TRANSCRIPTION 🔗
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He is actually in the news pretty
much on a monthly, if not weekly
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basis, examples of critical equipment being
exposed on the Internet and being rich.
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Welcome everyone to the Industrial Security Podcast. My name is Nate Nelson. I'm
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here with Andrew Ginter, the vice
president of Industrial Security at Waterfall Scurity Solutions,
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who's going to introduce the subject and
guest of our show today. Andrew,
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how's it going. I'm very well, Thank you, Nate. Our
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guest today is Robin Bertier. He
is the CEO and co founder at Network
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Perception, and he's going to be
talking to us about machine analysis of network
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zoning, so you know, basically
analyzing our networks so we can understand attack
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pads. Okay, your interview with
Robin. Hello Robin, and welcome to
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the podcast. Before we get started, can you tell our listeners a little
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bit about yourself and about the good
work that you're doing at Network Perception.
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Thanks Andrew for having me. So. My name is Robin Buquier. I'm
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the CEO and co founder of Network
Perception, a cybersecurity software company. We
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help hot networks to get understood,
visualized, and analyze for risks. And
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my background is in computer science and
cybersecurity. I grew up in France,
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moved to the United States in two
thousand and five for grad school, and
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then moved from grad school to Chicago
to launch Network Perception and support the critical
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infrastructure industry by developing solutions that helps
practitioners in those OT and cyber physical system
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environments. Thanks for that, and
our topic today is analyzing networks analyzing zoning.
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You were on the show six months
ago walking us through your your network
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modeling tools, your capabilities back then, you know, to remind our listeners.
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You know, back then you were
reading and analyzing config files and backups
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for firewalls and routers in my recollection. These let you visualize the network.
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It lets you, uh, you
know, design a policy, express the
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policy to your tool, compare all
of these configurations to the policy. You
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know, the policy this machine can
be reachable by those networks, but not
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by anything else, and then report
on deviations. You know, is the
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network configured the way we think it
ought to be configured? And you know
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you're back so you're talking about today. What's new? Is there a new
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problem that you're solving? Yes,
So two things are happening. One inside
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netroperception and one outside. Let me
start with the outside the driving force first.
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So in the last six months,
we've seen in uptake in terms of
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interest by organizations with out networks to
formally verify the segmentation of the environment.
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It's becoming more and more of a
priority for them, and I think that's
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driven by both a more pressure from
adversaries making sure you have the right access
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policy in place to block attackers to
prevent a breage from spreading to the critical
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zones inside your network. And it's
also driven by more stringent regulations we've seen
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with no OXIP seeing now with the
TSA Secretity directives, it's just more focused
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being put around the importance of extremely
robust network segmentation, good hygiene for your
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firewalls, and having very precise rules
to only allow traffic on a need to
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know basis. And then the second
thing that's happening inside that properception is that
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we you know, I didn't mention
in my background, but I really have
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two passions. One is is cybersecurity, the other one is information visualization and
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specifically how to present a large rim
of data into concise reports that leads to
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efficient decision making. So over the
past couple of quarters, we you know,
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reflected on the data analytics that MPVU
provides, and we went back to
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the you know, brainstorming and the
white boat to really think how to best
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present that information because sometimes, you
know, you start importing file configuration files
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and you will have thousands or even
tens of thousands of network paths being discovered
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by the modeling engine that tells you
the exposure of your different critical assets.
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So how do we compress and present
and summarize this information in the way that's
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helping you making better decisions in terms
of risk, in terms of you know,
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the risk
Load full transcript
really to your to your
network. This is of course a
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very important subject that Robin is heading
on here. Network segmentation comes up in
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any domain of cybersecurity at some point, relatively frequently. In it especially,
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I can think of a million examples
where an attacker started off with one network
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resource and ended up moving their way
through a network because wasn't segmented enough,
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the classic example being the target breach
back in twenty thirteen, when a phishing
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email at a small HVAC provider in
Pittsburgh led through target's client portal supplier portal
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rather, attackers got into the network
associated with the HVAC systems and ended up
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burrowing their way through the target network
through to their point of sale systems and
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then stole a bunch of credit card
information. The story goes on from there.
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So all that is to say,
this is very important. You and
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I have talked about air gapping and
unidirectional gateways and all of these relevant technologies
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before. Absolutely, and you know
where to begin. It is important.
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This is why you know, the
first volume, the first volume that was
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published in the sixty four four three
series. You know it's a it's a
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fourteen volume set of standards. The
first volume was you know, half of
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it was about segmentation IT. You
know, it's that important. And you
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know on the OT side, you
know, the to me, the classic
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example was the ransomware attacks Snake got
into Honda a couple of years ago.
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I mean, there's been lots of
ransomware attacks that had OT consequences, but
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that was sort of the uh,
the highest profile one that had you know,
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enough enough detail published to be able
to figure out vaguely what happened.
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And in my recollection, it was
the bad guys got into the IT network
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through the IT to Internet firewall and
pivoted from the IT network into the OT
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network, and you know, contaminated
the uh the production line with with ransomware.
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You know, operated the ransomware remotely
encrypted stuff blah blah blah. And
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so you know, there were firewalls
all the way along there, and uh,
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you know what what people don't understand
is,
you know when people when
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I entered the industry naively, you
know, more than much more than a
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decade ago. You know, I
had sort of the same perception everybody else
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did. You know, You take
a little encryption, throw a few firewalls
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at it, you know, some
VPNs and you're good, right, question
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mark. And you know it was
once I started digging into it. I
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mean now bluntly, I went to
SANDS training on firewalls, and I was
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appalled. And a couple of years
later I put together my own presentation on
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thirteen ways to break a firewall.
You know, what's the low tech way
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to break a firewall? Your shoulder
surf as you know, the firewall that
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enters the password and you enter it
yourself later on and at a rule that
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says allow all and it's all over. You know, what's the what's the
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high tech way to break a firewall? You find a zero day a bug
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that no one else has found in
the firewall. You write code to exploit
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the bug. You sneak your way
through the firewall in a way that you
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know there is no defense against because
there's no patch for the bug. There's
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there's no you know, attack signature
for the attack. It's it's brand new.
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You know what's the uh, the
the modern way to break through a
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firewall? Well, you know,
we've talked about it countless times. You
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get into the IT network, you
you know, trick various ways into people
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and technology into into getting domain credentials, and now you give yourself permission to
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log in to systems through the firewall, and you know, work your will
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upon the target system. You know. Here, here's a pop quiz.
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What is the most widely known sort
of the instinctive, the knee jerk reaction?
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How do you break through a firewall? What's the most widely known way
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through a firewall? Is it like
they do in the movies where you type
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a bunch of zeros and ones until
you get a notification, pull the pops
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up and says access granted. And
your screen scrolls really fast. No good
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one, I have no idea.
Okay, you know it's it's the most
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widely known is you don't attack the
firewall itself. You you know,
every
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firewall. People imagine that firewalls protect
industrial systems from cyber attacks. You know,
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they give you access to industrial data, but they protect the industrial systems.
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In fact, that's not what firewalls
do. What firewalls do is they
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give you access to some industrial systems
and hopefully block you from others so that
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you can ask those industrial systems for
data. If you ask for data politely,
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well you get data back. If
you ask for data impolitely by let's
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say, you know, guessing the
admin password instead of going in as your
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mere user password. Now you're attacking
the OT system through the firewall. This
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is sort of the the the way
that that you know, everyone knows.
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Of course, you can attack through
a firewall. The firewall gives you access
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to a handful of industrial systems and
lets you send messages to those systems,
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and some of those messages can be
attacks. And so you know, this
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is you know, back to the
point here with with Robin. If you
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can send messages to the OT systems
through the firewalls, you can attack them.
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You can pivot attacks into those systems. And so in my understanding,
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this is, you know, the
question he's asking of I have you know,
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in a refinery, I don't know, dozens and dozens of subnetworks and
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dozens of firewalls, and you know
configuration for all of those firewalls. The
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most complex would be the IoT firewall, but you know there's other configurations everywhere
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else. And the question becomes,
where can I pivot? How many steps
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do I have to go through?
How many systems do I have to compromise
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before I get from where I am
on the Internet or in the IT network
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or whatnot to a target that has
really high value? You know, how
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do you do that that? And
this is the kind of analysis that that
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his tools are doing, So that
makes sense, you know, pressure from
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various kinds of regulators, uh,
you know, pressure from the threat environment,
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people caring more about about how their
their networks are configured, and you
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know which parts of it are more
or less easily reachable. But if I
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recall that was kind of what you
were focused on on the last time as
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well, What's what's changed that you
know, you needed to build something new.
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So yeah, good question. So
so based on that reflection, we
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had to improve presenting large room of
data into concise reportata, you know,
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leading to efficient decision making. We
started to work on a new capability for
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the platform that we call a zone
segmentation matrix, and that feature takes your
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entire set of connectivity paths in the
environment that you're modeling and presenting it according
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to a metrix of zone to zone
path. So in one single screen you
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can see like a pertside, you
can see which access network access would present
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a risk for your environment. So, for instance, that metrics will reveal
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if someone from the corporate network will
have direct access to your scaled environment,
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and if so, on which pot
Before you had to go one by one
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into a subnet an asset and then
look at the path in and out of
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that asset. Now we're surfacing in
that metris right away those different results,
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and so that that gives you,
you know, a faster way to identify
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over re permissive rules, overly permissive
segmentation, or gaps in terms of your
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network segmentation. All right, So
the ability to visualize at a glance and
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see where problems are in larger network
configurations. That that sounds good in theory,
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you know, in practice? You
know, you mentioned, you mentioned
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standards, you mentioned drivers. You
know, can you connect the theory the
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capability to the practice. How would
you use this for i SM? You
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know, can you remind us what
is NERK I in SM? I mean?
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As as a general theme, network
visibility has been a key challenge for
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out infrastructure. You have geographically dispersed
facilities and then some very legacy equipment and
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so getting good visibility over those networks
is just is difficult. So FIRK as
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a year ago NERK to stop drafting
a standard around internal network security Monitoring I
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n s M, and the concept
there would be that even if you implement
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good cybo hygiene, even if you
have good proactive defense initiatives in place,
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if an adversary is able to breach
your environment, you should have as part
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of your defense in depth you should
have capabilities to monitor suspicious netroalk traffic and
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alert you and detect if an attack
is going on. So NARK is in
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the process the drafting team in the
process of crafting a revision to the standard
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to include a requirement around pulling sensors
inside those critical networks in order to capture
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the traffic and detect intrusions. It's
still much work in progress. Actually two
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days ago was the end of the
voting period for the first version. I
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don't think the that version was accepted, so it's going to go back to
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the drafting team for some changes,
and then we're going to know in the
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next few months in the final version
with actual enforcement data in the next couple
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of years. But this ties into
that big theme of network visibility, and
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for us at Network Perception, it's
really important that we support the industry gaining
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a much more precise understanding of those
tea networks, and we see our solution
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as extremely complimentary to the network traffic
monitoring product that on the market. We
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call this the two sides of network
visibility. So on one side you have
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actual network traffic monitoring and then on
the other side you have what will,
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which is network modeling. So when
you monitor network traffic, you can see
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in real time what's happening and you
can answer questions such as the something suspicious
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occurring now in my network. When
you do modeling, you can ensure a
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different portion, which is what can
connect to what we covered this in the
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last episode of the podcast. Now
with the I NSM, the push for
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the NSM regulation, we're helping in
two ways. Number One, we can
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help organizations to better plan for the
diplomat of their sensus because with NPVU you
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can very quickly generate a reference architectural
diagram for your environment just in the conflict
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fire to your firewalls, barterers and
switches and so once you have the diagram,
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the decision of where to put sensors
in order to
capture the correct critical
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traffic is easier, specifically with that
zone segmentation metric that I referred to earlier,
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where you have that Berks eye view
and you see what are the critical
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connectivity path which zones should be instrumented
with those sensors. And then the second
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value is to be able to build
context around the event that you're going to
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trigger through that network traffic monitoring sensor. So, for example, you have
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a suspicious netro connection that connects to
critical equipment, you want to know first
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you know how cretical equipment is in
which what what what's the source zone of
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that traffic, what's the destination zone? And then if that equipment gets compromised,
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Where could an attacker go? Like, what are the other paths that
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could be taken for this attack to
propagate in cell? Your environment? And
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those are the that's the contextual environment, the contextual information that that we can
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we can provide for for users.
So, Andrew, it seems to me
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that we have spoken with many guests
before about modeling attack paths, about modeling
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networks and such. What is the
exact distinction in what Robin's talking about here?
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Where to begin? Robin, I
think actually later in the episode says
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this, So I'm going to repeat
what he says in a moment, but
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I think I recall him saying drawing
a distinction between intrusion detection looking at network
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packets and the kind of analysis that
his tools do. Intrusion detection looks at
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what connections are happening, and if
you see an unusual connection, one that
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you haven't seen before, you might
raise an alarm saying someone should look at
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this. I've never seen this before. So it looks at what's happening the
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attack. The analysis tool that Robin
has doesn't look at what's happening. He
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looks at what's possible. He looks
at the firewall configurations and says, well,
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this device here could connect to that
device there. The firewall allows it,
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whether or not it's currently happening.
IDs is what's currently happening. And
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you know, his tool talks about
what could happen to you. I guess
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I'm
kind of surprised that that's actually
never been covered before in all of our
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previous discussions. You know, I
could be wrong. I don't recall it
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has been covered, but you know, we're at one hundred and twenty episodes.
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My memory fails sometimes. I do
remember that something like this we talked
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about with Terry Inglesby at Amanaza.
You know, his company does the attack
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tree analysis where he says, well, you know, how could you get
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from you know, a source the
Internet, a source of an attack,
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you know, or a malicious insider
sitting at that workstation or whatever. How
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could you get from a source of
an attack to a high value target.
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Well, first you'd have to break
into this machine. Then you'd have to
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get through that firewall. Then you'd
have to and each step he assigns a
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weight indicator how difficult it is to
do that, how capable the adversary has
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to be, and he puts together, you know, all of the possibilities
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into a ridiculous number, sometimes literally
over a billion possible attack paths, weighs
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them all and says, here's the
bit you should be worried about. But
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in my recollection that I could be
wrong. You know, his tool looked
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at things sort of a little bit
generally, whereas what Robin's tool is doing,
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what you know network perception is doing, is looking at the config files
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for the firewalls and saying, here's
everything that's possible, not sort of generally.
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Well, you know, you an
attack could pivot through the firewall.
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He would say, well, these
machines here can talk to those machines there.
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That's all the firewall allows. And
so's he's doing that sort of detailed
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analysis that I'm not aware that other
people are doing. IDs is you know
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what is happening? You're talking about
context? Are you connecting? Are you
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supplying that context in a sense in
real time? Are you are you taking
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the alarms in and analyzing the IP
addresses and you know somehow augmenting them.
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So step best step we are.
So we started to develop integration with the
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ideas vendors to be able to first
and reach the topology map that we generate
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with the asset and equipment that has
been detected as communicating on the network.
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Because you know, so far,
when we create a map, we are
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inferring the presence of endpoints based on
references that we extract from the configurations of
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firewalls, routers and switches. But
we don't know for sure that those i
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prcs there is an equipment behind it. But if you start integrating with your
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network scanners, your asset inventory solution, your ideas providers, then we can
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turn those inference into actual endpoint you
communicating and being present on the network,
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which which is enriching your map.
So that pot is, you know,
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you have prototype available today. The
next phase in that roadmap is to be
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able to also visualize the network traffic
directly in study MPV map. So that's
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something on which we're actively working right
now. You can leverage NPVU to contextualize,
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but that's not yet you know,
automated through integration, So that makes
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sense. Another thing that that you
said that intrigued me. You're you're you
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know, you said, figure out
where the adversary can go if an intrusion
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detection system and ideas is alarming about
a particular asset that appears to have been
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compromised and is now sending out probes
and and attacks to other or you know,
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suspicious traffic to other assets. This
is pivoting. This is using a
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compromise machine. It. You know, I heard you say that you could
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figure out what what we're you know, what assets were at risk by a
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pivoting attack, given you know that
a certain asset might have been taken over.
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Well, you know, in the
worst case, if an adversarya is
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you know, taking advantage of I
don't know, known vulnerabilities, exploiting vulnerabilities,
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and you know a lot of control
systems are they have they're not fully
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patched. It's hard to patch these
systems because of reliability concerns, because of
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safety concerns. Sometimes in the worst
case, you can pivot to you know,
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arguably everything on the local network and
everything through firewalls that anything on the
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local net network can reach. It
does little good if you take over one
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asset to take your entire you know, zoned network map and turn the whole
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thing red and say this is where
they can go. Eventually, I'm guessing
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you've got something finer grained, can
you talk about, you know, what
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you actually show people is it?
Is it one or two steps ahead?
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Is it something thing else? What
you know, other than the whole thing
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lighting up. Yeah, that's a
great question. So currently we're looking four
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steps ahead. So what we do
is to leverage our understanding of your network
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sigmutation. So based on your access
policy, firewalls, virus and switches,
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what are the pivot from one subnet
to another subnet now within the single local
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area network. To your point,
it's game over, right if you have
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one, if you have one equipment
compromised, and then that switch is not
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segmenting the networking two villains, so
you have pretty much everything can do to
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everything else in that one net subnet. Then there's not much you can do
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where where we're finding the analysis,
there is to be able to ingest also
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the reports from vunability scanners. So
if you scan that environment either activity scanning
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or past really monitoring to extract which
I pracies is hosting application where you have
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a vailability, then we were planning
to refine that analysis to show you exactly,
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you know, watch which cded it
could be exploded on which portment services.
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But that really leads to the discussion
around actually the importance of reducing the
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size of your segment you know,
the whole macro segmentation movement, right,
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So instead of having a giant,
uh, you know, local area network
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with dozens of vipiracies, segmenting with
villains, or segmenting with actual firewall access
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control to be able to group by
level of criticality and function equipment, so
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that if something is compromised, then
you contain within a very small zone that
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bridge. Mm hmm. So Nate, I don't know if it was it
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was completely clear, But what I
just heard Robin say there was that this
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tool is helping us answer the question, you know, how should we design
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our networks, how should we segment
our networks? I mean, look at
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you look at the Internet. You
look at the threats out there. Nation
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states are out there stirring the pot. Ransomware is out there. Some of
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the ransomware is backed by nation states. They've got the capabilities of nation states.
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Some of the ransomware is rich enough
to buy their own nation state tools,
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li rich enough to build their own
nation state grade tools. So what's
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coming at us across the Internet can
be really nasty, and you know,
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the bad part about these ransom where
with nation state tools is unlike nation states,
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they're not just going to go after
important targets. They're going to go
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after everybody with money. So if
that grade of ransomware is coming after us,
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we got to ask the question,
you know, are have we designed
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our networks in such a way as
to defend them properly. So we look
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at our networks, and you know, generally you've got two kinds of networks.
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You've got networks where the worst case
compromise, if it occurs, is
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unacceptable, you know, rail switching
systems, safety systems, and there's other
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networks where, well, if we
get compromised, you know, we kind
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of want to recover quickly, and
we want our insurance companies to pay us
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out. But you know, it's
it's a big deal, but it's not
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the end of the world. So
in both cases, in both kinds of
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networks, we've got to figure out
how exposed we are. If a bad
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guy from the Internet wants to get
in, how many steps do they have
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to go through? How many machines
do they have to compromise and then pivot
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use the compromise machine to reach through
the next layer of firewall to compromise another
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machine. And what Robin's saying is
that they're starting to integrate this tool not
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just with the network diagrams to count
the steps, but to look at the
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vulnerabilities in each of these targets and
ask the question, how hard is it
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to carry out the next pivot.
So, for example, if we have
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a really important system, very deep
in our networks, and it turns out
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that we've designed the network, we've
broken it not just into one big network
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you're in, you're in. You
know, Robin saying, let's talk about
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finer grained segmentation, micro segmentation.
If you break it into small networks and
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you've got to get from one small
network into another one into another one,
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let's say three or four hops in, and two of those hops have to
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pass through a machine that has zero
known vulnerabilities in it. Well, suddenly
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the bad guys, if they want
to get in, they've got to conjure
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up two zero days to punch through
that kind of segmentation. That's expensive.
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And so you know, it's not
just how many hops that are being counted
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here, but it you know,
it sounds like what we can start doing
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with this kind of system that Robin's
putting together is getting insights into really how
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thoroughly protected or not our networks are. So that all sounds good. You
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know, I'm going to ask you
in a moment for sort of examples and
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experience. But before I get to
that, let me ask you about about
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availability this new capability. You know, I can't ask you for examples if
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it hasn't been released yet or you
know, at least be available in beta.
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What's the status of this new development
here? Yes, so we are
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actively working with a fewer for different
partner on finalizing that release, and we're
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actually getting super close to raising that
to the market. So we're planning to
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have a launch of the later's version
of ntview that includes the zone sigmaentation Metrix
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at the S four conference early notch
Okay, So then let me ask you
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the hard question about about experience.
You know, do you have beta customers?
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Do you have you know sites where
you've been trying us out? You
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know, who've been working with you? How is it working? What are
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these people learning? What kind of
feedback are you getting? You know,
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how how's it going? Especially this, uh, this whole pivoting concept sounds
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interesting? Have you got any examples
of that? Yes, so on the
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RUB and partner we are you know, working closely with them too deploy that
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solution and inform them with what we
call the steppingstone map. And that's you
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know what you read earlier with the
pivoting. And so what's interesting is that
359
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while we don't have you know,
example of actual network bridge yet to illustrate
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the value of it, we observe
these just the initial value of enabling stakeholders
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from different teams and different background to
understand finally like how you know the network
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environment is configured and what segmdation means
and how things are protected, you know.
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With the visual map and this,
you know, lighting up the pyvoting
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points, you put risk in context. And whether you are from compliance or
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cybersecurity or networking, whether you are
a technical person or you are in in
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the you know, in the leadership, you know, the picture helps everyone
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to have the same language to discuss
about those concepts which can be pretty complex
368
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with the size and sophistication of networks
today. So the feature and the capability
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and the visual edition of it has
been received extremely well by all or in
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sure you know better distance okay,
So let me ask you what if I
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mean, if I have a complex
network and I've got high value assets buried
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deep in that network somewhere protective relays
or safety instrumented systems or I don't know,
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leak detection systems. What do I
know You've got high value assets and
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you know the pivoting path that I
worry about is from a command and control
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center on the internet. Can I
ask you, you know, is it
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possible to take your tool and say
I'm worried about an attack from the internet.
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What's the shortest, the easiest path
to get from the Internet into these
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high value assets? And you know, is that possible? And you know,
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do do people start seeing things that
their eyes open and go, oh
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shoot, I forgot about that.
You know? Is that is that doable
381
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with your technology? Yes? So
it actually it's pretty interesting, like every
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time we reminded analysis for the first
time, you know, there are insights
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I can't I can't remember like a
single example where someone saw the result of
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that stepping stone map and didn't tell
us, Oh, I didn't
know that
385
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this was possible. You know this, I didn't know that this access was
386
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you know, was doing board in
that environment? But so the way we
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do it, and often you know
you have you start importing some conflict files
388
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into the platform. They may not
cover all your network path all the way
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to the to the Internet, because
you start with your own your critical environment,
390
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with your criticals and an esp In
the case of NERD, what we
391
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do is that we when we passed
the conflict files, we extract the raving
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table and specifically the deffault routes,
and so we know that Internet traffic or
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external traffic would come from a specific
gateway. We put the get in the
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map and then we have actually default
template routers that you can also import in
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addition to your actual equipment in order
to close the gaps between the environmental mapping
396
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with the network that's connecting to the
external world. And that allows us to
397
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breach and connect the different islands that
you could see in the network map.
398
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And then we launched the stepping stone
map from that external gateway and you're going
399
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to see in one, two,
three, or four hubs which nodes could
400
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be used as pivot for an adversary
standing from the external zone to go all
401
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the way to your critical equipment.
Right now, this analysis is agnostic of
402
00:35:58.119 --> 00:36:01.599
your vulnerabilities, but we're working to
be able to filter it down to prune
403
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that set of capabilities, a set
of possible path that we identified into you
404
00:36:08.199 --> 00:36:13.480
know, to your point, the
shortest or easiest path based on venomit information,
405
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which hosts have an outdated application of
something that could be exploded, and
406
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matching a board or survey that's available
based on your fireword wards like really connecting
407
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the dots and combining those two data
sets into an insight for you to know,
408
00:36:30.760 --> 00:36:35.920
like which path is the risk testing
in your network? So you know
409
00:36:36.039 --> 00:36:38.199
what you're saying here, It actually
reminds me of, you know, an
410
00:36:38.280 --> 00:36:43.239
experience in my past. I was
at Industrial Defender. I was working with
411
00:36:43.320 --> 00:36:49.199
Jonathan Palaya, a very capable penetration
tester. You know, we were not
412
00:36:49.320
--> 00:36:52.239
doing a pen test. Uh,
the business had been contracted with a customer
413
00:36:52.320 --> 00:36:57.159
to look at some network diagrams and
you know, some systems do a risk
414
00:36:57.199 --> 00:37:01.840
assessment basically, and we did not
have any kind of technology like this.
415
00:37:02.119 --> 00:37:06.920
And so I remember Jonathan sat down
with I don't know, you know,
416
00:37:07.079 --> 00:37:12.360
seventeen three foot by five foot as
built network diagrams, big massive things full
417
00:37:12.360 --> 00:37:16.159
of you know, wiring diagrams and
he's paging through these things one after another,
418
00:37:16.440 --> 00:37:21.159
and he looks up and he says, you realize there's a path from
419
00:37:21.199 --> 00:37:27.639
the internet into your deepest control system
here without ever passing through a firewall.
420
00:37:27.760 --> 00:37:31.480
Just routers, what do you mean? Well, on this network diagram,
421
00:37:31.519 --> 00:37:35.159
it starts here from the Internet,
and then you go to this machine and
422
00:37:35.159 --> 00:37:37.800
that machine through here, and then
you take this thing over here that you
423
00:37:37.800 --> 00:37:40.000
know is kind of off in the
corner, takes you over to this page.
424
00:37:40.000 --> 00:37:45.000
Bang bang bang, You're in,
you know. And the reaction was,
425
00:37:45.559 --> 00:37:47.440
give me that and you know,
snatch the network diagras back, kick
426
00:37:47.519 --> 00:37:51.159
us out, go and fix the
problem, and you know, bring us
427
00:37:51.159 --> 00:37:54.159
back in a couple of months.
Is this the kind of thing that you
428
00:37:54.199 --> 00:37:58.119
know you're looking at? Is this
this the kind of experience you're trying to
429
00:37:58.159 --> 00:38:06.480
prevent? And it's it's interesting because
I can't find in my memory like a
430
00:38:06.519 --> 00:38:14.639
single example of you know, user
we hasn't had this type of insight after
431
00:38:15.000 --> 00:38:22.639
depraying our solution. This is always
a weakness or some misconfiguration or overly permissive
432
00:38:22.719 --> 00:38:29.400
rule that someone forgot inside that configuration
that allows this type of of path may
433
00:38:29.440 --> 00:38:31.760
be not always on the Internet,
but for sure from an untrusting zone to
434
00:38:31.800 --> 00:38:39.199
a trusted zone. So the key
there is to do that, you know,
435
00:38:39.239 --> 00:38:44.840
with the power of technology, right
because for you know, the expertise
436
00:38:44.920 --> 00:38:49.400
and experience that the genre is bringing, your example, we want to be
437
00:38:49.440 --> 00:38:55.320
able to bring that that capability without
the risk of human error to the mass
438
00:38:55.320 --> 00:39:00.320
and to be able to have all
of stakeholder's being able to identify those risky
439
00:39:00.360 --> 00:39:05.360
paths. But yeah, it's it's
fascinating, like we stop, you know,
440
00:39:05.440 --> 00:39:08.920
important conflict files, the map is
getting generated, and then you know,
441
00:39:08.960 --> 00:39:14.599
in those firewalls we have in the
ratios, we extract the default gateways
442
00:39:14.599 --> 00:39:19.760
so we know we can infer wates
the external access point into your environment.
443
00:39:20.519 --> 00:39:23.719
We launch a stepping stone analysis from
that access pondent. You know, just
444
00:39:23.760 --> 00:39:29.519
a few seconds later you see the
nose in your map lagging up, and
445
00:39:30.599 --> 00:39:36.440
you know you're going to see your
critical zone with everything little a specific color
446
00:39:36.480 --> 00:39:38.440
that says you know, this is
protected, this is mitigated by access control.
447
00:39:38.480 --> 00:39:44.239
And then for sure there's always like
one of the two nodes in bright
448
00:39:44.320 --> 00:39:50.039
red that tells you there's a direct
access from an external ip RAS all the
449
00:39:50.039 --> 00:39:53.239
way to that critical equipment deep inside
your environment that you have no idea about
450
00:39:53.280 --> 00:40:00.199
them. You know, the causes
are the very but often it's someone a
451
00:40:00.280 --> 00:40:04.239
temporary fire or rule like six months
ago and it was supposed to stay for
452
00:40:04.360 --> 00:40:07.719
a couple of days, but they
forgot to remove it. Or you know,
453
00:40:07.760 --> 00:40:14.960
we thought that this rule was actually
preventing external traffic from getting in,
454
00:40:15.320 --> 00:40:21.000
but we had a misconfiguration. The
rule never got attached to an interface,
455
00:40:21.039 --> 00:40:23.079
so the rule was useless, you
know, just a line in your confide
456
00:40:23.079 --> 00:40:30.440
that the fire wasn't taken into account. Or we had examples of just object
457
00:40:30.480 --> 00:40:35.119
groups not being correctly defined. You
know, you have rules that are referencing
458
00:40:35.519 --> 00:40:40.199
source and destination services using groups,
and then it's pretty complex as a human
459
00:40:40.280 --> 00:40:44.800
to keep track of that, right
you have to use lookup tables and make
460
00:40:44.800 --> 00:40:47.360
sure that you know what value is
in which group, which sort of appearacies,
461
00:40:47.360 --> 00:40:52.159
which sort of portant services, and
so often we see you know,
462
00:40:52.760 --> 00:40:59.360
an old ip or something forgotten that
gives more access than they expect. So
463
00:40:59.480 --> 00:41:05.079
the example that that Robin gave,
there were misconfigured firewalls, and you know,
464
00:41:05.199 --> 00:41:07.480
I just wanted to jump in sort
of with a couple of examples of
465
00:41:07.480 --> 00:41:13.000
misconfigured firewalls on my own. You
know, I used to do a demo
466
00:41:13.639 --> 00:41:16.760
at like trade shows how to break
through firewalls. Uh, you know,
467
00:41:16.920 --> 00:41:22.119
just an awareness thing, a threat
awareness thing. One of the scenarios was
468
00:41:22.320 --> 00:41:29.119
just misconfiguring the firewall. And we're
not we're not talking about home you know,
469
00:41:29.199 --> 00:41:34.199
small office firewalls here. We're talking
about enterprise grade firewalls. And these
470
00:41:34.199 --> 00:41:40.239
firewalls have operating systems and user interfaces
that are designed for scale. They're designed
471
00:41:40.320 --> 00:41:46.159
for big systems. Uh. You
know, they're designed to deal with complexity.
472
00:41:46.239 --> 00:41:52.320
And so you know, if you
want to put a rule in there
473
00:41:52.360 --> 00:41:57.000
that says Andrew's laptop is allowed to
connect to you know, the Pie server
474
00:41:57.119 --> 00:42:02.239
through the firewall, well you can't. It's not one rule. First you
475
00:42:02.320 --> 00:42:07.159
have to define who Andrew is,
and then you have to define what Andrew's
476
00:42:07.239 --> 00:42:12.559
laptop is, and then you have
to define what the Pie server is.
477
00:42:13.639 --> 00:42:16.760
And then you put a rule together, not with Andrew's laptop's IP address and
478
00:42:16.800 --> 00:42:22.760
the Pie server IP address and allow
you put together. You have to partner.
479
00:42:22.800 --> 00:42:24.960
You have to define service numbers,
the port numbers as well. You
480
00:42:25.000 --> 00:42:34.920
put a rule together that says roughly
in English, Andrew's laptop is allowed to
481
00:42:35.000 --> 00:42:40.519
connect to the you know, a
Viva PI client server port on the PIE
482
00:42:40.599 --> 00:42:46.599
server in the DMZ network. You
use almost exactly those words. Okay,
483
00:42:46.599 --> 00:42:51.639
there's no IP addresses anywhere, there's
there's no user names, there's it's all
484
00:42:51.760 --> 00:42:57.639
symbols. And they do this so
that you know, these thousands of complicated
485
00:42:57.639 --> 00:43:01.679
firebles are are comprehensible. But what
it means, and you know my demo,
486
00:43:02.320 --> 00:43:06.360
what it means is that you can
look at that firewall rule and say,
487
00:43:06.760 --> 00:43:09.559
there's nothing wrong with this firewall rule. Andrew's laptop is allowed to connect
488
00:43:09.559 --> 00:43:15.119
to blah blah blah. The rule
is right, yet I'm letting the entire
489
00:43:15.159 --> 00:43:20.639
IT network connect to the PIE server. There's something wrong with this rule.
490
00:43:21.280 --> 00:43:23.000
And you can stare at the rule
till le cows come home and you won't
491
00:43:23.039 --> 00:43:28.079
find it because it's there's nothing wrong
with the rule. What's wrong is with
492
00:43:28.239 --> 00:43:31.440
the definition of the IP address of
Andrew's laptop. You've buggered up the definition
493
00:43:31.480 --> 00:43:35.559
and you've included the entire IT network
in the definition. You've got to look
494
00:43:35.599 --> 00:43:37.800
in a different place. You got
to look at the definition of each of
495
00:43:37.800 --> 00:43:43.159
the symbols and you know, I
forget the details, but there was another
496
00:43:44.199 --> 00:43:49.840
thing where, you know, instead
of saying I messed up the definition of
497
00:43:49.880 --> 00:43:52.519
the DMZ network and now you can
connect to anything you want. You know,
498
00:43:53.440 --> 00:44:01.000
if you basically these these systems are
complicated and it really is easy to
499
00:44:01.119 --> 00:44:07.119
mess them up in ways that just
aren't evident when you know, you look
500
00:44:07.159 --> 00:44:09.840
at you look at the definition and
you try and understand what it's doing.
501
00:44:13.800 --> 00:44:15.960
So that's how fascinating. You know, have you got anything else for us?
502
00:44:16.000 --> 00:44:20.559
I mean, you seem to be
a fountain of examples here. What
503
00:44:20.559 --> 00:44:23.960
what else you know? Can we
can we get insights from using technology like
504
00:44:24.000 --> 00:44:29.480
this? These actually in the news
pretty much on a monthly, if not
505
00:44:29.559 --> 00:44:37.679
weekly basis, examples of critical equipment
being exposed on the Internet and being breached.
506
00:44:37.760 --> 00:44:44.280
Right the latest that I have in
nine is uh the water and West
507
00:44:44.360 --> 00:44:50.880
Water treatment facility in i Equipped,
Pennsylvania, and that that got compromised just
508
00:44:50.880 --> 00:44:58.880
a few months ago, and the
issue came from a PLC with the Human
509
00:44:58.960 --> 00:45:06.280
Machine interface where you know there's a
port on those equipment. Actually in this
510
00:45:06.400 --> 00:45:14.760
kiss Ticipate pot twenty five six that
was directly exposed to the Internet and then
511
00:45:15.440 --> 00:45:19.320
to make it worse, the password
on that machie that the piece of equipment
512
00:45:19.400 --> 00:45:22.760
was a default password from the manufacturer
that hasn't been changed, So that got
513
00:45:23.079 --> 00:45:27.920
compromise pretty quickly. And you know, this is the type of finding where
514
00:45:28.239 --> 00:45:32.800
if you have network modeling, you
can very quickly, you know, you
515
00:45:32.840 --> 00:45:37.400
import your firewalls, you import your
list of equipment from yourdset inventory and you
516
00:45:37.440 --> 00:45:43.280
can see, okay, what's exposed
and what's not exposed. So another example
517
00:45:44.199 --> 00:45:50.199
is last year May eleven when you
had a cordin need attack against sixteen Danish
518
00:45:50.480 --> 00:46:00.000
energy companies where an attacker exploded vulnerability
inside a firewall to be able to craft
519
00:46:00.280 --> 00:46:07.519
arbitrary command and run arbitrary command on
those firewalls. So those equipment where netal
520
00:46:07.519 --> 00:46:14.400
equipment were exposed to the outside.
But then the neutronsgmentation for the rest of
521
00:46:14.400 --> 00:46:19.360
the environment wasn't strong enough to contain
those attacks. So the attackers on you
522
00:46:19.400 --> 00:46:25.400
know what five hundred DP
protocol of
those six CEL devices were able to to
523
00:46:25.400 --> 00:46:31.760
get compromised and then pivot to your
discussion to get the critical equipment inside the
524
00:46:32.320 --> 00:46:39.519
inside those sixteen facilities. And so
that's the type of inside you want to
525
00:46:39.559 --> 00:46:44.800
have prior to an attack, because
you know the next zero that are going
526
00:46:44.880 --> 00:46:50.519
to get published. You want to
have the confidence that you segmentation and the
527
00:46:50.679 --> 00:46:54.360
ZO thing that you put in place
with access policy is strong enough to contain
528
00:46:57.079 --> 00:47:00.920
any potential you know, zero day
into a you know, vendor of network
529
00:47:00.960 --> 00:47:05.480
equipment to a single zone and not
propagetting to the rest of your critical environment.
530
00:47:06.559 --> 00:47:09.079
That all makes sense. You know, we're coming up on the end
531
00:47:09.119 --> 00:47:13.199
of the episode. I want to
say thank you so much for joining us
532
00:47:13.400 --> 00:47:16.079
before we let you go, can
you you know, sum up for our
533
00:47:16.079 --> 00:47:21.519
listeners. What should we take away
from from you know, the changing needs
534
00:47:21.559 --> 00:47:25.880
and the you know, the changing
capabilities in the world of network segmentation.
535
00:47:28.079 --> 00:47:32.400
Thanks Andrew again for having me andsure. So really, the the key one
536
00:47:32.440 --> 00:47:37.639
I wanted to make is that verification
of network segmentation is becoming more and more
537
00:47:37.639 --> 00:47:43.400
of a priority, and it's it's
it's not a one time thing, right,
538
00:47:43.400 --> 00:47:49.280
because the networks of today's networks are
just growing in size and complexity and
539
00:47:49.320 --> 00:47:53.400
becoming more and more dynamic, even
in inside traditionally more stadic environments such as
540
00:47:53.519 --> 00:48:02.719
out environments. So it's a cyber
hygiene best practice to frequently make sure that
541
00:48:02.840 --> 00:48:08.519
the configuration of the equipment and forcing
your segmentation so the firewalls, vatters and
542
00:48:08.679 --> 00:48:15.880
switches is correct and you don't have
overly permiency rules or gaps that could open
543
00:48:15.960 --> 00:48:20.920
up access to your critical equipment.
So to that end, we are about
544
00:48:20.960 --> 00:48:27.800
to release the most capable vision product
and PVU that includes that new zone segmentation
545
00:48:27.960 --> 00:48:32.360
metrics to give you a birth sie
view of your exposure for your environment,
546
00:48:32.599 --> 00:48:40.159
really helping faster insight and decision making
in terms of network risks. And I
547
00:48:40.239 --> 00:48:46.440
invite folks to check us out at
at network dash perception dot com for more
548
00:48:46.440 --> 00:48:53.320
information about how we can we can
have them. Andrew, that just about
549
00:48:53.440 --> 00:48:58.880
concludes your interview with Robin Bartier.
Do you have any final thoughts that you
550
00:48:58.920 --> 00:49:02.400
would like to leave with our listeners. I mean, yeah, you know,
551
00:49:02.480 --> 00:49:08.239
reflecting back on the episode here we're
talking about network segmentation. This in
552
00:49:08.280 --> 00:49:12.920
a sense is the oldest trick in
the book. It's the oldest tool in
553
00:49:12.960 --> 00:49:15.440
the trade. It's the first thing
that was documented in the first volume of
554
00:49:15.480 --> 00:49:20.880
six two four four three, Back
when when you know, industrial cybersecurity wasn't
555
00:49:20.920 --> 00:49:23.000
industrial cybersecurity, it was scat of
security. It was you know, even
556
00:49:23.039 --> 00:49:28.840
the terminology has changed, and you
know, fireballs have been around forever.
557
00:49:29.639 --> 00:49:32.960
Yet you know, this is a
new development in the field. I mean,
558
00:49:34.400 --> 00:49:37.519
when was the last sort of big
new development in the field. It
559
00:49:37.599 --> 00:49:42.480
was there was deep packaged inspection over
a decade ago, is my recollection.
560
00:49:42.559 --> 00:49:47.719
But here's a way to analyze networks, you know, here's a way to
561
00:49:49.639 --> 00:49:54.920
add context to alerts when there's potential
intrusions in progress. You know, we've
562
00:49:54.960 --> 00:50:00.599
been talking to some some vendors of
asset risk tools, asset inventory tools that
563
00:50:00.719 --> 00:50:06.440
sort of they're working with the the
intrusion detection vendors, the alarming vendors to
564
00:50:06.920 --> 00:50:10.920
say, look, this asset is
at risk from this attack. That's that's
565
00:50:10.960 --> 00:50:16.440
coming in here because they have information
about the asset. Here's an extra step.
566
00:50:16.480 --> 00:50:21.079
The next step is okay, given
that this asset is at risk of
567
00:50:21.280 --> 00:50:25.679
potentially being compromised. If it were
compromised, here's all of the other assets
568
00:50:25.679 --> 00:50:31.119
that would be at risk because this
one's at risk. You know, the
569
00:50:31.840 --> 00:50:37.920
field continues to to to develop.
It. You know, surprises me that
570
00:50:37.920 --> 00:50:40.960
that something as old as the idea
of network segmentation. You know, there's
571
00:50:42.159 --> 00:50:45.559
there's there's still there's new inventions happening
in the field, so you know,
572
00:50:45.920 --> 00:50:52.280
it's it's an interesting development. Well, thank you to Robin for sharing that
573
00:50:52.320 --> 00:50:54.719
development with us. And Andrew,
as always, thank you for speaking with
574
00:50:54.719 --> 00:50:58.960
me. It's always a pleasure.
Thank you, Nate. This has been
575
00:50:59.000 --> 00:51:04.039
the Industrial Security podcast from Waterfall.
Thanks to everybody out there listening.