WEBVTT
1
00:00:00.840 --> 00:00:01.860
Welcome back, everybody.
2
00:00:01.919 --> 00:00:04.500
Today we're going to be looking at Operation Eagle Claw,
3
00:00:04.780 --> 00:00:09.220
the Special Forces' unfortunate disaster. So we'll take a look
4
00:00:09.259 --> 00:00:11.640
to see what happened in Operation Eagle Claw and how
5
00:00:11.689 --> 00:00:16.629
it changed everything. On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants stormed
6
00:00:16.649 --> 00:00:20.809
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and seized dozens of Americans.
7
00:00:20.929 --> 00:00:24.910
As the hostage crisis stretched into months, President Carter authorized
8
00:00:24.949 --> 00:00:30.230
an extraordinarily ambitious military rescue attempt. The plan required approximately
9
00:00:30.230 --> 00:00:34.850
90 Delta Force operators and supporting personnel to secretly enter Iran.
10
00:00:35.490 --> 00:00:38.759
The rescue force would fly aboard Air Force MC-130 and
11
00:00:38.820 --> 00:00:42.079
EC-130 aircraft to a remote location in the Iranian desert
12
00:00:42.100 --> 00:00:47.219
known as Desert One. Navy RH-53D helicopters would arrive separately
13
00:00:47.280 --> 00:00:52.250
after flying from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz. From there,
14
00:00:52.289 --> 00:00:55.549
the helicopters would transport the assault force closer to Tehran.
15
00:00:55.670 --> 00:00:58.439
The operators would hide during daylight hours, move into the
16
00:00:58.479 --> 00:01:02.219
city the following night, assault the embassy and other locations
17
00:01:02.259 --> 00:01:05.819
where hostages were believed to be held, and then evacuate
18
00:01:05.840 --> 00:01:10.519
aboard helicopters to an airfield secured by Army Rangers. Almost
19
00:01:10.620 --> 00:01:13.370
every stage depended upon the previous one working. That became
20
00:01:13.390 --> 00:01:18.650
the mission's greatest vulnerability. Trouble begins before Delta Force reaches Tehran.
21
00:01:19.629 --> 00:01:22.569
Eight of the helicopters departed the Nimitz. They encountered clouds
22
00:01:22.590 --> 00:01:26.370
of fine dust from the desert known as haboobs, creating
23
00:01:26.409 --> 00:01:31.090
difficult flying conditions and reducing visibility. One helicopter turned back
24
00:01:31.129 --> 00:01:34.629
after experiencing a warning associated with its rotor system. Another
25
00:01:34.670 --> 00:01:40.329
developed navigation instrumentation problems and also returned. Six helicopters eventually
26
00:01:40.409 --> 00:01:43.420
reached Desert One. The minimum number of planners believed necessary
27
00:01:43.439 --> 00:01:48.060
to continue. Then another helicopter developed a hydraulic problem. Now
28
00:01:48.140 --> 00:01:54.769
only five were considered operational. The mission required six. Colonel
29
00:01:54.829 --> 00:01:58.609
Charlie Beckwith, commander of Delta Force, recommended aborting. The decision
30
00:01:58.650 --> 00:02:01.430
moved through the command structure and Carter approved termination of
31
00:02:01.450 --> 00:02:04.769
the mission. The Americans had traveled hundreds of miles into
32
00:02:04.810 --> 00:02:08.169
hostile territory. They would leave without ever even reaching Tehran.
33
00:02:09.659 --> 00:02:12.680
But the most devastating moment was still ahead. Before departing,
34
00:02:12.719 --> 00:02:17.370
the helicopters needed fuel from the EC-130 aircraft. During repositioning,
35
00:02:17.430 --> 00:02:19.889
one of the helicopters maneuvered through the blowing dust. The
36
00:02:19.909 --> 00:02:23.710
pilot lost clear visual reference and collided with the EC,
37
00:02:24.189 --> 00:02:28.330
or one of them, carrying personnel and fuel. Both aircraft
38
00:02:28.370 --> 00:02:32.789
tragically erupted into flames. Eight American servicemen were killed, five
39
00:02:32.949 --> 00:02:34.729
Air Force personnel and three Marines.
40
00:02:35.469 --> 00:02:36.879
Others suffered severe burns.
41
00:02:37.289 --> 00:02:40.580
The remaining helicopters were abandoned and the surviving force evacuated
42
00:02:40.620 --> 00:02:42.080
aboard the transport aircraft.
43
00:02:43.080 --> 00:02:45.659
Operation E, or Eagle Claw, was over.
44
00:02:46.870 --> 00:02:49.849
Images of burned American aircraft sitting abandoned in the Iranian
45
00:02:49.889 --> 00:02:53.849
desert soon became symbols of the failed attempt. It would
46
00:02:53.870 --> 00:02:57.490
be easy to reduce Eagle Claw to pilot error, mechanical failure,
47
00:02:57.530 --> 00:02:58.189
or bad weather.
48
00:02:58.490 --> 00:03:00.280
The deeper problem might have been systemic.
49
00:03:00.939 --> 00:03:03.419
The mission required the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines
50
00:03:03.460 --> 00:03:07.800
to perform an extremely complicated operation together. Yet America's special
51
00:03:07.879 --> 00:03:10.900
op capabilities lacked that unified command structure at the time.
52
00:03:11.520 --> 00:03:16.000
Specialized aviation resources also lacked routine joint training. that later
53
00:03:16.060 --> 00:03:21.370
became standard. Different units used different procedures, communication systems, equipment.
54
00:03:21.889 --> 00:03:26.990
The operation also contained numerous interconnected stages. Aircraft had to
55
00:03:27.050 --> 00:03:31.159
arrive in particular locations. Helicopters had to remain operational. Fuel
56
00:03:31.180 --> 00:03:34.759
had to be transferred. Ground forces had to move, undetected.
57
00:03:35.379 --> 00:03:38.680
The plan provided little room for cascading failure. Once enough
58
00:03:38.719 --> 00:03:44.979
helicopters became unavailable, the entire operation collapsed. Eagle Claw was
59
00:03:45.020 --> 00:03:48.000
a tragedy, there's no doubt, but its consequences extended far
60
00:03:48.039 --> 00:03:53.569
beyond Desert One. The lessons accelerated major reforms in American
61
00:03:53.610 --> 00:03:59.389
special operations. The Army created the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, SOAR,
62
00:04:00.050 --> 00:04:03.810
eventually known as the Night Stalkers, providing highly specialized aviation
63
00:04:03.849 --> 00:04:08.409
support for missions conducted at night and under extraordinarily demanding conditions.
64
00:04:09.370 --> 00:04:13.409
Joint terror and counterterrorism capabilities also expanded, including the development
65
00:04:13.430 --> 00:04:17.639
of JSOC, The larger transformation eventually contributed to the creation
66
00:04:17.660 --> 00:04:22.790
of the United States Special Operations Command in 1987, bringing together,
67
00:04:24.209 --> 00:04:28.310
bringing greater coordination of special operation forces across military services.
68
00:04:29.290 --> 00:04:33.430
That actually may be Eagle Claw's most important legacy. Elite
69
00:04:33.509 --> 00:04:40.089
operators alone cannot guarantee the success of an operation, but aircraft, intelligence, logistics, communications, contingency,
70
00:04:40.670 --> 00:04:42.829
and the people conducting this all, all have to function
71
00:04:42.889 --> 00:04:46.860
as a system. Operation Eagle Claw never reached the American
72
00:04:46.899 --> 00:04:50.579
hostages in Tehran, but the lessons learned in the Iranian
73
00:04:50.620 --> 00:04:53.360
desert to help build the American special operations system that
74
00:04:53.379 --> 00:04:56.079
would conduct some of the most complex and amazing military
75
00:04:56.139 --> 00:04:58.259
missions of the next four decades.
76
00:05:01.529 --> 00:05:05.069
A wonderful thing for the last 40 years.
1
00:00:00.840 --> 00:00:01.860
Welcome back, everybody.
2
00:00:01.919 --> 00:00:04.500
Today we're going to be looking at Operation Eagle Claw,
3
00:00:04.780 --> 00:00:09.220
the Special Forces' unfortunate disaster. So we'll take a look
4
00:00:09.259 --> 00:00:11.640
to see what happened in Operation Eagle Claw and how
5
00:00:11.689 --> 00:00:16.629
it changed everything. On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants stormed
6
00:00:16.649 --> 00:00:20.809
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and seized dozens of Americans.
7
00:00:20.929 --> 00:00:24.910
As the hostage crisis stretched into months, President Carter authorized
8
00:00:24.949 --> 00:00:30.230
an extraordinarily ambitious military rescue attempt. The plan required approximately
9
00:00:30.230 --> 00:00:34.850
90 Delta Force operators and supporting personnel to secretly enter Iran.
10
00:00:35.490 --> 00:00:38.759
The rescue force would fly aboard Air Force MC-130 and
11
00:00:38.820 --> 00:00:42.079
EC-130 aircraft to a remote location in the Iranian desert
12
00:00:42.100 --> 00:00:47.219
known as Desert One. Navy RH-53D helicopters would arrive separately
13
00:00:47.280 --> 00:00:52.250
after flying from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz. From there,
14
00:00:52.289 --> 00:00:55.549
the helicopters would transport the assault force closer to Tehran.
15
00:00:55.670 --> 00:00:58.439
The operators would hide during daylight hours, move into the
16
00:00:58.479 --> 00:01:02.219
city the following night, assault the embassy and other locations
17
00:01:02.259 --> 00:01:05.819
where hostages were believed to be held, and then evacuate
18
00:01:05.840 --> 00:01:10.519
aboard helicopters to an airfield secured by Army Rangers. Almost
19
00:01:10.620 --> 00:01:13.370
every stage depended upon the previous one working. That became
20
00:01:13.390 --> 00:01:18.650
the mission's greatest vulnerability. Trouble begins before Delta Force reaches Tehran.
21
00:01:19.629 --> 00:01:22.569
Eight of the helicopters departed the Nimitz. They encountered clouds
22
00:01:22.590 --> 00:01:26.370
of fine dust from the desert known as haboobs, creating
23
00:01:26.409 --> 00:01:31.090
difficult flying conditions and reducing visibility. One helicopter turned back
24
00:01:31.129 --> 00:01:34.629
after experiencing a warning associated with its rotor system. Another
25
00:01:34.670 --> 00:01:40.329
developed navigation instrumentation problems and also returned. Six helicopters eventually
26
00:01:40.409 --> 00:01:43.420
reached Desert One. The minimum number of planners believed necessary
27
00:01:43.439 --> 00:01:48.060
to continue. Then another helicopter developed a hydraulic problem. Now
28
00:01:48.140 --> 00:01:54.769
only five were considered operational. The mission required six. Colonel
29
00:01:54.829 --> 00:01:58.609
Charlie Beckwith, commander of Delta Force, recommended aborting. The decision
30
00:01:58.650 --> 00:02:01.430
moved through the command structure and Carter approved termination of
31
00:02:01.450 --> 00:02:04.769
the mission. The Americans had traveled hundreds of miles into
32
00:02:04.810 --> 00:02:08.169
hostile territory. They would leave without ever even reaching Tehran.
33
00:02:09.659 --> 00:02:12.680
But the most devastating moment was still ahead. Before departing,
34
00:02:12.719 --> 00:02:17.370
the helicopters needed fuel from the EC-130 aircraft. During repositioning,
35
00:02:17.430 --> 00:02:19.889
one of the helicopters maneuvered through the blowing dust. The
36
00:02:19.909 --> 00:02:23.710
pilot lost clear visual reference and collided with the EC,
37
00:02:24.189 --> 00:02:28.330
or one of them, carrying personnel and fuel. Both aircraft
38
00:02:28.370 --> 00:02:32.789
tragically erupted into flames. Eight American servicemen were killed, five
39
00:02:32.949 --> 00:02:34.729
Air Force personnel and three Marines.
40
00:02:35.469 --> 00:02:36.879
Others suffered severe burns.
41
00:02:37.289 --> 00:02:40.580
The remaining helicopters were abandoned and the surviving force evacuated
42
00:02:40.620 --> 00:02:42.080
aboard the transport aircraft.
43
00:02:43.080 --> 00:02:45.659
Operation E, or Eagle Claw, was over.
44
00:02:46.870 --> 00:02:49.849
Images of burned American aircraft sitting abandoned in the Iranian
45
00:02:49.889 --> 00:02:53.849
desert soon became symbols of the failed attempt. It would
46
00:02:53.870 --> 00:02:57.490
be easy to reduce Eagle Claw to pilot error, mechanical failure,
47
00:02:57.530 --> 00:02:58.189
or bad weather.
48
00:02:58.490 --> 00:03:00.280
The deeper problem might have been systemic.
49
00:03:00.939 --> 00:03:03.419
The mission required the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines
50
00:03:03.460 --> 00:03:07.800
to perform an extremely complicated operation together. Yet America's special
51
00:03:07.879 --> 00:03:10.900
op capabilities lacked that unified command structure at the time.
52
00:03:11.520 --> 00:03:16.000
Specialized aviation resources also lacked routine joint training. that later
53
00:03:16.060 --> 00:03:21.370
became standard. Different units used different procedures, communication systems, equipment.
54
00:03:21.889 --> 00:03:26.990
The operation also contained numerous interconnected stages. Aircraft had to
55
00:03:27.050 --> 00:03:31.159
arrive in particular locations. Helicopters had to remain operational. Fuel
56
00:03:31.180 --> 00:03:34.759
had to be transferred. Ground forces had to move, undetected.
57
00:03:35.379 --> 00:03:38.680
The plan provided little room for cascading failure. Once enough
58
00:03:38.719 --> 00:03:44.979
helicopters became unavailable, the entire operation collapsed. Eagle Claw was
59
00:03:45.020 --> 00:03:48.000
a tragedy, there's no doubt, but its consequences extended far
60
00:03:48.039 --> 00:03:53.569
beyond Desert One. The lessons accelerated major reforms in American
61
00:03:53.610 --> 00:03:59.389
special operations. The Army created the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, SOAR,
62
00:04:00.050 --> 00:04:03.810
eventually known as the Night Stalkers, providing highly specialized aviation
63
00:04:03.849 --> 00:04:08.409
support for missions conducted at night and under extraordinarily demanding conditions.
64
00:04:09.370 --> 00:04:13.409
Joint terror and counterterrorism capabilities also expanded, including the development
65
00:04:13.430 --> 00:04:17.639
of JSOC, The larger transformation eventually contributed to the creation
66
00:04:17.660 --> 00:04:22.790
of the United States Special Operations Command in 1987, bringing together,
67
00:04:24.209 --> 00:04:28.310
bringing greater coordination of special operation forces across military services.
68
00:04:29.290 --> 00:04:33.430
That actually may be Eagle Claw's most important legacy. Elite
69
00:04:33.509 --> 00:04:40.089
operators alone cannot guarantee the success of an operation, but aircraft, intelligence, logistics, communications, contingency,
70
00:04:40.670 --> 00:04:42.829
and the people conducting this all, all have to function
71
00:04:42.889 --> 00:04:46.860
as a system. Operation Eagle Claw never reached the American
72
00:04:46.899 --> 00:04:50.579
hostages in Tehran, but the lessons learned in the Iranian
73
00:04:50.620 --> 00:04:53.360
desert to help build the American special operations system that
74
00:04:53.379 --> 00:04:56.079
would conduct some of the most complex and amazing military
75
00:04:56.139 --> 00:04:58.259
missions of the next four decades.
76
00:05:01.529 --> 00:05:05.069
A wonderful thing for the last 40 years.
