BẢN CHÉP ÂM THANH 🔗
WEBVTT
1
00:00:04.960 --> 00:00:09.679
Hello there, how's your week been good? I hope we
2
00:00:09.720 --> 00:00:13.519
are fully caffeinated and ready to talk about the intriguing
3
00:00:13.560 --> 00:00:19.600
world of criminal intelligence. Now you might think that policing
4
00:00:20.440 --> 00:00:24.879
is all about making an arrest, feeling a collar, nicking
5
00:00:24.879 --> 00:00:30.000
a criminal, but in reality, it starts with little bits
6
00:00:30.039 --> 00:00:35.000
of information, often from all over the place. A single
7
00:00:35.320 --> 00:00:38.039
piece of information doesn't really mean much on its own.
8
00:00:38.679 --> 00:00:42.520
Criminal intelligence is what happens when you join all of
9
00:00:42.560 --> 00:00:46.880
those pieces together like a jigsaw, and suddenly you can
10
00:00:46.920 --> 00:00:51.119
see the picture. At least that's what I think, Jack,
11
00:00:51.200 --> 00:00:51.920
am I right.
12
00:00:53.200 --> 00:00:58.079
That's pretty much it. Yeah. The National Crime Agency that's
13
00:00:58.159 --> 00:01:03.079
the UK's equivalent of the FBI, and that states that
14
00:01:04.680 --> 00:01:11.040
intelligence is the processed, analyzed and evaluated information regarding actual
15
00:01:11.280 --> 00:01:16.400
or suspected criminal activity used by law enforcement to make decisions,
16
00:01:16.959 --> 00:01:23.319
identify suspects, and predict trends. It transforms raw data such
17
00:01:23.359 --> 00:01:29.439
as forensic reports, human sources, and surveillance, which we talked
18
00:01:29.439 --> 00:01:34.799
about last time, and it converts that into actionable insights
19
00:01:34.920 --> 00:01:40.760
to guide investigations, support operations, and prevent crime. Now that
20
00:01:40.879 --> 00:01:45.640
sounds great in an ideal world, and I think this
21
00:01:46.280 --> 00:01:49.239
episode could well be called that. In an ideal world,
22
00:01:49.920 --> 00:01:53.840
law enforcement agencies would would know everything, wouldn't we we'd
23
00:01:53.879 --> 00:01:56.879
be one step ahead of the game, would prevent or
24
00:01:56.920 --> 00:02:00.920
detect every criminal act in the country. But like in
25
00:02:00.959 --> 00:02:03.959
a lot of areas, we don't live in an ideal world.
26
00:02:05.200 --> 00:02:10.280
How has intelligence changed over the years? Because you were
27
00:02:10.520 --> 00:02:12.639
thirty years on the job and you've been out of
28
00:02:12.680 --> 00:02:15.879
the job for a little while. Now, how did it
29
00:02:15.960 --> 00:02:18.120
evolve during your time as a copper?
30
00:02:20.680 --> 00:02:24.800
I think, like everything, it's changed enormously, particularly with the
31
00:02:24.879 --> 00:02:28.120
digital age, which was sort of the nineties. So if
32
00:02:28.120 --> 00:02:33.479
you go back nineteen eighty five when I joined, we
33
00:02:33.560 --> 00:02:38.719
had what was called the collator. The collator worked at
34
00:02:39.039 --> 00:02:46.199
subdivisional stations and had an office that collated or collected
35
00:02:48.800 --> 00:02:56.680
information or details of crime reports, intelligence reports, etc. Typed
36
00:02:56.680 --> 00:02:59.960
them up, put them on a card, index into little
37
00:03:00.280 --> 00:03:09.240
metal draws and cabinets, linked it to addressers, names, types
38
00:03:09.280 --> 00:03:10.039
of crime, etc.
39
00:03:10.800 --> 00:03:13.120
I see, I just had a vision of a collator
40
00:03:13.240 --> 00:03:16.520
being a machine, something beige, sitting in the corner, like
41
00:03:16.560 --> 00:03:19.240
a fax machine. But it's a role, it's a job role,
42
00:03:19.240 --> 00:03:21.759
it's a person. It's not like a computer. Used to
43
00:03:21.759 --> 00:03:25.719
be a person who did calculations, kalator was a person.
44
00:03:26.840 --> 00:03:29.919
It's very much a person, an officer, and they would
45
00:03:29.960 --> 00:03:35.479
also have someone to help type this intelligence or this
46
00:03:35.560 --> 00:03:41.159
information onto bulletins and cards, etc. Often that typist was
47
00:03:42.120 --> 00:03:47.400
an officer who was maybe on recuperating from injury, that
48
00:03:47.520 --> 00:03:50.680
kind of thing, not necessarily trained in the use of
49
00:03:50.719 --> 00:03:56.919
the typewriter, remember those. Yeah, So, what the cleator would produce,
50
00:03:58.000 --> 00:04:00.719
I don't know whether this was weekly or or every
51
00:04:00.759 --> 00:04:03.719
couple of days or whenever they felt they had the
52
00:04:03.759 --> 00:04:07.400
time to do it would be an intelligence report, a
53
00:04:07.439 --> 00:04:10.599
sheet of paper, a sheet of a four that would
54
00:04:10.680 --> 00:04:15.039
be used in briefings to all the offices about what
55
00:04:15.159 --> 00:04:20.720
had been happening, trends, a particular criminal who was back
56
00:04:20.800 --> 00:04:25.720
living on the area, that kind of thing. And I
57
00:04:25.759 --> 00:04:30.120
remember this as well because the colleague and friend who
58
00:04:30.160 --> 00:04:34.279
is still a friend of mine was working there at
59
00:04:34.319 --> 00:04:38.759
the time, and I remember he was criticized behind his
60
00:04:38.920 --> 00:04:43.959
back in terms of the amount of intelligence that he
61
00:04:44.079 --> 00:04:45.279
was submitting.
62
00:04:46.480 --> 00:04:49.319
Too much or too little, too much, too much?
63
00:04:50.160 --> 00:04:54.639
Yes, and well this is key because we're going back
64
00:04:54.680 --> 00:05:01.079
to the nineteen eighties here, And what other officers would
65
00:05:01.160 --> 00:05:03.839
say was, well, why doesn't he go and sort it
66
00:05:03.879 --> 00:05:08.759
out himself that he's putting this information about a criminal
67
00:05:09.000 --> 00:05:14.959
who's driving a particular car, who disqualified driver who's driving
68
00:05:14.959 --> 00:05:17.519
a particular call, this kind of thing, and that would
69
00:05:17.560 -->
Load full transcript
00:05:23.439
be the criticism of him, which was wrong, which was misguided.
70
00:05:23.480 --> 00:05:25.480
But in those days, I think you have to remember
71
00:05:27.040 --> 00:05:31.600
policing was very parochial. Officers and detectives kept things close
72
00:05:31.639 --> 00:05:34.720
to the chest. They wanted to deal with it, and
73
00:05:34.759 --> 00:05:39.120
that was a failing because it meant that information wasn't
74
00:05:39.279 --> 00:05:46.680
shared properly and allowed to be managed properly. People were parochial,
75
00:05:46.759 --> 00:05:50.480
quite sort of selfish of their own self interests.
76
00:05:51.519 --> 00:05:54.199
So we're talking about working in silos, which is something
77
00:05:54.240 --> 00:05:57.279
I'm familiar with from my work in business and industry
78
00:05:57.560 --> 00:06:03.000
and something which the BC used to be criticized for.
79
00:06:03.319 --> 00:06:08.000
I remember working for different programs and they were very
80
00:06:08.199 --> 00:06:15.639
very parochial about their stories, their contacts. They wouldn't share anything. Yes,
81
00:06:15.720 --> 00:06:19.759
this is it, and trying to overcome that culture took decades.
82
00:06:19.920 --> 00:06:24.879
Yes, and it's it's actually goes beyond silos in terms
83
00:06:24.879 --> 00:06:30.480
of teams who were working in silos. But as individuals
84
00:06:31.000 --> 00:06:35.079
there was something competitive and something keeping your cards close
85
00:06:35.160 --> 00:06:40.720
to your chest, and it was it was not productive.
86
00:06:40.759 --> 00:06:44.199
It was not properly productive. I mean I remember in
87
00:06:44.240 --> 00:06:48.279
my early days of supervisory duties, I would say to
88
00:06:48.759 --> 00:06:53.319
an officer, can you put this put some intelligence in?
89
00:06:54.519 --> 00:06:58.040
And that the standard The stock reply would be I
90
00:06:58.040 --> 00:07:00.879
would do but I'm not very intelligent and you know,
91
00:07:01.000 --> 00:07:06.040
pretty poor sort of gag. I suppose. So officers were
92
00:07:06.079 --> 00:07:11.720
sort of culturally trained, sort of not to keep things
93
00:07:11.759 --> 00:07:14.680
either close to the chest or can't really be bothered
94
00:07:14.720 --> 00:07:19.560
about putting in this thing called intelligence, Well it should
95
00:07:19.560 --> 00:07:26.800
have been put in. So I've always been a champion
96
00:07:27.000 --> 00:07:31.160
for putting intelligence in. Now in those days as well,
97
00:07:31.480 --> 00:07:35.439
it would be a simple handwritten report on a sheet,
98
00:07:35.600 --> 00:07:38.279
so you could be done in seconds, providing you thought
99
00:07:38.279 --> 00:07:41.560
about it carefully. What you were putting bear in mind.
100
00:07:41.680 --> 00:07:46.360
But wherever the information had come from, put it in
101
00:07:46.639 --> 00:07:50.000
and then let somebody else analyze it, look at it,
102
00:07:50.279 --> 00:07:52.120
evaluate it, etc.
103
00:07:53.360 --> 00:07:56.480
Puts me in mind of the hunt for Peter Sutcliffe
104
00:07:56.480 --> 00:08:02.120
and how that produced a mountain of information that overwhelmed
105
00:08:02.120 --> 00:08:05.199
the detectives working on the case to the point where
106
00:08:05.199 --> 00:08:07.759
they couldn't to use a cliche, see the wood for
107
00:08:07.800 --> 00:08:12.720
the trees, right, and opportunities to identify Sutcliffe and to
108
00:08:13.000 --> 00:08:17.199
arrest him were missed as a result the card index
109
00:08:17.480 --> 00:08:22.879
and you'll remember the Psycho Killer podcast about the Yorkshire Ripper.
110
00:08:23.199 --> 00:08:28.279
The card index filled an entire floor of Millgarth Nick
111
00:08:28.360 --> 00:08:33.480
in Leeds, the main police station for Leeds. It's like
112
00:08:33.519 --> 00:08:37.399
a blockhouse, this thing. And the weight became so great
113
00:08:38.039 --> 00:08:41.320
that the floor below had to be cleared and they
114
00:08:41.399 --> 00:08:46.399
brought in pit props from a nearby colliery to support
115
00:08:46.440 --> 00:08:49.639
the weight of the floor above to prevent it collapsing.
116
00:08:50.200 --> 00:08:52.879
Such was the weight of all of the card indexes
117
00:08:52.919 --> 00:08:56.200
and the filing cabinets and all of the paraphernalia of
118
00:08:56.279 --> 00:08:58.720
that analog system upstairs.
119
00:08:59.240 --> 00:09:04.000
That's right, and remember for good reasons in a way,
120
00:09:04.120 --> 00:09:08.159
but all that information held in there would not be
121
00:09:08.320 --> 00:09:09.639
available anywhere else.
122
00:09:11.159 --> 00:09:13.840
Yes, of course you'd have to go there, effectively, go
123
00:09:13.919 --> 00:09:17.440
to the library to retrieve the information from somebody who
124
00:09:17.440 --> 00:09:22.360
could help you find it. Yeah, yes, akalator. Yeah, so
125
00:09:22.399 --> 00:09:26.279
that was well nineteen seventies, late seventies, coming into the
126
00:09:26.320 --> 00:09:30.200
early eighties, and then you joined the police force early
127
00:09:30.279 --> 00:09:31.720
to mid eighties, is that right?
128
00:09:31.840 --> 00:09:32.039
Yeah?
129
00:09:32.080 --> 00:09:34.720
So how was what was the situation like then with
130
00:09:34.840 --> 00:09:39.159
intelligent gathering and data storage. Was it similar card index
131
00:09:39.320 --> 00:09:43.360
or was it moving on to an electronic form of storage.
132
00:09:45.039 --> 00:09:52.039
It was very much card index systems. In the nineties,
133
00:09:52.399 --> 00:09:57.679
I was working at headquarters when something called the World
134
00:09:57.679 --> 00:10:05.519
Wide Web was launched and our desks were I think
135
00:10:05.559 --> 00:10:09.879
we had to actually have new desks as well, because
136
00:10:09.960 --> 00:10:18.120
these huge monitors and keyboards and towers or computer towers
137
00:10:18.159 --> 00:10:24.039
were being delivered by
the newly formed IT Department information Technology,
138
00:10:26.240 --> 00:10:30.600
and we were still used to going to a metal
139
00:10:30.600 --> 00:10:34.519
cabinet and drawing out files and bits of information.
140
00:10:34.919 --> 00:10:38.480
So how did colleagues react to that the introduction of it.
141
00:10:42.080 --> 00:10:45.639
I think it varied. As you know in any walk
142
00:10:45.679 --> 00:10:49.440
of life and yourselves, there will be those that you think,
143
00:10:49.480 --> 00:10:52.159
if the system's not broken, don't try and fix it,
144
00:10:52.639 --> 00:10:57.039
and others would be all over this new technology as
145
00:10:57.039 --> 00:11:03.720
though it's something to behold. I'm a middle of the
146
00:11:03.799 --> 00:11:07.440
road guy, and I slowly, I slowly adapted to it,
147
00:11:07.559 --> 00:11:10.360
as as as I've adapted to, you know, to any
148
00:11:10.480 --> 00:11:12.799
changes in the organization.
149
00:11:13.039 --> 00:11:16.120
I suppose a few people fell by the wayside and
150
00:11:16.200 --> 00:11:17.960
went out of the door at the same time as
151
00:11:17.960 --> 00:11:21.159
the typewriters were taken out to a skip exactly.
152
00:11:21.279 --> 00:11:24.600
I mean, if I remember we we we used, I
153
00:11:24.720 --> 00:11:28.840
used to use a builder for doing sort of odd jobs.
154
00:11:29.639 --> 00:11:32.720
And he was an ex refuse collector, a bin man,
155
00:11:33.440 --> 00:11:38.200
and he said he left that organization when they ruined
156
00:11:38.720 --> 00:11:44.000
the skill and the art of bin collections because he
157
00:11:44.120 --> 00:11:46.799
was used to putting a metal bin with a handle
158
00:11:46.840 --> 00:11:50.879
over his shoulder and taking it to the the bin.
159
00:11:50.960 --> 00:11:56.080
Lorry wheelibins came in and he lost all faith in
160
00:11:56.159 --> 00:11:57.799
the in the process.
161
00:11:59.480 --> 00:12:03.240
My first substantive job as a broadcast journalist was in
162
00:12:03.279 --> 00:12:07.519
a newsroom that had three computer terminals, as you've described,
163
00:12:07.960 --> 00:12:11.519
and then the olivety typewriter that the boss, the editor
164
00:12:11.639 --> 00:12:14.200
used because he couldn't get on with all of this nonsense.
165
00:12:15.279 --> 00:12:17.480
Never mind the fact that it was network, never mind
166
00:12:17.519 --> 00:12:19.720
the fact that we had all of the news scripts
167
00:12:19.759 --> 00:12:23.960
backed up on floppy discs. Remember those. Julian would hammer
168
00:12:24.000 --> 00:12:27.279
away at his typewriter, and the closer it got to
169
00:12:27.320 --> 00:12:31.519
a deadline, the more perforated the paper became right because
170
00:12:31.559 --> 00:12:34.720
he'd be hitting those keys with a purpose. And you
171
00:12:34.759 --> 00:12:37.639
could hold these scripts up afterwards to the window and
172
00:12:37.759 --> 00:12:40.840
see where the full stops and the commas had just
173
00:12:40.919 --> 00:12:43.360
gone straight through the paper. And if it was a
174
00:12:43.399 --> 00:12:46.440
really tight deadline. All of the o's would have gone
175
00:12:46.519 --> 00:12:49.279
through as well. So I'm familiar with it and the
176
00:12:49.320 --> 00:12:51.759
tension that kind of came with it. The young guy
177
00:12:51.799 --> 00:12:55.639
who was all forering introducing this technology and for the
178
00:12:55.679 --> 00:12:57.639
life of him, couldn't get the boss to see that
179
00:12:57.720 --> 00:12:59.679
he should be embracing it as well.
180
00:13:00.159 --> 00:13:03.679
It managers management's key, isn't it. Those that are resistant
181
00:13:03.720 --> 00:13:10.039
to change for whatever reason will cause some issues. But
182
00:13:10.159 --> 00:13:13.080
then those who are all about the change and not
183
00:13:13.159 --> 00:13:17.120
really about the past, sometimes they lose that connection to
184
00:13:17.679 --> 00:13:21.879
what has worked. So it's fine in that balance. What
185
00:13:22.320 --> 00:13:24.879
this department when I was in headquarters, so this is
186
00:13:24.919 --> 00:13:29.759
the arrival of information technology, we had something unique in
187
00:13:29.799 --> 00:13:34.000
this particular office, and we had a paper system of
188
00:13:35.639 --> 00:13:44.039
records from the Immigration Service and the UK Passport Authority,
189
00:13:45.120 --> 00:13:53.399
and we dealt with referrals information investigations relating to those topics,
190
00:13:56.279 --> 00:13:59.399
but we dealt with them in complete isolation. So that
191
00:13:59.440 --> 00:14:06.679
paperwork was unless we consciously shared it for a particular reason,
192
00:14:07.559 --> 00:14:12.159
it was kept in one department in a silo, you
193
00:14:12.240 --> 00:14:16.039
use the term silo. So it was really interesting because
194
00:14:16.840 --> 00:14:21.039
when I looked at what we'd collated over the years
195
00:14:21.080 --> 00:14:26.360
in terms of let's talk about passports, so passports, passport
196
00:14:26.399 --> 00:14:33.039
fraud and use of passports being docted, altered, etc. Would
197
00:14:34.120 --> 00:14:37.120
we would have records that come from the Peterborough Passport
198
00:14:37.200 --> 00:14:43.159
Office that would say we suspect this application is false,
199
00:14:43.720 --> 00:14:47.480
please investigate, and we would go and do that reply
200
00:14:47.600 --> 00:14:51.720
to them either confirming it's all genuine, there's just a
201
00:14:51.799 --> 00:14:57.320
mistake here, or were identify as there's been a rogue
202
00:14:57.320 --> 00:15:01.960
application made and deal with it accord. We would also
203
00:15:02.000 --> 00:15:10.360
have records of Nottingham based passports that had been recovered
204
00:15:10.399 --> 00:15:13.600
around the world that had been adopted that had a
205
00:15:13.639 --> 00:15:20.240
new photograph inserted. But again we would or we had
206
00:15:20.320 --> 00:15:24.799
been purely just collating and filing all this information rather
207
00:15:24.840 --> 00:15:30.200
than sharing it to the wider police organization. Having looked
208
00:15:30.240 --> 00:15:37.480
at this collated information, it was clear analyzing the intelligence,
209
00:15:39.440 --> 00:15:42.519
it was clear that there was something going off in
210
00:15:42.639 --> 00:15:48.600
terms of applications were going in to Peterborough Passport Office
211
00:15:48.720 --> 00:15:52.879
in person and then a significant number of them were
212
00:15:53.440 --> 00:16:00.720
then being recovered later with a new photograph inserted to
213
00:16:00.759 --> 00:16:05.600
skip forward within six months, which identified a criminal who
214
00:16:05.639 --> 00:16:12.559
was recruiting individuals to apply for their first passport for
215
00:16:12.639 --> 00:16:15.440
a fee. For an amount of money and they were
216
00:16:16.440 --> 00:16:22.000
taken to Peterborough the Passport office issued with their passport,
217
00:16:22.159 --> 00:16:24.960
they would hand it over for money and then it
218
00:16:25.080 --> 00:16:32.360
allowed the criminals to replace the photograph with another individual
219
00:16:32.480 --> 00:16:35.039
and then sold to Warder. And it was quite a
220
00:16:35.120 --> 00:16:41.000
large scale activity. It was only our department that was
221
00:16:41.039 --> 00:16:45.200
able to identify that because all the other activity was
222
00:16:45.279 --> 00:16:55.000
not being analyzed, recorded, checked, et cetera. So that to
223
00:16:55.039 --> 00:16:58.440
me is that early example of how the old system
224
00:16:58.559 --> 00:17:03.919
was failing. And subsequent to that, obviously things potentially could
225
00:17:03.919 --> 00:17:05.799
be could be a lot better. In fact, they all
226
00:17:05.880 --> 00:17:08.039
as we know, with passport applications.
227
00:17:08.680 --> 00:17:11.000
So just to be clear, this is a national activity,
228
00:17:11.400 --> 00:17:18.480
the passport scam, and the information was held in Nottingham
229
00:17:19.400 --> 00:17:23.000
and the Passport office in Peterborough had to communicate with
230
00:17:23.160 --> 00:17:30.440
Nottingham in order to flag up potential passport fraud. They
231
00:17:30.440 --> 00:17:32.920
had to go to Nottingham. They couldn't go anywhere else
232
00:17:32.960 --> 00:17:36.640
because that information wasn't shared with for example, Cambridgeshire Police
233
00:17:36.920 --> 00:17:40.160
or with the met or whatever precisely, and or it
234
00:17:40.200 --> 00:17:42.839
wasn't accessible to them. You'd share it, but it would
235
00:17:42.880 --> 00:17:45.599
take time. Nowadays it's accessible.
236
00:17:45.359 --> 00:17:50.279
And each fraud was an individual matter, rather being looking
237
00:17:50.319 --> 00:17:53.920
at a trend or a system looking at the profile
238
00:17:54.000 --> 00:17:58.839
of the applicants. So this wasn't rocket
science. This was
239
00:17:59.000 --> 00:18:05.160
just as you would allude to, genuine professional curiosity. What's
240
00:18:05.200 --> 00:18:10.680
going off here? Why why is this trend happening? Well,
241
00:18:10.720 --> 00:18:13.200
identifying the trend and then saying why is it happening?
242
00:18:13.599 --> 00:18:15.759
And then how do we solve it? How do we
243
00:18:15.799 --> 00:18:16.680
stop it?
244
00:18:16.839 --> 00:18:19.599
Was there a light bulb moment then when you realized
245
00:18:19.640 --> 00:18:23.680
that the it would allow you to collate intelligence in
246
00:18:23.720 --> 00:18:26.599
a way that would show those patterns.
247
00:18:28.319 --> 00:18:32.400
It wasn't so much it it just coincidentally was at
248
00:18:32.400 --> 00:18:34.880
the time of the arrival of it. This was yeah,
249
00:18:34.920 --> 00:18:43.880
this was this was basic, basic policing where an individual
250
00:18:44.319 --> 00:18:48.079
had the time to look and analyze, rather than subsequently
251
00:18:48.119 --> 00:18:52.279
where potentially it could analyze that for you.
252
00:18:53.160 --> 00:18:56.839
And there you are in your CID office with your
253
00:18:57.200 --> 00:19:01.039
smart new Windows ninety five computers and they're all networked
254
00:19:01.039 --> 00:19:04.279
I'm assuming their network. So you can share that information
255
00:19:04.519 --> 00:19:06.680
and you can share it well, could you share it
256
00:19:06.839 --> 00:19:09.880
just within the building or could you share it with
257
00:19:10.559 --> 00:19:15.759
your force? Or was it accessible to the other police
258
00:19:15.799 --> 00:19:17.920
forces across the United Kingdom?
259
00:19:19.799 --> 00:19:23.440
Then not at all, no that, so there.
260
00:19:23.359 --> 00:19:28.400
Were Chinese walls that prevented total accessibility or completely.
261
00:19:28.519 --> 00:19:33.079
I think it was another twenty years before intelligence systems
262
00:19:33.279 --> 00:19:39.319
were nationalized and accessible, and then they weren't accessible to everybody.
263
00:19:39.319 --> 00:19:44.680
They would have specific intelligence analyst and researchers who could
264
00:19:44.759 --> 00:19:48.960
access them for you. But progress was made, but it
265
00:19:49.039 --> 00:19:51.400
must have been over a twenty year period.
266
00:19:52.279 --> 00:19:55.640
And we've talked about the home system before. Just give
267
00:19:55.640 --> 00:19:59.240
me a quick summary of what homes is or was
268
00:19:59.799 --> 00:20:03.319
in case people have forgotten and how did homes fit
269
00:20:03.400 --> 00:20:06.880
into the picture overall of intelligence and this type of
270
00:20:06.880 --> 00:20:08.319
transition to digital.
271
00:20:09.799 --> 00:20:14.039
Well, again, the homes, the home office large major inquiry system,
272
00:20:14.079 --> 00:20:21.640
I think is the that the term is a system
273
00:20:21.880 --> 00:20:26.880
of investigating major crime in an
incident room that again
274
00:20:26.920 --> 00:20:33.519
has also been advanced using technology and is more accessible
275
00:20:33.559 --> 00:20:41.599
across departments. But it's still very much in isolation for
276
00:20:41.759 --> 00:20:46.319
a number of reasons really for obviously security of the
277
00:20:46.359 --> 00:20:50.920
of the data. So there's still some difficult decisions sometimes
278
00:20:50.920 --> 00:20:54.680
in what to release to the to the bigger intelligence picture.
279
00:20:56.359 --> 00:20:58.559
You know this it's in an ideal world to go
280
00:20:58.640 --> 00:21:00.920
back to that point, you know, in an idea world
281
00:21:02.160 --> 00:21:06.079
and everything would be secure, but accessible to the right people.
282
00:21:06.200 --> 00:21:11.599
But as you know from your organization, you know there
283
00:21:11.599 --> 00:21:14.240
are flaws to it, and there are difficulties in that.
284
00:21:14.680 --> 00:21:17.039
There's a need for confidentiality in a lot of cases,
285
00:21:17.079 --> 00:21:18.839
isn't there absolutely?
286
00:21:19.079 --> 00:21:23.680
I mean I do remember one one aspect and introducing
287
00:21:24.799 --> 00:21:31.720
the homes and major crime murder squad scenarios. It was interesting.
288
00:21:31.759 --> 00:21:35.680
So when I left this department with the passport activity,
289
00:21:37.400 --> 00:21:45.640
I was keen to improve the dissemination of intelligence that
290
00:21:45.720 --> 00:21:52.240
might be of value to the wider organization. And in
291
00:21:52.359 --> 00:21:58.759
two thousand and six, I believe there was an awful
292
00:21:58.799 --> 00:22:04.519
incident where a police officer was shot in Nottingham, PC
293
00:22:04.720 --> 00:22:08.480
Rachel Bown, and ultimately she tried to return to the
294
00:22:10.440 --> 00:22:12.960
job but it was too much for her. She was
295
00:22:13.000 --> 00:22:22.400
shot with a firearm in the abdomen after attending a
296
00:22:22.559 --> 00:22:29.759
routine incident in part of Nottingham. I wasn't directly involved
297
00:22:29.799 --> 00:22:35.480
in that investigation, but I recall that the suspect was
298
00:22:35.519 --> 00:22:39.720
identified I think within a couple of days, and it
299
00:22:39.759 --> 00:22:43.119
was an individual called Trevon Thomas who was from Trinidad.
300
00:22:45.039 --> 00:22:49.359
And what was apparent is that during that inquiry they
301
00:22:50.079 --> 00:22:54.359
somehow got a name or an idea of who it
302
00:22:54.440 --> 00:22:59.519
might be, and when they checked the system for Trevon Thomas,
303
00:23:01.960 --> 00:23:05.880
I'd submitted an intelligence report six years early. I think
304
00:23:05.880 --> 00:23:12.240
it was in two thousand that identified him, his passport number,
305
00:23:12.519 --> 00:23:15.559
the details that he'd come and he was at risk
306
00:23:15.640 --> 00:23:20.000
of overstaying in that period in two thousand. In fact,
307
00:23:20.039 --> 00:23:22.480
my intelligence was right because he had overstayed, and it
308
00:23:22.519 --> 00:23:25.279
was six years later that he ended up shooting PC
309
00:23:25.480 --> 00:23:31.400
Rachel Baun. So it's a simple example, but the point
310
00:23:31.519 --> 00:23:36.279
is that information might have still sat in a file
311
00:23:36.680 --> 00:23:42.920
in the office at headquarters, but someone, an officer, had
312
00:23:42.960 --> 00:23:48.240
taken the time to turn that into potentially useful intelligence
313
00:23:48.480 --> 00:23:54.599
to future investigations because of the suspected criminality of the individual.
314
00:23:56.279 --> 00:23:59.559
So there's the example for you.
315
00:24:00.519 --> 00:24:04.200
And Trevon Thomas was arrested. Actually he throw airport, wasn't
316
00:24:04.240 --> 00:24:08.839
He was trying to leave the country and they arrested him.
317
00:24:09.240 --> 00:24:11.160
Actually as he was at the gate at the airport,
318
00:24:11.440 --> 00:24:14.319
he was he was are you involved in that? Did
319
00:24:14.359 --> 00:24:16.039
you did you go to that or was that something
320
00:24:16.079 --> 00:24:16.640
that was handled.
321
00:24:17.039 --> 00:24:19.880
I wasn't involved in the investigation at all, but colleagues
322
00:24:19.920 --> 00:24:23.799
who were came back and they that they referenced how
323
00:24:25.079 --> 00:24:28.039
they quickly got quite a lot of information from that
324
00:24:28.119 --> 00:24:32.480
report that I put in six years before. So it
325
00:24:32.640 --> 00:24:35.759
just goes to show taking up little bit of time
326
00:24:35.839 --> 00:24:44.680
to disseminate information intelligence for in an ideal world if
327
00:24:44.680 --> 00:24:45.119
it's needed.
328
00:24:45.119 --> 00:24:50.079
Again, so you were an example of good practice. Now
329
00:24:50.079 --> 00:24:55.559
that we've got so much more information technology, the Internet,
330
00:24:56.400 --> 00:25:01.720
artificial intelligence at our fingertips. Does that mean that we
331
00:25:01.799 --> 00:25:05.720
do live in an ideal world that everybody is following
332
00:25:05.799 --> 00:25:09.599
best practice and your example from the Trevon Thomas case.
333
00:25:10.200 --> 00:25:14.000
Or are people still inclined to work in silos to
334
00:25:14.119 --> 00:25:18.640
keep their cards close to their chests? What's happening nowadays
335
00:25:18.680 --> 00:25:20.039
in policing in Britain.
336
00:25:22.480 --> 00:25:26.759
I guess it might not be silos anymore, but I
337
00:25:26.839 --> 00:25:34.519
guess departments within organizations look to protect themselves in terms
338
00:25:34.599 --> 00:25:38.119
of demand of work, and departments are under more and
339
00:25:38.119 --> 00:25:43.000
more pressure now, staffing levels, etc. So they might look
340
00:25:42.079 --> 00:25:48.079
to shield off stuff and almost become a silo by
341
00:25:49.559 --> 00:25:54.160
by default. There's an interesting example
going off at the moment,
342
00:25:54.279 --> 00:25:58.200
isn't there with the public inquiry into the Notting attacks.
343
00:25:58.599 --> 00:26:00.480
Yes, for sure, yes, this.
344
00:26:00.480 --> 00:26:03.279
Is a judge led public inquiry about you know, the
345
00:26:03.279 --> 00:26:06.880
actions of Valdo Calacane leading up to those awful deaths
346
00:26:06.960 --> 00:26:11.559
in June twenty twenty three when two University of notting
347
00:26:11.640 --> 00:26:16.160
students were killed along with a school caretaker, Ian Coates,
348
00:26:17.200 --> 00:26:22.119
and also severely injured were I think three other individuals
349
00:26:23.559 --> 00:26:28.599
by this man. And this inquiry is is showing that
350
00:26:29.079 --> 00:26:38.759
information through various agencies maybe isn't distributed in an ideal
351
00:26:38.799 --> 00:26:43.720
world for people to make proper judgments about people like Calacane.
352
00:26:44.480 --> 00:26:48.880
In fact, just this week the Inquiry has heard an
353
00:26:48.920 --> 00:26:54.240
example potentially of just this kind of thing happening back
354
00:26:54.279 --> 00:26:57.039
in May twenty twenty one, I think it was so
355
00:26:57.200 --> 00:27:02.000
two years before the Nottingham merge. Callakain had attempted to
356
00:27:02.039 --> 00:27:05.680
hand himself into mi I five at its headquarters at
357
00:27:05.720 --> 00:27:12.680
Thames House in central London, and according to evidence given
358
00:27:13.000 --> 00:27:17.559
to the inquiry, PC Graham Foster, who confronted callakin outside
359
00:27:18.119 --> 00:27:21.599
after he'd rung the buildings into coom, told the Inquiry
360
00:27:21.599 --> 00:27:24.640
that Callokaine had informed a member of security that he
361
00:27:24.720 --> 00:27:27.839
wanted to be arrested and to speak to the police.
362
00:27:27.880 --> 00:27:33.839
So this is two years before the murders. Now, Superintendent
363
00:27:34.039 --> 00:27:37.920
Lorraine Busby McVeigh of the Metropolitan Police told the inquiry
364
00:27:37.960 --> 00:27:43.559
that Callakaine was looked at by the Fixated Threat Assessment Center,
365
00:27:44.480 --> 00:27:49.000
a unit that examines threats from fixated individuals, but he
366
00:27:49.119 --> 00:27:52.759
didn't meet their threshold to be assessed further not at
367
00:27:52.759 --> 00:27:56.039
that point. We've discovered since that he was suffering from
368
00:27:56.400 --> 00:28:01.160
a number of psychiatric disorders. Buzzby mcvas that an intelligence
369
00:28:01.240 --> 00:28:05.960
report from FTAC regarding Calla Kaine's visit to Thames House
370
00:28:06.359 --> 00:28:10.079
was passed to Nottinghamshire Police the next day, the first
371
00:28:10.079 --> 00:28:13.359
of June, but that the force didn't then carry out
372
00:28:13.440 --> 00:28:17.599
their own assessment. Busby McVeigh said that was something she
373
00:28:17.920 --> 00:28:22.279
and I quote would have quite liked to have happened.
374
00:28:23.400 --> 00:28:26.440
I think that puts in a nutshell what we're talking about,
375
00:28:26.480 --> 00:28:28.640
doesn't it.
376
00:28:28.640 --> 00:28:34.000
It does, And I saw the comments from that video
377
00:28:34.039 --> 00:28:38.759
interaction with Calla Kain with the police in London, and
378
00:28:38.799 --> 00:28:41.680
a lot of the public were reading into it that
379
00:28:41.720 --> 00:28:47.079
that was another blunder, another opportunity missed. In fact, even
380
00:28:47.119 --> 00:28:50.119
the BBC News described it as more damning evidence of
381
00:28:50.200 --> 00:28:55.759
how Callakain could have been stopped. But my view is
382
00:28:55.799 --> 00:28:59.359
that when we think about what was he doing at
383
00:28:59.480 --> 00:29:03.359
m I five, the Security Service HQ of all places. Now,
384
00:29:04.880 --> 00:29:10.359
Paranoid schizophrenics can go through various phases of their schizophrenia
385
00:29:11.079 --> 00:29:15.079
in and out of psychosis, etc. And they can also
386
00:29:15.160 --> 00:29:19.680
be paranoid and think that they're being watched. So that
387
00:29:19.799 --> 00:29:25.880
interaction with Calacan was was not a blunder in terms
388
00:29:25.880 --> 00:29:34.000
of managing him. He was quite precise, clear, calm. He
389
00:29:34.079 --> 00:29:38.720
was behaving very oddly and that happens a lot. I
390
00:29:38.720 --> 00:29:42.359
think the officer even alluded to that. The fact that
391
00:29:42.400 --> 00:29:45.599
the MET looked at his potential threat to the government
392
00:29:45.799 --> 00:29:51.039
or security buildings was fine, and the report then went
393
00:29:51.119 --> 00:29:54.920
back to Nottingham, but it didn't in itself, it didn't
394
00:29:57.480 --> 00:30:01.960
raise a real concern about Calacan. The question is, of course,
395
00:30:02.000 --> 00:30:05.319
as if somebody was looking at Calakin as a whole
396
00:30:05.599 --> 00:30:08.200
and got that, it would have added to it. But
397
00:30:08.920 --> 00:30:16.039
Callakain's behavior had change, was periodically involved with stuff, and
398
00:30:16.079 --> 00:30:20.519
I think he went on later that year to be
399
00:30:20.599 --> 00:30:23.960
involved in a threat or an incident towards a fellow
400
00:30:24.039 --> 00:30:27.279
student at the university and that was dealt with as
401
00:30:27.480 --> 00:30:30.240
an internal matter at the university.
402
00:30:30.400 --> 00:30:34.079
So there's another agency involved there as well. I was
403
00:30:34.200 --> 00:30:39.279
thinking this was more the benefit of hindsight than it
404
00:30:39.440 --> 00:30:43.119
was blunders and institutionalized failings. But now you've brought in
405
00:30:43.160 --> 00:30:48.279
that extra element the university. It makes me wonder if
406
00:30:48.319 --> 00:30:54.519
this thinking had been joined up, perhaps the terrible crimes
407
00:30:54.759 --> 00:30:57.680
in Nottingham that Summer's Evening could have been avoided.
408
00:30:58.759 --> 00:31:02.640
Absolutely, and that obviously the Public Inquiry is looking into
409
00:31:02.680 --> 00:31:07.519
it exactly that, and I'm sure the term in an
410
00:31:07.559 --> 00:31:13.839
ideal world will be used again relating to that. I
411
00:31:14.400 --> 00:31:18.160
remember as well, if we're thinking about paranoid schizophrenia. I
412
00:31:18.599 --> 00:31:24.759
worked on a the Memoirs of a paranoid schizophrenic who
413
00:31:24.960 --> 00:31:28.480
I spent a lot of time with and worked on
414
00:31:29.480 --> 00:31:33.279
his memoirs, And he came from the Irish community. When
415
00:31:33.279 --> 00:31:36.240
he came he was born in Ireland and in the
416
00:31:36.319 --> 00:31:42.480
nineteen seventies as a child he was already developing some
417
00:31:42.519 --> 00:31:47.039
mental illness and some schizophrenia. As a young man and
418
00:31:47.119 --> 00:31:49.599
he became very paranoid, and he believed he was being
419
00:31:49.680 --> 00:31:53.880
watched by the security services because of the Irish troubles
420
00:31:53.920 --> 00:31:59.400
and the situation that was happening. Then. So this this
421
00:31:59.519 --> 00:32:07.200
paranoid and changes, you know, it changes with the circumstances
422
00:32:07.240 --> 00:32:11.839
and they adapt it to certain things. What kla Kan
423
00:32:11.960 --> 00:32:16.519
was doing at the Security Service, we don't appear to know,
424
00:32:16.640 --> 00:32:21.359
do we, And it certainly wouldn't have been He hadn't
425
00:32:21.359 --> 00:32:23.599
got anything particularly relevant to do, but he got it
426
00:32:23.640 --> 00:32:27.400
in his mind maybe that he thought he was being watched,
427
00:32:27.920 --> 00:32:31.720
that he wanted to ask why. We don't know, But
428
00:32:32.279 --> 00:32:35.720
his behavior was odd. He was deemed not to be
429
00:32:35.759 --> 00:32:41.759
a threat to those establishments, and his behavior that was
430
00:32:41.920 --> 00:32:44.039
happening in Nottingham was something separate.
431
00:32:44.480 --> 00:32:48.359
I suppose. Maybe it's a little bit like working for
432
00:32:48.799 --> 00:32:54.000
an international news organization. You do encounter odd people who
433
00:32:54.160 --> 00:32:57.160
turn up at the door with stories, in my case,
434
00:32:57.200 --> 00:33:02.400
but in your case, with potential criminal activity, bizarre comments.
435
00:33:02.799 --> 00:33:05.720
It must be fairly routine, isn't it. How do you
436
00:33:05.759 --> 00:33:09.160
go about sorting the wheat from the chaff? You know,
437
00:33:11.160 --> 00:33:14.880
to coin a phrase, the harmless nutter from the person
438
00:33:14.920 --> 00:33:18.279
who's actually got the story to tell. The reason I
439
00:33:18.440 --> 00:33:22.519
mentioned this is because of you remember that the Jeremy
440
00:33:22.559 --> 00:33:26.440
Thorpe affair in the nineteen seventies. He was the leader
441
00:33:26.480 --> 00:33:29.440
of the Liberal Party and
he was eventually convicted of
442
00:33:29.960 --> 00:33:35.200
conspiracy to murder. But the first person who flagged up
443
00:33:35.720 --> 00:33:38.720
any kind of concern about Jeremy Thorpe. Was a guy
444
00:33:38.759 --> 00:33:41.480
called Norman Scott who told the police that Thorpe had
445
00:33:41.559 --> 00:33:44.160
arranged for his dog to be shot. Went into a
446
00:33:44.200 --> 00:33:47.319
police station and said, in a rather flamboyant way, you know,
447
00:33:47.400 --> 00:33:51.519
my poor little dog, he's going to have Jeremy Thorpe's
448
00:33:51.519 --> 00:33:56.559
going to have my dog shot. And the police looked
449
00:33:56.559 --> 00:33:59.079
at each other, as you can imagine behind the front desk,
450
00:33:59.119 --> 00:34:03.799
and here's another one. Must be a full moon. But
451
00:34:03.960 --> 00:34:09.320
of course what he was saying had a substantial kernel
452
00:34:09.360 --> 00:34:12.199
of truth to it, and thought went on, as I said,
453
00:34:12.280 --> 00:34:15.519
to be convicted. So yeah, how do you thought the
454
00:34:15.559 --> 00:34:24.440
real cases the Norman Scots from your average, everyday harmless Nutter.
455
00:34:27.280 --> 00:34:32.440
That is an excellent point because we've got within the
456
00:34:32.440 --> 00:34:36.039
police organization now there is another system which deals with
457
00:34:36.199 --> 00:34:39.480
threats to life and how to manage, minimize and keep
458
00:34:39.519 --> 00:34:46.960
people safe, which is sort of the first role of
459
00:34:46.960 --> 00:34:52.519
policing to protect life and property. But as you say,
460
00:34:52.559 --> 00:34:58.639
there are many many instances either by people with mental
461
00:34:58.679 --> 00:35:08.199
health who or people who just say things aggressively ingest
462
00:35:08.280 --> 00:35:14.719
how do you interpret it? Comments suggestions of somebody who
463
00:35:14.760 --> 00:35:18.280
may be over risk to somebody, But it's more general
464
00:35:18.400 --> 00:35:24.519
rather than specific, So it's a minefield to manage people.
465
00:35:24.960 --> 00:35:29.920
And as we know, paranoid schizophrenks aren't always in a
466
00:35:29.960 --> 00:35:35.280
psychotic state, and those that make verbal threats on one
467
00:35:35.400 --> 00:35:38.559
day might be somebody completely different than the other.
468
00:35:39.599 --> 00:35:45.719
Okay, final question, do you think that policing manages intelligence
469
00:35:45.960 --> 00:35:51.159
better now than when you began your service in nineteen
470
00:35:51.199 --> 00:35:55.119
eighty five. Let's set aside the technical aspects of it.
471
00:35:55.559 --> 00:36:01.239
I'm thinking about institutional attitudes to intelligence. Do you think
472
00:36:01.320 --> 00:36:03.400
that the attitude has changed?
473
00:36:05.960 --> 00:36:09.320
Yes? I do. It's a good question, though, and I
474
00:36:09.400 --> 00:36:12.760
think that in nineteen eighty five we were we the
475
00:36:12.760 --> 00:36:18.320
police were better at getting information. We're better at interacting
476
00:36:19.920 --> 00:36:23.320
with the public and with criminals. We spent more time
477
00:36:23.360 --> 00:36:26.039
with them, We had more conversations with them for a
478
00:36:26.119 --> 00:36:29.159
number of reasons. But we look people in the eye
479
00:36:29.199 --> 00:36:33.119
a bit more in those days, and the relationships with
480
00:36:33.159 --> 00:36:39.320
individuals was more fluid. Where we are better now is
481
00:36:40.280 --> 00:36:44.119
the recording and analyzing of the information and then converting
482
00:36:44.199 --> 00:36:49.800
into what would you say, actionable intelligence. But as good
483
00:36:49.800 --> 00:36:55.079
as our intelligence picture is now, it still needs actioning
484
00:36:55.079 --> 00:36:58.159
and it still needs dealing with. Can you give me
485
00:36:58.199 --> 00:37:02.840
some examples, yes, I think now one of the tools
486
00:37:03.679 --> 00:37:06.320
the police have that we never had in nineteen eighty
487
00:37:06.360 --> 00:37:11.280
five was the command and control system. Such a useful
488
00:37:11.320 --> 00:37:16.000
tool because it records or calls into the police about
489
00:37:16.480 --> 00:37:25.880
antisocial behavior, about domestic abuse, about drink driving, whatever it
490
00:37:25.960 --> 00:37:30.559
may be. And it's a database that has such a
491
00:37:30.639 --> 00:37:37.719
lot of information and is regularly tralled and provides intelligence
492
00:37:38.199 --> 00:37:43.880
and then evidence for subsequent inquiries in investigations. So yeah,
493
00:37:43.920 --> 00:37:50.800
that has changed tremendously. In the old days, police stations
494
00:37:50.840 --> 00:37:53.719
would have a lever arch file and any coll coming
495
00:37:53.760 --> 00:37:58.880
into that police station would be the call will be taken,
496
00:38:00.800 --> 00:38:04.480
a decision made whether to record an incident on a
497
00:38:04.519 --> 00:38:09.159
piece of paper, give it a subsequent number, and put
498
00:38:09.159 --> 00:38:17.119
in a file for action. Very antiquated, very difficult to research.
499
00:38:17.239 --> 00:38:20.599
Later it went nowhere other than a filing cabinet in
500
00:38:20.719 --> 00:38:24.960
that control room once it was signed off by the
501
00:38:25.000 --> 00:38:27.800
supervisors and management, and that.
502
00:38:27.719 --> 00:38:30.679
Would be a process that was familiar to offices in
503
00:38:30.760 --> 00:38:34.679
nineteen twenty five, just as it was in nineteen eighty five.
504
00:38:35.320 --> 00:38:39.960
Precisely now we may not be working in those silos
505
00:38:40.039 --> 00:38:44.480
particularly anymore, but there's still that risk of intelligence disappearing
506
00:38:44.519 --> 00:38:51.280
down a rabbit hole because departments maybe protect themselves, and
507
00:38:51.320 --> 00:38:56.320
it's whether somebody takes real ownership of an individual or
508
00:38:56.360 --> 00:38:58.800
of a case, and that's key.
509
00:38:59.760 --> 00:39:01.760
It's the same in journalism. A lot of what you're
510
00:39:01.800 --> 00:39:05.599
saying is resonating with me about so much information coming
511
00:39:05.679 --> 00:39:08.719
in on a screen, people sitting in an office, not
512
00:39:08.880 --> 00:39:11.800
going out, not using shoe leather, not talking to people
513
00:39:11.880 --> 00:39:14.000
face to face, the whole idea that you can do
514
00:39:14.119 --> 00:39:17.039
all of this on a teams meeting or on a spreadsheet.
515
00:39:17.320 --> 00:39:20.920
We call it air conditioned journalism because reporters no longer
516
00:39:21.000 --> 00:39:25.199
go out and report. And yet what I tell my
517
00:39:25.400 --> 00:39:27.920
students is that that's the one thing you've got to
518
00:39:27.960 --> 00:39:30.559
do is to go out and learn to interact with people,
519
00:39:30.599 --> 00:39:33.280
to talk to people total strangers, to be able to
520
00:39:33.360 --> 00:39:37.840
develop conversations. And the best place of doing it, I say,
521
00:39:38.719 --> 00:39:42.360
is the good old English public house, which maybe is
522
00:39:42.400 --> 00:39:46.800
where we're heading now having completed this episode of The
523
00:39:46.840 --> 00:39:49.800
Detective's Files True Crime Tales with Jack Morrel.
524
00:39:50.199 --> 00:39:52.480
The truth is out there, Simon, and we're going to
525
00:39:52.519 --> 00:39:53.840
find it excellent.
526
00:39:54.000 --> 00:39:57.760
Thanks so much again, it's fascinating talking to you about
527
00:39:57.800 --> 00:40:02.000
your decades of experience as a copper and a detective
528
00:40:02.599 --> 00:40:05.719
in Nottingham. And thank you for listening. I hope you've
529
00:40:05.840 --> 00:40:08.719
enjoyed it. We've gone down a few rabbit holes this time,
530
00:40:09.079 --> 00:40:12.599
but I'm sure you'll agree with me that the information
531
00:40:13.079 --> 00:40:16.840
that we've been able to discuss is utterly fascinating and
532
00:40:16.920 --> 00:40:19.800
a record of not just how things used to be,
533
00:40:20.400 --> 00:40:24.079
but how things are now and possibly where they're going
534
00:40:24.079 --> 00:40:27.400
in the future. We'll see you again next time.