The Detective's Files: True Crime Tales With Jacques Morrell – Police Surveillance

WEBVTT
1
00:00:02.279 --> 00:00:06.320
So welcome back to Detective Files, True Crime Tales with
2
00:00:06.759 --> 00:00:11.000
Jack Morrel, my pal that I call the Governor, and Jack,
3
00:00:11.119 --> 00:00:14.240
you've given this little chat the title of are you
4
00:00:14.439 --> 00:00:15.080
following me?
5
00:00:16.160 --> 00:00:21.679
Please explain? Yes, are you following me? I think this
6
00:00:23.000 --> 00:00:27.519
will go on to talk about police surveillance, police monitoring
7
00:00:27.519 --> 00:00:31.879
of individuals, but it's maybe it's something a bit a
8
00:00:31.920 --> 00:00:38.079
bit wider than that. A few days ago I bumped
9
00:00:38.079 --> 00:00:42.600
into an old friend and colleague and not seen them
10
00:00:42.600 --> 00:00:45.119
for some years, and had a quick chat this, that
11
00:00:45.200 --> 00:00:50.240
and the other, and then not strangely, but it coincidentally
12
00:00:50.840 --> 00:00:55.119
a couple of hours later we passed again, and as
13
00:00:55.159 --> 00:01:00.759
I did, I think my first initial joke was, I've
14
00:01:00.759 --> 00:01:04.200
just bumped into your twin brother, you know, how are
15
00:01:04.239 --> 00:01:07.159
you doing sort of thing? And he said, hmm yeah,
16
00:01:07.200 --> 00:01:11.519
twice in one day. Something not right about this, And
17
00:01:11.840 --> 00:01:15.079
I think that's fairly normal. You know, people, we all
18
00:01:15.120 --> 00:01:17.280
probably have these scenarios that we can think of.
19
00:01:17.599 --> 00:01:20.359
It's a small world, right, yeah.
20
00:01:19.719 --> 00:01:23.120
It seems a small world when coincidences like that happen,
21
00:01:24.319 --> 00:01:28.959
And yet it almost explains maybe something in the human
22
00:01:29.000 --> 00:01:33.480
psyche about we don't want to think we're being watched
23
00:01:33.560 --> 00:01:37.840
or followed, and we might make jokes of it, but
24
00:01:37.879 --> 00:01:40.159
there's something there that says.
25
00:01:40.280 --> 00:01:40.439
H.
26
00:01:42.280 --> 00:01:44.840
Am, I uncomfortable about this, you know what's going off?
27
00:01:45.040 --> 00:01:48.319
Well, maybe more so nowadays because of the level of
28
00:01:48.359 --> 00:01:52.400
surveillance in this country. I think that the UK has
29
00:01:52.719 --> 00:01:56.680
the most surveillance of any country in Europe, and it's
30
00:01:56.719 --> 00:01:58.519
second only in the world to China.
31
00:01:59.079 --> 00:01:59.799
I read that some.
32
00:02:00.239 --> 00:02:04.040
So we're talking about CCTV cameras and there's a comparison
33
00:02:04.079 --> 00:02:09.879
between London and Berlin. Berlin has eleven point two cameras.
34
00:02:09.879 --> 00:02:11.560
How you get a fraction of a camera, I don't know,
35
00:02:11.599 --> 00:02:15.759
but let's say eleven cameras per one thousand residents in
36
00:02:15.800 --> 00:02:20.400
Berlin and in London. Guess how many cameras per thousand
37
00:02:20.479 --> 00:02:21.400
residents in London?
38
00:02:21.400 --> 00:02:22.199
How many do you reckon?
39
00:02:23.960 --> 00:02:28.240
Fifty sixty eight and a bit according to the stats. Again,
40
00:02:28.240 --> 00:02:29.560
how you get a fraction of a camera?
41
00:02:29.639 --> 00:02:30.039
I don't know.
42
00:02:30.080 --> 00:02:34.000
But anyway, outside China, the UK is one of the
43
00:02:34.039 --> 00:02:38.240
most watched countries per capita globally, So maybe people have
44
00:02:38.319 --> 00:02:40.879
got a right to feel a little bit paranoid.
45
00:02:41.840 --> 00:02:45.719
Yes, and I remember I think it's John Lewis using
46
00:02:45.759 --> 00:02:49.439
the escalators in John Lewis. Now you come to the
47
00:02:49.479 --> 00:02:53.919
top and you see a video of yourself with a
48
00:02:53.960 --> 00:02:57.879
square around your face, and it's reading. It's reading your image,
49
00:02:57.879 --> 00:03:04.240
isn't it. Wow? You know, I hold an account with
50
00:03:04.360 --> 00:03:06.719
John Lewis and stuff, so I'm sure they know plenty
51
00:03:06.719 --> 00:03:09.879
about me in order to tempt me into the next purchase.
52
00:03:09.960 --> 00:03:15.680
But equally they maybe the system knows when I'm in
53
00:03:15.719 --> 00:03:16.159
the store.
54
00:03:16.479 --> 00:03:19.159
Well, I think my phone knows exactly what I'm doing
55
00:03:19.360 --> 00:03:22.960
and when I'm doing it because it Taylor's advertising. Even
56
00:03:23.000 --> 00:03:25.560
though I try and turn that off on websites with
57
00:03:25.560 --> 00:03:29.439
the cookie preferences, it knows what I've been looking up,
58
00:03:29.479 --> 00:03:33.319
so it'll tailor stuff towards me. The ones that really
59
00:03:33.319 --> 00:03:36.159
worry me are the ones about cut price cremations. I
60
00:03:36.199 --> 00:03:38.960
don't know if it knows something that I don't, but anyway,
61
00:03:38.639 --> 00:03:43.280
that's one for another time. It Yeah, it's good to
62
00:03:43.280 --> 00:03:46.599
plan ahead song absolutely like a good boy scout, be prepared.
63
00:03:47.039 --> 00:03:47.199
Now.
64
00:03:47.479 --> 00:03:50.719
The thing that strikes me is that there's more and
65
00:03:50.840 --> 00:03:54.879
more of this facial recognition, which people said was something
66
00:03:54.919 --> 00:04:00.879
that was associated with totalitarian regimes, and it was particularly
67
00:04:00.960 --> 00:04:06.360
of concern I think when China took over Hong Kong
68
00:04:07.000 --> 00:04:10.199
or took back Hong Kong in nineteen ninety seven. The
69
00:04:10.240 --> 00:04:14.159
whole scenario around Chinese surveillance and the fact that the
70
00:04:14.280 --> 00:04:20.120
Chinese government is diametrically opposed to the democratic governments like
71
00:04:20.160 --> 00:04:23.240
we have in the West, and that surveillance would become
72
00:04:23.319 --> 00:04:28.079
something that was used insidiously, and there is evidence of that.
73
00:04:28.120 --> 00:04:31.360
Obviously that's taking place. That's what they that's how the
74
00:04:31.439 --> 00:04:34.079
Chinese regime behaves.
75
00:04:34.360 --> 00:04:39.120
Sure, so some cultures are not necessarily comfortable with it,
76
00:04:39.199 --> 00:04:45.360
but they accept it or have to accept it a
77
00:04:45.399 --> 00:04:51.160
little bit like career criminals have to accept the pitfalls
78
00:04:50.480 --> 00:04:53.480
of being monitored, which.
79
00:04:53.360 --> 00:04:58.079
Is and something that happens electronically or something that happens
80
00:04:59.160 --> 00:05:04.040
in person by as you see in every Hollywood movie
81
00:05:04.079 --> 00:05:07.759
to do with detective work. A van full of guys,
82
00:05:07.839 --> 00:05:10.519
there's a real to real tape recorder in there, somewhere,
83
00:05:10.560 --> 00:05:13.959
there's someone wearing headphones, and at some point they either
84
00:05:14.000 --> 00:05:17.079
have to get out of there quick because they've been spotted,
85
00:05:17.360 --> 00:05:21.000
or they all go piling out and arrest somebody. Is
86
00:05:21.040 --> 00:05:23.600
that what happens in practice? I'd like to think it was.
87
00:05:23.720 --> 00:05:25.720
I'd like to think it was. You know, every job
88
00:05:25.759 --> 00:05:29.160
you did was like an episode of Homeland.
89
00:05:29.279 --> 00:05:32.759
It would be great, it would be great. This. I
90
00:05:32.800 --> 00:05:38.879
think we're both agreeing here that we as humans or
91
00:05:39.240 --> 00:05:44.399
do get nervous about the motives of another individual or
92
00:05:44.480 --> 00:05:49.079
an organization, you know, being sort of intrusive, sort of
93
00:05:49.120 --> 00:05:51.839
looking asking questions, are they you know, are they watching me?
94
00:05:51.879 --> 00:05:56.920
Are they are they following me? I mean, coming from
95
00:05:56.959 --> 00:06:05.040
a police background, I think we generally can can smell
96
00:06:05.079 --> 00:06:09.879
that unease in people because I guess, I guess being
97
00:06:09.879 --> 00:06:14.839
a court nobody, nobody really likes to engage with the police,
98
00:06:15.560 --> 00:06:19.480
whatever the scenario is. So there's an element of unease
99
00:06:19.759 --> 00:06:23.839
when the police interact with the public, and no one's
100
00:06:23.879 --> 00:06:28.759
really relaxed when a police officer is known to be present.
101
00:06:29.120 --> 00:06:33.800
And I guess that's natural and quite normal, until, of course,
102
00:06:35.040 --> 00:06:41.439
that unease becomes sort of more paranoid, more affecting your
103
00:06:42.439 --> 00:06:43.319
day to day life.
104
00:06:44.199 --> 00:06:47.040
I suppose if you've got nothing to hide, your conscience
105
00:06:47.120 --> 00:06:50.279
is clear, you shouldn't feel uncomfortable in the presence of
106
00:06:50.319 --> 00:06:52.720
a police officer, should you.
107
00:06:52.759 --> 00:06:55.240
No, But I think it's it's it is just natural
108
00:06:55.319 --> 00:06:58.720
because I don't know, maybe everyone thinks they've got something
109
00:06:59.600 --> 00:07:06.160
to hire not necessarily have committed a capital crime, but
110
00:07:06.480 --> 00:07:09.879
that you know, we've all done something. We think, oh yeah,
111
00:07:10.399 --> 00:07:14.959
why is that happening? Or am I being falsely accused
112
00:07:15.000 --> 00:07:17.560
of something or suspected of something? Yeah? I think it's
113
00:07:17.560 --> 00:07:19.439
just that general and ease in the population.
114
00:07:20.000 --> 00:07:22.959
That's interesting almost like a lack of trust, isn't it?
115
00:07:23.360 --> 00:07:27.560
And yet you've set that against policing by consent, people
116
00:07:27.800 --> 00:07:32.639
allow you to police them. So hmm, interesting philosophically, isn't
117
00:07:32.639 --> 00:07:35.560
it that one? I'm just wondering as well, if with
118
00:07:36.480 --> 00:07:39.480
three decades of experience as a copper on the beat
119
00:07:39.519 --> 00:07:43.839
and also as a detective, you develop an instinct for
120
00:07:44.120 --> 00:07:48.560
when somebody's being evasive, for when somebody is lying. I'm
121
00:07:48.560 --> 00:07:55.000
thinking about body language micro signals that you see sometimes
122
00:07:55.040 --> 00:07:59.600
on dramas and drama documentaries where a police officer or
123
00:08:00.879 --> 00:08:04.199
a trained investigatable go, aha, I know they're lying now
124
00:08:04.279 --> 00:08:07.639
because they look down and to the left, or you know,
125
00:08:07.680 --> 00:08:10.920
their pupils have dilated or something like that. You know,
126
00:08:11.600 --> 00:08:14.040
is is that what happens in practice?
127
00:08:14.240 --> 00:08:15.439
Could you do that to me?
128
00:08:15.600 --> 00:08:18.560
Could you walk out onto the street and say, don't
129
00:08:18.600 --> 00:08:20.319
like the look of him. He looks like a crook.
130
00:08:22.879 --> 00:08:26.399
I don't personally rely on that too much to a
131
00:08:26.439 --> 00:08:31.079
point that any human interaction you try and build up
132
00:08:32.080 --> 00:08:36.279
either an element of trust or lack of trust or
133
00:08:36.440 --> 00:08:38.919
en ease, but there can be there's so many factors
134
00:08:38.919 --> 00:08:42.799
involved there that you know you have to sort of
135
00:08:42.840 --> 00:08:48.200
read each scenario as it as it stands. I mean,
136
00:08:48.240 --> 00:08:52.879
it's interesting you say that. I do recall quite a
137
00:08:52.879 --> 00:09:00.000
bizarre sequence of meetings or interactions with a career criminal
138
00:09:00.120 --> 00:09:06.679
who I've known and seen over over many years, who
139
00:09:06.759 --> 00:09:12.159
knows my face. I know his face, and it was
140
00:09:13.080 --> 00:09:15.000
a couple of years ago. I'd not seen him for
141
00:09:15.000 --> 00:09:19.720
some time, and I was in a pub, a very
142
00:09:19.720 --> 00:09:25.080
busy pub. I'm tall, this individual is tall, and we
143
00:09:25.200 --> 00:09:28.639
sort of our eyes met over the sea of heads
144
00:09:28.639 --> 00:09:33.720
in this in this busy pub, and I sort of
145
00:09:33.720 --> 00:09:37.200
did a dtour because you know, I didn't particularly wasn't
146
00:09:37.240 --> 00:09:40.240
particularly interested in a conversation with him. I was there
147
00:09:40.279 --> 00:09:44.559
for other matters and worked my way round to the bar,
148
00:09:44.720 --> 00:09:47.360
and next minute he he appeared in front of me
149
00:09:47.440 --> 00:09:50.480
with a with a sidekick, and he was he was
150
00:09:50.600 --> 00:09:56.679
very chatty, which was absolutely fine. We sort of reminisced.
151
00:09:57.120 --> 00:10:02.559
He dropped out names of fellow officers going back twenty
152
00:10:03.120 --> 00:10:07.879
thirty years what more in fact, so he was referencing
153
00:10:07.960 --> 00:10:13.080
me to a long time ago, and it was all
154
00:10:13.200 --> 00:10:20.279
very superficial, but lighthearted. And I saw him in various
155
00:10:20.279 --> 00:10:24.159
scenarios two or three times in the following days or
156
00:10:24.159 --> 00:10:27.360
a couple of weeks. And at one time he was
157
00:10:27.759 --> 00:10:32.639
walking on the street with a child in school uniform.
158
00:10:33.960 --> 00:10:37.519
And we're acknowledged again because of that first interaction where
159
00:10:37.519 --> 00:10:43.759
he'd approached me and he said something in front of him,
160
00:10:43.759 --> 00:10:45.759
said that are you you know you're not following me?
161
00:10:45.840 --> 00:10:50.440
Are you again? In a joky way, but he chose
162
00:10:50.480 --> 00:10:54.360
to say it, so we laughed about that, and this
163
00:10:54.799 --> 00:10:56.919
seemed to carry on. It was one of these strange things,
164
00:10:56.960 --> 00:10:59.240
you know, where you end up you're in a remote
165
00:10:59.279 --> 00:11:02.720
airport in the world and you look across the carousel
166
00:11:02.759 --> 00:11:05.759
waited for your case, and you you see somebody you know,
167
00:11:05.919 --> 00:11:06.879
you know, it's all a bit.
168
00:11:07.159 --> 00:11:09.080
Yes, happened to me, It's happened to me. I'm sure
169
00:11:09.200 --> 00:11:10.320
it's happened to a lot of people.
170
00:11:10.559 --> 00:11:14.759
Yeah. And the final scenario was it was again I
171
00:11:14.799 --> 00:11:20.120
was with some friends and we were leaving a bar.
172
00:11:21.399 --> 00:11:23.360
I think we were going somewhere for a meal, and
173
00:11:23.440 --> 00:11:26.000
I knew there was a big football match on that
174
00:11:26.000 --> 00:11:29.320
that night, and he was there, and he was with
175
00:11:29.440 --> 00:11:35.279
a a girlfriend of some description at the time who
176
00:11:35.320 --> 00:11:40.159
stood there, and again there was an acknowledgment and I
177
00:11:40.200 --> 00:11:44.720
said to him, you know where you're going to watch
178
00:11:44.720 --> 00:11:49.600
the game tonight, assuming he was he was doing just that,
179
00:11:49.799 --> 00:11:51.960
and he sort of just turned back and he said,
180
00:11:52.600 --> 00:12:02.120
wherever you're not as a way of closing down any lighthearted,
181
00:12:02.679 --> 00:12:07.000
friendly relationship that we'd sort of built up over the
182
00:12:07.039 --> 00:12:08.159
previous few weeks.
183
00:12:08.559 --> 00:12:11.000
So it's being confrontational. Then it wasn't another joke.
184
00:12:11.080 --> 00:12:13.480
It was a oh no, it was confrontational. Yeah. Whether
185
00:12:13.480 --> 00:12:17.080
it was to impress the girlfriend who he was with,
186
00:12:18.159 --> 00:12:22.159
don't I don't know. But it shut down. It shut
187
00:12:22.200 --> 00:12:27.000
down that bromance that was that had been developing between us.
188
00:12:27.919 --> 00:12:32.200
Quite funny really, so he yeah, he and the fact
189
00:12:32.240 --> 00:12:35.240
that it also announced on that first meeting that he was,
190
00:12:35.519 --> 00:12:39.200
you know, keeping out of trouble now he was going straight.
191
00:12:39.440 --> 00:12:42.840
He was this, that and the other. And then it
192
00:12:42.879 --> 00:12:46.080
got back to the well, I'm not having anything to
193
00:12:46.120 --> 00:12:48.600
do with you because you're a cop.
194
00:12:48.799 --> 00:12:52.000
Well, habits die hard. I suppose don't they.
195
00:12:52.120 --> 00:12:55.360
They do. I mean, if he'd not approached me that
196
00:12:55.840 --> 00:13:00.960
initial time, it would have been just an odd yeah,
197
00:13:01.159 --> 00:13:03.960
just eye contact, a nod. He knows who I am,
198
00:13:04.200 --> 00:13:06.639
I know who he is, and we get on with
199
00:13:06.679 --> 00:13:10.879
our lives separately, you know. But he was the one
200
00:13:10.919 --> 00:13:16.320
to initiate some conversation and then he was the one
201
00:13:16.360 --> 00:13:18.200
to completely close it down.
202
00:13:18.200 --> 00:13:20.600
Maybe he did think it was a form of surveillance.
203
00:13:21.000 --> 00:13:24.600
I'm thinking about I'm thinking about James Bond. Actually there's
204
00:13:24.600 --> 00:13:27.480
a lovely quote from I forget which book it is,
205
00:13:27.519 --> 00:13:31.559
but anyway, Ian Fleming, who was an intelligence officer who
206
00:13:31.559 --> 00:13:36.480
wrote all the James Bond books. Once his coincidence twice
207
00:13:36.519 --> 00:13:41.200
is unfortunate three times his enemy action, Yes, and maybe
208
00:13:42.159 --> 00:13:44.399
he had that in mind.
209
00:13:44.519 --> 00:13:46.480
And maybe maybe he was doing something criminal.
210
00:13:46.919 --> 00:13:48.399
It could have been he could have been up to
211
00:13:48.399 --> 00:13:50.440
no good on that particular even he were the last
212
00:13:50.440 --> 00:13:51.600
person he wanted to see.
213
00:13:51.960 --> 00:13:55.360
And yeah, so but long way that continue long made
214
00:13:55.399 --> 00:14:02.159
criminals be nervous of the authorities and the police, because
215
00:14:02.200 --> 00:14:06.519
the day that comes that they're not will be a
216
00:14:06.559 --> 00:14:09.799
sad day, certainly for policing and for society. Yeah.
217
00:14:09.919 --> 00:14:17.200
Sure, thinking about society a large and growing part of
218
00:14:17.279 --> 00:14:20.600
society that is hidden from the general population is the
219
00:14:20.600 --> 00:14:25.639
prison population, isn't it. And I'm curious about how surveillance
220
00:14:25.679 --> 00:14:31.360
operates in prison. Our prisoners under surveillance the whole time
221
00:14:31.679 --> 00:14:35.639
is electronic surveillance used. What are the mechanisms, the legal
222
00:14:35.679 --> 00:14:39.600
mechanisms that allows that to take place? Because the punishment
223
00:14:39.639 --> 00:14:42.679
is deprivation of liberty, right, but you still have your
224
00:14:42.759 --> 00:14:46.879
human rights in prison. So how does it all work?
225
00:14:47.080 --> 00:14:50.519
Can prisoners be bugged? For instance? What goes on?
226
00:14:51.840 --> 00:14:58.000
Well? In simple terms, the police having the powers to
227
00:15:00.320 --> 00:15:07.919
monitor behavior of suspected criminals has always been there. Historically,
228
00:15:09.039 --> 00:15:14.799
authority was given through the command structure in terms of
229
00:15:16.120 --> 00:15:21.519
a written report to justify any surveillance activity, whatever that
230
00:15:21.600 --> 00:15:26.480
might be. It was then superseded in the year two
231
00:15:26.519 --> 00:15:34.120
thousand with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which really
232
00:15:34.200 --> 00:15:38.759
brought in all methods of surveillance, particularly now technology the
233
00:15:38.840 --> 00:15:45.639
digital world was coming and monitoring of cameras you mentioned
234
00:15:45.879 --> 00:15:51.840
and audio communications, that kind of thing was advancing rapidly,
235
00:15:51.879 --> 00:15:55.080
so it brought it up to date. The only real
236
00:15:55.120 --> 00:16:02.080
difference really with the prison population is that the governor
237
00:16:02.120 --> 00:16:07.759
of the prison needs to manage the discipline and well
238
00:16:07.799 --> 00:16:15.200
being of the establishment, you know, to avoid rioting unresk,
239
00:16:15.559 --> 00:16:21.600
threats to prison officers, threats to other inmates. So the
240
00:16:21.679 --> 00:16:26.679
level of authority is higher in terms of the final
241
00:16:26.720 --> 00:16:29.960
decision has to be made by the governor or on
242
00:16:30.080 --> 00:16:37.080
appeal to the Home Office simply because you know, you
243
00:16:37.120 --> 00:16:42.919
can't have that. There's got to be a control of
244
00:16:43.039 --> 00:16:46.480
discipline within the prison establishment. But other than that, if
245
00:16:46.519 --> 00:16:49.720
it's justified and all these any kind of surveillance has
246
00:16:49.799 --> 00:16:55.919
to be legal, It has to be justified and it
247
00:16:55.960 --> 00:17:02.440
has to be proportionate. There's no point point spending thousands
248
00:17:02.480 --> 00:17:08.240
of pounds to monitor where you go to do your shopping,
249
00:17:09.720 --> 00:17:14.519
you know, because we suspect that occasionally you put a
250
00:17:15.119 --> 00:17:17.720
you know, an extra tin of beans in your shopping.
251
00:17:17.720 --> 00:17:20.359
You know, it wouldn't justify doing a surveillance on that.
252
00:17:20.559 --> 00:17:26.079
It's not proportionate. So that level of authority and the
253
00:17:26.160 --> 00:17:29.599
level of surveillance will depend on the severity of the crime.
254
00:17:30.200 --> 00:17:33.839
The irony is that every time you click allow on
255
00:17:33.880 --> 00:17:37.640
the terms and conditions on a website, you are allowing
256
00:17:37.839 --> 00:17:40.119
your phone to follow you and say, yes, you did
257
00:17:40.119 --> 00:17:42.759
put an extra cann of beans in at tesco's so
258
00:17:43.400 --> 00:17:46.519
that happens. People allow that. They just accept it, don't they.
259
00:17:47.119 --> 00:17:49.599
It's going on, it's part of the warp and weft
260
00:17:49.640 --> 00:17:52.440
of everyday life. And yet when it comes down to
261
00:17:53.240 --> 00:18:00.440
monitoring criminal activity potential antisocial behavior, we get really prickly
262
00:18:00.480 --> 00:18:05.759
about it. Do you think that that's hypocritical that people
263
00:18:05.759 --> 00:18:08.680
have got dual standards. They'll accept it in one set
264
00:18:08.720 --> 00:18:11.519
of circumstances and in another it's a threat to civil liberties?
265
00:18:12.559 --> 00:18:16.319
Yes, exactly, because well we all don't. We all want
266
00:18:16.359 --> 00:18:19.839
to think the police are dealing with the bad people,
267
00:18:21.319 --> 00:18:23.880
But the police deal with a lot, a wide scenario
268
00:18:23.920 --> 00:18:27.559
of things, and when it starts to come on me
269
00:18:27.839 --> 00:18:30.920
or you as an individual, that's when it starts to
270
00:18:32.519 --> 00:18:33.359
great a little bit.
271
00:18:34.200 --> 00:18:40.160
It's interesting you used the words proportionate and justified when
272
00:18:40.559 --> 00:18:45.480
talking about the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, because that's
273
00:18:45.559 --> 00:18:51.559
the phraseology that's used by OFFCOM, the regulator of broadcasters
274
00:18:51.559 --> 00:18:54.319
in the media in the UK, when it comes to
275
00:18:54.680 --> 00:18:59.039
regulating what I'll call it bugging but surreptitious filming or
276
00:18:59.079 --> 00:19:06.279
recording for journalistic purposes. So OFCOM talks about warranted use,
277
00:19:06.519 --> 00:19:11.960
public interest, justification, proportionality, the word that you used. And
278
00:19:12.000 --> 00:19:15.920
again it's got to be a measure of last resort.
279
00:19:16.319 --> 00:19:19.720
You've got to have exhausted all other channels before you
280
00:19:19.880 --> 00:19:25.279
resort to surreptitious filming or recording. When I was at
281
00:19:25.319 --> 00:19:29.759
the BBC, the guidelines for producers talked about crime or
282
00:19:29.799 --> 00:19:35.200
extremely serious anti social behavior as one of the red
283
00:19:35.240 --> 00:19:39.000
flags that would perhaps justify in the minds of the
284
00:19:39.119 --> 00:19:44.640
editorial policy department surreptitious filming or recording. So there seems
285
00:19:44.640 --> 00:19:47.880
to be an alignment between my world and your world
286
00:19:48.079 --> 00:19:52.240
in that we're regulated by the same principles.
287
00:19:52.400 --> 00:19:59.160
Oh totally. You know, it's with the hacking scandal of journalism.
288
00:19:59.200 --> 00:20:01.079
I mean what we're talking out here. With surveillance, there's
289
00:20:01.079 --> 00:20:06.759
there's various methods. There's there's wire taps and bugging, the
290
00:20:06.759 --> 00:20:11.200
intercepting of communications, which is you know, pretty major stuff.
291
00:20:13.039 --> 00:20:16.079
Then there's directors surveillance, the following, the following of people
292
00:20:16.200 --> 00:20:18.839
who we think are going to commit a crime or
293
00:20:20.400 --> 00:20:22.960
are involved in criminality, and we're looking to establish what
294
00:20:23.000 --> 00:20:28.519
their lifestyle is about covert human intelligence sources, you know,
295
00:20:28.680 --> 00:20:33.720
undercover informers. Again, there's always that crossover. And then there's
296
00:20:33.799 --> 00:20:38.920
the the really intrusive one where you actually bugging a
297
00:20:39.039 --> 00:20:47.680
premises with a warrant to go into a premises covertly
298
00:20:49.160 --> 00:20:52.039
and to set up a you know, monitoring which is
299
00:20:53.960 --> 00:20:56.880
you know, if you or I discovered that somebody had
300
00:20:56.920 --> 00:21:00.880
set up a device in our homes, we would be mortified.
301
00:21:01.519 --> 00:21:05.119
So that level, certainly from a policing angle, has to
302
00:21:05.160 --> 00:21:10.960
be It's rare, extremely rare, and has to be so
303
00:21:12.039 --> 00:21:15.160
well justified and documented. I mean the paperwork to do
304
00:21:15.200 --> 00:21:17.680
this kind of thing is enough to put anybody off
305
00:21:17.720 --> 00:21:20.400
from applying. You know, you need to employ somebody for
306
00:21:20.440 --> 00:21:22.960
a couple of days to submit the documentation.
307
00:21:23.240 --> 00:21:24.960
So and then what you had do you have to
308
00:21:25.000 --> 00:21:27.119
go to a judge, to a court to get it
309
00:21:27.200 --> 00:21:29.079
authorized or how does it work?
310
00:21:29.440 --> 00:21:32.119
It goes through a level of authority. Yeah, down down
311
00:21:32.160 --> 00:21:37.160
to to London, to the Commissioners I think they're called. Yeah,
312
00:21:37.200 --> 00:21:40.400
there's there's there's various hoops to to to go through
313
00:21:40.440 --> 00:21:43.119
you know, through the Chief Constable and then through to
314
00:21:43.960 --> 00:21:46.400
an independent authority.
315
00:21:47.440 --> 00:21:53.559
What about the situation where somebody has their own security
316
00:21:53.640 --> 00:21:57.960
camera installed in the house. I'm thinking about the Nest
317
00:21:58.119 --> 00:22:02.480
system or something like that. What would be the justification
318
00:22:03.640 --> 00:22:08.759
for hacking a camera like that, which is something that
319
00:22:08.799 --> 00:22:13.119
criminals are supposedly able to do so with connected devices
320
00:22:13.160 --> 00:22:16.839
in the house. Would the police be able to do
321
00:22:16.880 --> 00:22:19.240
that and would they be allowed to do it? If so,
322
00:22:19.720 --> 00:22:21.960
what would be the route they took to get it justified?
323
00:22:22.000 --> 00:22:25.359
Would it be the same as authorizing bugging for instance.
324
00:22:28.119 --> 00:22:31.279
Yes, it would, and the risks I mean the risks
325
00:22:31.279 --> 00:22:34.599
involved there. If you think back to the days where
326
00:22:34.640 --> 00:22:40.759
you got permission to use someone's a building to conduct
327
00:22:40.759 --> 00:22:47.480
observations from, there's certain caveats on that. If the information
328
00:22:47.759 --> 00:22:52.839
that's subsequently obtained, if that's then sought to be used
329
00:22:52.839 --> 00:22:56.640
in evidence, the disclosure of where that came from, So
330
00:22:56.680 --> 00:23:00.839
there's extra layers of risk. And there's also a level
331
00:23:00.839 --> 00:23:06.160
of risk if you're using uh, you know, a system
332
00:23:06.279 --> 00:23:12.759
that there's in use by by other people. So again
333
00:23:12.799 --> 00:23:16.519
it all comes down to that and the other The
334
00:23:16.519 --> 00:23:18.960
other aspect of it is can the can the information
335
00:23:19.079 --> 00:23:22.880
you're seeking be obtained by other means and less intrusive
336
00:23:23.000 --> 00:23:29.960
or less complicated If the answer is yes, If if
337
00:23:30.000 --> 00:23:33.319
you have a human intelligence source that's going into these
338
00:23:33.359 --> 00:23:37.799
places as part of their natural day to day thing,
339
00:23:37.960 --> 00:23:42.559
can they recover the information you want, so, you know,
340
00:23:42.599 --> 00:23:44.599
there's a lot of thought goes into these things.
341
00:23:44.640 --> 00:23:48.000
And with things like video doorbells, dash cams, we see
342
00:23:48.039 --> 00:23:51.559
a lot of appeals for dashcam footage of incidents, accidents,
343
00:23:51.599 --> 00:23:55.240
that kind of thing, and the use of doorbell camera
344
00:23:55.279 --> 00:24:01.839
footage as well in criminal prosecutions. What's the threshold that
345
00:24:02.200 --> 00:24:07.319
police have to reach in order to seize footage from
346
00:24:07.880 --> 00:24:14.400
doorbell cameras and dash cam.
347
00:24:11.920 --> 00:24:14.319
That's a good question, and I have not to be fair,
348
00:24:14.319 --> 00:24:17.680
there's been such a explosion of this in the last
349
00:24:17.720 --> 00:24:24.359
ten years subsequent to my service, and the fact that
350
00:24:24.400 --> 00:24:32.000
the police now invite dashcam footage, invite ring bell footage.
351
00:24:34.079 --> 00:24:39.720
The department that has to look at this must be
352
00:24:39.960 --> 00:24:44.319
vast now because of the sheer amount of data that
353
00:24:44.440 --> 00:24:50.039
has to be logged and gone through. It is quite
354
00:24:50.039 --> 00:24:56.599
mind blowing. And that's you know that it's slightly away
355
00:24:56.759 --> 00:25:01.200
on a tangent because you're dealing with stuff. There's more
356
00:25:01.319 --> 00:25:04.920
that's overt that's over evidence. You know, a ring camera
357
00:25:05.079 --> 00:25:08.759
is on a doorstep is overt. A camera outside of
358
00:25:08.759 --> 00:25:16.240
property looking down is overt. But the covert activity is
359
00:25:18.119 --> 00:25:21.359
probably on the same level. I'm not saying it wouldn't
360
00:25:21.480 --> 00:25:26.000
use an easier means of getting the footage or seeing
361
00:25:26.480 --> 00:25:32.720
that the activity. But I guess I'm old school. I
362
00:25:32.799 --> 00:25:34.039
want to be out there for you.
363
00:25:34.000 --> 00:25:38.599
Know, well, yeah, the difficulty is with the reduction in
364
00:25:38.680 --> 00:25:44.000
police resources. Old school is expensive. So what does it
365
00:25:44.079 --> 00:25:46.799
take to put a tail on somebody? What does it
366
00:25:46.839 --> 00:25:50.559
take to sit a car outside of property? You're thinking
367
00:25:50.599 --> 00:25:53.720
of the overtime, I guess, aren't you, and justifying that,
368
00:25:54.119 --> 00:26:00.240
whereas if you can gather some doorbell footage or or
369
00:26:00.440 --> 00:26:04.000
CCTV from a pub, you don't have to spend all
370
00:26:04.039 --> 00:26:07.279
of that time and money following people around old school.
371
00:26:08.440 --> 00:26:11.039
Yeah, that's that's very that's very true. There's still there's
372
00:26:11.039 --> 00:26:14.079
still a I guess there's still a need for that
373
00:26:14.240 --> 00:26:21.960
human reading of a situation, particularly when you're looking at
374
00:26:22.200 --> 00:26:26.200
It's like cameras on a football match. You can have
375
00:26:26.240 --> 00:26:32.000
as many cameras on all corners of the stadia feeding
376
00:26:32.039 --> 00:26:37.839
all this scenario live, but something will happen off camera
377
00:26:38.559 --> 00:26:41.480
that the cameras never get that a player might have
378
00:26:41.559 --> 00:26:44.440
heard that a player might have heard somebody say, you know,
379
00:26:44.480 --> 00:26:46.680
we had that incident the other day, didn't we wear
380
00:26:47.160 --> 00:26:49.880
a player appeared to put his shirt over his mouth
381
00:26:49.920 --> 00:26:54.920
and then or to some racist. So you know, there's
382
00:26:54.920 --> 00:26:58.079
always something missed by the cameras, and so you've got
383
00:26:58.119 --> 00:26:59.480
to take take the thing as a whole.
384
00:27:00.759 --> 00:27:03.599
The training that you had for this, What was it like.
385
00:27:05.880 --> 00:27:10.920
For me? I feel very fortunate to have been trained
386
00:27:11.000 --> 00:27:17.079
to a level beyond the majority you know of police officers.
387
00:27:17.160 --> 00:27:24.720
They would they would know of terminology and potential use.
388
00:27:24.839 --> 00:27:30.839
But I went through the weeks of training in sort
389
00:27:30.880 --> 00:27:36.559
of agent handling, which involved surveillance and anti surveillance or
390
00:27:36.599 --> 00:27:43.440
counter surveillance. Anti surveillance meaning you trained to find out
391
00:27:43.480 --> 00:27:50.440
whether you're being followed. Counter surveillance is an even bigger level.
392
00:27:50.519 --> 00:27:54.279
So if a criminal wants to ensure that he's not
393
00:27:54.359 --> 00:27:57.720
being followed, he would deploy somebody else to check that
394
00:27:57.759 --> 00:28:05.960
they're not being followed. So quite a complex scenario. How
395
00:28:06.039 --> 00:28:07.039
might that work? Then?
396
00:28:07.640 --> 00:28:11.039
I'm thinking about the being followed in a car scenario
397
00:28:11.680 --> 00:28:16.200
where in the movie somebody turns around and goes, yeah,
398
00:28:16.279 --> 00:28:18.759
they've been following us. We need to take a hard left,
399
00:28:18.799 --> 00:28:20.599
and then they try and shake the car off and
400
00:28:20.640 --> 00:28:23.799
the car starts chasing them. Is it like that or not?
401
00:28:24.559 --> 00:28:31.039
The whole training with vehicles on foot is distinct because
402
00:28:31.039 --> 00:28:33.799
of obviously the nature of what it does. But the
403
00:28:33.920 --> 00:28:38.519
idea to be to have a team of people following
404
00:28:38.559 --> 00:28:43.480
somebody for a long period of time, maybe well potentially
405
00:28:43.519 --> 00:28:48.960
twenty four hours, has to remain covert by keeping that
406
00:28:49.680 --> 00:28:54.599
distance from the subject and yet close enough to know
407
00:28:54.640 --> 00:28:59.680
what they're doing and to ensure that you don't lose them.
408
00:29:00.119 --> 00:29:03.920
So it's interesting in my training that it was in
409
00:29:03.960 --> 00:29:12.000
London and I was asked to go from a chosen
410
00:29:12.119 --> 00:29:15.960
point A to a point B to what would be
411
00:29:16.319 --> 00:29:22.119
then a criminal exchange. But I needed to ensure that
412
00:29:23.799 --> 00:29:29.119
I wasn't being followed, and you put in various checks,
413
00:29:31.599 --> 00:29:36.640
various activity that you can do to throw off a surveillance,
414
00:29:37.319 --> 00:29:43.400
changing roots, directly, looking in windows, shop windows, just look
415
00:29:43.440 --> 00:29:47.039
what's behind you. You know, various sort of James Bond
416
00:29:47.079 --> 00:29:48.440
stuff that you've alluded to.
417
00:29:48.880 --> 00:29:52.599
So you're using the reflection in the plate glass window
418
00:29:52.640 --> 00:29:55.039
of say John Lewis.
419
00:29:56.000 --> 00:29:59.799
Yeah, you can stand there. It looks natural, you're looking
420
00:29:59.799 --> 00:30:05.400
through at the showroom dummy, and you're actually conscious of
421
00:30:05.440 --> 00:30:10.200
what's been reflected across the thing. So but the point
422
00:30:10.240 --> 00:30:12.079
I'm going to make here is that all those checks
423
00:30:12.079 --> 00:30:15.400
had failed, or I'd not identified that I was being followed,
424
00:30:15.599 --> 00:30:19.079
and you told that you will almost certainly will be followed.
425
00:30:20.880 --> 00:30:24.240
And the final check for me was And another aspect
426
00:30:24.279 --> 00:30:26.559
is to go from a busy, busy area to a
427
00:30:26.640 --> 00:30:30.559
quiet area, a long quiet road where if you are
428
00:30:30.599 --> 00:30:33.119
being followed, they're going to have to drop back some
429
00:30:33.160 --> 00:30:36.279
distance and you can haither use that for two is
430
00:30:36.480 --> 00:30:41.160
one one to disappear down alleyway and gone hopefully never
431
00:30:41.200 --> 00:30:48.359
picked up a game by the surveillance operatives, or put
432
00:30:48.400 --> 00:30:52.880
in another method. And this is the method I used
433
00:30:52.920 --> 00:30:58.319
on this long quiet road. It's somewhere off the horse
434
00:30:58.359 --> 00:31:01.160
Ferry Road. But it went from a the busy area
435
00:31:01.200 --> 00:31:04.480
to a quiet area. And but bear in mind had
436
00:31:04.480 --> 00:31:11.119
already wrecked this area. And what I did was I
437
00:31:11.119 --> 00:31:13.440
would appeared to have turned a corner, but actually on
438
00:31:13.480 --> 00:31:17.240
the corner there was an old telephone chaosk that was
439
00:31:17.279 --> 00:31:20.759
actually hidden by some hoarding from a property that was
440
00:31:20.839 --> 00:31:25.440
under renovation. So my plan was to appear to turn
441
00:31:25.960 --> 00:31:29.640
into a side street, stop, get in a telephone chaosk,
442
00:31:30.640 --> 00:31:35.119
and wait and wait I did. I was almost at
443
00:31:35.160 --> 00:31:39.359
the point of saying I'll carry on now, but I thought, well,
444
00:31:39.359 --> 00:31:43.480
I'll wait for the next person to walk past me,
445
00:31:46.000 --> 00:31:50.279
and I think the person before that was probably a
446
00:31:50.359 --> 00:31:55.599
woman in Arab dress with a small child. And I thought, well,
447
00:31:55.599 --> 00:31:59.680
if that's somebody deployed to follow me, that's very clever
448
00:32:00.680 --> 00:32:05.880
or extremely diligent and careful. So I thought I'd wait
449
00:32:05.880 --> 00:32:09.000
for the next person. And the next person to pass
450
00:32:09.079 --> 00:32:16.079
me was a young man on his own with genes
451
00:32:16.119 --> 00:32:21.759
and fairly ordinary bland clothing, a backpack of some description,
452
00:32:22.359 --> 00:32:29.759
and he was holding a street plan of London, and
453
00:32:29.960 --> 00:32:34.200
he walked past where I was. I think he clearly
454
00:32:34.279 --> 00:32:38.440
realized that I was there, and then he continued walking
455
00:32:38.440 --> 00:32:40.599
his way after consulting his map. And do you know
456
00:32:40.720 --> 00:32:48.160
what stood out for me about him? He had an
457
00:32:48.559 --> 00:32:54.160
almost military gait. He walked with that degree of sort
458
00:32:54.160 --> 00:33:01.200
of purpose, sort of military. And it's interesting because I
459
00:33:01.319 --> 00:33:06.519
then aborted my criminal activity because I was, I knew,
460
00:33:06.799 --> 00:33:08.880
or I believed I was, I was being followed. So
461
00:33:09.599 --> 00:33:15.680
officially I canceled what nefarious activity I was planning because
462
00:33:15.720 --> 00:33:18.200
i'd i'd suss them out.
463
00:33:19.279 --> 00:33:20.000
Was he following you?
464
00:33:21.920 --> 00:33:24.400
Yeah? The whole idea was that you didn't on this
465
00:33:25.200 --> 00:33:31.000
training scenario, you don't talk about it with the team.
466
00:33:31.039 --> 00:33:34.839
You go back to the classroom and you wait for
467
00:33:34.920 --> 00:33:39.400
further instruction and a debrief. As I was making my
468
00:33:39.440 --> 00:33:46.200
way back, I was at a crossing, a pedestrian crossing
469
00:33:46.400 --> 00:33:52.160
at the traffic lights, and a female voice side me,
470
00:33:52.799 --> 00:34:00.920
beside me said, my mate's not happy, and I said,
471
00:34:01.079 --> 00:34:03.960
as your mate with the ages out of London, and
472
00:34:04.000 --> 00:34:08.559
the backpack said yeah, And we ended up we ended
473
00:34:08.639 --> 00:34:11.239
up meeting up against the rules of the training, but
474
00:34:11.800 --> 00:34:15.199
it had to be done, and we had a debrief
475
00:34:15.239 --> 00:34:18.280
of our own about that. So it was a learning
476
00:34:18.400 --> 00:34:21.400
a learning curve for for us.
477
00:34:21.400 --> 00:34:23.679
All that's really interesting, though, isn't it?
478
00:34:24.000 --> 00:34:24.239
More?
479
00:34:24.440 --> 00:34:27.880
Maybe because there was more than one person involved in
480
00:34:27.920 --> 00:34:30.440
this exercise, So you could have been walking down horse
481
00:34:30.440 --> 00:34:33.920
Free Road, heading towards lambeth Bridge or Millbank or wherever,
482
00:34:34.159 --> 00:34:37.000
and there could have been half a dozen people who
483
00:34:37.079 --> 00:34:39.639
were following you or keeping tabs on you, or with
484
00:34:39.719 --> 00:34:42.280
a mobile phone going He's coming around your corner, now,
485
00:34:42.320 --> 00:34:42.800
may you know?
486
00:34:44.719 --> 00:34:49.519
That's it? That's it? And I don't know whether because
487
00:34:49.599 --> 00:34:54.239
I'd appeared to turn right down a side street, whether
488
00:34:54.280 --> 00:34:59.039
there were other people frantically making up ground to cover
489
00:34:59.159 --> 00:35:03.920
the exit. Had they done that and not seen me
490
00:35:04.119 --> 00:35:08.719
exit any further? There was then another check to see
491
00:35:08.920 --> 00:35:13.280
where I might be, So it was all for me.
492
00:35:13.400 --> 00:35:16.559
It was a wonderful trap and I'd caught them out.
493
00:35:16.599 --> 00:35:18.920
And that's the game. It's cat and mouse, isn't it.
494
00:35:21.760 --> 00:35:26.360
If the criminal suspect is aware of surveillance, so go
495
00:35:26.440 --> 00:35:26.719
on them.
496
00:35:26.760 --> 00:35:31.039
For amateurs sleuth's who like to sit there and people watch,
497
00:35:31.239 --> 00:35:37.440
which I do unashamedly. What do you look for in people?
498
00:35:38.280 --> 00:35:41.719
Is there a way that you could say that person's
499
00:35:41.800 --> 00:35:47.119
up to no good, or possibly, thinking about the podcast,
500
00:35:48.079 --> 00:35:52.079
that person looks like a psychopath? Could that be possible?
501
00:35:55.000 --> 00:36:00.719
I think in terms of surveillance, it would have to
502
00:36:00.800 --> 00:36:08.400
be the monitoring of communications, wouldn't it short interactions You
503
00:36:08.760 --> 00:36:12.119
might think you're uneasy about somebody, or or you just
504
00:36:12.199 --> 00:36:20.119
don't like them because of their character or personality. I
505
00:36:20.159 --> 00:36:28.360
would imagine that to identify someone's psychopathy, which we're obviously
506
00:36:28.400 --> 00:36:33.559
fascinated about, you would have to be monitoring their almost
507
00:36:33.599 --> 00:36:39.039
a private thought. So whether that would be in their diary,
508
00:36:39.079 --> 00:36:43.639
in their notes on their computer, or in their communication
509
00:36:44.239 --> 00:36:46.360
with social media and stuff. So it need a lot
510
00:36:47.760 --> 00:36:51.599
a lot more work to establish how these people are ticking.
511
00:36:52.440 --> 00:36:59.440
Yeah, So pure visual observation impossible. What about something less
512
00:36:59.440 --> 00:37:03.679
sinister but just as dangerous, somebody who's going to snatch
513
00:37:03.679 --> 00:37:08.119
a mobile phone. Could you tell when you're walking down
514
00:37:08.159 --> 00:37:12.039
a street whether the person who's coming towards you in
515
00:37:12.079 --> 00:37:15.679
a hoodie is likely to take your phone, is likely
516
00:37:15.760 --> 00:37:19.239
to rob you or not. Is there something that you
517
00:37:19.280 --> 00:37:21.400
could see in the way that they were walking, the
518
00:37:21.440 --> 00:37:22.880
way that they were looking.
519
00:37:24.760 --> 00:37:29.239
Well, without a doubt. If you imagine you talked about
520
00:37:29.320 --> 00:37:33.559
the numbers of cameras that are monitoring the streets of
521
00:37:33.599 --> 00:37:38.119
the UK and in London, well imagine the operators of those,
522
00:37:39.440 --> 00:37:44.719
not necessarily police staff, they would they would know how
523
00:37:45.679 --> 00:37:51.960
groups of individuals move behave. I think we all know
524
00:37:54.639 --> 00:37:59.159
how to recognize a drug addict who's going to get
525
00:37:59.239 --> 00:38:02.119
their score. You know when you see them, they've got
526
00:38:02.119 --> 00:38:09.679
that gate, they've got that way of busily going for something,
527
00:38:09.679 --> 00:38:12.800
and you know, you almost know what's what's happening there.
528
00:38:12.880 --> 00:38:18.599
So people who regularly watch the public moving around Oxford
529
00:38:18.599 --> 00:38:24.079
Street in London or whatever would would soon see movement
530
00:38:24.239 --> 00:38:29.079
activity not necessarily profiling with you know, people talk about
531
00:38:29.679 --> 00:38:34.920
clothing profiling and whatever, but just you know that they're
532
00:38:34.960 --> 00:38:38.159
not walking like a shopper or like somebody going out
533
00:38:38.159 --> 00:38:41.039
for lunch from the office. You know, there'd be some
534
00:38:41.039 --> 00:38:45.519
some traits there that would identify potential criminal activity.
535
00:38:45.920 --> 00:38:49.559
So that's something that you could use. Walking down Tottenham
536
00:38:49.559 --> 00:38:53.320
Court Road at eleven o'clock at night, for instance, you'd
537
00:38:53.360 --> 00:38:55.559
think maybe I need to be on the other side
538
00:38:55.599 --> 00:38:56.679
of the road from that person.
539
00:38:57.519 --> 00:39:00.840
Well sure, but I mean the nighttime, which economy is
540
00:39:00.880 --> 00:39:04.920
a different board game, isn't it. You know, Yeah, you
541
00:39:05.000 --> 00:39:09.559
can have some quite odd you know. I remember seeing
542
00:39:09.599 --> 00:39:12.519
you know, you see footage of incidents when we follow
543
00:39:12.599 --> 00:39:18.000
up investigations and you see some quite again what appears
544
00:39:18.000 --> 00:39:24.440
on camera to be extremely odd behavior and movements that
545
00:39:24.519 --> 00:39:26.800
if you were actually there, it might be just a
546
00:39:26.840 --> 00:39:32.840
couple of students who who've have had too many Vodkas
547
00:39:33.159 --> 00:39:36.559
and red bulls and they're locking around, but it would
548
00:39:36.599 --> 00:39:39.480
look to a camera it looks extremely odd. You know,
549
00:39:39.519 --> 00:39:44.599
you're almost almost violent. So yeah, again I go back
550
00:39:44.639 --> 00:39:47.199
to the point that you know, cameras can only give
551
00:39:47.199 --> 00:39:47.760
you so much.
552
00:39:48.079 --> 00:39:55.360
Yeah, there's something looping back to the insidious surveillance conversation
553
00:39:55.519 --> 00:39:59.679
we had a little while ago. Recently in West Yorkshire,
554
00:39:59.679 --> 00:40:04.000
the police we're using facial recognition cameras that are deployed
555
00:40:04.039 --> 00:40:07.639
in a van so mobile unit and they were able
556
00:40:07.719 --> 00:40:16.039
to arrest an alleged persistent shoplifter using facial recognition from
557
00:40:16.119 --> 00:40:19.719
an approved watch list. And the other aspect of it
558
00:40:19.800 --> 00:40:24.840
is that as well as identifying criminals and potential criminals
559
00:40:24.920 --> 00:40:28.880
people who are wanted, it's also used to identify people
560
00:40:28.920 --> 00:40:31.840
who are missing. And I think that's something that we
561
00:40:31.920 --> 00:40:34.599
need to unpack a bit, isn't it is that surveillance
562
00:40:34.719 --> 00:40:42.679
has another face, which is reuniting people who are missing
563
00:40:43.159 --> 00:40:45.199
or at risk with their loved ones.
564
00:40:46.760 --> 00:40:50.599
That's interesting. That is interesting. I mean I have noticed
565
00:40:51.000 --> 00:40:56.360
certainly the trend now is for missing persons to be
566
00:40:57.760 --> 00:41:04.199
publicized by the police almost daily as a constant feed
567
00:41:04.480 --> 00:41:07.519
of images of people who are missing. And as we know,
568
00:41:07.559 --> 00:41:11.239
people go missing for a number of reasons, and people
569
00:41:11.280 --> 00:41:14.079
are reported missing for a number of reasons, and it
570
00:41:14.119 --> 00:41:17.800
seems I don't imagine that there are more people going missing.
571
00:41:17.840 --> 00:41:20.679
It's just that the public are more aware of more
572
00:41:20.719 --> 00:41:26.079
people and that can bring a problem because that facial recognition,
573
00:41:26.679 --> 00:41:34.079
whilst it's not infallible, it's it's judging things on an
574
00:41:34.119 --> 00:41:39.480
analytical basis rather than a human good feeling because we've
575
00:41:39.519 --> 00:41:43.440
had many cases where the public have been asked to
576
00:41:43.599 --> 00:41:47.159
help and they try to help, but they're actually giving
577
00:41:47.199 --> 00:41:52.800
lots of possible sightings. They don't want to they think
578
00:41:52.840 --> 00:41:56.519
it might have been the person and feel they must
579
00:41:56.880 --> 00:42:04.440
suggest it, which is fine, but the number of mistaken
580
00:42:04.679 --> 00:42:14.480
identities by humans is very high. Whereas I guess the
581
00:42:14.599 --> 00:42:23.079
camera identification is it's more accurate, or potentially more accurate,
582
00:42:23.400 --> 00:42:27.719
or there's less room for error. Of course, then you've
583
00:42:27.719 --> 00:42:28.679
got to do the follow up.
584
00:42:29.440 --> 00:42:34.079
I suppose it allows you to prioritize your resources in
585
00:42:34.119 --> 00:42:37.480
a way that wasn't possible when you were following up
586
00:42:38.239 --> 00:42:42.119
a dozen leads from members of the public who thought
587
00:42:42.159 --> 00:42:44.719
they might have seen the person you were interested in.
588
00:42:45.199 --> 00:42:47.559
You can narrow it down and focus it, and that's
589
00:42:47.599 --> 00:42:48.239
more efficient.
590
00:42:48.559 --> 00:42:54.360
It's interesting, you're right about efficiency and good value. And
591
00:42:54.599 --> 00:43:04.760
is this I remember conducting a two two person surveillance
592
00:43:05.199 --> 00:43:09.119
on an individual. I call it a surveillance. It was
593
00:43:09.159 --> 00:43:15.639
actually part of a you know, completely lawful inquiry I had,
594
00:43:15.679 --> 00:43:22.000
and the scenario was this, we we'd been told that
595
00:43:22.119 --> 00:43:28.320
an individual was working under a false name illegally at
596
00:43:28.320 --> 00:43:33.519
a factory premises, and this information was was put before
597
00:43:33.559 --> 00:43:39.960
me to deal with it's it gave a description of
598
00:43:40.039 --> 00:43:45.519
the individual and I think a nickname, but but other
599
00:43:45.559 --> 00:43:49.360
than that, we couldn't identify who they were talking about.
600
00:43:50.480 --> 00:43:54.960
The problem was that that particular factory logistically was quite
601
00:43:54.960 --> 00:44:00.320
difficult to to get into. We'd we'd we conducted other
602
00:44:00.719 --> 00:44:05.440
multi agency investigations at this premises and it was very
603
00:44:05.440 --> 00:44:07.960
difficult by the time you've got access. If there was
604
00:44:08.000 --> 00:44:11.559
anyone there who didn't want to be spoken to, there
605
00:44:11.559 --> 00:44:19.320
were ways to get away. So it didn't justify. There
606
00:44:19.440 --> 00:44:23.360
was no reason reasonable justification to do a similar project
607
00:44:23.400 --> 00:44:30.440
like this. But this particular individual was was described as
608
00:44:30.639 --> 00:44:35.519
as black Jamaican, where the majority of people in this
609
00:44:35.559 --> 00:44:39.800
factory weren't of that description, and it gave I think
610
00:44:39.800 --> 00:44:45.880
it gave some timing of when the person worked there. Anyway,
611
00:44:46.000 --> 00:44:49.800
So I was in the area of this factory on
612
00:44:50.199 --> 00:44:54.119
other inquiries and I thought, I'll just I'll just park
613
00:44:54.199 --> 00:44:58.360
up and have a cigarette or a sandwich or whatever
614
00:44:58.480 --> 00:45:02.360
is doing and sitting watch at this relevant time. And
615
00:45:02.440 --> 00:45:07.480
sure enough, a person of this description exited the premises
616
00:45:10.360 --> 00:45:14.400
and we decided, and it was on foot we decided
617
00:45:14.440 --> 00:45:18.960
that we would we would follow him to see hopefully
618
00:45:19.000 --> 00:45:22.559
that he would go to a premises where he was living.
619
00:45:24.320 --> 00:45:27.320
So it involved me and my colleague who we'd got
620
00:45:27.320 --> 00:45:31.360
a car, me jumping out the car and a foot
621
00:45:31.400 --> 00:45:34.360
follow through the estate, the car going around picking me up,
622
00:45:34.599 --> 00:45:41.000
and we sort of plotted his route to a probably
623
00:45:41.000 --> 00:45:44.440
about a mile away, and we actually lost sight of
624
00:45:44.519 --> 00:45:52.559
him near some dwelling houses. Probably probably thought he'd gone
625
00:45:52.599 --> 00:45:56.880
into one of maybe four or five properties, but weren't
626
00:45:56.880 --> 00:46:03.880
sure which one. So far, so good. I then went
627
00:46:04.480 --> 00:46:07.960
the following week with an immigration officer who would need
628
00:46:08.000 --> 00:46:13.280
to be involved in this process, and we did the
629
00:46:13.320 --> 00:46:18.840
same thing. The individual came out, but rather than follow them,
630
00:46:20.519 --> 00:46:23.440
I drove round to the location where we'd followed him
631
00:46:23.440 --> 00:46:27.840
the week before and waited. I got a colleague in
632
00:46:27.880 --> 00:46:31.480
a mark police car on standby on the end of
633
00:46:31.559 --> 00:46:35.400
the radio just around the corner, and lo and behold
634
00:46:35.400 --> 00:46:40.480
he this man did the same route, got to the
635
00:46:40.519 --> 00:46:43.639
location where we'd lost sight of him a week before,
636
00:46:44.960 --> 00:46:53.199
got out the car, introduced myself, althovery, relaxed, yes, most apologetic,
637
00:46:55.559 --> 00:47:00.199
showed his passport. He was in the house nearby, was
638
00:47:00.239 --> 00:47:09.159
an overstayer, and he was dealt with appropriately, Possibly a
639
00:47:09.239 --> 00:47:12.719
perfect scenario. I think, I know what you're going to
640
00:47:12.760 --> 00:47:13.119
ask me.
641
00:47:13.679 --> 00:47:18.719
Yeah, so I assume you could visit the factory or
642
00:47:18.800 --> 00:47:21.239
even just stop him as he left the building. You'd
643
00:47:21.239 --> 00:47:22.519
be entitled to do that, wouldn't you.
644
00:47:23.159 --> 00:47:26.760
Yes, yes, absolutely, yes, yes we could have done that.
645
00:47:28.800 --> 00:47:33.559
The reasons why, well, the main reason why I didn't
646
00:47:33.599 --> 00:47:37.280
particularly want a chase on foot. I wasn't in the
647
00:47:37.320 --> 00:47:42.440
mood for him running. It was a busy, busy road
648
00:47:42.480 --> 00:47:45.960
where the factory was a lot of people about. Logistically,
649
00:47:46.239 --> 00:47:49.719
I thought, I just don't want this because you don't
650
00:47:49.760 --> 00:47:53.079
want to lose, lose your suspect, or lose the person
651
00:47:53.119 --> 00:47:56.760
you're interested in. And it had all the hallmarks of
652
00:47:58.440 --> 00:48:01.480
him running through traffic, cross traffic and all that. So
653
00:48:02.159 --> 00:48:05.559
I guess a health and safety aspect to the whole thing.
654
00:48:06.719 --> 00:48:11.480
The scenario where we were pretty sure that he was
655
00:48:11.519 --> 00:48:15.159
living at one of a number of a small number
656
00:48:15.199 --> 00:48:22.960
of premises was much better and easier to control, because equally,
657
00:48:23.079 --> 00:48:27.159
he hadn't got much wriggle room really in terms of
658
00:48:27.280 --> 00:48:29.960
he was outside the house where he was living, he
659
00:48:30.039 --> 00:48:33.679
was lodging with a family or an individual, and he
660
00:48:33.800 --> 00:48:36.119
got his passport there. In fact, he'd even got his
661
00:48:37.159 --> 00:48:43.440
case virtually packed with you know, with the airwaves tag
662
00:48:43.480 --> 00:48:44.039
still on it.
663
00:48:44.599 --> 00:48:47.800
I guess control is the key to that, isn't it.
664
00:48:47.880 --> 00:48:50.159
Because if you'd shouted.
665
00:48:49.840 --> 00:48:52.199
Oh stop police.
666
00:48:52.519 --> 00:48:56.360
And then started chasing him through a crowded area, then
667
00:48:56.400 --> 00:49:01.960
it becomes chaotic and uncontained and unpredictable, doesn't it. Members
668
00:49:01.960 --> 00:49:05.079
of the public are involved, people could be injured, et cetera.
669
00:49:05.239 --> 00:49:11.519
Whereas by using a stealthy approach you were able to
670
00:49:12.159 --> 00:49:15.559
complete the task without involving anybody else.
671
00:49:15.840 --> 00:49:23.039
Yeah, exactly. Yeah, stealth and guile and and I think
672
00:49:23.119 --> 00:49:27.400
good good value to get the job done with the
673
00:49:27.519 --> 00:49:30.760
least impact on resources.
674
00:49:30.679 --> 00:49:33.960
No drama, and you didn't break a sweat. So great.
675
00:49:34.239 --> 00:49:39.519
It's a successful round that Jack Morrell. That's fantastic. Catching
676
00:49:39.559 --> 00:49:43.360
criminals and investigating cases is basically good fun.
677
00:49:43.639 --> 00:49:47.800
Yeah it is. It is. Yeah, you know, let's be honest.
678
00:49:47.880 --> 00:49:51.000
You know, there's a serious sight to it, but there's
679
00:49:51.039 --> 00:49:52.840
some good fun and humor to be had as well.
680
00:49:53.719 --> 00:49:57.800
We hope you enjoyed this episode of Detectives Files True
681
00:49:57.840 --> 00:50:02.199
Crime Tales with Jack Morrell the Governor. We're working on
682
00:50:02.320 --> 00:50:06.039
some more of those and also some more psycho killer
683
00:50:06.119 --> 00:50:09.440
cases coming up in the not too distant future, but
684
00:50:09.519 --> 00:50:12.360
for now, thank you for your company and we'll see
685
00:50:12.400 --> 00:50:13.880
you again soon.