 --> 01:18:34,929
And... But mostly in the privacy security or
2181
01:18:35,010 --> 01:18:36,149
Open source intelligence
2182
01:18:36,545 --> 01:18:36,784
fields.
2183
01:18:37,824 --> 01:18:39,185
Wonderful. Well I'll put links to the show
2184
01:18:39,185 --> 01:18:41,025
notes, as I said, Jason, thank you so
2185
01:18:41,025 --> 01:18:42,625
much for coming the show. That we'll definitely
2186
01:18:42,625 --> 01:18:43,744
have to bring you back in the future.
2187
01:18:44,225 --> 01:18:45,104
Absolutely. Thanks, Kurt.
2188
01:18:51,261 --> 01:18:53,176
I really enjoyed that to interview did too.
2189
01:18:53,336 --> 01:18:55,385
That was a lot of fun, very, very
2190
01:18:55,503 --> 01:18:56,003
interesting
2191
01:18:56,536 --> 01:18:56,933
and
2192
01:18:57,409 --> 01:18:58,918
brought out a lot of things that I
2193
01:18:58,918 --> 01:18:59,951
don't think a lot of us think about.
2194
01:19:00,269 --> 01:19:03,310
So just Fyi, I've been going through their
2195
01:19:03,939 --> 01:19:06,659
data removal guide. And, there are links in
2196
01:19:06,659 --> 01:19:08,340
the shown notes. You're welcome to, obviously, go
2197
01:19:08,340 --> 01:19:10,100
look at that yourself, as well as links
2198
01:19:10,100 --> 01:19:12,020
to many of the other tools and,
2199
01:19:12,833 --> 01:19:15,139
and stuff that we talked about today, all
2200
01:19:15,139 --> 01:19:16,887
today show notes. But I am going through
2201
01:19:16,887 --> 01:19:17,921
the process of,
2202
01:19:19,034 --> 01:19:21,419
requesting that my data be deleted or in
2203
01:19:21,419 --> 01:19:22,158
some cases
2204
01:19:22,548 --> 01:19:24,861
suppressed, and I'll explain that when the time
2205
01:19:24,861 --> 01:19:27,572
comes. Using the documents that these guys have
2206
01:19:27,572 --> 01:19:29,487
put out, which are very, very helpful. I'm
2207
01:19:29,487 --> 01:19:30,922
taking a whole bunch of notes that I'm
2208
01:19:30,922 --> 01:19:33,011
going to be talking about that, I might
2209
01:19:33,011 --> 01:19:34,608
even make that like, a whole episode, because
2210
01:19:34,608 --> 01:19:36,203
it's a... I'm just shocked at the...
2211
01:19:37,002 --> 01:19:39,816
The things that I'm finding and the weird
2212
01:19:40,448 --> 01:19:43,239
aspects to how all of these things work.
2213
01:19:43,957 --> 01:19:44,994
It will be a tip of the week
2214
01:19:44,994 --> 01:19:46,670
for sure, but it's gonna be a big
2215
01:19:46,670 --> 01:19:49,381
1. So we'll see End I might have
2216
01:19:49,541 --> 01:19:52,100
having to dedicate a whole kinda episode to
2217
01:19:52,100 --> 01:19:52,974
this. We will see.
2218
01:19:54,007 --> 01:19:55,676
But know that that is coming. So you're
2219
01:19:55,676 --> 01:19:56,708
welcome to look at it now, but if
2220
01:19:56,708 --> 01:19:57,820
you want me to kind of blaze the
2221
01:19:57,820 --> 01:19:58,297
trail for you,
2222
01:19:59,028 --> 01:20:01,421
stay tuned because I will be giving you
2223
01:20:01,421 --> 01:20:04,291
my experiences on this and and give you
2224
01:20:04,291 --> 01:20:06,125
some tips and tricks for things that I
2225
01:20:06,125 --> 01:20:07,640
found along the way that may help you
2226
01:20:07,640 --> 01:20:09,653
out. If and when, you decide to do
2227
01:20:09,653 --> 01:20:11,091
this for yourself. And I think you should,
2228
01:20:11,171 --> 01:20:11,650
by the way,
2229
01:20:12,368 --> 01:20:14,287
if for as kind of painful and weird
2230
01:20:14,287 --> 01:20:15,485
as this process has been,
2231
01:20:16,534 --> 01:20:19,475
it was very enlighten, and I I... After
2232
01:20:19,475 --> 01:20:22,336
having done it, I will agree with Jason
2233
01:20:22,336 --> 01:20:24,323
that it it's something you shouldn't pay someone
2234
01:20:24,323 --> 01:20:26,267
else to do. You should do it yourself
2235
01:20:26,402 --> 01:20:28,148
and paste yourself and spread it out every
2236
01:20:28,148 --> 01:20:30,291
time. So, anyway, I will give you my
2237
01:20:30,291 --> 01:20:31,957
take on that and maybe my advice on
2238
01:20:31,957 --> 01:20:33,148
how to go about doing that and a...
2239
01:20:33,957 --> 01:20:36,501
Future show, not too long from now.
2240
01:20:37,534 --> 01:20:39,045
Patrons on Thursday we'll get some really fun
2241
01:20:39,045 --> 01:20:40,714
bonus content with with Jason.
2242
01:20:41,986 --> 01:20:42,884
I ask him
2243
01:20:43,274 --> 01:20:45,985
So How do pronounce Michael Be or basil.
2244
01:20:46,225 --> 01:20:47,660
How do you pronounce that last name? And
2245
01:20:47,660 --> 01:20:49,277
his answer was
2246
01:20:50,133 --> 01:20:51,112
surprising and
2247
01:20:51,569 --> 01:20:51,967
hilarious.
2248
01:20:52,859 --> 01:20:54,397
We also talk about using
2249
01:20:55,094 --> 01:20:57,728
disinformation to mask your own data,
2250
01:20:58,287 --> 01:21:00,122
throwing out some of that cha. The sm
2251
01:21:00,122 --> 01:21:01,081
interesting takes on that.
2252
01:21:01,734 --> 01:21:03,652
You will find out why you actually are
2253
01:21:03,652 --> 01:21:05,969
more likely to have your information exposed by
2254
01:21:05,969 --> 01:21:08,286
4 request than your elected officials. And then
2255
01:21:08,446 --> 01:21:09,899
I had to ask him, you know, since
2256
01:21:09,899 --> 01:21:11,577
they take care of some of these high
2257
01:21:11,577 --> 01:21:13,734
profile clients. When you go through the looking
2258
01:21:13,734 --> 01:21:15,412
glass 1? What does it like when you
2259
01:21:15,412 --> 01:21:17,581
try to take, you know, the stream measures
2260
01:21:17,581 --> 01:21:19,994
to to scrub people's information
2261
01:21:20,531 --> 01:21:22,682
from the Internet. So all very interesting stuff,
2262
01:21:22,762 --> 01:21:24,118
and that will be coming for the patrons
2263
01:21:24,118 --> 01:21:26,850
as usual, on the Thursday bonus podcast.
2264
01:21:27,729 --> 01:21:29,570
Next week, we'll have a new show. Again,
2265
01:21:29,729 --> 01:21:31,970
I will definitely cover the the cloud strike,
2266
01:21:33,409 --> 01:21:33,729
debacle,
2267
01:21:34,384 --> 01:21:35,821
And maybe I'll be ready to talk about
2268
01:21:35,821 --> 01:21:38,535
the data deletion project that I'm on, but
2269
01:21:38,615 --> 01:21:40,052
I've not next week, it will be sent.
2270
01:21:40,451 --> 01:21:41,968
That'll do it this week. Take care of
2271
01:21:41,968 --> 01:21:43,326
everybody stay safe out there.
2272
01:21:43,979 --> 01:21:45,408
And until next week as always,
2273
01:21:46,123 --> 01:21:47,552
don't get caught with your draw down.