אודות פרק זה
This is episode #21 of the podcast and it’s Thursday, the 7th of July, 2022.
My guest today is Dr. Matthias Michel, a philosopher working at the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at the New York University. Although most of his research focuses on the scientific study of consciousness, he is also interested in non-human / animal consciousness. Matthias has also worked in the domain of 'philosophy of measurement' as it applies to the measurement of mental properties, especially in psychiatric research (for instance, in the measurement of fear and anxiety).
We started the show by defining consciousness — discussing the ways in which we can assess our own conscious experience. Since the subjective aspect of consciousness makes its scientific study very challenging, I asked Matthias to summarize for us the current assessment methods used in the field. One such method (the use of subjective reports), although somewhat controversial, proves to be particularly important in applications like mental disorders (specifically, fear and anxiety). Matthias believes that cognitive neuroscience research on consciousness could give us a deeper understanding of mental disorders and their treatments.
The second part of the interview covered technology where we focused in particular on the questions ‘can AI systems be conscious? And, if yes, how?’ Matthias kindly shares with us his field’s perspective as well as his own opinion on the topic.
Here is the show.
Show Notes:
- Defining consciousness; Is human experience always conscious?
- Does being conscious presuppose being aware? (And what kind of awareness is needed here?)
- What makes the scientific study of consciousness challenging?
- Applications: mental disorders (like fear and anxiety): how can the scientific field of consciousness help?
- Subjective reports in the assessment of conscious experience
- Technology: Can AI be conscious? How?
Note:
Relevant papers:
Michel, Matthias. "The Mismeasure of Consciousness: A problem of coordination for the Perceptual Awareness Scale." Philosophy of Science 86.5 (2019): 1239-1249.
Taschereau-Dumouchel, Vincent, et al. "Putting the “mental” back in “mental disorders”: a perspective from research on fear and anxiety." Molecular Psychiatry 27.3 (2022): 1322-1330.
Lau, Hakwan. In Consciousness we Trust: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Subjective Experience. Oxford University Press. 2022.
Link to Dr. Michel’s website:
https://matthias-michel.wixsite.com/michel
