Bản chép lời đầy đủ của 153 Million Driver’s Licenses for Sale: Why Identity Verification Is Broken

We're dealing with it security is with a customer 69 00:04:24,200 --> 00:04:30,120 that is asking us why we don't have certain controls they think are reasonable 70 00:04:30,120 --> 00:04:34,640 at the same time that there's a conversation about breaches they've been part of. 71 00:04:35,000 --> 00:04:38,120 Right. That's what in my opinion, that's what happened here. 72 00:04:38,280 --> 00:04:41,320 We had a company that stood up something to solve a problem 73 00:04:41,480 --> 00:04:46,400 and they solved the problem and secure themselves well enough. 74 00:04:46,400 --> 00:04:47,280 Yeah. 75 00:04:47,320 --> 00:04:52,080 This will continue to happen for as long as we don't hold people accountable 76 00:04:52,720 --> 00:04:53,720 for the loss. 77 00:04:53,720 --> 00:04:57,000 And I mean, effectively accountable, not just, oh, man, 78 00:04:57,000 --> 00:05:00,160 everybody got a year of free credit monitoring, because that's where it'll 79 00:05:00,160 --> 00:05:02,720 come out of this. We'll all get another three year. 80 00:05:03,040 --> 00:05:07,120 I think I'm currently a year four thousand that I've been right. 81 00:05:07,200 --> 00:05:09,560 I've lost track. Right. 82 00:05:09,560 --> 00:05:12,120 My my favorite is they don't stack. 83 00:05:12,880 --> 00:05:14,000 Right. Like you don't. 84 00:05:14,000 --> 00:05:16,240 OK, so I've got 2026 covered. 85 00:05:16,240 --> 00:05:18,280 Do I get 2027? No, no, no, no, no. 86 00:05:18,280 --> 00:05:20,600 You just get 2026 covered again. 87 00:05:21,320 --> 00:05:23,080 Yeah, I know. Yeah. 88 00:05:23,080 --> 00:05:27,160 I think it's really interesting and going back into the age verification 89 00:05:27,280 --> 00:05:32,480 debate, there are so many of these companies out there now that are doing 90 00:05:32,840 --> 00:05:37,440 ID verification, age verification, whatever flavor of verification 91 00:05:37,440 --> 00:05:39,000 you want to call it. 92 00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:43,920 And there is no regulation or, you know, 93 00:05:43,920 --> 00:05:47,000 laws around how this this information is stored. 94 00:05:47,000 --> 00:05:51,440 And so to your point, Kevin, about a breach, like this is going to 95 00:05:51,440 --> 00:05:52,680 continue to happen. 96 00:05:52,680 --> 00:05:57,080 And it's kind of scary to think about that any random company 97 00:05:57,080 --> 00:06:00,760 can now just partner with these organizations and it's going to vary 98 00:06:00,760 --> 00:06:04,320 by state and institution and business and all these things. 99 00:06:04,320 --> 00:06:08,240 And this is just another way to expand out the attack 100 00:06:08,280 --> 00:06:14,120 surface of very personal and, you know, these are driver's licenses. 101 00:06:14,120 --> 00:06:20,480 And I it just blows my mind that here we are again talking about this 102 00:06:20,480 --> 00:06:22,040 and it's only getting worse. 103 00:06:22,040 --> 00:06:24,000 Well, like we've talked about in the past, 104 00:06:24,000 --> 00:06:27,000 what was that dude that was running the business out of his apartment 105 00:06:27,000 --> 00:06:29,720 that was just doing data collection and selling it to marketing? 106 00:06:30,320 --> 00:06:32,760 Yep. Well, we've seen through lots of these companies 107 00:06:32,760 --> 00:06:35,880 and I don't know about this one, but they are data brokers 108 00:06:35,920 --> 00:06:38,760 in and of themselves, whether they're doing it for marketing 109 00:06:38,760 --> 00:06:42,360 or whether they're doing it for verification, they are a data broker. 110 00:06:42,640 --> 00:06:48,240 And as long as we allow anybody, private organization, individuals, 111 00:06:48,240 --> 00:06:53,120 government agencies, what have you to collect data unfettered. 112 00:06:53,400 --> 00:06:59,080 And then when there's a breach, we just go, oh, man, that sucks. 113 00:06:59,080 --> 00:07:02,360 I go deal with that because I tell you right now, 114 00:07:03,120 --> 00:07:06,480 I can't go to Florida and say my driver's license 115 00:07:06,480 --> 00:07:09,040 has been compromised, give me a new number. 116 00:07:09,040 --> 00:07:10,560 That is not an auction. 117 00:07:10,560 --> 00:07:11,800 Nope. Right. 118 00:07:11,800 --> 00:07:15,760 As far as I know, I don't know any state that allows you to say 119 00:07:15,760 --> 00:07:18,040 my driver's license was compromised, give me a new number. 120 00:07:19,200 --> 00:07:20,320 Unless you lost it. 121 00:07:20,320 --> 00:07:25,120 But if you let it expire, you have the same driver's license. 122 00:07:25,120 --> 00:07:27,320 You get the same number, though. Yeah, you're right. 123 00:07:27,320 --> 00:07:29,960 Yes. So my address is the same. 124 00:07:29,960 --> 00:07:31,200 My date of birth is the same. 125 00:07:31,200 --> 00:07:33,200 The day it was issued is the same. 126 00:07:33,200 --> 00:07:34,880 You know, originally issued. 127 00:07:34,880 --> 00:07:38,040 Every piece of personal identifiable information on a driver's license 128 00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:41,640 stays the same no matter what. 129 00:07:41,640 --> 00:07:43,440 So there is no validation. 130 00:07:43,440 --> 00:07:46,440 So at what point do we then say, OK, 131 00:07:46,680 --> 00:07:49,200 driver's license are no longer good for ID 132 00:07:49,200 --> 00:07:51,360 because they've been compromised so many times. 133 00:07:51,360 --> 00:07:52,920 What's next? 134 00:07:52,920 --> 00:07:55,120 Fingerprints. Well, digital ID, 135 00:07:55,120 --> 00:07:57,600 which has already been rolling out. 136 00:07:57,720 --> 00:07:59,680 Some states actually have this now 137 00:07:59,680 --> 00:08:02,200 where you can have your digital ID on your phone 138 00:08:02,200 --> 00:08:05,520 and you can go through security at the airport with it. 139 00:08:05,520 --> 00:08:07,840 And I'm seeing this more now. 140 00:08:08,240 --> 00:08:10,280 But then just like everything else, 141 00:08:10,280 --> 00:08:11,840 what happens when you lose your phone, 142

00:08:11,840 --> 00:08:14,000 which people lose their phones all the time. 143 00:08:14,000 --> 00:08:18,560 So it's, you know, wallet or phone, physical piece of paper 144 00:08:18,560 --> 00:08:21,480 or ID card versus a digital version. 145 00:08:21,800 --> 00:08:23,880 I think to your point, Kevin, it's going to stay the same. 146 00:08:23,880 --> 00:08:25,880 If I lose my phone, they're just going to issue 147 00:08:25,880 --> 00:08:28,760 another digital ID with the same number. 148 00:08:29,360 --> 00:08:33,160 Right. Well, what we need to do, in my opinion, 149 00:08:33,920 --> 00:08:38,840 what we need to do is hold people accountable 150 00:08:39,600 --> 00:08:41,120 for the damage they've done. 151 00:08:41,120 --> 00:08:42,040 It's that simple. 152 00:08:42,040 --> 00:08:43,640 Yeah, it really is. 153 00:08:43,640 --> 00:08:46,320 The minute you start and I know 154 00:08:46,560 --> 00:08:49,520 I willingly be called the hypocrite that I probably am here 155 00:08:49,680 --> 00:08:52,360 because there is a level of victim blaming that I'm doing. 156 00:08:52,600 --> 00:08:55,360 This organization is the victim, 157 00:08:55,840 --> 00:08:58,160 is a victim because they were hacked. 158 00:08:58,400 --> 00:09:00,000 And we don't know about this specific one, 159 00:09:00,000 --> 00:09:02,760 but we, you know, as well as I do that in the past, 160 00:09:02,760 --> 00:09:05,520 we have seen that they don't have even the basic security 161 00:09:05,520 --> 00:09:08,400 controls that we would expect an organization to have. 162 00:09:08,720 --> 00:09:10,800 I don't know about this one, right? 163 00:09:10,800 --> 00:09:13,400 At what point do we say, OK, you're no longer the victim, 164 00:09:13,400 --> 00:09:15,560 you're part of the problem. 165 00:09:15,960 --> 00:09:17,920 Yeah. And I don't know where that line is, 166 00:09:17,920 --> 00:09:21,120 but I think it needs to be figured out somewhat soon. 167 00:09:21,600 --> 00:09:25,000 I think it's interesting to me when we talk about physical IDs, 168 00:09:25,040 --> 00:09:29,040 like this used to be so simple, like literally, 169 00:09:29,040 --> 00:09:33,400 like just like 10 years ago, maybe even further in 10 years. 170 00:09:33,400 --> 00:09:36,200 But I'm just thinking like we didn't we were never recording 171 00:09:36,200 --> 00:09:38,920 people's driver's license when you went to go rent a car 172 00:09:38,920 --> 00:09:41,880 or when you went to show your ID at a restaurant 173 00:09:41,880 --> 00:09:44,520 or, you know, purchasing alcohol, what like. 174 00:09:45,360 --> 00:09:48,280 That's not true. No. Sorry. 175 00:09:48,280 --> 00:09:51,600 We were recording driver's licenses when you rented a car 176 00:09:52,360 --> 00:09:53,960 the 27 years ago. 177 00:09:53,960 --> 00:09:56,920 And I only know that because I worked at Alamo 27 years ago. 178 00:09:56,920 --> 00:09:58,760 OK, so their quick rent system. 179 00:09:58,760 --> 00:10:04,320 We were storing credit card drivers license numbers then. OK. 180 00:10:04,320 --> 00:10:08,680 But. But the rest of what you said is absolutely correct. 181 00:10:08,920 --> 00:10:13,240 When you walked into a restaurant and showed ID to pick up your reservation, 182 00:10:13,240 --> 00:10:16,680 which I've had to do not always, but there are times you have to do that. 183 00:10:17,120 --> 00:10:18,320 They don't record it. 184 00:10:18,320 --> 00:10:21,760 I just read an entire rent by somebody on Reddit. 185 00:10:21,880 --> 00:10:24,640 I think it was where they went into. 186 00:10:24,960 --> 00:10:28,000 I think they send Kroger's, but I don't know. 187 00:10:28,840 --> 00:10:32,200 They went to buy something and it required ID, 188 00:10:32,200 --> 00:10:34,120 whether it was alcohol, cigarettes, I don't know. 189 00:10:34,560 --> 00:10:37,400 And they took the ID and they scanned it through the register. 190 00:10:37,680 --> 00:10:40,600 And the person was complaining that that grocery store, 191 00:10:40,600 --> 00:10:44,920 whichever one it was, yep, doesn't have a privacy policy about what they're doing. 192 00:10:44,920 --> 00:10:46,240 What are you getting off of that? 193 00:10:46,240 --> 00:10:48,000 Versions that you're scanning. 194 00:10:48,040 --> 00:10:49,320 Where are you storing it? 195 00:10:49,320 --> 00:10:50,120 Where are you putting that? 196 00:10:50,120 --> 00:10:52,880 Are you, you know, every bit of that? 197 00:10:53,400 --> 00:10:55,440 And those answers aren't available to us right now. 198 00:10:55,440 --> 00:10:59,800 And we just keep running down the throwing out a tangent here, but related. 199 00:11:00,000 --> 00:11:02,680 We going down the loyalty path, right? 200 00:11:02,680 --> 00:11:04,800 Yeah, do you have a loyalty program with that grocery store? 201 00:11:04,800 --> 00:11:07,640 Do you have a lawyer program with that marijuana dispensary? 202 00:11:07,640 --> 00:11:10,120 Do you how did you verify that it was you? 203 00:11:10,120 --> 00:11:12,200 How did you get right? 204 00:11:12,200 --> 00:11:14,160 Yeah, it's just getting worse and worse. 205 00:11:14,760 --> 00:11:17,800 And we're being told it's for our own safety. 206 00:11:18,800 --> 00:11:20,760 And to protect the children, of course. 207 00:11:20,760 --> 00:11:23,040 Well, absolutely. Yeah. 208 00:11:23,040 --> 00:11:27,320 Yeah, so Scott, I think you had an interesting angle to this story, didn't you? 209 00:11:27,320 --> 00:11:31,200 Yeah, I mean, first of all, you know, my background in risk management stuff 210 00:11:31,200 --> 00:11:35,560 is interesting because what we're really talking about is transferring risk, right? 211 00:11:35,720 --> 00:11:39,520 In this business model where you go into a rental car company, 212 00:11:39,840 --> 00:11:42,000 they don't really want to have to go through all the process 213 00:11:42,000 --> 00:11:43,800 of verifying exactly who you are. 214 00:11:43,800 --> 00:11:47,600 They want to outsource that process of verifying

your identity, right? 215 00:11:47,600 --> 00:11:49,560 So that's the transfer of risk. 216 00:11:49,560 --> 00:11:54,880 And what Kevin's talking about is really how do you minimize the data exposure, right? 217 00:11:54,880 --> 00:12:00,160 And so if you can minimize the information that's being stored centrally, 218 00:12:00,160 --> 00:12:04,000 especially, then that solves, you know, part of the problem. 219 00:12:04,520 --> 00:12:07,600 The other part, of course, if you do it totally decentralized 220 00:12:07,600 --> 00:12:10,200 is the problem of what happens if you lose your your device. 221 00:12:10,520 --> 00:12:13,160 So it's still a risk management problem. 222 00:12:13,160 --> 00:12:17,320 But the real issue is because, you know, when the stuff gets stolen, 223 00:12:17,560 --> 00:12:19,160 you risk impersonation, right? 224 00:12:19,160 --> 00:12:22,840 And that can have many other kinds of impacts on people, 225 00:12:23,160 --> 00:12:26,120 not just that you can go and, you know, set up a loan account 226 00:12:26,120 --> 00:12:29,480 or some other high value account in someone's name, 227 00:12:29,480 --> 00:12:32,880 but you could impersonate people and do lots of damaging things. 228 00:12:33,440 --> 00:12:38,240 And I think your comment about the digital ID is really important. 229 00:12:38,240 --> 00:12:41,440 It's certainly an area we haven't really heard a lot about. 230 00:12:41,440 --> 00:12:44,240 I know you guys know of many solutions out there. 231 00:12:44,600 --> 00:12:48,800 I would like to mention there's one here in Ottawa in Canada called Blue Inc. 232 00:12:48,800 --> 00:12:50,360 B-L-U-I-N-K. 233 00:12:50,360 --> 00:12:53,000 So if you're looking for a Canadian solution that does digital IDs, 234 00:12:53,000 --> 00:12:54,520 that's a it's a good place to go. 235 00:12:55,280 --> 00:12:58,160 But the really nice thing from a risk management point of view 236 00:12:58,160 --> 00:13:02,920 and data minimization is they're not storing data centrally, right? 237 00:13:02,960 --> 00:13:07,920 They do some scanning of your things, capture some information 238 00:13:07,920 --> 00:13:10,040 and then encrypt it and keep it locally. 239 00:13:10,040 --> 00:13:12,840 So the service itself never has that information 240 00:13:12,840 --> 00:13:15,880 and the customers of the service never have that information. 241 00:13:16,280 --> 00:13:19,520 So I think it's an elegant solution, but yeah, you're right. 242 00:13:19,520 --> 00:13:22,080 We've got to solve the issue of what happens if you lose your device. 243 00:13:22,080 --> 00:13:23,960 There's got to be backup processes. 244 00:13:23,960 --> 00:13:26,840 I don't have a whole lot of information about how the Blue Inc. 245 00:13:26,840 --> 00:13:30,280 service works, but if I get any, I'll pass it on to Tom. 246 00:13:30,280 --> 00:13:33,960 We can talk about that or provide some resources on it. 247 00:13:34,080 --> 00:13:37,720 But I think the whole idea is that way, as

Kevin says, 248 00:13:37,720 --> 00:13:41,360 way too many people are storing data and not being held accountable for it. 249 00:13:41,560 --> 00:13:45,360 And I think that I was trying to think of like, what would we tell 250 00:13:45,360 --> 00:13:48,720 listeners of like, what to do about this, right? 251 00:13:49,200 --> 00:13:51,560 Yeah. And there isn't anything you can really do 252 00:13:51,560 --> 00:13:53,760 except for don't give your ID over, but then. 253 00:13:53,960 --> 00:13:57,440 Yeah, I mean, actually, there's a use case I went through recently 254 00:13:57,440 --> 00:13:59,280 where, you know, they didn't use Blue Inc. 255 00:13:59,280 --> 00:14:02,680 or digital ID as far as I know, but I had to, you know, 256 00:14:02,680 --> 00:14:05,280 to recover a Facebook account or something like that, right? 257 00:14:05,280 --> 00:14:09,160 You've got to show your front and back of your driver's license, scan it. 258 00:14:09,280 --> 00:14:11,640 It goes somewhere. I don't know where. 259 00:14:11,640 --> 00:14:14,760 I don't know what, what, you know, did I read the terms of, you know, 260 00:14:15,440 --> 00:14:17,600 privacy policies or anything like that? 261 00:14:17,600 --> 00:14:20,320 So that kind of stuff is really common now. 262 00:14:20,320 --> 00:14:24,160 And so I think you have to ask yourself, you know, where if you're 263 00:14:24,160 --> 00:14:26,600 concerned about this stuff, where is the data being stored? 264 00:14:26,960 --> 00:14:28,720 What data are they storing? 265 00:14:28,720 --> 00:14:30,520 How is it being protected? 266 00:14:30,520 --> 00:14:32,280 How is it being used or shared, right? 267 00:14:32,280 --> 00:14:36,640 And what accountability or penalties are there on them for losing it? 268 00:14:37,000 --> 00:14:39,640 Yeah, and that's just really hard to do when you're, you know, 269 00:14:39,640 --> 00:14:43,320 trying to access a service and you just like, OK, I just want to get this thing done. 270 00:14:43,320 --> 00:14:46,680 Well, I got five minutes, I'm not going to read it, 20 page privacy policy. 271 00:14:46,680 --> 00:14:50,240 And so like, and I think it was interesting about this particular attack. 272 00:14:50,240 --> 00:14:54,520 And if you read the article that was talking about how this was happening 273 00:14:54,520 --> 00:14:58,200 in real time, so the attackers actually had access to this system 274 00:14:58,200 --> 00:15:01,960 and new IDs were coming in like all the time. 275 00:15:02,080 --> 00:15:05,000 And so they had a real time feed to this access. 276 00:15:05,000 --> 00:15:09,000 So even if the company says, yeah, yeah, we delete your ID 277 00:15:09,000 --> 00:15:14,560 after so many days or whatever, like this reminds me of mage card, Kevin, 278 00:15:14,560 --> 00:15:18,200 like, you know, when you had a checkout system compromised 279 00:15:18,200 --> 00:15:21,920 and attackers are getting credit cards as the transactions are happening. 280 00:15:22,320 --> 00:15:24,760 Even if they do the right thing of like, hey, we're only capturing 281 00:15:24,760 --> 00:15:26,800 certain information or encrypting it. 282 00:15:26,800 --> 00:15:30,800 This is all happening before those processes actually start. 283 00:15:30,800 --> 00:15:36,960 So this is like the worst case scenario, in my opinion, of of how this attack is happening. 284 00:15:37,120 --> 00:15:39,880 This is the problem with application security that we have. 285 00:15:40,080 --> 00:15:42,120 Totally. And three years, right? 286 00:15:42,520 --> 00:15:48,520 The app at some point as the data, whatever we do, right? 287 00:15:48,520 --> 00:15:53,320 And we've always we've always historically talked about Alice and Bob 288 00:15:53,320 --> 00:15:57,560 and right, like transmission of data in somewhere 289 00:15:57,600 --> 00:16:02,800 where I see a huge gap in understanding is that if one end is compromised, 290 00:16:02,800 --> 00:16:06,280 what happens, you know, and yeah, this is a fun one. 291 00:16:06,480 --> 00:16:08,400 Oh, yeah, really exciting. 292 00:16:08,400 --> 00:16:10,920 Oh, well, we're going to get out of all the driver's license. 293 00:16:10,920 --> 00:16:15,560 Well, I was not at a dispensary in Las Vegas. 294 00:16:15,560 --> 00:16:21,080 I do know my driver's license has been scanned and pen into lots of systems. 295 00:16:21,080 --> 00:16:22,560 Oh, everybody's. Yeah. 296 00:16:22,560 --> 00:16:26,120 Well, mine has been more than average 297 00:16:26,640 --> 00:16:30,320 because of the name chain, the number of systems. 298 00:16:30,520 --> 00:16:33,040 Right. And I give you a good example. 299 00:16:33,040 --> 00:16:36,400 I had to change my Hilton number, my name on my Hilton account. 300 00:16:37,240 --> 00:16:41,680 I have never given Hilton my driver's license to change my name. 301 00:16:41,680 --> 00:16:43,680 I had to send them a copy of my driver's license. Wow. 302 00:16:44,360 --> 00:16:46,320 Right. And I understand why they asked for it. 303 00:16:46,320 --> 00:16:50,920 Right. Like I get the reasoning and I'm not complaining about Hilton here. 304 00:16:50,920 --> 00:16:55,680 But this is anybody who has had to go through that type of system recently. 305 00:16:56,160 --> 00:16:57,120 Tag, you're in it. 306 00:16:57,120 --> 00:16:59,880 Yeah, especially Hertz, Target, FedEx, Motorola. 307 00:17:00,480 --> 00:17:02,440 Yeah. All the ones that Brian Krebs named, right? 308 00:17:02,440 --> 00:17:04,480 Caesar's Entertainment. That's right. Yeah. 309 00:17:04,720 --> 00:17:06,400 Yeah. It's a huge list. 310 00:17:06,400 --> 00:17:13,440 And it's very hard as a consumer to, you know, unless you just literally say, 311 00:17:13,440 --> 00:17:18,120 I'm not giving you my ID and then therefore you're just not going to use these services. 312 00:17:18,120 --> 00:17:22,680 I mean, I even had my ID scanned for a reservation at a restaurant. 313 00:17:23,120 --> 00:17:26,880 Like it's insane how much this is happening

now. 314 00:17:26,880 --> 00:17:30,000 So we just don't have great advice for everybody. 315 00:17:30,480 --> 00:17:33,120 Sorry. The advice is how this sucks. 316 00:17:33,320 --> 00:17:34,840 Yeah, it just sucks, right? 317 00:17:34,840 --> 00:17:39,000 Until there is more legislation or, you know, something changes. 318 00:17:39,000 --> 00:17:42,160 But I don't see this getting any better, unfortunately. 319 00:17:42,160 --> 00:17:44,000 And you know my opinion of legislation. 320 00:17:44,000 --> 00:17:45,840 Oh, I know. It's not going to help. 321 00:17:45,840 --> 00:17:49,280 No. No matter what country it is, it's probably not going to help. 322 00:17:50,040 --> 00:17:55,000 All right. Well, last thing really quick, again, we'll plug Scott's book. 323 00:17:55,200 --> 00:17:57,160 So we'll have links in the show notes. 324 00:17:57,160 --> 00:18:01,080 We love plugging the book because you're continuing to get feedback, which is good. 325 00:18:01,080 --> 00:18:01,840 Yeah, absolutely. 326 00:18:01,840 --> 00:18:05,600 Getting some great review comments from people who've been listeners to the show. 327 00:18:05,600 --> 00:18:08,240 So thank you, everybody, for that. 328 00:18:08,240 --> 00:18:11,440 I'll share just a little tidbit of wisdom for people. 329 00:18:11,680 --> 00:18:16,240 You may have heard of the, you know, all the legacy contact solutions 330 00:18:16,240 --> 00:18:20,400 that are out there for Google and Facebook and Apple and Microsoft, et cetera. 331 00:18:20,400 --> 00:18:24,800 Right. So the Google solution is called the Google Inactive Account Manager. 332 00:18:25,320 --> 00:18:30,280 And once it makes it so much easier if you can set up these things. 333 00:18:30,280 --> 00:18:33,120 But just as an example, how they all work so differently. 334 00:18:33,720 --> 00:18:35,720 It's great if you set this up with Google. 335 00:18:35,720 --> 00:18:40,040 You can say, I want Tom to be my legacy contact. 336 00:18:40,040 --> 00:18:44,640 And if I if he makes a request for my access 337 00:18:44,640 --> 00:18:49,200 to my Google account information and I don't respond 338 00:18:49,560 --> 00:18:53,840 within a period of time, then Tom gets granted access. 339 00:18:53,840 --> 00:18:55,320 So that that makes sense. 340 00:18:55,320 --> 00:18:59,680 But what I've learned and what might be interesting to people is the minimum 341 00:18:59,960 --> 00:19:05,600 period that Google allows for that to happen is 30 days, which is a long time. 342 00:19:06,080 --> 00:19:09,960 For my point of view, I mean, if I'm out of action 343 00:19:09,960 --> 00:19:13,080 for five days, then somebody should be able to take over, right? 344 00:19:13,080 --> 00:19:16,040 And so anyway, just thought I'd pass that on. 345 00:19:16,760 --> 00:19:18,280 Yeah, that's good to know. 346 00:19:18,280 --> 00:19:21,360 It means you've got to think more about, you know, what do you want to happen 347 00:19:21,360 --> 00:19:22,680 in that period of time? 348 00:19:22,680 --> 00:19:26,720 Yeah. And I'd encourage listeners, if you want to find out more about Scott's 349 00:19:26,720 --> 00:19:29,320 book, definitely check out the link in the show notes. 350 00:19:29,320 --> 00:19:32,600 And hopefully a pre-order coming out soon. 351 00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:35,640 Yeah, we're going to be putting up a pre-order page soon. 352 00:19:35,640 --> 00:19:37,320 Yep. Nice. 353 00:19:38,360 --> 00:19:38,680 All right. 354 00:19:38,680 --> 00:19:42,800 Discounted Kindle version for for shared security listeners. 355 00:19:43,120 --> 00:19:45,280 Awesome. Awesome. All right. 356 00:19:45,360 --> 00:19:49,880 Well, thank you all for listening as always and supporting the podcast. 357 00:19:49,880 --> 00:19:51,360 We really appreciate it. 358 00:19:51,360 --> 00:19:55,280 Until next time, stay safe, stay secure and stay privates. 359 00:19:55,360 --> 00:19:57,080 Thank you for listening or watching. 360 00:19:57,080 --> 00:20:01,000 If you like this episode, hit subscribe, share it with your friends and 361 00:20:01,000 --> 00:20:05,040 colleagues or jump into our community at sharedsecurity.net 362 00:20:05,040 --> 00:20:07,680 slash supporter to keep the conversation going. 363 00:20:07,760 --> 00:20:08,560 Thanks again. 364 00:20:08,560 --> 00:20:12,440 And we'll see you next week for another episode of shared security.