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The centerpiece of this episode is Dave's interview with Spencer Weber Waller, an antitrust professor at Loyola University Chicago, former Justice Department prosecutor, and author of Power and Greed: Monopolies, Mergers, and Cartels on the American Stage, out October 15 from Bloomsbury's Methuen Drama imprint. Waller says the book began during COVID, when his wife, who works on the business side of theater, asked if he had heard of the American Theatrical Syndicate. He hadn't. It turned out that in 1896 six producers, booking agents, and theater owners met in a New York hotel and formed a cartel that controlled most Broadway houses and national tour booking. Producers and performers could work only in Syndicate theaters, and venues could book only Syndicate shows.
Waller traces a similar pattern in vaudeville. There the East Coast Keith-Albee circuit and the West Coast Orpheum Circuit combined rather than competed. He stresses that these weren't cartoon villains. The Syndicate brought real order to a chaotic post–Civil War touring business, but it charged a heavy price for that order. The Shubert brothers began as a small Syndicate client in upstate New York. After being blackballed, they built a rival theater empire, sometimes colluded with the Syndicate, and joined it in a failed 1907 invasion of vaudeville that ended with a payoff and a 15-year non-compete. Waller notes that much of this conduct would be a criminal felony today.
It went unchecked partly because courts ruled that theater wasn't "trade or commerce." The Supreme Court's baseball decision then made things murkier. By the 1950s, the Shuberts were the last monopoly standing, and the government finally sued. The Supreme Court rejected the Shuberts' defense, and they were forced to sell theaters and exit booking and ticketing. Dave raises a point: by then, taste, the movies, and the Great Depression had already weakened these companies more than the government had. Waller agrees that enforcement often arrives as a monopoly starts to decline, and he compares it to Microsoft. He still believes the breakup improved Broadway by giving producers more options.
The book ends at the present day, with the Live Nation–Ticketmaster case. Waller criticizes the DOJ's mid-trial settlement as lenient. He notes reports of White House meetings and a pardoned witness, and he praises Jeffrey Kessler, his former co-author, for winning the states' jury verdict on short notice. His view is that when a company has already broken two consent decrees, another round of behavioral promises isn't enough, and a breakup is the right remedy. Asked whether Live Nation is bigger than the Syndicate and the Shuberts combined, he says it arguably has more power, even though consumers today have more entertainment choices.
The Rob Bonta / Paramount–Warner Bros. Settlement
Dave and Michael also examine California AG Rob Bonta's settlement allowing Paramount to acquire Warner Bros. Discovery. Michael calls himself "disappointed," echoing the AGs who signed off, and he worries about CNN, the creative side of the business, and Warner's vast library. Dave asks whether stopping a merger is harder than prosecuting one afterward. Michael agrees that it is: before a merger, harm is hypothetical, while afterward there is evidence. He also notes that American culture tends to celebrate corporate titans. Dave notes that Larry Ellison's threat to move Paramount to Tennessee gave the company leverage.
The key question is what this means for Live Nation. Its lawyers may cite the settlement to argue for the behavioral remedies in its DOJ deal. Michael thinks the comparison won't carry much weight with Judge Subramanian, because Live Nation already broke earlier behavioral commitments and now has a liability verdict against it. Both hosts suspect that the backlash may push Bonta to take a harder line on a Live Nation breakup, especially since Michael Rapino has little leverage.