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Hello everyone, welcome to another episode
of the data standard are you experience?
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Today we have Louise Does Santos,
a data engineer manager from a major tech
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company, and they were going to
be speaking about data security. So welcome
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to the show, Louise. I'm
excited to speak with you and learn more
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about data security. Thanks, it's
always a pleasure, definitely. Can you
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introduce yourself and to us more about
your background? Sure so, as you
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mention, my name is Louise Does
Santos, and currently I'm a date engineer
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manager in a big Tech Company.
I've been in this company for about forty
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years, but I work with that
data for the past twenty years of my
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life. Before that, I use
it to be a PM in a developer
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in Microsoft in the Sequel Server Team, towards when I for ten years,
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where I went into the deeps of
relation of databases, and before that I
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use it to be a consultant in
the field back in Brazil, mostly in
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the financial area, but always handling
data. So during my career also had
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the opportunity to work with multiple companies. Okay, dive you deep working internals
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and build even to day to a
house clusters for this company that I am
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right now. So, yeah,
it's a little bit about my raisume on
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data yeah, awesome, and so
I want to jump straight into the questions
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now. So what are some ways
to ensure data security? I know there's
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a lot of different problems with some
companies being able to just have secure data.
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There's always data bridges and all that. So tell us more about that.
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Sure, outside data securities a very
broad right, but if you streamline
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in the five major topics, I
would say that it starts with the categorization
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of the data. So what you
want to store in terms of data in
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your hippositories, right, and then
you go into authentication and authorization, in
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other words, who you will let
access that data and we which power right,
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and then we go a little bit
over the technical aspects of it,
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which is how you encrypt and make
sure that data is easy stored in a
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safe place and is transferred safely between
different machines, right over the wire.
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And last in a part that people
typically forget about but very, very important,
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which is auditing who is handling and
who is reading and who is writing
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that data. If you think about
is storing the data and and if you
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think about selectivity accessing that data.
The First Line of defense that you need
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to have right is being very,
very selective about what type of data,
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okay, you are story in the
database. So you need to be very
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careful about categorizing the data that you
want to store. Okay, and,
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most important, think about who is
going to access that data and why.
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So if you have a very good
plan on this aspect of the data,
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then it's a matter it goes into
a technical mirror of incrypting, so you
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make sure that data cannot be copied
from the place you have and simply be
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read in a different place. Okay, making sure it's very important that is
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encrypted over the wire. So good
practice says that you need to have a
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minimum of tls, one point,
one support and truly enforced that through the
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technology that you use to make sure
nobody access that data over an open wire
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and also avoid, at maximum cost, okay, transferring credentials over the wire
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when you want to access that data. The technology that you choose for that
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might be able to transfer only tokens
if you have an integrated security technology,
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or sometimes you just use a you
phase or to restree phase authentication technology for
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that right, if you are not
transferring passwords over the wire and you have
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everything greeted and you know exactly what
data you are storing and you are being
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very selective on that, then I
would say that, last you need to
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be very selective about the technology that
you are going to use to outdid who
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is access in that right and providing
proper authorization on that. You know the
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words, who can read, who
can write and who cannot read nor right.
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So I think those are the aspects
of data security. Definitely odd thing,
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and knowing who is access in the
data, even within the company and
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the team, is so important.
And how can companies kind of predict that
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bridges make occur before they actually occur? And my experience I always see,
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I always saw two types of beaches, external and internal. External beaches are
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the ones that happen when a hacker
or someone from outside the company tries to
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breach and try to steal information from
you. Okay. Typically those ones are
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detectable at a network level. Okay. So if your company invest in specialize
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at Hydwrid and software, okay,
it's typically called intrusion prevention systems. Okay,
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able to detect suspicious activities in the
network. Okay, you are establishing
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your first level of defense. Then
you want to make sure people in the
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organization are also paying attention to security
bulletings that literally come out every day.
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Okay, you need to have at
least one, one person or a small
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group of people paying attention to that. Right. This way you can be
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proactive in terms of building security mentality
in the organization. Okay, making sure
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you know what are the latest breaches
in the latest menaces out there, and
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it gives you also a good confidence
to apply updates in all your software and
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make sure everything is up to that. Okay, this is from an external
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standpoint. From an internal standpoint,
breaches that happened internally in the competents way
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more complicated, because you are dealing
with someone that you you trust, right,
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and then you have a problem.
Then that's exactly when the auditing,
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okay, it's very important, and
when you have also alert that highlight suspicious
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activities inside your network and that you
can only have with proper auditing and alerting
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on top of that. Yeah,
definitely, and I think it's very difficult,
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once it's within your your organization,
when there is a security breacher,
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data breach, because it's someone you're
supposed to trust, it's someone that's within
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your team. What happens in that
kind of case when somehow you're able to
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find that it's someone within the team? I. How do you handle that
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kind of situation? Typically, in
the scenario we we get two types of
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alarms. We get false of arms
when typically it's someone who is who is
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acting of good faith, okay,
but for some reason it's struggling to get
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something okay, doesn't know exactly what
he's doing or she's doing and because of
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that, okay, it triggers our
alarm and someone comes and say hey,
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what are you trying to do?
This scenario is the most common one and
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typically I face this scenarios every month
or every once in awhile, okay,
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and it's a matter of education,
right, so you come to that person,
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that person needs to do something,
they don't know how, okay,
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and you come and you educate to
that person, just telling them that what
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he's doing or she's doing is not
good. It's not a good practice to
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contact the person responsible, okay,
for that particular data and work close with
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my case, with me and my
team, to get that data proper delivered.
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that the that the typical scenari okay, the other scenario is when the
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person's really malicious, and it did
in this I never personally faced this case,
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okay, in my twenty years of
experience, but I saw people who
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had to face this case, and
it typically starts with an internal investigation what's
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happening right, and then we start
tracing down backwards in the logs of our
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auditing systems to understand as equid that
person was doing, and based on that
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we determine if that person was being
malicious or not, and based on that
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we just handle to hr for proper
actions. Yeah, that makes sense.
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So the first case that seems more
common is just it's more of an accident
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and, like you had said,
it's education. Okay, that that oft
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makes sense. Yeah, we're talking
a lot about security and the importance of
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being able to detect something before word
actually occurs, and so do you think
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it's possible to ever reach a maximum
amount of security at one point? I
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know that hackers are constantly trying to
get ahead of the step, like step
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ahead of us, and things are
always changing. Technology is always changing,
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and so are you changing the algorithms
to constantly kind of keep updated or how
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does this kind of work? Maximum
or absolute security is Utopia right it?
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It's not possible and it's not possible
because, as it was proven in the
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past that there are no zero bug
system. Okay, every system have bugs,
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helps, every system have limitations and
problems, and typically all those exploits
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are based on bugs or limitations that
hackers find. Recently, I remember there
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was a huge breach in python.
We're a floating point in math function.
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Okay, it was found that a
floating point math function had the bleach that
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was allowing hacks, hackers to put
systems down. So it happens like a
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month ago and it was literally a
bug in the python math library. That's
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one example. So it always happens
and it's randomly happening in people use that.
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Those as exploits. Okay. I
would say that if you have a
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good policy around data categorization, data
classification and you know exactly what type of
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data you are sharing, you are
storing and sharing with your customers, your
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stakeholders, okay, you have a
proper retention policy on that data. Sometimes
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you need to have some critical data
right that in your database for your day
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to day use. But if you
keep that data with a very short span
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of time. That's say. I
would say that for in my case,
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critical data I don't keep for more
than ninety days in my database. I
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simply erase them. That would say
already gives you piece of mind because if
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a hacker come and try to steal
what you have, it's literally useless information
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without proper context. Right. It's
like stealing a bay a zip code database
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without understanding what those typic codes are
for. If you have that categorization and
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that in properly in place day on, the rest is just implementation itself of
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countermeasures and you know encryption and best
practises. Okay, but in the end
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of the day you will have peace
of mind because you know that you have
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the your diligence done in the right
sets of levels of a data you have
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and you have your base implementation.
Know the words. Your data is not
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as valuable for the Harker as he
thinks it should be. Yeah, that's
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great that you had mentioned that,
because that's not something that I personally would
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think about. Someone who it's always
kind of funny if someone were to try
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to take a piece of data but
then not understand the context is and as
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useless for them and so then there's
no point in differing that. They just
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wasted their time. So it's a
bit funny. It's to kind of hear
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that I want to hear. Now
there's I'm not there must be a huge
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process with kind of ensuring this data
security and making these predictions for it.
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What is your favorite aspect of the
process for data security? But my experience
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is the data categorization process and classification, because it's where you really challenge is
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takeyholders on each pieces of a data
they really need for the business. Right.
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If you ask US takeyholder, he
or she will always come to you
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and say I need everything. But
if you counter ask them and ask what
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are you going to do with it, this piece of information, then you
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will start to have he or she
thinking a little bit more about exactly what
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the use of that right. So
it's a conversation and needs a negotiation.
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Many times you open up and you
bring a lot of data that you completely
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useless. Nobody uses that or someone
use it at some point in time,
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okay, and that can become a
huge risk for your organization. So categorize
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and classify the data and make sure
your stakeholders have only what they need for
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the day to day job. Okay. Is, my opinion, the most
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challenging and enticing problem to solve,
because that's when you start to define and
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find it tune the business. Yeah, definitely, and I want to say
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now thank you so much, Louise, for joining us today. It was
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such a pleasure to have you on
the show. And we at the data
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stay Dard, we're trying to build
a community where everyone can network and collaborate
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with one another, and so I
know that you're coming from a huge data
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background with especially in expertise with data
security. So what is something the community
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can do for you? Well,
I think networking, collaboration. I'd love
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you to exchange experience unions which the
community, to be part of the community,
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okay, because in these data security
aspects is a lot about talking to
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each other, exchanging experiences, understanding
situations where someone face it something, how
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that someone solve it that something and
just replicate back. It's the easiest way
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and best way to go. Yeah, definitely, and especially that collaboration aspect
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and just being able to network with
the community. For sure. Will definitely
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try to connect with you, with
people within our community, and so where
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can everybody find you online so that
they can connect with you? I'm very
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reachable from my linkedin. Okay,
it's Louise FFS. Currently it's the only
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medium I have to interact with professionals. I unfortunately I'm too lazy for Tweet
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facebook. So yeah, yeah,
that, no, that's fine. To
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our audience. For more information on
the data standard, you can find this
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at www dot data standard. That
I oh, as well as our youtube
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and Linkedin page and this episode of
sponsored by Pandio. They're innovating the text
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00:17:04.559 --> 00:17:08.160
base with their patchy pulsar messaging system. So you can learn more about their
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00:17:08.200 --> 00:17:11.480
work at pandiocom. And thank you
so much, Louise, for joining us.
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It was such a pleasure to have
you on the show and learn more
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about your experiences and stories with data
security. So thank you, thank you.
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Hello everyone, welcome to another episode
of the data standard are you experience?
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00:00:03.839 --> 00:00:08.390
Today we have Louise Does Santos,
a data engineer manager from a major tech
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company, and they were going to
be speaking about data security. So welcome
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to the show, Louise. I'm
excited to speak with you and learn more
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about data security. Thanks, it's
always a pleasure, definitely. Can you
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introduce yourself and to us more about
your background? Sure so, as you
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mention, my name is Louise Does
Santos, and currently I'm a date engineer
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manager in a big Tech Company.
I've been in this company for about forty
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years, but I work with that
data for the past twenty years of my
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life. Before that, I use
it to be a PM in a developer
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in Microsoft in the Sequel Server Team, towards when I for ten years,
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where I went into the deeps of
relation of databases, and before that I
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use it to be a consultant in
the field back in Brazil, mostly in
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the financial area, but always handling
data. So during my career also had
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the opportunity to work with multiple companies. Okay, dive you deep working internals
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and build even to day to a
house clusters for this company that I am
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right now. So, yeah,
it's a little bit about my raisume on
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data yeah, awesome, and so
I want to jump straight into the questions
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now. So what are some ways
to ensure data security? I know there's
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a lot of different problems with some
companies being able to just have secure data.
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There's always data bridges and all that. So tell us more about that.
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Sure, outside data securities a very
broad right, but if you streamline
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in the five major topics, I
would say that it starts with the categorization
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of the data. So what you
want to store in terms of data in
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your hippositories, right, and then
you go into authentication and authorization, in
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other words, who you will let
access that data and we which power right,
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and then we go a little bit
over the technical aspects of it,
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which is how you encrypt and make
sure that data is easy stored in a
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safe place and is transferred safely between
different machines, right over the wire.
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And last in a part that people
typically forget about but very, very important,
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which is auditing who is handling and
who is reading and who is writing
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that data. If you think about
is storing the data and and if you
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think about selectivity accessing that data.
The First Line of defense that you need
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to have right is being very,
very selective about what type of data,
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okay, you are story in the
database. So you need to be very
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careful about categorizing the data that you
want to store. Okay, and,
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most important, think about who is
going to access that data and why.
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So if you have a very good
plan on this aspect of the data,
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then it's a matter it goes into
a technical mirror of incrypting, so you
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make sure that data cannot be copied
from the place you have and simply be
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read in a different place. Okay, making sure it's very important that is
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encrypted over the wire. So good
practice says that you need to have a
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minimum of tls, one point,
one support and truly enforced that through the
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technology that you use to make sure
nobody access that data over an open wire
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and also avoid, at maximum cost, okay, transferring credentials over the wire
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when you want to access that data. The technology that you choose for that
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might be able to transfer only tokens
if you have an integrated security technology,
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or sometimes you just use a you
phase or to restree phase authentication technology for
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that right, if you are not
transferring passwords over the wire and you have
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everything greeted and you know exactly what
data you are storing and you are being
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very selective on that, then I
would say that, last you need to
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be very selective about the technology that
you are going to use to outdid who
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is access in that right and providing
proper authorization on that. You know the
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words, who can read, who
can write and who cannot read nor right.
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So I think those are the aspects
of data security. Definitely odd thing,
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and knowing who is access in the
data, even within the company and
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the team, is so important.
And how can companies kind of predict that
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bridges make occur before they actually occur? And my experience I always see,
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I always saw two types of beaches, external and internal. External beaches are
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the ones that happen when a hacker
or someone from outside the company tries to
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breach and try to steal information from
you. Okay. Typically those ones are
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detectable at a network level. Okay. So if your company invest in specialize
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at Hydwrid and software, okay,
it's typically called intrusion prevention systems. Okay,
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able to detect suspicious activities in the
network. Okay, you are establishing
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your first level of defense. Then
you want to make sure people in the
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organization are also paying attention to security
bulletings that literally come out every day.
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Okay, you need to have at
least one, one person or a small
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group of people paying attention to that. Right. This way you can be
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proactive in terms of building security mentality
in the organization. Okay, making sure
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you know what are the latest breaches
in the latest menaces out there, and
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it gives you also a good confidence
to apply updates in all your software and
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make sure everything is up to that. Okay, this is from an external
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standpoint. From an internal standpoint,
breaches that happened internally in the competents way
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more complicated, because you are dealing
with someone that you you trust, right,
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and then you have a problem.
Then that's exactly when the auditing,
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okay, it's very important, and
when you have also alert that highlight suspicious
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activities inside your network and that you
can only have with proper auditing and alerting
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on top of that. Yeah,
definitely, and I think it's very difficult,
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once it's within your your organization,
when there is a security breacher,
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data breach, because it's someone you're
supposed to trust, it's someone that's within
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your team. What happens in that
kind of case when somehow you're able to
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find that it's someone within the team? I. How do you handle that
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kind of situation? Typically, in
the scenario we we get two types of
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alarms. We get false of arms
when typically it's someone who is who is
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acting of good faith, okay,
but for some reason it's struggling to get
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something okay, doesn't know exactly what
he's doing or she's doing and because of
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that, okay, it triggers our
alarm and someone comes and say hey,
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what are you trying to do?
This scenario is the most common one and
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typically I face this scenarios every month
or every once in awhile, okay,
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and it's a matter of education,
right, so you come to that person,
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that person needs to do something,
they don't know how, okay,
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and you come and you educate to
that person, just telling them that what
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he's doing or she's doing is not
good. It's not a good practice to
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contact the person responsible, okay,
for that particular data and work close with
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my case, with me and my
team, to get that data proper delivered.
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that the that the typical scenari okay, the other scenario is when the
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person's really malicious, and it did
in this I never personally faced this case,
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okay, in my twenty years of
experience, but I saw people who
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had to face this case, and
it typically starts with an internal investigation what's
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happening right, and then we start
tracing down backwards in the logs of our
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auditing systems to understand as equid that
person was doing, and based on that
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we determine if that person was being
malicious or not, and based on that
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we just handle to hr for proper
actions. Yeah, that makes sense.
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So the first case that seems more
common is just it's more of an accident
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and, like you had said,
it's education. Okay, that that oft
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makes sense. Yeah, we're talking
a lot about security and the importance of
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being able to detect something before word
actually occurs, and so do you think
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it's possible to ever reach a maximum
amount of security at one point? I
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know that hackers are constantly trying to
get ahead of the step, like step
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ahead of us, and things are
always changing. Technology is always changing,
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and so are you changing the algorithms
to constantly kind of keep updated or how
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does this kind of work? Maximum
or absolute security is Utopia right it?
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It's not possible and it's not possible
because, as it was proven in the
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past that there are no zero bug
system. Okay, every system have bugs,
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helps, every system have limitations and
problems, and typically all those exploits
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are based on bugs or limitations that
hackers find. Recently, I remember there
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was a huge breach in python.
We're a floating point in math function.
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Okay, it was found that a
floating point math function had the bleach that
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was allowing hacks, hackers to put
systems down. So it happens like a
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month ago and it was literally a
bug in the python math library. That's
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one example. So it always happens
and it's randomly happening in people use that.
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Those as exploits. Okay. I
would say that if you have a
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good policy around data categorization, data
classification and you know exactly what type of
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data you are sharing, you are
storing and sharing with your customers, your
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stakeholders, okay, you have a
proper retention policy on that data. Sometimes
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you need to have some critical data
right that in your database for your day
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to day use. But if you
keep that data with a very short span
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of time. That's say. I
would say that for in my case,
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critical data I don't keep for more
than ninety days in my database. I
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simply erase them. That would say
already gives you piece of mind because if
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a hacker come and try to steal
what you have, it's literally useless information
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without proper context. Right. It's
like stealing a bay a zip code database
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without understanding what those typic codes are
for. If you have that categorization and
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that in properly in place day on, the rest is just implementation itself of
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countermeasures and you know encryption and best
practises. Okay, but in the end
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of the day you will have peace
of mind because you know that you have
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the your diligence done in the right
sets of levels of a data you have
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and you have your base implementation.
Know the words. Your data is not
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as valuable for the Harker as he
thinks it should be. Yeah, that's
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great that you had mentioned that,
because that's not something that I personally would
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think about. Someone who it's always
kind of funny if someone were to try
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to take a piece of data but
then not understand the context is and as
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useless for them and so then there's
no point in differing that. They just
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wasted their time. So it's a
bit funny. It's to kind of hear
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that I want to hear. Now
there's I'm not there must be a huge
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process with kind of ensuring this data
security and making these predictions for it.
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What is your favorite aspect of the
process for data security? But my experience
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is the data categorization process and classification, because it's where you really challenge is
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takeyholders on each pieces of a data
they really need for the business. Right.
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If you ask US takeyholder, he
or she will always come to you
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and say I need everything. But
if you counter ask them and ask what
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are you going to do with it, this piece of information, then you
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will start to have he or she
thinking a little bit more about exactly what
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the use of that right. So
it's a conversation and needs a negotiation.
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Many times you open up and you
bring a lot of data that you completely
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useless. Nobody uses that or someone
use it at some point in time,
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okay, and that can become a
huge risk for your organization. So categorize
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and classify the data and make sure
your stakeholders have only what they need for
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the day to day job. Okay. Is, my opinion, the most
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challenging and enticing problem to solve,
because that's when you start to define and
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find it tune the business. Yeah, definitely, and I want to say
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now thank you so much, Louise, for joining us today. It was
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such a pleasure to have you on
the show. And we at the data
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stay Dard, we're trying to build
a community where everyone can network and collaborate
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with one another, and so I
know that you're coming from a huge data
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background with especially in expertise with data
security. So what is something the community
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can do for you? Well,
I think networking, collaboration. I'd love
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you to exchange experience unions which the
community, to be part of the community,
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okay, because in these data security
aspects is a lot about talking to
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each other, exchanging experiences, understanding
situations where someone face it something, how
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that someone solve it that something and
just replicate back. It's the easiest way
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and best way to go. Yeah, definitely, and especially that collaboration aspect
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and just being able to network with
the community. For sure. Will definitely
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try to connect with you, with
people within our community, and so where
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can everybody find you online so that
they can connect with you? I'm very
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reachable from my linkedin. Okay,
it's Louise FFS. Currently it's the only
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medium I have to interact with professionals. I unfortunately I'm too lazy for Tweet
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facebook. So yeah, yeah,
that, no, that's fine. To
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our audience. For more information on
the data standard, you can find this
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at www dot data standard. That
I oh, as well as our youtube
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and Linkedin page and this episode of
sponsored by Pandio. They're innovating the text
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00:17:04.559 --> 00:17:08.160
base with their patchy pulsar messaging system. So you can learn more about their
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00:17:08.200 --> 00:17:11.480
work at pandiocom. And thank you
so much, Louise, for joining us.
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It was such a pleasure to have
you on the show and learn more
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about your experiences and stories with data
security. So thank you, thank you.
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