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Hello, everyone, that's Professor Buzzkill here, your favorite history professor.
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Fortunately for you, we have on the line Alan Packwood,
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who's here from the Churchill Archive Center at Churchill College
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and the University of Cambridge to talk to us about
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how Churchill waged war the most challenging decisions of the
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Second World War. Thank you so much for coming on
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the show having me. As you and I were talking
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about before the show started. You know, most Americans here
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Churchill and they think of great speeches, they think of
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inspirational leadership, things like that, but they don't actually know
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very much about how he ran the war. And everything
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I've read in it, especially your work, leads me to
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believe that, sure, the speeches were important in the in
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their own way, but what really wins the war is
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how he runs it as a sort of chief executive.
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Oh well, well, I'm glad you picked up on this
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because I think it is the main theme of the book.
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I mean, really, what motivated me to write this book
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was to try and answer the question, well, what did
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Churchill actually do? Rather than what did Churchill say? It's
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very interesting that at the end of the war, as
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he was traveling out to Italy, with his doctor. He
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made the point that he didn't want to be remembered
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just for his wartime speeches, that he felt that he
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actually he had contributed to some of the big military decisions,
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and so that really sort of got me thinking, well,
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then you know, what are those decisions and what was
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his approach to wartime government.
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Well, I think the crucial thing we need to establish
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first is that again, most of our listeners in America,
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they won't necessarily understand how a British prime minister works,
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and up until Churchill in the war, I think it's
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fair to say that the prime minister acted sort of
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as a chairman of the board. But this change is
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and has to change.
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It does I mean the first thing I would say,
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of course, just to remind your listeners that Churchill is
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not elected prime minister in May nineteen fourteen. He's actually
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there really as a result of a Westminster coup. He's
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there as a result of the fact that the Labor
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Party and a significant portion of the Conservative Party made
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it clear that they no longer want to serve under
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Neville Chamberlain. And it is clear that Chamberlain is going
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to have to restructure the government that he needs to
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bring in the opposition parties, and once the Labor leaders
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have made it clear that they won't serve under him,
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then there's going to have to be somebody else in charge.
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The choice falls on Churchill or Halifax, the Conservative Foreign
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Secretary's really a choice, as I think I say in
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the book, between a hawk and a dove. You know,
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it's quite clear that the new Prime Minister is going
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to have to be drawn from the ranks of the
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Conservative Party, because the Conservative Party is the biggest party
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in the House of Commons. But it's going to have
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to be someone who can bring together a national coalition.
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Churchill has been the most bellicost member of Chamberlain's war cabinet,
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whereas it's clear that Halifax takes a rather different line
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and favors some form of negotiation if possible, And I
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think Halifax probably senses that the mood of the House
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of Commons is far more with Churchill than it is
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with him. So Churchill becomes the Prime Minister in May
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nineteen forty, but actually he's not in a particularly strong
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political position. He hasn't been elected prime minister. He has
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really very little choice as to who he brings into
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his initial war cabinet, he has to bring in his predecessor,
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Neville Chamberlain, who's still the leader of the Conservative Party
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at this point. Halfax is such a powerful figure that
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he can't be ignored and has to remain Foreign Secretary.
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And then he has to bring in the labor leaders
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Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood, who you know, these are
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people who Churchill has spent much of the last decade
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criticizing and attacking in Parliament.
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So as he looks around that.
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Cabinet table its first meetings on sort of early May
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nineteen forty, this is not a cabinet of his choosing.
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It's not a cabinet of natural friends to him.
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So he's not in a.
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Particularly strong political position. And his response to that, I
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think is really interesting. And one of the first things
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that he does is to make himself not just Prime
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Minister but also Minister of Defense. And this, of course
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is a new position one that he is creating. Up
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until this point, the armed forces have been represented by
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their own ministers in cabinet. So First Lord of the
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Admiralty has represented the Navy, the Secretary of State for War,
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the Army, the Secretary of State for Air the Royal
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Air Force. By making himself Minister of Defense, Churchill effectively
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demotes those ministers. They're no longer members of the war cabinet.
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And what it means is that the chiefs of staff
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are now reporting into him directly, and he is chairing
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the key committee on Military operations, so he is putting
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himself right at the center of the military decision making
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as well as the political decision making. And this is
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why I say, actually, you know, he's quite clear that
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he's going to get his hands dirty, that he's going
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to be not playing the chairman's role but the chief
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Executive CEO's role here, and.
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I think it's a very important decision.
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It sends out a very clear message that he is
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going to play this sort of hands on role, and
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what it allows him to do is to centralize power
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in Downing Street, because it allows him to bring together
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this military secretariat which is serving him as Minister of Defense,
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with the cabinet secretariats which is serving him as Prime Minister,
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along with his own specialist advisors, and meld them into
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one machine at the center, which is then playing a
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sort of critical role in running the war. So he
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brings in Desmond Morton to help advise him on intelligence matters,
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and he brings in the Oxford physicist Frederick linderman to
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advise him on scientific issues. Effectively, he's the first British
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prime minister to have a scientific advisor in Downing Street,
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and he sets up under Lindermann a statistical unit, which
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is basically an information unit which is gathering information on
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all the issues that the Prime Minister might be concerned
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with and feeding it to him in sort of digestible
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and often graphical graph format so that you know, he
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can be briefed when speaking to his other ministers or
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or speaking to the American President. So it is about
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creating this machine to run the war at the center,
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which brings together the key sort of political and military staffs.
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Churchill had a reputation for being quite overbearing in meetings
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and before he becomes Prime minister. One of the main
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criticisms of him from his contemporaries is that you know
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he will try and dominate the meetings and control the agenda.
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And I think the problem he has is that before
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he becomes Prime minister, he doesn't actually have either the
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responsibility or the machine to convert that sort of drive
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and dynamism into action. So when he's chairing the Military
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Coordination Committee under Chamberlain, it's described as being like a
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vehicle with one wheel that is far too large and
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consequently it won't work. But the important thing is that
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once he's in the center, then the machine can be
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geared around him, and I think that's what makes him
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an effective war leader.
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Well, to a lot of people, this was seemed to
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be the obvious thing to do. After all, this is
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a war, it's a new type of war. It's a
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more massive war than anyone's ever seen before. But it's
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also changing the British governing system. Was there much pushback
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among his colleagues or people saying, oh, no, he's trying
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to become a president.
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I think if you're going to do it, if you're
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going to make this change, then the spring of nineteen
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forty is clearly the moment to do it. And I
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suppose what really enables Churchill to get away with this
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is the fact that on the same day that he
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becomes Prime Minister, at the tenth of May nineteen forty,
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Hitler launches his Blitzkrieg offensive against the Low Countries and
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ultimately France changing in a stroke the dynamic of the
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whole war, and of course within weeks you're in a
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situation where Britain's military strategy has effectively collapsed. Our main
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ally is on the brink of surrender, have been evacuated
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from the beaches of Dunkirk, and we're facing the possibility
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of direct attack across the channel. So the scale of
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that emergency I think allows Churchill to drive through those changes,
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but it also puts that new system under very immediate
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and huge critical stress. And of course, you know Churchill's
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strategy is not without risks. By making himself Minister of Defense,
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by working directly with the chiefs of Staff, he is
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effectively taking responsibility for those main military decisions, and he
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has no way then of distancing himself from them, so
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that you know, if it all goes wrong, then you
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know it is Churchill who's going to be blamed.
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You know, he can't.
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Simply sack the first Lord of the Abyalty. If he's
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been taking some of the key decisions.
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Well, that's right. If he's creating this new system, then
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he becomes responsible for it. Well, as you say, all
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these things are happening more or less at the same time.
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And then the first real test of this new system,
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the first real test of Churchill's leadership approach, is the
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fall of France. And that's one of the things that's
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a chapter two. How did Churchill respond to the collapse
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of his ally. We should remind our listeners again, Americanism
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may not know this that Churchill's a Francophile. Churchill's a
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Napoleon worshiper. Churchill, you know, doesn't have this traditional Anglo
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feeling towards the French's. He's very much for a Francophile.
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So this is a big deal.
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You will, yeah, I mean it is. I mean it's
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a big deal on several levels. First of all, on
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the personal level, you're absolutely right, he was a Franco file.
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People talk about the special relationship with the United States,
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and we can maybe talk about that, but of course
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that's something that really develops after the fall of France.
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Prior to the fall, France's our main ally, and Churchill,
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you know, he's someone who has a huge love of
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French history and French culture. He likes French food, wine,
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he likes holidaying on the riviera. But it goes deeper
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than that, as you imply just a moment ago. He
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has a great knowledge of French history. He's a huge
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admirer of Napoleon. It's Napoleon's bust who he has on
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his study desk at his house chart Well in Kent.
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And I think, you know, he's been through the First
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World War, both as a minister but also briefly commanding
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a battalion on the Western Front. He's worked with the
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French generals and commanders. He knew people like Foch and Clemenceau.
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He admires them, He's written about them. And you know,
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in nineteen thirty nine he visits France just before the
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outbreak of war and he inspects the Magino defenses and
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I think, like many in the British establishment, he doesn't
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see how quickly France will fall.
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He doesn't foresee it.
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He believes, like so many others, that war is going
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to come, but that that war will be fought largely
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in Europe, using a very large French army backed up
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by British expeditionary Force, supported by the Royal Air Force,
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and with a blockade of Germany from the Royal Navy. So,
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in other words, the strategy going into the Second World
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War is very similar to that going into the first
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and of course all of that unravels within weeks of
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him becoming Prime Minister.
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And then one of the decisions he has to take,
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which is an absolutely horrific decision, is what to do
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after France has fallen, what to do about the French fleet,
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for instance, in various places in Europe and around Europe,
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and to try to stop it falling into German hands.
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And I don't want to tell this story because you're
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so much better out it than I am, but it
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is really one of the most gut wrenching decisions of
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the war.
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And I think it builds on earlier decisions. I mean,
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I think, well, what I hope I show in this
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chapter in the book about the battle in France is
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how torn Churchill is because on the one hand, he
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is a Francophile, France is our ally he wants to
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do everything he can to keep the fight going in France.
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When he goes out there and meets with General Wagan
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and the French commanders, he struggles to believe how quickly
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this collapses happening. Can't believe it when he's told that
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there are no reserves, so on the one hand, he
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wants to keep fighting in France desperately, and of course
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the French are begging him for aid and support for
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more aircraft. But on the other hand, he's also conscious
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that his primary responsibility is to Britain and that if
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France is going to fall, then you're going to need
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your troops, your equipment, your aircraft for the defense of Britain.
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So how far do you go in propping up France,
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in trying to keep France in the conflict? How much
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do you hold things back for the defense of the
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UK And balancing those things must have been incredibly hard.
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I mean, the war Cabinet in Britain at this point
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is in almost constant session as the news is sort
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of coming in by dispatch rider from France and sort
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of getting grimmer and grimmer, and you know, it's carrot
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and stick really here. In terms of the carrot, Churchill
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wants to keep France fighting so as the fall seems inevitable.
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One of the things that he does is to reach
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out and actually offer a full political union with France,
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which when you think about it, is an unprecedented offer.
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But you have to understand the context in which that
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offer is being made. I mean, this is a way
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of keeping France fighting when mainland France doesn't exist. By
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merging the governments. It would also have allowed the British
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legitimately to take control of French troops, French gold reserves,
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and of course the French navy. And you know, Churchill
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was incredibly worried about the French navy. This is a
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very powerful navy. He's aware that should France fall, it
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means that we're going to have to defend the British Isles.
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The Royal Navy is going to have to concentrate on that.
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But we also have huge commitments in the Mediterranean, where
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we also have strong British presence, British colonies and British
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mandates to defend. And the prospect of the French navy
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falling into German hands and being combined with the German
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navy and possibly also of course the Spanish navy if
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Spain were to come into the war.
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Is a real fear for him.
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Threatens to really sort of unbalance British naval dominance and
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actually put us at risk of defeat in the Mediterranean
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theater and threaten our ability to defend our own shores.
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So these are huge decisions for him. And when the
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carrot fails, when then Patam's government rejects just before it's
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for the offer of union, then I think his mind
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switches to, well, you know, if we can't secure the
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French fleet in this way, then we're going to have
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to neutralize it as a threat.
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But this was an incredibly tough decision to take.
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Oh yeah, And basically, the British blockade the French navy
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in Algeria and in other ports, and they give the
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French navy a certain deadline by which to surrender or scuttle.
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And when the French Navy does not do that in Algeria,
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they opened fire Urselle Kabir with the loss of a
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large number of French sailors. And these were people, these
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were men who had been allies of the British only
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days before.
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It was something that was done very.
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Very reluctantly by the Royal Navy, and most of the
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higher command of the Navy was advising Churchill against it.
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But his view was that this needed to be done
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to neutralize that threat to allow Britain to continue to
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fight in the Mediterranean. But I think he was also
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aware that in doing this it was sending a very
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strong signal, obviously a strong signal of defiance to Hitler,
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but this is also about a signal to the United States,
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signal to Roosevelt that the British are not going to
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surrender in the same way that France has just done.
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And it's very interesting that when Churchill then announces this
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action in the House of Commons.
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He's in tears.
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Yeah, as he desaid, it's not a decision that he's
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taken lightly, but it is the first time since becoming
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Prime Minister on the tenth of May, that he is
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actually cheered to the rafters by all sides, including by
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those elements of the Conservative Party who had remained loyal
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to Chamberlain.
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So if you've seen the movie Darkest.
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Hour, and at the very end of that movie, there's
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a scene where Gary Oldman as Churchill is there talking
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about how we will fight on and Chamberlain gives a
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coded signal and all of his followers sheare along.
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With everyone else.
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Now, that point did not happen in May June nineteen forty.
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It actually happens in July nineteen forty, at the time
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of the sinking of the French Fleet. That's the moment
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where the British Parliament sort of coalesces around Churchill's leadership.
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And we should say that he you know, he felt
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moral qualms about doing this and it bothered him for
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a very long time, but felt it had to be done.
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Yeah, And I think, you know, you cannot be a
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war leader without taking incredibly tough decision, and Churchill takes
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tough decision after decision, but it's clear that some do
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affect him quite deeply on a personal level. I think
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the sinking of the French Fleet is one example. Another
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from later in the war would be the sinking of
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the H and S Prince of Wales and which, of
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course huge British battleship, which was sunk off the coast
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of Malaya by the Japanese just after Pearl Harbor.
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And I think Churchill.
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Felt that loss particularly deeply, partly because he'd been responsible
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for sending the Prince of Wales out to Malaya and
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had known that it was going without proper air cover.
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It was sent out really prior to Pearl Harbor as
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a deterrent to the Japanese, but partly also because that
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is the ship that he crossed the Atlantic on in
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August nineteen forty one to meet with President Roosevelt off
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the coast of Newfoundland. So in this particular case, all
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those young officers and crew who died on that ship,
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he'd spent time with them. He would have been able
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to put faces and names to many of those casualty figures,
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and so you can see why that would have really hurt.
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Well, then, not very long after that he has to
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decide between well, he doesn't have to decide, but there
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are two developments. First of all, the US comes into
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the war, and then Germany invades the Soviet Union, and
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suddenly you have these two allies who, at least ideologically
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in economic terms anywhere, are completely opposed to each other.
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Yet Britain is in the middle, having to treat or
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considering how to treat both of these each of these allies,
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and how to treat them equally. That's what's so fascinating
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about the fourth chapter in your book. In fact, I
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love the title of it, Evil and the Deep Blue Sea,
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because it's saying that the British government and Turchill is
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in between these two conundrums. How much do we keep
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drawing support from the US, and then do we give
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a lot of it to the Soviet Union? Is the
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US going to object to that? Things like that as
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an absolutely fascinating conundrum, as you.
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Say, ideologically and personally, for Churchill, there was no equivalence
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between the United States and the Soviet Union. Churchill had
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been a die hard opponent of Bolshevism from its inception.
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He described the famous train that imported Lenin back into
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Russia from Germany in nineteen seventeen as being like the
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importation of a plague. Bacillis he talked about the foul,
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baboonery of Bolshevism. In the immediate period after the First
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World War, he'd wanted to keep British troops fighting in
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support of the white Russians who were fighting Trotsky's Red Army,
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And in the nineteen twenties he certainly sees the hand
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of communism everywhere and sees it as sort of undermining
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British Empire but also undermining British stability at home through
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Communist support of strikers in the UK. So he is
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a die hard opponent of Bolshevism and communism. By contrast,
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of course, he's half American by birth, and unlike many
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of his contemporaries, he has spent time.
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In the United States.
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Visits New York in eighteen ninety five en route to Cuba,
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and he returns and conducts major lecture tours of the
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United States in nineteen hundred and then again in nineteen
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twenty nine and nineteen thirty one. So he has a
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knowledge of the United States. He has contacts, arsenal contacts
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in the United States, and I think after the First
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World War he's very clearly of the world view that
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the Soviet Union is a bad thing, but the United
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States is a very good thing and is perhaps where
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the future lies.
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And he's quite clear.
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I think from the moment that he becomes Prime Minister
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in May nineteen forty that Britain is going to need
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the support of the United States. And actually that's very
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clear in a document that his chiefs of staff draw
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up for him in May nineteen forty, where they make
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it very clear that really Britain's only hope of ultimate
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success and of delivering the victory that he's promised is
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if they get the material help from the United States.
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And there are two wonderful quotes.
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I think that illustrate this how he views this these relationships.
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When Hitler invades the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa in
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June nineteen forty one, Churchill has to decide how much
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support to give to the Soviet Union. He's very clear, actually,
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I think almost immediately that he is going to support
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the Soviet Union. Of course, he's very careful in his
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public pronouncements not to retract one word of the criticism
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00:22:53.160 --> 00:22:57.119
that I've previously made of their government. And it's noticeable
402
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that he talks about the Russian people rather than the
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same Soviet Union. He also tells his private secretary John Colville.
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When Colville teases him about supporting Stalin, he says, if
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Hitler had invaded Hell, I would at least make a
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favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.
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And I think, you know, he's very.
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Clear that my enemy's enemy is my friend, and that
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every German soldier, every German aircraft, every tank that is
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lost fighting on the Eastern Front is also helping the
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British war effort at this point, but he also says
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to Colville of the United States and a President Roosevelt,
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no lover ever studied every whim of his mistress, as
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I did those of President Roosevelt. So his heart is
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intent on sort of bringing in the United States and
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working with the United States. His head tells him that
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he also needs the alliance with the Soviet Union, but
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it's quite clear that from very early on those things
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are going to pull in very opposite directions.
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Roosevelt makes it.
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Very clear at the Atlantic Meeting off Newfoundland in August
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nineteen forty one, before Pearl Harbor, before America has come
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into the war, that his vision for the postwar world,
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once Hitler has been defeated, is the creation of the
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United Nations and effectively a new world order. At the
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same time, Stalin is making it very clear to Churchill
427
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that his price for working with Britain is much more
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based on real politique, and it will be about the
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division of Eastern Europe.
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It will be about the division of the Balkans.
431
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Now, in nineteen forty one nineteen forty two, none of
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this really matters. What really matters is defeating Germany. But
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as the war goes on, these pressures start to mount,
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and they start to put incredible stress on Churchill as
435
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he's pulled between his two increasingly powerful allies.
436
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Well, that's that's what gives us. Those those things give
437
00:25:02.039 --> 00:25:06.119
us an example examples of the different decisions that he
438
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had to make. Now, let's go back to our original
439
00:25:09.960 --> 00:25:11.759
thing at the beginning of the show, and we talked
440
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about him becoming the chief executive and sort of inventing
441
00:25:15.720 --> 00:25:19.640
a chief executive role within the British cabinet. So then
442
00:25:20.440 --> 00:25:24.440
how does doing that way back at the beginning help
443
00:25:24.559 --> 00:25:27.480
him make these decisions as the war goes on?
444
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Really good question, and I think the answer is that
445
00:25:31.680 --> 00:25:36.160
it streamlines the decision making at the center, particularly as
446
00:25:36.400 --> 00:25:43.799
regards the key decisions on international relations and military operations,
447
00:25:44.240 --> 00:25:48.119
because it is clear really that the main decisions in
448
00:25:48.240 --> 00:25:53.799
terms of foreign policy, international relations, diplomacy, the creation of
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00:25:53.920 --> 00:25:57.359
this grand alliance with the United States and the Soviet
450
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Union that that is being run out of Downing Street
451
00:26:00.519 --> 00:26:05.359
by Churchill directly. So yes, he's working with Eden, but
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Eden is really very much in the deputy's supporting role
453
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to Churchill as Prime Minister. Similarly, in terms of the
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military operations, it allows Churchill, at least in the early
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phase of the war, to get directly involved with who
456
00:26:23.000 --> 00:26:25.960
is going to command the major offensives and what action
457
00:26:26.000 --> 00:26:29.480
it's going to be taken. I think there are disadvantages
458
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to this approach as well as advantages. One of the
459
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disadvantages is of course that by concentrating on the war effort,
460
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by concentrating on international relations, it means that Churchill cannot
461
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spend the time on running the domestic front, and that
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he has to delegate to others there, and increasingly, of
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00:26:51.039 --> 00:26:54.519
course he delegates to Clement Atlett, who from nineteen forty
464
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two onwards is Deputy Prime Minister.
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The Labor Party, of the Labor Party.
466
00:27:00.039 --> 00:27:03.960
An important member of Churchill's coalition government. But I think,
467
00:27:04.160 --> 00:27:07.680
of course what that does then is to make it
468
00:27:07.839 --> 00:27:11.039
much more difficult for Churchill when it comes to the
469
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end of the war and the nineteen forty five general election,
470
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because actually when he launches into his criticism of the
471
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Labor Party and their leaders, these are the people who
472
00:27:23.240 --> 00:27:24.359
have been running.
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That home front. They've been very visible to the British.
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Electorate, and it makes it much more difficult, I think,
475
00:27:31.279 --> 00:27:35.119
for him to grasp the metal there. I mean, really,
476
00:27:35.119 --> 00:27:38.160
at the end of the war, you can argue that
477
00:27:38.279 --> 00:27:40.960
what Churchill should have done is to step back from
478
00:27:40.960 --> 00:27:44.000
that CEO position that it worked during the war, but
479
00:27:44.000 --> 00:27:45.400
at the end of the war, perhaps he should have
480
00:27:45.440 --> 00:27:49.039
stepped back and played the chairman's role and said to
481
00:27:49.200 --> 00:27:52.160
the British electorate, well, I promised you victory.
482
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I've delivered victory in Europe.
483
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Let me finish the war against Japan and we'll continue
484
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with this coalition. Instead, what he does is to launch
485
00:28:00.680 --> 00:28:04.680
back into British domestic politics to make some very forceful
486
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attack on the Labor Party who'd been members of his
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government till only weeks before, which rather backfires and leads
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to the election defeat. So I think the interesting thing
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here is that that CEO role serves him incredibly well.
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I think in the early part of the war in
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nineteen forty one through to about nineteen forty three. But
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when you get to the last two years of the war,
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I think it takes its toll. It takes its toll
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on his physical health, as I think it would on anyone,
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and he comes very close to death in North Africa
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in nineteen forty three when he collapses after the Tehran
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Conference with pneumonia.
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So the other.
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Side of this hands on CEO role is the toll
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that it takes on him personally. And what it means
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he can't concentrate on because by the end of the war,
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the war has become so big, so global, that actually
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it's impossible to play that hands on role in quite
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the same way.
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If that makes sense.
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Well, that explains an awful lot, and I hope it
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helps people understand and put into better context what really happened,
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first of all the Battle of Britain, but also the
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war in general and Churchill's handling of it. So really
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it just remains for me to say thank you so
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much for coming on the show and enlightening us.
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It's been a real pleasure, and I'm sure that your
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listeners will have plenty of questions, comments, arguments.
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I'd be very happy to come back on and answer
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some of them.
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Well, the book is How Churchill Waged War the most
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challenging decisions of the Second World War, and of course
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it's on the Buzzkill bookshelf, So everyone please go to
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professor Buzzkill dot com, do everything you need to do there,
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00:29:47.440 --> 00:29:50.160
and we will talk to all of you about this
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and other topics next week.
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Hello, everyone, that's Professor Buzzkill here, your favorite history professor.
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Fortunately for you, we have on the line Alan Packwood,
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who's here from the Churchill Archive Center at Churchill College
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and the University of Cambridge to talk to us about
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how Churchill waged war the most challenging decisions of the
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Second World War. Thank you so much for coming on
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the show having me. As you and I were talking
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about before the show started. You know, most Americans here
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Churchill and they think of great speeches, they think of
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inspirational leadership, things like that, but they don't actually know
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very much about how he ran the war. And everything
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I've read in it, especially your work, leads me to
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believe that, sure, the speeches were important in the in
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their own way, but what really wins the war is
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how he runs it as a sort of chief executive.
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Oh well, well, I'm glad you picked up on this
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because I think it is the main theme of the book.
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I mean, really, what motivated me to write this book
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was to try and answer the question, well, what did
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Churchill actually do? Rather than what did Churchill say? It's
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very interesting that at the end of the war, as
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he was traveling out to Italy, with his doctor. He
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made the point that he didn't want to be remembered
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just for his wartime speeches, that he felt that he
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actually he had contributed to some of the big military decisions,
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and so that really sort of got me thinking, well,
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then you know, what are those decisions and what was
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his approach to wartime government.
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Well, I think the crucial thing we need to establish
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first is that again, most of our listeners in America,
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they won't necessarily understand how a British prime minister works,
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and up until Churchill in the war, I think it's
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fair to say that the prime minister acted sort of
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as a chairman of the board. But this change is
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and has to change.
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It does I mean the first thing I would say,
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of course, just to remind your listeners that Churchill is
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not elected prime minister in May nineteen fourteen. He's actually
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there really as a result of a Westminster coup. He's
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there as a result of the fact that the Labor
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Party and a significant portion of the Conservative Party made
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it clear that they no longer want to serve under
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Neville Chamberlain. And it is clear that Chamberlain is going
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to have to restructure the government that he needs to
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bring in the opposition parties, and once the Labor leaders
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have made it clear that they won't serve under him,
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then there's going to have to be somebody else in charge.
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The choice falls on Churchill or Halifax, the Conservative Foreign
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Secretary's really a choice, as I think I say in
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the book, between a hawk and a dove. You know,
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it's quite clear that the new Prime Minister is going
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to have to be drawn from the ranks of the
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Conservative Party, because the Conservative Party is the biggest party
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in the House of Commons. But it's going to have
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to be someone who can bring together a national coalition.
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Churchill has been the most bellicost member of Chamberlain's war cabinet,
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whereas it's clear that Halifax takes a rather different line
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and favors some form of negotiation if possible, And I
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think Halifax probably senses that the mood of the House
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of Commons is far more with Churchill than it is
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with him. So Churchill becomes the Prime Minister in May
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nineteen forty, but actually he's not in a particularly strong
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political position. He hasn't been elected prime minister. He has
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really very little choice as to who he brings into
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his initial war cabinet, he has to bring in his predecessor,
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Neville Chamberlain, who's still the leader of the Conservative Party
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at this point. Halfax is such a powerful figure that
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he can't be ignored and has to remain Foreign Secretary.
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And then he has to bring in the labor leaders
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Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood, who you know, these are
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people who Churchill has spent much of the last decade
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criticizing and attacking in Parliament.
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So as he looks around that.
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Cabinet table its first meetings on sort of early May
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nineteen forty, this is not a cabinet of his choosing.
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It's not a cabinet of natural friends to him.
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So he's not in a.
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Particularly strong political position. And his response to that, I
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think is really interesting. And one of the first things
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that he does is to make himself not just Prime
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Minister but also Minister of Defense. And this, of course
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is a new position one that he is creating. Up
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until this point, the armed forces have been represented by
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their own ministers in cabinet. So First Lord of the
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Admiralty has represented the Navy, the Secretary of State for War,
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the Army, the Secretary of State for Air the Royal
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Air Force. By making himself Minister of Defense, Churchill effectively
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demotes those ministers. They're no longer members of the war cabinet.
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And what it means is that the chiefs of staff
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are now reporting into him directly, and he is chairing
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the key committee on Military operations, so he is putting
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himself right at the center of the military decision making
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as well as the political decision making. And this is
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why I say, actually, you know, he's quite clear that
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he's going to get his hands dirty, that he's going
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to be not playing the chairman's role but the chief
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Executive CEO's role here, and.
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I think it's a very important decision.
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It sends out a very clear message that he is
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going to play this sort of hands on role, and
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what it allows him to do is to centralize power
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in Downing Street, because it allows him to bring together
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this military secretariat which is serving him as Minister of Defense,
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with the cabinet secretariats which is serving him as Prime Minister,
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along with his own specialist advisors, and meld them into
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one machine at the center, which is then playing a
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sort of critical role in running the war. So he
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brings in Desmond Morton to help advise him on intelligence matters,
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and he brings in the Oxford physicist Frederick linderman to
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advise him on scientific issues. Effectively, he's the first British
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prime minister to have a scientific advisor in Downing Street,
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and he sets up under Lindermann a statistical unit, which
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is basically an information unit which is gathering information on
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all the issues that the Prime Minister might be concerned
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with and feeding it to him in sort of digestible
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and often graphical graph format so that you know, he
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can be briefed when speaking to his other ministers or
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or speaking to the American President. So it is about
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creating this machine to run the war at the center,
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which brings together the key sort of political and military staffs.
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Churchill had a reputation for being quite overbearing in meetings
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and before he becomes Prime minister. One of the main
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criticisms of him from his contemporaries is that you know
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he will try and dominate the meetings and control the agenda.
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And I think the problem he has is that before
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he becomes Prime minister, he doesn't actually have either the
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responsibility or the machine to convert that sort of drive
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and dynamism into action. So when he's chairing the Military
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Coordination Committee under Chamberlain, it's described as being like a
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vehicle with one wheel that is far too large and
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consequently it won't work. But the important thing is that
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once he's in the center, then the machine can be
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geared around him, and I think that's what makes him
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an effective war leader.
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Well, to a lot of people, this was seemed to
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be the obvious thing to do. After all, this is
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a war, it's a new type of war. It's a
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more massive war than anyone's ever seen before. But it's
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also changing the British governing system. Was there much pushback
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among his colleagues or people saying, oh, no, he's trying
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to become a president.
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I think if you're going to do it, if you're
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going to make this change, then the spring of nineteen
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forty is clearly the moment to do it. And I
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suppose what really enables Churchill to get away with this
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is the fact that on the same day that he
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becomes Prime Minister, at the tenth of May nineteen forty,
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Hitler launches his Blitzkrieg offensive against the Low Countries and
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ultimately France changing in a stroke the dynamic of the
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whole war, and of course within weeks you're in a
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situation where Britain's military strategy has effectively collapsed. Our main
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ally is on the brink of surrender, have been evacuated
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from the beaches of Dunkirk, and we're facing the possibility
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of direct attack across the channel. So the scale of
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that emergency I think allows Churchill to drive through those changes,
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but it also puts that new system under very immediate
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and huge critical stress. And of course, you know Churchill's
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strategy is not without risks. By making himself Minister of Defense,
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by working directly with the chiefs of Staff, he is
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effectively taking responsibility for those main military decisions, and he
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has no way then of distancing himself from them, so
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that you know, if it all goes wrong, then you
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know it is Churchill who's going to be blamed.
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You know, he can't.
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Simply sack the first Lord of the Abyalty. If he's
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been taking some of the key decisions.
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Well, that's right. If he's creating this new system, then
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he becomes responsible for it. Well, as you say, all
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these things are happening more or less at the same time.
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And then the first real test of this new system,
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the first real test of Churchill's leadership approach, is the
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fall of France. And that's one of the things that's
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a chapter two. How did Churchill respond to the collapse
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of his ally. We should remind our listeners again, Americanism
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may not know this that Churchill's a Francophile. Churchill's a
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Napoleon worshiper. Churchill, you know, doesn't have this traditional Anglo
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feeling towards the French's. He's very much for a Francophile.
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So this is a big deal.
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You will, yeah, I mean it is. I mean it's
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a big deal on several levels. First of all, on
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the personal level, you're absolutely right, he was a Franco file.
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People talk about the special relationship with the United States,
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and we can maybe talk about that, but of course
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that's something that really develops after the fall of France.
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Prior to the fall, France's our main ally, and Churchill,
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you know, he's someone who has a huge love of
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French history and French culture. He likes French food, wine,
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he likes holidaying on the riviera. But it goes deeper
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than that, as you imply just a moment ago. He
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has a great knowledge of French history. He's a huge
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admirer of Napoleon. It's Napoleon's bust who he has on
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his study desk at his house chart Well in Kent.
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And I think, you know, he's been through the First
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World War, both as a minister but also briefly commanding
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a battalion on the Western Front. He's worked with the
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French generals and commanders. He knew people like Foch and Clemenceau.
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He admires them, He's written about them. And you know,
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in nineteen thirty nine he visits France just before the
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outbreak of war and he inspects the Magino defenses and
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I think, like many in the British establishment, he doesn't
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see how quickly France will fall.
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He doesn't foresee it.
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He believes, like so many others, that war is going
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to come, but that that war will be fought largely
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in Europe, using a very large French army backed up
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by British expeditionary Force, supported by the Royal Air Force,
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and with a blockade of Germany from the Royal Navy. So,
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in other words, the strategy going into the Second World
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War is very similar to that going into the first
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and of course all of that unravels within weeks of
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him becoming Prime Minister.
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And then one of the decisions he has to take,
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which is an absolutely horrific decision, is what to do
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after France has fallen, what to do about the French fleet,
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for instance, in various places in Europe and around Europe,
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and to try to stop it falling into German hands.
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And I don't want to tell this story because you're
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so much better out it than I am, but it
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is really one of the most gut wrenching decisions of
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the war.
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And I think it builds on earlier decisions. I mean,
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I think, well, what I hope I show in this
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chapter in the book about the battle in France is
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how torn Churchill is because on the one hand, he
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is a Francophile, France is our ally he wants to
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do everything he can to keep the fight going in France.
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When he goes out there and meets with General Wagan
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and the French commanders, he struggles to believe how quickly
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this collapses happening. Can't believe it when he's told that
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there are no reserves, so on the one hand, he
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wants to keep fighting in France desperately, and of course
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the French are begging him for aid and support for
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more aircraft. But on the other hand, he's also conscious
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that his primary responsibility is to Britain and that if
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France is going to fall, then you're going to need
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your troops, your equipment, your aircraft for the defense of Britain.
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So how far do you go in propping up France,
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in trying to keep France in the conflict? How much
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do you hold things back for the defense of the
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UK And balancing those things must have been incredibly hard.
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I mean, the war Cabinet in Britain at this point
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is in almost constant session as the news is sort
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of coming in by dispatch rider from France and sort
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of getting grimmer and grimmer, and you know, it's carrot
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and stick really here. In terms of the carrot, Churchill
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wants to keep France fighting so as the fall seems inevitable.
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One of the things that he does is to reach
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out and actually offer a full political union with France,
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which when you think about it, is an unprecedented offer.
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But you have to understand the context in which that
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offer is being made. I mean, this is a way
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of keeping France fighting when mainland France doesn't exist. By
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merging the governments. It would also have allowed the British
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legitimately to take control of French troops, French gold reserves,
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and of course the French navy. And you know, Churchill
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was incredibly worried about the French navy. This is a
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very powerful navy. He's aware that should France fall, it
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means that we're going to have to defend the British Isles.
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The Royal Navy is going to have to concentrate on that.
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But we also have huge commitments in the Mediterranean, where
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we also have strong British presence, British colonies and British
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mandates to defend. And the prospect of the French navy
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falling into German hands and being combined with the German
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navy and possibly also of course the Spanish navy if
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Spain were to come into the war.
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Is a real fear for him.
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Threatens to really sort of unbalance British naval dominance and
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actually put us at risk of defeat in the Mediterranean
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theater and threaten our ability to defend our own shores.
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So these are huge decisions for him. And when the
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carrot fails, when then Patam's government rejects just before it's
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for the offer of union, then I think his mind
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switches to, well, you know, if we can't secure the
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French fleet in this way, then we're going to have
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to neutralize it as a threat.
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But this was an incredibly tough decision to take.
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Oh yeah, And basically, the British blockade the French navy
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in Algeria and in other ports, and they give the
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French navy a certain deadline by which to surrender or scuttle.
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And when the French Navy does not do that in Algeria,
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they opened fire Urselle Kabir with the loss of a
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large number of French sailors. And these were people, these
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were men who had been allies of the British only
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days before.
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It was something that was done very.
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Very reluctantly by the Royal Navy, and most of the
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higher command of the Navy was advising Churchill against it.
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But his view was that this needed to be done
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to neutralize that threat to allow Britain to continue to
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fight in the Mediterranean. But I think he was also
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aware that in doing this it was sending a very
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strong signal, obviously a strong signal of defiance to Hitler,
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but this is also about a signal to the United States,
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signal to Roosevelt that the British are not going to
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surrender in the same way that France has just done.
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And it's very interesting that when Churchill then announces this
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action in the House of Commons.
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He's in tears.
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Yeah, as he desaid, it's not a decision that he's
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taken lightly, but it is the first time since becoming
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Prime Minister on the tenth of May, that he is
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actually cheered to the rafters by all sides, including by
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those elements of the Conservative Party who had remained loyal
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to Chamberlain.
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So if you've seen the movie Darkest.
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Hour, and at the very end of that movie, there's
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a scene where Gary Oldman as Churchill is there talking
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about how we will fight on and Chamberlain gives a
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coded signal and all of his followers sheare along.
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With everyone else.
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Now, that point did not happen in May June nineteen forty.
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It actually happens in July nineteen forty, at the time
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of the sinking of the French Fleet. That's the moment
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where the British Parliament sort of coalesces around Churchill's leadership.
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And we should say that he you know, he felt
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moral qualms about doing this and it bothered him for
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a very long time, but felt it had to be done.
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Yeah, And I think, you know, you cannot be a
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war leader without taking incredibly tough decision, and Churchill takes
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tough decision after decision, but it's clear that some do
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affect him quite deeply on a personal level. I think
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the sinking of the French Fleet is one example. Another
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from later in the war would be the sinking of
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the H and S Prince of Wales and which, of
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course huge British battleship, which was sunk off the coast
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of Malaya by the Japanese just after Pearl Harbor.
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And I think Churchill.
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Felt that loss particularly deeply, partly because he'd been responsible
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for sending the Prince of Wales out to Malaya and
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had known that it was going without proper air cover.
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It was sent out really prior to Pearl Harbor as
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a deterrent to the Japanese, but partly also because that
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is the ship that he crossed the Atlantic on in
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August nineteen forty one to meet with President Roosevelt off
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the coast of Newfoundland. So in this particular case, all
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those young officers and crew who died on that ship,
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he'd spent time with them. He would have been able
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to put faces and names to many of those casualty figures,
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and so you can see why that would have really hurt.
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Well, then, not very long after that he has to
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decide between well, he doesn't have to decide, but there
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are two developments. First of all, the US comes into
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the war, and then Germany invades the Soviet Union, and
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suddenly you have these two allies who, at least ideologically
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in economic terms anywhere, are completely opposed to each other.
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Yet Britain is in the middle, having to treat or
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considering how to treat both of these each of these allies,
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and how to treat them equally. That's what's so fascinating
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about the fourth chapter in your book. In fact, I
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love the title of it, Evil and the Deep Blue Sea,
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because it's saying that the British government and Turchill is
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in between these two conundrums. How much do we keep
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drawing support from the US, and then do we give
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a lot of it to the Soviet Union? Is the
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US going to object to that? Things like that as
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an absolutely fascinating conundrum, as you.
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Say, ideologically and personally, for Churchill, there was no equivalence
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between the United States and the Soviet Union. Churchill had
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been a die hard opponent of Bolshevism from its inception.
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He described the famous train that imported Lenin back into
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Russia from Germany in nineteen seventeen as being like the
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importation of a plague. Bacillis he talked about the foul,
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baboonery of Bolshevism. In the immediate period after the First
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World War, he'd wanted to keep British troops fighting in
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support of the white Russians who were fighting Trotsky's Red Army,
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And in the nineteen twenties he certainly sees the hand
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of communism everywhere and sees it as sort of undermining
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British Empire but also undermining British stability at home through
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Communist support of strikers in the UK. So he is
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a die hard opponent of Bolshevism and communism. By contrast,
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of course, he's half American by birth, and unlike many
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of his contemporaries, he has spent time.
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In the United States.
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Visits New York in eighteen ninety five en route to Cuba,
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and he returns and conducts major lecture tours of the
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United States in nineteen hundred and then again in nineteen
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twenty nine and nineteen thirty one. So he has a
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knowledge of the United States. He has contacts, arsenal contacts
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in the United States, and I think after the First
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World War he's very clearly of the world view that
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the Soviet Union is a bad thing, but the United
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States is a very good thing and is perhaps where
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the future lies.
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And he's quite clear.
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I think from the moment that he becomes Prime Minister
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in May nineteen forty that Britain is going to need
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the support of the United States. And actually that's very
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clear in a document that his chiefs of staff draw
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up for him in May nineteen forty, where they make
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it very clear that really Britain's only hope of ultimate
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success and of delivering the victory that he's promised is
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if they get the material help from the United States.
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And there are two wonderful quotes.
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I think that illustrate this how he views this these relationships.
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When Hitler invades the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa in
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June nineteen forty one, Churchill has to decide how much
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support to give to the Soviet Union. He's very clear, actually,
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I think almost immediately that he is going to support
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the Soviet Union. Of course, he's very careful in his
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public pronouncements not to retract one word of the criticism
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that I've previously made of their government. And it's noticeable
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that he talks about the Russian people rather than the
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same Soviet Union. He also tells his private secretary John Colville.
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When Colville teases him about supporting Stalin, he says, if
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Hitler had invaded Hell, I would at least make a
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favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.
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And I think, you know, he's very.
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Clear that my enemy's enemy is my friend, and that
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every German soldier, every German aircraft, every tank that is
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lost fighting on the Eastern Front is also helping the
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British war effort at this point, but he also says
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to Colville of the United States and a President Roosevelt,
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no lover ever studied every whim of his mistress, as
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I did those of President Roosevelt. So his heart is
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intent on sort of bringing in the United States and
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working with the United States. His head tells him that
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he also needs the alliance with the Soviet Union, but
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it's quite clear that from very early on those things
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are going to pull in very opposite directions.
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Roosevelt makes it.
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Very clear at the Atlantic Meeting off Newfoundland in August
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nineteen forty one, before Pearl Harbor, before America has come
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into the war, that his vision for the postwar world,
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once Hitler has been defeated, is the creation of the
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United Nations and effectively a new world order. At the
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same time, Stalin is making it very clear to Churchill
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that his price for working with Britain is much more
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based on real politique, and it will be about the
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division of Eastern Europe.
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It will be about the division of the Balkans.
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Now, in nineteen forty one nineteen forty two, none of
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this really matters. What really matters is defeating Germany. But
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as the war goes on, these pressures start to mount,
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and they start to put incredible stress on Churchill as
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he's pulled between his two increasingly powerful allies.
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Well, that's that's what gives us. Those those things give
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us an example examples of the different decisions that he
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had to make. Now, let's go back to our original
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thing at the beginning of the show, and we talked
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about him becoming the chief executive and sort of inventing
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a chief executive role within the British cabinet. So then
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how does doing that way back at the beginning help
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him make these decisions as the war goes on?
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Really good question, and I think the answer is that
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it streamlines the decision making at the center, particularly as
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regards the key decisions on international relations and military operations,
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because it is clear really that the main decisions in
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terms of foreign policy, international relations, diplomacy, the creation of
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this grand alliance with the United States and the Soviet
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Union that that is being run out of Downing Street
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by Churchill directly. So yes, he's working with Eden, but
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00:26:05.599 --> 00:26:09.680
Eden is really very much in the deputy's supporting role
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00:26:09.920 --> 00:26:14.519
to Churchill as Prime Minister. Similarly, in terms of the
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00:26:14.519 --> 00:26:19.240
military operations, it allows Churchill, at least in the early
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00:26:19.279 --> 00:26:22.960
phase of the war, to get directly involved with who
456
00:26:23.000 --> 00:26:25.960
is going to command the major offensives and what action
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00:26:26.000 --> 00:26:29.480
it's going to be taken. I think there are disadvantages
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00:26:29.720 --> 00:26:31.960
to this approach as well as advantages. One of the
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00:26:32.000 --> 00:26:38.119
disadvantages is of course that by concentrating on the war effort,
460
00:26:38.240 --> 00:26:43.279
by concentrating on international relations, it means that Churchill cannot
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00:26:43.359 --> 00:26:47.880
spend the time on running the domestic front, and that
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00:26:47.960 --> 00:26:51.000
he has to delegate to others there, and increasingly, of
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00:26:51.039 --> 00:26:54.519
course he delegates to Clement Atlett, who from nineteen forty
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00:26:54.519 --> 00:26:57.319
two onwards is Deputy Prime Minister.
465
00:26:57.880 --> 00:27:00.079
The Labor Party, of the Labor Party.
466
00:27:00.039 --> 00:27:03.960
An important member of Churchill's coalition government. But I think,
467
00:27:04.160 --> 00:27:07.680
of course what that does then is to make it
468
00:27:07.839 --> 00:27:11.039
much more difficult for Churchill when it comes to the
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00:27:11.160 --> 00:27:14.119
end of the war and the nineteen forty five general election,
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00:27:14.559 --> 00:27:20.039
because actually when he launches into his criticism of the
471
00:27:20.119 --> 00:27:23.160
Labor Party and their leaders, these are the people who
472
00:27:23.240 --> 00:27:24.359
have been running.
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00:27:24.119 --> 00:27:27.960
That home front. They've been very visible to the British.
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00:27:27.680 --> 00:27:31.240
Electorate, and it makes it much more difficult, I think,
475
00:27:31.279 --> 00:27:35.119
for him to grasp the metal there. I mean, really,
476
00:27:35.119 --> 00:27:38.160
at the end of the war, you can argue that
477
00:27:38.279 --> 00:27:40.960
what Churchill should have done is to step back from
478
00:27:40.960 --> 00:27:44.000
that CEO position that it worked during the war, but
479
00:27:44.000 --> 00:27:45.400
at the end of the war, perhaps he should have
480
00:27:45.440 --> 00:27:49.039
stepped back and played the chairman's role and said to
481
00:27:49.200 --> 00:27:52.160
the British electorate, well, I promised you victory.
482
00:27:52.240 --> 00:27:53.759
I've delivered victory in Europe.
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00:27:54.119 --> 00:27:57.039
Let me finish the war against Japan and we'll continue
484
00:27:57.079 --> 00:28:00.519
with this coalition. Instead, what he does is to launch
485
00:28:00.680 --> 00:28:04.680
back into British domestic politics to make some very forceful
486
00:28:04.680 --> 00:28:07.119
attack on the Labor Party who'd been members of his
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00:28:07.200 --> 00:28:11.599
government till only weeks before, which rather backfires and leads
488
00:28:11.640 --> 00:28:14.640
to the election defeat. So I think the interesting thing
489
00:28:14.720 --> 00:28:19.279
here is that that CEO role serves him incredibly well.
490
00:28:19.400 --> 00:28:22.160
I think in the early part of the war in
491
00:28:22.240 --> 00:28:26.039
nineteen forty one through to about nineteen forty three. But
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00:28:26.640 --> 00:28:29.279
when you get to the last two years of the war,
493
00:28:29.559 --> 00:28:32.279
I think it takes its toll. It takes its toll
494
00:28:32.359 --> 00:28:35.440
on his physical health, as I think it would on anyone,
495
00:28:35.640 --> 00:28:38.640
and he comes very close to death in North Africa
496
00:28:38.720 --> 00:28:42.160
in nineteen forty three when he collapses after the Tehran
497
00:28:42.359 --> 00:28:44.039
Conference with pneumonia.
498
00:28:44.440 --> 00:28:45.160
So the other.
499
00:28:45.119 --> 00:28:48.640
Side of this hands on CEO role is the toll
500
00:28:48.680 --> 00:28:52.480
that it takes on him personally. And what it means
501
00:28:52.920 --> 00:28:55.640
he can't concentrate on because by the end of the war,
502
00:28:55.720 --> 00:28:59.839
the war has become so big, so global, that actually
503
00:29:00.079 --> 00:29:04.319
it's impossible to play that hands on role in quite
504
00:29:04.319 --> 00:29:04.880
the same way.
505
00:29:04.920 --> 00:29:05.720
If that makes sense.
506
00:29:06.079 --> 00:29:08.960
Well, that explains an awful lot, and I hope it
507
00:29:09.039 --> 00:29:14.079
helps people understand and put into better context what really happened,
508
00:29:14.480 --> 00:29:16.160
first of all the Battle of Britain, but also the
509
00:29:16.240 --> 00:29:19.720
war in general and Churchill's handling of it. So really
510
00:29:19.920 --> 00:29:21.759
it just remains for me to say thank you so
511
00:29:21.839 --> 00:29:23.880
much for coming on the show and enlightening us.
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00:29:24.119 --> 00:29:27.599
It's been a real pleasure, and I'm sure that your
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00:29:27.640 --> 00:29:31.079
listeners will have plenty of questions, comments, arguments.
514
00:29:31.160 --> 00:29:33.279
I'd be very happy to come back on and answer
515
00:29:33.359 --> 00:29:33.799
some of them.
516
00:29:34.119 --> 00:29:37.640
Well, the book is How Churchill Waged War the most
517
00:29:37.720 --> 00:29:41.160
challenging decisions of the Second World War, and of course
518
00:29:41.200 --> 00:29:44.000
it's on the Buzzkill bookshelf, So everyone please go to
519
00:29:44.039 --> 00:29:46.920
professor Buzzkill dot com, do everything you need to do there,
520
00:29:47.440 --> 00:29:50.160
and we will talk to all of you about this
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00:29:50.440 --> 00:29:52.279
and other topics next week.
