From the Courthouse Steps: FCC v. AT&T

WEBVTT
1
00:00:01.560 --> 00:00:06.200
Welcome to FEDSOC Forums, a Federalist Society podcast. I'm Elizabeth Lattery,
2
00:00:06.360 --> 00:00:09.880
vice president of Practice Groups. Be sure to subscribe wherever
3
00:00:09.919 --> 00:00:13.439
you get your podcasts so you won't miss an episode. Now,
4
00:00:13.439 --> 00:00:15.279
please enjoy today's conversation.
5
00:00:17.839 --> 00:00:21.839
Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to FEDSOC Forums. My name
6
00:00:21.879 --> 00:00:24.760
is Dan Zuba, and I recently graduated from the University
7
00:00:24.760 --> 00:00:27.559
of Akron School of Law. I also serve as the
8
00:00:27.600 --> 00:00:31.280
student liaison to the Federalist Society's Federalism and Separation of
9
00:00:31.320 --> 00:00:35.320
Powers Practice Group. As a reminder, all opinions expressed are
10
00:00:35.359 --> 00:00:38.119
those of our speakers and now of the Federal Society,
11
00:00:38.399 --> 00:00:42.399
as the Federal Society takes no positions. Today's program is
12
00:00:42.439 --> 00:00:47.679
titled from the Courthouse Steps FCC VAT and T. We're
13
00:00:47.799 --> 00:00:51.119
very pleased to welcome an excellent group of panelists. Thomas
14
00:00:51.159 --> 00:00:54.119
Berry is the director of the CATO Institutes Robert A.
15
00:00:54.320 --> 00:00:57.759
Levy Center for Constitutional Studies and editor in chief of
16
00:00:57.799 --> 00:01:01.159
the CATO Supreme Court Review. Before joining CATO, he was
17
00:01:01.200 --> 00:01:04.079
an attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation and clerk for
18
00:01:04.200 --> 00:01:07.000
Judge E. Grady Jolly of the US Court of Appeals
19
00:01:07.000 --> 00:01:10.319
for the Fifth Circuit Josh Robbins is an attorney in
20
00:01:10.359 --> 00:01:14.319
Pacific Legal Foundations Separation of Powers Group. Prior to joining
21
00:01:14.359 --> 00:01:17.959
Pacific Legal Foundation, Josh was an associate at a large
22
00:01:18.000 --> 00:01:21.079
law firm where he litigated cases in federal and state courts.
23
00:01:21.560 --> 00:01:24.040
He clerked for the Honorable Jerry E. Smith of the
24
00:01:24.120 --> 00:01:26.680
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Houston.
25
00:01:27.879 --> 00:01:30.439
One note for our audience before we begin. If you
26
00:01:30.519 --> 00:01:33.480
have any questions throughout the webinar that pertain to the
27
00:01:33.519 --> 00:01:36.879
topic at hand, please submit them through Zoom's Q and
28
00:01:36.920 --> 00:01:39.920
a feature located at the bottom of your screen, not
29
00:01:40.120 --> 00:01:42.879
the chat, so that we'll be able to access them
30
00:01:42.920 --> 00:01:45.760
later in the program. With that note, I will turn
31
00:01:45.799 --> 00:01:48.680
things over to our speakers to begin the conversation. Thank
32
00:01:48.719 --> 00:01:51.159
you so much for joining us today, Thomas, why don't
33
00:01:51.200 --> 00:01:53.719
you kick us off all right?
34
00:01:53.760 --> 00:01:55.840
Fantastic? Well, thanks so much, Dan, and thanks to the
35
00:01:55.879 --> 00:01:58.200
Federal Society for inviting me. It's always an honor to
36
00:01:58.239 --> 00:02:01.319
participate in these types of events. So today we're talking,
37
00:02:01.359 --> 00:02:04.719
as you said, about the FCC versus AT and T decision,
38
00:02:05.040 --> 00:02:08.039
which is a decision about the Seventh Amendment and whether
39
00:02:08.479 --> 00:02:13.439
this particular FCC procedure for both finding liability and then
40
00:02:13.520 --> 00:02:19.039
collecting money from people who violate or allegedly violate FCC
41
00:02:19.120 --> 00:02:22.400
rules and regulations, whether that comports with the Seventh Amendment. So,
42
00:02:22.439 --> 00:02:25.280
as a brief refresher, Seventh Amendment says, in suits a
43
00:02:25.400 --> 00:02:28.879
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
44
00:02:29.159 --> 00:02:30.800
the right of trial by jury.
45
00:02:30.599 --> 00:02:31.639
Shall be preserved.
46
00:02:32.039 --> 00:02:34.719
And the big major case that's the background all of
47
00:02:34.719 --> 00:02:37.560
this that all of our watcher viewers need to keep
48
00:02:37.560 --> 00:02:39.560
in mind is, of course the Jarcacy case from a
49
00:02:39.560 --> 00:02:42.000
couple of years ago that was about the SEC the
50
00:02:42.039 --> 00:02:44.960
Securities and Exchange Commission, but it was really a landmark
51
00:02:45.000 --> 00:02:48.680
case where the Supreme Court's analysis said, in a typical
52
00:02:48.840 --> 00:02:54.439
agency adjudication, where they are imposing punitive monetary fines on you,
53
00:02:54.759 --> 00:02:57.039
where they are taking money not just for the purpose
54
00:02:57.080 --> 00:02:59.879
of restitution, but to set an example and to disc
55
00:03:00.080 --> 00:03:02.719
weigh other people from doing the same, where they are
56
00:03:02.840 --> 00:03:05.080
where they are going through a civil process to punish
57
00:03:05.080 --> 00:03:07.599
you in some way, that is a suited common law.
58
00:03:07.680 --> 00:03:10.719
They went through the history, they went through founding era precedents,
59
00:03:10.759 --> 00:03:14.719
founding era analogies, and they basically said, yes, a jury
60
00:03:14.719 --> 00:03:17.680
trial attaches to that. So the Court, in the Darcacy
61
00:03:17.719 --> 00:03:21.280
decision two years ago invalidated what had been the SEC's
62
00:03:21.360 --> 00:03:24.199
process at the time, which was to find you liable
63
00:03:24.319 --> 00:03:26.960
not in federal court with an Article three judge and
64
00:03:27.000 --> 00:03:30.560
with a jury of your peers, but in an agency adjudication,
65
00:03:30.759 --> 00:03:33.439
either with an administrative law judge or with the commission
66
00:03:33.439 --> 00:03:36.400
itself the SEC. And then you could appeal from that
67
00:03:36.520 --> 00:03:39.159
on questions of law to a court of appeals. But
68
00:03:39.240 --> 00:03:41.280
you never got a jury, you never got to novo
69
00:03:41.400 --> 00:03:45.000
factual review. So with that being the background, this was
70
00:03:45.039 --> 00:03:49.000
a challenge to the FCC's process. The underlying subject matter
71
00:03:49.159 --> 00:03:52.759
is about privacy rules. So Section two two two of
72
00:03:53.159 --> 00:03:59.199
forty seven USC says that telecommission telecommunications carriers have a
73
00:03:59.280 --> 00:04:03.840
duty to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information of their customers.
74
00:04:04.960 --> 00:04:07.639
As everybody knows, when you download.
75
00:04:07.280 --> 00:04:10.439
Apps or sign up for cell phone service, you have
76
00:04:10.520 --> 00:04:13.800
to click yes to all sorts of signing away your
77
00:04:13.879 --> 00:04:16.199
rights and your privacies, and one of those is about
78
00:04:16.240 --> 00:04:20.399
location data. To what extent can they keep your location data,
79
00:04:20.480 --> 00:04:21.720
what can they use it for, what.
80
00:04:21.639 --> 00:04:22.920
Can they not use it for?
81
00:04:23.319 --> 00:04:27.839
So various telecom companies use this company called Securists as
82
00:04:27.839 --> 00:04:33.480
a third party location data collector, and Securists had terms
83
00:04:33.519 --> 00:04:35.959
of service, they had things, They had reasons when they
84
00:04:36.040 --> 00:04:39.279
could validly give your location data over and reasons when
85
00:04:39.279 --> 00:04:41.519
they could not. And they said they would only give
86
00:04:41.560 --> 00:04:44.480
your location data over to law enforcement if they showed
87
00:04:44.519 --> 00:04:48.000
up with a warrant, if they had certain minimum standards.
88
00:04:48.279 --> 00:04:51.000
But at New York Times Expose around twenty eighteen twenty
89
00:04:51.120 --> 00:04:54.199
nineteen said, in fact, there is an example where a
90
00:04:54.199 --> 00:04:59.120
Securists did not protect privacy protect location data as they
91
00:04:59.120 --> 00:05:01.279
should have. They actually turned it over to a sheriff
92
00:05:01.360 --> 00:05:04.399
who did not have a warrant, violating the terms of service.
93
00:05:04.720 --> 00:05:07.720
So once that came out, the FCC said, these telecom
94
00:05:07.759 --> 00:05:11.560
carriers were on notice that their customer's location data was
95
00:05:11.600 --> 00:05:15.600
not being protected adequately. The FCC alleged that the telecom
96
00:05:15.639 --> 00:05:19.240
carriers did not act quickly enough, and so they brought
97
00:05:19.240 --> 00:05:20.160
an action against them.
98
00:05:20.199 --> 00:05:21.639
They said, you violated the law.
99
00:05:21.680 --> 00:05:23.720
We're going to come after you and try to find
100
00:05:23.759 --> 00:05:25.959
you liable under section two two two.
101
00:05:26.319 --> 00:05:27.519
So they did against.
102
00:05:27.199 --> 00:05:29.759
Several telecom carriers, all the big ones AT and T
103
00:05:29.879 --> 00:05:33.079
and Verizon or the two at issue here. Hit they
104
00:05:33.120 --> 00:05:36.279
had an adjudication in house in the agency, and this
105
00:05:36.360 --> 00:05:38.360
is before the jarcacy decision.
106
00:05:38.399 --> 00:05:40.120
And they said, we have found you liable.
107
00:05:40.160 --> 00:05:43.680
And it's worth reading the text of what they sent
108
00:05:43.920 --> 00:05:46.839
them because it looks pretty scary when you get one
109
00:05:46.879 --> 00:05:49.160
of these. It doesn't look like the type of thing
110
00:05:49.319 --> 00:05:53.720
where you have many options. So after an in house adjudication,
111
00:05:53.839 --> 00:05:56.680
again without a jury, AT and T, for example, got
112
00:05:56.680 --> 00:05:59.360
a piece of paper that said, quote in all caps
113
00:05:59.399 --> 00:06:03.079
in bold it is ordered and then back to lowercase.
114
00:06:03.279 --> 00:06:07.680
That pursuanto blah blah blah us code AT and T
115
00:06:07.759 --> 00:06:10.639
inc back to all caps in all bold is liable
116
00:06:10.720 --> 00:06:13.920
for a monetary forfeiture back to lowercase in the amount
117
00:06:13.920 --> 00:06:16.959
of about fifty seven million dollars for willfully and repeatedly
118
00:06:17.040 --> 00:06:19.000
violating Section two two two of the Act.
119
00:06:19.399 --> 00:06:22.439
So doesn't sound like there's a lot of wiggle room
120
00:06:22.439 --> 00:06:23.120
there now.
121
00:06:23.199 --> 00:06:26.519
Once that happens, Once you get an order like that
122
00:06:26.759 --> 00:06:30.560
from the agency, from the FCC, you basically have two options.
123
00:06:30.800 --> 00:06:34.839
You can appeal directly to an appellate court. You don't
124
00:06:34.839 --> 00:06:38.040
get a jury in that circumstance. And the understanding at
125
00:06:38.040 --> 00:06:40.279
the time was you even have to pay to have
126
00:06:40.360 --> 00:06:42.720
the right to appeal. There's some dispute now whether that
127
00:06:42.759 --> 00:06:45.040
was true or not, but that was their understanding. So
128
00:06:45.120 --> 00:06:47.839
you can either appeal to an appellate court immediately never
129
00:06:47.879 --> 00:06:50.240
get your jury right, or you can just wait and
130
00:06:50.279 --> 00:06:53.759
do nothing. And if you do that, then in theory,
131
00:06:54.360 --> 00:06:57.240
the Department of Justice is authorized to come collect. They
132
00:06:57.240 --> 00:06:59.720
can file a suit against you in a federal district
133
00:06:59.720 --> 00:07:03.079
court with venue pretty much everywhere anywhere you do business,
134
00:07:03.319 --> 00:07:06.000
and any point between when you get this letter and
135
00:07:06.120 --> 00:07:08.839
five years in the future. That's the statute of limitations.
136
00:07:09.199 --> 00:07:11.560
And then if they bring that, then you get your
137
00:07:11.560 --> 00:07:17.199
denovo trial. So in practice, it seemed that no telecom
138
00:07:17.199 --> 00:07:20.879
company had ever waited to done that second option.
139
00:07:21.000 --> 00:07:22.399
They always appealed right away.
140
00:07:22.720 --> 00:07:25.000
That's what both of these companies at issue here did,
141
00:07:25.040 --> 00:07:27.279
AT and T and Verizon at and T to the
142
00:07:27.279 --> 00:07:32.040
Fifth Circuit verison to the Second Circuit in both of them. Originally,
143
00:07:32.319 --> 00:07:36.319
the FCC resists the argument that the Seventh Amendment applies
144
00:07:36.360 --> 00:07:39.639
at all, but eventually they acquiesce. By the time it
145
00:07:39.680 --> 00:07:42.240
gets up to the Supreme Court, they've acquiesced on the
146
00:07:42.279 --> 00:07:45.079
Seventh Amendment as a basic point that it does apply,
147
00:07:45.199 --> 00:07:49.120
that this is a common law penalty action. So the
148
00:07:49.160 --> 00:07:52.759
issue now, the Fifth Circuit rules against the FCC, holds
149
00:07:52.759 --> 00:07:55.480
that you violated the Seventh Amendment, but the Second Circuit
150
00:07:55.759 --> 00:07:57.600
accepts the backup argument.
151
00:07:57.279 --> 00:07:58.040
Of the FCC.
152
00:07:58.319 --> 00:08:00.759
They say, yes, you need a jury trial at some point,
153
00:08:01.040 --> 00:08:03.680
but it's sufficient that you can, in theory do that
154
00:08:03.800 --> 00:08:08.319
second option. If you wait and let DOJ sue you,
155
00:08:07.879 --> 00:08:12.279
then you get your jury trial and that's sufficient. So
156
00:08:12.399 --> 00:08:14.639
that's the issue as it goes up to the Supreme Court.
157
00:08:14.800 --> 00:08:18.639
Is this weight let DOJ potentially sue you within five years?
158
00:08:19.000 --> 00:08:21.279
Is that sufficient to get view the jury trial that
159
00:08:21.319 --> 00:08:23.800
you need under the seventh Amendment. It goes up to
160
00:08:23.839 --> 00:08:26.920
the Supreme Court. There's oral argument which I attended. It
161
00:08:27.000 --> 00:08:30.720
seems to go actually fairly well for the government. But
162
00:08:30.800 --> 00:08:33.000
a lot of it is simply getting deep into the
163
00:08:33.000 --> 00:08:35.600
weeds of well, what is the actual force if anything
164
00:08:35.639 --> 00:08:37.759
of this order that you get it sure looks scary.
165
00:08:38.000 --> 00:08:40.840
Does it give you a stigma, does it potentially carry
166
00:08:42.360 --> 00:08:45.919
do the facts found? Could it potentially have interest occurring
167
00:08:46.000 --> 00:08:49.919
against you? Could it be used in future penalties as
168
00:08:49.960 --> 00:08:51.080
sort of proof that you're.
169
00:08:50.919 --> 00:08:51.919
A repeat offender.
170
00:08:52.320 --> 00:08:54.320
Those were the types of things that issue and at
171
00:08:54.399 --> 00:08:57.600
and t's lawyer basically repeatedly said, Look, the only way
172
00:08:57.639 --> 00:09:00.559
that this could possibly be permissible without a jury is
173
00:09:00.600 --> 00:09:03.000
if it's not even a paper tiger, but literally just
174
00:09:03.039 --> 00:09:05.559
a piece of paper. So that's at the stage for
175
00:09:05.720 --> 00:09:07.960
the opinion which we got last week, and I'll hand it.
176
00:09:07.879 --> 00:09:10.639
Over to Josh.
177
00:09:10.759 --> 00:09:13.720
Thanks Tommy, and thanks to the Federal Society for inviting
178
00:09:13.720 --> 00:09:14.519
me to participate.
179
00:09:15.240 --> 00:09:15.480
Yeah.
180
00:09:15.519 --> 00:09:19.399
So the Supreme Court in its opinion last week ended
181
00:09:19.480 --> 00:09:23.919
up siding with the Second Circuit, and it basically said
182
00:09:23.960 --> 00:09:28.919
that this forfeiture order from the FCC under the statute
183
00:09:28.960 --> 00:09:31.679
was just a piece of paper, and it analogized it
184
00:09:31.720 --> 00:09:35.480
to other kinds of case initiating documents like an indictment
185
00:09:35.519 --> 00:09:38.080
or a right to sue letter, because according to the Court,
186
00:09:38.360 --> 00:09:41.480
under the statute, the order did not definitively resolve the
187
00:09:41.519 --> 00:09:47.360
party's legal obligations and the commission's factual findings were not conclusive. So,
188
00:09:47.480 --> 00:09:49.480
just to hit some of the high points from the
189
00:09:49.559 --> 00:09:53.480
Court's opinion, the Court reiterated that the jury trial rights
190
00:09:53.480 --> 00:09:57.200
are broadly available in any case settling legal rights, regardless
191
00:09:57.240 --> 00:10:00.279
of the form, but that the Seventh Amendment does not
192
00:10:00.960 --> 00:10:03.480
guarantee a jury trial at the beginning of any of
193
00:10:03.559 --> 00:10:07.120
these processes, just at some point during the process, before
194
00:10:07.200 --> 00:10:10.080
the final determinations are made, the jury has to make
195
00:10:10.120 --> 00:10:14.039
the ultimate determination of issues of fact, and it cited
196
00:10:14.039 --> 00:10:18.840
to older precedents, one from an agency fact determination that
197
00:10:18.879 --> 00:10:21.360
a court reviewed Denovo and another from a district court
198
00:10:21.399 --> 00:10:24.519
appointing an auditor that it had signed off on that
199
00:10:24.919 --> 00:10:27.720
had Denovo jury trial review as a basis for this
200
00:10:28.639 --> 00:10:32.679
and here with respect to the FCC order, the court
201
00:10:33.039 --> 00:10:36.080
said that three features of it meant that it wasn't
202
00:10:36.159 --> 00:10:40.159
legally binding before this after the fact Denovo jury trial
203
00:10:40.200 --> 00:10:44.440
that the DOJ can initiate. The FCC couldn't execute on
204
00:10:44.480 --> 00:10:47.320
the forfeiture order to collect the fines, there was no
205
00:10:47.399 --> 00:10:50.440
penalty for non payment of the fines, and the FCC
206
00:10:50.480 --> 00:10:55.240
couldn't hold against the carriers the fact that the forfeiture
207
00:10:55.320 --> 00:10:58.720
order had been issued unless the carriers paid or this
208
00:10:58.960 --> 00:11:03.120
later court enforced court process enforced the order. And on
209
00:11:03.159 --> 00:11:06.559
the fact finding question, since the statute, the court said
210
00:11:06.960 --> 00:11:09.200
offered a trial de novo and I was understood to
211
00:11:09.279 --> 00:11:13.159
let the court determine anew both issues of law and fact.
212
00:11:13.840 --> 00:11:18.320
The carriers would get a fresh jury trial on everything
213
00:11:18.360 --> 00:11:22.600
including the facts having to do with the case. The
214
00:11:22.639 --> 00:11:25.919
court then went through the petitioner's arguments and rejected them.
215
00:11:25.960 --> 00:11:30.799
As Tommy said, there's some daunting, scary language in the
216
00:11:31.159 --> 00:11:32.960
order in the statute indicating.
217
00:11:32.559 --> 00:11:35.039
That this might be legally binding. But the Court.
218
00:11:34.879 --> 00:11:37.759
Swept this acide and said that it couldn't be considered
219
00:11:37.840 --> 00:11:41.440
legally binding because there was no enforcement mechanism regardless of
220
00:11:41.440 --> 00:11:44.399
what these orders said. And for that reason, the Court
221
00:11:44.440 --> 00:11:48.759
also said that this FCC order was not comparable to
222
00:11:49.000 --> 00:11:52.799
Jarcassy and the SEC scheme because the SEC's penalties in
223
00:11:52.879 --> 00:11:56.440
Jarcacy that the Court said violated the Seventh Amendment were
224
00:11:56.720 --> 00:12:00.480
immediately enforceable through proceedings like furnishment.
225
00:12:01.879 --> 00:12:03.679
And then, as I said at the top, the.
226
00:12:03.639 --> 00:12:07.559
Court analogized these letters to these orders to write to
227
00:12:07.559 --> 00:12:10.480
sue letter and said that that was not not something
228
00:12:10.519 --> 00:12:13.200
that had any legal effect because it didn't come to
229
00:12:13.240 --> 00:12:17.120
a final determination of the carrier's legal obligations. And A
230
00:12:17.200 --> 00:12:20.759
pushed to one side the carrier's arguments that they were
231
00:12:20.799 --> 00:12:24.480
suffering practical harms from having been found to have violated
232
00:12:24.679 --> 00:12:26.480
the statutes and the regulations here.
233
00:12:26.799 --> 00:12:28.360
Because of such practical.
234
00:12:28.000 --> 00:12:31.000
Harms, the Court says come at any preliminary stage of
235
00:12:31.000 --> 00:12:33.799
a proceedings, such as if you were criminally indicted and
236
00:12:33.960 --> 00:12:37.919
got bad press because of that, The carriers also had
237
00:12:38.039 --> 00:12:43.879
a backup argument that this structure violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
238
00:12:43.919 --> 00:12:46.919
So this is a doctrine the Court has recognized in
239
00:12:46.960 --> 00:12:52.440
a variety of contexts that the constitutional rights, the extras
240
00:12:52.440 --> 00:12:56.759
of constitutional rights, or privileges or benefits can't be conditioned
241
00:12:56.799 --> 00:13:01.039
on someone having to waive one of their their constitutional
242
00:13:01.120 --> 00:13:05.440
rights in the process. Here, the carriers argued that the
243
00:13:05.519 --> 00:13:08.440
costs of having to wait for doj to maybe in
244
00:13:08.519 --> 00:13:11.919
five years bring a collection action for them to get
245
00:13:11.960 --> 00:13:16.120
a jury trial basically coerced them into pursuing the Court
246
00:13:16.120 --> 00:13:19.480
of Appeals review process in which a jury trial wasn't available.
247
00:13:20.120 --> 00:13:22.919
But the Court rejected this argument because, as it had
248
00:13:22.919 --> 00:13:25.879
found in the previous section, the Seventh Amendment right did
249
00:13:25.879 --> 00:13:30.159
not even attach to these orders because they, according to
250
00:13:30.200 --> 00:13:35.039
the Court's interpretation, were non binding. They couldn't be used
251
00:13:35.080 --> 00:13:38.159
against the carrier. The fact determinations had no preclusive effect
252
00:13:38.320 --> 00:13:42.960
after the fact, and the Court again rejected this reputational
253
00:13:42.960 --> 00:13:46.279
harm argument, but the carriers put forward this time it
254
00:13:46.360 --> 00:13:51.120
compared the reputational. This time, it compared the risks and
255
00:13:51.159 --> 00:13:56.720
the coercive effects to its prior cases signing off on
256
00:13:57.440 --> 00:14:00.120
situations in which the exercise of the sixth Amendment or
257
00:14:00.200 --> 00:14:02.919
trial right in the criminal context could result in higher
258
00:14:03.000 --> 00:14:06.840
penalties vic plea bargaining on the court side. If that
259
00:14:07.039 --> 00:14:09.519
was okay, which it had said in the past, then
260
00:14:09.679 --> 00:14:12.519
whatever coersive effect might exist here was certainly not enough.
261
00:14:13.080 --> 00:14:15.519
So I'll toss it back to Tommy to talk through
262
00:14:15.679 --> 00:14:16.720
Justice Thomas's descent.
263
00:14:17.440 --> 00:14:19.840
All right, Well, I'll be brief, because it's a brief descent.
264
00:14:19.919 --> 00:14:23.679
Even Justice Thomas does not disagree with the majority's view
265
00:14:23.799 --> 00:14:26.679
or the majority's new reading of this statute that there's
266
00:14:26.679 --> 00:14:31.120
no preclusive effect, there's no stigma, there's no teeth whatsoever
267
00:14:31.279 --> 00:14:34.399
to these orders from the FCC. Just as Thomas's point
268
00:14:34.440 --> 00:14:36.600
is really just one of fairness, he makes the case
269
00:14:36.840 --> 00:14:39.600
that that was not at all clear before this decision.
270
00:14:39.720 --> 00:14:43.240
So he said that rewinding the clock back to when
271
00:14:43.279 --> 00:14:46.120
they got these letters, when AT and T and Verizon, etc.
272
00:14:46.399 --> 00:14:49.559
Got these letters, this is before jarcacy. This is when
273
00:14:49.600 --> 00:14:53.080
the FCC had not yet conceded that the Seventh Amendment applied,
274
00:14:53.440 --> 00:14:56.159
and this is when, in Justice Thomas's view, the statute
275
00:14:56.200 --> 00:14:59.000
was far from clear that you in fact would get
276
00:14:59.000 --> 00:15:02.240
denovo factual review if you waited the five years. So
277
00:15:02.360 --> 00:15:04.360
Justice Thomas says, the only fair thing to do is
278
00:15:04.399 --> 00:15:07.679
rewind the clock and give the carriers the choice all
279
00:15:07.720 --> 00:15:10.240
over again. Let them give them their money back, and
280
00:15:10.320 --> 00:15:12.440
let them decide if they want to to take this
281
00:15:12.519 --> 00:15:15.000
alternate route, because that's not a choice they have now
282
00:15:15.039 --> 00:15:18.480
given the Court's decision. The Court's view is essentially, you
283
00:15:18.519 --> 00:15:21.039
could have gotten your jury, but you chose not to,
284
00:15:21.480 --> 00:15:23.559
and we're not going to let you go back and
285
00:15:23.759 --> 00:15:27.279
make that decision over again. So I think Justice Thomas
286
00:15:27.120 --> 00:15:29.919
has a fair point in my view, which is that
287
00:15:30.080 --> 00:15:34.679
maybe now in the future companies will view this as
288
00:15:34.720 --> 00:15:36.759
a paper tiger, and that's all well and good that
289
00:15:36.799 --> 00:15:39.320
they've taken all the teeth out of this and made
290
00:15:39.360 --> 00:15:42.120
clear for the future that there's no stigma. That doesn't
291
00:15:42.120 --> 00:15:45.399
really resolve the companies the harm suffered by the companies
292
00:15:45.399 --> 00:15:48.679
in the past who would have felt very nervous about
293
00:15:48.720 --> 00:15:53.559
making that choice. So, Josh, what do you make of
294
00:15:53.600 --> 00:15:54.200
this decision?
295
00:15:55.919 --> 00:16:00.200
Yeah, I think you know, as a basically unanimate on
296
00:16:00.240 --> 00:16:03.600
the law and outstanding Justice Thomas's practical point. And you know,
297
00:16:03.639 --> 00:16:07.240
I think if you accept the Justice's view of this
298
00:16:07.480 --> 00:16:12.279
as some kind of non binding case initiating letter, it's
299
00:16:12.519 --> 00:16:16.159
it's probably right that I think that makes sense for
300
00:16:16.240 --> 00:16:20.159
how the Seventh Amendment operates. I think in a practical sense, uh,
301
00:16:20.240 --> 00:16:23.120
it's going to be a tough decision on you know,
302
00:16:23.200 --> 00:16:26.600
any on Americans and companies to implement, because, as Tommy
303
00:16:26.600 --> 00:16:30.399
pointed out, you get these notices that have all this
304
00:16:30.600 --> 00:16:35.000
language that that seems legally binding, and this decision, you know,
305
00:16:35.519 --> 00:16:39.879
sort of invites companies and Americans to flout these orders
306
00:16:39.960 --> 00:16:42.960
and you know, wait for for d J to come
307
00:16:43.000 --> 00:16:45.039
after them, and that that's you know, even that that
308
00:16:45.120 --> 00:16:46.399
that's right under.
309
00:16:46.240 --> 00:16:47.000
The Seventh Amendment.
310
00:16:47.039 --> 00:16:50.360
That's a bit of an awkward set of incentives. But
311
00:16:50.440 --> 00:16:55.360
I think there are two silver linings to this, just briefly. One,
312
00:16:56.080 --> 00:17:00.039
the Court you know, does does say very firmly that
313
00:17:00.120 --> 00:17:03.279
there has to be some kind of de novo factual
314
00:17:03.320 --> 00:17:05.759
review at some point in the process under the Seventh
315
00:17:05.799 --> 00:17:09.279
Amendment in jocracy, And I think we'll see in the
316
00:17:09.319 --> 00:17:12.279
future this Seventh Amendment analysis is going to be tied
317
00:17:12.319 --> 00:17:16.440
really closely to whether or not. There is Article three
318
00:17:16.519 --> 00:17:19.319
jurisdiction over cases, and the Court seems inclined to clamp
319
00:17:19.359 --> 00:17:19.839
down on that.
320
00:17:20.279 --> 00:17:21.640
And this suggests to me that.
321
00:17:22.000 --> 00:17:26.319
The substantial substantial review standard for evidentiary.
322
00:17:25.759 --> 00:17:27.920
Review in the appellate review model might.
323
00:17:27.759 --> 00:17:31.039
Be under threat in cases going forward that are equitable
324
00:17:31.160 --> 00:17:33.599
rather than common law, and the Court might think that
325
00:17:33.960 --> 00:17:37.240
judges have to make those fact decisions anew in those
326
00:17:37.279 --> 00:17:41.319
cases as well. And the Court also implicitly applies the
327
00:17:41.400 --> 00:17:46.000
Unconstitutional Conditions doctrine to the Seventh Amendment here. It didn't
328
00:17:46.000 --> 00:17:49.640
outright say that the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine didn't apply, It
329
00:17:49.680 --> 00:17:52.480
actually analyzed it. And so I think that's going to
330
00:17:52.480 --> 00:17:56.480
be It's going to be important in challenges to the
331
00:17:56.480 --> 00:18:01.720
constitutionality of FINRA and the cases like I'm litigating against
332
00:18:01.759 --> 00:18:05.000
the Horse Racing Integrity and Safety Authority, where you have
333
00:18:05.079 --> 00:18:08.839
private entities that have some sort of nominal registration requirement
334
00:18:09.279 --> 00:18:12.480
that the government argues as a waiver of your Seventh
335
00:18:12.519 --> 00:18:18.440
Amendment rights. But the unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine can, even more
336
00:18:18.440 --> 00:18:21.200
clearly than it did before, come in and combat that
337
00:18:21.240 --> 00:18:21.880
weave argument.
338
00:18:23.279 --> 00:18:23.480
Yeah.
339
00:18:23.559 --> 00:18:25.480
No, I think that's a great point to flag and
340
00:18:25.559 --> 00:18:28.440
something that might not be apparent from the face of
341
00:18:28.440 --> 00:18:31.759
the opinion at first. To me, my frustration with this
342
00:18:31.880 --> 00:18:34.599
is the same as my frustration more broadly with so
343
00:18:34.680 --> 00:18:38.680
called constitutional avoidance decisions, which I think this fits very
344
00:18:38.680 --> 00:18:42.240
comfortably in and in fact, Justice Katanji Brown Jackson had
345
00:18:42.319 --> 00:18:44.599
I thought a very good dissent in one from a
346
00:18:44.640 --> 00:18:47.559
couple of years ago about the statute making it a
347
00:18:47.559 --> 00:18:51.440
crime to encourage violations of immigration law, which the Supreme
348
00:18:51.480 --> 00:18:55.200
Court narrowed essentially to get it within constitutional bounds.
349
00:18:55.480 --> 00:18:56.160
And as just as.
350
00:18:56.160 --> 00:18:58.200
Jackson pointed out, the government kind of gets to have
351
00:18:58.240 --> 00:19:02.440
it both ways. They apply statutes maximally to scare people
352
00:19:02.799 --> 00:19:05.759
right up until the point where it's challenged is unconstitutional,
353
00:19:06.079 --> 00:19:07.880
and then they change their tune when they're on the
354
00:19:07.920 --> 00:19:11.519
back foot, interpret it minimally and get it just narrow
355
00:19:11.599 --> 00:19:15.319
enough to survive and continue. But that doesn't reverse the
356
00:19:15.359 --> 00:19:18.880
fact that they enforced it maximally for however many years,
357
00:19:19.240 --> 00:19:24.400
and course people to in this case unanimously pay as
358
00:19:24.440 --> 00:19:27.640
soon as they got these letters rather than risking non payment.
359
00:19:28.759 --> 00:19:31.000
At and T's brief at one point said that the
360
00:19:31.039 --> 00:19:33.599
government treats these companies as if they're the so called
361
00:19:33.599 --> 00:19:37.079
holmesy and bad man. People might remember the Oliver Wendell
362
00:19:37.079 --> 00:19:40.839
Holmes theory from law school that the law should treat
363
00:19:40.839 --> 00:19:42.759
people as if they were a bad man who just
364
00:19:42.799 --> 00:19:46.359
thinks about what are the actual concrete penalties I received
365
00:19:46.400 --> 00:19:49.839
from breaking the law, not about some abstract stigma. It
366
00:19:49.880 --> 00:19:52.160
even reminds me a little bit of the Obamacare decision
367
00:19:52.200 --> 00:19:55.319
to be honest, where the Supreme Court reread a penalty
368
00:19:55.319 --> 00:19:57.920
as attacks in such a way that there's no stigma
369
00:19:58.480 --> 00:20:01.799
to not getting to not buying health insurance, with the
370
00:20:01.880 --> 00:20:04.759
Justice Roberts even saying he thought it was implausible that
371
00:20:04.799 --> 00:20:07.559
a statute would make outlaws of millions of people, which
372
00:20:07.599 --> 00:20:10.880
was the prediction for how many would not buy insurance. Similarly,
373
00:20:10.920 --> 00:20:13.920
here at and T's brief said, how plausible is it
374
00:20:14.000 --> 00:20:18.119
that you would write a statute that expects companies to
375
00:20:18.119 --> 00:20:21.440
be scoff laws and ignore these letters. Well, now that's
376
00:20:22.000 --> 00:20:24.279
basically the Supreme Court is just reassured, No, we're going
377
00:20:24.359 --> 00:20:25.799
to narrow this and read this in a way that
378
00:20:26.000 --> 00:20:28.160
don't worry, You're not a scoff law. You're just being
379
00:20:28.240 --> 00:20:32.559
the rational actor ignoring this, and there's no stigma whatsoever.
380
00:20:32.680 --> 00:20:34.440
But that doesn't go back and fix it.
381
00:20:34.480 --> 00:20:37.000
Then The last point I'll make is that what you
382
00:20:37.039 --> 00:20:42.359
mentioned the analogy to course of plea bargaining and plea agreements, Well,
383
00:20:42.759 --> 00:20:44.839
I think the Supreme Court takes one step too many
384
00:20:44.880 --> 00:20:47.000
when they say, of course that's fine, so this must
385
00:20:47.079 --> 00:20:50.359
be fine. We and Cato have been criticizing coersive plea
386
00:20:50.400 --> 00:20:52.559
bargaining for quite a while, and I think this is
387
00:20:52.599 --> 00:20:56.319
another example where the bad precedent of assuming course of
388
00:20:56.359 --> 00:21:00.880
plea bargaining is fine leads to other assumptions.
389
00:21:01.079 --> 00:21:02.279
So we hope.
390
00:21:02.079 --> 00:21:05.640
Eventually the Supreme Court will reconsider whether that fundamental premise
391
00:21:05.720 --> 00:21:06.880
is correct in the first place.
392
00:21:10.160 --> 00:21:12.359
Well, guys, I want to just hop in for a
393
00:21:12.400 --> 00:21:15.640
second and just remind our audience if you have any questions,
394
00:21:15.680 --> 00:21:18.599
please type them into Zoom's Q and A feature at
395
00:21:18.640 --> 00:21:22.000
the bottom of your screen. I think we're ready to
396
00:21:22.000 --> 00:21:23.680
move to Q and A, so I'll just start with
397
00:21:23.680 --> 00:21:27.000
the first question. Are there any other agencies that have
398
00:21:27.079 --> 00:21:31.039
a similar system to this where they send a letter
399
00:21:31.200 --> 00:21:35.000
saying you owe and you don't have to pay until
400
00:21:35.000 --> 00:21:36.039
the DJ sues you.
401
00:21:37.559 --> 00:21:39.039
Yeah, there are, and I think that's one of the
402
00:21:39.079 --> 00:21:42.599
most practically useful things for people to know and be
403
00:21:42.640 --> 00:21:46.559
aware of coming out of this opinion. So the telecom
404
00:21:46.559 --> 00:21:49.160
companies had said, well, wait, if this argument is right,
405
00:21:49.440 --> 00:21:52.839
you know, why was jargacy right? But as Josh mentioned, jrcacy,
406
00:21:52.920 --> 00:21:56.119
the SEC scheme that was different, that was not like
407
00:21:56.160 --> 00:21:59.559
this because you could apparently the government could start garnishing
408
00:21:59.599 --> 00:22:03.480
money through taxes or other means without any further without
409
00:22:03.480 --> 00:22:06.559
this kind of lawsuit. But if people are interested, it's
410
00:22:06.599 --> 00:22:09.880
on page thirty three of the government's brief in this
411
00:22:10.039 --> 00:22:14.559
case they list out the other procedures that are at
412
00:22:14.640 --> 00:22:17.359
least in the government's view like this one here, So
413
00:22:17.599 --> 00:22:20.720
unlike the SEC one in jarcacy, they say, there are
414
00:22:20.799 --> 00:22:25.400
five agencies with eleven other enforcement statutes that like this one,
415
00:22:26.000 --> 00:22:28.319
you're found liable, but then you don't actually have to
416
00:22:28.359 --> 00:22:32.119
pay until the government sues you. So the five agencies
417
00:22:32.160 --> 00:22:35.440
are there, some from Department of Energy, Department of AHHS,
418
00:22:35.799 --> 00:22:39.319
Custom Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and FURK the Federal
419
00:22:39.400 --> 00:22:40.880
Energy Regulatory Commission.
420
00:22:41.160 --> 00:22:43.119
So kind of a random grab bag.
421
00:22:43.240 --> 00:22:45.240
But if people are entrusted, they can look at page
422
00:22:45.279 --> 00:22:48.319
thirty three of the government's brief. Presumably the reasoning of
423
00:22:48.359 --> 00:22:51.680
this opinion here means that all eleven of those statutes
424
00:22:51.720 --> 00:22:54.599
that the government lists are also okay, so people should
425
00:22:54.599 --> 00:22:57.480
be aware. I think that the logic of this extends
426
00:22:57.519 --> 00:22:59.480
now to those as well. If you get this kind
427
00:22:59.519 --> 00:23:01.720
of scary life letter, but you don't have to pay
428
00:23:01.799 --> 00:23:04.599
until an enforcement suit has brought you now know there's
429
00:23:04.640 --> 00:23:06.960
no stigma to not paying and waiting to get your
430
00:23:07.000 --> 00:23:07.599
jury trial.
431
00:23:09.680 --> 00:23:13.279
Thank you. Here's another question. Will the Seventh Amendment argument
432
00:23:13.359 --> 00:23:19.039
apply to the states.
433
00:23:18.519 --> 00:23:24.480
It will take a different case to do that.
434
00:23:24.480 --> 00:23:28.200
That gets into the question of incorporation doctrine and whether
435
00:23:28.279 --> 00:23:31.519
or not the Fourteenth Amendment, when it was enacted after
436
00:23:31.559 --> 00:23:34.279
the Civil War, actually extended the Bill of Rights to
437
00:23:34.319 --> 00:23:36.880
the States. So that's happened for a lot of different rights.
438
00:23:36.880 --> 00:23:38.759
So the most recent right that was incorporated was the.
439
00:23:38.680 --> 00:23:41.599
Second Amendment right. But the Seventh Amendment is.
440
00:23:41.599 --> 00:23:44.599
Actually not one that has been incorporated against the states yet. Well,
441
00:23:44.680 --> 00:23:47.480
many states have jury trial rights, the Seventh Amendment itself
442
00:23:47.519 --> 00:23:51.759
doesn't apply. So there's a lot of ongoing litigation about that,
443
00:23:52.000 --> 00:23:54.519
including my colleagues at PLF.
444
00:23:54.599 --> 00:23:55.759
So we'll have to see.
445
00:24:00.319 --> 00:24:02.680
Josh, can you just speak to some of the broader
446
00:24:03.039 --> 00:24:05.000
policy implications of this ruling.
447
00:24:07.079 --> 00:24:08.559
Yeah, I think going forward.
448
00:24:09.599 --> 00:24:15.400
It cheering off what Tommy said about the constitutional avoidance arguments.
449
00:24:15.519 --> 00:24:16.039
I think.
450
00:24:17.920 --> 00:24:23.039
For cases going before the Court on these structural constitutional questions,
451
00:24:23.079 --> 00:24:27.440
I think this sort of reinforces that the Court is
452
00:24:27.519 --> 00:24:33.200
going to really make an effort to interpret the statute
453
00:24:33.240 --> 00:24:37.440
in a way that avoids a constitutional problem. You know,
454
00:24:37.519 --> 00:24:42.599
this kind of aligns with the FCC versus Consumers Research opinion.
455
00:24:42.240 --> 00:24:44.519
We saw last year where the.
456
00:24:46.200 --> 00:24:49.759
Court decided that they're the Universal Service Fund. Also at
457
00:24:49.759 --> 00:24:53.920
the FCC did not violate the non delegation doctrine, but
458
00:24:54.119 --> 00:24:57.920
in doing so, it tightened up some of its precedents.
459
00:24:57.440 --> 00:25:01.160
About what the how non delegation.
460
00:25:00.759 --> 00:25:03.240
Doctrine works and what a statute must do, and then
461
00:25:03.400 --> 00:25:08.559
gave teeth to the way the Universal Service Fund Statute
462
00:25:08.640 --> 00:25:12.400
was written in a way again like here that might
463
00:25:12.480 --> 00:25:15.359
not have been immediately obvious to everyone who was actually
464
00:25:15.359 --> 00:25:18.039
operating under the statute before the Supreme Court went about
465
00:25:18.079 --> 00:25:18.519
it this way.
466
00:25:19.319 --> 00:25:22.400
So I think I think this indicates.
467
00:25:21.880 --> 00:25:24.839
That you're granting this case and next term they're going
468
00:25:24.880 --> 00:25:29.440
to consider a case called Sundalley Orchards about agency adjudication
469
00:25:29.519 --> 00:25:31.680
as well, that the Court's interested in these issues and
470
00:25:31.759 --> 00:25:34.960
these I think these structures are definitely going to be
471
00:25:35.000 --> 00:25:39.440
closely scrutinized by the court, but the court is going
472
00:25:39.519 --> 00:25:43.200
to do everything it can to interpret the statute in
473
00:25:43.240 --> 00:25:45.079
a way that is as narrow.
474
00:25:44.880 --> 00:25:47.440
As possible to avoid reaching a constitutional question.
475
00:25:49.119 --> 00:25:51.480
Yeah, I totally agree with that. I do think there's
476
00:25:51.519 --> 00:25:53.119
a potential also going forward.
477
00:25:53.519 --> 00:25:58.160
The companies didn't raise other questions about, now that we know, okay,
478
00:25:58.200 --> 00:26:00.640
you get de novo in this trial, is there any
479
00:26:00.640 --> 00:26:03.160
other option besides weighing the full five years? Could there
480
00:26:03.160 --> 00:26:06.519
be an option to bring into claratory judgment suit, Could
481
00:26:06.519 --> 00:26:08.559
you bring some kind of due process claim that five
482
00:26:08.640 --> 00:26:10.000
years is just too long to wait?
483
00:26:10.039 --> 00:26:10.559
In limbo?
484
00:26:10.720 --> 00:26:13.240
I mean, the analogy is to like an indictment, but
485
00:26:13.319 --> 00:26:17.519
you know, in the criminal context, it would be violation
486
00:26:17.599 --> 00:26:19.839
of due process and speedy trial to be indicted and
487
00:26:19.839 --> 00:26:23.640
then say we'll maybe enforce it within the next five years,
488
00:26:23.680 --> 00:26:24.480
but who knows when.
489
00:26:24.960 --> 00:26:26.599
So not totally certain.
490
00:26:26.920 --> 00:26:28.920
But I still think people should treat those as open
491
00:26:29.000 --> 00:26:31.720
questions because they just weren't weren't raised in this case.
492
00:26:31.759 --> 00:26:34.200
This is just the more basic question of is this
493
00:26:34.279 --> 00:26:36.640
type of structure where the ball goes into the government's
494
00:26:36.640 --> 00:26:43.839
court basically constitutional as long as it really is denevo.
495
00:26:43.880 --> 00:26:44.559
How about this.
496
00:26:44.720 --> 00:26:48.119
Are there cases attempting to use state law to apply
497
00:26:49.079 --> 00:26:52.359
the right to a jury trial to professional licensure cases?
498
00:26:54.160 --> 00:26:57.880
Hm, there actually is.
499
00:26:58.200 --> 00:27:00.440
I know one of my colleagues here at PEEL has
500
00:27:01.480 --> 00:27:05.880
just argued a case before the Nevada Supreme Court called Hagen,
501
00:27:06.960 --> 00:27:13.559
which involves the Nevada Board of Architecture and an architecture
502
00:27:13.680 --> 00:27:17.839
licensing scheme with an out of state architect being pursued
503
00:27:17.920 --> 00:27:22.119
by the Nevada Board of Architecture for unauthorized practice. So
504
00:27:22.160 --> 00:27:25.400
in that case there are Nevada civildery trial claims and
505
00:27:25.440 --> 00:27:28.000
then a Seventh Amendment claim.
506
00:27:27.799 --> 00:27:29.599
As well in the background.
507
00:27:29.640 --> 00:27:32.640
That's one of those potential cases that might raise the
508
00:27:32.680 --> 00:27:34.480
incorporation issue that I talked about before.
509
00:27:37.839 --> 00:27:40.200
One wrinkle also raise by this opinion, just briefly, is
510
00:27:40.200 --> 00:27:42.880
they actually bring up the twenty dollars clause, which I
511
00:27:42.960 --> 00:27:45.880
dot can't remember another Seventh Amendment case that ever raised that,
512
00:27:45.920 --> 00:27:49.039
where the Supreme Court basically says, yes, you raise these
513
00:27:49.279 --> 00:27:52.920
sort of non monetary potential harms of being held in limbo,
514
00:27:53.400 --> 00:27:55.759
but it says twenty dollars right in there. You've got
515
00:27:55.759 --> 00:27:58.519
to be able to put a more concrete dollar amount
516
00:27:58.559 --> 00:28:01.519
to it. I don't know whether this will make it
517
00:28:01.559 --> 00:28:06.160
somewhat harder for people in cases about abstract but still
518
00:28:06.440 --> 00:28:09.079
real harms, whether that's stigma right there and a living
519
00:28:09.079 --> 00:28:11.440
et cetera. It feels like you have to put a
520
00:28:11.440 --> 00:28:14.000
lot of work when you're thinking about these into putting
521
00:28:14.000 --> 00:28:15.920
a dollar amount that's more concrete on this.
522
00:28:17.319 --> 00:28:19.880
Yeah, the one the one thing that might help there
523
00:28:19.960 --> 00:28:23.079
is that a lot of these agency admuication schemes often
524
00:28:23.200 --> 00:28:28.160
pair financial penalties with some kind of suspension or industry.
525
00:28:27.720 --> 00:28:30.960
Bar order, and luckily, under pretty well.
526
00:28:30.880 --> 00:28:34.440
Established Supreme Court precedent and a case called Dairy Queen,
527
00:28:34.960 --> 00:28:39.000
you still get a jury trial on the on the
528
00:28:39.079 --> 00:28:42.640
facts that relate to that monetary penalty, even if there's
529
00:28:42.680 --> 00:28:45.400
something that's equitable as well. So that may not apply
530
00:28:45.759 --> 00:28:48.960
in every situation. As we're discussing here, the carriers were
531
00:28:49.039 --> 00:28:51.319
kind of boiled down to reputational harm by the court's
532
00:28:51.920 --> 00:28:56.160
interpretation practice or interpretation of a statute. But that at
533
00:28:56.240 --> 00:28:59.200
least leaves the door open for people to bring these
534
00:28:59.200 --> 00:29:01.200
claims and variety of places.
535
00:29:03.359 --> 00:29:06.440
Well, guys, this has been such an interesting conversation, and
536
00:29:06.480 --> 00:29:09.039
thank you to our audience for asking such great questions.
537
00:29:09.480 --> 00:29:10.240
I wanted to thank.
538
00:29:10.119 --> 00:29:13.119
Our panelists for sharing their expertise and opinions on this
539
00:29:13.319 --> 00:29:16.920
very important issue. If our audience is interested in learning
540
00:29:16.960 --> 00:29:20.480
more about all the Federal Societies programming, please visit their
541
00:29:20.480 --> 00:29:24.559
website at fedsoc dot org. And with that, we are adjourned.
542
00:29:25.400 --> 00:29:29.200
Thanks for listening to FEDSOC Forums, a Federalist Society podcast.
543
00:29:29.559 --> 00:29:32.119
Be sure to subscribe wherever you get your podcasts so
544
00:29:32.160 --> 00:29:35.119
you won't miss an episode. To learn more, visit our
545
00:29:35.119 --> 00:29:37.000
website fedsoc dot org