WEBVTT
1
00:00:00.170 --> 00:00:01.750
When you get older, you got to have yourself a
2
00:00:01.770 --> 00:00:05.509
little bit of the comfort. And that's where the avocado
3
00:00:05.570 --> 00:00:08.269
green mattress comes in, man. And unlike most mattress brands,
4
00:00:08.650 --> 00:00:11.490
they'll only sell you online. They do have stores too.
5
00:00:11.509 --> 00:00:13.349
You can go in the store. You can try them out.
6
00:00:13.810 --> 00:00:19.579
Unbelievably comfortable. Avocado mattress is designed for comfort, support, helping
7
00:00:19.620 --> 00:00:22.140
your body stay aligned. You know, the last time my
8
00:00:22.219 --> 00:00:27.300
body was aligned, it's been, I think it might've been
9
00:00:27.359 --> 00:00:30.420
the last time the Mets won the world series. That's
10
00:00:30.440 --> 00:00:33.280
how long it's been since it's been aligned. But these mattresses,
11
00:00:33.520 --> 00:00:37.649
avocado green mattress, responsibly sourced organic materials that are built
12
00:00:37.670 --> 00:00:42.450
to last. So get an avocado green mattress. Avocado products
13
00:00:42.490 --> 00:00:47.070
are made, not manufactured, and thoughtfully crafted with real materials
14
00:00:47.350 --> 00:00:49.939
to deliver lasting comfort and support. You can experience them
15
00:00:49.979 --> 00:00:53.859
in person at an avocado showroom or a premier retailer
16
00:00:53.899 --> 00:00:58.479
near you. Or shop online at avocadogreenmattress.com slash TWS to
17
00:00:58.500 --> 00:01:06.760
check out their mattress and furniture sale. avocadogreenmattress.com slash TWS, avocadogreenmattress.com
18
00:01:07.599 --> 00:01:13.590
slash TWS, period. Look, you know, I don't know when
19
00:01:13.609 --> 00:01:14.969
I'm going to leave this job. I don't know when
20
00:01:14.989 --> 00:01:16.390
I'm going to stay in this job. I don't know
21
00:01:16.450 --> 00:01:18.030
how these things are going to do, but when I do,
22
00:01:18.549 --> 00:01:23.819
you should replace me with Indeed. You should call Indeed
23
00:01:25.079 --> 00:01:29.409
when you're replacing me because I, listen, This podcast, it
24
00:01:29.450 --> 00:01:30.290
requires skills.
25
00:01:30.390 --> 00:01:31.230
You need a face.
26
00:01:33.409 --> 00:01:35.750
You need a pie hole so that you can open
27
00:01:35.790 --> 00:01:42.109
your pie hole and just spout. Not everybody can do that.
28
00:01:43.170 --> 00:01:47.480
And so, you know, if you need to hire, you
29
00:01:47.500 --> 00:01:48.799
got to say to yourself, this is a job for
30
00:01:48.840 --> 00:01:51.640
indeed sponsored jobs. You can reach candidates that meet your
31
00:01:51.659 --> 00:01:54.299
specific criteria. Like if you want them to have skills
32
00:01:55.079 --> 00:01:59.019
or pie hole certifications. Maybe even you want to know
33
00:01:59.040 --> 00:02:01.780
what the location is. Only Indeed can get that stuff
34
00:02:01.829 --> 00:02:06.269
done efficiently. Trust me, you know, you got to kiss
35
00:02:06.310 --> 00:02:08.870
a lot of frogs unless you use one of these
36
00:02:08.889 --> 00:02:11.990
services there like Indeed. So spend less time searching and
37
00:02:12.030 --> 00:02:14.960
more time actually interviewing candidates who check all your boxes.
38
00:02:15.219 --> 00:02:18.360
Less stress, less time, more results. When you need the
39
00:02:18.400 --> 00:02:20.520
right person to cut through the chaos, this is a
40
00:02:20.580 --> 00:02:25.819
job for Indeed-sponsored jobs. listeners of this show will get
41
00:02:25.840 --> 00:02:29.719
a $ 75 sponsored job credit to help get your job
42
00:02:29.740 --> 00:02:34.569
the premium status it deserves at Indeed.com slash podcast. Just
43
00:02:34.590 --> 00:02:38.189
go to Indeed.com slash podcast right now and support our
44
00:02:38.210 --> 00:02:42.430
show by saying you heard about Indeed on this podcast. Indeed.com
45
00:02:42.449 --> 00:02:55.110
slash podcast. Terms and conditions apply. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome
46
00:02:55.409 --> 00:02:57.310
to the weekly show podcast. My name is John Stewart.
47
00:02:57.349 --> 00:03:02.180
It is Tuesday, July 7th. This will air Wednesday, July 8th.
48
00:03:02.840 --> 00:03:05.280
We're not going to talk about the 250th celebration. We're
49
00:03:05.300 --> 00:03:07.979
not going to talk about the U.S. men's soccer team's
50
00:03:08.620 --> 00:03:14.650
truly just disappointing performance in their game against Belgium. All
51
00:03:14.689 --> 00:03:16.870
those things worthy of episodes. Not going to be doing
52
00:03:16.889 --> 00:03:20.229
it because we have today an unusual opportunity. We have
53
00:03:20.270 --> 00:03:22.830
two gentlemen on the show who really should not be
54
00:03:22.909 --> 00:03:26.819
on the show. They have lawsuits pending against our federal government.
55
00:03:28.120 --> 00:03:31.560
One of them is seemingly in the crosshairs of the
56
00:03:31.810 --> 00:03:36.689
newly weaponized Trump Department of Justice under the auspices of Mr.
57
00:03:36.729 --> 00:03:39.530
Todd Blanch, who is, as you know, an independent observer
58
00:03:39.590 --> 00:03:43.189
of law and not, in fact, the president's former lawyer
59
00:03:43.270 --> 00:03:44.930
who is just working on his behalf.
60
00:03:45.129 --> 00:03:45.830
Well, oops.
61
00:03:45.849 --> 00:03:46.310
Yes, he is.
62
00:03:47.629 --> 00:03:49.419
And I will just get to it.
63
00:03:50.159 --> 00:03:53.560
We are surprised and delighted to get an opportunity to
64
00:03:53.599 --> 00:03:56.340
speak with these two gentlemen, and we'll get to it
65
00:03:56.379 --> 00:03:56.719
right now.
66
00:04:01.250 --> 00:04:03.569
All right, so we're going to bring in our guests immediately.
67
00:04:03.810 --> 00:04:07.389
We've got Jack Smith, obviously the former special counsel on
68
00:04:07.409 --> 00:04:09.770
a classified documents case and the election interference case.
69
00:04:09.789 --> 00:04:11.449
We've got Brian Driscoll, who was a former.
70
00:04:11.310 --> 00:04:14.879
FBI agent who in 2025 was serving as the acting
71
00:04:15.120 --> 00:04:20.250
director of the FBI until being let go by the administration. Brian, Jack,
72
00:04:20.970 --> 00:04:24.410
thank you for joining us. Thank you for your service
73
00:04:24.449 --> 00:04:27.529
to the rule of law. Let me start with this.
74
00:04:28.490 --> 00:04:31.449
I am under the impression that you are, well, Jack,
75
00:04:31.509 --> 00:04:35.310
probably more than Brian, but under some legal peril in
76
00:04:35.379 --> 00:04:37.339
terms of what you are allowed to talk about, what
77
00:04:37.379 --> 00:04:39.819
you are not allowed to talk about. Brian, I think
78
00:04:39.839 --> 00:04:42.980
you have a pending lawsuit. Jack, obviously the president has
79
00:04:43.079 --> 00:04:48.939
threatened you specifically. Why are you here? I'll start with Jack.
80
00:04:49.600 --> 00:04:50.120
Yeah, sure.
81
00:04:50.180 --> 00:04:52.939
Well, first off, John, thanks very much for having us
82
00:04:53.040 --> 00:04:57.759
on your show. Brian and I are here because we
83
00:04:57.800 --> 00:05:00.040
want to talk about the attack on the rule of
84
00:05:00.139 --> 00:05:04.870
law and specifically how that attack has played out against
85
00:05:04.910 --> 00:05:07.709
public servants, the people that we spent decades working with.
86
00:05:09.230 --> 00:05:12.430
The things that we're seeing over the last year and
87
00:05:12.449 --> 00:05:15.379
a half– Uh, you know, you can see the output
88
00:05:15.420 --> 00:05:17.620
of that, right? You can see people being targeted. I
89
00:05:18.160 --> 00:05:21.060
think Brian and I have a unique perspective and we
90
00:05:21.399 --> 00:05:24.810
understand what's being done to the people who enforce the
91
00:05:24.850 --> 00:05:26.910
rule of law. Uh, the rule of law in our
92
00:05:26.949 --> 00:05:30.370
country does not enforce itself. It takes people of character
93
00:05:30.389 --> 00:05:35.699
and integrity to do it and to undermine it. Uh,
94
00:05:35.899 --> 00:05:39.980
you have to attack those people. And why I wanted
95
00:05:40.019 --> 00:05:42.699
to be here today, John, was to talk about those people, uh,
96
00:05:43.600 --> 00:05:46.579
how much we should be valuing them, how much we
97
00:05:46.660 --> 00:05:49.879
lose when people like that are targeted. And not just
98
00:05:49.920 --> 00:05:54.300
the people who've been fired, but also appreciating the sacrifice
99
00:05:54.319 --> 00:05:57.339
of the people who are still manning their posts, still
100
00:05:57.360 --> 00:05:59.930
doing their job. I feel like a lot of that
101
00:06:00.490 --> 00:06:04.350
is getting lost. And I think more of a discussion
102
00:06:04.389 --> 00:06:07.269
about that is part of the solution going forward.
103
00:06:07.870 --> 00:06:10.790
And Brian, obviously, you're one of those people.
104
00:06:11.949 --> 00:06:15.269
Jack was special counsel over at the the DOJ, you
105
00:06:15.329 --> 00:06:18.029
were in the FBI. Give me a little bit about
106
00:06:18.069 --> 00:06:21.550
your background real quick about being one of those individuals
107
00:06:21.889 --> 00:06:27.220
who's working for the rule of law and had never
108
00:06:27.279 --> 00:06:29.959
had a problem before, in fact, was moving up the chain.
109
00:06:30.319 --> 00:06:32.639
Yeah. I mean, as far as my background is concerned,
110
00:06:32.660 --> 00:06:37.639
I started straight out of graduate school. I went into
111
00:06:37.699 --> 00:06:41.800
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service as an agent for about
112
00:06:41.839 --> 00:06:44.939
three years and came over to the FBI. And then
113
00:06:45.139 --> 00:06:47.519
I served for about close to 18 years with the
114
00:06:47.639 --> 00:06:52.649
FBI as a doer, you know, as a special agent.
115
00:06:52.850 --> 00:06:55.509
You were a hostage and rescue guy, yeah?
116
00:06:56.250 --> 00:06:58.470
Yes, sir. Yeah, for a time during my career, I
117
00:06:58.509 --> 00:07:01.889
was an operator. I started, you know, everybody starts as
118
00:07:01.949 --> 00:07:04.600
a street agent, a criminal investigator on a squad. I
119
00:07:04.639 --> 00:07:07.079
worked to organize crime matters, among other things. Then I
120
00:07:07.160 --> 00:07:09.519
was on the SWAT team in New York. And then
121
00:07:09.579 --> 00:07:12.699
I made the hostage rescue team. Very fortunately, probably some
122
00:07:12.740 --> 00:07:16.180
clerical errors in there. But slipped through the cracks and
123
00:07:16.540 --> 00:07:20.120
served as an operator and a sniper and a team
124
00:07:20.160 --> 00:07:23.959
leader with the hostage rescue team, working embedded with our
125
00:07:23.980 --> 00:07:28.579
military on some significant operations as well, but mostly domestically.
126
00:07:28.600 --> 00:07:29.540
Right.
127
00:07:29.600 --> 00:07:34.220
More than just hostage rescues, but very– what I like
128
00:07:34.259 --> 00:07:37.180
to say is we solve problems like the wolf, you know,
129
00:07:37.240 --> 00:07:40.480
from– I forget the movie. You know what I'm talking about.
130
00:07:40.620 --> 00:07:42.120
I know what you're talking about. I wasn't sure if
131
00:07:42.160 --> 00:07:43.560
it was the wolf or the jackal. I didn't know
132
00:07:43.579 --> 00:07:46.360
what you were talking about. The reason why I want
133
00:07:46.399 --> 00:07:50.000
to establish these sort of bona fides and credentials is
134
00:07:50.019 --> 00:07:55.600
that Brian has worked in busting up child exploitation, sex trafficking,
135
00:07:55.699 --> 00:08:00.939
and terrorism rings. Jack Smith was at The Hague working
136
00:08:01.120 --> 00:08:09.670
on crimes against humanity and genocide. These are universally respected
137
00:08:10.110 --> 00:08:13.709
and admired members of, first of all, those are things
138
00:08:13.750 --> 00:08:17.709
that almost everybody in the world thinks it's heroic to
139
00:08:17.769 --> 00:08:20.509
try and tackle and to try and break up. And
140
00:08:20.550 --> 00:08:26.250
yet you have both become embroiled in the political collateral
141
00:08:26.290 --> 00:08:30.990
damage of, I guess, our dysfunctional system at this point.
142
00:08:32.210 --> 00:08:35.309
So I just wanted to establish what your careers were
143
00:08:36.570 --> 00:08:43.379
before all this occurred. Neither of you are partisan political actors.
144
00:08:43.539 --> 00:08:44.710
Would that be fair to say?
145
00:08:45.299 --> 00:08:47.409
Correct. 100% accurate.
146
00:08:48.009 --> 00:08:48.789
Jack, let's start with you.
147
00:08:48.970 --> 00:08:53.350
You came on people's radar as the special counsel investigating
148
00:08:53.750 --> 00:08:57.070
the cases about election interference into the Trump administration and
149
00:08:57.090 --> 00:09:02.179
the classified documents cases. Before that, what were some of
150
00:09:02.210 --> 00:09:04.649
the things that you were working on before you had
151
00:09:04.669 --> 00:09:08.450
been tapped by, I'm assuming, Merrick Garland to take those cases?
152
00:09:08.950 --> 00:09:09.230
Sure.
153
00:09:09.549 --> 00:09:12.269
I think, you know, overarching, John, the thing to understand
154
00:09:13.129 --> 00:09:16.289
is Brian and I had similar career paths and that,
155
00:09:16.889 --> 00:09:18.929
you know, we might be known to people for the
156
00:09:18.970 --> 00:09:22.389
last job we had, but the truth is, Brian and myself,
157
00:09:22.570 --> 00:09:26.509
we were guys on the line doing the work for
158
00:09:26.549 --> 00:09:28.990
the vast majority of our career. I started as a
159
00:09:29.539 --> 00:09:32.320
local prosecutor in New York City at the district attorney's
160
00:09:32.399 --> 00:09:36.919
office prosecuting domestic violence and sex crimes cases. I then
161
00:09:36.960 --> 00:09:40.519
became a federal prosecutor for nine years in Brooklyn. And again,
162
00:09:40.570 --> 00:09:43.889
the majority of that time, I was trying cases. I
163
00:09:43.950 --> 00:09:46.830
turned down promotions because I liked doing the actual work
164
00:09:47.090 --> 00:09:50.730
of being a prosecutor. After that, I was overseas at
165
00:09:50.769 --> 00:09:54.210
the International Criminal Court. I was then the chief of
166
00:09:54.269 --> 00:09:58.529
the public integrity section, which oversees corruption prosecutions around.
167
00:09:58.330 --> 00:09:59.070
The United States.
168
00:09:59.899 --> 00:10:02.419
Uh, Then I moved to Nashville, Tennessee with my family
169
00:10:02.460 --> 00:10:06.639
and I became– first, I was the first assistant US attorney,
170
00:10:06.679 --> 00:10:09.440
which is kind of the second in command in the office.
171
00:10:09.500 --> 00:10:12.820
Then during the first Trump administration, I was named the
172
00:10:12.879 --> 00:10:17.419
acting US attorney in Nashville. After that job, I went
173
00:10:17.639 --> 00:10:20.659
into a private sector job for a very short period
174
00:10:20.679 --> 00:10:23.620
of time. And then the Trump administration asked me to
175
00:10:23.659 --> 00:10:26.480
come back and serve in the State Department overseas running
176
00:10:26.519 --> 00:10:28.259
a war crimes tribunal. And that was what I was
177
00:10:28.320 --> 00:10:29.960
doing before I became special counsel.
178
00:10:29.980 --> 00:10:34.149
Jesus. And this is so– so clearly that's not the
179
00:10:34.169 --> 00:10:36.889
career path of let's say a James Carville or somebody
180
00:10:36.929 --> 00:10:40.250
along those lines. So how did you get tapped to
181
00:10:40.289 --> 00:10:45.100
become the special counsel in these classified documents cases? When
182
00:10:45.120 --> 00:10:47.500
did Merrick Garland reach out to you or is that
183
00:10:47.519 --> 00:10:48.279
not how this works?
184
00:10:48.940 --> 00:10:51.919
Yeah, I had had a career in public service. Why
185
00:10:51.960 --> 00:10:54.580
they picked me, you'd have to ask Merrick Garland about that.
186
00:10:55.139 --> 00:10:58.230
I was asked to serve and my career has been
187
00:10:58.250 --> 00:11:00.710
about service and I think Brian and I, again, have
188
00:11:00.850 --> 00:11:05.190
very similar kind of life and kind of views about this.
189
00:11:05.809 --> 00:11:09.769
Public service is a privilege. I've spent the best part
190
00:11:09.809 --> 00:11:12.669
of my adult life working shoulder to shoulder with people
191
00:11:12.710 --> 00:11:16.450
like Brian. And when I was asked to come back
192
00:11:16.509 --> 00:11:18.509
and serve in this role, there was no way I
193
00:11:18.529 --> 00:11:19.309
was not going to do that.
194
00:11:19.730 --> 00:11:21.809
And when you're asked for it, do you say, is
195
00:11:22.990 --> 00:11:24.629
this a prosecutable case?
196
00:11:24.820 --> 00:11:27.159
Is this a partisan case? Is this too political?
197
00:11:27.519 --> 00:11:29.840
Or do you just say, this is my assignment, and
198
00:11:29.879 --> 00:11:31.799
now it's time for me to go in and start
199
00:11:31.860 --> 00:11:34.100
gathering the information with all the tools that I have
200
00:11:34.460 --> 00:11:35.179
at my disposal?
201
00:11:35.559 --> 00:11:38.539
Yeah, I went into it with no preconceived notions. I
202
00:11:38.559 --> 00:11:41.070
was living overseas in Europe in this State Department job
203
00:11:41.090 --> 00:11:43.870
for the last four years. And so- My job was
204
00:11:43.909 --> 00:11:46.370
to get up to speed on the facts and on
205
00:11:46.389 --> 00:11:50.210
the law and to make a call. Listen, I've done
206
00:11:50.330 --> 00:11:53.909
big public cases before, big corruption cases before. I knew
207
00:11:53.970 --> 00:11:55.549
that no matter what decision I was going to make,
208
00:11:55.629 --> 00:11:59.389
somebody was going to criticize it. I think people who
209
00:11:59.429 --> 00:12:04.100
have experience doing those cases, they know that all that stuff,
210
00:12:04.340 --> 00:12:06.539
what people say in the media, people like you, people
211
00:12:06.580 --> 00:12:08.919
don't like you, you're a villain, you're a hero. It's
212
00:12:08.960 --> 00:12:13.480
all noise, just noise. I had a great team of
213
00:12:13.539 --> 00:12:17.159
public servants who had careers very similar to mine. I
214
00:12:17.879 --> 00:12:20.139
think the important thing for your listeners to understand, John,
215
00:12:20.179 --> 00:12:23.559
is we did that case the way I did cases
216
00:12:23.600 --> 00:12:27.960
throughout my career. Same way, same investigative techniques, same ways
217
00:12:28.000 --> 00:12:31.879
of investigating, same ways of making decisions. At the end
218
00:12:31.899 --> 00:12:34.539
of the day, we felt we could prove that case
219
00:12:34.600 --> 00:12:36.100
in court, and that's why we charged the cases.
220
00:12:36.759 --> 00:12:39.919
Brian, for you, a similar path, I'm assuming. You're working
221
00:12:39.950 --> 00:12:42.909
your way up all these different areas. within the FBI
222
00:12:43.610 --> 00:12:49.159
and you are tapped to be, uh, the, the director,
223
00:12:49.200 --> 00:12:52.200
I guess, of the FBI. Um, or I guess you
224
00:12:52.220 --> 00:12:54.000
were tapped to be the deputy director. Is that what
225
00:12:54.019 --> 00:12:55.720
happened first? And they screwed up. There's a bit of
226
00:12:55.759 --> 00:12:58.659
a clerical, uh, decision here. And so you just ended
227
00:12:58.730 --> 00:13:01.110
up being the acting head for a little while. Is
228
00:13:01.149 --> 00:13:02.570
that how you came to your role?
229
00:13:03.470 --> 00:13:06.070
Yeah. Yeah, exactly. So I was tapped to be the
230
00:13:06.149 --> 00:13:10.529
acting deputy director. Um, and then on January 20th, uh,
231
00:13:10.570 --> 00:13:14.789
there was a, clerical error in the publishing coming from
232
00:13:14.820 --> 00:13:18.440
the white house that had my name as the acting
233
00:13:18.620 --> 00:13:21.679
or interim director of the fbi rather than my partners
234
00:13:21.700 --> 00:13:23.399
so they were just flipped.
235
00:13:23.600 --> 00:13:26.120
So then you became that then uh what happened in
236
00:13:26.320 --> 00:13:30.950
in brian's case is uh so at a certain point
237
00:13:31.190 --> 00:13:36.629
you were asked to compile a list of investigators that
238
00:13:36.690 --> 00:13:42.149
had worked on the cases that they deemed were going
239
00:13:42.269 --> 00:13:45.950
after Trump or people within Trump world.
240
00:13:46.230 --> 00:13:47.629
Would that be accurate to say?
241
00:13:47.649 --> 00:13:53.110
Yeah, yeah. In some substance, that's absolutely accurate. And it's
242
00:13:53.129 --> 00:13:56.090
all detailed in the complaint that the attorneys put forth
243
00:13:56.149 --> 00:13:56.450
as well.
244
00:13:57.269 --> 00:14:00.110
And so when you were asked to compile this, you
245
00:14:00.149 --> 00:14:02.210
did not do that. You said you gave them sort
246
00:14:02.230 --> 00:14:06.960
of an anonymized grouping. You felt that that was, they
247
00:14:06.980 --> 00:14:09.220
would be targeting people politically if you were to give
248
00:14:09.259 --> 00:14:10.659
that list and for no reason.
249
00:14:11.649 --> 00:14:14.549
I mean, it was fraught with risk. But before I
250
00:14:15.049 --> 00:14:21.049
did that, which is accurate, I offered and asked for process,
251
00:14:21.629 --> 00:14:27.259
existing process to reinvestigate or look for any of the
252
00:14:27.320 --> 00:14:31.059
alleged corruption or bad intent.
253
00:14:31.220 --> 00:14:33.000
When you say ask for process, what do you mean
254
00:14:33.019 --> 00:14:35.600
by that? Not that I'm not up on the law stuff.
255
00:14:35.779 --> 00:14:36.220
Trust me.
256
00:14:36.600 --> 00:14:39.509
I watch- A shit ton of SVU. So don't think
257
00:14:39.549 --> 00:14:42.860
that none of this is going over my head. But
258
00:14:43.019 --> 00:14:43.940
what do you mean by that?
259
00:14:43.960 --> 00:14:48.919
The show's the best. So there are existing processes in
260
00:14:48.940 --> 00:14:54.850
the DOJ that are purpose-built to investigate internally and externally
261
00:14:55.419 --> 00:15:02.029
any violation or misconduct or corruption. And those processes are
262
00:15:02.090 --> 00:15:06.720
what I articulated when asked for a list of based
263
00:15:06.779 --> 00:15:09.600
off of just what they were assigned to work on
264
00:15:09.679 --> 00:15:12.679
and investigate, because agents and analysts and members of the
265
00:15:12.700 --> 00:15:15.080
FBI don't get to choose. You are assigned.
266
00:15:15.990 --> 00:15:18.470
And so what you're basically saying is, what are you
267
00:15:18.509 --> 00:15:21.049
accusing these people of before I give you a list
268
00:15:21.690 --> 00:15:24.230
of this kind of a thing? Are you just accusing
269
00:15:24.269 --> 00:15:28.149
them of weaponizing? I'm assuming this is about they're accusing
270
00:15:28.190 --> 00:15:32.360
you or these people of weaponizing the DOJ against Donald Trump.
271
00:15:32.379 --> 00:15:32.909
Would that be fair?
272
00:15:33.779 --> 00:15:37.139
Yeah, I think that's fair. And I was not going
273
00:15:37.200 --> 00:15:41.299
to get into an argument about those allegations. I wanted process,
274
00:15:42.120 --> 00:15:46.460
articulated process in writing. So I'm not just leading these
275
00:15:46.500 --> 00:15:49.460
people to the edge of an employment cliff just to
276
00:15:49.500 --> 00:15:50.519
watch them get kicked off.
277
00:15:50.919 --> 00:15:53.620
Right. And this is after Kash Patel took over that
278
00:15:53.639 --> 00:15:54.450
job or before?
279
00:15:54.779 --> 00:15:57.429
Before. It was while I was the acting director early on.
280
00:15:57.809 --> 00:15:59.850
So he came in and replaced you. And then at
281
00:15:59.889 --> 00:16:01.169
that point, they let you go.
282
00:16:02.179 --> 00:16:05.990
I lasted a few more months. So the current director
283
00:16:06.090 --> 00:16:08.409
got in there at the end of February, I believe.
284
00:16:08.470 --> 00:16:11.220
And then I was shown the door on August 8th.
285
00:16:11.690 --> 00:16:13.389
And what was the reason they gave you for showing
286
00:16:13.409 --> 00:16:13.809
you the door?
287
00:16:14.809 --> 00:16:19.590
I mean, it was a one-page memo and there's nothing
288
00:16:19.629 --> 00:16:22.480
of substance and there was no process. So I don't,
289
00:16:22.820 --> 00:16:23.500
I'm still not clear.
290
00:16:23.659 --> 00:16:26.379
There's nothing in there that says like, you were late.
291
00:16:27.279 --> 00:16:30.700
You weren't wearing your FBI-issue polo shirt or jacket.
292
00:16:31.179 --> 00:16:33.120
No, I didn't say that. None of that.
293
00:16:33.159 --> 00:16:35.059
So just left going. That's, I assume, the basis of
294
00:16:35.100 --> 00:16:36.940
your lawsuit, which you probably can't discuss.
295
00:16:37.299 --> 00:16:37.580
Correct.
296
00:16:38.139 --> 00:16:38.659
Fair enough.
297
00:16:38.860 --> 00:16:41.580
I can discuss other things. And I want to.
298
00:16:41.720 --> 00:16:42.759
And we will, young man.
299
00:16:44.679 --> 00:16:48.169
Jack, Brian just said something interesting, which is you don't
300
00:16:48.210 --> 00:16:51.669
get to choose. You got to choose whether or not
301
00:16:51.750 --> 00:16:55.870
to accept the role. But the investigators that are assigned
302
00:16:55.909 --> 00:16:58.690
to you or the people in the FBI, I assume
303
00:16:58.730 --> 00:17:01.129
you use all the different tools that are available at
304
00:17:01.149 --> 00:17:06.730
your disposal at DOJ. Those individuals are not given the opportunity.
305
00:17:06.849 --> 00:17:10.109
If you're assigning them a task, they can't say, this
306
00:17:10.190 --> 00:17:13.789
feels political, or I don't think I want to work
307
00:17:13.849 --> 00:17:17.130
on that because I'm a Trump supporter or a Biden supporter.
308
00:17:17.789 --> 00:17:18.789
Is that the case?
309
00:17:19.539 --> 00:17:23.319
That's correct. And I think, again, for people like Brian
310
00:17:23.359 --> 00:17:28.829
and I, it is just... 101 Justice Department, FBI. Politics
311
00:17:28.869 --> 00:17:30.930
doesn't play a role in these things. People don't talk
312
00:17:30.990 --> 00:17:34.009
about stuff like that. People don't bring up stuff like that.
313
00:17:34.890 --> 00:17:38.779
The team of agents who worked on the cases I investigated, John,
314
00:17:38.819 --> 00:17:42.000
I've been doing this for 30 years. These people were superstars.
315
00:17:42.480 --> 00:17:45.519
They were the best of the best. A lot of
316
00:17:45.539 --> 00:17:48.480
them were veterans, people who'd served their country in all
317
00:17:48.500 --> 00:17:52.839
different sorts of ways. And to see those folks demonized
318
00:17:53.839 --> 00:17:57.869
and cast aside I just– one of the reasons I've
319
00:17:57.910 --> 00:18:00.410
been so lucky to meet Brian and get to chat
320
00:18:00.430 --> 00:18:04.170
with him is Brian is a perfect example of if
321
00:18:04.259 --> 00:18:06.839
you think our country is safer when we get rid
322
00:18:06.880 --> 00:18:10.579
of people like this, you don't know anything about national security.
323
00:18:10.599 --> 00:18:12.859
You don't know anything about fighting corruption in our country.
324
00:18:13.539 --> 00:18:16.559
I think it's very easy to demonize people as faceless
325
00:18:16.599 --> 00:18:20.099
bureaucrats when they're not there to tell their story. But
326
00:18:20.119 --> 00:18:22.079
when you get an example of the sort of people
327
00:18:22.119 --> 00:18:24.359
who worked on my case, the people Brian spent his
328
00:18:24.400 --> 00:18:28.319
career with, it becomes very hard to defend the actions
329
00:18:28.400 --> 00:18:32.200
against these people. I have seen this attack on the
330
00:18:32.240 --> 00:18:35.589
rule of law. Brian used the word process. I think
331
00:18:35.619 --> 00:18:38.170
if you want to use one sort of metric to
332
00:18:38.230 --> 00:18:43.589
measure this, it's are you going to get predetermined outcomes
333
00:18:43.670 --> 00:18:45.950
no matter what, hell or high water, or are you
334
00:18:45.970 --> 00:18:49.650
going to follow a good process? We followed process when
335
00:18:49.690 --> 00:18:52.609
we did our investigation just like I had throughout my career.
336
00:18:53.450 --> 00:18:55.769
And the outcome of that process and those facts is
337
00:18:55.829 --> 00:18:57.829
what it is. And whether people like it or don't
338
00:18:57.869 --> 00:19:01.509
like it, that's how you do the job well. And
339
00:19:01.549 --> 00:19:03.210
it's the same thing with these agents who were fired.
340
00:19:03.250 --> 00:19:06.599
There was no process. Brian was trying to protect these
341
00:19:06.700 --> 00:19:12.019
agents and he lost a career that he cherished, that
342
00:19:12.059 --> 00:19:14.900
he devoted his life to for doing the right thing.
343
00:19:15.960 --> 00:19:16.680
I feel like.
344
00:19:16.599 --> 00:19:18.519
Stories like that, we need to talk about it more
345
00:19:18.559 --> 00:19:22.099
because to me in my career, The rule of law
346
00:19:22.140 --> 00:19:25.160
was never a partisan thing. It wasn't a Republican Democrat thing.
347
00:19:25.880 --> 00:19:29.829
And I just can't imagine that people of goodwill could
348
00:19:29.880 --> 00:19:33.509
hear stories like Brian's story, the stories of the agents
349
00:19:33.549 --> 00:19:37.450
who worked on my case and say, no, that's okay.
350
00:19:37.509 --> 00:19:38.710
I'm down with that. That's good.
351
00:19:39.410 --> 00:19:42.730
These are the people who– these are role models. You
352
00:19:42.750 --> 00:19:44.490
want to raise your kids to be like these people
353
00:19:45.269 --> 00:19:48.450
and to have them victimized. It's unfair to them, but
354
00:19:48.490 --> 00:19:50.460
we're all going to pay a cost for it. both
355
00:19:50.519 --> 00:19:51.839
in the short term and in the long term.
356
00:19:58.720 --> 00:20:00.930
Mint Mobile. I don't know what you want out of
357
00:20:00.970 --> 00:20:01.609
a phone company.
358
00:20:01.890 --> 00:20:03.829
What I want out of a phone company is deliver
359
00:20:03.869 --> 00:20:07.670
me a good product for less and don't bother me.
360
00:20:08.470 --> 00:20:12.269
Don't bother me with the like, Oh, have you heard
361
00:20:12.309 --> 00:20:16.369
about our new program? You can upgrade to it. It'll
362
00:20:16.390 --> 00:20:19.410
just cost you a lot more. And then they like
363
00:20:19.650 --> 00:20:22.930
call you a bunch on their own phone. Think about that.
364
00:20:23.269 --> 00:20:26.970
Think about the diabolical mind games that phone companies are
365
00:20:27.009 --> 00:20:30.690
playing by like locking you into an expensive phone program
366
00:20:30.880 --> 00:20:34.279
and then using the very item that they sold you
367
00:20:34.559 --> 00:20:39.809
to contact you. about paying more for some ridiculous upgrade
368
00:20:39.829 --> 00:20:43.730
that's not even really an upgrade. Oh, they're diabolical, but
369
00:20:43.769 --> 00:20:46.390
not Mint Mobile. Mint Mobile plan, 15 bucks a month.
370
00:20:46.390 --> 00:20:52.779
15 bucks a month. What is it? 1992?
371
00:20:52.779 --> 00:20:53.650
15 bucks a month.
372
00:20:53.900 --> 00:20:56.480
High-speed data, unlimited talk and text delivered on the nation's
373
00:20:56.519 --> 00:20:58.819
largest 5G network. To get your new wireless plan for
374
00:20:58.839 --> 00:21:01.460
just 15 bucks a month, go to mintmobile.com slash TWS.
375
00:21:01.700 --> 00:21:07.740
That's mintmobile.com slash TWS. Got your wireless bill to 15
376
00:21:07.740 --> 00:21:12.630
bucks a month at mintmobile.com slash TWS. That's it.
377
00:21:13.210 --> 00:21:14.009
There's no catch.
378
00:21:15.029 --> 00:21:18.309
Upfront payments of $ 45 for three months, $ 90 for six months,
379
00:21:18.509 --> 00:21:22.430
or $ 180 for 12 months. Plan required. $ 15 per month equivalent.
380
00:21:22.750 --> 00:21:25.589
Taxes and fees extra. Initial plan term only. Greater than
381
00:21:25.589 --> 00:21:28.529
50 gigabytes. May slow when network is busy. Includes up
382
00:21:28.569 --> 00:21:33.099
to 20 gigabyte hotspot. Capable device required. Availability, speed, and
383
00:21:33.150 --> 00:21:43.910
coverage varies. See mintmobile.com. I really hope they speed that up. Well,
384
00:21:43.930 --> 00:21:46.309
let's try and tease apart sort of the idea of
385
00:21:46.650 --> 00:21:50.309
special counsels and then just the general DOJ operations, because
386
00:21:50.329 --> 00:21:53.210
I do think there are slight differences and special counsels are,
387
00:21:53.990 --> 00:21:57.589
I think, more inherently political, maybe than, you know, just
388
00:21:57.650 --> 00:22:01.309
the general workings of the DOJ in terms of the
389
00:22:01.329 --> 00:22:04.950
types of prosecutions that they do. So, Brian, first of all,
390
00:22:06.279 --> 00:22:08.079
The first question I would ask is, do you feel
391
00:22:08.140 --> 00:22:11.869
the difference when you're working as an FBI agent or,
392
00:22:12.869 --> 00:22:15.289
you know, Jack, when you're working just as a regular
393
00:22:16.750 --> 00:22:21.069
person within the DOJ when administrations change? Do you feel
394
00:22:21.109 --> 00:22:25.410
the difference between an Obama administration and a Trump administration
395
00:22:25.549 --> 00:22:29.599
or or first Trump administration and second Trump administration or
396
00:22:29.680 --> 00:22:35.480
Biden administration? Brian, how does that play out within the organization?
397
00:22:36.700 --> 00:22:41.450
Listen, every administration has their priorities and that's okay. That's
398
00:22:41.490 --> 00:22:43.950
a part of doing business in America. And that's one
399
00:22:43.990 --> 00:22:46.930
of the beautiful things about this country. I think the
400
00:22:46.970 --> 00:22:49.950
best way I could answer that question is very rarely
401
00:22:49.990 --> 00:22:52.109
did I, and I, my career, as well as the
402
00:22:52.150 --> 00:22:55.950
careers of those senior engineering me have transcended administrations. It
403
00:22:55.990 --> 00:23:00.130
has not changed the way we go about doing the job.
404
00:23:00.190 --> 00:23:02.170
And I think the best way to illustrate that, it
405
00:23:02.190 --> 00:23:05.299
kind of demystify what it's like to be an FBI
406
00:23:05.400 --> 00:23:10.130
agent for, the general American or otherwise out there is
407
00:23:10.190 --> 00:23:13.859
to talk about what's on the center of the FBI
408
00:23:13.920 --> 00:23:18.299
badge itself. And it's a depiction of Lady Justice. She's
409
00:23:18.339 --> 00:23:24.000
adorned with three things, scales, a sword, and a blindfold.
410
00:23:24.809 --> 00:23:30.170
The scales symbolize careful weighing of evidence and process and
411
00:23:30.289 --> 00:23:33.940
fairness and balance. The sword is the authority and the
412
00:23:34.359 --> 00:23:38.700
very serious and respected power of enforcing that law. And
413
00:23:38.720 --> 00:23:47.890
the blindfold is the ideal of performing that job with impartiality, objectivity,
414
00:23:48.309 --> 00:23:53.789
and without favor. And when that blindfold is removed and
415
00:23:53.809 --> 00:23:58.339
the scales are disregarded or are tipped because of an
416
00:23:58.390 --> 00:24:03.910
agenda or an influence that's inappropriate, and the sword swings wildly,
417
00:24:03.930 --> 00:24:06.140
then we have some problems.
418
00:24:07.000 --> 00:24:10.000
I want to give people a fuller picture because I think, look,
419
00:24:10.799 --> 00:24:13.220
everybody understands that people that are working in these public
420
00:24:13.240 --> 00:24:18.289
services are doing so probably with less financial reward than
421
00:24:18.329 --> 00:24:20.710
they would if they were going off and doing it
422
00:24:20.809 --> 00:24:24.170
in a more mercenary type operation. But everybody also has
423
00:24:24.210 --> 00:24:28.609
concerns about the excesses and abuses of the legal system,
424
00:24:29.009 --> 00:24:31.670
of the DOJ. There's I want to see if we
425
00:24:31.710 --> 00:24:36.960
can separate out political abuses and power abuses, if that
426
00:24:37.000 --> 00:24:42.740
makes sense. What you're discussing are, you're seeing now political abuses.
427
00:24:43.299 --> 00:24:49.390
How do they internally remediate other kinds of abuses? Because
428
00:24:49.410 --> 00:24:51.150
there's certainly a lot of people out there who might say,
429
00:24:52.410 --> 00:24:54.369
if I had to go up against the FBI, I
430
00:24:54.410 --> 00:24:56.910
couldn't do it. The resources that they have, everything that
431
00:24:56.930 --> 00:25:00.089
they bring to bear, whether it's fair or not, you know,
432
00:25:00.390 --> 00:25:03.880
with RICO or they might want to squeeze somebody at
433
00:25:03.910 --> 00:25:05.960
a low level to get somebody higher. You know, people
434
00:25:06.000 --> 00:25:10.660
are always concerned about overreach within legal jurisdiction.
435
00:25:11.940 --> 00:25:17.839
So I am not concerned about the FBI employees abusing
436
00:25:17.880 --> 00:25:22.690
their authority and power. There are at full strength 38,000
437
00:25:22.690 --> 00:25:25.789
FBI employees that are there for a reason. And it
438
00:25:25.930 --> 00:25:29.630
is to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution.
439
00:25:30.319 --> 00:25:33.960
And everybody has a line. And I have never met
440
00:25:34.240 --> 00:25:38.599
anybody in 21 years, almost 21 years, as a federal
441
00:25:38.700 --> 00:25:43.349
agent that has or would be willing to cross that line.
442
00:25:43.980 --> 00:25:46.910
And how does the FBI police that within its own ranks?
443
00:25:48.049 --> 00:25:50.150
Oh, there's layers.
444
00:25:50.670 --> 00:25:51.230
Okay.
445
00:25:51.250 --> 00:25:55.529
There's an entire inspections division. There's Office of Professional Responsibility.
446
00:25:56.339 --> 00:25:58.579
And the DOJ, there's checks and balances throughout.
447
00:25:59.099 --> 00:26:01.480
And these are put in, I assume, after sort of
448
00:26:01.539 --> 00:26:07.230
Hoover's reign, where trust within the FBI plummets when they
449
00:26:07.269 --> 00:26:09.710
find out, oh, they're getting recordings of Martin Luther King
450
00:26:09.730 --> 00:26:12.509
and all these. So they've layered in a lot of
451
00:26:12.589 --> 00:26:14.710
safeguards for that type of abuse.
452
00:26:15.190 --> 00:26:15.410
Right.
453
00:26:15.509 --> 00:26:19.160
And it's an imperfect organization with a sordid history led
454
00:26:19.200 --> 00:26:24.240
by imperfect men and women. But I've never met anybody
455
00:26:24.660 --> 00:26:29.779
with malicious intent. to leverage the FBI to corrupt or
456
00:26:30.140 --> 00:26:32.390
violate the rights of the American citizens.
457
00:26:32.829 --> 00:26:34.869
And Jack, same question for you in terms of more
458
00:26:34.890 --> 00:26:38.450
of the DOJ aspect of it and the authorities, because,
459
00:26:39.150 --> 00:26:42.009
you know, look, there is, and I think a fair
460
00:26:42.089 --> 00:26:45.470
criticism to be made that when the federal government brings
461
00:26:45.509 --> 00:26:48.650
to bear all of its resources against a citizen, that
462
00:26:48.710 --> 00:26:53.460
citizen is up against it. I believe the phrase is
463
00:26:53.480 --> 00:26:56.529
Schitt's Creek without a paddle. It's very difficult to go
464
00:26:56.569 --> 00:26:59.769
up against that. How does DOJ protect against those kinds
465
00:26:59.809 --> 00:27:00.250
of abuses?
466
00:27:00.630 --> 00:27:03.549
Yeah. So I think these are really important topics. First
467
00:27:03.869 --> 00:27:07.490
is just my experience. Been in the department as a
468
00:27:07.529 --> 00:27:12.839
prosecutor for decades. To your point, John, I'm not saying
469
00:27:12.920 --> 00:27:15.299
the DOJ has been perfect at every step. It's a
470
00:27:15.339 --> 00:27:18.640
human endeavor, right? But what I saw is similar to
471
00:27:18.680 --> 00:27:22.700
what Brian saw. People of goodwill trying. Trying to do
472
00:27:22.740 --> 00:27:24.339
the right thing. Are mistakes made?
473
00:27:24.400 --> 00:27:24.640
Sure.
474
00:27:24.839 --> 00:27:27.619
But good prosecutors, they correct it when they make a mistake.
475
00:27:28.660 --> 00:27:31.500
In terms of the power, that goes back to the
476
00:27:31.539 --> 00:27:35.759
point I was making earlier that to be a prosecutor,
477
00:27:35.819 --> 00:27:37.769
you have to make choices. You have to make judgments
478
00:27:37.849 --> 00:27:40.670
about to bring this case. Don't bring that case. It
479
00:27:40.730 --> 00:27:44.630
is so important that the people in the roles with
480
00:27:44.809 --> 00:27:48.569
that serious amount of power are doing it the right
481
00:27:48.609 --> 00:27:50.710
way and for the right reasons. And they're not doing
482
00:27:50.750 --> 00:27:53.549
it for political reasons. They're doing it because they looked
483
00:27:53.569 --> 00:27:56.569
at the facts and they didn't have a preconceived notion
484
00:27:56.809 --> 00:28:00.250
of the outcome beforehand. That's always going to be tough.
485
00:28:00.269 --> 00:28:02.960
And no matter what decision I make as a prosecutor,
486
00:28:03.539 --> 00:28:05.140
if it's a big case, there's going to be certain
487
00:28:05.180 --> 00:28:07.200
people who think it's unfair and certain people who think
488
00:28:07.259 --> 00:28:10.359
it's great. We can't get away if we're going to
489
00:28:10.380 --> 00:28:14.619
have a justice system of having prosecutors have a discretion
490
00:28:14.940 --> 00:28:18.210
about which cases to bring. And we can talk a
491
00:28:18.230 --> 00:28:20.549
bunch about the different ways we can make the department better.
492
00:28:20.609 --> 00:28:23.569
But the biggest one is to put people in the
493
00:28:23.609 --> 00:28:27.869
roles making those decisions who have experience and expertise. One
494
00:28:27.910 --> 00:28:30.390
of the things I think we see today is the
495
00:28:30.430 --> 00:28:33.150
attack on public servants is an attack on expertise that
496
00:28:33.170 --> 00:28:36.619
you actually don't need a lot of experience or judgment
497
00:28:36.740 --> 00:28:39.880
to do this job. And so making sure that people
498
00:28:39.920 --> 00:28:42.420
are qualified for the jobs they have, that they've earned
499
00:28:42.480 --> 00:28:46.769
the responsibility they're being given in significant cases. And then
500
00:28:46.809 --> 00:28:49.569
to protect those public servants. I think the thing now
501
00:28:49.630 --> 00:28:52.869
that's different than any time in my career is the
502
00:28:52.990 --> 00:28:56.670
idea that you could make a prosecutorial decision. And because
503
00:28:56.690 --> 00:28:59.539
of that, just because someone later didn't like it, you
504
00:28:59.579 --> 00:29:01.920
get fired. Or maybe even you don't make a decision.
505
00:29:01.960 --> 00:29:05.720
You just randomly get assigned to a case. That sort
506
00:29:05.759 --> 00:29:09.099
of randomness, that chills people from doing their job. And
507
00:29:09.299 --> 00:29:12.569
my view is it's intentional. They're trying to chill people
508
00:29:12.609 --> 00:29:15.329
and they're trying to send a message. That if you
509
00:29:15.369 --> 00:29:18.410
come– if you investigate people who are my friends or
510
00:29:18.450 --> 00:29:21.059
my allies, you're going to pay a price for it.
511
00:29:21.380 --> 00:29:24.599
And it's interesting you talk about the power dynamics because
512
00:29:25.200 --> 00:29:27.880
I think what you're saying is real. And as a prosecutor,
513
00:29:27.960 --> 00:29:31.420
I always felt it very important to think about that.
514
00:29:31.460 --> 00:29:33.220
Think about like if I'm going to issue a subpoena,
515
00:29:33.309 --> 00:29:36.009
if I'm going to investigate this, this is a big
516
00:29:36.250 --> 00:29:38.670
thing in this person's life and being thoughtful about it
517
00:29:38.869 --> 00:29:41.640
and following the process. to make sure I treat person
518
00:29:41.799 --> 00:29:45.279
A the same as I treat person B. But at
519
00:29:45.319 --> 00:29:50.240
the same time, we have a situation now where these
520
00:29:50.279 --> 00:29:54.190
public servants who have devoted their lives to the craft
521
00:29:54.230 --> 00:29:56.730
of doing this the right way, and they're not getting
522
00:29:56.789 --> 00:30:02.460
any process whatsoever. And again, my biggest concern is that
523
00:30:03.140 --> 00:30:07.119
we're not highlighting that enough because if those people can't
524
00:30:07.180 --> 00:30:09.680
do their jobs right, the concern that you have, John.
525
00:30:10.140 --> 00:30:11.019
It's exacerbated.
526
00:30:12.420 --> 00:30:13.740
The whole thing becomes politicized.
527
00:30:14.279 --> 00:30:17.160
Politicized and also or just fear, right? I mean, there's
528
00:30:17.180 --> 00:30:20.130
so many knock-on effects. You have people who like, we
529
00:30:20.150 --> 00:30:22.230
should totally open this case, but I might get fired
530
00:30:22.250 --> 00:30:24.309
for doing it. I'm not going to do it. Then
531
00:30:24.349 --> 00:30:27.349
you have people quitting, right? Because they're like, I can't
532
00:30:27.410 --> 00:30:28.789
be a part of this. I don't want to be
533
00:30:28.849 --> 00:30:32.369
labeled as someone who is so different than how I
534
00:30:32.390 --> 00:30:35.750
was raised as a prosecutor. And for me, the biggest
535
00:30:35.789 --> 00:30:41.119
concern is that we have young people who were, you know,
536
00:30:41.180 --> 00:30:43.640
when Brian and I were 20 years old and I
537
00:30:43.680 --> 00:30:45.259
wanted to be a prosecutor and he wanted to be
538
00:30:45.299 --> 00:30:47.839
an agent. I have a concern right now that the
539
00:30:47.880 --> 00:30:50.180
people who are that age and are thinking about what
540
00:30:50.200 --> 00:30:53.349
they're going to do as public servants, they're like, no way,
541
00:30:53.670 --> 00:30:55.619
no way I'm doing this. And I'm going to lose
542
00:30:55.650 --> 00:30:59.500
my job for nothing. And we will suffer a much
543
00:31:00.079 --> 00:31:03.619
greater cost for that than anything else going on. That's
544
00:31:03.680 --> 00:31:08.309
the hardest thing. If people are driven away from public service,
545
00:31:08.369 --> 00:31:11.869
nonpartisan people who just want to serve, that's the hardest
546
00:31:11.890 --> 00:31:12.650
thing to correct for.
547
00:31:13.049 --> 00:31:15.109
Well, how can they not? I mean, I want to
548
00:31:15.130 --> 00:31:16.329
talk about your case for a second, Jack, and then
549
00:31:16.349 --> 00:31:19.430
we'll go back to you, Brian. But When I see
550
00:31:19.470 --> 00:31:22.210
the just level of abuse that was leveled at you
551
00:31:23.150 --> 00:31:26.750
as somebody who was doing that special prosecution case, we
552
00:31:26.769 --> 00:31:29.130
can talk a little bit later about some decisions that
553
00:31:29.170 --> 00:31:34.710
maybe were questioned or not questioned, but the threats that
554
00:31:34.779 --> 00:31:39.700
came down upon you, I would think would be enough
555
00:31:39.759 --> 00:31:44.579
to discourage almost anybody, whether it be somebody within the
556
00:31:44.619 --> 00:31:46.900
DOJ that's gonna take case or somebody that's being asked
557
00:31:46.940 --> 00:31:50.150
to work on that case, It would discourage them. I mean,
558
00:31:50.730 --> 00:31:54.079
the president of the United States was calling you a
559
00:31:54.359 --> 00:31:59.180
psycho who should be in jail. I don't understand how
560
00:32:00.420 --> 00:32:02.720
anyone in their right mind would want to take on
561
00:32:03.259 --> 00:32:05.289
that kind of potential for abuse.
562
00:32:06.349 --> 00:32:09.170
Yeah. I mean, I don't spend a lot of time
563
00:32:09.349 --> 00:32:12.410
thinking about the names I'm being called by the president.
564
00:32:13.329 --> 00:32:16.309
And for me, I mean, we talk about like overcoming
565
00:32:16.349 --> 00:32:18.809
things or facing things. I'm a guy who just did
566
00:32:18.829 --> 00:32:21.509
my job, right? I've been doing it for a long time.
567
00:32:22.069 --> 00:32:24.269
I followed the same traditions and I worked with the
568
00:32:24.309 --> 00:32:26.230
same sort of people I had all through my career.
569
00:32:26.930 --> 00:32:29.990
There's nothing really special about that. A guy like Brian,
570
00:32:30.009 --> 00:32:32.730
on the other hand, is a guy who could have
571
00:32:32.750 --> 00:32:35.430
went along, could have said, here you go. Here's the names.
572
00:32:35.930 --> 00:32:36.569
Here you go.
573
00:32:37.529 --> 00:32:41.150
Fire these people. People like him and there's others. Brian's
574
00:32:41.190 --> 00:32:44.890
an example, but there's many others stood up, lost something
575
00:32:45.730 --> 00:32:48.920
that they built their lives around. because they wouldn't do
576
00:32:48.960 --> 00:32:50.519
the wrong thing and had to do the right thing.
577
00:32:52.400 --> 00:32:55.700
I feel like the more we can celebrate that and
578
00:32:55.839 --> 00:32:59.299
use that as a differentiator, the better we'll be.
579
00:32:59.940 --> 00:33:01.549
Brian, I thought Jack was the hero here. It turns
580
00:33:01.589 --> 00:33:03.329
out you're the hero.
581
00:33:03.349 --> 00:33:04.470
No, Jack's the hero.
582
00:33:04.490 --> 00:33:05.990
I was going for Jack here as the hero. It
583
00:33:06.009 --> 00:33:06.950
turns out Brian's the hero.
584
00:33:07.509 --> 00:33:11.710
Jack is too kind. He is absolutely a hero. Jack,
585
00:33:11.730 --> 00:33:14.819
I appreciate you. You know that, brother. I do want
586
00:33:14.839 --> 00:33:17.759
to add something to what Jack said before is where
587
00:33:17.819 --> 00:33:23.039
I find peace and hope with those of us who
588
00:33:23.099 --> 00:33:28.119
have been either forced into retirement or wrongfully terminated or otherwise.
589
00:33:28.140 --> 00:33:32.180
I talk to most, if not all of those people
590
00:33:32.720 --> 00:33:38.329
whose careers and frankly their life's purposes were disrupted or
591
00:33:39.069 --> 00:33:43.549
interrupted during this period of time. And to a person
592
00:33:44.160 --> 00:33:48.049
Each one of them intends to go back and serve.
593
00:33:48.930 --> 00:33:53.009
And I'm one of them, obviously. And these are people
594
00:33:53.069 --> 00:33:56.269
that were just doing their job, like Jack said. We
595
00:33:56.289 --> 00:34:01.049
didn't sign up for praise or awards or chest candy medals,
596
00:34:01.109 --> 00:34:02.950
all this stuff. We signed up to do our job
597
00:34:02.990 --> 00:34:05.269
because we believe in it and we believe in doing
598
00:34:05.289 --> 00:34:06.970
the right thing. That doesn't change.
599
00:34:07.390 --> 00:34:09.559
Brian, do you have a sense of how many people
600
00:34:09.719 --> 00:34:14.630
have been removed because of working on cases that the
601
00:34:14.650 --> 00:34:18.530
Trump administration deemed partisan? And how many have left just
602
00:34:18.570 --> 00:34:20.710
because they didn't want to be a part of this?
603
00:34:20.989 --> 00:34:24.659
And how many that are left there have their work
604
00:34:25.179 --> 00:34:26.980
chilled because of what's happened?
605
00:34:27.880 --> 00:34:29.719
I don't have a number, but one is too many.
606
00:34:30.219 --> 00:34:30.420
Right.
607
00:34:30.780 --> 00:34:32.739
But it's significant. You would say there has been a
608
00:34:32.840 --> 00:34:34.110
significant drain.
609
00:34:34.889 --> 00:34:39.869
Absolutely. With experience. As the acting director, I watched my
610
00:34:39.929 --> 00:34:42.929
mentor's A lot of whom were my mentors and people
611
00:34:42.969 --> 00:34:45.590
who helped raise me in the organization get forced out.
612
00:34:46.369 --> 00:34:50.210
And then people started to be fired just because of
613
00:34:50.250 --> 00:34:52.340
the cases they were assigned to. And like I said,
614
00:34:52.380 --> 00:34:54.739
they all want to go back. These are veterans. These
615
00:34:54.800 --> 00:34:59.639
are agents. They're analysts who were at the top of
616
00:34:59.679 --> 00:35:03.159
their game, but also some newer employees who were assigned
617
00:35:03.199 --> 00:35:07.630
to these cases that want to go back and be
618
00:35:07.670 --> 00:35:10.059
an analyst. I got an email yesterday saying, From a
619
00:35:10.079 --> 00:35:12.960
guy who was a new analyst assigned to one of
620
00:35:13.000 --> 00:35:17.639
these cases, was fired, and hitting me up for guidance
621
00:35:17.800 --> 00:35:21.250
on once he does get back in, how to apply
622
00:35:21.289 --> 00:35:23.610
to be an agent because that was his goal. It's
623
00:35:23.630 --> 00:35:25.449
not everybody's goal, but it happened to be his. These
624
00:35:25.489 --> 00:35:26.409
people are motivated.
625
00:35:26.429 --> 00:35:27.630
It's feeling like a calling.
626
00:35:27.929 --> 00:35:28.789
It is a calling.
627
00:35:28.909 --> 00:35:29.590
And a service.
628
00:35:29.829 --> 00:35:32.210
Yes. And that is why, like Jack said, he doesn't
629
00:35:32.230 --> 00:35:35.840
spend a lot of time talking about the slings and
630
00:35:35.929 --> 00:35:39.579
arrows that people like us can be the recipients of.
631
00:35:40.739 --> 00:35:43.679
that matters not because we are unafraid. We just want
632
00:35:43.699 --> 00:35:44.050
to serve.
633
00:35:44.469 --> 00:35:45.630
I want to ask you a question too.
634
00:35:45.989 --> 00:35:49.329
You were asked specifically about, they basically said to you,
635
00:35:49.469 --> 00:35:53.369
you'll be okay as long as you've never donated to
636
00:35:53.570 --> 00:35:57.150
a Democrat or voted for Kamala Harris. Is that, did
637
00:35:57.190 --> 00:36:00.769
they ask you that specifically or is that something you're
638
00:36:00.809 --> 00:36:01.670
not allowed to talk about?
639
00:36:02.469 --> 00:36:05.320
No, it's documented in the complaint that was asked me
640
00:36:05.460 --> 00:36:10.869
specifically prior to going back down to headquarters as the
641
00:36:10.929 --> 00:36:14.289
acting deputy director. It was referred to as a vetting interview.
642
00:36:14.650 --> 00:36:14.809
Right.
643
00:36:15.110 --> 00:36:16.670
And I want to make very clear, the vetting to
644
00:36:16.690 --> 00:36:19.409
become an FBI agent is unbelievable. I mean, in terms
645
00:36:19.489 --> 00:36:22.440
of they'll interview everybody you've ever met. They'll put you
646
00:36:22.460 --> 00:36:25.739
through lie detectors. They put you through a process of
647
00:36:26.619 --> 00:36:29.280
making sure that there is nothing within your background that
648
00:36:29.320 --> 00:36:33.039
could be considered controversial or easily blackmailable or any of
649
00:36:33.099 --> 00:36:36.840
those other kinds of things to do that. Is that
650
00:36:36.909 --> 00:36:40.329
the first time in your service you were ever asked
651
00:36:40.389 --> 00:36:41.750
about a political affiliation?
652
00:36:42.130 --> 00:36:42.349
Yes.
653
00:36:43.170 --> 00:36:44.389
And had never been asked before?
654
00:36:44.750 --> 00:36:44.969
Never.
655
00:36:45.610 --> 00:36:46.590
Jack Smith, same question.
656
00:36:46.610 --> 00:36:49.050
Had you ever been asked about your political affiliation before
657
00:36:49.110 --> 00:36:50.929
getting a case? Had you ever been asked who you
658
00:36:50.989 --> 00:36:53.630
donated to? Has there ever been a question in terms
659
00:36:53.670 --> 00:36:55.550
of politics? I'm trying to get to the difference between
660
00:36:56.050 --> 00:36:58.989
When you start to remove, everybody can be considered a
661
00:36:59.030 --> 00:37:02.320
partisan depending on where you vote, but not everybody's an ideologue.
662
00:37:03.320 --> 00:37:04.420
And I want to get to a little bit of
663
00:37:04.440 --> 00:37:08.219
the difference between that. Jack, was there ever a partisan
664
00:37:08.940 --> 00:37:11.980
tilt to how you were asked to operate?
665
00:37:12.579 --> 00:37:14.920
Never. Even in the first Trump administration?
666
00:37:15.300 --> 00:37:17.800
Even in the first Trump administration. Look, John, I was
667
00:37:17.860 --> 00:37:21.750
working in Nashville as the first assistant, right? And it's
668
00:37:22.849 --> 00:37:26.630
before Trump's elected. Trump gets elected. I become the acting
669
00:37:26.730 --> 00:37:28.909
US attorney. The office did not change.
670
00:37:30.769 --> 00:37:32.050
We still did our job.
671
00:37:32.070 --> 00:37:34.010
And just to go back to a point you raised earlier,
672
00:37:35.329 --> 00:37:37.489
if a new administration comes in and they want to
673
00:37:37.570 --> 00:37:40.880
change policy, they want to say, we want to focus
674
00:37:41.139 --> 00:37:44.840
on immigration enforcement. We want to focus less on civil rights.
675
00:37:44.880 --> 00:37:47.900
We want to do environment. We don't want to do
676
00:37:47.940 --> 00:37:50.590
less of corruption. They get to do that. That is
677
00:37:50.659 --> 00:37:53.769
why elections happen. And I tell young people all the time,
678
00:37:54.500 --> 00:37:56.460
If you think you want to be a prosecutor but
679
00:37:56.500 --> 00:37:59.179
you only want to work for certain sorts of administrations
680
00:37:59.239 --> 00:38:02.530
in certain cases, career prosecutor is the wrong profession for you.
681
00:38:02.550 --> 00:38:04.289
You shouldn't do it.
682
00:38:05.150 --> 00:38:07.730
But at the same time, if you want to do
683
00:38:07.789 --> 00:38:09.849
those things, you want to change the policy, that's fine.
684
00:38:10.230 --> 00:38:11.269
But you have to follow the.
685
00:38:11.230 --> 00:38:14.340
Law and you have to follow doing things the right way.
686
00:38:15.179 --> 00:38:20.260
You don't investigate the victims of police shootings, right? You
687
00:38:20.280 --> 00:38:22.980
don't try to smear them and call them domestic terrorists
688
00:38:23.000 --> 00:38:26.650
or to set it a narrative. That is so far
689
00:38:26.730 --> 00:38:31.489
removed from anything I've experienced, both as a line prosecutor
690
00:38:31.710 --> 00:38:34.840
or in leadership positions. It's just never been even anything
691
00:38:34.880 --> 00:38:35.460
close to that.
692
00:38:46.320 --> 00:38:47.980
So what are we to make then of the people
693
00:38:48.000 --> 00:38:51.260
who are still there and they are told, find out
694
00:38:52.170 --> 00:38:56.929
what Letitia James' mortgage situation is like, find out. I mean,
695
00:38:57.110 --> 00:39:01.409
right now, they have weaponized it. It's very clear, and
696
00:39:01.659 --> 00:39:05.179
they've said it explicitly. They are going to go after
697
00:39:05.280 --> 00:39:10.840
those that they felt weaponized the DOJ against Trump. So
698
00:39:11.000 --> 00:39:15.969
if you're working there now, how do you respond to that?
699
00:39:17.789 --> 00:39:21.190
Should everybody quit? I mean, clearly, there's probably partisans there,
700
00:39:21.230 --> 00:39:23.219
but How do they deal with that, Brian?
701
00:39:23.239 --> 00:39:23.960
I'll ask you that.
702
00:39:25.039 --> 00:39:28.010
I think it's pretty black and white. If you receive
703
00:39:28.030 --> 00:39:30.360
a legal order or if it's in further investigation, of
704
00:39:30.389 --> 00:39:37.679
a properly, legally predicated investigation, then that's the job. If
705
00:39:37.699 --> 00:39:41.079
you're asked to cross that line into what is unethical, immoral,
706
00:39:41.179 --> 00:39:44.139
and illegal, then you have a decision to make. And
707
00:39:44.179 --> 00:39:45.340
that's what I've faced as well.
708
00:39:45.420 --> 00:39:48.579
But there are judgments associated with this. There are judgments
709
00:39:48.639 --> 00:39:50.659
in terms of, when to bring a case, you know,
710
00:39:50.920 --> 00:39:53.619
there is discretion. And I think you saw it when
711
00:39:53.639 --> 00:39:57.969
they brought in Lindsay Halligan. There was cases that career
712
00:39:58.030 --> 00:40:02.309
prosecutors felt were not, had not risen to the level
713
00:40:02.630 --> 00:40:05.550
of being, charges being brought.
714
00:40:06.329 --> 00:40:10.510
And that's the decision point. And that is not unilaterally
715
00:40:10.550 --> 00:40:14.969
decided by the FBI. The FBI doesn't make prosecutorial decisions.
716
00:40:15.050 --> 00:40:17.570
We work hand in hand with the DOJ. And then
717
00:40:17.610 --> 00:40:20.489
if it makes it to court, And then it needs
718
00:40:20.510 --> 00:40:21.570
to go through the process.
719
00:40:21.989 --> 00:40:22.170
Right.
720
00:40:22.710 --> 00:40:25.139
Jack, how do you think people should handle that?
721
00:40:25.260 --> 00:40:25.780
Yeah, sure.
722
00:40:25.820 --> 00:40:28.340
And this is something I talk to young people who
723
00:40:28.400 --> 00:40:30.619
are thinking of being prosecutors or people who are still
724
00:40:30.639 --> 00:40:32.159
in the department. I talk to them about it all
725
00:40:32.179 --> 00:40:34.119
the time. And my view is very similar to Brian's.
726
00:40:35.010 --> 00:40:38.030
If you can still do your job, DOJ, even today,
727
00:40:38.190 --> 00:40:40.449
does a lot of good things, a lot of important things,
728
00:40:40.489 --> 00:40:44.170
protecting communities around our country, protecting the safety of Americans,
729
00:40:44.230 --> 00:40:47.510
protecting our national security. A lot of people can do
730
00:40:47.530 --> 00:40:50.050
their job. Now, it could be in this administration, you're
731
00:40:50.070 --> 00:40:52.670
going to get asked to do something that is just wrong,
732
00:40:52.869 --> 00:40:57.250
just illegal, just corrupt. If that happens, your number is up.
733
00:40:57.409 --> 00:40:58.210
It's interesting.
734
00:40:58.869 --> 00:41:03.320
The people who I've talked to who are experienced serious prosecutors,
735
00:41:03.500 --> 00:41:06.500
they know the difference between those things. It's judgment, but
736
00:41:06.539 --> 00:41:10.739
it's not hard. You can look at Letitia James and
737
00:41:10.800 --> 00:41:13.579
look at her mortgage fraud situation and you can then.
738
00:41:13.739 --> 00:41:14.579
Get the facts together.
739
00:41:15.239 --> 00:41:19.000
But then ultimately you say, hey, as I understand the
740
00:41:19.039 --> 00:41:22.019
prosecutors in Virginia did, this is not a case anyone
741
00:41:22.039 --> 00:41:24.940
would ever bring. And then you might get fired for it,
742
00:41:24.949 --> 00:41:27.929
for telling the truth about how a case should be handled.
743
00:41:29.050 --> 00:41:33.190
And I think my view is that prosecutors and agents
744
00:41:33.230 --> 00:41:35.409
too should try to stay and.
745
00:41:35.369 --> 00:41:36.150
Do the right thing.
746
00:41:36.329 --> 00:41:38.820
And this isn't a matter– I've heard people say this
747
00:41:38.860 --> 00:41:40.579
isn't a matter of throwing sand in the gears.
748
00:41:41.260 --> 00:41:42.039
Just do your job.
749
00:41:42.679 --> 00:41:47.260
Do what you've done all along. And that– doing that
750
00:41:48.449 --> 00:41:51.789
makes it harder for them to weaponize the department. Just
751
00:41:51.869 --> 00:41:55.530
doing your job. If the rule of law, it doesn't work.
752
00:41:55.570 --> 00:41:59.409
The system doesn't hold if the people who enforce the
753
00:41:59.469 --> 00:42:02.550
law don't have integrity and character. But if they do,
754
00:42:03.469 --> 00:42:05.750
it's much harder to target people. That's why you see
755
00:42:05.789 --> 00:42:08.090
a lot of these prosecutions or the attempts to indict
756
00:42:08.699 --> 00:42:12.940
senators and congressmen for reciting the uniform code of military justice.
757
00:42:13.679 --> 00:42:17.820
They fall apart because A, real prosecutors won't do it
758
00:42:18.480 --> 00:42:21.500
and therefore the people they get to do it are incompetent.
759
00:42:21.880 --> 00:42:24.440
They don't actually know how to prosecute a case.
760
00:42:24.619 --> 00:42:26.300
The real estate lawyers, right?
761
00:42:26.320 --> 00:42:28.380
Yeah. They don't have any experience. I mean– and I
762
00:42:28.420 --> 00:42:31.550
think that's part of what we've seen that I think
763
00:42:31.949 --> 00:42:34.289
folks like Brian and I find very frustrating is this
764
00:42:34.409 --> 00:42:37.929
idea that you can do something that took us decades
765
00:42:37.989 --> 00:42:40.329
to learn how to do well. oh yeah, I can
766
00:42:40.369 --> 00:42:44.130
just walk in and I can investigate this incredibly complex case,
767
00:42:44.630 --> 00:42:46.530
follow department policy, follow the rules.
768
00:42:46.570 --> 00:42:47.409
Do it the right way.
769
00:42:47.449 --> 00:42:50.820
And I think one other thing that's important to understand, John,
770
00:42:50.840 --> 00:42:55.320
it's like a hallmark of this weaponization is what's happening
771
00:42:55.340 --> 00:42:58.760
in the courts. I mean, the decisions you're seeing from
772
00:42:58.820 --> 00:43:05.289
judges about the positions that DOJ is taking, corrupt, illegal, improper.
773
00:43:05.309 --> 00:43:09.239
I mean, there was a decision recently regarding subpoenas to
774
00:43:09.280 --> 00:43:15.949
officials in Minnesota for a sham investigation. The judge found
775
00:43:16.610 --> 00:43:19.389
that that was not a legitimate criminal investigation and that
776
00:43:19.409 --> 00:43:22.230
it was unlawful. It was meant to retaliate against people.
777
00:43:23.070 --> 00:43:26.949
And again, just the narrative, that judge, the judge was
778
00:43:26.989 --> 00:43:30.650
appointed by George Bush. That judge was a Scalia clerk.
779
00:43:31.010 --> 00:43:36.610
So this is not radical left lunatics making these determinations.
780
00:43:37.300 --> 00:43:40.500
This is the rule of law kind of right in
781
00:43:40.539 --> 00:43:43.980
front of us having that battle. And my view is
782
00:43:44.000 --> 00:43:46.780
that the most important thing we do now is when
783
00:43:46.820 --> 00:43:50.469
we see public servants and we see good people standing up,
784
00:43:51.239 --> 00:43:54.320
we support them. Those people need our support and our
785
00:43:54.360 --> 00:43:57.360
support will make a difference whether those people can continue
786
00:43:57.400 --> 00:43:57.869
to stand up.
787
00:43:58.320 --> 00:44:00.679
Is that the way you feel also within the FBI, Brian?
788
00:44:00.679 --> 00:44:01.619
100%.
789
00:44:01.619 --> 00:44:07.139
The amount of sacrifice... that the people in any agency,
790
00:44:07.179 --> 00:44:09.280
but I'll speak for the FBI, are making on a
791
00:44:09.360 --> 00:44:12.320
daily basis and who are willing to trade all their
792
00:44:12.340 --> 00:44:19.610
tomorrows to save your today is immeasurable. They're incredible human
793
00:44:19.650 --> 00:44:22.929
beings that are going through a lot. And they go
794
00:44:22.969 --> 00:44:25.550
through a lot. They always have, but they continue to
795
00:44:25.610 --> 00:44:27.570
every day and they don't complain about it. They make
796
00:44:27.610 --> 00:44:30.239
the sacrifices, whether that's being willing to make the ultimate
797
00:44:30.300 --> 00:44:36.260
sacrifice for somebody else or to navigate This different environment
798
00:44:36.440 --> 00:44:39.400
in which they are working to get the job done,
799
00:44:39.460 --> 00:44:41.340
not for themselves, but to protect you and me.
800
00:44:42.019 --> 00:44:44.550
Let's talk a little bit about this different environment and
801
00:44:44.590 --> 00:44:49.349
in terms of how, you know, Americans' faith in our
802
00:44:49.429 --> 00:44:53.769
legal system, I think, is waning, would be.
803
00:44:53.769 --> 00:44:54.690
Putting it politely.
804
00:44:55.820 --> 00:44:57.079
And I want to talk a little bit about the
805
00:44:57.119 --> 00:45:00.599
systemic changes that I think have caused that.
806
00:45:01.059 --> 00:45:02.820
Jack, you hit on it a little bit right there.
807
00:45:02.840 --> 00:45:04.659
You said, well, this is a judge that was appointed
808
00:45:04.699 --> 00:45:08.820
by Bush, and this was an Alito clerk. But think
809
00:45:08.880 --> 00:45:14.159
about that. We're so politicized to the point now. I mean,
810
00:45:14.199 --> 00:45:17.280
you face this, Jack, there was criticism that you brought
811
00:45:17.320 --> 00:45:20.219
the classified documents case down to Florida because there was
812
00:45:20.260 --> 00:45:22.780
a chance you might end up in Judge Cannon's court.
813
00:45:22.820 --> 00:45:26.320
Judge Cannon is a Trump, I think people would say
814
00:45:26.360 --> 00:45:29.469
not just partisan, but ideologue, and she would make decisions
815
00:45:29.769 --> 00:45:34.090
purely based on protecting her person. We've got the point
816
00:45:34.150 --> 00:45:38.570
now where we have teams. Judges are on teams. They're
817
00:45:38.610 --> 00:45:41.710
on the Democrat team. They're on the Republican team. And
818
00:45:41.789 --> 00:45:46.550
you can't expect fair justice if you're on the opposing squad.
819
00:45:47.070 --> 00:45:51.110
Is the entire system so politicized that there's, and we'll
820
00:45:51.159 --> 00:45:53.460
get into the Supreme Court of it all after this,
821
00:45:53.579 --> 00:45:58.260
but what do we do about the fact that that
822
00:45:58.340 --> 00:46:02.630
we now look to when decisions come down, whether or
823
00:46:02.730 --> 00:46:06.949
not that judge is an Obama judge, a Trump judge,
824
00:46:07.949 --> 00:46:08.750
and we use.
825
00:46:08.610 --> 00:46:09.969
That as part of justification.
826
00:46:09.989 --> 00:46:12.510
Well, that was a great decision because a Trump judge
827
00:46:13.340 --> 00:46:17.940
went against Trump world or an Obama judge went against
828
00:46:18.440 --> 00:46:19.159
the Democrats.
829
00:46:20.000 --> 00:46:21.079
What do you do about that?
830
00:46:21.940 --> 00:46:25.860
Yeah, I think the first thing is that that this
831
00:46:25.900 --> 00:46:28.440
judge was appointed by this person, this judge clerked for
832
00:46:28.460 --> 00:46:31.119
this person. I think it's a– and I raised it
833
00:46:31.340 --> 00:46:34.039
as it's sort of a response to the claim that
834
00:46:34.059 --> 00:46:38.880
they're all political, radical people against this particular president. From
835
00:46:38.920 --> 00:46:42.539
my point of view, in terms of getting credibility back,
836
00:46:42.900 --> 00:46:45.400
not only for the courts, but also for the Department
837
00:46:45.420 --> 00:46:48.340
of Justice, I think about it the same way I
838
00:46:48.380 --> 00:46:50.739
think about my work as a prosecutor. When I am
839
00:46:50.909 --> 00:46:54.619
going into court, I need to be credible with judges.
840
00:46:54.900 --> 00:46:57.159
I need to be credible with juries. I need to
841
00:46:57.179 --> 00:47:00.329
be credible with witnesses. How I do that as a
842
00:47:00.369 --> 00:47:05.989
prosecutor is I behave with values that we all share.
843
00:47:06.010 --> 00:47:11.230
I act with integrity. I tell the truth. I treat
844
00:47:11.289 --> 00:47:14.849
people with respect, whether they deserve it or not. I
845
00:47:15.320 --> 00:47:17.519
show kindness and I show courage if I need to.
846
00:47:18.820 --> 00:47:22.699
Those sort of values, those sort of traits, that's the
847
00:47:22.760 --> 00:47:26.320
fabric that binds us together. And my view is that
848
00:47:26.739 --> 00:47:30.079
we have to lean into that more than ever, and
849
00:47:30.099 --> 00:47:32.940
that we should be looking for people in positions leading
850
00:47:32.980 --> 00:47:37.739
these institutions or appointing judges who have not just will
851
00:47:37.840 --> 00:47:40.179
voice those traits, but have lived those traits.
852
00:47:40.980 --> 00:47:42.440
But that's not what the public sees.
853
00:47:42.500 --> 00:47:46.920
What the public sees is a judge in Florida that
854
00:47:47.199 --> 00:47:51.079
delays the case, that makes rulings that make it impossible
855
00:47:51.539 --> 00:47:52.860
for you to file.
856
00:47:53.840 --> 00:47:54.599
That changes things.
857
00:47:54.840 --> 00:48:00.599
And then they see a prosecutor yourself release a hundred and,
858
00:48:00.840 --> 00:48:05.340
I don't know, 65 page document about election interference right
859
00:48:05.380 --> 00:48:09.019
before the election that they feel is a political move
860
00:48:09.960 --> 00:48:15.530
on your part. So the tough part is everybody who's
861
00:48:15.570 --> 00:48:19.429
within those institutions can say, look, we're, we're working through
862
00:48:19.469 --> 00:48:24.070
process and we are doing it in values and morals
863
00:48:24.289 --> 00:48:26.809
that we think are fitting to the stature of the
864
00:48:26.849 --> 00:48:30.670
organizations that we're in. But the public isn't, that's not
865
00:48:30.750 --> 00:48:35.269
their experience with this. Their experience with this is it
866
00:48:35.349 --> 00:48:40.789
is a political game being played out through processes that
867
00:48:40.929 --> 00:48:43.469
we normally thought were apolitical.
868
00:48:44.510 --> 00:48:47.909
Yeah, I think that gets to, that's the next layer, right?
869
00:48:47.949 --> 00:48:52.159
That's like, communication. And to me, I was a prosecutor, right?
870
00:48:52.199 --> 00:48:55.360
My career, I was a guy, I spoke in the courtroom,
871
00:48:55.599 --> 00:48:56.739
not on the courthouse steps.
872
00:48:57.780 --> 00:48:58.639
If I did press.
873
00:48:58.460 --> 00:49:01.360
Conferences, I said the absolute minimum I had to say,
874
00:49:01.920 --> 00:49:03.420
and I got back to work. I didn't see that
875
00:49:03.460 --> 00:49:05.179
as part of my job. I saw my job as
876
00:49:05.219 --> 00:49:08.039
working with people like Brian to actually do the work.
877
00:49:09.159 --> 00:49:11.219
I think what we've learned, to your point, John, is
878
00:49:11.320 --> 00:49:14.840
that there is another component to being a leader in
879
00:49:14.860 --> 00:49:15.800
the Justice Department.
880
00:49:16.360 --> 00:49:17.639
Maybe the largest component.
881
00:49:17.989 --> 00:49:20.780
Well, I would differ with you on that. because I
882
00:49:20.820 --> 00:49:22.739
don't want to get where the next leaders of the
883
00:49:22.780 --> 00:49:25.860
Department of Justice are comms people, right? And they don't
884
00:49:25.889 --> 00:49:30.050
know anything about prosecuting cases. I just think that people– look,
885
00:49:30.110 --> 00:49:33.829
the people who are good prosecutors– they are good communicators.
886
00:49:33.869 --> 00:49:36.389
They have to win juries over. They have to win
887
00:49:36.429 --> 00:49:39.269
judges over. I think in the past, we just haven't
888
00:49:39.369 --> 00:49:42.179
taken it as part of our job to have this
889
00:49:42.219 --> 00:49:44.599
larger conversation. I mean, for me, I grew up in
890
00:49:44.639 --> 00:49:48.460
upstate New York. I grew up outside of Syracuse. I
891
00:49:48.500 --> 00:49:52.800
think a lot of folks in Washington don't think that
892
00:49:52.840 --> 00:49:55.300
they need to communicate necessarily to those people. We talk
893
00:49:55.320 --> 00:49:58.869
to people in Washington. I would love to see future
894
00:49:58.909 --> 00:50:02.650
leaders of the Justice Department trying to explain what they're
895
00:50:02.670 --> 00:50:06.489
doing to people outside of just the legal community, outside
896
00:50:06.530 --> 00:50:09.030
of just Washington, D.C. I think it's hard to be
897
00:50:09.230 --> 00:50:12.429
real fair. You got a right to a fair trial, right?
898
00:50:12.510 --> 00:50:14.610
You can't be talking about– you shouldn't be talking about
899
00:50:14.650 --> 00:50:18.039
a case, the specifics of a case while it's pending.
900
00:50:18.840 --> 00:50:20.539
But I do think there's more we can do if
901
00:50:20.579 --> 00:50:24.159
we all agree that if you don't communicate these things
902
00:50:24.199 --> 00:50:26.320
that show integrity. Because if you have integrity and you
903
00:50:26.360 --> 00:50:30.940
have competence, it doesn't mean much if people don't know
904
00:50:30.980 --> 00:50:32.440
that and you can't communicate that.
905
00:50:33.039 --> 00:50:34.900
But is it just a, do you really think it's
906
00:50:34.920 --> 00:50:38.860
just a communications problem, Jack? Because, you know, and Brian,
907
00:50:38.880 --> 00:50:40.840
I'll ask you this too, you know, the FBI doesn't
908
00:50:40.880 --> 00:50:45.619
communicate their methodologies and their things. But I think people
909
00:50:46.059 --> 00:50:49.510
look at the way that these institutions, I'll go back
910
00:50:49.590 --> 00:50:52.349
to Brian, when you were first there, when Trump was
911
00:50:52.389 --> 00:50:55.889
going after the two FBI agents during the Russia investigation
912
00:50:56.269 --> 00:50:58.510
that he thought were, it was Page and Strzok, I
913
00:50:58.530 --> 00:51:03.219
think that were had an affair and he was ridiculing them.
914
00:51:04.000 --> 00:51:08.239
Is it enough for the FBI to just communicate.
915
00:51:07.659 --> 00:51:09.619
Better what they're doing?
916
00:51:10.099 --> 00:51:13.340
Or do we need to really look at the totality
917
00:51:13.389 --> 00:51:15.050
of a system that's been politicized?
918
00:51:15.070 --> 00:51:18.469
I think there's value in looking at the totality, but
919
00:51:18.550 --> 00:51:21.250
you can't look at the totality without a clear and
920
00:51:21.510 --> 00:51:27.150
depth of understanding of the process. And I think the FBI...
921
00:51:28.059 --> 00:51:31.460
has an interesting history of how they communicate those processes
922
00:51:32.000 --> 00:51:34.699
when they can and they can't always. But I think
923
00:51:34.820 --> 00:51:40.949
to Jack's point, you can rarely, in my experience, gain
924
00:51:41.309 --> 00:51:45.150
and earn trust and credibility through chest beating and being
925
00:51:45.190 --> 00:51:48.690
the loudest voice in the room and being the voice
926
00:51:48.730 --> 00:51:51.409
when we're living in these 18 inches between our phones
927
00:51:51.449 --> 00:51:57.400
and our faces with just clicks and content. It requires...
928
00:51:57.389 --> 00:52:05.530
Leadership with grace and poise and practice with clear messaging
929
00:52:06.280 --> 00:52:09.460
of what I can tell you, what I can't, and why.
930
00:52:10.559 --> 00:52:11.900
And then just hope for trust.
931
00:52:12.360 --> 00:52:15.579
But I don't think we get it. I'll give you
932
00:52:15.619 --> 00:52:19.480
two examples. First is January 6th. So the big story
933
00:52:19.539 --> 00:52:22.780
on the right is January 6th actually wasn't what we
934
00:52:22.820 --> 00:52:23.760
all saw that it was.
935
00:52:24.300 --> 00:52:25.829
It was an FBI op.
936
00:52:26.510 --> 00:52:28.730
There was a guy who was an FBI plant and
937
00:52:28.769 --> 00:52:30.510
he urged people to go in there. And there were
938
00:52:30.510 --> 00:52:33.750
600 FBI agents that were there that day. And they're
939
00:52:33.789 --> 00:52:36.889
the ones that stirred the pot. And they did all that.
940
00:52:37.210 --> 00:52:41.269
And so our entire understanding of this was actually the
941
00:52:41.429 --> 00:52:48.989
feds instigating an insurrection on January 6th. And that's their
942
00:52:49.070 --> 00:52:52.059
storyline as they're going to get through. And I'll give
943
00:52:52.079 --> 00:52:54.539
you the flip side of that on the left, which is,
944
00:52:54.929 --> 00:52:57.610
James Comey, who was the head of it at the time,
945
00:52:58.530 --> 00:53:00.909
announcing that he was going to do an investigation or
946
00:53:00.969 --> 00:53:04.460
reopen an investigation into Hillary Clinton, you know, a month
947
00:53:04.519 --> 00:53:08.159
before the election. And that's what sunk her chances. You know,
948
00:53:08.500 --> 00:53:12.920
those are the narratives that you're fighting. And I have
949
00:53:13.000 --> 00:53:15.760
not heard, you know, Comey has come out and said
950
00:53:15.800 --> 00:53:18.840
a few things about, well, I might not have done that,
951
00:53:18.880 --> 00:53:19.989
but I thought it was important.
952
00:53:20.030 --> 00:53:21.710
You know, he's explained certain things.
953
00:53:22.309 --> 00:53:27.019
The FBI hasn't really talked that much about who those
954
00:53:27.099 --> 00:53:29.630
agents were, what they were doing there, or any of
955
00:53:29.659 --> 00:53:31.090
those other situations.
956
00:53:31.869 --> 00:53:36.349
Yeah. Listen, what I'll say about that is that if
957
00:53:36.409 --> 00:53:41.090
the FBI expended its resources chasing down or debunking every
958
00:53:41.130 --> 00:53:44.760
conspiracy theory, they would be spending much less time focusing
959
00:53:44.820 --> 00:53:48.619
on national security and mitigating serious crime.
960
00:53:49.159 --> 00:53:51.480
Just some, though, raised to the level that need to
961
00:53:51.559 --> 00:53:54.199
be addressed more forcefully.
962
00:53:54.719 --> 00:53:58.519
Yeah, I think, and that comes with close and continuing
963
00:53:58.940 --> 00:54:02.880
communication with the public in a responsible manner. And I
964
00:54:02.940 --> 00:54:05.750
think that could fix a lot of the things that
965
00:54:05.769 --> 00:54:10.409
you're addressing. And honestly, when you're speaking about Director Comey
966
00:54:10.429 --> 00:54:14.170
and the others, I can't and won't speak for them.
967
00:54:14.190 --> 00:54:17.539
And they have their choices to make on their, not
968
00:54:17.599 --> 00:54:20.480
only their when and how they communicate, but the style
969
00:54:20.500 --> 00:54:22.639
in which they do so. And they're surrounded by very
970
00:54:22.679 --> 00:54:23.139
smart people.
971
00:54:23.760 --> 00:54:26.440
How hard is it now when the director of the FBI,
972
00:54:26.500 --> 00:54:29.380
Kash Patel, is one of the people who propagated the
973
00:54:29.420 --> 00:54:32.139
January 6th theory? That now you have somebody leading the
974
00:54:32.260 --> 00:54:36.000
FBI who was a proponent of that conspiracy. Yet, you know,
975
00:54:36.019 --> 00:54:37.760
there was a guy, Ray Epp, you know, they've never
976
00:54:37.820 --> 00:54:40.440
brought charges against any of those people. They've never actually
977
00:54:41.400 --> 00:54:44.400
given the information out there. They've never released certain files.
978
00:54:44.739 --> 00:54:49.699
You know, how do we retain faith in an institution
979
00:54:50.780 --> 00:54:55.800
that in some respects is won't defend itself forcefully, or
980
00:54:55.880 --> 00:54:59.530
in this particular case, is being led by someone who
981
00:54:59.570 --> 00:55:02.230
was one of the leading proponents that we shouldn't trust
982
00:55:02.269 --> 00:55:03.110
this organization.
983
00:55:04.150 --> 00:55:08.289
Yeah. So I understand that a fish stinks from the
984
00:55:08.329 --> 00:55:10.210
head kind of concept.
985
00:55:10.550 --> 00:55:11.159
I've heard that.
986
00:55:11.449 --> 00:55:14.719
However, I was only the head of that fish for
987
00:55:14.860 --> 00:55:16.940
a very short amount of time. However, I spent a
988
00:55:17.059 --> 00:55:22.250
lot of time with the people that, And shared risk
989
00:55:23.409 --> 00:55:28.730
of our lives with the people that actually work that organization.
990
00:55:29.329 --> 00:55:33.630
Like I said, 38,000 at full strength. One guy named
991
00:55:33.690 --> 00:55:38.449
as the director, right? Now, I think people need to
992
00:55:38.510 --> 00:55:42.210
trust that those people, they're not appointees. They're civil servants.
993
00:55:42.250 --> 00:55:44.610
They've given up a lot to be able to serve
994
00:55:44.650 --> 00:55:47.349
in their capacities. They've worked their asses off to do it.
995
00:55:48.130 --> 00:55:50.369
And their families have given up a lot. And that's
996
00:55:50.409 --> 00:55:53.130
where I find trust in them because I was one
997
00:55:53.170 --> 00:55:54.679
of them and I was with them and I'll do
998
00:55:54.719 --> 00:55:59.139
anything for them. Now, as far as the current director
999
00:55:59.460 --> 00:56:04.599
is concerned, on his first night after he was confirmed,
1000
00:56:05.460 --> 00:56:07.639
he came to the office and I had a few
1001
00:56:07.679 --> 00:56:10.480
minutes with him and I made him a promise in
1002
00:56:10.519 --> 00:56:13.840
that moment, not knowing how long I had left there.
1003
00:56:14.099 --> 00:56:17.030
I didn't have a crystal ball. I had some feelings
1004
00:56:17.070 --> 00:56:20.489
about it, but I promised him that I would do
1005
00:56:20.710 --> 00:56:23.829
everything in my power and whatever influence I had to
1006
00:56:23.889 --> 00:56:27.250
make him the best director we've ever had because we
1007
00:56:27.289 --> 00:56:29.320
need him to be. And if he fails, we fail.
1008
00:56:30.659 --> 00:56:35.599
That has not changed. Despite what people want to assign
1009
00:56:35.639 --> 00:56:38.340
to me as far as my opinions and thoughts, my
1010
00:56:38.380 --> 00:56:43.039
opinions are unproductive. I hope and root that he will
1011
00:56:43.699 --> 00:56:49.489
be better every day. I hope. that those in leadership positions,
1012
00:56:49.550 --> 00:56:51.670
not just in the FBI, but everywhere else that serves
1013
00:56:52.309 --> 00:56:56.949
our country, understands that having authority and being an authority
1014
00:56:57.329 --> 00:56:59.989
are not the same thing. And surround yourself with people
1015
00:57:00.909 --> 00:57:04.800
that are smarter and better and more experienced, and we'll
1016
00:57:04.840 --> 00:57:05.929
all be better off for it.
1017
00:57:06.440 --> 00:57:12.860
And how does that dysfunction present itself clearly within the organization,
1018
00:57:12.960 --> 00:57:16.809
chain of command, morale, eye on the prize in terms of,
1019
00:57:17.170 --> 00:57:20.250
Or is there literally like the majority of the FBI
1020
00:57:20.349 --> 00:57:23.409
is focused on those day-to-day tasks of protecting Americans and
1021
00:57:23.869 --> 00:57:25.670
making sure these threats don't go? And there is a
1022
00:57:25.829 --> 00:57:31.079
small kind of cadre, a kind of adjacent office that
1023
00:57:31.139 --> 00:57:33.300
is more focused on these partisan endeavors.
1024
00:57:34.039 --> 00:57:36.159
Well, let me caveat this with it. I'm out in
1025
00:57:36.199 --> 00:57:38.940
these streets, just like you guys. So I'm not in there.
1026
00:57:39.579 --> 00:57:45.260
But what you said is accurate. The majority of the
1027
00:57:45.300 --> 00:57:46.909
people there are doing their job.
1028
00:57:47.800 --> 00:57:50.980
And the priorities, they might shift to drug interdiction or
1029
00:57:51.019 --> 00:57:54.500
they might shift to trafficking or something else, but they're
1030
00:57:54.960 --> 00:58:00.000
still focused on the day-to-day task at hand and the
1031
00:58:00.059 --> 00:58:02.659
processes that were put in place to protect those tests.
1032
00:58:03.400 --> 00:58:03.659
Yes.
1033
00:58:03.960 --> 00:58:11.539
And if there are priorities or surges driven by the leadership,
1034
00:58:11.559 --> 00:58:14.659
then portions of the FBI will surge to that.
1035
00:58:15.260 --> 00:58:18.840
Well, like when they say we're now moving a bunch
1036
00:58:18.889 --> 00:58:23.690
of FBI agents to go to Atlanta and they're going
1037
00:58:23.710 --> 00:58:26.710
to go and they're going to raid election offices and
1038
00:58:26.730 --> 00:58:29.909
they're going to do all those things. And by all accounts,
1039
00:58:30.349 --> 00:58:33.960
they're moving a lot of manpower to do that. How
1040
00:58:34.019 --> 00:58:37.579
are we supposed to have faith in that organization anymore
1041
00:58:37.699 --> 00:58:42.900
when that's so clearly a partisan endeavor, an ideological endeavor?
1042
00:58:43.579 --> 00:58:43.719
Yeah.
1043
00:58:45.030 --> 00:58:46.960
Listen, I'm not going to be cute about it. That
1044
00:58:47.019 --> 00:58:49.940
is troubling to watch from the outside. I don't know
1045
00:58:51.519 --> 00:58:57.590
what's going into those decision matrix that are driving those investigations.
1046
00:58:58.349 --> 00:59:04.489
So I won't speak to the credibility of them. That said,
1047
00:59:04.630 --> 00:59:06.219
I will go back to what I said before. If
1048
00:59:06.340 --> 00:59:09.219
it is legal, if it's predicated, if all the things
1049
00:59:09.300 --> 00:59:11.949
have been done properly, then, you know.
1050
00:59:12.750 --> 00:59:15.530
Even if, look, even if just by the very nature
1051
00:59:15.570 --> 00:59:19.010
of doing it, that puts a chilling effect on the
1052
00:59:19.070 --> 00:59:21.989
electoral process in that area, the people that work there,
1053
00:59:22.320 --> 00:59:25.239
you know, we saw the hell that they put two
1054
00:59:25.300 --> 00:59:28.460
election workers through when they were looking there, you know,
1055
00:59:28.619 --> 00:59:32.280
these are the things that that I think very much
1056
00:59:32.460 --> 00:59:36.130
undermine that credibility that you guys are talking about and
1057
00:59:36.190 --> 00:59:39.110
the story that you guys are talking about in terms
1058
00:59:39.269 --> 00:59:43.010
of the individuals and the sacrifices they're making to protect us.
1059
00:59:43.670 --> 00:59:46.659
Yeah, I mean, and I think what's most vexing on
1060
00:59:46.719 --> 00:59:49.179
top of that is not just how the resources are
1061
00:59:49.219 --> 00:59:53.159
being allocated and what they're being allocated to, but what's
1062
00:59:53.199 --> 00:59:56.659
getting dropped. You know, what kind of actual threats are
1063
00:59:56.679 --> 01:00:02.800
being prioritized or deprioritized when that's happening. We have a
1064
01:00:02.880 --> 01:00:07.679
very heightened national security threat right now. Crime is going down,
1065
01:00:09.760 --> 01:00:13.699
speaking globally or nationally, which is great. I'm not going
1066
01:00:13.719 --> 01:00:16.730
to sit here and be ignorant enough to say everything
1067
01:00:17.289 --> 01:00:19.610
that these people are doing is bad. That's just not
1068
01:00:19.829 --> 01:00:24.090
the case. And it's irresponsible to say that. However, from
1069
01:00:24.130 --> 01:00:27.250
what I worked when I was in the With Jack
1070
01:00:27.730 --> 01:00:32.010
working in parallel, intersecting sometimes through people we share as
1071
01:00:32.030 --> 01:00:36.070
friends and colleagues, there are threats that we could use
1072
01:00:36.139 --> 01:00:39.920
more resources pointed at, you know, especially with the global
1073
01:00:41.599 --> 01:00:45.320
environment and what's happening all over the world right now.
1074
01:00:46.019 --> 01:00:46.940
Terrorism didn't stop.
1075
01:00:48.039 --> 01:00:48.239
Right.
1076
01:00:48.420 --> 01:00:49.719
And those threats don't stop.
1077
01:00:49.980 --> 01:00:53.610
Jack, I want to ask you about, you know, When DOJ,
1078
01:00:53.619 --> 01:00:55.210
when you've got the DOJ is headed up by the
1079
01:00:55.269 --> 01:00:57.650
president's personal lawyer. But I want to talk about other
1080
01:00:57.690 --> 01:01:02.429
structural things. DOJ, I always look at as you're fighting corruption, right?
1081
01:01:02.590 --> 01:01:08.789
It's influence peddling, bribes, the types of white collar crime
1082
01:01:09.289 --> 01:01:13.389
that is difficult to get your arms around and handle.
1083
01:01:13.769 --> 01:01:18.469
But it seems as though the Supreme Court has made
1084
01:01:18.530 --> 01:01:22.960
that job. Forget about Trump and politicizing these things. It
1085
01:01:23.019 --> 01:01:28.349
seems as though corruption, as we typically understood it, has
1086
01:01:28.389 --> 01:01:32.389
been redefined by the Supreme Court over the last 15 years.
1087
01:01:33.230 --> 01:01:35.829
And I want to know how that affects your ability
1088
01:01:36.650 --> 01:01:39.090
to do the job that the DOJ is supposed to
1089
01:01:39.110 --> 01:01:42.989
be doing. So just as an example, in the McDonald case,
1090
01:01:43.230 --> 01:01:45.610
did you work on the McDonald case in Virginia?
1091
01:01:46.170 --> 01:01:46.489
I did.
1092
01:01:46.530 --> 01:01:48.349
I was one of the supervisors of that case, yes.
1093
01:01:48.760 --> 01:01:52.519
Okay, so that's a case where a guy is paid
1094
01:01:52.860 --> 01:01:58.079
money and gifts and bribes to give access, right? You
1095
01:01:58.099 --> 01:02:00.159
guys bring a case against him, he gets convicted. The
1096
01:02:00.199 --> 01:02:05.809
Supreme Court says, actually, it's not bribery if it's just
1097
01:02:05.889 --> 01:02:10.070
for access. You know, there were other cases. I've got
1098
01:02:10.130 --> 01:02:13.130
some written down. The Snyder case, which I thought was
1099
01:02:13.190 --> 01:02:17.769
a fascinating one. Bribes that are given after you do
1100
01:02:17.869 --> 01:02:23.599
something the quid pro quo are considered gratuities and therefore
1101
01:02:23.920 --> 01:02:28.980
can't be prosecuted as bribes. You have the absolute immunity
1102
01:02:29.019 --> 01:02:33.500
case for Trump. You have the skilling case, which is
1103
01:02:33.599 --> 01:02:38.090
about conflict of interest or self-dealing. At every turn, the
1104
01:02:38.119 --> 01:02:42.530
Supreme Court is redefining what public corruption is to the
1105
01:02:42.570 --> 01:02:46.030
point where I don't even know how you would prosecute
1106
01:02:46.090 --> 01:02:50.519
public corruption. Unless someone is holding a giant bag that
1107
01:02:50.559 --> 01:02:53.659
has a dollar sign on it and on it it says,
1108
01:02:54.090 --> 01:02:56.210
for helping me with that thing.
1109
01:02:57.309 --> 01:03:01.289
Well, John, it's actually even more dire than you lay out.
1110
01:03:01.789 --> 01:03:03.670
It can't be more dire than that, Jack.
1111
01:03:04.409 --> 01:03:04.869
It can't.
1112
01:03:05.230 --> 01:03:08.070
But before we get to the Supreme Court and I'll
1113
01:03:08.090 --> 01:03:10.409
come back to that, we're in a world right now, John,
1114
01:03:10.469 --> 01:03:14.369
where if there is corruption at the highest levels of
1115
01:03:14.429 --> 01:03:16.530
our government, there is nobody to look at it.
1116
01:03:17.010 --> 01:03:17.340
Nobody.
1117
01:03:17.920 --> 01:03:20.119
Congress is not going to look at it. The DOJ
1118
01:03:20.159 --> 01:03:22.079
is not going to look at it. There's not going
1119
01:03:22.099 --> 01:03:24.989
to be any outside prosecutor to look at it. And
1120
01:03:25.070 --> 01:03:27.710
so before we even get to bringing a case, there's
1121
01:03:27.750 --> 01:03:29.789
no one who would be allowed to investigate it.
1122
01:03:30.750 --> 01:03:31.809
I do think you're right.
1123
01:03:32.070 --> 01:03:35.090
When you say nobody is allowed to investigate it, how
1124
01:03:35.110 --> 01:03:35.510
do you mean?
1125
01:03:36.139 --> 01:03:40.340
Well, you can imagine if there was– take a look
1126
01:03:40.380 --> 01:03:46.469
at the Signalgate thing, right? With the sharing– Battle plans.
1127
01:03:46.590 --> 01:03:49.329
Classified information over a– Right.
1128
01:03:49.730 --> 01:03:54.050
And the attorney general at the time, Attorney General Bondi, immediately,
1129
01:03:54.239 --> 01:03:57.099
without any facts, said there's not going to be an investigation.
1130
01:03:57.960 --> 01:04:01.420
Comes out later from the inspector general that, in fact,
1131
01:04:01.539 --> 01:04:05.079
it was classified information and it endangered the lives of
1132
01:04:05.179 --> 01:04:09.960
service members. If that's not being investigated, we don't have
1133
01:04:09.980 --> 01:04:11.840
to worry about what the Supreme Court says because we're
1134
01:04:11.860 --> 01:04:13.739
not going to get to court and have a case.
1135
01:04:14.800 --> 01:04:17.739
But they are investigating Rene Good. I mean, they are investigating.
1136
01:04:17.760 --> 01:04:20.590
They're just– it seems upside down to some extent.
1137
01:04:20.789 --> 01:04:26.469
Right. And again, my point is that that judgment to
1138
01:04:26.690 --> 01:04:30.900
investigate real corruption and not investigate shooting victims' family members,
1139
01:04:32.099 --> 01:04:34.460
you need good people in these roles. Just again, in
1140
01:04:34.500 --> 01:04:37.300
terms of as we go forward, I hear a lot
1141
01:04:37.340 --> 01:04:39.099
of people talk about how are we going to fix
1142
01:04:39.119 --> 01:04:41.489
the FBI? How are we going to fix the Department
1143
01:04:41.510 --> 01:04:47.650
of Justice. I've heard someone say, the next director of
1144
01:04:47.670 --> 01:04:50.389
the FBI really needs to have smart people around them
1145
01:04:50.449 --> 01:04:52.579
who really know the Bureau and how it works, people
1146
01:04:52.599 --> 01:04:56.679
like Brian Driscoll. My response to that is, how about
1147
01:04:57.219 --> 01:04:59.559
we just have one of those people run the FBI?
1148
01:05:00.019 --> 01:05:03.119
Someone who actually knows it, not a politician, not a
1149
01:05:03.159 --> 01:05:05.869
person with a political stake in the game, but people
1150
01:05:05.929 --> 01:05:08.869
who actually have done the work since they were young people.
1151
01:05:09.210 --> 01:05:09.789
How about that?
1152
01:05:09.929 --> 01:05:13.949
And I agree with you, John, that winning back credibility
1153
01:05:13.969 --> 01:05:16.170
is not going to be easy, but I don't think
1154
01:05:16.210 --> 01:05:19.650
we shouldn't try to do it. And again, I think
1155
01:05:19.730 --> 01:05:24.489
that diving into that, my life, when I interact with
1156
01:05:24.530 --> 01:05:27.199
people in the world, I hear people all the time
1157
01:05:27.239 --> 01:05:29.960
who want to go back to having normal people make
1158
01:05:30.000 --> 01:05:30.679
these decisions.
1159
01:05:31.219 --> 01:05:34.840
Oh, dear God. People are exhausted. They're absolutely exhausted.
1160
01:05:35.099 --> 01:05:37.429
And so the way I think of it is, We
1161
01:05:37.510 --> 01:05:40.550
have the people who work in the Justice Department and
1162
01:05:41.269 --> 01:05:44.449
in the FBI, the everyday line prosecutors and agents, which
1163
01:05:44.510 --> 01:05:46.329
Brian and I spent most of our career doing.
1164
01:05:46.989 --> 01:05:48.050
People know their story.
1165
01:05:48.150 --> 01:05:50.380
They're going to like that. They're going to respect it.
1166
01:05:50.449 --> 01:05:52.269
I mean, just to go back real quick, John, on
1167
01:05:52.309 --> 01:05:55.980
the issue of communication and the issue of January 6th,
1168
01:05:56.550 --> 01:06:00.219
there is a inspector general's report that exists that debunks
1169
01:06:00.510 --> 01:06:03.559
everything you said about the FBI setting this up.
1170
01:06:04.099 --> 01:06:04.840
It's in detail.
1171
01:06:05.199 --> 01:06:06.940
And if you take the time to read the 100
1172
01:06:06.940 --> 01:06:10.380
whatever odd pages it is, no person could come away
1173
01:06:10.420 --> 01:06:11.039
and think.
1174
01:06:11.460 --> 01:06:12.159
That's what happened.
1175
01:06:12.679 --> 01:06:16.469
The problem? Nobody's read it. Nobody knows about it. Nobody
1176
01:06:16.510 --> 01:06:18.630
took it as their job to go out to the
1177
01:06:18.670 --> 01:06:22.150
public and say, hey, this is a big deal. People
1178
01:06:22.190 --> 01:06:24.809
are going to believe this narrative unless I explain this
1179
01:06:24.849 --> 01:06:27.050
to folks. And so that's what I say about leaders
1180
01:06:28.210 --> 01:06:31.460
on issues like that that can cause huge distrust. Taking
1181
01:06:31.480 --> 01:06:33.500
that on is part of the job. I certainly didn't
1182
01:06:33.539 --> 01:06:36.309
do it in the DOJ before, but I think that's
1183
01:06:36.369 --> 01:06:37.809
a thing we need to change going forward.
1184
01:06:48.429 --> 01:06:52.889
How do we change when the Supreme Court has made
1185
01:06:52.949 --> 01:06:56.800
the bar for public corruption so high? Look, special counsels
1186
01:06:56.860 --> 01:07:00.619
in general were appointed because it all felt like It
1187
01:07:01.119 --> 01:07:05.880
was a problem beyond the scope of our standard system.
1188
01:07:05.920 --> 01:07:07.960
So you had the Watergate special prosecutor.
1189
01:07:08.000 --> 01:07:13.699
You had Iran Contra was a special prosecutor. And they
1190
01:07:13.739 --> 01:07:17.719
looked into it and they found evidence of criminal wrongdoing
1191
01:07:17.860 --> 01:07:21.869
in the case of Watergate brought down a president.
1192
01:07:22.070 --> 01:07:23.030
Interesting that J.D.
1193
01:07:23.110 --> 01:07:26.469
Vance said Watergate today would be a 12-hour story and
1194
01:07:26.530 --> 01:07:29.000
nothing would happen. And I don't disagree with that, not
1195
01:07:29.039 --> 01:07:32.760
because it's not an egregious abuse of power, but because
1196
01:07:33.639 --> 01:07:39.449
the levers of accountability that we have seem diminished. And
1197
01:07:39.489 --> 01:07:42.070
I wonder if special, you know, special counsels played a
1198
01:07:42.110 --> 01:07:44.050
role in that. And I want your opinion on that.
1199
01:07:44.409 --> 01:07:46.489
You know, if you think about, let's look at the
1200
01:07:46.530 --> 01:07:49.489
last ones you had, the Mueller case with Russia had
1201
01:07:49.510 --> 01:07:52.519
a lot of convictions, but very few of them were about.
1202
01:07:54.119 --> 01:07:55.599
Election interference.
1203
01:07:55.619 --> 01:07:59.420
It was mostly obstruction or perjury or those things uh
1204
01:07:59.619 --> 01:08:03.219
we had i guess uh the next one was the
1205
01:08:03.239 --> 01:08:06.380
classified documents case then they had the biden documents case
1206
01:08:06.440 --> 01:08:09.420
it looked like he also had classified documents then they
1207
01:08:09.440 --> 01:08:12.809
had a hunter biden special counsel where we finally got
1208
01:08:12.869 --> 01:08:18.449
him on weapons charges you know whitewater was another one
1209
01:08:19.609 --> 01:08:24.289
where the special counsels also i guess at fault in
1210
01:08:24.369 --> 01:08:27.560
some ways Because they never really got to the crux
1211
01:08:27.600 --> 01:08:30.939
of what they were investigating. They were only able to
1212
01:08:31.119 --> 01:08:36.270
spring process traps. And that's how they ended up catching
1213
01:08:36.289 --> 01:08:42.149
a few low-level fish. So if that's not there, what
1214
01:08:42.189 --> 01:08:45.470
levers of accountability are we left with? And I know
1215
01:08:45.510 --> 01:08:48.310
that's a lot to answer, but I wanted your opinion
1216
01:08:48.369 --> 01:08:48.590
on that.
1217
01:08:48.909 --> 01:08:49.409
Yeah, sure.
1218
01:08:49.510 --> 01:08:53.140
So I think of it this way. You've got a situation,
1219
01:08:53.159 --> 01:08:56.920
a highly sensitive situation, with high-level people in the government.
1220
01:08:57.020 --> 01:08:59.010
It could be my case, it could be Iran-Contra, it
1221
01:08:59.029 --> 01:09:00.819
could be Watergate, any of the ones you talked about.
1222
01:09:01.260 --> 01:09:02.100
You've got three options.
1223
01:09:03.039 --> 01:09:07.359
Option one is you say, this is too sensitive. We're
1224
01:09:07.390 --> 01:09:09.970
not going to really look into it. Corruption at the
1225
01:09:09.989 --> 01:09:12.789
highest level of government, it doesn't happen very often and
1226
01:09:12.829 --> 01:09:15.310
the executive needs a lot of power to do their job.
1227
01:09:15.369 --> 01:09:17.930
So we're really not going to even go down that road.
1228
01:09:18.760 --> 01:09:21.979
There are people who take that position. On the other end,
1229
01:09:22.060 --> 01:09:24.899
you say, you know what? The Justice Department run by
1230
01:09:24.939 --> 01:09:28.020
a political appointee of the current president can totally do
1231
01:09:28.060 --> 01:09:30.039
it and people will find it credible because the Justice
1232
01:09:30.079 --> 01:09:32.380
Department does this every day and we don't have to
1233
01:09:32.420 --> 01:09:36.420
do anything special. The middle ground is to appoint somebody
1234
01:09:36.579 --> 01:09:39.279
outside the government and how much discretion and power that
1235
01:09:39.340 --> 01:09:42.619
person has depends on whether you're talking about the independent
1236
01:09:42.640 --> 01:09:46.699
counsel statute, which was Iran-Contra or the special counsel regulations
1237
01:09:46.720 --> 01:09:50.140
that I worked under. And the balance is you want
1238
01:09:50.199 --> 01:09:52.649
independence so that person can make a call and call
1239
01:09:52.659 --> 01:09:56.329
balls and strikes as they are. But you also need accountability, right?
1240
01:09:56.470 --> 01:09:58.369
Because you don't want to have– and I think that
1241
01:09:58.390 --> 01:10:00.689
was the concern with the independent counsel statute is some
1242
01:10:00.750 --> 01:10:04.289
felt that the independent counsel was accountable to no one
1243
01:10:04.329 --> 01:10:05.170
and could go on forever.
1244
01:10:06.350 --> 01:10:09.029
And could catch a lot of people in situations where
1245
01:10:09.050 --> 01:10:11.640
they don't have the resources. Look, I'm no fan of
1246
01:10:11.680 --> 01:10:14.920
General Flynn. But it's very different for Donald Trump to
1247
01:10:14.939 --> 01:10:16.899
have to defend himself. I mean that guy– had to
1248
01:10:16.939 --> 01:10:20.119
like sell his house. You know, when somebody is in
1249
01:10:20.159 --> 01:10:24.819
the crosshairs, whether it's a Papadopoulos or a Carter Page
1250
01:10:24.979 --> 01:10:28.079
or a, you know, Hunter Biden has resources, but, you know,
1251
01:10:28.649 --> 01:10:32.510
Letitia James now, you know, these people don't have the
1252
01:10:32.569 --> 01:10:36.369
resources to go up against it. Clearly abuses have been
1253
01:10:36.390 --> 01:10:37.029
taking place.
1254
01:10:37.630 --> 01:10:37.810
Yeah.
1255
01:10:37.829 --> 01:10:40.229
And I guess one thing I would just add to
1256
01:10:40.250 --> 01:10:44.189
that and to the framework is, is how we judge it, right?
1257
01:10:44.770 --> 01:10:50.189
Like I think when you're dealing with these situations, these complex, difficult,
1258
01:10:50.289 --> 01:10:54.430
hard to prove situations, the idea that anybody is going
1259
01:10:54.489 --> 01:10:57.930
to do that job and you're going to get sort
1260
01:10:57.949 --> 01:11:01.350
of unanimous public agreement that that's a fabulous job and
1261
01:11:01.380 --> 01:11:03.779
we all agree with the outcome. That's just not happening.
1262
01:11:03.800 --> 01:11:05.260
No, that's a good point. Yeah.
1263
01:11:05.460 --> 01:11:08.039
And so I think what we need to do and
1264
01:11:08.159 --> 01:11:12.779
my view is in those situations, you hew to the
1265
01:11:13.909 --> 01:11:16.109
doing things the right way, the way they've been done
1266
01:11:16.149 --> 01:11:19.590
in justice department for generations, at least since Watergate, that
1267
01:11:19.869 --> 01:11:24.670
is a credibility, uh, enhancer. I think again, communicating how
1268
01:11:24.710 --> 01:11:27.310
you're doing that is going to be helpful, but you're
1269
01:11:27.350 --> 01:11:30.489
never going to get a hundred percent approval and you're
1270
01:11:30.520 --> 01:11:33.319
never going to get an outcome that everybody agrees with. Um,
1271
01:11:33.359 --> 01:11:37.039
sometimes the outcomes are, uh, more complicated than, than can
1272
01:11:37.060 --> 01:11:40.880
be explained in a short narrative. Uh, I feel like
1273
01:11:40.899 --> 01:11:44.100
the job of a prosecutor is not achieving a particular outcomes,
1274
01:11:44.140 --> 01:11:48.380
how many convictions you got, how many people were charged,
1275
01:11:48.420 --> 01:11:50.819
that sort of thing. It's doing it the right way.
1276
01:11:51.319 --> 01:11:52.920
You do it the right way and you let the
1277
01:11:52.960 --> 01:11:56.300
chips fall where they're going to fall. Not every profession
1278
01:11:56.319 --> 01:11:59.079
is like that. And I think the thing that's from
1279
01:11:59.220 --> 01:12:01.279
the perspective I have, I think Brian might share this,
1280
01:12:01.960 --> 01:12:05.000
is the way the public judges a lot of the
1281
01:12:05.020 --> 01:12:09.350
criminal justice system is outcome-based. And good prosecutors don't do that.
1282
01:12:09.390 --> 01:12:11.750
So our internal metric for doing the job the right
1283
01:12:11.789 --> 01:12:15.100
way is one of like, I did things the way
1284
01:12:15.119 --> 01:12:17.979
they're supposed to be done. Of course, if I think
1285
01:12:18.000 --> 01:12:20.119
someone's guilty, I want to get a conviction and I'm
1286
01:12:20.140 --> 01:12:22.279
going to try to do that. But it's much more
1287
01:12:22.319 --> 01:12:24.880
important to me that I do it the right way
1288
01:12:24.899 --> 01:12:27.340
than I get a particular outcome. And I would never
1289
01:12:27.380 --> 01:12:30.270
want to have a prosecutor who would cut corners because
1290
01:12:31.210 --> 01:12:33.810
he wants the public adulation and support because he got
1291
01:12:33.829 --> 01:12:36.350
an outcome a lot of people wanted. And so I
1292
01:12:36.359 --> 01:12:39.189
guess a long way to say that is like, there's
1293
01:12:39.409 --> 01:12:43.390
sort of ceilings on how much you can have everybody
1294
01:12:43.489 --> 01:12:45.789
really happy with the outcome of these things. They're built
1295
01:12:45.850 --> 01:12:47.210
to be difficult from the start.
1296
01:12:47.289 --> 01:12:50.260
Well, I'm not even talking about their happiness with it.
1297
01:12:50.430 --> 01:12:54.439
I'm more talking about the broader sense of accountability that
1298
01:12:54.479 --> 01:12:57.779
doesn't seem, look, in my mind, the macro view of this,
1299
01:12:58.060 --> 01:13:00.479
and Brian, I think I'd like to get your opinion
1300
01:13:00.539 --> 01:13:04.600
on this. January 6th was a Rubicon for me. in
1301
01:13:04.659 --> 01:13:10.770
terms of democratic system being subverted. The Supreme Court can
1302
01:13:10.829 --> 01:13:14.329
say the president basically has absolute immunity and you can't
1303
01:13:14.369 --> 01:13:17.470
find anything and basically makes him beyond the scope of
1304
01:13:17.489 --> 01:13:21.670
the law if he's doing the duties of his office.
1305
01:13:22.489 --> 01:13:23.390
But January 6th.
1306
01:13:24.939 --> 01:13:28.739
Was the crossing the line that I thought, this is
1307
01:13:28.920 --> 01:13:31.260
a person that needs to be held to account for
1308
01:13:31.300 --> 01:13:34.430
trying to subvert you know, it's peaceful transfer of power.
1309
01:13:34.770 --> 01:13:35.510
That's the line.
1310
01:13:36.649 --> 01:13:39.180
We can all, there's different corruptions within it, but if
1311
01:13:39.199 --> 01:13:41.640
you won't leave when you're supposed to leave, that's when
1312
01:13:41.680 --> 01:13:43.739
we turn from a democracy into an autocracy.
1313
01:13:43.779 --> 01:13:47.260
Like that's the dividing line, black and white.
1314
01:13:48.060 --> 01:13:52.550
Our inability to hold that president to account through a
1315
01:13:52.569 --> 01:13:57.970
political process, impeachment, that was clearly partisan. People that said, yeah,
1316
01:13:57.989 --> 01:13:59.850
that was egregious and he should never hold office again,
1317
01:13:59.909 --> 01:14:02.689
still voted not to impeach because they said well he's
1318
01:14:02.750 --> 01:14:04.470
leaving anyway little did they know.
1319
01:14:04.329 --> 01:14:08.010
Uh so the political process proved itself to be uh.
1320
01:14:09.829 --> 01:14:14.270
Not up to the task the legal process i thought
1321
01:14:14.449 --> 01:14:16.640
also proved itself not to be up to the task
1322
01:14:17.119 --> 01:14:20.180
it took merrick garland i don't know years before he
1323
01:14:20.380 --> 01:14:24.420
even asked you to do the investigation i don't know
1324
01:14:24.500 --> 01:14:26.899
why i don't know if you have an opinion on
1325
01:14:26.939 --> 01:14:28.399
that jack.
1326
01:14:28.739 --> 01:14:34.180
Oh Listen, my view of my work, I got appointed
1327
01:14:34.199 --> 01:14:35.960
to do a job and I did it. When I
1328
01:14:36.000 --> 01:14:39.000
interacted with Merrick Garland, he's not a guy who put
1329
01:14:39.020 --> 01:14:40.640
the finger on the scale. He didn't try to push
1330
01:14:40.680 --> 01:14:43.340
me to do it, bring a case, not bring a case.
1331
01:14:45.020 --> 01:14:46.949
But he didn't bring it for years. He didn't even
1332
01:14:47.050 --> 01:14:47.369
ask you.
1333
01:14:47.689 --> 01:14:47.890
Yeah.
1334
01:14:47.949 --> 01:14:51.310
I mean, I got appointed when I got appointed. I
1335
01:14:51.329 --> 01:14:54.569
guess my point on that, John, is that I understand
1336
01:14:54.590 --> 01:14:56.569
that that's a narrative that people want to talk about
1337
01:14:56.649 --> 01:14:59.699
is like– Why didn't he move faster? That sort of thing.
1338
01:14:59.720 --> 01:15:03.810
I feel like from my perspective, having been someone who's
1339
01:15:04.029 --> 01:15:06.590
done this job for a long time and cares a
1340
01:15:06.750 --> 01:15:09.270
lot about where the department goes going forward, cares a
1341
01:15:09.270 --> 01:15:11.850
lot about the people who work there, I'm much more
1342
01:15:11.909 --> 01:15:17.260
interested in finding people who are examples of courageous people
1343
01:15:17.319 --> 01:15:20.920
who are standing up, who are making sacrifices. If we're
1344
01:15:20.979 --> 01:15:24.619
looking– if you're on a sports team and you're trying
1345
01:15:24.659 --> 01:15:28.060
to do well, you look for ways that you can succeed.
1346
01:15:28.100 --> 01:15:30.899
You look for plays that work. I want to see
1347
01:15:30.960 --> 01:15:35.199
people and I want to raise people up who could
1348
01:15:35.220 --> 01:15:37.800
be part of the solution rather than kind of looking backward.
1349
01:15:38.739 --> 01:15:40.010
And I completely agree with that.
1350
01:15:40.100 --> 01:15:43.590
I'm talking more about sort of how the system is
1351
01:15:43.689 --> 01:15:47.529
perceived even with those good people in it. So Merrick
1352
01:15:47.550 --> 01:15:49.090
Garland takes two to three years to do it. I'm
1353
01:15:49.109 --> 01:15:52.689
talking about how the legal process seemed to not be
1354
01:15:52.710 --> 01:15:55.159
able to hold him to account for what I thought
1355
01:15:55.220 --> 01:15:59.479
is the most egregious moment in my lifetime in American history,
1356
01:16:00.119 --> 01:16:04.180
makes Watergate look like chump change. So he holds off
1357
01:16:04.279 --> 01:16:08.539
on that. Then the system, unable to get at him
1358
01:16:08.619 --> 01:16:13.310
through that legal methodology, seemed like, and you can push
1359
01:16:13.359 --> 01:16:17.649
back on this, seemed like it went after Trump with
1360
01:16:17.869 --> 01:16:23.029
every available methodology they could think of. Letitia James prosecutes
1361
01:16:23.090 --> 01:16:28.789
him for, I think, his... business and mortgage dealings. Alvin
1362
01:16:28.850 --> 01:16:33.770
Bragg prosecutes him for the Stormy Daniels payments. The government
1363
01:16:33.810 --> 01:16:36.609
goes after classified documents, which is something that I think
1364
01:16:36.649 --> 01:16:38.949
most people were like, I'd never even heard. I didn't
1365
01:16:38.970 --> 01:16:42.760
even know that was a thing. I always assumed, because
1366
01:16:42.800 --> 01:16:46.619
in this country, our classification system is also broken. It
1367
01:16:46.699 --> 01:16:52.960
looked like to fair appearances that the system did turn
1368
01:16:53.000 --> 01:16:57.170
its eye to getting this guy any way they could.
1369
01:16:58.029 --> 01:17:01.659
And so if the political process failed us and the
1370
01:17:01.720 --> 01:17:04.399
legal process seemed to have failed us, I think that's
1371
01:17:04.439 --> 01:17:07.399
the question of how do we rebuild trust in that system,
1372
01:17:08.220 --> 01:17:10.939
even though it's staffed with really good people.
1373
01:17:11.000 --> 01:17:12.020
Brian, you were going to say something.
1374
01:17:12.430 --> 01:17:14.090
Yeah, no, I'm going to take Jack off the hook
1375
01:17:14.149 --> 01:17:14.810
for a second.
1376
01:17:14.890 --> 01:17:15.449
Please.
1377
01:17:18.670 --> 01:17:21.890
I'm not saying that you're saying this. However, I think
1378
01:17:21.930 --> 01:17:28.159
it's important for people to know that We didn't do nothing.
1379
01:17:29.000 --> 01:17:34.739
We investigated the people who perpetrated the January 6th crimes.
1380
01:17:35.100 --> 01:17:39.979
That's right. Myself personally were part of arrest teams that
1381
01:17:40.460 --> 01:17:43.659
took off some of the most violent and dangerous offenders
1382
01:17:43.819 --> 01:17:48.390
affiliated with some very violent groups. And these things, they
1383
01:17:48.470 --> 01:17:51.250
do take time. I can't speak to the decision process
1384
01:17:51.869 --> 01:17:55.439
of A.G. Garland at the time and any– delays and
1385
01:17:55.449 --> 01:17:58.420
this and the other thing, but the DOJ didn't sit
1386
01:17:58.460 --> 01:18:01.439
on our hands either. We were hustling, we were working
1387
01:18:01.840 --> 01:18:11.079
to hold the criminals accountable and did. Now going all
1388
01:18:11.119 --> 01:18:12.939
the way over to POTUS, I can't speak for that.
1389
01:18:14.489 --> 01:18:15.770
but I felt like Jack needed some help.
1390
01:18:15.970 --> 01:18:19.010
So yeah.
1391
01:18:19.090 --> 01:18:20.750
Listen, I think Jack will be fine.
1392
01:18:20.770 --> 01:18:23.489
Am I being unfair?
1393
01:18:23.609 --> 01:18:26.579
Am I, am I being unfair in saying that to
1394
01:18:26.680 --> 01:18:27.159
my mind?
1395
01:18:27.220 --> 01:18:29.239
And I, again, I'm not talking about the guys who,
1396
01:18:29.279 --> 01:18:32.140
like you say, you know, that stormed the Capitol and
1397
01:18:32.180 --> 01:18:35.279
got arrested and were given sentences like, and we're held
1398
01:18:35.319 --> 01:18:35.760
to account.
1399
01:18:36.340 --> 01:18:37.399
I'm not talking about that.
1400
01:18:38.279 --> 01:18:43.010
I'm talking about the ring leaders and the people that, uh,
1401
01:18:43.350 --> 01:18:47.729
pardoned those same people and Were never held to account
1402
01:18:47.789 --> 01:18:51.050
for anything either through our political media Our only political
1403
01:18:51.069 --> 01:18:51.890
means is impeachment.
1404
01:18:52.869 --> 01:18:56.270
Our only legal means is through the DOJ.
1405
01:18:56.880 --> 01:19:01.119
So am I being unfair to say that those systems
1406
01:19:02.119 --> 01:19:06.619
were unable to operate and at this point have been
1407
01:19:07.319 --> 01:19:12.220
through whether it's the Supreme Court or whether it's through
1408
01:19:12.340 --> 01:19:16.600
the ability of Donald Trump and his allies to delay,
1409
01:19:16.619 --> 01:19:19.000
have we failed? Yeah.
1410
01:19:19.060 --> 01:19:21.619
I mean, John, I would say first, on the political part,
1411
01:19:22.159 --> 01:19:24.199
you're probably talking to the wrong guys for that. We're
1412
01:19:24.479 --> 01:19:27.369
criminal investigators who work on criminal cases.
1413
01:19:27.529 --> 01:19:29.569
I just want your opinions. I know that.
1414
01:19:29.789 --> 01:19:32.850
Yeah. So on the other part, in terms of the
1415
01:19:32.890 --> 01:19:36.270
cases against Trump, I can speak most directly to ours.
1416
01:19:36.970 --> 01:19:39.100
And when I took that job, I would have been
1417
01:19:39.260 --> 01:19:42.859
perfectly happy if the facts in law didn't justify it
1418
01:19:42.899 --> 01:19:45.539
to not bring those cases. And I'm sure if the
1419
01:19:45.600 --> 01:19:48.029
facts were different, John, I'm sure a lot of the
1420
01:19:48.090 --> 01:19:50.529
people who think I'm great would not think I'm so great.
1421
01:19:50.829 --> 01:19:52.970
And some of the people who think I'm bad would
1422
01:19:52.989 --> 01:19:53.810
think I'm really nice.
1423
01:19:54.750 --> 01:19:55.930
The truth is- Very good point.
1424
01:19:56.470 --> 01:20:00.050
Yeah. When you're a prosecutor, right? All that sort of
1425
01:20:00.090 --> 01:20:03.109
things in terms of perceptions and people feeling this way
1426
01:20:03.170 --> 01:20:06.140
in this election, that is noise. That is things that
1427
01:20:06.399 --> 01:20:09.420
I didn't consider when I'm doing my job. And I
1428
01:20:09.979 --> 01:20:12.520
brought those cases and I moved them forward because I
1429
01:20:12.560 --> 01:20:14.180
thought I could prove them in court and I thought
1430
01:20:14.220 --> 01:20:15.000
I'd win on appeal.
1431
01:20:15.659 --> 01:20:16.359
That's the same.
1432
01:20:16.399 --> 01:20:20.369
We don't change the metric once it's someone who's a
1433
01:20:20.750 --> 01:20:26.750
high-profile case. And again, just to juxtapose what weaponization is, right?
1434
01:20:28.510 --> 01:20:31.140
I've been doing this for three decades. I'm not a
1435
01:20:31.149 --> 01:20:34.300
political operative who was brought in from outside because they
1436
01:20:34.340 --> 01:20:37.520
couldn't get a line prosecutor to do it. People didn't
1437
01:20:37.619 --> 01:20:41.539
resign because I demanded that they do things that run
1438
01:20:41.560 --> 01:20:45.430
so counter to the traditions of the department. I mean,
1439
01:20:45.439 --> 01:20:49.430
just think about today, John, if you had an allegation
1440
01:20:49.470 --> 01:20:52.729
of corruption, can you imagine this administration bringing in someone
1441
01:20:53.210 --> 01:20:55.449
like me who's got no political allegiance? Can you imagine
1442
01:20:55.489 --> 01:20:59.189
that happening? And that's why we come back to this
1443
01:20:59.229 --> 01:21:00.079
issue of process.
1444
01:21:00.479 --> 01:21:03.210
I can't imagine, by the way, them even prosecuting it.
1445
01:21:03.520 --> 01:21:07.510
I mean, he literally was bragging yesterday. that he was
1446
01:21:07.569 --> 01:21:12.729
making sure they weren't going to investigate cryptocurrency corruption. I mean,
1447
01:21:12.789 --> 01:21:18.229
they're bragging about no longer investigating white-collar crime.
1448
01:21:18.550 --> 01:21:20.800
Yeah, and again, that's why I go back to this
1449
01:21:20.949 --> 01:21:23.899
issue of how we talk about it, because when you
1450
01:21:23.909 --> 01:21:27.140
talk about, John, the fact that people don't believe this
1451
01:21:27.239 --> 01:21:30.300
and people don't trust that, it's not in a vacuum, right?
1452
01:21:30.479 --> 01:21:35.560
There are people with very powerful megaphones using repetitive messages
1453
01:21:35.779 --> 01:21:39.439
over and over again that have no factual basis, but
1454
01:21:39.460 --> 01:21:41.000
they get out there and they become part of the
1455
01:21:41.119 --> 01:21:46.939
public discussion. The history before these last couple of years
1456
01:21:47.500 --> 01:21:50.600
is prosecutors just sat on their hands and let that
1457
01:21:50.640 --> 01:21:53.500
be said, and we didn't worry about that. I think
1458
01:21:53.819 --> 01:21:57.239
the credibility issues you're talking about are because one side
1459
01:21:57.279 --> 01:21:59.319
was telling a story divorced from the facts and the
1460
01:21:59.359 --> 01:22:02.680
other side wasn't telling a story. I think if you
1461
01:22:02.779 --> 01:22:05.800
lean into the facts, the cases we do, I could
1462
01:22:05.819 --> 01:22:08.500
justify them in court and I could justify them publicly.
1463
01:22:09.279 --> 01:22:12.449
I think going forward, that is the recipe. That and
1464
01:22:12.510 --> 01:22:16.149
having the people who are telling the stories be from
1465
01:22:16.210 --> 01:22:19.510
the rank and file and be people who've lived the
1466
01:22:19.569 --> 01:22:21.649
values that they're asking the teams to follow.
1467
01:22:21.829 --> 01:22:24.189
No, and Brian, I'm assuming you feel the same way
1468
01:22:24.250 --> 01:22:26.649
about within the FBI because what it feels like is
1469
01:22:26.710 --> 01:22:30.680
you now have an organization that is generally built apolitically.
1470
01:22:31.729 --> 01:22:34.470
built through merit, built through whatever methodologies they think gives
1471
01:22:34.510 --> 01:22:37.250
them the best chance to get the best agents and
1472
01:22:37.270 --> 01:22:43.550
the most selfless people being utilized and weaponized by partisans
1473
01:22:44.109 --> 01:22:46.869
and with very little recourse, I would assume.
1474
01:22:47.369 --> 01:22:51.770
Yeah, I am 100%. No surprise here aligned with what
1475
01:22:51.810 --> 01:22:52.569
Jack just said.
1476
01:22:53.109 --> 01:22:55.729
It's going to take- You make a formidable team, the
1477
01:22:55.750 --> 01:22:56.130
two of you.
1478
01:22:56.229 --> 01:23:01.260
Appreciate that. Jack's on the top. And Robin, Batman.
1479
01:23:01.520 --> 01:23:01.810
All right.
1480
01:23:01.880 --> 01:23:02.460
Fair enough.
1481
01:23:02.680 --> 01:23:03.699
How dare you, sir?
1482
01:23:05.720 --> 01:23:09.180
I don't look that great in tights. So again, like
1483
01:23:09.220 --> 01:23:12.600
what Jack said, it's going to take people from the
1484
01:23:12.640 --> 01:23:16.500
rank and file who cannot speak for themselves publicly, not
1485
01:23:16.640 --> 01:23:19.680
allowed to. But people like Jack and I, and I
1486
01:23:19.699 --> 01:23:21.619
don't want to put words in Jack's mouth or speak
1487
01:23:21.680 --> 01:23:23.539
for him, but I can speak for myself when I
1488
01:23:23.619 --> 01:23:28.880
say that I am have been and continue to seek purpose,
1489
01:23:28.960 --> 01:23:33.939
to fill the purpose that was taken from me. Part
1490
01:23:34.039 --> 01:23:36.930
of how I'm fulfilling that purpose is trying to be
1491
01:23:36.970 --> 01:23:40.189
that responsible voice. I'm not anointed by the men and
1492
01:23:40.229 --> 01:23:42.529
women of the FBI to speak on their behalf. However,
1493
01:23:42.569 --> 01:23:45.130
I can offer a perspective that most don't hear. And
1494
01:23:45.170 --> 01:23:49.270
like I said before, demystifying some of the thought processes,
1495
01:23:49.289 --> 01:23:52.069
some of the experiences we've been through, and some of
1496
01:23:52.090 --> 01:23:56.189
the ways things get done. It's a responsibility. And I
1497
01:23:56.250 --> 01:24:01.310
think all of that noise, all of the dynamic opinions
1498
01:24:01.390 --> 01:24:04.529
regarding it. Jack and I talked about this the other day.
1499
01:24:04.760 --> 01:24:07.600
We're like Joe Fridays. It's just the facts. That was
1500
01:24:07.640 --> 01:24:09.739
our career. It was not about credit. It was not
1501
01:24:09.800 --> 01:24:12.779
about getting the awards. It's about the facts, doing the job,
1502
01:24:12.800 --> 01:24:15.039
because it's what we signed up for. And now we
1503
01:24:15.060 --> 01:24:19.359
can represent, hopefully. But it's a no-fail task. When Jack
1504
01:24:19.399 --> 01:24:23.649
and I speak, we cannot fail. We cannot fail. allow
1505
01:24:23.750 --> 01:24:27.130
our words to be twisted because we speak and stand
1506
01:24:27.149 --> 01:24:29.939
for something bigger than just ourselves because that's the part
1507
01:24:29.960 --> 01:24:32.279
of the organization we craved to be a part of
1508
01:24:32.300 --> 01:24:34.689
and we're proud to be a part of, something larger
1509
01:24:34.890 --> 01:24:38.510
than us. It makes me deeply uncomfortable. to do this
1510
01:24:38.569 --> 01:24:41.710
kind of this type of stuff. No offense. Thank you
1511
01:24:41.829 --> 01:24:43.229
so much for having us.
1512
01:24:43.250 --> 01:24:45.600
By the way, I am, I'm deeply uncomfortable as well
1513
01:24:45.640 --> 01:24:47.579
doing this. I have been for years, 30 years.
1514
01:24:47.619 --> 01:24:48.760
Yeah, I know.
1515
01:24:48.880 --> 01:24:52.180
I would, I told this to my teammates when I
1516
01:24:52.220 --> 01:24:54.180
was in that period of time where I was the
1517
01:24:54.239 --> 01:24:57.850
acting director. There is nothing I wanted more when that
1518
01:24:57.930 --> 01:25:02.010
period was over than to just disappear into anonymity and
1519
01:25:02.069 --> 01:25:04.590
continue putting points on the board on behalf of the organization,
1520
01:25:04.670 --> 01:25:09.100
on behalf of the American people. Now, I understand that
1521
01:25:09.880 --> 01:25:14.039
I can be and put myself under a level of
1522
01:25:14.119 --> 01:25:18.270
pressure to do things like this. But to me, pressure
1523
01:25:18.289 --> 01:25:21.569
is a privilege because it means something is expected of me,
1524
01:25:21.789 --> 01:25:23.390
even if I'm the only one that might expect it
1525
01:25:23.430 --> 01:25:23.869
of myself.
1526
01:25:24.069 --> 01:25:27.300
Right. It's finding purpose even after you've been Sort of
1527
01:25:27.720 --> 01:25:29.979
let go from the place where you found that grounding
1528
01:25:30.020 --> 01:25:31.020
and you found that relevance.
1529
01:25:31.819 --> 01:25:34.579
Because I believe in them. I believe in the organizations.
1530
01:25:34.659 --> 01:25:37.130
I believe in the American people. I had an experience
1531
01:25:37.149 --> 01:25:41.930
last week that reinforced it in a very real way.
1532
01:25:41.949 --> 01:25:46.869
I told Jack, I ride my motorcycle to work. save
1533
01:25:46.909 --> 01:25:47.720
money on the easy pass lane.
1534
01:25:47.729 --> 01:25:50.100
How much cooler than me can you be? God, this
1535
01:25:50.439 --> 01:25:53.199
is really, now it's just, now you're just taunting me.
1536
01:25:54.680 --> 01:25:55.199
I promise.
1537
01:25:55.380 --> 01:25:58.600
Well, I ride my electric bike sometimes to get the mail.
1538
01:25:58.619 --> 01:26:01.279
So don't think you and I aren't the same because
1539
01:26:01.340 --> 01:26:02.060
we're the same.
1540
01:26:02.439 --> 01:26:06.819
You're exponentially better in every way. But so I was
1541
01:26:07.279 --> 01:26:10.520
riding to work and I was going to speed limit.
1542
01:26:10.600 --> 01:26:13.930
I promise it was 50 miles an hour, two way
1543
01:26:13.970 --> 01:26:16.510
lane or two way street hit a deer. I had
1544
01:26:16.569 --> 01:26:17.649
no time, nowhere to go.
1545
01:26:18.210 --> 01:26:20.090
And so at 50 miles an hour, I took a
1546
01:26:20.130 --> 01:26:24.149
short flight, then a longer slide and tumble. Wow. Bike
1547
01:26:24.189 --> 01:26:27.949
is fine, importantly, for me, in my mindset.
1548
01:26:28.189 --> 01:26:28.409
All right.
1549
01:26:28.430 --> 01:26:30.229
Deer is okay, important to me.
1550
01:26:30.729 --> 01:26:34.409
I don't, it surprisingly ran off. I never saw it again.
1551
01:26:34.600 --> 01:26:37.899
I will find it. All right. So, but what happened
1552
01:26:37.960 --> 01:26:41.460
next after I realized that I was okay, I stood
1553
01:26:41.560 --> 01:26:46.479
up and Traffic stopped on both sides of the street.
1554
01:26:47.859 --> 01:26:50.520
And everybody emptied those cars. It was rush hour in
1555
01:26:50.539 --> 01:26:53.460
the morning. The first person to me was an African-American
1556
01:26:53.520 --> 01:26:57.159
female in her 50s, let's say. Second person, young blonde
1557
01:26:57.199 --> 01:27:01.630
woman in scrubs. The third, fourth, fifth people were in
1558
01:27:01.649 --> 01:27:03.029
the car that would have killed me if I went
1559
01:27:03.069 --> 01:27:09.329
into oncoming traffic filled with Hispanic laborers. None of them
1560
01:27:09.409 --> 01:27:13.420
asked who I voted for. Like what I, you know,
1561
01:27:13.460 --> 01:27:16.289
my sexual orientation, my religion. They didn't even ask my name.
1562
01:27:16.529 --> 01:27:19.149
All they saw was a dude in America who needed
1563
01:27:19.189 --> 01:27:22.989
help and they helped me. And that, in that moment
1564
01:27:23.029 --> 01:27:25.069
and every moment in the last week and a half
1565
01:27:25.689 --> 01:27:29.260
has kind of like cleared the fog for me as
1566
01:27:29.340 --> 01:27:34.520
far as all of the things I consume responsibly. And
1567
01:27:34.539 --> 01:27:37.579
I think it is on those consumers. It's on the
1568
01:27:37.619 --> 01:27:40.670
communicators as well in the organizations you talked about. And
1569
01:27:40.689 --> 01:27:43.750
it's on us, but it's also on the consumers to
1570
01:27:43.810 --> 01:27:46.210
be responsible and don't just believe the first headline that
1571
01:27:46.229 --> 01:27:50.560
you see, but read diversely, broadly, and don't just get
1572
01:27:50.760 --> 01:27:53.680
sucked in to what the algorithm is telling you how
1573
01:27:53.720 --> 01:27:54.119
to think.
1574
01:27:54.220 --> 01:27:57.739
Brother, preach, preach. I'm telling you.
1575
01:27:57.859 --> 01:27:58.619
I feel better now.
1576
01:27:58.939 --> 01:28:04.250
Listen, it's very easy to have your perspective skewed and
1577
01:28:04.289 --> 01:28:05.710
it's an important.
1578
01:28:06.890 --> 01:28:07.750
Remembrance there.
1579
01:28:08.039 --> 01:28:10.079
And I think that's, and listen, I appreciate both your
1580
01:28:10.100 --> 01:28:13.119
guys' time so much for this. And I think probably
1581
01:28:13.159 --> 01:28:16.720
a great way to end is in that sense of,
1582
01:28:16.979 --> 01:28:19.659
so how do we get back to that without sort
1583
01:28:19.680 --> 01:28:22.810
of the idea of, you know, just believing in the
1584
01:28:22.850 --> 01:28:27.470
goodness of us? But do you have ideas on how
1585
01:28:27.529 --> 01:28:35.189
we can reclaim the accountability so necessary for this system
1586
01:28:35.640 --> 01:28:36.560
to function properly?
1587
01:28:38.739 --> 01:28:39.970
And not be co-opted.
1588
01:28:40.479 --> 01:28:46.039
By bad actors or partisan actors. People will say like, well,
1589
01:28:46.079 --> 01:28:51.659
the real elections are the real accountability. That's ultimately where
1590
01:28:51.699 --> 01:28:56.079
it all ends up. But I'm watching our electoral process
1591
01:28:57.539 --> 01:29:02.770
be co-opted now through partisan measures where even that, the
1592
01:29:02.810 --> 01:29:07.350
thumb is being put on that scale in very bad ways.
1593
01:29:08.390 --> 01:29:15.020
Do you have ideas about beyond trusting the integrity of
1594
01:29:15.220 --> 01:29:18.520
the rank and file where we can start to bring
1595
01:29:18.579 --> 01:29:20.760
a little more accountability to the system?
1596
01:29:20.800 --> 01:29:21.619
I'll ask you, Jack.
1597
01:29:22.319 --> 01:29:25.119
Well, in terms of the Justice Department and I think
1598
01:29:25.140 --> 01:29:27.140
the Bureau as well, I think the one thing we
1599
01:29:27.180 --> 01:29:30.630
can say with certainty is When there's been more politics,
1600
01:29:30.850 --> 01:29:33.409
it's been bad. And when there's been less politics, it's
1601
01:29:33.430 --> 01:29:37.310
been good. And so I think a thing that we
1602
01:29:37.350 --> 01:29:40.170
should be looked at is whether there's ways you can
1603
01:29:40.810 --> 01:29:42.750
not just get the Justice Department back to what it
1604
01:29:42.810 --> 01:29:45.270
was when I worked there, but are there ways we
1605
01:29:45.289 --> 01:29:48.189
can make it better? You know, John, after Watergate, there
1606
01:29:48.229 --> 01:29:50.189
was a bunch of reforms that made our government better.
1607
01:29:50.220 --> 01:29:50.520
Yep.
1608
01:29:51.149 --> 01:29:52.210
In a bunch of different ways.
1609
01:29:52.329 --> 01:29:53.329
Very much so.
1610
01:29:53.550 --> 01:29:56.500
And it was a dark time after Watergate, right? And
1611
01:29:56.640 --> 01:29:59.420
people took that darkness and the pain they were feeling
1612
01:29:59.600 --> 01:30:05.140
and the negative outlook for the future and they turned
1613
01:30:05.180 --> 01:30:06.779
it into things that made our country better for a
1614
01:30:06.800 --> 01:30:09.710
good long time. We have an opportunity to do that
1615
01:30:09.770 --> 01:30:13.890
right now. I think getting people– there are so many
1616
01:30:13.930 --> 01:30:17.649
people out there who feel alone and feel isolated and
1617
01:30:17.710 --> 01:30:20.659
feel like nobody– is standing up for them or speaking
1618
01:30:20.699 --> 01:30:24.739
for them or exhibiting the values that we're talking about.
1619
01:30:25.640 --> 01:30:27.659
I think that's a foundation and I think you start
1620
01:30:27.680 --> 01:30:31.039
with that and then the Justice Department of all the
1621
01:30:31.079 --> 01:30:33.079
things that the government does to me is the one
1622
01:30:33.119 --> 01:30:35.770
thing where politics can't have a role. We have to
1623
01:30:35.810 --> 01:30:39.050
find reforms where it makes it harder and harder to
1624
01:30:39.149 --> 01:30:40.609
do what's happening right now.
1625
01:30:41.010 --> 01:30:41.289
Brian?
1626
01:30:41.850 --> 01:30:43.630
Yeah, Jack is so much more articulate.
1627
01:30:43.890 --> 01:30:44.909
Look, come on.
1628
01:30:45.529 --> 01:30:49.550
I mean, what he said. No, I– No, I think
1629
01:30:49.630 --> 01:30:53.909
it comes down to not taking trust for granted. People
1630
01:30:53.970 --> 01:30:58.390
with credibility and real experience, maybe a little bit of
1631
01:30:58.409 --> 01:31:02.170
scar tissue, but don't have an agenda that are ready
1632
01:31:02.210 --> 01:31:05.449
to serve and bring trust into institutions. But I also
1633
01:31:05.529 --> 01:31:10.069
think that John Q. Citizen, Jane Q. Citizen should be
1634
01:31:10.130 --> 01:31:14.109
fluent in their rights. And like I said, they'd be
1635
01:31:14.289 --> 01:31:20.199
unafraid to exercise them. in a safe manner with no violence,
1636
01:31:20.420 --> 01:31:23.199
but just be unafraid.
1637
01:31:23.699 --> 01:31:25.840
And I think it's probably going to come down to
1638
01:31:25.880 --> 01:31:29.659
that is, you know, you said it earlier, courage and
1639
01:31:30.060 --> 01:31:32.989
the courage of individuals. And Jack, when you talked about
1640
01:31:33.510 --> 01:31:36.810
the reforms after Watergate, it struck me so much of
1641
01:31:36.869 --> 01:31:43.600
that was rebalancing the branches of government. And it does
1642
01:31:43.729 --> 01:31:48.659
feel We're moving this idea of a unitary executive and
1643
01:31:49.199 --> 01:31:54.529
a president as much more forceful as a king. Until
1644
01:31:54.590 --> 01:31:59.289
that changes, it's very difficult to rebalance this because now
1645
01:31:59.350 --> 01:32:02.170
we are going to be much more so, and DOJ
1646
01:32:02.189 --> 01:32:06.890
being under that auspice, it's going to be much more
1647
01:32:06.930 --> 01:32:11.170
difficult to do it until we rebalance the branches again.
1648
01:32:11.520 --> 01:32:13.989
And it's right now it's it feels like we're in
1649
01:32:14.130 --> 01:32:17.149
an outsized pre Watergate mindset.
1650
01:32:17.869 --> 01:32:20.930
Yeah. I mean, I would say one thing about that
1651
01:32:21.189 --> 01:32:24.750
is that when you think about like how change comes about,
1652
01:32:24.789 --> 01:32:26.909
like you look at the times in our history, right,
1653
01:32:26.949 --> 01:32:30.590
where something really bad happened and we got better, whether
1654
01:32:30.649 --> 01:32:33.899
it's abolishing slavery, women's suffrage, the civil rights movement. Right.
1655
01:32:35.970 --> 01:32:38.210
There were moments when no one knew if what they
1656
01:32:38.229 --> 01:32:39.869
were going to do was going to make a difference,
1657
01:32:40.010 --> 01:32:42.850
and they did it anyways. You don't think about the
1658
01:32:42.890 --> 01:32:44.909
likelihood of success. You just think, I'm going to be
1659
01:32:44.949 --> 01:32:47.140
on the right side of history. I'm going to behave
1660
01:32:47.180 --> 01:32:48.840
in a way that's going to make my kids proud,
1661
01:32:48.880 --> 01:32:51.319
my parents proud. And you just do that. And you
1662
01:32:51.380 --> 01:32:54.659
don't worry about consequences. I think in terms of a
1663
01:32:54.720 --> 01:32:59.420
mindset for our society, 99% of the time, I think
1664
01:32:59.500 --> 01:33:02.079
most people know the right thing to do. They really do.
1665
01:33:02.220 --> 01:33:05.770
The problem becomes... when they factor in the consequences for
1666
01:33:05.810 --> 01:33:08.810
doing the right thing. Because then people, if the consequences
1667
01:33:08.850 --> 01:33:11.890
are too high, they start rationalizing ways where they don't
1668
01:33:11.970 --> 01:33:13.829
quite have to do that. Maybe they can do something
1669
01:33:13.869 --> 01:33:17.710
short of that. As Brian said, if we start taking
1670
01:33:17.729 --> 01:33:20.789
a mindset of it's our country, we own the problems.
1671
01:33:21.369 --> 01:33:22.800
If you want a solution, you got to be a
1672
01:33:22.810 --> 01:33:25.699
part of it. I feel like that happens. And if
1673
01:33:25.739 --> 01:33:28.819
that becomes our national dialogue and integrity is a more
1674
01:33:28.880 --> 01:33:31.859
central part of it, some of the things you're talking about,
1675
01:33:32.479 --> 01:33:35.739
we can elect people who will not do those sort
1676
01:33:35.779 --> 01:33:37.560
of things. I mean, I have a big concern. I
1677
01:33:37.600 --> 01:33:40.159
don't want to have a situation where we've had these
1678
01:33:40.229 --> 01:33:43.069
abuses and that becomes a new normal for any party, right?
1679
01:33:43.750 --> 01:33:45.609
And we've seen that other times.
1680
01:33:46.569 --> 01:33:48.489
And the key to remember is it doesn't have to,
1681
01:33:48.970 --> 01:33:54.109
that it is. Like you say, that action against this
1682
01:33:54.250 --> 01:33:59.180
corruption is necessary. And the courage to take action against
1683
01:33:59.220 --> 01:34:01.930
that corruption- is all of our responsibilities.
1684
01:34:02.890 --> 01:34:03.369
Absolutely.
1685
01:34:03.590 --> 01:34:06.739
Well, I can't think of three bigger heroes than the
1686
01:34:06.800 --> 01:34:07.340
three of us.
1687
01:34:08.920 --> 01:34:14.119
All right, just you two. Damn it. Jack Smith, former
1688
01:34:14.140 --> 01:34:17.100
special counsel, Brian Driscoll, former FBI agent, who in 2025
1689
01:34:17.100 --> 01:34:19.789
was the acting director of the FBI. Thank you so
1690
01:34:19.829 --> 01:34:23.949
much for spending the time and pointing out the great
1691
01:34:24.010 --> 01:34:26.930
stories of the integrity of the people in the rank
1692
01:34:26.970 --> 01:34:31.520
and file of law enforcement, and of our Department of
1693
01:34:31.579 --> 01:34:35.569
Justice and all those things. We have to keep highlighting
1694
01:34:35.609 --> 01:34:38.670
the good work by the good people and those that
1695
01:34:38.729 --> 01:34:41.989
continue to stand up against corruption in all of its forms.
1696
01:34:42.430 --> 01:34:44.130
And so I appreciate you both being here for that.
1697
01:34:44.489 --> 01:34:45.029
Thank you, sir.
1698
01:34:45.189 --> 01:34:45.970
Thanks for having us, John.
1699
01:34:45.989 --> 01:34:47.350
Appreciate you. Really appreciate it.
1700
01:34:59.199 --> 01:34:59.979
Those guys have balls.
1701
01:35:00.199 --> 01:35:00.479
You know what?
1702
01:35:00.539 --> 01:35:02.560
Can I say something?
1703
01:35:02.920 --> 01:35:06.109
When I'm hanging out with guys like that, I'm literally like,
1704
01:35:06.130 --> 01:35:07.170
so you guys want to do shots?
1705
01:35:07.229 --> 01:35:08.550
What do you want to do?
1706
01:35:09.470 --> 01:35:10.770
Want to go to Giants game? What do you want
1707
01:35:10.789 --> 01:35:10.909
to do?
1708
01:35:11.210 --> 01:35:12.130
We're going to hang out, right?
1709
01:35:12.569 --> 01:35:14.770
We're going to hang out, right, guys? It's so like
1710
01:35:15.109 --> 01:35:16.710
you're overwhelmed by manly madness.
1711
01:35:16.750 --> 01:35:17.189
Yeah.
1712
01:35:17.250 --> 01:35:22.100
That was also three New York, New Jersey, tri-state area
1713
01:35:22.279 --> 01:35:23.810
accents that I was hearing too.
1714
01:35:23.840 --> 01:35:24.420
That's terrible.
1715
01:35:24.439 --> 01:35:25.079
That's terrible.
1716
01:35:25.729 --> 01:35:27.029
I wouldn't that, you know what, that should have been
1717
01:35:27.050 --> 01:35:31.850
the whole conversation. You believe these fucking guys at the DOJ,
1718
01:35:32.189 --> 01:35:35.149
but you know, it is a little bit like, you know, uh, uh,
1719
01:35:35.170 --> 01:35:38.090
the Jimmy Cagney movies were like, one brother's a priest,
1720
01:35:38.149 --> 01:35:41.390
the other's a gangster. Like they're, they're the brother that
1721
01:35:41.409 --> 01:35:42.869
like went into law enforcement.
1722
01:35:43.390 --> 01:35:43.689
Yeah.
1723
01:35:43.770 --> 01:35:44.829
My brother on the street.
1724
01:35:45.229 --> 01:35:45.510
Yeah.
1725
01:35:45.550 --> 01:35:47.369
He's in trouble all the time, but I went the
1726
01:35:47.409 --> 01:35:47.789
other way.
1727
01:35:48.609 --> 01:35:52.760
Um, but I, I honestly, like, I can't imagine.
1728
01:35:53.380 --> 01:35:56.159
They keep talking about it, like trying to divorce themselves
1729
01:35:56.600 --> 01:36:00.819
from the madness. But the madness, the circus is all
1730
01:36:00.859 --> 01:36:04.920
that we experience from them. And it's incredible. Like there's
1731
01:36:04.960 --> 01:36:09.329
a certain Zen, like they have, I guess, kind of accepted.
1732
01:36:09.670 --> 01:36:12.229
They've accepted the storm and there's like a weird Zen
1733
01:36:12.270 --> 01:36:12.689
about them.
1734
01:36:13.270 --> 01:36:13.649
Yeah.
1735
01:36:13.670 --> 01:36:15.369
I think it's almost maybe, I don't know.
1736
01:36:15.529 --> 01:36:17.369
I'm just sort of thinking out loud, but like they
1737
01:36:17.409 --> 01:36:22.569
really harp so much on how important processes in their work.
1738
01:36:22.850 --> 01:36:26.619
And I almost think it's like hard to then remove
1739
01:36:26.659 --> 01:36:29.100
themselves from just like, well, this is how we do things.
1740
01:36:29.579 --> 01:36:31.640
You know, this is, we just keep putting one foot
1741
01:36:31.659 --> 01:36:32.260
in front of the other.
1742
01:36:32.319 --> 01:36:33.760
We just keep keeping our.
1743
01:36:33.760 --> 01:36:34.460
Eye on the ball.
1744
01:36:34.479 --> 01:36:36.600
Well, I also think, you know, it, he got to
1745
01:36:36.649 --> 01:36:38.350
it a little bit at the end, which is like,
1746
01:36:38.510 --> 01:36:41.569
they live in a world of standards, evidentiary standards, and
1747
01:36:41.590 --> 01:36:45.529
the Trump administration lives in a world of, you know, hyperbole.
1748
01:36:46.210 --> 01:36:50.199
And so, and hyper, the world of hyperbole never survives
1749
01:36:50.649 --> 01:36:52.069
its contact.
1750
01:36:51.529 --> 01:36:52.630
With the world of standards.
1751
01:36:52.649 --> 01:36:57.949
And so I think that's, it really is that strange dichotomy.
1752
01:36:58.649 --> 01:37:00.750
I think they're more comfortable in that world of like, well,
1753
01:37:00.789 --> 01:37:02.470
you can't really just make shit up.
1754
01:37:03.010 --> 01:37:04.670
You have to prove it. Yeah, because we're going to
1755
01:37:04.710 --> 01:37:06.489
actually have to then put this in front of a
1756
01:37:06.529 --> 01:37:09.210
judge and a jury and actually have to prove our case.
1757
01:37:09.880 --> 01:37:12.779
Whereas the Trump administration can just say, surely you can
1758
01:37:12.960 --> 01:37:16.119
all agree with us that somebody took a razor blade
1759
01:37:16.239 --> 01:37:20.130
to the reflecting pool because I feel that way.
1760
01:37:20.310 --> 01:37:22.189
And stole 13,000 votes.
1761
01:37:22.390 --> 01:37:22.649
Yeah.
1762
01:37:22.710 --> 01:37:25.210
And there were 500,000 people on the mall watching the
1763
01:37:25.229 --> 01:37:27.109
speech and just nonsense.
1764
01:37:27.449 --> 01:37:27.649
Yeah.
1765
01:37:27.689 --> 01:37:28.529
And what's your evidence?
1766
01:37:29.989 --> 01:37:30.470
Fuck you.
1767
01:37:30.909 --> 01:37:31.130
Right.
1768
01:37:31.350 --> 01:37:31.770
Fuck you.
1769
01:37:31.810 --> 01:37:32.189
You're dumb.
1770
01:37:32.210 --> 01:37:33.189
That's a terrible question.
1771
01:37:33.369 --> 01:37:35.069
Yeah. Next question. All right.
1772
01:37:35.229 --> 01:37:37.569
Well, I'm definitely, I've got to make sure I've got
1773
01:37:37.609 --> 01:37:41.039
a big, motorcycle ride planned.
1774
01:37:41.600 --> 01:37:43.279
I was actually, I was reminded when he was saying
1775
01:37:43.319 --> 01:37:46.199
that when I was looking into Jack Smith, he took
1776
01:37:46.300 --> 01:37:49.699
the role as special prosecutor while he was recovering from
1777
01:37:49.739 --> 01:37:53.560
a bike accident in the Netherlands. And they were concerned
1778
01:37:53.600 --> 01:37:56.579
that him sort of agreeing to it, it would be
1779
01:37:56.720 --> 01:37:59.100
an issue that he was on painkillers. So he went
1780
01:37:59.159 --> 01:38:03.819
like cold turkey for several days in order to I mean, integrity.
1781
01:38:03.439 --> 01:38:05.039
Is so important to these people.
1782
01:38:05.460 --> 01:38:06.180
Oh, my God.
1783
01:38:06.399 --> 01:38:06.640
Yeah.
1784
01:38:06.699 --> 01:38:08.319
I mean, I was just thinking about that during when
1785
01:38:08.340 --> 01:38:09.659
he was talking about the bike accident.
1786
01:38:09.760 --> 01:38:12.899
I love to also like that that's crazy Jack Smith.
1787
01:38:13.300 --> 01:38:14.020
Yeah.
1788
01:38:14.220 --> 01:38:15.039
Deranged.
1789
01:38:15.239 --> 01:38:16.939
Deranged Jack Smith.
1790
01:38:17.000 --> 01:38:20.970
And he's like, you know, for me, it's really about process. Like,
1791
01:38:21.289 --> 01:38:24.229
he's like the Bob Ross of law enforcement. He's like,
1792
01:38:24.550 --> 01:38:27.170
I take a little bit of white, a little bit
1793
01:38:27.189 --> 01:38:27.729
of blue.
1794
01:38:27.770 --> 01:38:28.810
My bike through the Netherlands.
1795
01:38:28.930 --> 01:38:31.560
What is his morning mask? I need to know it.
1796
01:38:31.619 --> 01:38:32.680
He needs to drop it.
1797
01:38:32.960 --> 01:38:36.319
No question. What do the kids want, Brittany, after our
1798
01:38:36.359 --> 01:38:36.800
week off?
1799
01:38:37.579 --> 01:38:40.460
John, do you think Trump is happy?
1800
01:38:40.479 --> 01:38:48.069
Oh, boy. That's, you know, I never considered that, Brittany.
1801
01:38:49.130 --> 01:38:49.600
Poor boy.
1802
01:38:50.260 --> 01:38:52.039
Poor little billionaire president.
1803
01:38:52.079 --> 01:38:53.159
Getting richer by the minute.
1804
01:38:53.260 --> 01:39:01.520
Poor sweet little. I think he is animated by vengeance.
1805
01:39:02.800 --> 01:39:10.779
And so paradoxically, yes. I think he is happy that
1806
01:39:11.340 --> 01:39:16.500
his body is a bile production facility. Whereas you and
1807
01:39:16.640 --> 01:39:23.600
I live aerobically. He lives anaerobically and therefore is happy
1808
01:39:23.619 --> 01:39:26.600
in his oxygen-less.
1809
01:39:27.340 --> 01:39:27.680
World.
1810
01:39:28.779 --> 01:39:29.159
Yeah.
1811
01:39:29.380 --> 01:39:32.539
But like even just coming off of this weekend, like
1812
01:39:32.640 --> 01:39:35.720
that wasn't a success. He's happy by how this weekend
1813
01:39:35.760 --> 01:39:38.939
went for him. He's happy with all of his renovations.
1814
01:39:39.220 --> 01:39:42.010
Do you believe that that is how he's interpreting the weekend?
1815
01:39:42.439 --> 01:39:48.779
He put on the greatest American fare ever. Ever since
1816
01:39:49.039 --> 01:39:53.149
the expo. since the World Expo in, like, 19-whatever.
1817
01:39:53.329 --> 01:39:54.250
Meet me in St. Louis.
1818
01:39:54.369 --> 01:39:57.079
Right.
1819
01:39:57.180 --> 01:40:00.840
He posted that photo where it's, like, deranged. It's, you know, like,
1820
01:40:01.100 --> 01:40:04.079
millions of people and, like, signs that say Trump. Like,
1821
01:40:04.140 --> 01:40:05.300
it's so... It's beloved.
1822
01:40:05.319 --> 01:40:05.779
And I honestly.
1823
01:40:06.279 --> 01:40:10.319
It's like, is there a distinction between, like, believing your
1824
01:40:10.359 --> 01:40:13.479
own lies and just, like... I think he... I don't
1825
01:40:13.510 --> 01:40:15.130
know if he believes them or if it even matters
1826
01:40:15.189 --> 01:40:18.829
to him. Like, it's enough to have that photo, I guess.
1827
01:40:18.909 --> 01:40:19.029
Yeah.
1828
01:40:19.890 --> 01:40:21.670
Even though it's completely made up.
1829
01:40:21.710 --> 01:40:22.390
I don't know.
1830
01:40:22.409 --> 01:40:23.329
It's pretty sick.
1831
01:40:23.770 --> 01:40:25.869
I think when you say, is he happy? Is he
1832
01:40:25.909 --> 01:40:27.050
the center of attention?
1833
01:40:27.350 --> 01:40:27.569
Yes.
1834
01:40:27.970 --> 01:40:28.729
Then he's happy.
1835
01:40:28.829 --> 01:40:29.220
That's it.
1836
01:40:29.899 --> 01:40:34.100
Because he is animated only by our eyes and our
1837
01:40:34.199 --> 01:40:39.199
focus and our attention. He's the original algorithm. He drives
1838
01:40:39.340 --> 01:40:44.159
us to his embrace and we all revolve. He is
1839
01:40:44.260 --> 01:40:47.319
the sun and we are but the stars. He's It's
1840
01:40:47.460 --> 01:40:51.840
Romeo and Juliet is about him. It's about Donald Trump
1841
01:40:52.159 --> 01:40:53.760
stepping out over the balcony.
1842
01:40:54.239 --> 01:40:55.640
And it is the East.
1843
01:40:56.140 --> 01:40:57.439
I always got more of a Lear vibe.
1844
01:40:58.149 --> 01:40:59.310
Okay, Jillian.
1845
01:40:59.390 --> 01:41:02.970
It's both. Well, she's our Jeopardy champ. So she's got
1846
01:41:03.010 --> 01:41:04.550
to know that shit. I only have to know the
1847
01:41:04.590 --> 01:41:07.270
titles of a couple of plays. She's got to know
1848
01:41:07.289 --> 01:41:09.729
what they're about. What else do they want?
1849
01:41:10.449 --> 01:41:15.600
John, when do you think Democrats should start campaigning for 2028?
1850
01:41:16.100 --> 01:41:18.479
Oh my God, I thought they already had. Oh, you
1851
01:41:18.500 --> 01:41:19.960
know what I think? I think when they come up
1852
01:41:19.979 --> 01:41:23.420
with like a plan, I don't want to be controversial,
1853
01:41:23.479 --> 01:41:26.359
but when they come up with like an idea about
1854
01:41:26.399 --> 01:41:29.640
what they want to do when they govern, that isn't
1855
01:41:29.680 --> 01:41:32.380
just like, what if we just extend that one housing
1856
01:41:32.439 --> 01:41:36.890
tax credit? Like when they develop a theory of the
1857
01:41:36.949 --> 01:41:41.789
case of government and how to make it actionable and
1858
01:41:42.060 --> 01:41:45.630
to people's lives with value instead of just platitudes about,
1859
01:41:45.649 --> 01:41:47.789
we got to get back to affordability. You know, those
1860
01:41:47.850 --> 01:41:50.250
kitchen table issues and you're like kitchen, what are you
1861
01:41:50.369 --> 01:41:51.369
fucking talking about?
1862
01:41:51.390 --> 01:41:51.970
Yeah.
1863
01:41:52.029 --> 01:41:56.130
But have some specifics. You don't have any chat GPT.
1864
01:41:55.789 --> 01:41:57.970
Could come up with a pretty nice platform probably in
1865
01:41:58.010 --> 01:41:59.210
a minute and a half. Yeah.
1866
01:41:59.229 --> 01:42:00.300
Andrew Cuomo tried that.
1867
01:42:01.340 --> 01:42:01.920
Exactly.
1868
01:42:02.239 --> 01:42:03.920
Oh, he did those AI commercials.
1869
01:42:04.220 --> 01:42:06.880
Well, he also, like, there was a housing plan that
1870
01:42:06.920 --> 01:42:09.319
his team put out that just had, like, chat GPT, like,
1871
01:42:09.380 --> 01:42:10.479
gibberish in the middle.
1872
01:42:10.659 --> 01:42:10.920
Yeah.
1873
01:42:11.060 --> 01:42:11.880
That's hilarious.
1874
01:42:12.579 --> 01:42:13.520
What's that guy up to?
1875
01:42:13.520 --> 01:42:14.739
And that's why he won.
1876
01:42:14.859 --> 01:42:15.670
Exactly.
1877
01:42:16.229 --> 01:42:20.130
But how hard can it be? All right. Very good. Brittany,
1878
01:42:20.170 --> 01:42:21.149
how do they keep in touch with us?
1879
01:42:21.409 --> 01:42:24.829
Twitter. We are Weekly Show Pod, Instagram threads, TikTok, Blue Sky.
1880
01:42:24.890 --> 01:42:27.319
We are Weekly Show Podcast, and you can like, subscribe,
1881
01:42:27.340 --> 01:42:29.359
and comment on our YouTube channel, The Weekly Show with
1882
01:42:29.380 --> 01:42:29.859
Jon Stewart.
1883
01:42:30.100 --> 01:42:32.130
Fantastic, guys. Thanks very much.
1884
01:42:32.729 --> 01:42:35.930
As always, producer Brittany Mamedovic, producer Jillian Spear, video editor
1885
01:42:35.949 --> 01:42:39.310
and engineer Rob Vitolo, who types faster than you think
1886
01:42:39.350 --> 01:42:42.770
he does. Audio editor and engineer Nicole Boyce and our
1887
01:42:42.789 --> 01:42:44.770
executive producers Chris McShane and Katie Gray.
1888
01:42:45.229 --> 01:42:49.840
We shall see you all next week. Bye-bye.
1889
01:42:56.619 --> 01:42:59.100
The Weekly Show with Jon Stewart is a Comedy Central
1890
01:42:59.140 --> 01:43:02.970
podcast is produced by Paramount Audio and Busboy Productions.
1
00:00:00.170 --> 00:00:01.750
When you get older, you got to have yourself a
2
00:00:01.770 --> 00:00:05.509
little bit of the comfort. And that's where the avocado
3
00:00:05.570 --> 00:00:08.269
green mattress comes in, man. And unlike most mattress brands,
4
00:00:08.650 --> 00:00:11.490
they'll only sell you online. They do have stores too.
5
00:00:11.509 --> 00:00:13.349
You can go in the store. You can try them out.
6
00:00:13.810 --> 00:00:19.579
Unbelievably comfortable. Avocado mattress is designed for comfort, support, helping
7
00:00:19.620 --> 00:00:22.140
your body stay aligned. You know, the last time my
8
00:00:22.219 --> 00:00:27.300
body was aligned, it's been, I think it might've been
9
00:00:27.359 --> 00:00:30.420
the last time the Mets won the world series. That's
10
00:00:30.440 --> 00:00:33.280
how long it's been since it's been aligned. But these mattresses,
11
00:00:33.520 --> 00:00:37.649
avocado green mattress, responsibly sourced organic materials that are built
12
00:00:37.670 --> 00:00:42.450
to last. So get an avocado green mattress. Avocado products
13
00:00:42.490 --> 00:00:47.070
are made, not manufactured, and thoughtfully crafted with real materials
14
00:00:47.350 --> 00:00:49.939
to deliver lasting comfort and support. You can experience them
15
00:00:49.979 --> 00:00:53.859
in person at an avocado showroom or a premier retailer
16
00:00:53.899 --> 00:00:58.479
near you. Or shop online at avocadogreenmattress.com slash TWS to
17
00:00:58.500 --> 00:01:06.760
check out their mattress and furniture sale. avocadogreenmattress.com slash TWS, avocadogreenmattress.com
18
00:01:07.599 --> 00:01:13.590
slash TWS, period. Look, you know, I don't know when
19
00:01:13.609 --> 00:01:14.969
I'm going to leave this job. I don't know when
20
00:01:14.989 --> 00:01:16.390
I'm going to stay in this job. I don't know
21
00:01:16.450 --> 00:01:18.030
how these things are going to do, but when I do,
22
00:01:18.549 --> 00:01:23.819
you should replace me with Indeed. You should call Indeed
23
00:01:25.079 --> 00:01:29.409
when you're replacing me because I, listen, This podcast, it
24
00:01:29.450 --> 00:01:30.290
requires skills.
25
00:01:30.390 --> 00:01:31.230
You need a face.
26
00:01:33.409 --> 00:01:35.750
You need a pie hole so that you can open
27
00:01:35.790 --> 00:01:42.109
your pie hole and just spout. Not everybody can do that.
28
00:01:43.170 --> 00:01:47.480
And so, you know, if you need to hire, you
29
00:01:47.500 --> 00:01:48.799
got to say to yourself, this is a job for
30
00:01:48.840 --> 00:01:51.640
indeed sponsored jobs. You can reach candidates that meet your
31
00:01:51.659 --> 00:01:54.299
specific criteria. Like if you want them to have skills
32
00:01:55.079 --> 00:01:59.019
or pie hole certifications. Maybe even you want to know
33
00:01:59.040 --> 00:02:01.780
what the location is. Only Indeed can get that stuff
34
00:02:01.829 --> 00:02:06.269
done efficiently. Trust me, you know, you got to kiss
35
00:02:06.310 --> 00:02:08.870
a lot of frogs unless you use one of these
36
00:02:08.889 --> 00:02:11.990
services there like Indeed. So spend less time searching and
37
00:02:12.030 --> 00:02:14.960
more time actually interviewing candidates who check all your boxes.
38
00:02:15.219 --> 00:02:18.360
Less stress, less time, more results. When you need the
39
00:02:18.400 --> 00:02:20.520
right person to cut through the chaos, this is a
40
00:02:20.580 --> 00:02:25.819
job for Indeed-sponsored jobs. listeners of this show will get
41
00:02:25.840 --> 00:02:29.719
a $ 75 sponsored job credit to help get your job
42
00:02:29.740 --> 00:02:34.569
the premium status it deserves at Indeed.com slash podcast. Just
43
00:02:34.590 --> 00:02:38.189
go to Indeed.com slash podcast right now and support our
44
00:02:38.210 --> 00:02:42.430
show by saying you heard about Indeed on this podcast. Indeed.com
45
00:02:42.449 --> 00:02:55.110
slash podcast. Terms and conditions apply. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome
46
00:02:55.409 --> 00:02:57.310
to the weekly show podcast. My name is John Stewart.
47
00:02:57.349 --> 00:03:02.180
It is Tuesday, July 7th. This will air Wednesday, July 8th.
48
00:03:02.840 --> 00:03:05.280
We're not going to talk about the 250th celebration. We're
49
00:03:05.300 --> 00:03:07.979
not going to talk about the U.S. men's soccer team's
50
00:03:08.620 --> 00:03:14.650
truly just disappointing performance in their game against Belgium. All
51
00:03:14.689 --> 00:03:16.870
those things worthy of episodes. Not going to be doing
52
00:03:16.889 --> 00:03:20.229
it because we have today an unusual opportunity. We have
53
00:03:20.270 --> 00:03:22.830
two gentlemen on the show who really should not be
54
00:03:22.909 --> 00:03:26.819
on the show. They have lawsuits pending against our federal government.
55
00:03:28.120 --> 00:03:31.560
One of them is seemingly in the crosshairs of the
56
00:03:31.810 --> 00:03:36.689
newly weaponized Trump Department of Justice under the auspices of Mr.
57
00:03:36.729 --> 00:03:39.530
Todd Blanch, who is, as you know, an independent observer
58
00:03:39.590 --> 00:03:43.189
of law and not, in fact, the president's former lawyer
59
00:03:43.270 --> 00:03:44.930
who is just working on his behalf.
60
00:03:45.129 --> 00:03:45.830
Well, oops.
61
00:03:45.849 --> 00:03:46.310
Yes, he is.
62
00:03:47.629 --> 00:03:49.419
And I will just get to it.
63
00:03:50.159 --> 00:03:53.560
We are surprised and delighted to get an opportunity to
64
00:03:53.599 --> 00:03:56.340
speak with these two gentlemen, and we'll get to it
65
00:03:56.379 --> 00:03:56.719
right now.
66
00:04:01.250 --> 00:04:03.569
All right, so we're going to bring in our guests immediately.
67
00:04:03.810 --> 00:04:07.389
We've got Jack Smith, obviously the former special counsel on
68
00:04:07.409 --> 00:04:09.770
a classified documents case and the election interference case.
69
00:04:09.789 --> 00:04:11.449
We've got Brian Driscoll, who was a former.
70
00:04:11.310 --> 00:04:14.879
FBI agent who in 2025 was serving as the acting
71
00:04:15.120 --> 00:04:20.250
director of the FBI until being let go by the administration. Brian, Jack,
72
00:04:20.970 --> 00:04:24.410
thank you for joining us. Thank you for your service
73
00:04:24.449 --> 00:04:27.529
to the rule of law. Let me start with this.
74
00:04:28.490 --> 00:04:31.449
I am under the impression that you are, well, Jack,
75
00:04:31.509 --> 00:04:35.310
probably more than Brian, but under some legal peril in
76
00:04:35.379 --> 00:04:37.339
terms of what you are allowed to talk about, what
77
00:04:37.379 --> 00:04:39.819
you are not allowed to talk about. Brian, I think
78
00:04:39.839 --> 00:04:42.980
you have a pending lawsuit. Jack, obviously the president has
79
00:04:43.079 --> 00:04:48.939
threatened you specifically. Why are you here? I'll start with Jack.
80
00:04:49.600 --> 00:04:50.120
Yeah, sure.
81
00:04:50.180 --> 00:04:52.939
Well, first off, John, thanks very much for having us
82
00:04:53.040 --> 00:04:57.759
on your show. Brian and I are here because we
83
00:04:57.800 --> 00:05:00.040
want to talk about the attack on the rule of
84
00:05:00.139 --> 00:05:04.870
law and specifically how that attack has played out against
85
00:05:04.910 --> 00:05:07.709
public servants, the people that we spent decades working with.
86
00:05:09.230 --> 00:05:12.430
The things that we're seeing over the last year and
87
00:05:12.449 --> 00:05:15.379
a half– Uh, you know, you can see the output
88
00:05:15.420 --> 00:05:17.620
of that, right? You can see people being targeted. I
89
00:05:18.160 --> 00:05:21.060
think Brian and I have a unique perspective and we
90
00:05:21.399 --> 00:05:24.810
understand what's being done to the people who enforce the
91
00:05:24.850 --> 00:05:26.910
rule of law. Uh, the rule of law in our
92
00:05:26.949 --> 00:05:30.370
country does not enforce itself. It takes people of character
93
00:05:30.389 --> 00:05:35.699
and integrity to do it and to undermine it. Uh,
94
00:05:35.899 --> 00:05:39.980
you have to attack those people. And why I wanted
95
00:05:40.019 --> 00:05:42.699
to be here today, John, was to talk about those people, uh,
96
00:05:43.600 --> 00:05:46.579
how much we should be valuing them, how much we
97
00:05:46.660 --> 00:05:49.879
lose when people like that are targeted. And not just
98
00:05:49.920 --> 00:05:54.300
the people who've been fired, but also appreciating the sacrifice
99
00:05:54.319 --> 00:05:57.339
of the people who are still manning their posts, still
100
00:05:57.360 --> 00:05:59.930
doing their job. I feel like a lot of that
101
00:06:00.490 --> 00:06:04.350
is getting lost. And I think more of a discussion
102
00:06:04.389 --> 00:06:07.269
about that is part of the solution going forward.
103
00:06:07.870 --> 00:06:10.790
And Brian, obviously, you're one of those people.
104
00:06:11.949 --> 00:06:15.269
Jack was special counsel over at the the DOJ, you
105
00:06:15.329 --> 00:06:18.029
were in the FBI. Give me a little bit about
106
00:06:18.069 --> 00:06:21.550
your background real quick about being one of those individuals
107
00:06:21.889 --> 00:06:27.220
who's working for the rule of law and had never
108
00:06:27.279 --> 00:06:29.959
had a problem before, in fact, was moving up the chain.
109
00:06:30.319 --> 00:06:32.639
Yeah. I mean, as far as my background is concerned,
110
00:06:32.660 --> 00:06:37.639
I started straight out of graduate school. I went into
111
00:06:37.699 --> 00:06:41.800
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service as an agent for about
112
00:06:41.839 --> 00:06:44.939
three years and came over to the FBI. And then
113
00:06:45.139 --> 00:06:47.519
I served for about close to 18 years with the
114
00:06:47.639 --> 00:06:52.649
FBI as a doer, you know, as a special agent.
115
00:06:52.850 --> 00:06:55.509
You were a hostage and rescue guy, yeah?
116
00:06:56.250 --> 00:06:58.470
Yes, sir. Yeah, for a time during my career, I
117
00:06:58.509 --> 00:07:01.889
was an operator. I started, you know, everybody starts as
118
00:07:01.949 --> 00:07:04.600
a street agent, a criminal investigator on a squad. I
119
00:07:04.639 --> 00:07:07.079
worked to organize crime matters, among other things. Then I
120
00:07:07.160 --> 00:07:09.519
was on the SWAT team in New York. And then
121
00:07:09.579 --> 00:07:12.699
I made the hostage rescue team. Very fortunately, probably some
122
00:07:12.740 --> 00:07:16.180
clerical errors in there. But slipped through the cracks and
123
00:07:16.540 --> 00:07:20.120
served as an operator and a sniper and a team
124
00:07:20.160 --> 00:07:23.959
leader with the hostage rescue team, working embedded with our
125
00:07:23.980 --> 00:07:28.579
military on some significant operations as well, but mostly domestically.
126
00:07:28.600 --> 00:07:29.540
Right.
127
00:07:29.600 --> 00:07:34.220
More than just hostage rescues, but very– what I like
128
00:07:34.259 --> 00:07:37.180
to say is we solve problems like the wolf, you know,
129
00:07:37.240 --> 00:07:40.480
from– I forget the movie. You know what I'm talking about.
130
00:07:40.620 --> 00:07:42.120
I know what you're talking about. I wasn't sure if
131
00:07:42.160 --> 00:07:43.560
it was the wolf or the jackal. I didn't know
132
00:07:43.579 --> 00:07:46.360
what you were talking about. The reason why I want
133
00:07:46.399 --> 00:07:50.000
to establish these sort of bona fides and credentials is
134
00:07:50.019 --> 00:07:55.600
that Brian has worked in busting up child exploitation, sex trafficking,
135
00:07:55.699 --> 00:08:00.939
and terrorism rings. Jack Smith was at The Hague working
136
00:08:01.120 --> 00:08:09.670
on crimes against humanity and genocide. These are universally respected
137
00:08:10.110 --> 00:08:13.709
and admired members of, first of all, those are things
138
00:08:13.750 --> 00:08:17.709
that almost everybody in the world thinks it's heroic to
139
00:08:17.769 --> 00:08:20.509
try and tackle and to try and break up. And
140
00:08:20.550 --> 00:08:26.250
yet you have both become embroiled in the political collateral
141
00:08:26.290 --> 00:08:30.990
damage of, I guess, our dysfunctional system at this point.
142
00:08:32.210 --> 00:08:35.309
So I just wanted to establish what your careers were
143
00:08:36.570 --> 00:08:43.379
before all this occurred. Neither of you are partisan political actors.
144
00:08:43.539 --> 00:08:44.710
Would that be fair to say?
145
00:08:45.299 --> 00:08:47.409
Correct. 100% accurate.
146
00:08:48.009 --> 00:08:48.789
Jack, let's start with you.
147
00:08:48.970 --> 00:08:53.350
You came on people's radar as the special counsel investigating
148
00:08:53.750 --> 00:08:57.070
the cases about election interference into the Trump administration and
149
00:08:57.090 --> 00:09:02.179
the classified documents cases. Before that, what were some of
150
00:09:02.210 --> 00:09:04.649
the things that you were working on before you had
151
00:09:04.669 --> 00:09:08.450
been tapped by, I'm assuming, Merrick Garland to take those cases?
152
00:09:08.950 --> 00:09:09.230
Sure.
153
00:09:09.549 --> 00:09:12.269
I think, you know, overarching, John, the thing to understand
154
00:09:13.129 --> 00:09:16.289
is Brian and I had similar career paths and that,
155
00:09:16.889 --> 00:09:18.929
you know, we might be known to people for the
156
00:09:18.970 --> 00:09:22.389
last job we had, but the truth is, Brian and myself,
157
00:09:22.570 --> 00:09:26.509
we were guys on the line doing the work for
158
00:09:26.549 --> 00:09:28.990
the vast majority of our career. I started as a
159
00:09:29.539 --> 00:09:32.320
local prosecutor in New York City at the district attorney's
160
00:09:32.399 --> 00:09:36.919
office prosecuting domestic violence and sex crimes cases. I then
161
00:09:36.960 --> 00:09:40.519
became a federal prosecutor for nine years in Brooklyn. And again,
162
00:09:40.570 --> 00:09:43.889
the majority of that time, I was trying cases. I
163
00:09:43.950 --> 00:09:46.830
turned down promotions because I liked doing the actual work
164
00:09:47.090 --> 00:09:50.730
of being a prosecutor. After that, I was overseas at
165
00:09:50.769 --> 00:09:54.210
the International Criminal Court. I was then the chief of
166
00:09:54.269 --> 00:09:58.529
the public integrity section, which oversees corruption prosecutions around.
167
00:09:58.330 --> 00:09:59.070
The United States.
168
00:09:59.899 --> 00:10:02.419
Uh, Then I moved to Nashville, Tennessee with my family
169
00:10:02.460 --> 00:10:06.639
and I became– first, I was the first assistant US attorney,
170
00:10:06.679 --> 00:10:09.440
which is kind of the second in command in the office.
171
00:10:09.500 --> 00:10:12.820
Then during the first Trump administration, I was named the
172
00:10:12.879 --> 00:10:17.419
acting US attorney in Nashville. After that job, I went
173
00:10:17.639 --> 00:10:20.659
into a private sector job for a very short period
174
00:10:20.679 --> 00:10:23.620
of time. And then the Trump administration asked me to
175
00:10:23.659 --> 00:10:26.480
come back and serve in the State Department overseas running
176
00:10:26.519 --> 00:10:28.259
a war crimes tribunal. And that was what I was
177
00:10:28.320 --> 00:10:29.960
doing before I became special counsel.
178
00:10:29.980 --> 00:10:34.149
Jesus. And this is so– so clearly that's not the
179
00:10:34.169 --> 00:10:36.889
career path of let's say a James Carville or somebody
180
00:10:36.929 --> 00:10:40.250
along those lines. So how did you get tapped to
181
00:10:40.289 --> 00:10:45.100
become the special counsel in these classified documents cases? When
182
00:10:45.120 --> 00:10:47.500
did Merrick Garland reach out to you or is that
183
00:10:47.519 --> 00:10:48.279
not how this works?
184
00:10:48.940 --> 00:10:51.919
Yeah, I had had a career in public service. Why
185
00:10:51.960 --> 00:10:54.580
they picked me, you'd have to ask Merrick Garland about that.
186
00:10:55.139 --> 00:10:58.230
I was asked to serve and my career has been
187
00:10:58.250 --> 00:11:00.710
about service and I think Brian and I, again, have
188
00:11:00.850 --> 00:11:05.190
very similar kind of life and kind of views about this.
189
00:11:05.809 --> 00:11:09.769
Public service is a privilege. I've spent the best part
190
00:11:09.809 --> 00:11:12.669
of my adult life working shoulder to shoulder with people
191
00:11:12.710 --> 00:11:16.450
like Brian. And when I was asked to come back
192
00:11:16.509 --> 00:11:18.509
and serve in this role, there was no way I
193
00:11:18.529 --> 00:11:19.309
was not going to do that.
194
00:11:19.730 --> 00:11:21.809
And when you're asked for it, do you say, is
195
00:11:22.990 --> 00:11:24.629
this a prosecutable case?
196
00:11:24.820 --> 00:11:27.159
Is this a partisan case? Is this too political?
197
00:11:27.519 --> 00:11:29.840
Or do you just say, this is my assignment, and
198
00:11:29.879 --> 00:11:31.799
now it's time for me to go in and start
199
00:11:31.860 --> 00:11:34.100
gathering the information with all the tools that I have
200
00:11:34.460 --> 00:11:35.179
at my disposal?
201
00:11:35.559 --> 00:11:38.539
Yeah, I went into it with no preconceived notions. I
202
00:11:38.559 --> 00:11:41.070
was living overseas in Europe in this State Department job
203
00:11:41.090 --> 00:11:43.870
for the last four years. And so- My job was
204
00:11:43.909 --> 00:11:46.370
to get up to speed on the facts and on
205
00:11:46.389 --> 00:11:50.210
the law and to make a call. Listen, I've done
206
00:11:50.330 --> 00:11:53.909
big public cases before, big corruption cases before. I knew
207
00:11:53.970 --> 00:11:55.549
that no matter what decision I was going to make,
208
00:11:55.629 --> 00:11:59.389
somebody was going to criticize it. I think people who
209
00:11:59.429 --> 00:12:04.100
have experience doing those cases, they know that all that stuff,
210
00:12:04.340 --> 00:12:06.539
what people say in the media, people like you, people
211
00:12:06.580 --> 00:12:08.919
don't like you, you're a villain, you're a hero. It's
212
00:12:08.960 --> 00:12:13.480
all noise, just noise. I had a great team of
213
00:12:13.539 --> 00:12:17.159
public servants who had careers very similar to mine. I
214
00:12:17.879 --> 00:12:20.139
think the important thing for your listeners to understand, John,
215
00:12:20.179 --> 00:12:23.559
is we did that case the way I did cases
216
00:12:23.600 --> 00:12:27.960
throughout my career. Same way, same investigative techniques, same ways
217
00:12:28.000 --> 00:12:31.879
of investigating, same ways of making decisions. At the end
218
00:12:31.899 --> 00:12:34.539
of the day, we felt we could prove that case
219
00:12:34.600 --> 00:12:36.100
in court, and that's why we charged the cases.
220
00:12:36.759 --> 00:12:39.919
Brian, for you, a similar path, I'm assuming. You're working
221
00:12:39.950 --> 00:12:42.909
your way up all these different areas. within the FBI
222
00:12:43.610 --> 00:12:49.159
and you are tapped to be, uh, the, the director,
223
00:12:49.200 --> 00:12:52.200
I guess, of the FBI. Um, or I guess you
224
00:12:52.220 --> 00:12:54.000
were tapped to be the deputy director. Is that what
225
00:12:54.019 --> 00:12:55.720
happened first? And they screwed up. There's a bit of
226
00:12:55.759 --> 00:12:58.659
a clerical, uh, decision here. And so you just ended
227
00:12:58.730 --> 00:13:01.110
up being the acting head for a little while. Is
228
00:13:01.149 --> 00:13:02.570
that how you came to your role?
229
00:13:03.470 --> 00:13:06.070
Yeah. Yeah, exactly. So I was tapped to be the
230
00:13:06.149 --> 00:13:10.529
acting deputy director. Um, and then on January 20th, uh,
231
00:13:10.570 --> 00:13:14.789
there was a, clerical error in the publishing coming from
232
00:13:14.820 --> 00:13:18.440
the white house that had my name as the acting
233
00:13:18.620 --> 00:13:21.679
or interim director of the fbi rather than my partners
234
00:13:21.700 --> 00:13:23.399
so they were just flipped.
235
00:13:23.600 --> 00:13:26.120
So then you became that then uh what happened in
236
00:13:26.320 --> 00:13:30.950
in brian's case is uh so at a certain point
237
00:13:31.190 --> 00:13:36.629
you were asked to compile a list of investigators that
238
00:13:36.690 --> 00:13:42.149
had worked on the cases that they deemed were going
239
00:13:42.269 --> 00:13:45.950
after Trump or people within Trump world.
240
00:13:46.230 --> 00:13:47.629
Would that be accurate to say?
241
00:13:47.649 --> 00:13:53.110
Yeah, yeah. In some substance, that's absolutely accurate. And it's
242
00:13:53.129 --> 00:13:56.090
all detailed in the complaint that the attorneys put forth
243
00:13:56.149 --> 00:13:56.450
as well.
244
00:13:57.269 --> 00:14:00.110
And so when you were asked to compile this, you
245
00:14:00.149 --> 00:14:02.210
did not do that. You said you gave them sort
246
00:14:02.230 --> 00:14:06.960
of an anonymized grouping. You felt that that was, they
247
00:14:06.980 --> 00:14:09.220
would be targeting people politically if you were to give
248
00:14:09.259 --> 00:14:10.659
that list and for no reason.
249
00:14:11.649 --> 00:14:14.549
I mean, it was fraught with risk. But before I
250
00:14:15.049 --> 00:14:21.049
did that, which is accurate, I offered and asked for process,
251
00:14:21.629 --> 00:14:27.259
existing process to reinvestigate or look for any of the
252
00:14:27.320 --> 00:14:31.059
alleged corruption or bad intent.
253
00:14:31.220 --> 00:14:33.000
When you say ask for process, what do you mean
254
00:14:33.019 --> 00:14:35.600
by that? Not that I'm not up on the law stuff.
255
00:14:35.779 --> 00:14:36.220
Trust me.
256
00:14:36.600 --> 00:14:39.509
I watch- A shit ton of SVU. So don't think
257
00:14:39.549 --> 00:14:42.860
that none of this is going over my head. But
258
00:14:43.019 --> 00:14:43.940
what do you mean by that?
259
00:14:43.960 --> 00:14:48.919
The show's the best. So there are existing processes in
260
00:14:48.940 --> 00:14:54.850
the DOJ that are purpose-built to investigate internally and externally
261
00:14:55.419 --> 00:15:02.029
any violation or misconduct or corruption. And those processes are
262
00:15:02.090 --> 00:15:06.720
what I articulated when asked for a list of based
263
00:15:06.779 --> 00:15:09.600
off of just what they were assigned to work on
264
00:15:09.679 --> 00:15:12.679
and investigate, because agents and analysts and members of the
265
00:15:12.700 --> 00:15:15.080
FBI don't get to choose. You are assigned.
266
00:15:15.990 --> 00:15:18.470
And so what you're basically saying is, what are you
267
00:15:18.509 --> 00:15:21.049
accusing these people of before I give you a list
268
00:15:21.690 --> 00:15:24.230
of this kind of a thing? Are you just accusing
269
00:15:24.269 --> 00:15:28.149
them of weaponizing? I'm assuming this is about they're accusing
270
00:15:28.190 --> 00:15:32.360
you or these people of weaponizing the DOJ against Donald Trump.
271
00:15:32.379 --> 00:15:32.909
Would that be fair?
272
00:15:33.779 --> 00:15:37.139
Yeah, I think that's fair. And I was not going
273
00:15:37.200 --> 00:15:41.299
to get into an argument about those allegations. I wanted process,
274
00:15:42.120 --> 00:15:46.460
articulated process in writing. So I'm not just leading these
275
00:15:46.500 --> 00:15:49.460
people to the edge of an employment cliff just to
276
00:15:49.500 --> 00:15:50.519
watch them get kicked off.
277
00:15:50.919 --> 00:15:53.620
Right. And this is after Kash Patel took over that
278
00:15:53.639 --> 00:15:54.450
job or before?
279
00:15:54.779 --> 00:15:57.429
Before. It was while I was the acting director early on.
280
00:15:57.809 --> 00:15:59.850
So he came in and replaced you. And then at
281
00:15:59.889 --> 00:16:01.169
that point, they let you go.
282
00:16:02.179 --> 00:16:05.990
I lasted a few more months. So the current director
283
00:16:06.090 --> 00:16:08.409
got in there at the end of February, I believe.
284
00:16:08.470 --> 00:16:11.220
And then I was shown the door on August 8th.
285
00:16:11.690 --> 00:16:13.389
And what was the reason they gave you for showing
286
00:16:13.409 --> 00:16:13.809
you the door?
287
00:16:14.809 --> 00:16:19.590
I mean, it was a one-page memo and there's nothing
288
00:16:19.629 --> 00:16:22.480
of substance and there was no process. So I don't,
289
00:16:22.820 --> 00:16:23.500
I'm still not clear.
290
00:16:23.659 --> 00:16:26.379
There's nothing in there that says like, you were late.
291
00:16:27.279 --> 00:16:30.700
You weren't wearing your FBI-issue polo shirt or jacket.
292
00:16:31.179 --> 00:16:33.120
No, I didn't say that. None of that.
293
00:16:33.159 --> 00:16:35.059
So just left going. That's, I assume, the basis of
294
00:16:35.100 --> 00:16:36.940
your lawsuit, which you probably can't discuss.
295
00:16:37.299 --> 00:16:37.580
Correct.
296
00:16:38.139 --> 00:16:38.659
Fair enough.
297
00:16:38.860 --> 00:16:41.580
I can discuss other things. And I want to.
298
00:16:41.720 --> 00:16:42.759
And we will, young man.
299
00:16:44.679 --> 00:16:48.169
Jack, Brian just said something interesting, which is you don't
300
00:16:48.210 --> 00:16:51.669
get to choose. You got to choose whether or not
301
00:16:51.750 --> 00:16:55.870
to accept the role. But the investigators that are assigned
302
00:16:55.909 --> 00:16:58.690
to you or the people in the FBI, I assume
303
00:16:58.730 --> 00:17:01.129
you use all the different tools that are available at
304
00:17:01.149 --> 00:17:06.730
your disposal at DOJ. Those individuals are not given the opportunity.
305
00:17:06.849 --> 00:17:10.109
If you're assigning them a task, they can't say, this
306
00:17:10.190 --> 00:17:13.789
feels political, or I don't think I want to work
307
00:17:13.849 --> 00:17:17.130
on that because I'm a Trump supporter or a Biden supporter.
308
00:17:17.789 --> 00:17:18.789
Is that the case?
309
00:17:19.539 --> 00:17:23.319
That's correct. And I think, again, for people like Brian
310
00:17:23.359 --> 00:17:28.829
and I, it is just... 101 Justice Department, FBI. Politics
311
00:17:28.869 --> 00:17:30.930
doesn't play a role in these things. People don't talk
312
00:17:30.990 --> 00:17:34.009
about stuff like that. People don't bring up stuff like that.
313
00:17:34.890 --> 00:17:38.779
The team of agents who worked on the cases I investigated, John,
314
00:17:38.819 --> 00:17:42.000
I've been doing this for 30 years. These people were superstars.
315
00:17:42.480 --> 00:17:45.519
They were the best of the best. A lot of
316
00:17:45.539 --> 00:17:48.480
them were veterans, people who'd served their country in all
317
00:17:48.500 --> 00:17:52.839
different sorts of ways. And to see those folks demonized
318
00:17:53.839 --> 00:17:57.869
and cast aside I just– one of the reasons I've
319
00:17:57.910 --> 00:18:00.410
been so lucky to meet Brian and get to chat
320
00:18:00.430 --> 00:18:04.170
with him is Brian is a perfect example of if
321
00:18:04.259 --> 00:18:06.839
you think our country is safer when we get rid
322
00:18:06.880 --> 00:18:10.579
of people like this, you don't know anything about national security.
323
00:18:10.599 --> 00:18:12.859
You don't know anything about fighting corruption in our country.
324
00:18:13.539 --> 00:18:16.559
I think it's very easy to demonize people as faceless
325
00:18:16.599 --> 00:18:20.099
bureaucrats when they're not there to tell their story. But
326
00:18:20.119 --> 00:18:22.079
when you get an example of the sort of people
327
00:18:22.119 --> 00:18:24.359
who worked on my case, the people Brian spent his
328
00:18:24.400 --> 00:18:28.319
career with, it becomes very hard to defend the actions
329
00:18:28.400 --> 00:18:32.200
against these people. I have seen this attack on the
330
00:18:32.240 --> 00:18:35.589
rule of law. Brian used the word process. I think
331
00:18:35.619 --> 00:18:38.170
if you want to use one sort of metric to
332
00:18:38.230 --> 00:18:43.589
measure this, it's are you going to get predetermined outcomes
333
00:18:43.670 --> 00:18:45.950
no matter what, hell or high water, or are you
334
00:18:45.970 --> 00:18:49.650
going to follow a good process? We followed process when
335
00:18:49.690 --> 00:18:52.609
we did our investigation just like I had throughout my career.
336
00:18:53.450 --> 00:18:55.769
And the outcome of that process and those facts is
337
00:18:55.829 --> 00:18:57.829
what it is. And whether people like it or don't
338
00:18:57.869 --> 00:19:01.509
like it, that's how you do the job well. And
339
00:19:01.549 --> 00:19:03.210
it's the same thing with these agents who were fired.
340
00:19:03.250 --> 00:19:06.599
There was no process. Brian was trying to protect these
341
00:19:06.700 --> 00:19:12.019
agents and he lost a career that he cherished, that
342
00:19:12.059 --> 00:19:14.900
he devoted his life to for doing the right thing.
343
00:19:15.960 --> 00:19:16.680
I feel like.
344
00:19:16.599 --> 00:19:18.519
Stories like that, we need to talk about it more
345
00:19:18.559 --> 00:19:22.099
because to me in my career, The rule of law
346
00:19:22.140 --> 00:19:25.160
was never a partisan thing. It wasn't a Republican Democrat thing.
347
00:19:25.880 --> 00:19:29.829
And I just can't imagine that people of goodwill could
348
00:19:29.880 --> 00:19:33.509
hear stories like Brian's story, the stories of the agents
349
00:19:33.549 --> 00:19:37.450
who worked on my case and say, no, that's okay.
350
00:19:37.509 --> 00:19:38.710
I'm down with that. That's good.
351
00:19:39.410 --> 00:19:42.730
These are the people who– these are role models. You
352
00:19:42.750 --> 00:19:44.490
want to raise your kids to be like these people
353
00:19:45.269 --> 00:19:48.450
and to have them victimized. It's unfair to them, but
354
00:19:48.490 --> 00:19:50.460
we're all going to pay a cost for it. both
355
00:19:50.519 --> 00:19:51.839
in the short term and in the long term.
356
00:19:58.720 --> 00:20:00.930
Mint Mobile. I don't know what you want out of
357
00:20:00.970 --> 00:20:01.609
a phone company.
358
00:20:01.890 --> 00:20:03.829
What I want out of a phone company is deliver
359
00:20:03.869 --> 00:20:07.670
me a good product for less and don't bother me.
360
00:20:08.470 --> 00:20:12.269
Don't bother me with the like, Oh, have you heard
361
00:20:12.309 --> 00:20:16.369
about our new program? You can upgrade to it. It'll
362
00:20:16.390 --> 00:20:19.410
just cost you a lot more. And then they like
363
00:20:19.650 --> 00:20:22.930
call you a bunch on their own phone. Think about that.
364
00:20:23.269 --> 00:20:26.970
Think about the diabolical mind games that phone companies are
365
00:20:27.009 --> 00:20:30.690
playing by like locking you into an expensive phone program
366
00:20:30.880 --> 00:20:34.279
and then using the very item that they sold you
367
00:20:34.559 --> 00:20:39.809
to contact you. about paying more for some ridiculous upgrade
368
00:20:39.829 --> 00:20:43.730
that's not even really an upgrade. Oh, they're diabolical, but
369
00:20:43.769 --> 00:20:46.390
not Mint Mobile. Mint Mobile plan, 15 bucks a month.
370
00:20:46.390 --> 00:20:52.779
15 bucks a month. What is it? 1992?
371
00:20:52.779 --> 00:20:53.650
15 bucks a month.
372
00:20:53.900 --> 00:20:56.480
High-speed data, unlimited talk and text delivered on the nation's
373
00:20:56.519 --> 00:20:58.819
largest 5G network. To get your new wireless plan for
374
00:20:58.839 --> 00:21:01.460
just 15 bucks a month, go to mintmobile.com slash TWS.
375
00:21:01.700 --> 00:21:07.740
That's mintmobile.com slash TWS. Got your wireless bill to 15
376
00:21:07.740 --> 00:21:12.630
bucks a month at mintmobile.com slash TWS. That's it.
377
00:21:13.210 --> 00:21:14.009
There's no catch.
378
00:21:15.029 --> 00:21:18.309
Upfront payments of $ 45 for three months, $ 90 for six months,
379
00:21:18.509 --> 00:21:22.430
or $ 180 for 12 months. Plan required. $ 15 per month equivalent.
380
00:21:22.750 --> 00:21:25.589
Taxes and fees extra. Initial plan term only. Greater than
381
00:21:25.589 --> 00:21:28.529
50 gigabytes. May slow when network is busy. Includes up
382
00:21:28.569 --> 00:21:33.099
to 20 gigabyte hotspot. Capable device required. Availability, speed, and
383
00:21:33.150 --> 00:21:43.910
coverage varies. See mintmobile.com. I really hope they speed that up. Well,
384
00:21:43.930 --> 00:21:46.309
let's try and tease apart sort of the idea of
385
00:21:46.650 --> 00:21:50.309
special counsels and then just the general DOJ operations, because
386
00:21:50.329 --> 00:21:53.210
I do think there are slight differences and special counsels are,
387
00:21:53.990 --> 00:21:57.589
I think, more inherently political, maybe than, you know, just
388
00:21:57.650 --> 00:22:01.309
the general workings of the DOJ in terms of the
389
00:22:01.329 --> 00:22:04.950
types of prosecutions that they do. So, Brian, first of all,
390
00:22:06.279 --> 00:22:08.079
The first question I would ask is, do you feel
391
00:22:08.140 --> 00:22:11.869
the difference when you're working as an FBI agent or,
392
00:22:12.869 --> 00:22:15.289
you know, Jack, when you're working just as a regular
393
00:22:16.750 --> 00:22:21.069
person within the DOJ when administrations change? Do you feel
394
00:22:21.109 --> 00:22:25.410
the difference between an Obama administration and a Trump administration
395
00:22:25.549 --> 00:22:29.599
or or first Trump administration and second Trump administration or
396
00:22:29.680 --> 00:22:35.480
Biden administration? Brian, how does that play out within the organization?
397
00:22:36.700 --> 00:22:41.450
Listen, every administration has their priorities and that's okay. That's
398
00:22:41.490 --> 00:22:43.950
a part of doing business in America. And that's one
399
00:22:43.990 --> 00:22:46.930
of the beautiful things about this country. I think the
400
00:22:46.970 --> 00:22:49.950
best way I could answer that question is very rarely
401
00:22:49.990 --> 00:22:52.109
did I, and I, my career, as well as the
402
00:22:52.150 --> 00:22:55.950
careers of those senior engineering me have transcended administrations. It
403
00:22:55.990 --> 00:23:00.130
has not changed the way we go about doing the job.
404
00:23:00.190 --> 00:23:02.170
And I think the best way to illustrate that, it
405
00:23:02.190 --> 00:23:05.299
kind of demystify what it's like to be an FBI
406
00:23:05.400 --> 00:23:10.130
agent for, the general American or otherwise out there is
407
00:23:10.190 --> 00:23:13.859
to talk about what's on the center of the FBI
408
00:23:13.920 --> 00:23:18.299
badge itself. And it's a depiction of Lady Justice. She's
409
00:23:18.339 --> 00:23:24.000
adorned with three things, scales, a sword, and a blindfold.
410
00:23:24.809 --> 00:23:30.170
The scales symbolize careful weighing of evidence and process and
411
00:23:30.289 --> 00:23:33.940
fairness and balance. The sword is the authority and the
412
00:23:34.359 --> 00:23:38.700
very serious and respected power of enforcing that law. And
413
00:23:38.720 --> 00:23:47.890
the blindfold is the ideal of performing that job with impartiality, objectivity,
414
00:23:48.309 --> 00:23:53.789
and without favor. And when that blindfold is removed and
415
00:23:53.809 --> 00:23:58.339
the scales are disregarded or are tipped because of an
416
00:23:58.390 --> 00:24:03.910
agenda or an influence that's inappropriate, and the sword swings wildly,
417
00:24:03.930 --> 00:24:06.140
then we have some problems.
418
00:24:07.000 --> 00:24:10.000
I want to give people a fuller picture because I think, look,
419
00:24:10.799 --> 00:24:13.220
everybody understands that people that are working in these public
420
00:24:13.240 --> 00:24:18.289
services are doing so probably with less financial reward than
421
00:24:18.329 --> 00:24:20.710
they would if they were going off and doing it
422
00:24:20.809 --> 00:24:24.170
in a more mercenary type operation. But everybody also has
423
00:24:24.210 --> 00:24:28.609
concerns about the excesses and abuses of the legal system,
424
00:24:29.009 --> 00:24:31.670
of the DOJ. There's I want to see if we
425
00:24:31.710 --> 00:24:36.960
can separate out political abuses and power abuses, if that
426
00:24:37.000 --> 00:24:42.740
makes sense. What you're discussing are, you're seeing now political abuses.
427
00:24:43.299 --> 00:24:49.390
How do they internally remediate other kinds of abuses? Because
428
00:24:49.410 --> 00:24:51.150
there's certainly a lot of people out there who might say,
429
00:24:52.410 --> 00:24:54.369
if I had to go up against the FBI, I
430
00:24:54.410 --> 00:24:56.910
couldn't do it. The resources that they have, everything that
431
00:24:56.930 --> 00:25:00.089
they bring to bear, whether it's fair or not, you know,
432
00:25:00.390 --> 00:25:03.880
with RICO or they might want to squeeze somebody at
433
00:25:03.910 --> 00:25:05.960
a low level to get somebody higher. You know, people
434
00:25:06.000 --> 00:25:10.660
are always concerned about overreach within legal jurisdiction.
435
00:25:11.940 --> 00:25:17.839
So I am not concerned about the FBI employees abusing
436
00:25:17.880 --> 00:25:22.690
their authority and power. There are at full strength 38,000
437
00:25:22.690 --> 00:25:25.789
FBI employees that are there for a reason. And it
438
00:25:25.930 --> 00:25:29.630
is to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution.
439
00:25:30.319 --> 00:25:33.960
And everybody has a line. And I have never met
440
00:25:34.240 --> 00:25:38.599
anybody in 21 years, almost 21 years, as a federal
441
00:25:38.700 --> 00:25:43.349
agent that has or would be willing to cross that line.
442
00:25:43.980 --> 00:25:46.910
And how does the FBI police that within its own ranks?
443
00:25:48.049 --> 00:25:50.150
Oh, there's layers.
444
00:25:50.670 --> 00:25:51.230
Okay.
445
00:25:51.250 --> 00:25:55.529
There's an entire inspections division. There's Office of Professional Responsibility.
446
00:25:56.339 --> 00:25:58.579
And the DOJ, there's checks and balances throughout.
447
00:25:59.099 --> 00:26:01.480
And these are put in, I assume, after sort of
448
00:26:01.539 --> 00:26:07.230
Hoover's reign, where trust within the FBI plummets when they
449
00:26:07.269 --> 00:26:09.710
find out, oh, they're getting recordings of Martin Luther King
450
00:26:09.730 --> 00:26:12.509
and all these. So they've layered in a lot of
451
00:26:12.589 --> 00:26:14.710
safeguards for that type of abuse.
452
00:26:15.190 --> 00:26:15.410
Right.
453
00:26:15.509 --> 00:26:19.160
And it's an imperfect organization with a sordid history led
454
00:26:19.200 --> 00:26:24.240
by imperfect men and women. But I've never met anybody
455
00:26:24.660 --> 00:26:29.779
with malicious intent. to leverage the FBI to corrupt or
456
00:26:30.140 --> 00:26:32.390
violate the rights of the American citizens.
457
00:26:32.829 --> 00:26:34.869
And Jack, same question for you in terms of more
458
00:26:34.890 --> 00:26:38.450
of the DOJ aspect of it and the authorities, because,
459
00:26:39.150 --> 00:26:42.009
you know, look, there is, and I think a fair
460
00:26:42.089 --> 00:26:45.470
criticism to be made that when the federal government brings
461
00:26:45.509 --> 00:26:48.650
to bear all of its resources against a citizen, that
462
00:26:48.710 --> 00:26:53.460
citizen is up against it. I believe the phrase is
463
00:26:53.480 --> 00:26:56.529
Schitt's Creek without a paddle. It's very difficult to go
464
00:26:56.569 --> 00:26:59.769
up against that. How does DOJ protect against those kinds
465
00:26:59.809 --> 00:27:00.250
of abuses?
466
00:27:00.630 --> 00:27:03.549
Yeah. So I think these are really important topics. First
467
00:27:03.869 --> 00:27:07.490
is just my experience. Been in the department as a
468
00:27:07.529 --> 00:27:12.839
prosecutor for decades. To your point, John, I'm not saying
469
00:27:12.920 --> 00:27:15.299
the DOJ has been perfect at every step. It's a
470
00:27:15.339 --> 00:27:18.640
human endeavor, right? But what I saw is similar to
471
00:27:18.680 --> 00:27:22.700
what Brian saw. People of goodwill trying. Trying to do
472
00:27:22.740 --> 00:27:24.339
the right thing. Are mistakes made?
473
00:27:24.400 --> 00:27:24.640
Sure.
474
00:27:24.839 --> 00:27:27.619
But good prosecutors, they correct it when they make a mistake.
475
00:27:28.660 --> 00:27:31.500
In terms of the power, that goes back to the
476
00:27:31.539 --> 00:27:35.759
point I was making earlier that to be a prosecutor,
477
00:27:35.819 --> 00:27:37.769
you have to make choices. You have to make judgments
478
00:27:37.849 --> 00:27:40.670
about to bring this case. Don't bring that case. It
479
00:27:40.730 --> 00:27:44.630
is so important that the people in the roles with
480
00:27:44.809 --> 00:27:48.569
that serious amount of power are doing it the right
481
00:27:48.609 --> 00:27:50.710
way and for the right reasons. And they're not doing
482
00:27:50.750 --> 00:27:53.549
it for political reasons. They're doing it because they looked
483
00:27:53.569 --> 00:27:56.569
at the facts and they didn't have a preconceived notion
484
00:27:56.809 --> 00:28:00.250
of the outcome beforehand. That's always going to be tough.
485
00:28:00.269 --> 00:28:02.960
And no matter what decision I make as a prosecutor,
486
00:28:03.539 --> 00:28:05.140
if it's a big case, there's going to be certain
487
00:28:05.180 --> 00:28:07.200
people who think it's unfair and certain people who think
488
00:28:07.259 --> 00:28:10.359
it's great. We can't get away if we're going to
489
00:28:10.380 --> 00:28:14.619
have a justice system of having prosecutors have a discretion
490
00:28:14.940 --> 00:28:18.210
about which cases to bring. And we can talk a
491
00:28:18.230 --> 00:28:20.549
bunch about the different ways we can make the department better.
492
00:28:20.609 --> 00:28:23.569
But the biggest one is to put people in the
493
00:28:23.609 --> 00:28:27.869
roles making those decisions who have experience and expertise. One
494
00:28:27.910 --> 00:28:30.390
of the things I think we see today is the
495
00:28:30.430 --> 00:28:33.150
attack on public servants is an attack on expertise that
496
00:28:33.170 --> 00:28:36.619
you actually don't need a lot of experience or judgment
497
00:28:36.740 --> 00:28:39.880
to do this job. And so making sure that people
498
00:28:39.920 --> 00:28:42.420
are qualified for the jobs they have, that they've earned
499
00:28:42.480 --> 00:28:46.769
the responsibility they're being given in significant cases. And then
500
00:28:46.809 --> 00:28:49.569
to protect those public servants. I think the thing now
501
00:28:49.630 --> 00:28:52.869
that's different than any time in my career is the
502
00:28:52.990 --> 00:28:56.670
idea that you could make a prosecutorial decision. And because
503
00:28:56.690 --> 00:28:59.539
of that, just because someone later didn't like it, you
504
00:28:59.579 --> 00:29:01.920
get fired. Or maybe even you don't make a decision.
505
00:29:01.960 --> 00:29:05.720
You just randomly get assigned to a case. That sort
506
00:29:05.759 --> 00:29:09.099
of randomness, that chills people from doing their job. And
507
00:29:09.299 --> 00:29:12.569
my view is it's intentional. They're trying to chill people
508
00:29:12.609 --> 00:29:15.329
and they're trying to send a message. That if you
509
00:29:15.369 --> 00:29:18.410
come– if you investigate people who are my friends or
510
00:29:18.450 --> 00:29:21.059
my allies, you're going to pay a price for it.
511
00:29:21.380 --> 00:29:24.599
And it's interesting you talk about the power dynamics because
512
00:29:25.200 --> 00:29:27.880
I think what you're saying is real. And as a prosecutor,
513
00:29:27.960 --> 00:29:31.420
I always felt it very important to think about that.
514
00:29:31.460 --> 00:29:33.220
Think about like if I'm going to issue a subpoena,
515
00:29:33.309 --> 00:29:36.009
if I'm going to investigate this, this is a big
516
00:29:36.250 --> 00:29:38.670
thing in this person's life and being thoughtful about it
517
00:29:38.869 --> 00:29:41.640
and following the process. to make sure I treat person
518
00:29:41.799 --> 00:29:45.279
A the same as I treat person B. But at
519
00:29:45.319 --> 00:29:50.240
the same time, we have a situation now where these
520
00:29:50.279 --> 00:29:54.190
public servants who have devoted their lives to the craft
521
00:29:54.230 --> 00:29:56.730
of doing this the right way, and they're not getting
522
00:29:56.789 --> 00:30:02.460
any process whatsoever. And again, my biggest concern is that
523
00:30:03.140 --> 00:30:07.119
we're not highlighting that enough because if those people can't
524
00:30:07.180 --> 00:30:09.680
do their jobs right, the concern that you have, John.
525
00:30:10.140 --> 00:30:11.019
It's exacerbated.
526
00:30:12.420 --> 00:30:13.740
The whole thing becomes politicized.
527
00:30:14.279 --> 00:30:17.160
Politicized and also or just fear, right? I mean, there's
528
00:30:17.180 --> 00:30:20.130
so many knock-on effects. You have people who like, we
529
00:30:20.150 --> 00:30:22.230
should totally open this case, but I might get fired
530
00:30:22.250 --> 00:30:24.309
for doing it. I'm not going to do it. Then
531
00:30:24.349 --> 00:30:27.349
you have people quitting, right? Because they're like, I can't
532
00:30:27.410 --> 00:30:28.789
be a part of this. I don't want to be
533
00:30:28.849 --> 00:30:32.369
labeled as someone who is so different than how I
534
00:30:32.390 --> 00:30:35.750
was raised as a prosecutor. And for me, the biggest
535
00:30:35.789 --> 00:30:41.119
concern is that we have young people who were, you know,
536
00:30:41.180 --> 00:30:43.640
when Brian and I were 20 years old and I
537
00:30:43.680 --> 00:30:45.259
wanted to be a prosecutor and he wanted to be
538
00:30:45.299 --> 00:30:47.839
an agent. I have a concern right now that the
539
00:30:47.880 --> 00:30:50.180
people who are that age and are thinking about what
540
00:30:50.200 --> 00:30:53.349
they're going to do as public servants, they're like, no way,
541
00:30:53.670 --> 00:30:55.619
no way I'm doing this. And I'm going to lose
542
00:30:55.650 --> 00:30:59.500
my job for nothing. And we will suffer a much
543
00:31:00.079 --> 00:31:03.619
greater cost for that than anything else going on. That's
544
00:31:03.680 --> 00:31:08.309
the hardest thing. If people are driven away from public service,
545
00:31:08.369 --> 00:31:11.869
nonpartisan people who just want to serve, that's the hardest
546
00:31:11.890 --> 00:31:12.650
thing to correct for.
547
00:31:13.049 --> 00:31:15.109
Well, how can they not? I mean, I want to
548
00:31:15.130 --> 00:31:16.329
talk about your case for a second, Jack, and then
549
00:31:16.349 --> 00:31:19.430
we'll go back to you, Brian. But When I see
550
00:31:19.470 --> 00:31:22.210
the just level of abuse that was leveled at you
551
00:31:23.150 --> 00:31:26.750
as somebody who was doing that special prosecution case, we
552
00:31:26.769 --> 00:31:29.130
can talk a little bit later about some decisions that
553
00:31:29.170 --> 00:31:34.710
maybe were questioned or not questioned, but the threats that
554
00:31:34.779 --> 00:31:39.700
came down upon you, I would think would be enough
555
00:31:39.759 --> 00:31:44.579
to discourage almost anybody, whether it be somebody within the
556
00:31:44.619 --> 00:31:46.900
DOJ that's gonna take case or somebody that's being asked
557
00:31:46.940 --> 00:31:50.150
to work on that case, It would discourage them. I mean,
558
00:31:50.730 --> 00:31:54.079
the president of the United States was calling you a
559
00:31:54.359 --> 00:31:59.180
psycho who should be in jail. I don't understand how
560
00:32:00.420 --> 00:32:02.720
anyone in their right mind would want to take on
561
00:32:03.259 --> 00:32:05.289
that kind of potential for abuse.
562
00:32:06.349 --> 00:32:09.170
Yeah. I mean, I don't spend a lot of time
563
00:32:09.349 --> 00:32:12.410
thinking about the names I'm being called by the president.
564
00:32:13.329 --> 00:32:16.309
And for me, I mean, we talk about like overcoming
565
00:32:16.349 --> 00:32:18.809
things or facing things. I'm a guy who just did
566
00:32:18.829 --> 00:32:21.509
my job, right? I've been doing it for a long time.
567
00:32:22.069 --> 00:32:24.269
I followed the same traditions and I worked with the
568
00:32:24.309 --> 00:32:26.230
same sort of people I had all through my career.
569
00:32:26.930 --> 00:32:29.990
There's nothing really special about that. A guy like Brian,
570
00:32:30.009 --> 00:32:32.730
on the other hand, is a guy who could have
571
00:32:32.750 --> 00:32:35.430
went along, could have said, here you go. Here's the names.
572
00:32:35.930 --> 00:32:36.569
Here you go.
573
00:32:37.529 --> 00:32:41.150
Fire these people. People like him and there's others. Brian's
574
00:32:41.190 --> 00:32:44.890
an example, but there's many others stood up, lost something
575
00:32:45.730 --> 00:32:48.920
that they built their lives around. because they wouldn't do
576
00:32:48.960 --> 00:32:50.519
the wrong thing and had to do the right thing.
577
00:32:52.400 --> 00:32:55.700
I feel like the more we can celebrate that and
578
00:32:55.839 --> 00:32:59.299
use that as a differentiator, the better we'll be.
579
00:32:59.940 --> 00:33:01.549
Brian, I thought Jack was the hero here. It turns
580
00:33:01.589 --> 00:33:03.329
out you're the hero.
581
00:33:03.349 --> 00:33:04.470
No, Jack's the hero.
582
00:33:04.490 --> 00:33:05.990
I was going for Jack here as the hero. It
583
00:33:06.009 --> 00:33:06.950
turns out Brian's the hero.
584
00:33:07.509 --> 00:33:11.710
Jack is too kind. He is absolutely a hero. Jack,
585
00:33:11.730 --> 00:33:14.819
I appreciate you. You know that, brother. I do want
586
00:33:14.839 --> 00:33:17.759
to add something to what Jack said before is where
587
00:33:17.819 --> 00:33:23.039
I find peace and hope with those of us who
588
00:33:23.099 --> 00:33:28.119
have been either forced into retirement or wrongfully terminated or otherwise.
589
00:33:28.140 --> 00:33:32.180
I talk to most, if not all of those people
590
00:33:32.720 --> 00:33:38.329
whose careers and frankly their life's purposes were disrupted or
591
00:33:39.069 --> 00:33:43.549
interrupted during this period of time. And to a person
592
00:33:44.160 --> 00:33:48.049
Each one of them intends to go back and serve.
593
00:33:48.930 --> 00:33:53.009
And I'm one of them, obviously. And these are people
594
00:33:53.069 --> 00:33:56.269
that were just doing their job, like Jack said. We
595
00:33:56.289 --> 00:34:01.049
didn't sign up for praise or awards or chest candy medals,
596
00:34:01.109 --> 00:34:02.950
all this stuff. We signed up to do our job
597
00:34:02.990 --> 00:34:05.269
because we believe in it and we believe in doing
598
00:34:05.289 --> 00:34:06.970
the right thing. That doesn't change.
599
00:34:07.390 --> 00:34:09.559
Brian, do you have a sense of how many people
600
00:34:09.719 --> 00:34:14.630
have been removed because of working on cases that the
601
00:34:14.650 --> 00:34:18.530
Trump administration deemed partisan? And how many have left just
602
00:34:18.570 --> 00:34:20.710
because they didn't want to be a part of this?
603
00:34:20.989 --> 00:34:24.659
And how many that are left there have their work
604
00:34:25.179 --> 00:34:26.980
chilled because of what's happened?
605
00:34:27.880 --> 00:34:29.719
I don't have a number, but one is too many.
606
00:34:30.219 --> 00:34:30.420
Right.
607
00:34:30.780 --> 00:34:32.739
But it's significant. You would say there has been a
608
00:34:32.840 --> 00:34:34.110
significant drain.
609
00:34:34.889 --> 00:34:39.869
Absolutely. With experience. As the acting director, I watched my
610
00:34:39.929 --> 00:34:42.929
mentor's A lot of whom were my mentors and people
611
00:34:42.969 --> 00:34:45.590
who helped raise me in the organization get forced out.
612
00:34:46.369 --> 00:34:50.210
And then people started to be fired just because of
613
00:34:50.250 --> 00:34:52.340
the cases they were assigned to. And like I said,
614
00:34:52.380 --> 00:34:54.739
they all want to go back. These are veterans. These
615
00:34:54.800 --> 00:34:59.639
are agents. They're analysts who were at the top of
616
00:34:59.679 --> 00:35:03.159
their game, but also some newer employees who were assigned
617
00:35:03.199 --> 00:35:07.630
to these cases that want to go back and be
618
00:35:07.670 --> 00:35:10.059
an analyst. I got an email yesterday saying, From a
619
00:35:10.079 --> 00:35:12.960
guy who was a new analyst assigned to one of
620
00:35:13.000 --> 00:35:17.639
these cases, was fired, and hitting me up for guidance
621
00:35:17.800 --> 00:35:21.250
on once he does get back in, how to apply
622
00:35:21.289 --> 00:35:23.610
to be an agent because that was his goal. It's
623
00:35:23.630 --> 00:35:25.449
not everybody's goal, but it happened to be his. These
624
00:35:25.489 --> 00:35:26.409
people are motivated.
625
00:35:26.429 --> 00:35:27.630
It's feeling like a calling.
626
00:35:27.929 --> 00:35:28.789
It is a calling.
627
00:35:28.909 --> 00:35:29.590
And a service.
628
00:35:29.829 --> 00:35:32.210
Yes. And that is why, like Jack said, he doesn't
629
00:35:32.230 --> 00:35:35.840
spend a lot of time talking about the slings and
630
00:35:35.929 --> 00:35:39.579
arrows that people like us can be the recipients of.
631
00:35:40.739 --> 00:35:43.679
that matters not because we are unafraid. We just want
632
00:35:43.699 --> 00:35:44.050
to serve.
633
00:35:44.469 --> 00:35:45.630
I want to ask you a question too.
634
00:35:45.989 --> 00:35:49.329
You were asked specifically about, they basically said to you,
635
00:35:49.469 --> 00:35:53.369
you'll be okay as long as you've never donated to
636
00:35:53.570 --> 00:35:57.150
a Democrat or voted for Kamala Harris. Is that, did
637
00:35:57.190 --> 00:36:00.769
they ask you that specifically or is that something you're
638
00:36:00.809 --> 00:36:01.670
not allowed to talk about?
639
00:36:02.469 --> 00:36:05.320
No, it's documented in the complaint that was asked me
640
00:36:05.460 --> 00:36:10.869
specifically prior to going back down to headquarters as the
641
00:36:10.929 --> 00:36:14.289
acting deputy director. It was referred to as a vetting interview.
642
00:36:14.650 --> 00:36:14.809
Right.
643
00:36:15.110 --> 00:36:16.670
And I want to make very clear, the vetting to
644
00:36:16.690 --> 00:36:19.409
become an FBI agent is unbelievable. I mean, in terms
645
00:36:19.489 --> 00:36:22.440
of they'll interview everybody you've ever met. They'll put you
646
00:36:22.460 --> 00:36:25.739
through lie detectors. They put you through a process of
647
00:36:26.619 --> 00:36:29.280
making sure that there is nothing within your background that
648
00:36:29.320 --> 00:36:33.039
could be considered controversial or easily blackmailable or any of
649
00:36:33.099 --> 00:36:36.840
those other kinds of things to do that. Is that
650
00:36:36.909 --> 00:36:40.329
the first time in your service you were ever asked
651
00:36:40.389 --> 00:36:41.750
about a political affiliation?
652
00:36:42.130 --> 00:36:42.349
Yes.
653
00:36:43.170 --> 00:36:44.389
And had never been asked before?
654
00:36:44.750 --> 00:36:44.969
Never.
655
00:36:45.610 --> 00:36:46.590
Jack Smith, same question.
656
00:36:46.610 --> 00:36:49.050
Had you ever been asked about your political affiliation before
657
00:36:49.110 --> 00:36:50.929
getting a case? Had you ever been asked who you
658
00:36:50.989 --> 00:36:53.630
donated to? Has there ever been a question in terms
659
00:36:53.670 --> 00:36:55.550
of politics? I'm trying to get to the difference between
660
00:36:56.050 --> 00:36:58.989
When you start to remove, everybody can be considered a
661
00:36:59.030 --> 00:37:02.320
partisan depending on where you vote, but not everybody's an ideologue.
662
00:37:03.320 --> 00:37:04.420
And I want to get to a little bit of
663
00:37:04.440 --> 00:37:08.219
the difference between that. Jack, was there ever a partisan
664
00:37:08.940 --> 00:37:11.980
tilt to how you were asked to operate?
665
00:37:12.579 --> 00:37:14.920
Never. Even in the first Trump administration?
666
00:37:15.300 --> 00:37:17.800
Even in the first Trump administration. Look, John, I was
667
00:37:17.860 --> 00:37:21.750
working in Nashville as the first assistant, right? And it's
668
00:37:22.849 --> 00:37:26.630
before Trump's elected. Trump gets elected. I become the acting
669
00:37:26.730 --> 00:37:28.909
US attorney. The office did not change.
670
00:37:30.769 --> 00:37:32.050
We still did our job.
671
00:37:32.070 --> 00:37:34.010
And just to go back to a point you raised earlier,
672
00:37:35.329 --> 00:37:37.489
if a new administration comes in and they want to
673
00:37:37.570 --> 00:37:40.880
change policy, they want to say, we want to focus
674
00:37:41.139 --> 00:37:44.840
on immigration enforcement. We want to focus less on civil rights.
675
00:37:44.880 --> 00:37:47.900
We want to do environment. We don't want to do
676
00:37:47.940 --> 00:37:50.590
less of corruption. They get to do that. That is
677
00:37:50.659 --> 00:37:53.769
why elections happen. And I tell young people all the time,
678
00:37:54.500 --> 00:37:56.460
If you think you want to be a prosecutor but
679
00:37:56.500 --> 00:37:59.179
you only want to work for certain sorts of administrations
680
00:37:59.239 --> 00:38:02.530
in certain cases, career prosecutor is the wrong profession for you.
681
00:38:02.550 --> 00:38:04.289
You shouldn't do it.
682
00:38:05.150 --> 00:38:07.730
But at the same time, if you want to do
683
00:38:07.789 --> 00:38:09.849
those things, you want to change the policy, that's fine.
684
00:38:10.230 --> 00:38:11.269
But you have to follow the.
685
00:38:11.230 --> 00:38:14.340
Law and you have to follow doing things the right way.
686
00:38:15.179 --> 00:38:20.260
You don't investigate the victims of police shootings, right? You
687
00:38:20.280 --> 00:38:22.980
don't try to smear them and call them domestic terrorists
688
00:38:23.000 --> 00:38:26.650
or to set it a narrative. That is so far
689
00:38:26.730 --> 00:38:31.489
removed from anything I've experienced, both as a line prosecutor
690
00:38:31.710 --> 00:38:34.840
or in leadership positions. It's just never been even anything
691
00:38:34.880 --> 00:38:35.460
close to that.
692
00:38:46.320 --> 00:38:47.980
So what are we to make then of the people
693
00:38:48.000 --> 00:38:51.260
who are still there and they are told, find out
694
00:38:52.170 --> 00:38:56.929
what Letitia James' mortgage situation is like, find out. I mean,
695
00:38:57.110 --> 00:39:01.409
right now, they have weaponized it. It's very clear, and
696
00:39:01.659 --> 00:39:05.179
they've said it explicitly. They are going to go after
697
00:39:05.280 --> 00:39:10.840
those that they felt weaponized the DOJ against Trump. So
698
00:39:11.000 --> 00:39:15.969
if you're working there now, how do you respond to that?
699
00:39:17.789 --> 00:39:21.190
Should everybody quit? I mean, clearly, there's probably partisans there,
700
00:39:21.230 --> 00:39:23.219
but How do they deal with that, Brian?
701
00:39:23.239 --> 00:39:23.960
I'll ask you that.
702
00:39:25.039 --> 00:39:28.010
I think it's pretty black and white. If you receive
703
00:39:28.030 --> 00:39:30.360
a legal order or if it's in further investigation, of
704
00:39:30.389 --> 00:39:37.679
a properly, legally predicated investigation, then that's the job. If
705
00:39:37.699 --> 00:39:41.079
you're asked to cross that line into what is unethical, immoral,
706
00:39:41.179 --> 00:39:44.139
and illegal, then you have a decision to make. And
707
00:39:44.179 --> 00:39:45.340
that's what I've faced as well.
708
00:39:45.420 --> 00:39:48.579
But there are judgments associated with this. There are judgments
709
00:39:48.639 --> 00:39:50.659
in terms of, when to bring a case, you know,
710
00:39:50.920 --> 00:39:53.619
there is discretion. And I think you saw it when
711
00:39:53.639 --> 00:39:57.969
they brought in Lindsay Halligan. There was cases that career
712
00:39:58.030 --> 00:40:02.309
prosecutors felt were not, had not risen to the level
713
00:40:02.630 --> 00:40:05.550
of being, charges being brought.
714
00:40:06.329 --> 00:40:10.510
And that's the decision point. And that is not unilaterally
715
00:40:10.550 --> 00:40:14.969
decided by the FBI. The FBI doesn't make prosecutorial decisions.
716
00:40:15.050 --> 00:40:17.570
We work hand in hand with the DOJ. And then
717
00:40:17.610 --> 00:40:20.489
if it makes it to court, And then it needs
718
00:40:20.510 --> 00:40:21.570
to go through the process.
719
00:40:21.989 --> 00:40:22.170
Right.
720
00:40:22.710 --> 00:40:25.139
Jack, how do you think people should handle that?
721
00:40:25.260 --> 00:40:25.780
Yeah, sure.
722
00:40:25.820 --> 00:40:28.340
And this is something I talk to young people who
723
00:40:28.400 --> 00:40:30.619
are thinking of being prosecutors or people who are still
724
00:40:30.639 --> 00:40:32.159
in the department. I talk to them about it all
725
00:40:32.179 --> 00:40:34.119
the time. And my view is very similar to Brian's.
726
00:40:35.010 --> 00:40:38.030
If you can still do your job, DOJ, even today,
727
00:40:38.190 --> 00:40:40.449
does a lot of good things, a lot of important things,
728
00:40:40.489 --> 00:40:44.170
protecting communities around our country, protecting the safety of Americans,
729
00:40:44.230 --> 00:40:47.510
protecting our national security. A lot of people can do
730
00:40:47.530 --> 00:40:50.050
their job. Now, it could be in this administration, you're
731
00:40:50.070 --> 00:40:52.670
going to get asked to do something that is just wrong,
732
00:40:52.869 --> 00:40:57.250
just illegal, just corrupt. If that happens, your number is up.
733
00:40:57.409 --> 00:40:58.210
It's interesting.
734
00:40:58.869 --> 00:41:03.320
The people who I've talked to who are experienced serious prosecutors,
735
00:41:03.500 --> 00:41:06.500
they know the difference between those things. It's judgment, but
736
00:41:06.539 --> 00:41:10.739
it's not hard. You can look at Letitia James and
737
00:41:10.800 --> 00:41:13.579
look at her mortgage fraud situation and you can then.
738
00:41:13.739 --> 00:41:14.579
Get the facts together.
739
00:41:15.239 --> 00:41:19.000
But then ultimately you say, hey, as I understand the
740
00:41:19.039 --> 00:41:22.019
prosecutors in Virginia did, this is not a case anyone
741
00:41:22.039 --> 00:41:24.940
would ever bring. And then you might get fired for it,
742
00:41:24.949 --> 00:41:27.929
for telling the truth about how a case should be handled.
743
00:41:29.050 --> 00:41:33.190
And I think my view is that prosecutors and agents
744
00:41:33.230 --> 00:41:35.409
too should try to stay and.
745
00:41:35.369 --> 00:41:36.150
Do the right thing.
746
00:41:36.329 --> 00:41:38.820
And this isn't a matter– I've heard people say this
747
00:41:38.860 --> 00:41:40.579
isn't a matter of throwing sand in the gears.
748
00:41:41.260 --> 00:41:42.039
Just do your job.
749
00:41:42.679 --> 00:41:47.260
Do what you've done all along. And that– doing that
750
00:41:48.449 --> 00:41:51.789
makes it harder for them to weaponize the department. Just
751
00:41:51.869 --> 00:41:55.530
doing your job. If the rule of law, it doesn't work.
752
00:41:55.570 --> 00:41:59.409
The system doesn't hold if the people who enforce the
753
00:41:59.469 --> 00:42:02.550
law don't have integrity and character. But if they do,
754
00:42:03.469 --> 00:42:05.750
it's much harder to target people. That's why you see
755
00:42:05.789 --> 00:42:08.090
a lot of these prosecutions or the attempts to indict
756
00:42:08.699 --> 00:42:12.940
senators and congressmen for reciting the uniform code of military justice.
757
00:42:13.679 --> 00:42:17.820
They fall apart because A, real prosecutors won't do it
758
00:42:18.480 --> 00:42:21.500
and therefore the people they get to do it are incompetent.
759
00:42:21.880 --> 00:42:24.440
They don't actually know how to prosecute a case.
760
00:42:24.619 --> 00:42:26.300
The real estate lawyers, right?
761
00:42:26.320 --> 00:42:28.380
Yeah. They don't have any experience. I mean– and I
762
00:42:28.420 --> 00:42:31.550
think that's part of what we've seen that I think
763
00:42:31.949 --> 00:42:34.289
folks like Brian and I find very frustrating is this
764
00:42:34.409 --> 00:42:37.929
idea that you can do something that took us decades
765
00:42:37.989 --> 00:42:40.329
to learn how to do well. oh yeah, I can
766
00:42:40.369 --> 00:42:44.130
just walk in and I can investigate this incredibly complex case,
767
00:42:44.630 --> 00:42:46.530
follow department policy, follow the rules.
768
00:42:46.570 --> 00:42:47.409
Do it the right way.
769
00:42:47.449 --> 00:42:50.820
And I think one other thing that's important to understand, John,
770
00:42:50.840 --> 00:42:55.320
it's like a hallmark of this weaponization is what's happening
771
00:42:55.340 --> 00:42:58.760
in the courts. I mean, the decisions you're seeing from
772
00:42:58.820 --> 00:43:05.289
judges about the positions that DOJ is taking, corrupt, illegal, improper.
773
00:43:05.309 --> 00:43:09.239
I mean, there was a decision recently regarding subpoenas to
774
00:43:09.280 --> 00:43:15.949
officials in Minnesota for a sham investigation. The judge found
775
00:43:16.610 --> 00:43:19.389
that that was not a legitimate criminal investigation and that
776
00:43:19.409 --> 00:43:22.230
it was unlawful. It was meant to retaliate against people.
777
00:43:23.070 --> 00:43:26.949
And again, just the narrative, that judge, the judge was
778
00:43:26.989 --> 00:43:30.650
appointed by George Bush. That judge was a Scalia clerk.
779
00:43:31.010 --> 00:43:36.610
So this is not radical left lunatics making these determinations.
780
00:43:37.300 --> 00:43:40.500
This is the rule of law kind of right in
781
00:43:40.539 --> 00:43:43.980
front of us having that battle. And my view is
782
00:43:44.000 --> 00:43:46.780
that the most important thing we do now is when
783
00:43:46.820 --> 00:43:50.469
we see public servants and we see good people standing up,
784
00:43:51.239 --> 00:43:54.320
we support them. Those people need our support and our
785
00:43:54.360 --> 00:43:57.360
support will make a difference whether those people can continue
786
00:43:57.400 --> 00:43:57.869
to stand up.
787
00:43:58.320 --> 00:44:00.679
Is that the way you feel also within the FBI, Brian?
788
00:44:00.679 --> 00:44:01.619
100%.
789
00:44:01.619 --> 00:44:07.139
The amount of sacrifice... that the people in any agency,
790
00:44:07.179 --> 00:44:09.280
but I'll speak for the FBI, are making on a
791
00:44:09.360 --> 00:44:12.320
daily basis and who are willing to trade all their
792
00:44:12.340 --> 00:44:19.610
tomorrows to save your today is immeasurable. They're incredible human
793
00:44:19.650 --> 00:44:22.929
beings that are going through a lot. And they go
794
00:44:22.969 --> 00:44:25.550
through a lot. They always have, but they continue to
795
00:44:25.610 --> 00:44:27.570
every day and they don't complain about it. They make
796
00:44:27.610 --> 00:44:30.239
the sacrifices, whether that's being willing to make the ultimate
797
00:44:30.300 --> 00:44:36.260
sacrifice for somebody else or to navigate This different environment
798
00:44:36.440 --> 00:44:39.400
in which they are working to get the job done,
799
00:44:39.460 --> 00:44:41.340
not for themselves, but to protect you and me.
800
00:44:42.019 --> 00:44:44.550
Let's talk a little bit about this different environment and
801
00:44:44.590 --> 00:44:49.349
in terms of how, you know, Americans' faith in our
802
00:44:49.429 --> 00:44:53.769
legal system, I think, is waning, would be.
803
00:44:53.769 --> 00:44:54.690
Putting it politely.
804
00:44:55.820 --> 00:44:57.079
And I want to talk a little bit about the
805
00:44:57.119 --> 00:45:00.599
systemic changes that I think have caused that.
806
00:45:01.059 --> 00:45:02.820
Jack, you hit on it a little bit right there.
807
00:45:02.840 --> 00:45:04.659
You said, well, this is a judge that was appointed
808
00:45:04.699 --> 00:45:08.820
by Bush, and this was an Alito clerk. But think
809
00:45:08.880 --> 00:45:14.159
about that. We're so politicized to the point now. I mean,
810
00:45:14.199 --> 00:45:17.280
you face this, Jack, there was criticism that you brought
811
00:45:17.320 --> 00:45:20.219
the classified documents case down to Florida because there was
812
00:45:20.260 --> 00:45:22.780
a chance you might end up in Judge Cannon's court.
813
00:45:22.820 --> 00:45:26.320
Judge Cannon is a Trump, I think people would say
814
00:45:26.360 --> 00:45:29.469
not just partisan, but ideologue, and she would make decisions
815
00:45:29.769 --> 00:45:34.090
purely based on protecting her person. We've got the point
816
00:45:34.150 --> 00:45:38.570
now where we have teams. Judges are on teams. They're
817
00:45:38.610 --> 00:45:41.710
on the Democrat team. They're on the Republican team. And
818
00:45:41.789 --> 00:45:46.550
you can't expect fair justice if you're on the opposing squad.
819
00:45:47.070 --> 00:45:51.110
Is the entire system so politicized that there's, and we'll
820
00:45:51.159 --> 00:45:53.460
get into the Supreme Court of it all after this,
821
00:45:53.579 --> 00:45:58.260
but what do we do about the fact that that
822
00:45:58.340 --> 00:46:02.630
we now look to when decisions come down, whether or
823
00:46:02.730 --> 00:46:06.949
not that judge is an Obama judge, a Trump judge,
824
00:46:07.949 --> 00:46:08.750
and we use.
825
00:46:08.610 --> 00:46:09.969
That as part of justification.
826
00:46:09.989 --> 00:46:12.510
Well, that was a great decision because a Trump judge
827
00:46:13.340 --> 00:46:17.940
went against Trump world or an Obama judge went against
828
00:46:18.440 --> 00:46:19.159
the Democrats.
829
00:46:20.000 --> 00:46:21.079
What do you do about that?
830
00:46:21.940 --> 00:46:25.860
Yeah, I think the first thing is that that this
831
00:46:25.900 --> 00:46:28.440
judge was appointed by this person, this judge clerked for
832
00:46:28.460 --> 00:46:31.119
this person. I think it's a– and I raised it
833
00:46:31.340 --> 00:46:34.039
as it's sort of a response to the claim that
834
00:46:34.059 --> 00:46:38.880
they're all political, radical people against this particular president. From
835
00:46:38.920 --> 00:46:42.539
my point of view, in terms of getting credibility back,
836
00:46:42.900 --> 00:46:45.400
not only for the courts, but also for the Department
837
00:46:45.420 --> 00:46:48.340
of Justice, I think about it the same way I
838
00:46:48.380 --> 00:46:50.739
think about my work as a prosecutor. When I am
839
00:46:50.909 --> 00:46:54.619
going into court, I need to be credible with judges.
840
00:46:54.900 --> 00:46:57.159
I need to be credible with juries. I need to
841
00:46:57.179 --> 00:47:00.329
be credible with witnesses. How I do that as a
842
00:47:00.369 --> 00:47:05.989
prosecutor is I behave with values that we all share.
843
00:47:06.010 --> 00:47:11.230
I act with integrity. I tell the truth. I treat
844
00:47:11.289 --> 00:47:14.849
people with respect, whether they deserve it or not. I
845
00:47:15.320 --> 00:47:17.519
show kindness and I show courage if I need to.
846
00:47:18.820 --> 00:47:22.699
Those sort of values, those sort of traits, that's the
847
00:47:22.760 --> 00:47:26.320
fabric that binds us together. And my view is that
848
00:47:26.739 --> 00:47:30.079
we have to lean into that more than ever, and
849
00:47:30.099 --> 00:47:32.940
that we should be looking for people in positions leading
850
00:47:32.980 --> 00:47:37.739
these institutions or appointing judges who have not just will
851
00:47:37.840 --> 00:47:40.179
voice those traits, but have lived those traits.
852
00:47:40.980 --> 00:47:42.440
But that's not what the public sees.
853
00:47:42.500 --> 00:47:46.920
What the public sees is a judge in Florida that
854
00:47:47.199 --> 00:47:51.079
delays the case, that makes rulings that make it impossible
855
00:47:51.539 --> 00:47:52.860
for you to file.
856
00:47:53.840 --> 00:47:54.599
That changes things.
857
00:47:54.840 --> 00:48:00.599
And then they see a prosecutor yourself release a hundred and,
858
00:48:00.840 --> 00:48:05.340
I don't know, 65 page document about election interference right
859
00:48:05.380 --> 00:48:09.019
before the election that they feel is a political move
860
00:48:09.960 --> 00:48:15.530
on your part. So the tough part is everybody who's
861
00:48:15.570 --> 00:48:19.429
within those institutions can say, look, we're, we're working through
862
00:48:19.469 --> 00:48:24.070
process and we are doing it in values and morals
863
00:48:24.289 --> 00:48:26.809
that we think are fitting to the stature of the
864
00:48:26.849 --> 00:48:30.670
organizations that we're in. But the public isn't, that's not
865
00:48:30.750 --> 00:48:35.269
their experience with this. Their experience with this is it
866
00:48:35.349 --> 00:48:40.789
is a political game being played out through processes that
867
00:48:40.929 --> 00:48:43.469
we normally thought were apolitical.
868
00:48:44.510 --> 00:48:47.909
Yeah, I think that gets to, that's the next layer, right?
869
00:48:47.949 --> 00:48:52.159
That's like, communication. And to me, I was a prosecutor, right?
870
00:48:52.199 --> 00:48:55.360
My career, I was a guy, I spoke in the courtroom,
871
00:48:55.599 --> 00:48:56.739
not on the courthouse steps.
872
00:48:57.780 --> 00:48:58.639
If I did press.
873
00:48:58.460 --> 00:49:01.360
Conferences, I said the absolute minimum I had to say,
874
00:49:01.920 --> 00:49:03.420
and I got back to work. I didn't see that
875
00:49:03.460 --> 00:49:05.179
as part of my job. I saw my job as
876
00:49:05.219 --> 00:49:08.039
working with people like Brian to actually do the work.
877
00:49:09.159 --> 00:49:11.219
I think what we've learned, to your point, John, is
878
00:49:11.320 --> 00:49:14.840
that there is another component to being a leader in
879
00:49:14.860 --> 00:49:15.800
the Justice Department.
880
00:49:16.360 --> 00:49:17.639
Maybe the largest component.
881
00:49:17.989 --> 00:49:20.780
Well, I would differ with you on that. because I
882
00:49:20.820 --> 00:49:22.739
don't want to get where the next leaders of the
883
00:49:22.780 --> 00:49:25.860
Department of Justice are comms people, right? And they don't
884
00:49:25.889 --> 00:49:30.050
know anything about prosecuting cases. I just think that people– look,
885
00:49:30.110 --> 00:49:33.829
the people who are good prosecutors– they are good communicators.
886
00:49:33.869 --> 00:49:36.389
They have to win juries over. They have to win
887
00:49:36.429 --> 00:49:39.269
judges over. I think in the past, we just haven't
888
00:49:39.369 --> 00:49:42.179
taken it as part of our job to have this
889
00:49:42.219 --> 00:49:44.599
larger conversation. I mean, for me, I grew up in
890
00:49:44.639 --> 00:49:48.460
upstate New York. I grew up outside of Syracuse. I
891
00:49:48.500 --> 00:49:52.800
think a lot of folks in Washington don't think that
892
00:49:52.840 --> 00:49:55.300
they need to communicate necessarily to those people. We talk
893
00:49:55.320 --> 00:49:58.869
to people in Washington. I would love to see future
894
00:49:58.909 --> 00:50:02.650
leaders of the Justice Department trying to explain what they're
895
00:50:02.670 --> 00:50:06.489
doing to people outside of just the legal community, outside
896
00:50:06.530 --> 00:50:09.030
of just Washington, D.C. I think it's hard to be
897
00:50:09.230 --> 00:50:12.429
real fair. You got a right to a fair trial, right?
898
00:50:12.510 --> 00:50:14.610
You can't be talking about– you shouldn't be talking about
899
00:50:14.650 --> 00:50:18.039
a case, the specifics of a case while it's pending.
900
00:50:18.840 --> 00:50:20.539
But I do think there's more we can do if
901
00:50:20.579 --> 00:50:24.159
we all agree that if you don't communicate these things
902
00:50:24.199 --> 00:50:26.320
that show integrity. Because if you have integrity and you
903
00:50:26.360 --> 00:50:30.940
have competence, it doesn't mean much if people don't know
904
00:50:30.980 --> 00:50:32.440
that and you can't communicate that.
905
00:50:33.039 --> 00:50:34.900
But is it just a, do you really think it's
906
00:50:34.920 --> 00:50:38.860
just a communications problem, Jack? Because, you know, and Brian,
907
00:50:38.880 --> 00:50:40.840
I'll ask you this too, you know, the FBI doesn't
908
00:50:40.880 --> 00:50:45.619
communicate their methodologies and their things. But I think people
909
00:50:46.059 --> 00:50:49.510
look at the way that these institutions, I'll go back
910
00:50:49.590 --> 00:50:52.349
to Brian, when you were first there, when Trump was
911
00:50:52.389 --> 00:50:55.889
going after the two FBI agents during the Russia investigation
912
00:50:56.269 --> 00:50:58.510
that he thought were, it was Page and Strzok, I
913
00:50:58.530 --> 00:51:03.219
think that were had an affair and he was ridiculing them.
914
00:51:04.000 --> 00:51:08.239
Is it enough for the FBI to just communicate.
915
00:51:07.659 --> 00:51:09.619
Better what they're doing?
916
00:51:10.099 --> 00:51:13.340
Or do we need to really look at the totality
917
00:51:13.389 --> 00:51:15.050
of a system that's been politicized?
918
00:51:15.070 --> 00:51:18.469
I think there's value in looking at the totality, but
919
00:51:18.550 --> 00:51:21.250
you can't look at the totality without a clear and
920
00:51:21.510 --> 00:51:27.150
depth of understanding of the process. And I think the FBI...
921
00:51:28.059 --> 00:51:31.460
has an interesting history of how they communicate those processes
922
00:51:32.000 --> 00:51:34.699
when they can and they can't always. But I think
923
00:51:34.820 --> 00:51:40.949
to Jack's point, you can rarely, in my experience, gain
924
00:51:41.309 --> 00:51:45.150
and earn trust and credibility through chest beating and being
925
00:51:45.190 --> 00:51:48.690
the loudest voice in the room and being the voice
926
00:51:48.730 --> 00:51:51.409
when we're living in these 18 inches between our phones
927
00:51:51.449 --> 00:51:57.400
and our faces with just clicks and content. It requires...
928
00:51:57.389 --> 00:52:05.530
Leadership with grace and poise and practice with clear messaging
929
00:52:06.280 --> 00:52:09.460
of what I can tell you, what I can't, and why.
930
00:52:10.559 --> 00:52:11.900
And then just hope for trust.
931
00:52:12.360 --> 00:52:15.579
But I don't think we get it. I'll give you
932
00:52:15.619 --> 00:52:19.480
two examples. First is January 6th. So the big story
933
00:52:19.539 --> 00:52:22.780
on the right is January 6th actually wasn't what we
934
00:52:22.820 --> 00:52:23.760
all saw that it was.
935
00:52:24.300 --> 00:52:25.829
It was an FBI op.
936
00:52:26.510 --> 00:52:28.730
There was a guy who was an FBI plant and
937
00:52:28.769 --> 00:52:30.510
he urged people to go in there. And there were
938
00:52:30.510 --> 00:52:33.750
600 FBI agents that were there that day. And they're
939
00:52:33.789 --> 00:52:36.889
the ones that stirred the pot. And they did all that.
940
00:52:37.210 --> 00:52:41.269
And so our entire understanding of this was actually the
941
00:52:41.429 --> 00:52:48.989
feds instigating an insurrection on January 6th. And that's their
942
00:52:49.070 --> 00:52:52.059
storyline as they're going to get through. And I'll give
943
00:52:52.079 --> 00:52:54.539
you the flip side of that on the left, which is,
944
00:52:54.929 --> 00:52:57.610
James Comey, who was the head of it at the time,
945
00:52:58.530 --> 00:53:00.909
announcing that he was going to do an investigation or
946
00:53:00.969 --> 00:53:04.460
reopen an investigation into Hillary Clinton, you know, a month
947
00:53:04.519 --> 00:53:08.159
before the election. And that's what sunk her chances. You know,
948
00:53:08.500 --> 00:53:12.920
those are the narratives that you're fighting. And I have
949
00:53:13.000 --> 00:53:15.760
not heard, you know, Comey has come out and said
950
00:53:15.800 --> 00:53:18.840
a few things about, well, I might not have done that,
951
00:53:18.880 --> 00:53:19.989
but I thought it was important.
952
00:53:20.030 --> 00:53:21.710
You know, he's explained certain things.
953
00:53:22.309 --> 00:53:27.019
The FBI hasn't really talked that much about who those
954
00:53:27.099 --> 00:53:29.630
agents were, what they were doing there, or any of
955
00:53:29.659 --> 00:53:31.090
those other situations.
956
00:53:31.869 --> 00:53:36.349
Yeah. Listen, what I'll say about that is that if
957
00:53:36.409 --> 00:53:41.090
the FBI expended its resources chasing down or debunking every
958
00:53:41.130 --> 00:53:44.760
conspiracy theory, they would be spending much less time focusing
959
00:53:44.820 --> 00:53:48.619
on national security and mitigating serious crime.
960
00:53:49.159 --> 00:53:51.480
Just some, though, raised to the level that need to
961
00:53:51.559 --> 00:53:54.199
be addressed more forcefully.
962
00:53:54.719 --> 00:53:58.519
Yeah, I think, and that comes with close and continuing
963
00:53:58.940 --> 00:54:02.880
communication with the public in a responsible manner. And I
964
00:54:02.940 --> 00:54:05.750
think that could fix a lot of the things that
965
00:54:05.769 --> 00:54:10.409
you're addressing. And honestly, when you're speaking about Director Comey
966
00:54:10.429 --> 00:54:14.170
and the others, I can't and won't speak for them.
967
00:54:14.190 --> 00:54:17.539
And they have their choices to make on their, not
968
00:54:17.599 --> 00:54:20.480
only their when and how they communicate, but the style
969
00:54:20.500 --> 00:54:22.639
in which they do so. And they're surrounded by very
970
00:54:22.679 --> 00:54:23.139
smart people.
971
00:54:23.760 --> 00:54:26.440
How hard is it now when the director of the FBI,
972
00:54:26.500 --> 00:54:29.380
Kash Patel, is one of the people who propagated the
973
00:54:29.420 --> 00:54:32.139
January 6th theory? That now you have somebody leading the
974
00:54:32.260 --> 00:54:36.000
FBI who was a proponent of that conspiracy. Yet, you know,
975
00:54:36.019 --> 00:54:37.760
there was a guy, Ray Epp, you know, they've never
976
00:54:37.820 --> 00:54:40.440
brought charges against any of those people. They've never actually
977
00:54:41.400 --> 00:54:44.400
given the information out there. They've never released certain files.
978
00:54:44.739 --> 00:54:49.699
You know, how do we retain faith in an institution
979
00:54:50.780 --> 00:54:55.800
that in some respects is won't defend itself forcefully, or
980
00:54:55.880 --> 00:54:59.530
in this particular case, is being led by someone who
981
00:54:59.570 --> 00:55:02.230
was one of the leading proponents that we shouldn't trust
982
00:55:02.269 --> 00:55:03.110
this organization.
983
00:55:04.150 --> 00:55:08.289
Yeah. So I understand that a fish stinks from the
984
00:55:08.329 --> 00:55:10.210
head kind of concept.
985
00:55:10.550 --> 00:55:11.159
I've heard that.
986
00:55:11.449 --> 00:55:14.719
However, I was only the head of that fish for
987
00:55:14.860 --> 00:55:16.940
a very short amount of time. However, I spent a
988
00:55:17.059 --> 00:55:22.250
lot of time with the people that, And shared risk
989
00:55:23.409 --> 00:55:28.730
of our lives with the people that actually work that organization.
990
00:55:29.329 --> 00:55:33.630
Like I said, 38,000 at full strength. One guy named
991
00:55:33.690 --> 00:55:38.449
as the director, right? Now, I think people need to
992
00:55:38.510 --> 00:55:42.210
trust that those people, they're not appointees. They're civil servants.
993
00:55:42.250 --> 00:55:44.610
They've given up a lot to be able to serve
994
00:55:44.650 --> 00:55:47.349
in their capacities. They've worked their asses off to do it.
995
00:55:48.130 --> 00:55:50.369
And their families have given up a lot. And that's
996
00:55:50.409 --> 00:55:53.130
where I find trust in them because I was one
997
00:55:53.170 --> 00:55:54.679
of them and I was with them and I'll do
998
00:55:54.719 --> 00:55:59.139
anything for them. Now, as far as the current director
999
00:55:59.460 --> 00:56:04.599
is concerned, on his first night after he was confirmed,
1000
00:56:05.460 --> 00:56:07.639
he came to the office and I had a few
1001
00:56:07.679 --> 00:56:10.480
minutes with him and I made him a promise in
1002
00:56:10.519 --> 00:56:13.840
that moment, not knowing how long I had left there.
1003
00:56:14.099 --> 00:56:17.030
I didn't have a crystal ball. I had some feelings
1004
00:56:17.070 --> 00:56:20.489
about it, but I promised him that I would do
1005
00:56:20.710 --> 00:56:23.829
everything in my power and whatever influence I had to
1006
00:56:23.889 --> 00:56:27.250
make him the best director we've ever had because we
1007
00:56:27.289 --> 00:56:29.320
need him to be. And if he fails, we fail.
1008
00:56:30.659 --> 00:56:35.599
That has not changed. Despite what people want to assign
1009
00:56:35.639 --> 00:56:38.340
to me as far as my opinions and thoughts, my
1010
00:56:38.380 --> 00:56:43.039
opinions are unproductive. I hope and root that he will
1011
00:56:43.699 --> 00:56:49.489
be better every day. I hope. that those in leadership positions,
1012
00:56:49.550 --> 00:56:51.670
not just in the FBI, but everywhere else that serves
1013
00:56:52.309 --> 00:56:56.949
our country, understands that having authority and being an authority
1014
00:56:57.329 --> 00:56:59.989
are not the same thing. And surround yourself with people
1015
00:57:00.909 --> 00:57:04.800
that are smarter and better and more experienced, and we'll
1016
00:57:04.840 --> 00:57:05.929
all be better off for it.
1017
00:57:06.440 --> 00:57:12.860
And how does that dysfunction present itself clearly within the organization,
1018
00:57:12.960 --> 00:57:16.809
chain of command, morale, eye on the prize in terms of,
1019
00:57:17.170 --> 00:57:20.250
Or is there literally like the majority of the FBI
1020
00:57:20.349 --> 00:57:23.409
is focused on those day-to-day tasks of protecting Americans and
1021
00:57:23.869 --> 00:57:25.670
making sure these threats don't go? And there is a
1022
00:57:25.829 --> 00:57:31.079
small kind of cadre, a kind of adjacent office that
1023
00:57:31.139 --> 00:57:33.300
is more focused on these partisan endeavors.
1024
00:57:34.039 --> 00:57:36.159
Well, let me caveat this with it. I'm out in
1025
00:57:36.199 --> 00:57:38.940
these streets, just like you guys. So I'm not in there.
1026
00:57:39.579 --> 00:57:45.260
But what you said is accurate. The majority of the
1027
00:57:45.300 --> 00:57:46.909
people there are doing their job.
1028
00:57:47.800 --> 00:57:50.980
And the priorities, they might shift to drug interdiction or
1029
00:57:51.019 --> 00:57:54.500
they might shift to trafficking or something else, but they're
1030
00:57:54.960 --> 00:58:00.000
still focused on the day-to-day task at hand and the
1031
00:58:00.059 --> 00:58:02.659
processes that were put in place to protect those tests.
1032
00:58:03.400 --> 00:58:03.659
Yes.
1033
00:58:03.960 --> 00:58:11.539
And if there are priorities or surges driven by the leadership,
1034
00:58:11.559 --> 00:58:14.659
then portions of the FBI will surge to that.
1035
00:58:15.260 --> 00:58:18.840
Well, like when they say we're now moving a bunch
1036
00:58:18.889 --> 00:58:23.690
of FBI agents to go to Atlanta and they're going
1037
00:58:23.710 --> 00:58:26.710
to go and they're going to raid election offices and
1038
00:58:26.730 --> 00:58:29.909
they're going to do all those things. And by all accounts,
1039
00:58:30.349 --> 00:58:33.960
they're moving a lot of manpower to do that. How
1040
00:58:34.019 --> 00:58:37.579
are we supposed to have faith in that organization anymore
1041
00:58:37.699 --> 00:58:42.900
when that's so clearly a partisan endeavor, an ideological endeavor?
1042
00:58:43.579 --> 00:58:43.719
Yeah.
1043
00:58:45.030 --> 00:58:46.960
Listen, I'm not going to be cute about it. That
1044
00:58:47.019 --> 00:58:49.940
is troubling to watch from the outside. I don't know
1045
00:58:51.519 --> 00:58:57.590
what's going into those decision matrix that are driving those investigations.
1046
00:58:58.349 --> 00:59:04.489
So I won't speak to the credibility of them. That said,
1047
00:59:04.630 --> 00:59:06.219
I will go back to what I said before. If
1048
00:59:06.340 --> 00:59:09.219
it is legal, if it's predicated, if all the things
1049
00:59:09.300 --> 00:59:11.949
have been done properly, then, you know.
1050
00:59:12.750 --> 00:59:15.530
Even if, look, even if just by the very nature
1051
00:59:15.570 --> 00:59:19.010
of doing it, that puts a chilling effect on the
1052
00:59:19.070 --> 00:59:21.989
electoral process in that area, the people that work there,
1053
00:59:22.320 --> 00:59:25.239
you know, we saw the hell that they put two
1054
00:59:25.300 --> 00:59:28.460
election workers through when they were looking there, you know,
1055
00:59:28.619 --> 00:59:32.280
these are the things that that I think very much
1056
00:59:32.460 --> 00:59:36.130
undermine that credibility that you guys are talking about and
1057
00:59:36.190 --> 00:59:39.110
the story that you guys are talking about in terms
1058
00:59:39.269 --> 00:59:43.010
of the individuals and the sacrifices they're making to protect us.
1059
00:59:43.670 --> 00:59:46.659
Yeah, I mean, and I think what's most vexing on
1060
00:59:46.719 --> 00:59:49.179
top of that is not just how the resources are
1061
00:59:49.219 --> 00:59:53.159
being allocated and what they're being allocated to, but what's
1062
00:59:53.199 --> 00:59:56.659
getting dropped. You know, what kind of actual threats are
1063
00:59:56.679 --> 01:00:02.800
being prioritized or deprioritized when that's happening. We have a
1064
01:00:02.880 --> 01:00:07.679
very heightened national security threat right now. Crime is going down,
1065
01:00:09.760 --> 01:00:13.699
speaking globally or nationally, which is great. I'm not going
1066
01:00:13.719 --> 01:00:16.730
to sit here and be ignorant enough to say everything
1067
01:00:17.289 --> 01:00:19.610
that these people are doing is bad. That's just not
1068
01:00:19.829 --> 01:00:24.090
the case. And it's irresponsible to say that. However, from
1069
01:00:24.130 --> 01:00:27.250
what I worked when I was in the With Jack
1070
01:00:27.730 --> 01:00:32.010
working in parallel, intersecting sometimes through people we share as
1071
01:00:32.030 --> 01:00:36.070
friends and colleagues, there are threats that we could use
1072
01:00:36.139 --> 01:00:39.920
more resources pointed at, you know, especially with the global
1073
01:00:41.599 --> 01:00:45.320
environment and what's happening all over the world right now.
1074
01:00:46.019 --> 01:00:46.940
Terrorism didn't stop.
1075
01:00:48.039 --> 01:00:48.239
Right.
1076
01:00:48.420 --> 01:00:49.719
And those threats don't stop.
1077
01:00:49.980 --> 01:00:53.610
Jack, I want to ask you about, you know, When DOJ,
1078
01:00:53.619 --> 01:00:55.210
when you've got the DOJ is headed up by the
1079
01:00:55.269 --> 01:00:57.650
president's personal lawyer. But I want to talk about other
1080
01:00:57.690 --> 01:01:02.429
structural things. DOJ, I always look at as you're fighting corruption, right?
1081
01:01:02.590 --> 01:01:08.789
It's influence peddling, bribes, the types of white collar crime
1082
01:01:09.289 --> 01:01:13.389
that is difficult to get your arms around and handle.
1083
01:01:13.769 --> 01:01:18.469
But it seems as though the Supreme Court has made
1084
01:01:18.530 --> 01:01:22.960
that job. Forget about Trump and politicizing these things. It
1085
01:01:23.019 --> 01:01:28.349
seems as though corruption, as we typically understood it, has
1086
01:01:28.389 --> 01:01:32.389
been redefined by the Supreme Court over the last 15 years.
1087
01:01:33.230 --> 01:01:35.829
And I want to know how that affects your ability
1088
01:01:36.650 --> 01:01:39.090
to do the job that the DOJ is supposed to
1089
01:01:39.110 --> 01:01:42.989
be doing. So just as an example, in the McDonald case,
1090
01:01:43.230 --> 01:01:45.610
did you work on the McDonald case in Virginia?
1091
01:01:46.170 --> 01:01:46.489
I did.
1092
01:01:46.530 --> 01:01:48.349
I was one of the supervisors of that case, yes.
1093
01:01:48.760 --> 01:01:52.519
Okay, so that's a case where a guy is paid
1094
01:01:52.860 --> 01:01:58.079
money and gifts and bribes to give access, right? You
1095
01:01:58.099 --> 01:02:00.159
guys bring a case against him, he gets convicted. The
1096
01:02:00.199 --> 01:02:05.809
Supreme Court says, actually, it's not bribery if it's just
1097
01:02:05.889 --> 01:02:10.070
for access. You know, there were other cases. I've got
1098
01:02:10.130 --> 01:02:13.130
some written down. The Snyder case, which I thought was
1099
01:02:13.190 --> 01:02:17.769
a fascinating one. Bribes that are given after you do
1100
01:02:17.869 --> 01:02:23.599
something the quid pro quo are considered gratuities and therefore
1101
01:02:23.920 --> 01:02:28.980
can't be prosecuted as bribes. You have the absolute immunity
1102
01:02:29.019 --> 01:02:33.500
case for Trump. You have the skilling case, which is
1103
01:02:33.599 --> 01:02:38.090
about conflict of interest or self-dealing. At every turn, the
1104
01:02:38.119 --> 01:02:42.530
Supreme Court is redefining what public corruption is to the
1105
01:02:42.570 --> 01:02:46.030
point where I don't even know how you would prosecute
1106
01:02:46.090 --> 01:02:50.519
public corruption. Unless someone is holding a giant bag that
1107
01:02:50.559 --> 01:02:53.659
has a dollar sign on it and on it it says,
1108
01:02:54.090 --> 01:02:56.210
for helping me with that thing.
1109
01:02:57.309 --> 01:03:01.289
Well, John, it's actually even more dire than you lay out.
1110
01:03:01.789 --> 01:03:03.670
It can't be more dire than that, Jack.
1111
01:03:04.409 --> 01:03:04.869
It can't.
1112
01:03:05.230 --> 01:03:08.070
But before we get to the Supreme Court and I'll
1113
01:03:08.090 --> 01:03:10.409
come back to that, we're in a world right now, John,
1114
01:03:10.469 --> 01:03:14.369
where if there is corruption at the highest levels of
1115
01:03:14.429 --> 01:03:16.530
our government, there is nobody to look at it.
1116
01:03:17.010 --> 01:03:17.340
Nobody.
1117
01:03:17.920 --> 01:03:20.119
Congress is not going to look at it. The DOJ
1118
01:03:20.159 --> 01:03:22.079
is not going to look at it. There's not going
1119
01:03:22.099 --> 01:03:24.989
to be any outside prosecutor to look at it. And
1120
01:03:25.070 --> 01:03:27.710
so before we even get to bringing a case, there's
1121
01:03:27.750 --> 01:03:29.789
no one who would be allowed to investigate it.
1122
01:03:30.750 --> 01:03:31.809
I do think you're right.
1123
01:03:32.070 --> 01:03:35.090
When you say nobody is allowed to investigate it, how
1124
01:03:35.110 --> 01:03:35.510
do you mean?
1125
01:03:36.139 --> 01:03:40.340
Well, you can imagine if there was– take a look
1126
01:03:40.380 --> 01:03:46.469
at the Signalgate thing, right? With the sharing– Battle plans.
1127
01:03:46.590 --> 01:03:49.329
Classified information over a– Right.
1128
01:03:49.730 --> 01:03:54.050
And the attorney general at the time, Attorney General Bondi, immediately,
1129
01:03:54.239 --> 01:03:57.099
without any facts, said there's not going to be an investigation.
1130
01:03:57.960 --> 01:04:01.420
Comes out later from the inspector general that, in fact,
1131
01:04:01.539 --> 01:04:05.079
it was classified information and it endangered the lives of
1132
01:04:05.179 --> 01:04:09.960
service members. If that's not being investigated, we don't have
1133
01:04:09.980 --> 01:04:11.840
to worry about what the Supreme Court says because we're
1134
01:04:11.860 --> 01:04:13.739
not going to get to court and have a case.
1135
01:04:14.800 --> 01:04:17.739
But they are investigating Rene Good. I mean, they are investigating.
1136
01:04:17.760 --> 01:04:20.590
They're just– it seems upside down to some extent.
1137
01:04:20.789 --> 01:04:26.469
Right. And again, my point is that that judgment to
1138
01:04:26.690 --> 01:04:30.900
investigate real corruption and not investigate shooting victims' family members,
1139
01:04:32.099 --> 01:04:34.460
you need good people in these roles. Just again, in
1140
01:04:34.500 --> 01:04:37.300
terms of as we go forward, I hear a lot
1141
01:04:37.340 --> 01:04:39.099
of people talk about how are we going to fix
1142
01:04:39.119 --> 01:04:41.489
the FBI? How are we going to fix the Department
1143
01:04:41.510 --> 01:04:47.650
of Justice. I've heard someone say, the next director of
1144
01:04:47.670 --> 01:04:50.389
the FBI really needs to have smart people around them
1145
01:04:50.449 --> 01:04:52.579
who really know the Bureau and how it works, people
1146
01:04:52.599 --> 01:04:56.679
like Brian Driscoll. My response to that is, how about
1147
01:04:57.219 --> 01:04:59.559
we just have one of those people run the FBI?
1148
01:05:00.019 --> 01:05:03.119
Someone who actually knows it, not a politician, not a
1149
01:05:03.159 --> 01:05:05.869
person with a political stake in the game, but people
1150
01:05:05.929 --> 01:05:08.869
who actually have done the work since they were young people.
1151
01:05:09.210 --> 01:05:09.789
How about that?
1152
01:05:09.929 --> 01:05:13.949
And I agree with you, John, that winning back credibility
1153
01:05:13.969 --> 01:05:16.170
is not going to be easy, but I don't think
1154
01:05:16.210 --> 01:05:19.650
we shouldn't try to do it. And again, I think
1155
01:05:19.730 --> 01:05:24.489
that diving into that, my life, when I interact with
1156
01:05:24.530 --> 01:05:27.199
people in the world, I hear people all the time
1157
01:05:27.239 --> 01:05:29.960
who want to go back to having normal people make
1158
01:05:30.000 --> 01:05:30.679
these decisions.
1159
01:05:31.219 --> 01:05:34.840
Oh, dear God. People are exhausted. They're absolutely exhausted.
1160
01:05:35.099 --> 01:05:37.429
And so the way I think of it is, We
1161
01:05:37.510 --> 01:05:40.550
have the people who work in the Justice Department and
1162
01:05:41.269 --> 01:05:44.449
in the FBI, the everyday line prosecutors and agents, which
1163
01:05:44.510 --> 01:05:46.329
Brian and I spent most of our career doing.
1164
01:05:46.989 --> 01:05:48.050
People know their story.
1165
01:05:48.150 --> 01:05:50.380
They're going to like that. They're going to respect it.
1166
01:05:50.449 --> 01:05:52.269
I mean, just to go back real quick, John, on
1167
01:05:52.309 --> 01:05:55.980
the issue of communication and the issue of January 6th,
1168
01:05:56.550 --> 01:06:00.219
there is a inspector general's report that exists that debunks
1169
01:06:00.510 --> 01:06:03.559
everything you said about the FBI setting this up.
1170
01:06:04.099 --> 01:06:04.840
It's in detail.
1171
01:06:05.199 --> 01:06:06.940
And if you take the time to read the 100
1172
01:06:06.940 --> 01:06:10.380
whatever odd pages it is, no person could come away
1173
01:06:10.420 --> 01:06:11.039
and think.
1174
01:06:11.460 --> 01:06:12.159
That's what happened.
1175
01:06:12.679 --> 01:06:16.469
The problem? Nobody's read it. Nobody knows about it. Nobody
1176
01:06:16.510 --> 01:06:18.630
took it as their job to go out to the
1177
01:06:18.670 --> 01:06:22.150
public and say, hey, this is a big deal. People
1178
01:06:22.190 --> 01:06:24.809
are going to believe this narrative unless I explain this
1179
01:06:24.849 --> 01:06:27.050
to folks. And so that's what I say about leaders
1180
01:06:28.210 --> 01:06:31.460
on issues like that that can cause huge distrust. Taking
1181
01:06:31.480 --> 01:06:33.500
that on is part of the job. I certainly didn't
1182
01:06:33.539 --> 01:06:36.309
do it in the DOJ before, but I think that's
1183
01:06:36.369 --> 01:06:37.809
a thing we need to change going forward.
1184
01:06:48.429 --> 01:06:52.889
How do we change when the Supreme Court has made
1185
01:06:52.949 --> 01:06:56.800
the bar for public corruption so high? Look, special counsels
1186
01:06:56.860 --> 01:07:00.619
in general were appointed because it all felt like It
1187
01:07:01.119 --> 01:07:05.880
was a problem beyond the scope of our standard system.
1188
01:07:05.920 --> 01:07:07.960
So you had the Watergate special prosecutor.
1189
01:07:08.000 --> 01:07:13.699
You had Iran Contra was a special prosecutor. And they
1190
01:07:13.739 --> 01:07:17.719
looked into it and they found evidence of criminal wrongdoing
1191
01:07:17.860 --> 01:07:21.869
in the case of Watergate brought down a president.
1192
01:07:22.070 --> 01:07:23.030
Interesting that J.D.
1193
01:07:23.110 --> 01:07:26.469
Vance said Watergate today would be a 12-hour story and
1194
01:07:26.530 --> 01:07:29.000
nothing would happen. And I don't disagree with that, not
1195
01:07:29.039 --> 01:07:32.760
because it's not an egregious abuse of power, but because
1196
01:07:33.639 --> 01:07:39.449
the levers of accountability that we have seem diminished. And
1197
01:07:39.489 --> 01:07:42.070
I wonder if special, you know, special counsels played a
1198
01:07:42.110 --> 01:07:44.050
role in that. And I want your opinion on that.
1199
01:07:44.409 --> 01:07:46.489
You know, if you think about, let's look at the
1200
01:07:46.530 --> 01:07:49.489
last ones you had, the Mueller case with Russia had
1201
01:07:49.510 --> 01:07:52.519
a lot of convictions, but very few of them were about.
1202
01:07:54.119 --> 01:07:55.599
Election interference.
1203
01:07:55.619 --> 01:07:59.420
It was mostly obstruction or perjury or those things uh
1204
01:07:59.619 --> 01:08:03.219
we had i guess uh the next one was the
1205
01:08:03.239 --> 01:08:06.380
classified documents case then they had the biden documents case
1206
01:08:06.440 --> 01:08:09.420
it looked like he also had classified documents then they
1207
01:08:09.440 --> 01:08:12.809
had a hunter biden special counsel where we finally got
1208
01:08:12.869 --> 01:08:18.449
him on weapons charges you know whitewater was another one
1209
01:08:19.609 --> 01:08:24.289
where the special counsels also i guess at fault in
1210
01:08:24.369 --> 01:08:27.560
some ways Because they never really got to the crux
1211
01:08:27.600 --> 01:08:30.939
of what they were investigating. They were only able to
1212
01:08:31.119 --> 01:08:36.270
spring process traps. And that's how they ended up catching
1213
01:08:36.289 --> 01:08:42.149
a few low-level fish. So if that's not there, what
1214
01:08:42.189 --> 01:08:45.470
levers of accountability are we left with? And I know
1215
01:08:45.510 --> 01:08:48.310
that's a lot to answer, but I wanted your opinion
1216
01:08:48.369 --> 01:08:48.590
on that.
1217
01:08:48.909 --> 01:08:49.409
Yeah, sure.
1218
01:08:49.510 --> 01:08:53.140
So I think of it this way. You've got a situation,
1219
01:08:53.159 --> 01:08:56.920
a highly sensitive situation, with high-level people in the government.
1220
01:08:57.020 --> 01:08:59.010
It could be my case, it could be Iran-Contra, it
1221
01:08:59.029 --> 01:09:00.819
could be Watergate, any of the ones you talked about.
1222
01:09:01.260 --> 01:09:02.100
You've got three options.
1223
01:09:03.039 --> 01:09:07.359
Option one is you say, this is too sensitive. We're
1224
01:09:07.390 --> 01:09:09.970
not going to really look into it. Corruption at the
1225
01:09:09.989 --> 01:09:12.789
highest level of government, it doesn't happen very often and
1226
01:09:12.829 --> 01:09:15.310
the executive needs a lot of power to do their job.
1227
01:09:15.369 --> 01:09:17.930
So we're really not going to even go down that road.
1228
01:09:18.760 --> 01:09:21.979
There are people who take that position. On the other end,
1229
01:09:22.060 --> 01:09:24.899
you say, you know what? The Justice Department run by
1230
01:09:24.939 --> 01:09:28.020
a political appointee of the current president can totally do
1231
01:09:28.060 --> 01:09:30.039
it and people will find it credible because the Justice
1232
01:09:30.079 --> 01:09:32.380
Department does this every day and we don't have to
1233
01:09:32.420 --> 01:09:36.420
do anything special. The middle ground is to appoint somebody
1234
01:09:36.579 --> 01:09:39.279
outside the government and how much discretion and power that
1235
01:09:39.340 --> 01:09:42.619
person has depends on whether you're talking about the independent
1236
01:09:42.640 --> 01:09:46.699
counsel statute, which was Iran-Contra or the special counsel regulations
1237
01:09:46.720 --> 01:09:50.140
that I worked under. And the balance is you want
1238
01:09:50.199 --> 01:09:52.649
independence so that person can make a call and call
1239
01:09:52.659 --> 01:09:56.329
balls and strikes as they are. But you also need accountability, right?
1240
01:09:56.470 --> 01:09:58.369
Because you don't want to have– and I think that
1241
01:09:58.390 --> 01:10:00.689
was the concern with the independent counsel statute is some
1242
01:10:00.750 --> 01:10:04.289
felt that the independent counsel was accountable to no one
1243
01:10:04.329 --> 01:10:05.170
and could go on forever.
1244
01:10:06.350 --> 01:10:09.029
And could catch a lot of people in situations where
1245
01:10:09.050 --> 01:10:11.640
they don't have the resources. Look, I'm no fan of
1246
01:10:11.680 --> 01:10:14.920
General Flynn. But it's very different for Donald Trump to
1247
01:10:14.939 --> 01:10:16.899
have to defend himself. I mean that guy– had to
1248
01:10:16.939 --> 01:10:20.119
like sell his house. You know, when somebody is in
1249
01:10:20.159 --> 01:10:24.819
the crosshairs, whether it's a Papadopoulos or a Carter Page
1250
01:10:24.979 --> 01:10:28.079
or a, you know, Hunter Biden has resources, but, you know,
1251
01:10:28.649 --> 01:10:32.510
Letitia James now, you know, these people don't have the
1252
01:10:32.569 --> 01:10:36.369
resources to go up against it. Clearly abuses have been
1253
01:10:36.390 --> 01:10:37.029
taking place.
1254
01:10:37.630 --> 01:10:37.810
Yeah.
1255
01:10:37.829 --> 01:10:40.229
And I guess one thing I would just add to
1256
01:10:40.250 --> 01:10:44.189
that and to the framework is, is how we judge it, right?
1257
01:10:44.770 --> 01:10:50.189
Like I think when you're dealing with these situations, these complex, difficult,
1258
01:10:50.289 --> 01:10:54.430
hard to prove situations, the idea that anybody is going
1259
01:10:54.489 --> 01:10:57.930
to do that job and you're going to get sort
1260
01:10:57.949 --> 01:11:01.350
of unanimous public agreement that that's a fabulous job and
1261
01:11:01.380 --> 01:11:03.779
we all agree with the outcome. That's just not happening.
1262
01:11:03.800 --> 01:11:05.260
No, that's a good point. Yeah.
1263
01:11:05.460 --> 01:11:08.039
And so I think what we need to do and
1264
01:11:08.159 --> 01:11:12.779
my view is in those situations, you hew to the
1265
01:11:13.909 --> 01:11:16.109
doing things the right way, the way they've been done
1266
01:11:16.149 --> 01:11:19.590
in justice department for generations, at least since Watergate, that
1267
01:11:19.869 --> 01:11:24.670
is a credibility, uh, enhancer. I think again, communicating how
1268
01:11:24.710 --> 01:11:27.310
you're doing that is going to be helpful, but you're
1269
01:11:27.350 --> 01:11:30.489
never going to get a hundred percent approval and you're
1270
01:11:30.520 --> 01:11:33.319
never going to get an outcome that everybody agrees with. Um,
1271
01:11:33.359 --> 01:11:37.039
sometimes the outcomes are, uh, more complicated than, than can
1272
01:11:37.060 --> 01:11:40.880
be explained in a short narrative. Uh, I feel like
1273
01:11:40.899 --> 01:11:44.100
the job of a prosecutor is not achieving a particular outcomes,
1274
01:11:44.140 --> 01:11:48.380
how many convictions you got, how many people were charged,
1275
01:11:48.420 --> 01:11:50.819
that sort of thing. It's doing it the right way.
1276
01:11:51.319 --> 01:11:52.920
You do it the right way and you let the
1277
01:11:52.960 --> 01:11:56.300
chips fall where they're going to fall. Not every profession
1278
01:11:56.319 --> 01:11:59.079
is like that. And I think the thing that's from
1279
01:11:59.220 --> 01:12:01.279
the perspective I have, I think Brian might share this,
1280
01:12:01.960 --> 01:12:05.000
is the way the public judges a lot of the
1281
01:12:05.020 --> 01:12:09.350
criminal justice system is outcome-based. And good prosecutors don't do that.
1282
01:12:09.390 --> 01:12:11.750
So our internal metric for doing the job the right
1283
01:12:11.789 --> 01:12:15.100
way is one of like, I did things the way
1284
01:12:15.119 --> 01:12:17.979
they're supposed to be done. Of course, if I think
1285
01:12:18.000 --> 01:12:20.119
someone's guilty, I want to get a conviction and I'm
1286
01:12:20.140 --> 01:12:22.279
going to try to do that. But it's much more
1287
01:12:22.319 --> 01:12:24.880
important to me that I do it the right way
1288
01:12:24.899 --> 01:12:27.340
than I get a particular outcome. And I would never
1289
01:12:27.380 --> 01:12:30.270
want to have a prosecutor who would cut corners because
1290
01:12:31.210 --> 01:12:33.810
he wants the public adulation and support because he got
1291
01:12:33.829 --> 01:12:36.350
an outcome a lot of people wanted. And so I
1292
01:12:36.359 --> 01:12:39.189
guess a long way to say that is like, there's
1293
01:12:39.409 --> 01:12:43.390
sort of ceilings on how much you can have everybody
1294
01:12:43.489 --> 01:12:45.789
really happy with the outcome of these things. They're built
1295
01:12:45.850 --> 01:12:47.210
to be difficult from the start.
1296
01:12:47.289 --> 01:12:50.260
Well, I'm not even talking about their happiness with it.
1297
01:12:50.430 --> 01:12:54.439
I'm more talking about the broader sense of accountability that
1298
01:12:54.479 --> 01:12:57.779
doesn't seem, look, in my mind, the macro view of this,
1299
01:12:58.060 --> 01:13:00.479
and Brian, I think I'd like to get your opinion
1300
01:13:00.539 --> 01:13:04.600
on this. January 6th was a Rubicon for me. in
1301
01:13:04.659 --> 01:13:10.770
terms of democratic system being subverted. The Supreme Court can
1302
01:13:10.829 --> 01:13:14.329
say the president basically has absolute immunity and you can't
1303
01:13:14.369 --> 01:13:17.470
find anything and basically makes him beyond the scope of
1304
01:13:17.489 --> 01:13:21.670
the law if he's doing the duties of his office.
1305
01:13:22.489 --> 01:13:23.390
But January 6th.
1306
01:13:24.939 --> 01:13:28.739
Was the crossing the line that I thought, this is
1307
01:13:28.920 --> 01:13:31.260
a person that needs to be held to account for
1308
01:13:31.300 --> 01:13:34.430
trying to subvert you know, it's peaceful transfer of power.
1309
01:13:34.770 --> 01:13:35.510
That's the line.
1310
01:13:36.649 --> 01:13:39.180
We can all, there's different corruptions within it, but if
1311
01:13:39.199 --> 01:13:41.640
you won't leave when you're supposed to leave, that's when
1312
01:13:41.680 --> 01:13:43.739
we turn from a democracy into an autocracy.
1313
01:13:43.779 --> 01:13:47.260
Like that's the dividing line, black and white.
1314
01:13:48.060 --> 01:13:52.550
Our inability to hold that president to account through a
1315
01:13:52.569 --> 01:13:57.970
political process, impeachment, that was clearly partisan. People that said, yeah,
1316
01:13:57.989 --> 01:13:59.850
that was egregious and he should never hold office again,
1317
01:13:59.909 --> 01:14:02.689
still voted not to impeach because they said well he's
1318
01:14:02.750 --> 01:14:04.470
leaving anyway little did they know.
1319
01:14:04.329 --> 01:14:08.010
Uh so the political process proved itself to be uh.
1320
01:14:09.829 --> 01:14:14.270
Not up to the task the legal process i thought
1321
01:14:14.449 --> 01:14:16.640
also proved itself not to be up to the task
1322
01:14:17.119 --> 01:14:20.180
it took merrick garland i don't know years before he
1323
01:14:20.380 --> 01:14:24.420
even asked you to do the investigation i don't know
1324
01:14:24.500 --> 01:14:26.899
why i don't know if you have an opinion on
1325
01:14:26.939 --> 01:14:28.399
that jack.
1326
01:14:28.739 --> 01:14:34.180
Oh Listen, my view of my work, I got appointed
1327
01:14:34.199 --> 01:14:35.960
to do a job and I did it. When I
1328
01:14:36.000 --> 01:14:39.000
interacted with Merrick Garland, he's not a guy who put
1329
01:14:39.020 --> 01:14:40.640
the finger on the scale. He didn't try to push
1330
01:14:40.680 --> 01:14:43.340
me to do it, bring a case, not bring a case.
1331
01:14:45.020 --> 01:14:46.949
But he didn't bring it for years. He didn't even
1332
01:14:47.050 --> 01:14:47.369
ask you.
1333
01:14:47.689 --> 01:14:47.890
Yeah.
1334
01:14:47.949 --> 01:14:51.310
I mean, I got appointed when I got appointed. I
1335
01:14:51.329 --> 01:14:54.569
guess my point on that, John, is that I understand
1336
01:14:54.590 --> 01:14:56.569
that that's a narrative that people want to talk about
1337
01:14:56.649 --> 01:14:59.699
is like– Why didn't he move faster? That sort of thing.
1338
01:14:59.720 --> 01:15:03.810
I feel like from my perspective, having been someone who's
1339
01:15:04.029 --> 01:15:06.590
done this job for a long time and cares a
1340
01:15:06.750 --> 01:15:09.270
lot about where the department goes going forward, cares a
1341
01:15:09.270 --> 01:15:11.850
lot about the people who work there, I'm much more
1342
01:15:11.909 --> 01:15:17.260
interested in finding people who are examples of courageous people
1343
01:15:17.319 --> 01:15:20.920
who are standing up, who are making sacrifices. If we're
1344
01:15:20.979 --> 01:15:24.619
looking– if you're on a sports team and you're trying
1345
01:15:24.659 --> 01:15:28.060
to do well, you look for ways that you can succeed.
1346
01:15:28.100 --> 01:15:30.899
You look for plays that work. I want to see
1347
01:15:30.960 --> 01:15:35.199
people and I want to raise people up who could
1348
01:15:35.220 --> 01:15:37.800
be part of the solution rather than kind of looking backward.
1349
01:15:38.739 --> 01:15:40.010
And I completely agree with that.
1350
01:15:40.100 --> 01:15:43.590
I'm talking more about sort of how the system is
1351
01:15:43.689 --> 01:15:47.529
perceived even with those good people in it. So Merrick
1352
01:15:47.550 --> 01:15:49.090
Garland takes two to three years to do it. I'm
1353
01:15:49.109 --> 01:15:52.689
talking about how the legal process seemed to not be
1354
01:15:52.710 --> 01:15:55.159
able to hold him to account for what I thought
1355
01:15:55.220 --> 01:15:59.479
is the most egregious moment in my lifetime in American history,
1356
01:16:00.119 --> 01:16:04.180
makes Watergate look like chump change. So he holds off
1357
01:16:04.279 --> 01:16:08.539
on that. Then the system, unable to get at him
1358
01:16:08.619 --> 01:16:13.310
through that legal methodology, seemed like, and you can push
1359
01:16:13.359 --> 01:16:17.649
back on this, seemed like it went after Trump with
1360
01:16:17.869 --> 01:16:23.029
every available methodology they could think of. Letitia James prosecutes
1361
01:16:23.090 --> 01:16:28.789
him for, I think, his... business and mortgage dealings. Alvin
1362
01:16:28.850 --> 01:16:33.770
Bragg prosecutes him for the Stormy Daniels payments. The government
1363
01:16:33.810 --> 01:16:36.609
goes after classified documents, which is something that I think
1364
01:16:36.649 --> 01:16:38.949
most people were like, I'd never even heard. I didn't
1365
01:16:38.970 --> 01:16:42.760
even know that was a thing. I always assumed, because
1366
01:16:42.800 --> 01:16:46.619
in this country, our classification system is also broken. It
1367
01:16:46.699 --> 01:16:52.960
looked like to fair appearances that the system did turn
1368
01:16:53.000 --> 01:16:57.170
its eye to getting this guy any way they could.
1369
01:16:58.029 --> 01:17:01.659
And so if the political process failed us and the
1370
01:17:01.720 --> 01:17:04.399
legal process seemed to have failed us, I think that's
1371
01:17:04.439 --> 01:17:07.399
the question of how do we rebuild trust in that system,
1372
01:17:08.220 --> 01:17:10.939
even though it's staffed with really good people.
1373
01:17:11.000 --> 01:17:12.020
Brian, you were going to say something.
1374
01:17:12.430 --> 01:17:14.090
Yeah, no, I'm going to take Jack off the hook
1375
01:17:14.149 --> 01:17:14.810
for a second.
1376
01:17:14.890 --> 01:17:15.449
Please.
1377
01:17:18.670 --> 01:17:21.890
I'm not saying that you're saying this. However, I think
1378
01:17:21.930 --> 01:17:28.159
it's important for people to know that We didn't do nothing.
1379
01:17:29.000 --> 01:17:34.739
We investigated the people who perpetrated the January 6th crimes.
1380
01:17:35.100 --> 01:17:39.979
That's right. Myself personally were part of arrest teams that
1381
01:17:40.460 --> 01:17:43.659
took off some of the most violent and dangerous offenders
1382
01:17:43.819 --> 01:17:48.390
affiliated with some very violent groups. And these things, they
1383
01:17:48.470 --> 01:17:51.250
do take time. I can't speak to the decision process
1384
01:17:51.869 --> 01:17:55.439
of A.G. Garland at the time and any– delays and
1385
01:17:55.449 --> 01:17:58.420
this and the other thing, but the DOJ didn't sit
1386
01:17:58.460 --> 01:18:01.439
on our hands either. We were hustling, we were working
1387
01:18:01.840 --> 01:18:11.079
to hold the criminals accountable and did. Now going all
1388
01:18:11.119 --> 01:18:12.939
the way over to POTUS, I can't speak for that.
1389
01:18:14.489 --> 01:18:15.770
but I felt like Jack needed some help.
1390
01:18:15.970 --> 01:18:19.010
So yeah.
1391
01:18:19.090 --> 01:18:20.750
Listen, I think Jack will be fine.
1392
01:18:20.770 --> 01:18:23.489
Am I being unfair?
1393
01:18:23.609 --> 01:18:26.579
Am I, am I being unfair in saying that to
1394
01:18:26.680 --> 01:18:27.159
my mind?
1395
01:18:27.220 --> 01:18:29.239
And I, again, I'm not talking about the guys who,
1396
01:18:29.279 --> 01:18:32.140
like you say, you know, that stormed the Capitol and
1397
01:18:32.180 --> 01:18:35.279
got arrested and were given sentences like, and we're held
1398
01:18:35.319 --> 01:18:35.760
to account.
1399
01:18:36.340 --> 01:18:37.399
I'm not talking about that.
1400
01:18:38.279 --> 01:18:43.010
I'm talking about the ring leaders and the people that, uh,
1401
01:18:43.350 --> 01:18:47.729
pardoned those same people and Were never held to account
1402
01:18:47.789 --> 01:18:51.050
for anything either through our political media Our only political
1403
01:18:51.069 --> 01:18:51.890
means is impeachment.
1404
01:18:52.869 --> 01:18:56.270
Our only legal means is through the DOJ.
1405
01:18:56.880 --> 01:19:01.119
So am I being unfair to say that those systems
1406
01:19:02.119 --> 01:19:06.619
were unable to operate and at this point have been
1407
01:19:07.319 --> 01:19:12.220
through whether it's the Supreme Court or whether it's through
1408
01:19:12.340 --> 01:19:16.600
the ability of Donald Trump and his allies to delay,
1409
01:19:16.619 --> 01:19:19.000
have we failed? Yeah.
1410
01:19:19.060 --> 01:19:21.619
I mean, John, I would say first, on the political part,
1411
01:19:22.159 --> 01:19:24.199
you're probably talking to the wrong guys for that. We're
1412
01:19:24.479 --> 01:19:27.369
criminal investigators who work on criminal cases.
1413
01:19:27.529 --> 01:19:29.569
I just want your opinions. I know that.
1414
01:19:29.789 --> 01:19:32.850
Yeah. So on the other part, in terms of the
1415
01:19:32.890 --> 01:19:36.270
cases against Trump, I can speak most directly to ours.
1416
01:19:36.970 --> 01:19:39.100
And when I took that job, I would have been
1417
01:19:39.260 --> 01:19:42.859
perfectly happy if the facts in law didn't justify it
1418
01:19:42.899 --> 01:19:45.539
to not bring those cases. And I'm sure if the
1419
01:19:45.600 --> 01:19:48.029
facts were different, John, I'm sure a lot of the
1420
01:19:48.090 --> 01:19:50.529
people who think I'm great would not think I'm so great.
1421
01:19:50.829 --> 01:19:52.970
And some of the people who think I'm bad would
1422
01:19:52.989 --> 01:19:53.810
think I'm really nice.
1423
01:19:54.750 --> 01:19:55.930
The truth is- Very good point.
1424
01:19:56.470 --> 01:20:00.050
Yeah. When you're a prosecutor, right? All that sort of
1425
01:20:00.090 --> 01:20:03.109
things in terms of perceptions and people feeling this way
1426
01:20:03.170 --> 01:20:06.140
in this election, that is noise. That is things that
1427
01:20:06.399 --> 01:20:09.420
I didn't consider when I'm doing my job. And I
1428
01:20:09.979 --> 01:20:12.520
brought those cases and I moved them forward because I
1429
01:20:12.560 --> 01:20:14.180
thought I could prove them in court and I thought
1430
01:20:14.220 --> 01:20:15.000
I'd win on appeal.
1431
01:20:15.659 --> 01:20:16.359
That's the same.
1432
01:20:16.399 --> 01:20:20.369
We don't change the metric once it's someone who's a
1433
01:20:20.750 --> 01:20:26.750
high-profile case. And again, just to juxtapose what weaponization is, right?
1434
01:20:28.510 --> 01:20:31.140
I've been doing this for three decades. I'm not a
1435
01:20:31.149 --> 01:20:34.300
political operative who was brought in from outside because they
1436
01:20:34.340 --> 01:20:37.520
couldn't get a line prosecutor to do it. People didn't
1437
01:20:37.619 --> 01:20:41.539
resign because I demanded that they do things that run
1438
01:20:41.560 --> 01:20:45.430
so counter to the traditions of the department. I mean,
1439
01:20:45.439 --> 01:20:49.430
just think about today, John, if you had an allegation
1440
01:20:49.470 --> 01:20:52.729
of corruption, can you imagine this administration bringing in someone
1441
01:20:53.210 --> 01:20:55.449
like me who's got no political allegiance? Can you imagine
1442
01:20:55.489 --> 01:20:59.189
that happening? And that's why we come back to this
1443
01:20:59.229 --> 01:21:00.079
issue of process.
1444
01:21:00.479 --> 01:21:03.210
I can't imagine, by the way, them even prosecuting it.
1445
01:21:03.520 --> 01:21:07.510
I mean, he literally was bragging yesterday. that he was
1446
01:21:07.569 --> 01:21:12.729
making sure they weren't going to investigate cryptocurrency corruption. I mean,
1447
01:21:12.789 --> 01:21:18.229
they're bragging about no longer investigating white-collar crime.
1448
01:21:18.550 --> 01:21:20.800
Yeah, and again, that's why I go back to this
1449
01:21:20.949 --> 01:21:23.899
issue of how we talk about it, because when you
1450
01:21:23.909 --> 01:21:27.140
talk about, John, the fact that people don't believe this
1451
01:21:27.239 --> 01:21:30.300
and people don't trust that, it's not in a vacuum, right?
1452
01:21:30.479 --> 01:21:35.560
There are people with very powerful megaphones using repetitive messages
1453
01:21:35.779 --> 01:21:39.439
over and over again that have no factual basis, but
1454
01:21:39.460 --> 01:21:41.000
they get out there and they become part of the
1455
01:21:41.119 --> 01:21:46.939
public discussion. The history before these last couple of years
1456
01:21:47.500 --> 01:21:50.600
is prosecutors just sat on their hands and let that
1457
01:21:50.640 --> 01:21:53.500
be said, and we didn't worry about that. I think
1458
01:21:53.819 --> 01:21:57.239
the credibility issues you're talking about are because one side
1459
01:21:57.279 --> 01:21:59.319
was telling a story divorced from the facts and the
1460
01:21:59.359 --> 01:22:02.680
other side wasn't telling a story. I think if you
1461
01:22:02.779 --> 01:22:05.800
lean into the facts, the cases we do, I could
1462
01:22:05.819 --> 01:22:08.500
justify them in court and I could justify them publicly.
1463
01:22:09.279 --> 01:22:12.449
I think going forward, that is the recipe. That and
1464
01:22:12.510 --> 01:22:16.149
having the people who are telling the stories be from
1465
01:22:16.210 --> 01:22:19.510
the rank and file and be people who've lived the
1466
01:22:19.569 --> 01:22:21.649
values that they're asking the teams to follow.
1467
01:22:21.829 --> 01:22:24.189
No, and Brian, I'm assuming you feel the same way
1468
01:22:24.250 --> 01:22:26.649
about within the FBI because what it feels like is
1469
01:22:26.710 --> 01:22:30.680
you now have an organization that is generally built apolitically.
1470
01:22:31.729 --> 01:22:34.470
built through merit, built through whatever methodologies they think gives
1471
01:22:34.510 --> 01:22:37.250
them the best chance to get the best agents and
1472
01:22:37.270 --> 01:22:43.550
the most selfless people being utilized and weaponized by partisans
1473
01:22:44.109 --> 01:22:46.869
and with very little recourse, I would assume.
1474
01:22:47.369 --> 01:22:51.770
Yeah, I am 100%. No surprise here aligned with what
1475
01:22:51.810 --> 01:22:52.569
Jack just said.
1476
01:22:53.109 --> 01:22:55.729
It's going to take- You make a formidable team, the
1477
01:22:55.750 --> 01:22:56.130
two of you.
1478
01:22:56.229 --> 01:23:01.260
Appreciate that. Jack's on the top. And Robin, Batman.
1479
01:23:01.520 --> 01:23:01.810
All right.
1480
01:23:01.880 --> 01:23:02.460
Fair enough.
1481
01:23:02.680 --> 01:23:03.699
How dare you, sir?
1482
01:23:05.720 --> 01:23:09.180
I don't look that great in tights. So again, like
1483
01:23:09.220 --> 01:23:12.600
what Jack said, it's going to take people from the
1484
01:23:12.640 --> 01:23:16.500
rank and file who cannot speak for themselves publicly, not
1485
01:23:16.640 --> 01:23:19.680
allowed to. But people like Jack and I, and I
1486
01:23:19.699 --> 01:23:21.619
don't want to put words in Jack's mouth or speak
1487
01:23:21.680 --> 01:23:23.539
for him, but I can speak for myself when I
1488
01:23:23.619 --> 01:23:28.880
say that I am have been and continue to seek purpose,
1489
01:23:28.960 --> 01:23:33.939
to fill the purpose that was taken from me. Part
1490
01:23:34.039 --> 01:23:36.930
of how I'm fulfilling that purpose is trying to be
1491
01:23:36.970 --> 01:23:40.189
that responsible voice. I'm not anointed by the men and
1492
01:23:40.229 --> 01:23:42.529
women of the FBI to speak on their behalf. However,
1493
01:23:42.569 --> 01:23:45.130
I can offer a perspective that most don't hear. And
1494
01:23:45.170 --> 01:23:49.270
like I said before, demystifying some of the thought processes,
1495
01:23:49.289 --> 01:23:52.069
some of the experiences we've been through, and some of
1496
01:23:52.090 --> 01:23:56.189
the ways things get done. It's a responsibility. And I
1497
01:23:56.250 --> 01:24:01.310
think all of that noise, all of the dynamic opinions
1498
01:24:01.390 --> 01:24:04.529
regarding it. Jack and I talked about this the other day.
1499
01:24:04.760 --> 01:24:07.600
We're like Joe Fridays. It's just the facts. That was
1500
01:24:07.640 --> 01:24:09.739
our career. It was not about credit. It was not
1501
01:24:09.800 --> 01:24:12.779
about getting the awards. It's about the facts, doing the job,
1502
01:24:12.800 --> 01:24:15.039
because it's what we signed up for. And now we
1503
01:24:15.060 --> 01:24:19.359
can represent, hopefully. But it's a no-fail task. When Jack
1504
01:24:19.399 --> 01:24:23.649
and I speak, we cannot fail. We cannot fail. allow
1505
01:24:23.750 --> 01:24:27.130
our words to be twisted because we speak and stand
1506
01:24:27.149 --> 01:24:29.939
for something bigger than just ourselves because that's the part
1507
01:24:29.960 --> 01:24:32.279
of the organization we craved to be a part of
1508
01:24:32.300 --> 01:24:34.689
and we're proud to be a part of, something larger
1509
01:24:34.890 --> 01:24:38.510
than us. It makes me deeply uncomfortable. to do this
1510
01:24:38.569 --> 01:24:41.710
kind of this type of stuff. No offense. Thank you
1511
01:24:41.829 --> 01:24:43.229
so much for having us.
1512
01:24:43.250 --> 01:24:45.600
By the way, I am, I'm deeply uncomfortable as well
1513
01:24:45.640 --> 01:24:47.579
doing this. I have been for years, 30 years.
1514
01:24:47.619 --> 01:24:48.760
Yeah, I know.
1515
01:24:48.880 --> 01:24:52.180
I would, I told this to my teammates when I
1516
01:24:52.220 --> 01:24:54.180
was in that period of time where I was the
1517
01:24:54.239 --> 01:24:57.850
acting director. There is nothing I wanted more when that
1518
01:24:57.930 --> 01:25:02.010
period was over than to just disappear into anonymity and
1519
01:25:02.069 --> 01:25:04.590
continue putting points on the board on behalf of the organization,
1520
01:25:04.670 --> 01:25:09.100
on behalf of the American people. Now, I understand that
1521
01:25:09.880 --> 01:25:14.039
I can be and put myself under a level of
1522
01:25:14.119 --> 01:25:18.270
pressure to do things like this. But to me, pressure
1523
01:25:18.289 --> 01:25:21.569
is a privilege because it means something is expected of me,
1524
01:25:21.789 --> 01:25:23.390
even if I'm the only one that might expect it
1525
01:25:23.430 --> 01:25:23.869
of myself.
1526
01:25:24.069 --> 01:25:27.300
Right. It's finding purpose even after you've been Sort of
1527
01:25:27.720 --> 01:25:29.979
let go from the place where you found that grounding
1528
01:25:30.020 --> 01:25:31.020
and you found that relevance.
1529
01:25:31.819 --> 01:25:34.579
Because I believe in them. I believe in the organizations.
1530
01:25:34.659 --> 01:25:37.130
I believe in the American people. I had an experience
1531
01:25:37.149 --> 01:25:41.930
last week that reinforced it in a very real way.
1532
01:25:41.949 --> 01:25:46.869
I told Jack, I ride my motorcycle to work. save
1533
01:25:46.909 --> 01:25:47.720
money on the easy pass lane.
1534
01:25:47.729 --> 01:25:50.100
How much cooler than me can you be? God, this
1535
01:25:50.439 --> 01:25:53.199
is really, now it's just, now you're just taunting me.
1536
01:25:54.680 --> 01:25:55.199
I promise.
1537
01:25:55.380 --> 01:25:58.600
Well, I ride my electric bike sometimes to get the mail.
1538
01:25:58.619 --> 01:26:01.279
So don't think you and I aren't the same because
1539
01:26:01.340 --> 01:26:02.060
we're the same.
1540
01:26:02.439 --> 01:26:06.819
You're exponentially better in every way. But so I was
1541
01:26:07.279 --> 01:26:10.520
riding to work and I was going to speed limit.
1542
01:26:10.600 --> 01:26:13.930
I promise it was 50 miles an hour, two way
1543
01:26:13.970 --> 01:26:16.510
lane or two way street hit a deer. I had
1544
01:26:16.569 --> 01:26:17.649
no time, nowhere to go.
1545
01:26:18.210 --> 01:26:20.090
And so at 50 miles an hour, I took a
1546
01:26:20.130 --> 01:26:24.149
short flight, then a longer slide and tumble. Wow. Bike
1547
01:26:24.189 --> 01:26:27.949
is fine, importantly, for me, in my mindset.
1548
01:26:28.189 --> 01:26:28.409
All right.
1549
01:26:28.430 --> 01:26:30.229
Deer is okay, important to me.
1550
01:26:30.729 --> 01:26:34.409
I don't, it surprisingly ran off. I never saw it again.
1551
01:26:34.600 --> 01:26:37.899
I will find it. All right. So, but what happened
1552
01:26:37.960 --> 01:26:41.460
next after I realized that I was okay, I stood
1553
01:26:41.560 --> 01:26:46.479
up and Traffic stopped on both sides of the street.
1554
01:26:47.859 --> 01:26:50.520
And everybody emptied those cars. It was rush hour in
1555
01:26:50.539 --> 01:26:53.460
the morning. The first person to me was an African-American
1556
01:26:53.520 --> 01:26:57.159
female in her 50s, let's say. Second person, young blonde
1557
01:26:57.199 --> 01:27:01.630
woman in scrubs. The third, fourth, fifth people were in
1558
01:27:01.649 --> 01:27:03.029
the car that would have killed me if I went
1559
01:27:03.069 --> 01:27:09.329
into oncoming traffic filled with Hispanic laborers. None of them
1560
01:27:09.409 --> 01:27:13.420
asked who I voted for. Like what I, you know,
1561
01:27:13.460 --> 01:27:16.289
my sexual orientation, my religion. They didn't even ask my name.
1562
01:27:16.529 --> 01:27:19.149
All they saw was a dude in America who needed
1563
01:27:19.189 --> 01:27:22.989
help and they helped me. And that, in that moment
1564
01:27:23.029 --> 01:27:25.069
and every moment in the last week and a half
1565
01:27:25.689 --> 01:27:29.260
has kind of like cleared the fog for me as
1566
01:27:29.340 --> 01:27:34.520
far as all of the things I consume responsibly. And
1567
01:27:34.539 --> 01:27:37.579
I think it is on those consumers. It's on the
1568
01:27:37.619 --> 01:27:40.670
communicators as well in the organizations you talked about. And
1569
01:27:40.689 --> 01:27:43.750
it's on us, but it's also on the consumers to
1570
01:27:43.810 --> 01:27:46.210
be responsible and don't just believe the first headline that
1571
01:27:46.229 --> 01:27:50.560
you see, but read diversely, broadly, and don't just get
1572
01:27:50.760 --> 01:27:53.680
sucked in to what the algorithm is telling you how
1573
01:27:53.720 --> 01:27:54.119
to think.
1574
01:27:54.220 --> 01:27:57.739
Brother, preach, preach. I'm telling you.
1575
01:27:57.859 --> 01:27:58.619
I feel better now.
1576
01:27:58.939 --> 01:28:04.250
Listen, it's very easy to have your perspective skewed and
1577
01:28:04.289 --> 01:28:05.710
it's an important.
1578
01:28:06.890 --> 01:28:07.750
Remembrance there.
1579
01:28:08.039 --> 01:28:10.079
And I think that's, and listen, I appreciate both your
1580
01:28:10.100 --> 01:28:13.119
guys' time so much for this. And I think probably
1581
01:28:13.159 --> 01:28:16.720
a great way to end is in that sense of,
1582
01:28:16.979 --> 01:28:19.659
so how do we get back to that without sort
1583
01:28:19.680 --> 01:28:22.810
of the idea of, you know, just believing in the
1584
01:28:22.850 --> 01:28:27.470
goodness of us? But do you have ideas on how
1585
01:28:27.529 --> 01:28:35.189
we can reclaim the accountability so necessary for this system
1586
01:28:35.640 --> 01:28:36.560
to function properly?
1587
01:28:38.739 --> 01:28:39.970
And not be co-opted.
1588
01:28:40.479 --> 01:28:46.039
By bad actors or partisan actors. People will say like, well,
1589
01:28:46.079 --> 01:28:51.659
the real elections are the real accountability. That's ultimately where
1590
01:28:51.699 --> 01:28:56.079
it all ends up. But I'm watching our electoral process
1591
01:28:57.539 --> 01:29:02.770
be co-opted now through partisan measures where even that, the
1592
01:29:02.810 --> 01:29:07.350
thumb is being put on that scale in very bad ways.
1593
01:29:08.390 --> 01:29:15.020
Do you have ideas about beyond trusting the integrity of
1594
01:29:15.220 --> 01:29:18.520
the rank and file where we can start to bring
1595
01:29:18.579 --> 01:29:20.760
a little more accountability to the system?
1596
01:29:20.800 --> 01:29:21.619
I'll ask you, Jack.
1597
01:29:22.319 --> 01:29:25.119
Well, in terms of the Justice Department and I think
1598
01:29:25.140 --> 01:29:27.140
the Bureau as well, I think the one thing we
1599
01:29:27.180 --> 01:29:30.630
can say with certainty is When there's been more politics,
1600
01:29:30.850 --> 01:29:33.409
it's been bad. And when there's been less politics, it's
1601
01:29:33.430 --> 01:29:37.310
been good. And so I think a thing that we
1602
01:29:37.350 --> 01:29:40.170
should be looked at is whether there's ways you can
1603
01:29:40.810 --> 01:29:42.750
not just get the Justice Department back to what it
1604
01:29:42.810 --> 01:29:45.270
was when I worked there, but are there ways we
1605
01:29:45.289 --> 01:29:48.189
can make it better? You know, John, after Watergate, there
1606
01:29:48.229 --> 01:29:50.189
was a bunch of reforms that made our government better.
1607
01:29:50.220 --> 01:29:50.520
Yep.
1608
01:29:51.149 --> 01:29:52.210
In a bunch of different ways.
1609
01:29:52.329 --> 01:29:53.329
Very much so.
1610
01:29:53.550 --> 01:29:56.500
And it was a dark time after Watergate, right? And
1611
01:29:56.640 --> 01:29:59.420
people took that darkness and the pain they were feeling
1612
01:29:59.600 --> 01:30:05.140
and the negative outlook for the future and they turned
1613
01:30:05.180 --> 01:30:06.779
it into things that made our country better for a
1614
01:30:06.800 --> 01:30:09.710
good long time. We have an opportunity to do that
1615
01:30:09.770 --> 01:30:13.890
right now. I think getting people– there are so many
1616
01:30:13.930 --> 01:30:17.649
people out there who feel alone and feel isolated and
1617
01:30:17.710 --> 01:30:20.659
feel like nobody– is standing up for them or speaking
1618
01:30:20.699 --> 01:30:24.739
for them or exhibiting the values that we're talking about.
1619
01:30:25.640 --> 01:30:27.659
I think that's a foundation and I think you start
1620
01:30:27.680 --> 01:30:31.039
with that and then the Justice Department of all the
1621
01:30:31.079 --> 01:30:33.079
things that the government does to me is the one
1622
01:30:33.119 --> 01:30:35.770
thing where politics can't have a role. We have to
1623
01:30:35.810 --> 01:30:39.050
find reforms where it makes it harder and harder to
1624
01:30:39.149 --> 01:30:40.609
do what's happening right now.
1625
01:30:41.010 --> 01:30:41.289
Brian?
1626
01:30:41.850 --> 01:30:43.630
Yeah, Jack is so much more articulate.
1627
01:30:43.890 --> 01:30:44.909
Look, come on.
1628
01:30:45.529 --> 01:30:49.550
I mean, what he said. No, I– No, I think
1629
01:30:49.630 --> 01:30:53.909
it comes down to not taking trust for granted. People
1630
01:30:53.970 --> 01:30:58.390
with credibility and real experience, maybe a little bit of
1631
01:30:58.409 --> 01:31:02.170
scar tissue, but don't have an agenda that are ready
1632
01:31:02.210 --> 01:31:05.449
to serve and bring trust into institutions. But I also
1633
01:31:05.529 --> 01:31:10.069
think that John Q. Citizen, Jane Q. Citizen should be
1634
01:31:10.130 --> 01:31:14.109
fluent in their rights. And like I said, they'd be
1635
01:31:14.289 --> 01:31:20.199
unafraid to exercise them. in a safe manner with no violence,
1636
01:31:20.420 --> 01:31:23.199
but just be unafraid.
1637
01:31:23.699 --> 01:31:25.840
And I think it's probably going to come down to
1638
01:31:25.880 --> 01:31:29.659
that is, you know, you said it earlier, courage and
1639
01:31:30.060 --> 01:31:32.989
the courage of individuals. And Jack, when you talked about
1640
01:31:33.510 --> 01:31:36.810
the reforms after Watergate, it struck me so much of
1641
01:31:36.869 --> 01:31:43.600
that was rebalancing the branches of government. And it does
1642
01:31:43.729 --> 01:31:48.659
feel We're moving this idea of a unitary executive and
1643
01:31:49.199 --> 01:31:54.529
a president as much more forceful as a king. Until
1644
01:31:54.590 --> 01:31:59.289
that changes, it's very difficult to rebalance this because now
1645
01:31:59.350 --> 01:32:02.170
we are going to be much more so, and DOJ
1646
01:32:02.189 --> 01:32:06.890
being under that auspice, it's going to be much more
1647
01:32:06.930 --> 01:32:11.170
difficult to do it until we rebalance the branches again.
1648
01:32:11.520 --> 01:32:13.989
And it's right now it's it feels like we're in
1649
01:32:14.130 --> 01:32:17.149
an outsized pre Watergate mindset.
1650
01:32:17.869 --> 01:32:20.930
Yeah. I mean, I would say one thing about that
1651
01:32:21.189 --> 01:32:24.750
is that when you think about like how change comes about,
1652
01:32:24.789 --> 01:32:26.909
like you look at the times in our history, right,
1653
01:32:26.949 --> 01:32:30.590
where something really bad happened and we got better, whether
1654
01:32:30.649 --> 01:32:33.899
it's abolishing slavery, women's suffrage, the civil rights movement. Right.
1655
01:32:35.970 --> 01:32:38.210
There were moments when no one knew if what they
1656
01:32:38.229 --> 01:32:39.869
were going to do was going to make a difference,
1657
01:32:40.010 --> 01:32:42.850
and they did it anyways. You don't think about the
1658
01:32:42.890 --> 01:32:44.909
likelihood of success. You just think, I'm going to be
1659
01:32:44.949 --> 01:32:47.140
on the right side of history. I'm going to behave
1660
01:32:47.180 --> 01:32:48.840
in a way that's going to make my kids proud,
1661
01:32:48.880 --> 01:32:51.319
my parents proud. And you just do that. And you
1662
01:32:51.380 --> 01:32:54.659
don't worry about consequences. I think in terms of a
1663
01:32:54.720 --> 01:32:59.420
mindset for our society, 99% of the time, I think
1664
01:32:59.500 --> 01:33:02.079
most people know the right thing to do. They really do.
1665
01:33:02.220 --> 01:33:05.770
The problem becomes... when they factor in the consequences for
1666
01:33:05.810 --> 01:33:08.810
doing the right thing. Because then people, if the consequences
1667
01:33:08.850 --> 01:33:11.890
are too high, they start rationalizing ways where they don't
1668
01:33:11.970 --> 01:33:13.829
quite have to do that. Maybe they can do something
1669
01:33:13.869 --> 01:33:17.710
short of that. As Brian said, if we start taking
1670
01:33:17.729 --> 01:33:20.789
a mindset of it's our country, we own the problems.
1671
01:33:21.369 --> 01:33:22.800
If you want a solution, you got to be a
1672
01:33:22.810 --> 01:33:25.699
part of it. I feel like that happens. And if
1673
01:33:25.739 --> 01:33:28.819
that becomes our national dialogue and integrity is a more
1674
01:33:28.880 --> 01:33:31.859
central part of it, some of the things you're talking about,
1675
01:33:32.479 --> 01:33:35.739
we can elect people who will not do those sort
1676
01:33:35.779 --> 01:33:37.560
of things. I mean, I have a big concern. I
1677
01:33:37.600 --> 01:33:40.159
don't want to have a situation where we've had these
1678
01:33:40.229 --> 01:33:43.069
abuses and that becomes a new normal for any party, right?
1679
01:33:43.750 --> 01:33:45.609
And we've seen that other times.
1680
01:33:46.569 --> 01:33:48.489
And the key to remember is it doesn't have to,
1681
01:33:48.970 --> 01:33:54.109
that it is. Like you say, that action against this
1682
01:33:54.250 --> 01:33:59.180
corruption is necessary. And the courage to take action against
1683
01:33:59.220 --> 01:34:01.930
that corruption- is all of our responsibilities.
1684
01:34:02.890 --> 01:34:03.369
Absolutely.
1685
01:34:03.590 --> 01:34:06.739
Well, I can't think of three bigger heroes than the
1686
01:34:06.800 --> 01:34:07.340
three of us.
1687
01:34:08.920 --> 01:34:14.119
All right, just you two. Damn it. Jack Smith, former
1688
01:34:14.140 --> 01:34:17.100
special counsel, Brian Driscoll, former FBI agent, who in 2025
1689
01:34:17.100 --> 01:34:19.789
was the acting director of the FBI. Thank you so
1690
01:34:19.829 --> 01:34:23.949
much for spending the time and pointing out the great
1691
01:34:24.010 --> 01:34:26.930
stories of the integrity of the people in the rank
1692
01:34:26.970 --> 01:34:31.520
and file of law enforcement, and of our Department of
1693
01:34:31.579 --> 01:34:35.569
Justice and all those things. We have to keep highlighting
1694
01:34:35.609 --> 01:34:38.670
the good work by the good people and those that
1695
01:34:38.729 --> 01:34:41.989
continue to stand up against corruption in all of its forms.
1696
01:34:42.430 --> 01:34:44.130
And so I appreciate you both being here for that.
1697
01:34:44.489 --> 01:34:45.029
Thank you, sir.
1698
01:34:45.189 --> 01:34:45.970
Thanks for having us, John.
1699
01:34:45.989 --> 01:34:47.350
Appreciate you. Really appreciate it.
1700
01:34:59.199 --> 01:34:59.979
Those guys have balls.
1701
01:35:00.199 --> 01:35:00.479
You know what?
1702
01:35:00.539 --> 01:35:02.560
Can I say something?
1703
01:35:02.920 --> 01:35:06.109
When I'm hanging out with guys like that, I'm literally like,
1704
01:35:06.130 --> 01:35:07.170
so you guys want to do shots?
1705
01:35:07.229 --> 01:35:08.550
What do you want to do?
1706
01:35:09.470 --> 01:35:10.770
Want to go to Giants game? What do you want
1707
01:35:10.789 --> 01:35:10.909
to do?
1708
01:35:11.210 --> 01:35:12.130
We're going to hang out, right?
1709
01:35:12.569 --> 01:35:14.770
We're going to hang out, right, guys? It's so like
1710
01:35:15.109 --> 01:35:16.710
you're overwhelmed by manly madness.
1711
01:35:16.750 --> 01:35:17.189
Yeah.
1712
01:35:17.250 --> 01:35:22.100
That was also three New York, New Jersey, tri-state area
1713
01:35:22.279 --> 01:35:23.810
accents that I was hearing too.
1714
01:35:23.840 --> 01:35:24.420
That's terrible.
1715
01:35:24.439 --> 01:35:25.079
That's terrible.
1716
01:35:25.729 --> 01:35:27.029
I wouldn't that, you know what, that should have been
1717
01:35:27.050 --> 01:35:31.850
the whole conversation. You believe these fucking guys at the DOJ,
1718
01:35:32.189 --> 01:35:35.149
but you know, it is a little bit like, you know, uh, uh,
1719
01:35:35.170 --> 01:35:38.090
the Jimmy Cagney movies were like, one brother's a priest,
1720
01:35:38.149 --> 01:35:41.390
the other's a gangster. Like they're, they're the brother that
1721
01:35:41.409 --> 01:35:42.869
like went into law enforcement.
1722
01:35:43.390 --> 01:35:43.689
Yeah.
1723
01:35:43.770 --> 01:35:44.829
My brother on the street.
1724
01:35:45.229 --> 01:35:45.510
Yeah.
1725
01:35:45.550 --> 01:35:47.369
He's in trouble all the time, but I went the
1726
01:35:47.409 --> 01:35:47.789
other way.
1727
01:35:48.609 --> 01:35:52.760
Um, but I, I honestly, like, I can't imagine.
1728
01:35:53.380 --> 01:35:56.159
They keep talking about it, like trying to divorce themselves
1729
01:35:56.600 --> 01:36:00.819
from the madness. But the madness, the circus is all
1730
01:36:00.859 --> 01:36:04.920
that we experience from them. And it's incredible. Like there's
1731
01:36:04.960 --> 01:36:09.329
a certain Zen, like they have, I guess, kind of accepted.
1732
01:36:09.670 --> 01:36:12.229
They've accepted the storm and there's like a weird Zen
1733
01:36:12.270 --> 01:36:12.689
about them.
1734
01:36:13.270 --> 01:36:13.649
Yeah.
1735
01:36:13.670 --> 01:36:15.369
I think it's almost maybe, I don't know.
1736
01:36:15.529 --> 01:36:17.369
I'm just sort of thinking out loud, but like they
1737
01:36:17.409 --> 01:36:22.569
really harp so much on how important processes in their work.
1738
01:36:22.850 --> 01:36:26.619
And I almost think it's like hard to then remove
1739
01:36:26.659 --> 01:36:29.100
themselves from just like, well, this is how we do things.
1740
01:36:29.579 --> 01:36:31.640
You know, this is, we just keep putting one foot
1741
01:36:31.659 --> 01:36:32.260
in front of the other.
1742
01:36:32.319 --> 01:36:33.760
We just keep keeping our.
1743
01:36:33.760 --> 01:36:34.460
Eye on the ball.
1744
01:36:34.479 --> 01:36:36.600
Well, I also think, you know, it, he got to
1745
01:36:36.649 --> 01:36:38.350
it a little bit at the end, which is like,
1746
01:36:38.510 --> 01:36:41.569
they live in a world of standards, evidentiary standards, and
1747
01:36:41.590 --> 01:36:45.529
the Trump administration lives in a world of, you know, hyperbole.
1748
01:36:46.210 --> 01:36:50.199
And so, and hyper, the world of hyperbole never survives
1749
01:36:50.649 --> 01:36:52.069
its contact.
1750
01:36:51.529 --> 01:36:52.630
With the world of standards.
1751
01:36:52.649 --> 01:36:57.949
And so I think that's, it really is that strange dichotomy.
1752
01:36:58.649 --> 01:37:00.750
I think they're more comfortable in that world of like, well,
1753
01:37:00.789 --> 01:37:02.470
you can't really just make shit up.
1754
01:37:03.010 --> 01:37:04.670
You have to prove it. Yeah, because we're going to
1755
01:37:04.710 --> 01:37:06.489
actually have to then put this in front of a
1756
01:37:06.529 --> 01:37:09.210
judge and a jury and actually have to prove our case.
1757
01:37:09.880 --> 01:37:12.779
Whereas the Trump administration can just say, surely you can
1758
01:37:12.960 --> 01:37:16.119
all agree with us that somebody took a razor blade
1759
01:37:16.239 --> 01:37:20.130
to the reflecting pool because I feel that way.
1760
01:37:20.310 --> 01:37:22.189
And stole 13,000 votes.
1761
01:37:22.390 --> 01:37:22.649
Yeah.
1762
01:37:22.710 --> 01:37:25.210
And there were 500,000 people on the mall watching the
1763
01:37:25.229 --> 01:37:27.109
speech and just nonsense.
1764
01:37:27.449 --> 01:37:27.649
Yeah.
1765
01:37:27.689 --> 01:37:28.529
And what's your evidence?
1766
01:37:29.989 --> 01:37:30.470
Fuck you.
1767
01:37:30.909 --> 01:37:31.130
Right.
1768
01:37:31.350 --> 01:37:31.770
Fuck you.
1769
01:37:31.810 --> 01:37:32.189
You're dumb.
1770
01:37:32.210 --> 01:37:33.189
That's a terrible question.
1771
01:37:33.369 --> 01:37:35.069
Yeah. Next question. All right.
1772
01:37:35.229 --> 01:37:37.569
Well, I'm definitely, I've got to make sure I've got
1773
01:37:37.609 --> 01:37:41.039
a big, motorcycle ride planned.
1774
01:37:41.600 --> 01:37:43.279
I was actually, I was reminded when he was saying
1775
01:37:43.319 --> 01:37:46.199
that when I was looking into Jack Smith, he took
1776
01:37:46.300 --> 01:37:49.699
the role as special prosecutor while he was recovering from
1777
01:37:49.739 --> 01:37:53.560
a bike accident in the Netherlands. And they were concerned
1778
01:37:53.600 --> 01:37:56.579
that him sort of agreeing to it, it would be
1779
01:37:56.720 --> 01:37:59.100
an issue that he was on painkillers. So he went
1780
01:37:59.159 --> 01:38:03.819
like cold turkey for several days in order to I mean, integrity.
1781
01:38:03.439 --> 01:38:05.039
Is so important to these people.
1782
01:38:05.460 --> 01:38:06.180
Oh, my God.
1783
01:38:06.399 --> 01:38:06.640
Yeah.
1784
01:38:06.699 --> 01:38:08.319
I mean, I was just thinking about that during when
1785
01:38:08.340 --> 01:38:09.659
he was talking about the bike accident.
1786
01:38:09.760 --> 01:38:12.899
I love to also like that that's crazy Jack Smith.
1787
01:38:13.300 --> 01:38:14.020
Yeah.
1788
01:38:14.220 --> 01:38:15.039
Deranged.
1789
01:38:15.239 --> 01:38:16.939
Deranged Jack Smith.
1790
01:38:17.000 --> 01:38:20.970
And he's like, you know, for me, it's really about process. Like,
1791
01:38:21.289 --> 01:38:24.229
he's like the Bob Ross of law enforcement. He's like,
1792
01:38:24.550 --> 01:38:27.170
I take a little bit of white, a little bit
1793
01:38:27.189 --> 01:38:27.729
of blue.
1794
01:38:27.770 --> 01:38:28.810
My bike through the Netherlands.
1795
01:38:28.930 --> 01:38:31.560
What is his morning mask? I need to know it.
1796
01:38:31.619 --> 01:38:32.680
He needs to drop it.
1797
01:38:32.960 --> 01:38:36.319
No question. What do the kids want, Brittany, after our
1798
01:38:36.359 --> 01:38:36.800
week off?
1799
01:38:37.579 --> 01:38:40.460
John, do you think Trump is happy?
1800
01:38:40.479 --> 01:38:48.069
Oh, boy. That's, you know, I never considered that, Brittany.
1801
01:38:49.130 --> 01:38:49.600
Poor boy.
1802
01:38:50.260 --> 01:38:52.039
Poor little billionaire president.
1803
01:38:52.079 --> 01:38:53.159
Getting richer by the minute.
1804
01:38:53.260 --> 01:39:01.520
Poor sweet little. I think he is animated by vengeance.
1805
01:39:02.800 --> 01:39:10.779
And so paradoxically, yes. I think he is happy that
1806
01:39:11.340 --> 01:39:16.500
his body is a bile production facility. Whereas you and
1807
01:39:16.640 --> 01:39:23.600
I live aerobically. He lives anaerobically and therefore is happy
1808
01:39:23.619 --> 01:39:26.600
in his oxygen-less.
1809
01:39:27.340 --> 01:39:27.680
World.
1810
01:39:28.779 --> 01:39:29.159
Yeah.
1811
01:39:29.380 --> 01:39:32.539
But like even just coming off of this weekend, like
1812
01:39:32.640 --> 01:39:35.720
that wasn't a success. He's happy by how this weekend
1813
01:39:35.760 --> 01:39:38.939
went for him. He's happy with all of his renovations.
1814
01:39:39.220 --> 01:39:42.010
Do you believe that that is how he's interpreting the weekend?
1815
01:39:42.439 --> 01:39:48.779
He put on the greatest American fare ever. Ever since
1816
01:39:49.039 --> 01:39:53.149
the expo. since the World Expo in, like, 19-whatever.
1817
01:39:53.329 --> 01:39:54.250
Meet me in St. Louis.
1818
01:39:54.369 --> 01:39:57.079
Right.
1819
01:39:57.180 --> 01:40:00.840
He posted that photo where it's, like, deranged. It's, you know, like,
1820
01:40:01.100 --> 01:40:04.079
millions of people and, like, signs that say Trump. Like,
1821
01:40:04.140 --> 01:40:05.300
it's so... It's beloved.
1822
01:40:05.319 --> 01:40:05.779
And I honestly.
1823
01:40:06.279 --> 01:40:10.319
It's like, is there a distinction between, like, believing your
1824
01:40:10.359 --> 01:40:13.479
own lies and just, like... I think he... I don't
1825
01:40:13.510 --> 01:40:15.130
know if he believes them or if it even matters
1826
01:40:15.189 --> 01:40:18.829
to him. Like, it's enough to have that photo, I guess.
1827
01:40:18.909 --> 01:40:19.029
Yeah.
1828
01:40:19.890 --> 01:40:21.670
Even though it's completely made up.
1829
01:40:21.710 --> 01:40:22.390
I don't know.
1830
01:40:22.409 --> 01:40:23.329
It's pretty sick.
1831
01:40:23.770 --> 01:40:25.869
I think when you say, is he happy? Is he
1832
01:40:25.909 --> 01:40:27.050
the center of attention?
1833
01:40:27.350 --> 01:40:27.569
Yes.
1834
01:40:27.970 --> 01:40:28.729
Then he's happy.
1835
01:40:28.829 --> 01:40:29.220
That's it.
1836
01:40:29.899 --> 01:40:34.100
Because he is animated only by our eyes and our
1837
01:40:34.199 --> 01:40:39.199
focus and our attention. He's the original algorithm. He drives
1838
01:40:39.340 --> 01:40:44.159
us to his embrace and we all revolve. He is
1839
01:40:44.260 --> 01:40:47.319
the sun and we are but the stars. He's It's
1840
01:40:47.460 --> 01:40:51.840
Romeo and Juliet is about him. It's about Donald Trump
1841
01:40:52.159 --> 01:40:53.760
stepping out over the balcony.
1842
01:40:54.239 --> 01:40:55.640
And it is the East.
1843
01:40:56.140 --> 01:40:57.439
I always got more of a Lear vibe.
1844
01:40:58.149 --> 01:40:59.310
Okay, Jillian.
1845
01:40:59.390 --> 01:41:02.970
It's both. Well, she's our Jeopardy champ. So she's got
1846
01:41:03.010 --> 01:41:04.550
to know that shit. I only have to know the
1847
01:41:04.590 --> 01:41:07.270
titles of a couple of plays. She's got to know
1848
01:41:07.289 --> 01:41:09.729
what they're about. What else do they want?
1849
01:41:10.449 --> 01:41:15.600
John, when do you think Democrats should start campaigning for 2028?
1850
01:41:16.100 --> 01:41:18.479
Oh my God, I thought they already had. Oh, you
1851
01:41:18.500 --> 01:41:19.960
know what I think? I think when they come up
1852
01:41:19.979 --> 01:41:23.420
with like a plan, I don't want to be controversial,
1853
01:41:23.479 --> 01:41:26.359
but when they come up with like an idea about
1854
01:41:26.399 --> 01:41:29.640
what they want to do when they govern, that isn't
1855
01:41:29.680 --> 01:41:32.380
just like, what if we just extend that one housing
1856
01:41:32.439 --> 01:41:36.890
tax credit? Like when they develop a theory of the
1857
01:41:36.949 --> 01:41:41.789
case of government and how to make it actionable and
1858
01:41:42.060 --> 01:41:45.630
to people's lives with value instead of just platitudes about,
1859
01:41:45.649 --> 01:41:47.789
we got to get back to affordability. You know, those
1860
01:41:47.850 --> 01:41:50.250
kitchen table issues and you're like kitchen, what are you
1861
01:41:50.369 --> 01:41:51.369
fucking talking about?
1862
01:41:51.390 --> 01:41:51.970
Yeah.
1863
01:41:52.029 --> 01:41:56.130
But have some specifics. You don't have any chat GPT.
1864
01:41:55.789 --> 01:41:57.970
Could come up with a pretty nice platform probably in
1865
01:41:58.010 --> 01:41:59.210
a minute and a half. Yeah.
1866
01:41:59.229 --> 01:42:00.300
Andrew Cuomo tried that.
1867
01:42:01.340 --> 01:42:01.920
Exactly.
1868
01:42:02.239 --> 01:42:03.920
Oh, he did those AI commercials.
1869
01:42:04.220 --> 01:42:06.880
Well, he also, like, there was a housing plan that
1870
01:42:06.920 --> 01:42:09.319
his team put out that just had, like, chat GPT, like,
1871
01:42:09.380 --> 01:42:10.479
gibberish in the middle.
1872
01:42:10.659 --> 01:42:10.920
Yeah.
1873
01:42:11.060 --> 01:42:11.880
That's hilarious.
1874
01:42:12.579 --> 01:42:13.520
What's that guy up to?
1875
01:42:13.520 --> 01:42:14.739
And that's why he won.
1876
01:42:14.859 --> 01:42:15.670
Exactly.
1877
01:42:16.229 --> 01:42:20.130
But how hard can it be? All right. Very good. Brittany,
1878
01:42:20.170 --> 01:42:21.149
how do they keep in touch with us?
1879
01:42:21.409 --> 01:42:24.829
Twitter. We are Weekly Show Pod, Instagram threads, TikTok, Blue Sky.
1880
01:42:24.890 --> 01:42:27.319
We are Weekly Show Podcast, and you can like, subscribe,
1881
01:42:27.340 --> 01:42:29.359
and comment on our YouTube channel, The Weekly Show with
1882
01:42:29.380 --> 01:42:29.859
Jon Stewart.
1883
01:42:30.100 --> 01:42:32.130
Fantastic, guys. Thanks very much.
1884
01:42:32.729 --> 01:42:35.930
As always, producer Brittany Mamedovic, producer Jillian Spear, video editor
1885
01:42:35.949 --> 01:42:39.310
and engineer Rob Vitolo, who types faster than you think
1886
01:42:39.350 --> 01:42:42.770
he does. Audio editor and engineer Nicole Boyce and our
1887
01:42:42.789 --> 01:42:44.770
executive producers Chris McShane and Katie Gray.
1888
01:42:45.229 --> 01:42:49.840
We shall see you all next week. Bye-bye.
1889
01:42:56.619 --> 01:42:59.100
The Weekly Show with Jon Stewart is a Comedy Central
1890
01:42:59.140 --> 01:43:02.970
podcast is produced by Paramount Audio and Busboy Productions.