WEBVTT
1
00:00:00.100 --> 00:00:17.580
[upbeat music] Hello, and welcome to Explaining Brazil, the podcast by The Brazilian Report in partnership with the Brazil Office Alliance. My name is Gustavo Ribeiro.
2
00:00:17.680 --> 00:00:33.880
I'm the editor-in-chief of The Brazilian Report. Brazil's 2026 electoral campaign is officially underway. Since August the 16th, candidates have been allowed to explicitly ask for votes and hand out campaign material.
3
00:00:34.180 --> 00:00:46.780
And on August 28th, the free airtime blocks kick in. Those unmistakable party ads w- will flood radio and TV every day until October the 1st, three days before the first round.
4
00:00:47.240 --> 00:00:56.900
Almost all the attention goes to the presidential race. Congressional races get whatever is left over, which isn't much, and there are reasons for that.
5
00:00:57.380 --> 00:01:11.160
Presidential campaigns are a clash of big personalities with nationwide reach, and we get a steady drip of horse race polling, and there will be televised debates. Congressional races have none of those, those things.
6
00:01:11.660 --> 00:01:17.260
The format is complicated, there are thousands of candidates, and the polling is close to useless.
7
00:01:17.680 --> 00:01:30.240
Not because pollsters are bad or ill-intentioned, but because voters simply don't pay enough attention to down-ballot races. And I have an anecdote that makes the point, but it needs a setup first.
8
00:01:30.960 --> 00:01:42.640
In Brazil, we vote on electronic voting machines, and every candidate is assigned a number you punch into a keypad. Presidential and gubernatorial candidates get two digits.
9
00:01:43.140 --> 00:01:55.690
So for instance, Lula is number 13, Flávio Bolsonaro is number 22. Candidates for the lower house get four digits each, and the first two are their party's number.
10
00:01:56.280 --> 00:02:10.340
So Workers' Party candidates all start with 13, Liberal Party candidates with 22. So within that, the candidate a party believes can pull the most votes get the numbers that are the easiest to remember.
11
00:02:10.560 --> 00:02:16.880
So in the case of the Workers' Party, for instance, that's 1313, 1300.
12
00:02:17.520 --> 00:02:32.380
Uh, the center left PDT, for instance, carries the number 12, and it hands out, it hands out 1234, 1200, 1212 to its best candidates. Now the anecdote.
13
00:02:33.090 --> 00:02:43.160
The last time I went to vote in 2022, the person that was ahead of me froze once they were inside the booth, and they had forgotten the candidate's number.
14
00:02:43.820 --> 00:02:50.040
And here's the thing, you're allowed to walk in with a piece of paper listing every number you plan to punch in.
15
00:02:50.560 --> 00:03:02.260
So that person hadn't even bothered to do that and essentially lost their vote, because once you go into the booth, you can't, you cannot consult anything outside of it.
16
00:03:02.720 --> 00:03:08.820
So that's how casually Brazilians treat the races for Congress, and they shouldn't.
17
00:03:08.840 --> 00:03:26.980
Because the presidential race, of course, it matters enormously, but power in Brazil is increasingly won and lost in Congress just as much, and that's where the budget is increasingly being controlled and where any president agenda lives or dies.
18
00:03:27.540 --> 00:03:42.120
So to discuss where the Brazilian Congress stands today, uh, we have invited Beatriz Rey. She is a political scientist and a researcher at the University of Lisbon. Beatriz is an old friend of this show.
19
00:03:42.260 --> 00:03:54.760
She wrote a column for The Brazilian Report for years, and she recently coordinated a policy paper with Sérgio Fausto for the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Foundation on how to improve the way Congress operates.
20
00:03:55.500 --> 00:04:09.030
Bea, hello, and, uh, welcome back to the show. Thanks for joining us. Thank you for the invitation. It's good to be back. And of course, as always, I am joined by my regular podcasting partner, Dr.
21
00:04:09.320 --> 00:04:22.360
James Green, a historian at Brown University and chairman of the board of directors at the Brazil Office Alliance. James, thanks for being here with us as well. It's great to be here, Gustavo. Hel- hello, Bea. Prazer.
22
00:04:22.920 --> 00:04:39.420
Prazer. So Bea, uh, Brazilian Congress has never been this powerful, uh, especially in this post-dictatorship era. In the early years of that re-democratization, most laws came from the executive branch.
23
00:04:39.900 --> 00:04:53.380
But now Congress is asserting itself more, and it now controls also a massive chunk of the federal budget, what we call, uh, the emendas parlamentares, or the budgetary grants.
24
00:04:54.080 --> 00:05:08.780
And they have more power over the purse than arguably any other Western legislature. So how did that happen? Because Congress asserting itself is not bad per se, but what is happening in Brazil?
25
00:05:08.920 --> 00:05:21.800
What are the good things about it, and what are the bad things about it? So the short version is, uh, this process did not happen overnight, and it did not happen through one big reform.
26
00:05:21.880 --> 00:05:35.620
It's the accumulation of about two decades of smaller shifts, plus, I think, a couple of turning points. For most of the post-dictator period, the president really did run the show in Brazil.
27
00:05:35.860 --> 00:05:53.780
So, uh, if we look at earlier works, uh, uh, done in political science between 1988 and the early 2000s, about 85% of the laws that got approved originated in the presidency, and the odds of Congress actually, uh, killing a presidential bill were under 3%.
28
00:05:54.580 --> 00:06:06.760
I think the f- to me, and that's what, uh, we, we write in the, the policy papers, that the first, uh, turning point was in 2001, when Congress reformed how provisional decrees work.
29
00:06:07.468 --> 00:06:16.448
Provisional decrees are like, uh, executive orders in the US. Um, they work a little bit different, but I think that's the, the most appropriate comparison I can think about right now.
30
00:06:17.188 --> 00:06:27.408
Uh, so what Congress did, did is they capped their validity, required a joint committee to review them, uh, ended the practice of the president just reissuing the same decree over and over again.
31
00:06:28.448 --> 00:06:36.368
Uh, that reform forced a negoti- forced negotiation in a way that, uh, hadn't existed before.
32
00:06:36.858 --> 00:06:53.588
And then in 2009, uh, researchers in political science, they document that was the first year, uh, that deputies and senators passed more bill of their own, uh, sponsorship than the president. Um, from there, I think...
33
00:06:54.608 --> 00:07:05.048
I think it's cumulative. Congress starts building up, um, technical capacity. Uh, legislative consultancies, uh, hire more qualified people.
34
00:07:05.848 --> 00:07:14.108
Committees, uh, at that point at least, uh, start working as, uh, policy shops, uh, approving, uh, legislation.
35
00:07:14.908 --> 00:07:31.708
And then, uh, we have been discussing this a lot in Brazil recently, in 2015 and '19, two rounds of budget reforms, uh, made a chunk of the federal budget, uh, constitutionally guaranteed to individual and party amendments.
36
00:07:31.848 --> 00:07:44.988
Uh, that was the money that the president used to, uh, be able to, uh, to negotiate and, uh, reward allies and punish non-allies. Uh, that money now is just owned.
37
00:07:45.248 --> 00:07:56.868
That's the budgetary, uh, amendments or grants that you were referring to. Uh, we don't know the extent to which that shifted leverage. I, I am involved in a research project myself trying to figure that out.
38
00:07:57.108 --> 00:08:10.148
Uh, part of the literature says that it has, part of the literature says that it hasn't, so we're trying to understand that. Uh, I think COVID, the COVID pandemic, made all of this process, uh, more visible
39
00:08:11.088 --> 00:08:20.448
when, uh, in 2020, Congress wrote most all of the pandemic-related re- legislation, uh, 96% of the bills on the topic.
40
00:08:21.188 --> 00:08:30.148
Uh, it also, a lot of the, I don't have the numbers right now, but a lot of, most of the approved, uh, legislation was, uh, sponsored by legislators.
41
00:08:30.808 --> 00:08:44.387
And then when the government, that was the Bolsonaro administration, when it proposed a 200, uh, reais emergency payment to citizens, the, it was the Chamber of Deputies who said, "No. Uh, we want 500 reais."
42
00:08:45.088 --> 00:08:58.348
Um, and then that, that amount turned out to be 600 reais. So there you really saw Congress acting, uh, proactively in the policy-making process. Now, is it good or bad?
43
00:08:58.768 --> 00:09:12.288
Uh, on the contrary to what [laughs] the piece in The Economist says, uh, sort of putting that in my voice, uh, which I did not say, uh, I do not think that a more assertive Congress is an, is a problem.
44
00:09:12.428 --> 00:09:29.248
I don't think it is necessarily. Uh, I think Congress has the potential to act as a co-policymaker with the executive, um, if a certain, certain conditions are, are met, right? Uh, the president is one person.
45
00:09:29.468 --> 00:09:45.088
It reflects one political group. Congress, uh, has hundreds of people from every region and every ideology. Um, so I think it- And like 20 parties as well. [laughs] What? And 20 parties as well, so- Oh, yeah.
46
00:09:45.108 --> 00:09:55.328
[laughs] I mean, it's k- it's, it, we're, we're reducing the number after the institutional reforms. Uh, I think we're, we're, we're getting there. Um, but I think that's something that we have to keep in mind, right?
47
00:09:55.428 --> 00:10:09.368
So when Congress works well, I think that's a feature, not a bug. Uh, it should make policy more legitimate, more likely to stick. Um, the argument that we have in the policy paper is not that Congress got too strong.
48
00:10:09.658 --> 00:10:20.788
It's that a lot of this strength got built through the backdoor, uh, informal deals, procedural shortcuts, rather than through Congress's own formal groups.
49
00:10:20.948 --> 00:10:29.728
I think that's the part that worries me, worries Se- Senator Fausto, and, uh, not the gained power or the more assertive power itself.
50
00:10:31.108 --> 00:10:43.908
So, um, Bia, y- you know, your paper talks about the leadership councils that are formed by, um, members of Congress to set the agenda in the lower house, in the Câmara de Deputados, or the Chamber of the Deputies or House of Representatives.
51
00:10:44.358 --> 00:10:54.408
And now they meet over lunch at a restaurant or at some lawmaker's living room. So what is a legislative, a legislature look like when its most important coordinating body has no address?
52
00:10:54.488 --> 00:11:05.748
It's in this informality, the way it's set up. That is a great question. Um, and this is one of the, the things that, uh, when I found out, um, I, I, it, I was just shocked.
53
00:11:06.328 --> 00:11:22.948
So the, the leaders council on paper is a formal body. Uh, it has leaders of every party and bloc. Um, and uh, the job that the, the institution has is to help the president of the chamber to decide on the floor agenda.
54
00:11:23.748 --> 00:11:34.988
Uh, the way that... So the, the thing is, the way that it appears in the formal internal rules, it's, it is still between formal, uh, formality and informality.
55
00:11:35.228 --> 00:11:48.218
So I think because of that, uh, presidents have basically ran the, the council as they wished. Um, in the f- the first years after the approval of these internal rules, um,
56
00:11:49.928 --> 00:12:03.088
the, the, the, the council did work as, uh, a consulted body that met regularly, but ever since, um, the, the president of the chamber just decides exactly how it's going to, to, to, to run the show.
57
00:12:03.708 --> 00:12:16.428
Uh, and so in recent years, uh, specifically during the, the administration of Arthur Lira, uh, who was the... So I'm saying president, but it's, it's, it's the, uh, equivalent of the House Speaker in the US.
58
00:12:17.338 --> 00:12:37.668
Uh, Artur Lira was the equivalent of House Speaker, and, um, we started talking, researchers were- started talking to civil society groups and journalists, and we learned that these meetings were happening in s- dinners, in restaurants, or members' living rooms, or sometimes even the House Speaker's, uh, own house, [laughs]
59
00:12:38.298 --> 00:12:40.598
uh, not inside the chamber per se.
60
00:12:41.438 --> 00:12:55.177
So what you have is a body that is supposed to be the main forum where Congress negotiates its own agenda, or at the very least, the, the Chamber of Deputies, um, and it's not even happening inside the institution.
61
00:12:55.938 --> 00:13:06.368
Uh, when the new House Speaker, um, um, Gomerta took over, uh, the f- one of the first things that he did was he made this, the meetings public.
62
00:13:07.158 --> 00:13:20.558
What we're asking in the paper is not only that the meetings are public, uh, we're asking for, uh, public records, uh, documents that we can use to actually know what's happening in these meetings, right? Uh, because if,
63
00:13:21.738 --> 00:13:32.398
if I want to know, uh, why the floor calendar looks the way that it does, I don't even have a way to locate what was discussed in each meeting.
64
00:13:32.698 --> 00:13:47.358
Um, I have to basically find a way to be there, or I don't, I don't know if they're transmitting that. I'm assuming no. Um, so when you have the, the Leaders' Council working in the shadows like that, it, it's...
65
00:13:47.588 --> 00:14:02.318
What it's going to produce, it's the kind of Congress that works somewhat in the shadow, right? And a Congress that is more assertive, but, uh, in which the real bargaining is happening
66
00:14:03.498 --> 00:14:15.338
outside the, the, the li- the lines, right? Outside the formal lines. Um, so our recommendation is, uh, is really, uh, I think it's almost embarrassingly basic, right?
67
00:14:15.598 --> 00:14:26.598
Uh, the meetings should happen inside the institution. Um, the, the body should vote. There should be a, a, a majority decision on the agenda. The agenda should be public.
68
00:14:27.018 --> 00:14:30.958
Uh, the same way, by the way, that the, the, uh, the committee's agendas are public.
69
00:14:31.078 --> 00:14:40.098
If I want to know what is being discussed in each committee, um, regular, the standing committees or the special committees, I can, I have that information on their website.
70
00:14:40.158 --> 00:14:57.528
The same thing should be true about the Leaders' Council. And, uh, you mentioned the pandemic. Uh, now let's talk a little bit because the pandemic introduced remote sittings and remote votes, and, uh, this
71
00:14:58.498 --> 00:15:10.098
have been used with gusto ever since. Uh, they are, they're still a feature of the House at this moment, uh, even though we're no longer under COVID restrictions.
72
00:15:10.978 --> 00:15:16.938
How does that fundamentally alter the legislative process?
73
00:15:18.738 --> 00:15:31.438
So the pandemic, the tool that, uh, we developed for Congress to work during the pandemic, which by the way, Brazil was a pi- one of the pioneer legislatures in the world. This was a good thing back in the pandemic.
74
00:15:32.178 --> 00:15:36.338
That was supposed to be temporary, but it never really went away.
75
00:15:36.738 --> 00:15:53.178
Um, Brazil was one of the first to build a remote deliberation system so that Congress could still make decisions and importantly, decisions about the pandemic, uh, when no legislator could be inside the building because of health measures.
76
00:15:54.898 --> 00:16:06.718
Um, now what's happening is that the Chamber and the Senate, they run hybrid sessions every Monday and Friday with the little changes in between how it happens in, uh, the Chamber and the Senate.
77
00:16:07.638 --> 00:16:17.578
Uh, which by the way, are the two days that legislators are usually not in Brasilia. They are in their legislative districts, um, doing work. I'm not saying that they're not working.
78
00:16:17.638 --> 00:16:28.838
They are working, but doing different legislative work. Um, so I think that the problem, first of all, I think there are two problems here.
79
00:16:28.938 --> 00:16:44.658
The first one is that you're basically killing politics by allowing hybrid sessions to still happen. It's one thing to have that system operating when, um, when you have a health emergency, a pandemic, right?
80
00:16:45.278 --> 00:16:52.058
It's another thing when you really don't have a reason to, to, to have that system in place.
81
00:16:52.138 --> 00:17:00.358
If, uh, legislators are not in Brasilia in these two days, then all the voting should happen in the other days as it, as it always did.
82
00:17:00.718 --> 00:17:13.558
Um, when you take legislators out of the floor and allow them to vote remotely, uh, you, first of all, you don't know who is voting necessarily, and if the person knows what they're voting on.
83
00:17:14.118 --> 00:17:28.908
Uh, all of the bargaining that should happen on the floor doesn't, it doesn't exist, so that's why I, what I mean by killing politics, you're taking politics out of the process. Uh, and then, uh, the fourth thing is that
84
00:17:30.438 --> 00:17:43.478
this, this tool has been used tactically. So there are, there is the case, for instance, that we describe in the paper where the Speaker, um, delayed reinstating in-person committees specifically.
85
00:17:43.578 --> 00:17:56.198
So a constitutional amendment, um, on parliamentary immunity could clear its first procedural hurdle on the fi- virtual floor, skipping the committee that's actually supposed to vet it.
86
00:17:57.158 --> 00:18:20.038
Uh, you also have cases of, um, the Speaker manipulating the number of legislators who need to be present on the floor, uh, in terms of allowing the ones who are outside, uh, traveling in Europe, for instance, to, to have their votes count so that the measure or the bill that he supports is approved or not approved.
87
00:18:20.634 --> 00:18:33.034
Um, that is the problem, right? We're not following the rules here, and we're using a tool that was supposed to last for a specific period of time to operate in daily- daily routine. Uh, that's not okay.
88
00:18:33.734 --> 00:18:41.174
So we propose, uh, s- several restrictions. Basically, uh, if I had to summarize it, it's basically
89
00:18:42.254 --> 00:18:56.934
this, uh, uh, this system that was developed for the pandemic, uh, the remote system, should only be used in extraordinary conditions such as a pandemic, a climate crisis, something that is extraordinary.
90
00:18:57.014 --> 00:19:13.834
That's why it was created. It was never created to be a part of the- the, the routine of Congress. Gustavo, do you wanna take the next question? Sure. Uh, let's talk about, a little bit about the fact that, um,
91
00:19:15.294 --> 00:19:33.294
you, you also mentioned provisional decrees. And, uh, so these, uh, long story short, uh, they have to be approved by Congress until up to 180 days, otherwise they expire. Mm. And, uh, what we ha- have been seeing
92
00:19:34.354 --> 00:19:47.154
is many of them ex- simply expiring, not being turned down by lawmakers, but just, uh, uh, losing their validity, uh, by inertia.
93
00:19:47.714 --> 00:20:05.694
Uh, in 2020, you mentioned that 56 of them, uh, fell to that fate. Is that a problem? Is that just Congress exercising its discretion? Because, I mean, not ruling on the provisional decree is also
94
00:20:06.694 --> 00:20:09.474
a way of, of deciding. H- how do you see this?
95
00:20:11.154 --> 00:20:25.574
Uh, I don't think it's just discretion, uh, because I think discretion would imply that someone inside Congress made a decision, and I think the problem here is that nobody's making any decision, right?
96
00:20:25.754 --> 00:20:38.094
No decision is being made. Um, so a provisional decree, just to clarify, it takes effect immediately once it's issued by the executive, which means rules change, money moves.
97
00:20:38.134 --> 00:20:46.543
[laughs] Uh, once the president signs it, then it's valid. Uh, then it has 120 days to get an actual vote inside Congress.
98
00:20:46.594 --> 00:21:00.754
It has an entire process of, uh, of a committee that is supposed to be composed of legislators from the Senate and from the Chamber. Um, that was also the subject of a lot of debate, uh, for many years, but, um,
99
00:21:01.754 --> 00:21:12.034
that is how the process is supposed to work. Congress has 120 days to collectively decide, and collectively, I mean both the Chamber and the Senate. Uh, when nothing happens,
100
00:21:13.674 --> 00:21:19.374
it expires, and then all of that that happened, the rules, the, the money, it, it just, it's not valid anymore.
101
00:21:19.414 --> 00:21:33.654
So, um, I think in tw- 20, uh, 2001, when I described that first change that we had, um, in terms of Congress being more assertive, what I hear from lawmakers is that that...
102
00:21:33.694 --> 00:21:47.454
Lawmakers were there by the time, uh, at the time, by the way. Um, they enacted that reform because they were very, very, very tired of just the president reissuing, uh, o- um, uh, sorry.
103
00:21:47.534 --> 00:21:52.834
I'm, I'm thinking about executive decrees. Provisional decrees over and over again. They, they got very tired.
104
00:21:52.854 --> 00:22:05.934
They, they felt they were being abused, uh, in, in, in a way, and so they wanted to put a cap on exactly what the president could do, and I think that's the legitimate, um, that's a leg- a legitimate interest, right?
105
00:22:06.074 --> 00:22:10.034
Um, Congress wanted to be part of the policymaking process.
106
00:22:10.254 --> 00:22:23.974
But now we're going to the other extreme in which the president tries to exert its, uh, prerogative of issuing a provisional decree, and then Congress just does nothing. It, it doesn't, uh, it doesn't work.
107
00:22:24.054 --> 00:22:38.374
It doesn't take action. Uh, and I think that matters because I think... and that's where it gets the part that people should be worried, um, that rules have changed and money has gone through the door. So, um,
108
00:22:39.614 --> 00:22:51.304
you can spend, like, you have some of these decrees that you have, uh, dealing with budget credits, right? Uh, so what happens when Congress just sits on a decree and, and makes no decision?
109
00:22:51.894 --> 00:22:54.354
Uh, that, that's not discretion.
110
00:22:54.414 --> 00:23:06.294
I think that's, to me, that's a hole in the system, and I think it's gotten worse a lot because of this fight between the House and the Senate in terms of who should preside the joint committee to analyze them.
111
00:23:06.854 --> 00:23:12.014
But now I think it's just also a function of Congress just not wanting to do its job.
112
00:23:13.094 --> 00:23:29.334
So there's another issue, which is the power of the Brazilian speaker of the house, which, which is called Presidente in, in Brazil, but it's equivalent, where they can pull a bill out of a committee, or they can attach one proposal to another, or they can call a surprise session without almost no notice.
113
00:23:29.954 --> 00:23:36.854
So if, if you were listening to this in the United States, you would hear echoes of, uh, the Speakers of the House and their power.
114
00:23:36.914 --> 00:23:50.554
Our British listeners might think of the government's control over the Commons timetable. But how much power does the Brazilian speaker actually have compared to these counterparts, and, and where does it come from? Uh,
115
00:23:51.514 --> 00:23:56.734
that is a very good question. Um, I think it has... I, I don't, I don't know
116
00:23:57.634 --> 00:24:12.254
the case of these legislatures well enough to say that it has more or less power, but I do know the case of Brazil's legislature very well, and I think, uh, it has a lot of unchecked power. That's what I think.
117
00:24:12.954 --> 00:24:21.614
Um, there is a lot happening with the decisions of the speaker that needed to be checked, and that, that process is not happening. Um-
118
00:24:22.626 --> 00:24:32.306
So there is, uh, we describe something in the policy paper, uh, I'm gonna try to translate. I think it's, I would translate it as a committee pull power, uh, if that makes sense.
119
00:24:33.136 --> 00:24:47.946
That was a resolution that was passed in 1994. Um, and it lets the speaker yank a bill out of committee, uh, any committee, once a deadline's missed, and send it wherever he wants.
120
00:24:48.346 --> 00:24:57.966
In- which includes straight to the floor for a vote. Um, I think on its own that's probably not crazy, right?
121
00:24:58.046 --> 00:25:06.646
Because there is, there could be a case where the legislature reaches a gridlock, uh, and then somebody needs to have the power to break the gridlock.
122
00:25:07.646 --> 00:25:21.426
Uh, but the problem is that, again, with [laughs] again, like with the, the remote system, that that power has built itself into the daily practice of Congress. So now it's routine.
123
00:25:21.546 --> 00:25:33.026
Um, and I think it's, it ends up hollowing out the policy work that used to happen in committees, right? And that power itself created in Brazil a figure that I think it's very curious.
124
00:25:33.226 --> 00:25:51.366
Uh, [laughs] in Brazil, we have rapporteurs inside committees who is the legislator who is supposed to read the bill, study the bill, uh, hold public hearings, listening to their peers inside the committee, and produce a report, uh, suggesting that the committee either accepts or rejects the bill.
125
00:25:52.806 --> 00:26:05.606
Uh, once the speaker yanks the bill out of comm- a committee like that with that, uh, that pull, pull power, what you have on the floor is the figure of the floor rapporteur [laughs]
126
00:26:05.646 --> 00:26:14.926
reporting on behalf of a committee on the floor. Which is something that when I realized that in Congress, I was just like, "Okay, this makes no sense." Like, "This should be happening inside the committees."
127
00:26:15.866 --> 00:26:20.166
Um, so you can see how that distorts the legislative process, right?
128
00:26:20.826 --> 00:26:31.966
Um, the other thing is, um, Brazil, uh, the, the House specifically right now, uh, and I'm sorry that I'm using House and Chamber interchangeably, um, but it's the same institution.
129
00:26:32.666 --> 00:26:49.086
Um, it operates mainly through extraordinary sessions, which are sessions that, um, give more leeway for the speaker and the steering committee to just, um, jump processes, so to say.
130
00:26:49.726 --> 00:27:01.926
Uh, the, the routine, the former routine, would be to have most sessions as ordinary, right? Ordinary sessions, which is like when the- ordinary business, right? Ordinary routine.
131
00:27:02.686 --> 00:27:12.826
Uh, what we show in the paper is that by the mid-2010s, you had roughly four times as many extraordinary sessions as ordinary ones in one given year.
132
00:27:13.926 --> 00:27:28.446
And then ordinary sessions have basically disappeared from the official record since 2020. That lets the speaker pick the agenda, pick the timing, uh, engineer the quorum. Uh, it's, it's a one person show, right?
133
00:27:29.326 --> 00:27:34.026
The other thing- Uh, Beatriz, if I may, uh, interrupt you, and I'm sorry for that. But, uh,
134
00:27:35.246 --> 00:27:46.546
we, we, uh, you mentioned a few times that, uh, the legislative process in the House has become, uh, entirely attached to the speaker.
135
00:27:47.106 --> 00:27:54.926
And we have seen e- over the past few years, uh, very two different, uh, two very different types of speaker.
136
00:27:55.526 --> 00:28:16.695
A, an extremely strong one, like Eduardo Cunha or Arthur Lira, uh, people who not only, uh, know the, the bylaws of the House inside and out so they can exploit it the way they want, but also who command the floor and, uh, are able to whip votes.
137
00:28:17.106 --> 00:28:35.106
And then you have, uh, speakers like Hugo Motta, the current one, a very young legislator, and who is considered by most, uh, akin, uh, House observers, a, a weak speaker of the House. He, uh, his deals do not stand.
138
00:28:35.586 --> 00:28:50.746
Uh, he responds to who yells the loudest at him. Uh, what is worse? Hmm. Uh, someone with an iron grip, uh, on the legislator, or someone who just, uh,
139
00:28:51.826 --> 00:29:08.146
lets the, the mad people run the, the mental institution? So I would say that it doesn't really matter who is better or who's worse. The, the issue to me is we shouldn't have the House, uh,
140
00:29:09.776 --> 00:29:16.246
the legislative process inside the House happening in terms of the personality of the speaker.
141
00:29:16.946 --> 00:29:28.366
The rules should be enforced in a way that it doesn't matter if Arthur Lira is the one who likes to, um, the [laughs] we use the, the word in Portuguese, uh, atropelo, right?
142
00:29:28.446 --> 00:29:39.486
That, that just disregards all rules and just- Just bulldozing everything... bulldozing, thank you. Bulldozing everything. Or if the speaker is, uh, somebody who's young and nice and likes to chat.
143
00:29:39.566 --> 00:29:52.286
So I heard, like, I was at the speaker election in Brasilia, the last one. I heard this from legislators from the left to the right. Like, "We are tired of bulldozing. We, we, we, we really want things to happen
144
00:29:53.246 --> 00:29:56.226
in the way that they should." [laughs] Like, there are rules for that.
145
00:29:57.286 --> 00:30:08.226
It's because the rules are either, uh, have been hollowed out to a point that now we need new ones or changes in the existing ones, or that they're just not being respected at all.
146
00:30:08.466 --> 00:30:18.746
Like, that, that, that is why you're asking me that question, Gustavo, because the rules don't matter and what matters is the personality, because the rules are not being respected.
147
00:30:18.826 --> 00:30:32.666
So you see the, the, the problem comes exactly in that, I think James, you wanna go? Uh, sure. We can talk about betting, if that's another thing. There's- Mm... the gambling bill is a small story that tells a big one.
148
00:30:32.706 --> 00:30:43.726
A working group met three months ago, held one public hearing, left almost no records, wrote an entirely new bill, and sent it to the floor without a single standing committee touching it.
149
00:30:43.766 --> 00:30:56.986
And how common is this, that route, uh, right now? Unfortunately, more common than people realize, and I think it's becoming sort of a default route for anything that is considered politically awkward.
150
00:30:57.406 --> 00:31:03.666
Um, I think that the pattern that you're describing with the gambling bill is almost like a template, uh, from...
151
00:31:03.706 --> 00:31:09.546
And I- I've done work for the Brazilian report about this topic, so Gustavo knows [laughs] very well, uh, where I'm coming from.
152
00:31:09.786 --> 00:31:24.126
Um, so you have a working group that gets set up outside the formal, the normal committee system, committee system, meets for a few months, uh, holds, I don't know, a number of public hearings or no public hearings, uh, doesn't live leave
153
00:31:25.306 --> 00:31:35.946
any paper trail, or not much of a paper trail, writes its own bill from scratch, and that, that goes on the floor. Um, that's, uh, yeah, that, it's, it's completely absurd to me.
154
00:31:36.626 --> 00:31:51.346
Um, and it's not, like, something that happened once or twice, right? Um, the, between the early 2000s and today, the number of these working groups, uh, the speaker's office, uh, has created went from 3 to, like, 22.
155
00:31:51.466 --> 00:31:54.186
Uh, it's not really incremental.
156
00:31:54.366 --> 00:32:07.146
It, it's, what I see here is that Congress is really building a parallel track for, for bills, and, and it may be the case that the committee system is, uh, not able to, to deal with the amount of bills that we have in Brazil.
157
00:32:07.216 --> 00:32:11.866
And I know it's, th- they are a lot, believe me. I, [laughs] I work in legislative data. They are a lot.
158
00:32:12.166 --> 00:32:24.186
But if that's the case, then we think to, we need to sit down and rethink how committees work, not create an unform, informal parallel track to analyze bills. Um, and why does that matter, right?
159
00:32:24.366 --> 00:32:36.885
Uh, standing committees have obligations. They are required to hold public hearings. They importantly, and most importantly, they have to reflect the party balance of the whole chamber, the whole House.
160
00:32:37.986 --> 00:32:46.966
Um, that is a very key difference between the committees and the, the working groups. Working groups, th- they basically, they can operate as, as they want.
161
00:32:47.286 --> 00:32:55.026
Uh, you can have as many, uh, members from the opposition or the, the government that the speaker wants.
162
00:32:55.146 --> 00:33:08.166
Uh, the speaker decides who is on the c- the working group, how long the working group's gonna run, uh, whether it has to leave a paper trail or, or not, or even the, the members of the working group can convince the speaker, and then that's it.
163
00:33:08.266 --> 00:33:18.486
Uh, there's no accountability. Uh, so when you have a bill going through a working group instead of a committee, it's not just about skipping a formality.
164
00:33:18.606 --> 00:33:29.546
I think you're skipping the actual mechanism that's supposed to give the public, citizens, uh, a say before something comes, becomes law.
165
00:33:33.426 --> 00:33:50.446
Now, Bia, you and Sergio Fausto from the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Foundation have proposals that are less a call for reform and more tweaks to the legislative process.
166
00:33:50.586 --> 00:34:05.426
Uh, there is no constitutional overhaul. It's more touching on the rule book of the, of the House. Uh, but then again, you're asking a group of politicians to voluntarily give up discretion they enjoy.
167
00:34:06.546 --> 00:34:14.166
Why would they do that? Because right now they control the legislative process. They are, uh,
168
00:34:15.846 --> 00:34:27.136
increasingly more powerful over the budget, and, uh, that has reduced the cost of being in the opposition to any given government. Uh, I mean, how can you put the genie back in the bottle?
169
00:34:27.766 --> 00:34:33.166
Uh, and is there any precedent in Brazilian politics for Congress restraining itself?
170
00:34:34.866 --> 00:34:47.346
I think that's a fair question, and that's usually the last question [laughs] I get from every journalist I've talked to about this paper is, e- exactly why would they even bother to do that, th- that we have clear signals that they're not interested.
171
00:34:48.026 --> 00:35:01.326
Um, I think first, uh, is what you said. We're not asking for changes that would, um, s- just completely create an entire new Congress. That's not what we're saying.
172
00:35:01.406 --> 00:35:11.016
Everything that we're proposing can be enacted through a resolution bill that only needs to be approved inside the chambers if the H- House are dissenting,
173
00:35:12.896 --> 00:35:20.826
um, that are basically improvements in terms of how the rules are, either because they're not being respected or because a parallel track has been created anyway.
174
00:35:20.886 --> 00:35:30.325
Regardless of the why, we're just, uh, creating their, uh, a- adding layers, uh, to the, to the rule book, uh, through these...
175
00:35:30.506 --> 00:35:42.166
And, and the way to do this is through the resolutions, which again, i- it's, it's an internal affairs o- of Congress. It, it doesn't require anything but the, the, the support of themselves, right?
176
00:35:42.746 --> 00:35:51.686
Uh, and in that way, our expe- e- our expectation with the policy paper is that we would hope that
177
00:35:53.406 --> 00:36:02.206
a lot of legislators get interested in the paper, and we are discussing on, like, in terms of how we can make that happen. Um,
178
00:36:04.286 --> 00:36:20.806
so that each one would get an idea and propose as a, a resolution bill so that it's not one big effort. It's, like, small efforts happening in different timelines, um, so that it's more palatable for Congress.
179
00:36:21.866 --> 00:36:31.866
The other thing is, as I said, uh, I've, I've talked to legislators, and I know that they are all dissatisfied with the status quo, um, from the left to the right.
180
00:36:31.906 --> 00:36:43.562
Um- I spent a lot of time talking to them during the election for speaker and spe- specifically inside the House, and they are all dissatisfied because it makes their life harder, right?
181
00:36:43.742 --> 00:36:56.502
It- it's very hard if you're a legislator and if, if you care about your job, and y- you get the, the agenda for the floor session like two hours before you're supposed to be there and vote. Like, how...
182
00:36:57.162 --> 00:37:09.282
You can't do your job well. So I think there is a consensus inside, um, that things are not, uh, working as they should, even if that consensus has, um,
183
00:37:10.402 --> 00:37:24.502
weakened a little because of the profile, the personality of Ugumata, who is not bulldozing everything, uh, all the time. I think that there is still that will inside Congress. Um, and there is precedent, right?
184
00:37:24.842 --> 00:37:28.662
Uh, and it's not even ancient history, uh, Brazilian politics.
185
00:37:28.802 --> 00:37:43.342
Uh, in 2005, Congress changed its own rules in, in terms of how committee and leadership seats get allocated, uh, to top members from switching parties midterm just to gain the sit- the seat count.
186
00:37:44.342 --> 00:37:46.562
That was an instance of self-regulation.
187
00:37:47.282 --> 00:38:01.672
Uh, and it was done because the instability has- had gotten so bad that even the people that were benefiting from the old system wanted a fix, and I think we are in a similar moment right now, um, except a little broader, right?
188
00:38:01.802 --> 00:38:15.322
It's not gonna be a narrow fix, as I said, and that's why we hope that it's several people working in, in different, uh, resolution bills at, uh, in different times. Um, but it- and, and it's a fix. Um,
189
00:38:16.642 --> 00:38:32.242
and I think that the alternative of, of not doing anything has a cost. Uh, we have a Congress that if it keeps operating through improvisation, undocumented deals, bulldozing decisions [laughs], uh- Mm...
190
00:38:32.262 --> 00:38:46.522
that does, it... Yes, it does look, it makes Congress looks bad, but, um, it makes Congress itself harder to negotiate with, harder to trust by citizens, by, right, by parties. Um,
191
00:38:47.602 --> 00:38:55.502
and I think that is probably going to feed into the erosion of confidence in the whole political system.
192
00:38:56.182 --> 00:39:06.202
So I think at the, at some point, I would hope that self-interest and institutional health, um, sh- they should point in the same direction.
193
00:39:07.142 --> 00:39:22.002
So Bia, if you're right, the next president, whether it's, um, in, in October, whoever wins in October, whether it's Lula or Fla- Flávio or another person, Congress is gonna be stronger and less predictable and harder to negotiate with than in any other democratic era.
194
00:39:22.682 --> 00:39:39.262
So how can one govern, uh, under such circumstances? Uh, I think a lot of it will depend on how the composition of the Senate look, what, what it looks like. Um, we don't know how conservative it will become.
195
00:39:39.622 --> 00:39:44.362
Uh, I keep hearing that it should be more conservative than it actually is, and then the government
196
00:39:45.302 --> 00:39:59.922
in the hypothetical, um, second administration of Lula, second in this round, um, that the government would lose, um, any leeway that it had in terms of the Senate. Uh- Did he have leeway?
197
00:40:00.142 --> 00:40:12.322
[laughs] I mean, a little bit, right? I mean, we should, we could move to a situation in which there is no r- not even, like, room to talk, which I think it would be much worse, right? Um, just because of
198
00:40:13.562 --> 00:40:25.402
the shift to, like the extreme shift to the right. Uh, I keep hearing things that would, that say that this will happen and this won't happen, so I'm, I'm, I'm not gonna take a position on that. Uh, I don't think...
199
00:40:25.722 --> 00:40:37.672
A- after the 2018 election, I decided I, I don't make predictions anymore as a political [laughs] scientist. So I wait for results of the election and then reanalyze. Um, so I think, uh,
200
00:40:38.642 --> 00:40:46.961
regardless of who wins, we have a more assertive, assertive Congress, um, for sure. We saw that with Bolsonaro.
201
00:40:47.082 --> 00:41:01.662
Um, even when he decided that he was interested in governing, and that was halfway through his, uh, administration, he f- he had difficulties with Congress, uh, more than once. Um, so I think, uh,
202
00:41:03.642 --> 00:41:08.882
to govern in that environment, there are two layers there, I think.
203
00:41:09.402 --> 00:41:26.222
One is, and, and Gustavo and I have talked about this, that I think the Lula's present administration made many mistakes throughout the, the last four years in terms of how to negotiate, how to, the timing of negotiation, how many fronts of negotiation were there in Congress.
204
00:41:26.802 --> 00:41:40.442
So I think perhaps finding a more, um, skillful strategy, uh, would be s- something that any government should pursue. Um, but it, the fix also has to be institutional.
205
00:41:40.762 --> 00:41:57.542
Um, so if the rules themselves are unpredictable and largely informal, uh, any president is gonna be negotiating with a moving target, right? [laughs] So I think that the proposals we have in this paper, um,
206
00:41:58.822 --> 00:42:14.382
are actually the precondition for any president, uh, being able to make a deal that sticks. Um, and I think presidents perhaps should also, um, join this, uh, this effort, right?
207
00:42:14.522 --> 00:42:30.302
To, to ask Congress to self-regulate so then, um, maybe we can have a little more peace in executive legislative re- relations [laughs] in the near future. Bia, thank you very much.
208
00:42:30.392 --> 00:42:43.022
This, uh, was great, uh, and, um, we hope that, uh, your suggestions will be carried out by lawmakers even though, uh, I'm not usually known for my optimism.
209
00:42:43.962 --> 00:43:04.802
[laughs] But, [laughs] uh, but, uh, I would like also to take this opportunity and put you on the spot and say that James and I will have a live broadcast on election day, and you would be more than welcome especially to comment on the outlook of the next Congress that will, uh, take office in February 2027.
210
00:43:05.402 --> 00:43:17.882
And then, uh, we should also have you, uh, at that moment to talk about how the next government will be able to negotiate or not with the next Congress.
211
00:43:18.722 --> 00:43:29.162
Bia Haie, uh, researcher at the University of Lisbon, thank you very much for joining us. Thank you. Thank you, Bia. And I'm, I'm in for the commentary on the election. Great. [laughs] Wonderful.
212
00:43:29.382 --> 00:43:39.922
We'll be looking forward to seeing you there. Thank you both. James, thank you again. Uh, uh, see you next week. Até. Até. Obrigada, gente.
213
00:43:41.062 --> 00:43:47.602
Thank you s- th- thanks for listening, everyone, and next week Explaining Brazil will be back. Have a good one, folks.
1
00:00:00.100 --> 00:00:17.580
[upbeat music] Hello, and welcome to Explaining Brazil, the podcast by The Brazilian Report in partnership with the Brazil Office Alliance. My name is Gustavo Ribeiro.
2
00:00:17.680 --> 00:00:33.880
I'm the editor-in-chief of The Brazilian Report. Brazil's 2026 electoral campaign is officially underway. Since August the 16th, candidates have been allowed to explicitly ask for votes and hand out campaign material.
3
00:00:34.180 --> 00:00:46.780
And on August 28th, the free airtime blocks kick in. Those unmistakable party ads w- will flood radio and TV every day until October the 1st, three days before the first round.
4
00:00:47.240 --> 00:00:56.900
Almost all the attention goes to the presidential race. Congressional races get whatever is left over, which isn't much, and there are reasons for that.
5
00:00:57.380 --> 00:01:11.160
Presidential campaigns are a clash of big personalities with nationwide reach, and we get a steady drip of horse race polling, and there will be televised debates. Congressional races have none of those, those things.
6
00:01:11.660 --> 00:01:17.260
The format is complicated, there are thousands of candidates, and the polling is close to useless.
7
00:01:17.680 --> 00:01:30.240
Not because pollsters are bad or ill-intentioned, but because voters simply don't pay enough attention to down-ballot races. And I have an anecdote that makes the point, but it needs a setup first.
8
00:01:30.960 --> 00:01:42.640
In Brazil, we vote on electronic voting machines, and every candidate is assigned a number you punch into a keypad. Presidential and gubernatorial candidates get two digits.
9
00:01:43.140 --> 00:01:55.690
So for instance, Lula is number 13, Flávio Bolsonaro is number 22. Candidates for the lower house get four digits each, and the first two are their party's number.
10
00:01:56.280 --> 00:02:10.340
So Workers' Party candidates all start with 13, Liberal Party candidates with 22. So within that, the candidate a party believes can pull the most votes get the numbers that are the easiest to remember.
11
00:02:10.560 --> 00:02:16.880
So in the case of the Workers' Party, for instance, that's 1313, 1300.
12
00:02:17.520 --> 00:02:32.380
Uh, the center left PDT, for instance, carries the number 12, and it hands out, it hands out 1234, 1200, 1212 to its best candidates. Now the anecdote.
13
00:02:33.090 --> 00:02:43.160
The last time I went to vote in 2022, the person that was ahead of me froze once they were inside the booth, and they had forgotten the candidate's number.
14
00:02:43.820 --> 00:02:50.040
And here's the thing, you're allowed to walk in with a piece of paper listing every number you plan to punch in.
15
00:02:50.560 --> 00:03:02.260
So that person hadn't even bothered to do that and essentially lost their vote, because once you go into the booth, you can't, you cannot consult anything outside of it.
16
00:03:02.720 --> 00:03:08.820
So that's how casually Brazilians treat the races for Congress, and they shouldn't.
17
00:03:08.840 --> 00:03:26.980
Because the presidential race, of course, it matters enormously, but power in Brazil is increasingly won and lost in Congress just as much, and that's where the budget is increasingly being controlled and where any president agenda lives or dies.
18
00:03:27.540 --> 00:03:42.120
So to discuss where the Brazilian Congress stands today, uh, we have invited Beatriz Rey. She is a political scientist and a researcher at the University of Lisbon. Beatriz is an old friend of this show.
19
00:03:42.260 --> 00:03:54.760
She wrote a column for The Brazilian Report for years, and she recently coordinated a policy paper with Sérgio Fausto for the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Foundation on how to improve the way Congress operates.
20
00:03:55.500 --> 00:04:09.030
Bea, hello, and, uh, welcome back to the show. Thanks for joining us. Thank you for the invitation. It's good to be back. And of course, as always, I am joined by my regular podcasting partner, Dr.
21
00:04:09.320 --> 00:04:22.360
James Green, a historian at Brown University and chairman of the board of directors at the Brazil Office Alliance. James, thanks for being here with us as well. It's great to be here, Gustavo. Hel- hello, Bea. Prazer.
22
00:04:22.920 --> 00:04:39.420
Prazer. So Bea, uh, Brazilian Congress has never been this powerful, uh, especially in this post-dictatorship era. In the early years of that re-democratization, most laws came from the executive branch.
23
00:04:39.900 --> 00:04:53.380
But now Congress is asserting itself more, and it now controls also a massive chunk of the federal budget, what we call, uh, the emendas parlamentares, or the budgetary grants.
24
00:04:54.080 --> 00:05:08.780
And they have more power over the purse than arguably any other Western legislature. So how did that happen? Because Congress asserting itself is not bad per se, but what is happening in Brazil?
25
00:05:08.920 --> 00:05:21.800
What are the good things about it, and what are the bad things about it? So the short version is, uh, this process did not happen overnight, and it did not happen through one big reform.
26
00:05:21.880 --> 00:05:35.620
It's the accumulation of about two decades of smaller shifts, plus, I think, a couple of turning points. For most of the post-dictator period, the president really did run the show in Brazil.
27
00:05:35.860 --> 00:05:53.780
So, uh, if we look at earlier works, uh, uh, done in political science between 1988 and the early 2000s, about 85% of the laws that got approved originated in the presidency, and the odds of Congress actually, uh, killing a presidential bill were under 3%.
28
00:05:54.580 --> 00:06:06.760
I think the f- to me, and that's what, uh, we, we write in the, the policy papers, that the first, uh, turning point was in 2001, when Congress reformed how provisional decrees work.
29
00:06:07.468 --> 00:06:16.448
Provisional decrees are like, uh, executive orders in the US. Um, they work a little bit different, but I think that's the, the most appropriate comparison I can think about right now.
30
00:06:17.188 --> 00:06:27.408
Uh, so what Congress did, did is they capped their validity, required a joint committee to review them, uh, ended the practice of the president just reissuing the same decree over and over again.
31
00:06:28.448 --> 00:06:36.368
Uh, that reform forced a negoti- forced negotiation in a way that, uh, hadn't existed before.
32
00:06:36.858 --> 00:06:53.588
And then in 2009, uh, researchers in political science, they document that was the first year, uh, that deputies and senators passed more bill of their own, uh, sponsorship than the president. Um, from there, I think...
33
00:06:54.608 --> 00:07:05.048
I think it's cumulative. Congress starts building up, um, technical capacity. Uh, legislative consultancies, uh, hire more qualified people.
34
00:07:05.848 --> 00:07:14.108
Committees, uh, at that point at least, uh, start working as, uh, policy shops, uh, approving, uh, legislation.
35
00:07:14.908 --> 00:07:31.708
And then, uh, we have been discussing this a lot in Brazil recently, in 2015 and '19, two rounds of budget reforms, uh, made a chunk of the federal budget, uh, constitutionally guaranteed to individual and party amendments.
36
00:07:31.848 --> 00:07:44.988
Uh, that was the money that the president used to, uh, be able to, uh, to negotiate and, uh, reward allies and punish non-allies. Uh, that money now is just owned.
37
00:07:45.248 --> 00:07:56.868
That's the budgetary, uh, amendments or grants that you were referring to. Uh, we don't know the extent to which that shifted leverage. I, I am involved in a research project myself trying to figure that out.
38
00:07:57.108 --> 00:08:10.148
Uh, part of the literature says that it has, part of the literature says that it hasn't, so we're trying to understand that. Uh, I think COVID, the COVID pandemic, made all of this process, uh, more visible
39
00:08:11.088 --> 00:08:20.448
when, uh, in 2020, Congress wrote most all of the pandemic-related re- legislation, uh, 96% of the bills on the topic.
40
00:08:21.188 --> 00:08:30.148
Uh, it also, a lot of the, I don't have the numbers right now, but a lot of, most of the approved, uh, legislation was, uh, sponsored by legislators.
41
00:08:30.808 --> 00:08:44.387
And then when the government, that was the Bolsonaro administration, when it proposed a 200, uh, reais emergency payment to citizens, the, it was the Chamber of Deputies who said, "No. Uh, we want 500 reais."
42
00:08:45.088 --> 00:08:58.348
Um, and then that, that amount turned out to be 600 reais. So there you really saw Congress acting, uh, proactively in the policy-making process. Now, is it good or bad?
43
00:08:58.768 --> 00:09:12.288
Uh, on the contrary to what [laughs] the piece in The Economist says, uh, sort of putting that in my voice, uh, which I did not say, uh, I do not think that a more assertive Congress is an, is a problem.
44
00:09:12.428 --> 00:09:29.248
I don't think it is necessarily. Uh, I think Congress has the potential to act as a co-policymaker with the executive, um, if a certain, certain conditions are, are met, right? Uh, the president is one person.
45
00:09:29.468 --> 00:09:45.088
It reflects one political group. Congress, uh, has hundreds of people from every region and every ideology. Um, so I think it- And like 20 parties as well. [laughs] What? And 20 parties as well, so- Oh, yeah.
46
00:09:45.108 --> 00:09:55.328
[laughs] I mean, it's k- it's, it, we're, we're reducing the number after the institutional reforms. Uh, I think we're, we're, we're getting there. Um, but I think that's something that we have to keep in mind, right?
47
00:09:55.428 --> 00:10:09.368
So when Congress works well, I think that's a feature, not a bug. Uh, it should make policy more legitimate, more likely to stick. Um, the argument that we have in the policy paper is not that Congress got too strong.
48
00:10:09.658 --> 00:10:20.788
It's that a lot of this strength got built through the backdoor, uh, informal deals, procedural shortcuts, rather than through Congress's own formal groups.
49
00:10:20.948 --> 00:10:29.728
I think that's the part that worries me, worries Se- Senator Fausto, and, uh, not the gained power or the more assertive power itself.
50
00:10:31.108 --> 00:10:43.908
So, um, Bia, y- you know, your paper talks about the leadership councils that are formed by, um, members of Congress to set the agenda in the lower house, in the Câmara de Deputados, or the Chamber of the Deputies or House of Representatives.
51
00:10:44.358 --> 00:10:54.408
And now they meet over lunch at a restaurant or at some lawmaker's living room. So what is a legislative, a legislature look like when its most important coordinating body has no address?
52
00:10:54.488 --> 00:11:05.748
It's in this informality, the way it's set up. That is a great question. Um, and this is one of the, the things that, uh, when I found out, um, I, I, it, I was just shocked.
53
00:11:06.328 --> 00:11:22.948
So the, the leaders council on paper is a formal body. Uh, it has leaders of every party and bloc. Um, and uh, the job that the, the institution has is to help the president of the chamber to decide on the floor agenda.
54
00:11:23.748 --> 00:11:34.988
Uh, the way that... So the, the thing is, the way that it appears in the formal internal rules, it's, it is still between formal, uh, formality and informality.
55
00:11:35.228 --> 00:11:48.218
So I think because of that, uh, presidents have basically ran the, the council as they wished. Um, in the f- the first years after the approval of these internal rules, um,
56
00:11:49.928 --> 00:12:03.088
the, the, the, the council did work as, uh, a consulted body that met regularly, but ever since, um, the, the president of the chamber just decides exactly how it's going to, to, to, to run the show.
57
00:12:03.708 --> 00:12:16.428
Uh, and so in recent years, uh, specifically during the, the administration of Arthur Lira, uh, who was the... So I'm saying president, but it's, it's, it's the, uh, equivalent of the House Speaker in the US.
58
00:12:17.338 --> 00:12:37.668
Uh, Artur Lira was the equivalent of House Speaker, and, um, we started talking, researchers were- started talking to civil society groups and journalists, and we learned that these meetings were happening in s- dinners, in restaurants, or members' living rooms, or sometimes even the House Speaker's, uh, own house, [laughs]
59
00:12:38.298 --> 00:12:40.598
uh, not inside the chamber per se.
60
00:12:41.438 --> 00:12:55.177
So what you have is a body that is supposed to be the main forum where Congress negotiates its own agenda, or at the very least, the, the Chamber of Deputies, um, and it's not even happening inside the institution.
61
00:12:55.938 --> 00:13:06.368
Uh, when the new House Speaker, um, um, Gomerta took over, uh, the f- one of the first things that he did was he made this, the meetings public.
62
00:13:07.158 --> 00:13:20.558
What we're asking in the paper is not only that the meetings are public, uh, we're asking for, uh, public records, uh, documents that we can use to actually know what's happening in these meetings, right? Uh, because if,
63
00:13:21.738 --> 00:13:32.398
if I want to know, uh, why the floor calendar looks the way that it does, I don't even have a way to locate what was discussed in each meeting.
64
00:13:32.698 --> 00:13:47.358
Um, I have to basically find a way to be there, or I don't, I don't know if they're transmitting that. I'm assuming no. Um, so when you have the, the Leaders' Council working in the shadows like that, it, it's...
65
00:13:47.588 --> 00:14:02.318
What it's going to produce, it's the kind of Congress that works somewhat in the shadow, right? And a Congress that is more assertive, but, uh, in which the real bargaining is happening
66
00:14:03.498 --> 00:14:15.338
outside the, the, the li- the lines, right? Outside the formal lines. Um, so our recommendation is, uh, is really, uh, I think it's almost embarrassingly basic, right?
67
00:14:15.598 --> 00:14:26.598
Uh, the meetings should happen inside the institution. Um, the, the body should vote. There should be a, a, a majority decision on the agenda. The agenda should be public.
68
00:14:27.018 --> 00:14:30.958
Uh, the same way, by the way, that the, the, uh, the committee's agendas are public.
69
00:14:31.078 --> 00:14:40.098
If I want to know what is being discussed in each committee, um, regular, the standing committees or the special committees, I can, I have that information on their website.
70
00:14:40.158 --> 00:14:57.528
The same thing should be true about the Leaders' Council. And, uh, you mentioned the pandemic. Uh, now let's talk a little bit because the pandemic introduced remote sittings and remote votes, and, uh, this
71
00:14:58.498 --> 00:15:10.098
have been used with gusto ever since. Uh, they are, they're still a feature of the House at this moment, uh, even though we're no longer under COVID restrictions.
72
00:15:10.978 --> 00:15:16.938
How does that fundamentally alter the legislative process?
73
00:15:18.738 --> 00:15:31.438
So the pandemic, the tool that, uh, we developed for Congress to work during the pandemic, which by the way, Brazil was a pi- one of the pioneer legislatures in the world. This was a good thing back in the pandemic.
74
00:15:32.178 --> 00:15:36.338
That was supposed to be temporary, but it never really went away.
75
00:15:36.738 --> 00:15:53.178
Um, Brazil was one of the first to build a remote deliberation system so that Congress could still make decisions and importantly, decisions about the pandemic, uh, when no legislator could be inside the building because of health measures.
76
00:15:54.898 --> 00:16:06.718
Um, now what's happening is that the Chamber and the Senate, they run hybrid sessions every Monday and Friday with the little changes in between how it happens in, uh, the Chamber and the Senate.
77
00:16:07.638 --> 00:16:17.578
Uh, which by the way, are the two days that legislators are usually not in Brasilia. They are in their legislative districts, um, doing work. I'm not saying that they're not working.
78
00:16:17.638 --> 00:16:28.838
They are working, but doing different legislative work. Um, so I think that the problem, first of all, I think there are two problems here.
79
00:16:28.938 --> 00:16:44.658
The first one is that you're basically killing politics by allowing hybrid sessions to still happen. It's one thing to have that system operating when, um, when you have a health emergency, a pandemic, right?
80
00:16:45.278 --> 00:16:52.058
It's another thing when you really don't have a reason to, to, to have that system in place.
81
00:16:52.138 --> 00:17:00.358
If, uh, legislators are not in Brasilia in these two days, then all the voting should happen in the other days as it, as it always did.
82
00:17:00.718 --> 00:17:13.558
Um, when you take legislators out of the floor and allow them to vote remotely, uh, you, first of all, you don't know who is voting necessarily, and if the person knows what they're voting on.
83
00:17:14.118 --> 00:17:28.908
Uh, all of the bargaining that should happen on the floor doesn't, it doesn't exist, so that's why I, what I mean by killing politics, you're taking politics out of the process. Uh, and then, uh, the fourth thing is that
84
00:17:30.438 --> 00:17:43.478
this, this tool has been used tactically. So there are, there is the case, for instance, that we describe in the paper where the Speaker, um, delayed reinstating in-person committees specifically.
85
00:17:43.578 --> 00:17:56.198
So a constitutional amendment, um, on parliamentary immunity could clear its first procedural hurdle on the fi- virtual floor, skipping the committee that's actually supposed to vet it.
86
00:17:57.158 --> 00:18:20.038
Uh, you also have cases of, um, the Speaker manipulating the number of legislators who need to be present on the floor, uh, in terms of allowing the ones who are outside, uh, traveling in Europe, for instance, to, to have their votes count so that the measure or the bill that he supports is approved or not approved.
87
00:18:20.634 --> 00:18:33.034
Um, that is the problem, right? We're not following the rules here, and we're using a tool that was supposed to last for a specific period of time to operate in daily- daily routine. Uh, that's not okay.
88
00:18:33.734 --> 00:18:41.174
So we propose, uh, s- several restrictions. Basically, uh, if I had to summarize it, it's basically
89
00:18:42.254 --> 00:18:56.934
this, uh, uh, this system that was developed for the pandemic, uh, the remote system, should only be used in extraordinary conditions such as a pandemic, a climate crisis, something that is extraordinary.
90
00:18:57.014 --> 00:19:13.834
That's why it was created. It was never created to be a part of the- the, the routine of Congress. Gustavo, do you wanna take the next question? Sure. Uh, let's talk about, a little bit about the fact that, um,
91
00:19:15.294 --> 00:19:33.294
you, you also mentioned provisional decrees. And, uh, so these, uh, long story short, uh, they have to be approved by Congress until up to 180 days, otherwise they expire. Mm. And, uh, what we ha- have been seeing
92
00:19:34.354 --> 00:19:47.154
is many of them ex- simply expiring, not being turned down by lawmakers, but just, uh, uh, losing their validity, uh, by inertia.
93
00:19:47.714 --> 00:20:05.694
Uh, in 2020, you mentioned that 56 of them, uh, fell to that fate. Is that a problem? Is that just Congress exercising its discretion? Because, I mean, not ruling on the provisional decree is also
94
00:20:06.694 --> 00:20:09.474
a way of, of deciding. H- how do you see this?
95
00:20:11.154 --> 00:20:25.574
Uh, I don't think it's just discretion, uh, because I think discretion would imply that someone inside Congress made a decision, and I think the problem here is that nobody's making any decision, right?
96
00:20:25.754 --> 00:20:38.094
No decision is being made. Um, so a provisional decree, just to clarify, it takes effect immediately once it's issued by the executive, which means rules change, money moves.
97
00:20:38.134 --> 00:20:46.543
[laughs] Uh, once the president signs it, then it's valid. Uh, then it has 120 days to get an actual vote inside Congress.
98
00:20:46.594 --> 00:21:00.754
It has an entire process of, uh, of a committee that is supposed to be composed of legislators from the Senate and from the Chamber. Um, that was also the subject of a lot of debate, uh, for many years, but, um,
99
00:21:01.754 --> 00:21:12.034
that is how the process is supposed to work. Congress has 120 days to collectively decide, and collectively, I mean both the Chamber and the Senate. Uh, when nothing happens,
100
00:21:13.674 --> 00:21:19.374
it expires, and then all of that that happened, the rules, the, the money, it, it just, it's not valid anymore.
101
00:21:19.414 --> 00:21:33.654
So, um, I think in tw- 20, uh, 2001, when I described that first change that we had, um, in terms of Congress being more assertive, what I hear from lawmakers is that that...
102
00:21:33.694 --> 00:21:47.454
Lawmakers were there by the time, uh, at the time, by the way. Um, they enacted that reform because they were very, very, very tired of just the president reissuing, uh, o- um, uh, sorry.
103
00:21:47.534 --> 00:21:52.834
I'm, I'm thinking about executive decrees. Provisional decrees over and over again. They, they got very tired.
104
00:21:52.854 --> 00:22:05.934
They, they felt they were being abused, uh, in, in, in a way, and so they wanted to put a cap on exactly what the president could do, and I think that's the legitimate, um, that's a leg- a legitimate interest, right?
105
00:22:06.074 --> 00:22:10.034
Um, Congress wanted to be part of the policymaking process.
106
00:22:10.254 --> 00:22:23.974
But now we're going to the other extreme in which the president tries to exert its, uh, prerogative of issuing a provisional decree, and then Congress just does nothing. It, it doesn't, uh, it doesn't work.
107
00:22:24.054 --> 00:22:38.374
It doesn't take action. Uh, and I think that matters because I think... and that's where it gets the part that people should be worried, um, that rules have changed and money has gone through the door. So, um,
108
00:22:39.614 --> 00:22:51.304
you can spend, like, you have some of these decrees that you have, uh, dealing with budget credits, right? Uh, so what happens when Congress just sits on a decree and, and makes no decision?
109
00:22:51.894 --> 00:22:54.354
Uh, that, that's not discretion.
110
00:22:54.414 --> 00:23:06.294
I think that's, to me, that's a hole in the system, and I think it's gotten worse a lot because of this fight between the House and the Senate in terms of who should preside the joint committee to analyze them.
111
00:23:06.854 --> 00:23:12.014
But now I think it's just also a function of Congress just not wanting to do its job.
112
00:23:13.094 --> 00:23:29.334
So there's another issue, which is the power of the Brazilian speaker of the house, which, which is called Presidente in, in Brazil, but it's equivalent, where they can pull a bill out of a committee, or they can attach one proposal to another, or they can call a surprise session without almost no notice.
113
00:23:29.954 --> 00:23:36.854
So if, if you were listening to this in the United States, you would hear echoes of, uh, the Speakers of the House and their power.
114
00:23:36.914 --> 00:23:50.554
Our British listeners might think of the government's control over the Commons timetable. But how much power does the Brazilian speaker actually have compared to these counterparts, and, and where does it come from? Uh,
115
00:23:51.514 --> 00:23:56.734
that is a very good question. Um, I think it has... I, I don't, I don't know
116
00:23:57.634 --> 00:24:12.254
the case of these legislatures well enough to say that it has more or less power, but I do know the case of Brazil's legislature very well, and I think, uh, it has a lot of unchecked power. That's what I think.
117
00:24:12.954 --> 00:24:21.614
Um, there is a lot happening with the decisions of the speaker that needed to be checked, and that, that process is not happening. Um-
118
00:24:22.626 --> 00:24:32.306
So there is, uh, we describe something in the policy paper, uh, I'm gonna try to translate. I think it's, I would translate it as a committee pull power, uh, if that makes sense.
119
00:24:33.136 --> 00:24:47.946
That was a resolution that was passed in 1994. Um, and it lets the speaker yank a bill out of committee, uh, any committee, once a deadline's missed, and send it wherever he wants.
120
00:24:48.346 --> 00:24:57.966
In- which includes straight to the floor for a vote. Um, I think on its own that's probably not crazy, right?
121
00:24:58.046 --> 00:25:06.646
Because there is, there could be a case where the legislature reaches a gridlock, uh, and then somebody needs to have the power to break the gridlock.
122
00:25:07.646 --> 00:25:21.426
Uh, but the problem is that, again, with [laughs] again, like with the, the remote system, that that power has built itself into the daily practice of Congress. So now it's routine.
123
00:25:21.546 --> 00:25:33.026
Um, and I think it's, it ends up hollowing out the policy work that used to happen in committees, right? And that power itself created in Brazil a figure that I think it's very curious.
124
00:25:33.226 --> 00:25:51.366
Uh, [laughs] in Brazil, we have rapporteurs inside committees who is the legislator who is supposed to read the bill, study the bill, uh, hold public hearings, listening to their peers inside the committee, and produce a report, uh, suggesting that the committee either accepts or rejects the bill.
125
00:25:52.806 --> 00:26:05.606
Uh, once the speaker yanks the bill out of comm- a committee like that with that, uh, that pull, pull power, what you have on the floor is the figure of the floor rapporteur [laughs]
126
00:26:05.646 --> 00:26:14.926
reporting on behalf of a committee on the floor. Which is something that when I realized that in Congress, I was just like, "Okay, this makes no sense." Like, "This should be happening inside the committees."
127
00:26:15.866 --> 00:26:20.166
Um, so you can see how that distorts the legislative process, right?
128
00:26:20.826 --> 00:26:31.966
Um, the other thing is, um, Brazil, uh, the, the House specifically right now, uh, and I'm sorry that I'm using House and Chamber interchangeably, um, but it's the same institution.
129
00:26:32.666 --> 00:26:49.086
Um, it operates mainly through extraordinary sessions, which are sessions that, um, give more leeway for the speaker and the steering committee to just, um, jump processes, so to say.
130
00:26:49.726 --> 00:27:01.926
Uh, the, the routine, the former routine, would be to have most sessions as ordinary, right? Ordinary sessions, which is like when the- ordinary business, right? Ordinary routine.
131
00:27:02.686 --> 00:27:12.826
Uh, what we show in the paper is that by the mid-2010s, you had roughly four times as many extraordinary sessions as ordinary ones in one given year.
132
00:27:13.926 --> 00:27:28.446
And then ordinary sessions have basically disappeared from the official record since 2020. That lets the speaker pick the agenda, pick the timing, uh, engineer the quorum. Uh, it's, it's a one person show, right?
133
00:27:29.326 --> 00:27:34.026
The other thing- Uh, Beatriz, if I may, uh, interrupt you, and I'm sorry for that. But, uh,
134
00:27:35.246 --> 00:27:46.546
we, we, uh, you mentioned a few times that, uh, the legislative process in the House has become, uh, entirely attached to the speaker.
135
00:27:47.106 --> 00:27:54.926
And we have seen e- over the past few years, uh, very two different, uh, two very different types of speaker.
136
00:27:55.526 --> 00:28:16.695
A, an extremely strong one, like Eduardo Cunha or Arthur Lira, uh, people who not only, uh, know the, the bylaws of the House inside and out so they can exploit it the way they want, but also who command the floor and, uh, are able to whip votes.
137
00:28:17.106 --> 00:28:35.106
And then you have, uh, speakers like Hugo Motta, the current one, a very young legislator, and who is considered by most, uh, akin, uh, House observers, a, a weak speaker of the House. He, uh, his deals do not stand.
138
00:28:35.586 --> 00:28:50.746
Uh, he responds to who yells the loudest at him. Uh, what is worse? Hmm. Uh, someone with an iron grip, uh, on the legislator, or someone who just, uh,
139
00:28:51.826 --> 00:29:08.146
lets the, the mad people run the, the mental institution? So I would say that it doesn't really matter who is better or who's worse. The, the issue to me is we shouldn't have the House, uh,
140
00:29:09.776 --> 00:29:16.246
the legislative process inside the House happening in terms of the personality of the speaker.
141
00:29:16.946 --> 00:29:28.366
The rules should be enforced in a way that it doesn't matter if Arthur Lira is the one who likes to, um, the [laughs] we use the, the word in Portuguese, uh, atropelo, right?
142
00:29:28.446 --> 00:29:39.486
That, that just disregards all rules and just- Just bulldozing everything... bulldozing, thank you. Bulldozing everything. Or if the speaker is, uh, somebody who's young and nice and likes to chat.
143
00:29:39.566 --> 00:29:52.286
So I heard, like, I was at the speaker election in Brasilia, the last one. I heard this from legislators from the left to the right. Like, "We are tired of bulldozing. We, we, we, we really want things to happen
144
00:29:53.246 --> 00:29:56.226
in the way that they should." [laughs] Like, there are rules for that.
145
00:29:57.286 --> 00:30:08.226
It's because the rules are either, uh, have been hollowed out to a point that now we need new ones or changes in the existing ones, or that they're just not being respected at all.
146
00:30:08.466 --> 00:30:18.746
Like, that, that, that is why you're asking me that question, Gustavo, because the rules don't matter and what matters is the personality, because the rules are not being respected.
147
00:30:18.826 --> 00:30:32.666
So you see the, the, the problem comes exactly in that, I think James, you wanna go? Uh, sure. We can talk about betting, if that's another thing. There's- Mm... the gambling bill is a small story that tells a big one.
148
00:30:32.706 --> 00:30:43.726
A working group met three months ago, held one public hearing, left almost no records, wrote an entirely new bill, and sent it to the floor without a single standing committee touching it.
149
00:30:43.766 --> 00:30:56.986
And how common is this, that route, uh, right now? Unfortunately, more common than people realize, and I think it's becoming sort of a default route for anything that is considered politically awkward.
150
00:30:57.406 --> 00:31:03.666
Um, I think that the pattern that you're describing with the gambling bill is almost like a template, uh, from...
151
00:31:03.706 --> 00:31:09.546
And I- I've done work for the Brazilian report about this topic, so Gustavo knows [laughs] very well, uh, where I'm coming from.
152
00:31:09.786 --> 00:31:24.126
Um, so you have a working group that gets set up outside the formal, the normal committee system, committee system, meets for a few months, uh, holds, I don't know, a number of public hearings or no public hearings, uh, doesn't live leave
153
00:31:25.306 --> 00:31:35.946
any paper trail, or not much of a paper trail, writes its own bill from scratch, and that, that goes on the floor. Um, that's, uh, yeah, that, it's, it's completely absurd to me.
154
00:31:36.626 --> 00:31:51.346
Um, and it's not, like, something that happened once or twice, right? Um, the, between the early 2000s and today, the number of these working groups, uh, the speaker's office, uh, has created went from 3 to, like, 22.
155
00:31:51.466 --> 00:31:54.186
Uh, it's not really incremental.
156
00:31:54.366 --> 00:32:07.146
It, it's, what I see here is that Congress is really building a parallel track for, for bills, and, and it may be the case that the committee system is, uh, not able to, to deal with the amount of bills that we have in Brazil.
157
00:32:07.216 --> 00:32:11.866
And I know it's, th- they are a lot, believe me. I, [laughs] I work in legislative data. They are a lot.
158
00:32:12.166 --> 00:32:24.186
But if that's the case, then we think to, we need to sit down and rethink how committees work, not create an unform, informal parallel track to analyze bills. Um, and why does that matter, right?
159
00:32:24.366 --> 00:32:36.885
Uh, standing committees have obligations. They are required to hold public hearings. They importantly, and most importantly, they have to reflect the party balance of the whole chamber, the whole House.
160
00:32:37.986 --> 00:32:46.966
Um, that is a very key difference between the committees and the, the working groups. Working groups, th- they basically, they can operate as, as they want.
161
00:32:47.286 --> 00:32:55.026
Uh, you can have as many, uh, members from the opposition or the, the government that the speaker wants.
162
00:32:55.146 --> 00:33:08.166
Uh, the speaker decides who is on the c- the working group, how long the working group's gonna run, uh, whether it has to leave a paper trail or, or not, or even the, the members of the working group can convince the speaker, and then that's it.
163
00:33:08.266 --> 00:33:18.486
Uh, there's no accountability. Uh, so when you have a bill going through a working group instead of a committee, it's not just about skipping a formality.
164
00:33:18.606 --> 00:33:29.546
I think you're skipping the actual mechanism that's supposed to give the public, citizens, uh, a say before something comes, becomes law.
165
00:33:33.426 --> 00:33:50.446
Now, Bia, you and Sergio Fausto from the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Foundation have proposals that are less a call for reform and more tweaks to the legislative process.
166
00:33:50.586 --> 00:34:05.426
Uh, there is no constitutional overhaul. It's more touching on the rule book of the, of the House. Uh, but then again, you're asking a group of politicians to voluntarily give up discretion they enjoy.
167
00:34:06.546 --> 00:34:14.166
Why would they do that? Because right now they control the legislative process. They are, uh,
168
00:34:15.846 --> 00:34:27.136
increasingly more powerful over the budget, and, uh, that has reduced the cost of being in the opposition to any given government. Uh, I mean, how can you put the genie back in the bottle?
169
00:34:27.766 --> 00:34:33.166
Uh, and is there any precedent in Brazilian politics for Congress restraining itself?
170
00:34:34.866 --> 00:34:47.346
I think that's a fair question, and that's usually the last question [laughs] I get from every journalist I've talked to about this paper is, e- exactly why would they even bother to do that, th- that we have clear signals that they're not interested.
171
00:34:48.026 --> 00:35:01.326
Um, I think first, uh, is what you said. We're not asking for changes that would, um, s- just completely create an entire new Congress. That's not what we're saying.
172
00:35:01.406 --> 00:35:11.016
Everything that we're proposing can be enacted through a resolution bill that only needs to be approved inside the chambers if the H- House are dissenting,
173
00:35:12.896 --> 00:35:20.826
um, that are basically improvements in terms of how the rules are, either because they're not being respected or because a parallel track has been created anyway.
174
00:35:20.886 --> 00:35:30.325
Regardless of the why, we're just, uh, creating their, uh, a- adding layers, uh, to the, to the rule book, uh, through these...
175
00:35:30.506 --> 00:35:42.166
And, and the way to do this is through the resolutions, which again, i- it's, it's an internal affairs o- of Congress. It, it doesn't require anything but the, the, the support of themselves, right?
176
00:35:42.746 --> 00:35:51.686
Uh, and in that way, our expe- e- our expectation with the policy paper is that we would hope that
177
00:35:53.406 --> 00:36:02.206
a lot of legislators get interested in the paper, and we are discussing on, like, in terms of how we can make that happen. Um,
178
00:36:04.286 --> 00:36:20.806
so that each one would get an idea and propose as a, a resolution bill so that it's not one big effort. It's, like, small efforts happening in different timelines, um, so that it's more palatable for Congress.
179
00:36:21.866 --> 00:36:31.866
The other thing is, as I said, uh, I've, I've talked to legislators, and I know that they are all dissatisfied with the status quo, um, from the left to the right.
180
00:36:31.906 --> 00:36:43.562
Um- I spent a lot of time talking to them during the election for speaker and spe- specifically inside the House, and they are all dissatisfied because it makes their life harder, right?
181
00:36:43.742 --> 00:36:56.502
It- it's very hard if you're a legislator and if, if you care about your job, and y- you get the, the agenda for the floor session like two hours before you're supposed to be there and vote. Like, how...
182
00:36:57.162 --> 00:37:09.282
You can't do your job well. So I think there is a consensus inside, um, that things are not, uh, working as they should, even if that consensus has, um,
183
00:37:10.402 --> 00:37:24.502
weakened a little because of the profile, the personality of Ugumata, who is not bulldozing everything, uh, all the time. I think that there is still that will inside Congress. Um, and there is precedent, right?
184
00:37:24.842 --> 00:37:28.662
Uh, and it's not even ancient history, uh, Brazilian politics.
185
00:37:28.802 --> 00:37:43.342
Uh, in 2005, Congress changed its own rules in, in terms of how committee and leadership seats get allocated, uh, to top members from switching parties midterm just to gain the sit- the seat count.
186
00:37:44.342 --> 00:37:46.562
That was an instance of self-regulation.
187
00:37:47.282 --> 00:38:01.672
Uh, and it was done because the instability has- had gotten so bad that even the people that were benefiting from the old system wanted a fix, and I think we are in a similar moment right now, um, except a little broader, right?
188
00:38:01.802 --> 00:38:15.322
It's not gonna be a narrow fix, as I said, and that's why we hope that it's several people working in, in different, uh, resolution bills at, uh, in different times. Um, but it- and, and it's a fix. Um,
189
00:38:16.642 --> 00:38:32.242
and I think that the alternative of, of not doing anything has a cost. Uh, we have a Congress that if it keeps operating through improvisation, undocumented deals, bulldozing decisions [laughs], uh- Mm...
190
00:38:32.262 --> 00:38:46.522
that does, it... Yes, it does look, it makes Congress looks bad, but, um, it makes Congress itself harder to negotiate with, harder to trust by citizens, by, right, by parties. Um,
191
00:38:47.602 --> 00:38:55.502
and I think that is probably going to feed into the erosion of confidence in the whole political system.
192
00:38:56.182 --> 00:39:06.202
So I think at the, at some point, I would hope that self-interest and institutional health, um, sh- they should point in the same direction.
193
00:39:07.142 --> 00:39:22.002
So Bia, if you're right, the next president, whether it's, um, in, in October, whoever wins in October, whether it's Lula or Fla- Flávio or another person, Congress is gonna be stronger and less predictable and harder to negotiate with than in any other democratic era.
194
00:39:22.682 --> 00:39:39.262
So how can one govern, uh, under such circumstances? Uh, I think a lot of it will depend on how the composition of the Senate look, what, what it looks like. Um, we don't know how conservative it will become.
195
00:39:39.622 --> 00:39:44.362
Uh, I keep hearing that it should be more conservative than it actually is, and then the government
196
00:39:45.302 --> 00:39:59.922
in the hypothetical, um, second administration of Lula, second in this round, um, that the government would lose, um, any leeway that it had in terms of the Senate. Uh- Did he have leeway?
197
00:40:00.142 --> 00:40:12.322
[laughs] I mean, a little bit, right? I mean, we should, we could move to a situation in which there is no r- not even, like, room to talk, which I think it would be much worse, right? Um, just because of
198
00:40:13.562 --> 00:40:25.402
the shift to, like the extreme shift to the right. Uh, I keep hearing things that would, that say that this will happen and this won't happen, so I'm, I'm, I'm not gonna take a position on that. Uh, I don't think...
199
00:40:25.722 --> 00:40:37.672
A- after the 2018 election, I decided I, I don't make predictions anymore as a political [laughs] scientist. So I wait for results of the election and then reanalyze. Um, so I think, uh,
200
00:40:38.642 --> 00:40:46.961
regardless of who wins, we have a more assertive, assertive Congress, um, for sure. We saw that with Bolsonaro.
201
00:40:47.082 --> 00:41:01.662
Um, even when he decided that he was interested in governing, and that was halfway through his, uh, administration, he f- he had difficulties with Congress, uh, more than once. Um, so I think, uh,
202
00:41:03.642 --> 00:41:08.882
to govern in that environment, there are two layers there, I think.
203
00:41:09.402 --> 00:41:26.222
One is, and, and Gustavo and I have talked about this, that I think the Lula's present administration made many mistakes throughout the, the last four years in terms of how to negotiate, how to, the timing of negotiation, how many fronts of negotiation were there in Congress.
204
00:41:26.802 --> 00:41:40.442
So I think perhaps finding a more, um, skillful strategy, uh, would be s- something that any government should pursue. Um, but it, the fix also has to be institutional.
205
00:41:40.762 --> 00:41:57.542
Um, so if the rules themselves are unpredictable and largely informal, uh, any president is gonna be negotiating with a moving target, right? [laughs] So I think that the proposals we have in this paper, um,
206
00:41:58.822 --> 00:42:14.382
are actually the precondition for any president, uh, being able to make a deal that sticks. Um, and I think presidents perhaps should also, um, join this, uh, this effort, right?
207
00:42:14.522 --> 00:42:30.302
To, to ask Congress to self-regulate so then, um, maybe we can have a little more peace in executive legislative re- relations [laughs] in the near future. Bia, thank you very much.
208
00:42:30.392 --> 00:42:43.022
This, uh, was great, uh, and, um, we hope that, uh, your suggestions will be carried out by lawmakers even though, uh, I'm not usually known for my optimism.
209
00:42:43.962 --> 00:43:04.802
[laughs] But, [laughs] uh, but, uh, I would like also to take this opportunity and put you on the spot and say that James and I will have a live broadcast on election day, and you would be more than welcome especially to comment on the outlook of the next Congress that will, uh, take office in February 2027.
210
00:43:05.402 --> 00:43:17.882
And then, uh, we should also have you, uh, at that moment to talk about how the next government will be able to negotiate or not with the next Congress.
211
00:43:18.722 --> 00:43:29.162
Bia Haie, uh, researcher at the University of Lisbon, thank you very much for joining us. Thank you. Thank you, Bia. And I'm, I'm in for the commentary on the election. Great. [laughs] Wonderful.
212
00:43:29.382 --> 00:43:39.922
We'll be looking forward to seeing you there. Thank you both. James, thank you again. Uh, uh, see you next week. Até. Até. Obrigada, gente.
213
00:43:41.062 --> 00:43:47.602
Thank you s- th- thanks for listening, everyone, and next week Explaining Brazil will be back. Have a good one, folks.
