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Welcome to Cyberminded, where cybersecurity, behavior, and leadership meet.
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I'm Dr.
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Dustin Sachs, and this podcast, co-sponsored by CyberCog Labs and Cybersec Media, asks a simple question.
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What if the biggest risks in cybersecurity start with how we think, decide, and respond?
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Each episode is a chance to pause, reflect, and see security through a more human lens.
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Let's take some time and look beyond the controls to the human side of cybersecurity.
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Welcome to today's episode.
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Today we're exploring a problem in cybersecurity that leaders have wrestled with for years.
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Why people fail to take secure action even when the policy, training, or control exists.
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Organizations often assume that the answer is more awareness, more reminders, or more accountability, but the same patterns keep showing up.
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The issue isn't whether or not people care.
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It's that security has been designed around this concept of what we'll talk about today of the perfectly rational and level human being, someone who's calm, focused, attentive, emotionally regulated, and able to make secure choices, but not just once, every time.
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365 days a year, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
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If anyone on here knows somebody who meets the requirements that they are perfectly level every day of the year, all the time, without fail, send us a message because I'd love to meet that person, because that person doesn't exist.
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So the question that we're going to ask today, we're going to start off with what breaks when cybersecurity designs for an ideal human instead of what we all know, the real human?
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So, behavioral science answer is that people make security decisions inside real work conditions.
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We talk about this all the time here.
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Deadlines, interruptions, fatigue, ambiguity, social pressure, fear of looking foolish, which is probably more often than not, and competing priorities.
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Part of this is, and we'll talk a lot about this today, but executive function gives us a language for a part of this.
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And that's the important thing, a part of this.
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But it can also feel, as we're going to talk about squishy, unless we translate it into observable work.
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Can people prioritize?
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Can they remember?
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Can they start?
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Can they switch?
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Can they escalate and follow through under pressure?
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We all say we're great multitaskers, but the reality is, and the research really kind of backs up is we as humans don't do a very good job of multitasking.
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We may think we do, but that's the space this podcast is built to explore.
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My guest today is Shoshana Gordon.
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She's the owner and coach at Gordon Coaching.
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Shoshana is a coach manager, former technology operations leader whose work sits at the intersection of executive function, team development, security operations.
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Her public work includes security operations and compliance, technical operations, and I believe you had a security weekly conversation built around the idea that morale is a safety control.
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That makes her an ideal guest for today's conversation on the human conditions that determine whether security work actually happens.
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Joshana, welcome to Cyberminded.
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Oh, it's such a pleasure to be here.
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So before we get into the deeper parts of the conversation, I want to start with your perspective.
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This has been a fun question to ask at the beginning.
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I've talked about this on every episode how this is starting to become a really fun question.
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And the question that I'll ask you is this when you hear the phrase the human side of cybersecurity, what does it mean to you and where do you think the industry still misunderstands it?
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Oh, uh, that is a fun question.
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So I think actually that a lot of cybersecurity resides in the human side, and that it gets overlooked a lot.
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You called it squishy.
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I love that.
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There's a temptation to skip the squishy and to want to like not deal, skipping the sort of obvious information that like people have been perpetuating fraud on each other for a long time, and that basically entirely lives in the space of people being squishy.
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I love it.
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And by the way, I'll I'm gonna I'm gonna devolve into my behavioral science just for a moment for everybody.
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What you just saw is a really great example of anchoring bias.
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I used the word squishy a bunch of times in our prep call.
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I started off the conversation about squishy, so I anchored Shoshana into this concept of squishy so that it was ingrained in her mind.
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I use that as an example.
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Adopted, right?
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Oh,
Load full transcript
yeah.
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Recognize and prepared to talk about it.
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Oh, of course.
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Absolutely.
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And prepared to highlight it in a space where I don't assume that it's the default.
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Yeah.
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No, absolutely makes sense.
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Before we go further, this episode is supported by CyberCog Labs.
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At Cybercog Labs, we help cybersecurity and risk leaders look beyond control design to understand where human behavior is shaping cyber risk.
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Because the issue is not that a control does not exist, it's that the control breaks down when real people encounter pressure, ambiguity, competing priorities, unclear incentives, or decision fatigue.
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Cybercog Labs helps leaders identify those breakdowns and turn behavioral cyber risk into practical, board-relevant insight.
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Visit us at cybercog.com.
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That's P-S Y B-E-R-C-O-G.com.
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Now, with that in mind, let's get into the problem beneath the problem.
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So, Shoshana, the topic for today is really when we distill it down, it's about morale.
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It's the morale as a security control.
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It's the way we feel about the work that we're doing.
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And I want to start with that kind of concept.
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And the first part of this is really going to be a lot about the theoretical.
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We'll get into some of the more practical later.
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But many organizations still treat morale, treat all of these squishy topics we're going to talk about as a management issue rather than a risk issue.
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They don't tie the two together.
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So when did it become clear to you that these squishy topics about workplace and the way in which we operate, when did you notice that this was more about risk than it was about soft management, everyday kind of skills?
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So the roots of my realizing that are actually, as soon as I was in the tech field, my first job was doing telephone tech support for IBM.
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And you got a peek at people's states when they called in and how much that could impact the call.
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For example, one of the best groups of people to work with were the feds who called in from agencies whose name they couldn't give you, who said, I don't have an internet connection in this building and it's guarded by guys with guns.
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At which point you were just like, Welp, let's go.
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But because they sort of walked in with the understanding that like they were gonna read us line messages like punctuation mark by punctuation mark, that is not a hypothetical.
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I had someone reading me Colins.
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Then actually it was very spit, like you were just like, here we are on the phone, we're gonna do this.
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Right.
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And it was in contrast to people who'd call up in hysterics, already angry that you hadn't fixed their problem, who are actually a lot harder to deal with.
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Yeah.
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And I'm sure those guys who were reading the punctuation were also doing air quotes even while they're on the phone and can't you can't see them?
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They're probably sitting there going, quote.
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Honestly, for the little adjusting, there's a reason I remember this story.
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Oh, yeah.
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It was a very distinct attitude toward the weapon.
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Of course.
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So, where do cybersecurity leaders misdiagnose human failure as carelessness when in fact really what they're missing is it's either overload or ambiguity or the poor team conditions or any number of things, where do you see that being misdiagnosed most?
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So, and this may be a controversial statement.
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I see that starting inside the head of the person who's already in cybersecurity.
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So if you like computers a lot and you like computer problems a lot, you are already self-selecting.
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You like the machine.
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Well, the machine doesn't talk back to me.
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Usually it follows, it usually follows the directions I give it exactly.
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Uh it doesn't really like, you know, decide to just stop working.
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Well, I guess maybe it does.
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It's deterministic or at least pretends to be deterministic, right?
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It will wait for you indefinitely.
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It will sit there and listen when I'm feeling bad and just need somebody to talk to, you know.
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Right.
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Doesn't judge me.
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It doesn't judge me.
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There's no judgment.
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You can be wrong, but the computer can't tell anyone that you're wrong.
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Okay.
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Also, I will just say out loud that I have still not met a security person who doesn't have a secret soft spot for the heist story.
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There's a reason that we love being like, okay, how'd you get in?
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What did you do?
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Oh my god, I can't believe they taped the password there, right?
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The CEO's dog's name that he opened every presentation with.
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Yeah, I tell people that when I started out in forensics, my manager would regularly come to me and go, if you were gonna do it, how would you do it?
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And I was like, Cool.
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I get to play bad guy and not go to jail.
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Cool.
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This is awesome.
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I have a story about that one that I'll tell.
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Let me just put it this way I had never seen a hacker so happy to be given permission to test in production.
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Yep.
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Okay, so let's just caveat that like you attract people who like the machinery.
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Good.
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You have people who have a soft spot for the red team or the heist tail, also good.
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What you don't tend to see a lot of in security are like people who sort of self-identify as people, people, feelings people, right?
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And in fact, I've met quite a number of people in security that kind of want to roll their eyes to the heavens even for saying that.
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With me being very serious and saying, but hang on a second, right?
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Think of how people talk about fraudsters and hooksters, right?
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One of the words that tends to get used, at least in retelling those stories, is charismatic.
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Right?
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You can't sell people on a big idea that doesn't exist unless you have some way to sell to them.
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Yeah, I mean, Bernie Madoff was phenomenal at convincing people to do things.
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I mean, probably the top example, and I think most people of a certain age at this point have seen it, is Frank Abingdale.
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Or for those of you who are not old enough to remember Leonardo DiCaprio and catch me if you can.
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Let's caveat for those who don't already.
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You all know Frank Abingnail, whether you realize it or not.
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He talks, I listened to him talk.
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He talks about being very charismatic and claiming to be a doctor and playing it off and no one being the wiser, but yet at the same time, these are also people who, when you ask them about their, I'm very introverted.
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It's like, are you really though?
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So I think that it's not hard to come up with examples.
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And then you ask me where, like, where do you think it gets overlooked?
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And I think that's part of it, it's just up front.
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Yeah.
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Right?
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That you have a certain typical average mindset that excludes certain things while including others.
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Yes, so many of us think we're introverted, and then when we're shown the evidence, go, oh wow, I'm really not as introverted as I thought.
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And I would submit actually that most people are a little bit more emotional than they want to talk about.
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I can contrast working in a corporate environment to working as a private coach.
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People are much more emotional one-on-one with a coach.
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They were also more emotional one-on-one with me as a manager.
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Big meeting, forget it.
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Oh, yeah.
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I think what you're saying and what you're talking about really is important.
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I think we often build our controls, build our systems, assuming a steady human operator, someone who's attentive, calm, clear on priorities, willing to express themselves, willing to speak up, but real security, people are tired, they're confused, they're rushed, they're unsure whether or not they feel safe to bring something up.
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So, first of all, when we talk about what is executive function, I would love for you to give people an understanding because when you hear executive function, there may be some kind of preconceived notions of it.
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But what does executive function teach us about why this just follow the process concept is a weaker instruction than leaders think.
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Just follow the process, just do what the policy says, just follow the instructions I'm giving you.
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Why is that a weaker approach to security than most leaders think?
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So let's talk about executive function for a minute.
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It's one of my favorite topics.
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So executive function is a sort of aspect of you that tends to handle things like starting a task, stopping a task, decision making, planning, and follow-through.
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Everybody has it, but everyone occasionally has deficits in it.
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One of the things that people tend to recognize is relating this to ADHD.
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So folks who have ADHD tend to have challenges with executive function.
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And so people often think of it in that context.
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It is, however, not limited to ADHD, and I'm not talking just about those who have a diagnosis.
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I am not a doctor,
so I don't diagnose and I don't prescribe.
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And I'm not one, and my wife would be very clear for me to explain I am a doctor, but not that kind of doctor.
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Right.
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All right.
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So caveats aside, though, if you know what you're looking for, you can see patterns here, right?
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If you let's use taxes as an example, most people encounter taxes, they are a lot of little bubbles and squinty little instructions, and all the numbers gotta line up, right?
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And there's plenty of folks where you look at what they can accomplish in their job.
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You're like, but you wrote this giant report, you spoke confidently to the VPs, right?
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You I know you're a math major, but why are your taxes a week late?
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Right.
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And one of the answers to that can be that it is like everything that you're worst at.
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You have to start.
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You probably don't finish in one go, so then you have to stop.
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Then you have to come back, right?
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You have to bring focus each time.
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You might find the topic very boring, right?
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Every little line has to have its own little answer, right?
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By the way, if you're out there and you're already finding this frustrating, I get it.
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There's a reason I'm picking it as an example.
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Okay.
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And what I really want to highlight is that just because you're good at something in your life does not mean that you have tons and tons of executive function.
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There are lots of things to be good at as a person.
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And you also have to encounter the paradox that sometimes pressure or stress can cause improved performance in areas of challenge for folks with executive function problems.
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Yeah, I think the corollary is we always hear about the stories of people having ungodly feats of strength when they're in a situation of extreme stress where they model their style, can lift the car, kind of things.
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And those are real scenarios where you know something just focused in on things, those people who become, I'll say myopic, but myopic in a positive manner.
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Focused.
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Yeah, very focused.
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Yeah.
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And so again, I'll kind of speak out to your audience.
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Like if you're the sort of person who can look at your report and look at your report and look at your report, and you can't start it until four hours before it's due.
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Part of what's happening there is the pressure and the deadline are triggering a change in your executive function state.
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Yeah, I think we've all at some point had that experience where you crammed for the test the night before in college and then show up and do an amazing job, and you're like, oh, I'll do this again and again and again.
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And you always go, How is it that you're the one who can cram the night before and then get an A on the test?
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Because that pressure of I've got to get it done, gets it done.
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So focuses you down.
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Yep.
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Which really leads really well into the next question, the last question of the first half of our conversation.
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But in cybersecurity and in the work that we that you see and that you've seen in your career, where do you see organizations confusing activity, which is they're not doing, they're not very busy, they're not, you know, they don't look like they're putting in the effort with the actual follow-through of, but they got the job done really well.
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So I see mixed things in this space.
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It depends a little bit on what you're measuring.
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So on the one hand, you have busy.
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Anyone can be busy, right?
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And what I call busy is you're very active, but your results are indifferent.
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Right?
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Right.
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Then you can be active, which is not a by the way, this is not a distinction that always gets made, for example, at every meeting, but I'll make it now.
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Like you can be active and having results where you're investing a lot of effort, but you're seeing what comes out of it.
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And then there's the question separately of those two, of what the perception is, what looks right.
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So someone can indeed be visibly sitting at a desk taping away, right?
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And someone else is walking around the floor thinking, right?
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And even if they're both thinking about the World Cup, one of them looks busy and one of them does not.
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So I actually think that there's a bit of a problem about perception in a corporate situation in general, where people look at the moment-by-moment behavior and not always at the results.
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And it's particularly problematic when results are quite delayed or a little ambiguous.
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Yeah.
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So talking off that, I'm gonna I wanna just inject
this one last question in this first part.
00:18:28.720 --> 00:18:36.960
But when you hear somebody say, when you are coaching somebody, or when you've experienced and seen a leader say they should have known better, what are they missing?
00:18:37.119 --> 00:18:38.079
What are they ignoring?
00:18:38.240 --> 00:18:41.440
What are they not paying attention to that they should be?
00:18:42.400 --> 00:18:51.440
Interestingly, I feel like one of the things that get skipped there is ask the person what happened, and then it doesn't always get asked, first of all.
00:18:51.759 --> 00:18:54.960
And secondly, it doesn't always get asked neutrally.
00:18:55.200 --> 00:18:59.039
Why are you stupid is not a neutral way to ask a question.
00:18:59.359 --> 00:18:59.759
You're right.
00:19:00.559 --> 00:19:11.359
Saying what happened yesterday is more neutral, but it doesn't work if they've had 12 instances of you yelling, why are you stupid in the past week?
00:19:11.599 --> 00:19:11.839
Right?
00:19:11.920 --> 00:19:15.519
So it's a little cumulative and you have to start drawing people out.
00:19:15.839 --> 00:19:27.759
Yeah, it's funny that you bring up that example because I always think back to when I was doing my year of law school, the whole concept of asking questions that suppose an outcome or that already have information built in.
00:19:27.920 --> 00:19:29.119
Did you murder your wife?
00:19:29.279 --> 00:19:31.119
Which assumes so many different things.
00:19:31.279 --> 00:19:34.799
First of all, you're assuming that they actually did what you're saying.
00:19:34.960 --> 00:19:37.680
You're also assuming they're even married in the first place.
00:19:37.920 --> 00:19:41.599
Or the question, the joke is always when did you stop beating your wife?
00:19:41.839 --> 00:19:42.240
Correct.
00:19:42.319 --> 00:19:43.279
It's exactly that.
00:19:43.440 --> 00:19:47.359
So that would immediately call up, by the way, that just ask.
00:19:47.599 --> 00:19:48.160
Right.
00:19:48.480 --> 00:19:57.519
And the prep for you being able to ask is something that comes up a lot in both management and coaching that is easy to say, hard to do is you got to build trust.
00:19:57.839 --> 00:19:58.240
Yeah.
00:19:58.400 --> 00:20:11.039
And you've got to assume that it's not they're stupid, they don't understand it, they have got a knowledge gap, it's something else going on, which I think is the really that key takeaway for the first part of this conversation.
00:20:11.119 --> 00:20:14.480
It's that secure behavior isn't a knowledge problem.
00:20:14.559 --> 00:20:22.640
We all know what we know why our passwords should be 16 plus characters with multiple different types of things.
00:20:22.799 --> 00:20:29.920
We all understand that, but the conditions of the situation, we've got to work fast, we've got to, we're not allowed to write it down.
00:20:30.559 --> 00:20:39.680
All of these things create this scenario where we're expecting the person to have perfect attention, perfect memory, perfect regulation of their emotions.
00:20:39.839 --> 00:20:43.680
And it's building around this, what we'll call fictional operator.
00:20:43.839 --> 00:20:46.640
So it's it's an important concept to keep in mind.
00:20:46.960 --> 00:20:50.079
Make sure you save the dates for our 2027 events.
00:20:50.240 --> 00:20:54.000
CyberHackCon will be held in Dallas Fort Worth this February.
00:20:54.319 --> 00:20:58.720
OTSECCon will take place on April 14th and 15th at the George R.
00:20:58.880 --> 00:21:00.319
Brown Convention Center.
00:21:00.480 --> 00:21:05.680
And CyberSecCon will take place on September 22nd and 23rd at the George R.
00:21:05.839 --> 00:21:07.039
Brown Convention Center.
00:21:07.119 --> 00:21:08.559
Tickets will go on sale soon.
00:21:08.640 --> 00:21:10.000
We hope to see you there.
00:21:10.480 --> 00:21:16.160
So I want to move from the conceptual into a little bit more the practical and what can people actually do with it.
00:21:16.319 --> 00:21:22.480
You know, most, and I loved what you said in the last part about measurement, because it matters about what you're measuring.
00:21:22.640 --> 00:21:28.160
We talk about that all the time on this podcast and in the work that I do.
00:21:28.480 --> 00:21:33.119
Most organizations have, as we always say, they have no trouble measuring.
00:21:33.279 --> 00:21:34.400
Did we complete training?
00:21:34.559 --> 00:21:35.599
Did we close tickets?
00:21:35.839 --> 00:21:37.440
Did we acknowledge policies?
00:21:37.759 --> 00:21:47.599
But that doesn't tell us whether or not when the incident happens, when the decision has to be made, whether or not the conditions are right for that person to be successful.
00:21:47.759 --> 00:21:49.920
And at the end of the day, that's what we're worried about.
00:21:50.160 --> 00:21:59.759
So, how can leaders make what we've called squishy concepts like executive function concrete enough for their teams so that?
00:22:00.240 --> 00:22:03.359
That they can improve their security work.
00:22:03.599 --> 00:22:07.920
We talk about this idea of building a psychologically safe workplace.
00:22:08.079 --> 00:22:10.160
How do we actually do that though?
00:22:10.480 --> 00:22:11.759
So that's an interesting set of questions.
00:22:11.839 --> 00:22:12.960
Those are actually two different things.
00:22:13.119 --> 00:22:15.839
So let's pull a couple pieces apart, first of all.
00:22:16.160 --> 00:22:24.240
So one is executive function is a little bit about the framework of how you get things done, not what you get done.
00:22:24.559 --> 00:22:32.000
So just executive function all by itself doesn't get you security unless that's the thing that you're applying your techniques to.
00:22:32.319 --> 00:22:37.279
So as a real example, many people like the idea of inbox zero, right?
00:22:37.359 --> 00:22:42.559
You actually go through, you read everything, you handle all your emails, and you get them out of your inbox.
00:22:42.720 -->
00:22:43.039
Okay.
00:22:43.200 --> 00:22:45.599
You can do inbox zero as a security professional.
00:22:45.839 --> 00:22:48.319
You can do inbox zero as a freelance artist.
00:22:48.960 --> 00:22:49.279
Okay.
00:22:49.440 --> 00:22:52.000
It's a technique for a person, not a role.
00:22:52.240 --> 00:23:05.039
With that said, one of my observations as both a manager and a coach is that it helps a lot more to catch people doing the right thing and reward them for it than it does to yell about problems.
00:23:05.519 --> 00:23:08.640
So you need to correct if someone's making serious mistakes.
00:23:08.799 --> 00:23:16.160
Look, if you're a security professional and you just don't do your work, you need to have a performance conversation.
00:23:16.880 --> 00:23:25.519
But if you want your security professionals to pay attention when someone brings a strange problem to them, you have to reward them for it.
00:23:26.000 --> 00:23:27.599
Oh, you heard from HR?
00:23:27.839 --> 00:23:28.319
Interesting.
00:23:28.480 --> 00:23:29.759
They don't usually talk to us.
00:23:29.920 --> 00:23:31.200
What did they say?
00:23:32.160 --> 00:23:39.039
My favorite story in this is summed up by okay, is it okay if we keep sending internally confidential information by spreadsheet through Google?
00:23:39.359 --> 00:23:39.680
No.
00:23:39.920 --> 00:23:41.759
What if we're already doing it?
00:23:42.240 --> 00:23:42.559
No.
00:23:43.920 --> 00:23:44.240
Okay.
00:23:44.880 --> 00:23:50.079
But you have to actually reward someone pausing long enough to have that conversation.
00:23:50.559 --> 00:23:50.799
Yeah.
00:23:50.960 --> 00:23:59.680
And the example I'll give when I worked at the electric provider in Houston, we actually took the concept of the fish simulations.
00:23:59.759 --> 00:24:21.839
And yeah, we still did fish simulation, but we actually highlighted more often what we called our nice catch program, which was the idea that in this quarter, this person reported an email that was statistically and numerically based on our systems, the most likely to impact the organization and was going to impact the most people.
00:24:22.160 --> 00:24:33.440
This person saved 3,000 people from clicking on an email that they would have otherwise clicked on because they reported it and the system immediately removed it from the environment.
00:24:33.599 --> 00:24:37.599
So the other 3,000 people didn't even have a chance to click on it.
00:24:37.759 --> 00:24:43.920
And part of it is also balancing, making sure it's coming from the right level of leader.
00:24:44.079 --> 00:24:57.519
The higher the level of the leader, or and it varies depending on organization, because if the person at that highly high level isn't normally an approachable person, it's not going to mean the same.
00:24:57.839 --> 00:25:14.880
Elon Musk pointing out to a SpaceX employee something awesome they did, probably not the same as the C the manager at a local restaurant pointing out something somebody did really well, somebody who you talk with every day or approach every day.
00:25:15.039 --> 00:25:17.920
So is it the CISO that's the one who's pointing it out?
00:25:18.079 --> 00:25:19.599
Maybe, if they're well known.
00:25:19.759 --> 00:25:20.960
Is it the CEO?
00:25:21.119 --> 00:25:21.440
Maybe.
00:25:22.000 --> 00:25:26.000
It depends on you got to figure out in your organization who that right person is.
00:25:26.160 --> 00:25:35.519
Who's that person that when people get that message, they're gonna or see that message, they're gonna go, oh wow, that person called this person, like highlighted this person's success.
00:25:35.680 --> 00:25:36.960
I want to be like that.
00:25:37.119 --> 00:25:38.160
That's really cool.
00:25:38.319 --> 00:25:40.400
Those are the types of things you want to look for.
00:25:40.640 --> 00:25:43.119
So I think that's the really great point.
00:25:43.359 --> 00:25:45.839
So back to the metrics question.
00:25:46.480 --> 00:26:11.920
What should security teams observe or measure differently if they want to design for more of the real human instead of this idealized, perfect, rational human who has perfect executive function, makes the right decisions every time, is 100%, you know, always operating at top, can multitask and do a million things at once, all of the things that we know don't exist.
00:26:12.160 --> 00:26:15.119
But what should they be measuring differently?
00:26:15.200 --> 00:26:17.839
How can they show that it's actually moving forward?
00:26:18.160 --> 00:26:23.039
So that one is bigger than I have a sort of on hand answer for.
00:26:23.119 --> 00:26:26.880
I think if I had that answer, I think I'd be touring the CISO circuit.
00:26:27.440 --> 00:26:35.200
What I will say though is simple numbers are not just adequate on their own.
00:26:35.599 --> 00:26:37.119
So by all means have numbers.
00:26:37.200 --> 00:26:39.519
Like I'm not saying skip a hard metric.
00:26:39.920 --> 00:26:46.079
But I at the very least, I would say you need to look at who's talking to you in a given period.
00:26:46.799 --> 00:26:53.920
So for example, I took a job at one point where it turned out that no one was talking to IT, right?
00:26:54.000 --> 00:26:57.119
That it was considered odd that I went off and I found the IT director.
00:26:57.359 --> 00:27:00.000
I was at the time ahead of DevOps under software engineering.
00:27:01.680 --> 00:27:11.200
IT, as you might expect, had all of this stuff that they were in charge of, including like everybody's access and logins and emails, right?
00:27:11.279 --> 00:27:18.640
And was supporting HR, which also meant everybody's medical information or like their insurance information and pay.
00:27:19.200 --> 00:27:19.599
Right.
00:27:19.839 --> 00:27:22.880
So I would say that is a metric that I think you have to have a look at.
00:27:23.039 --> 00:27:24.240
Who did you talk to?
00:27:24.480 --> 00:27:27.200
How recently, and at what level?
00:27:27.519 -->
00:27:37.920
Yeah, and this really goes to the point of what I talk about, which is the idea that there's really three levels of what we'll call decision ecosystem, you know, decision making.
00:27:38.079 --> 00:27:41.839
There's that base level of decision making, should I buy the Oreos or not?
00:27:41.920 --> 00:27:45.119
That's gonna be subject to am I hungry that day?
00:27:45.279 --> 00:27:46.960
Are the Oreos on sale?
00:27:47.200 --> 00:27:49.599
Am I having a bad day and I just need them?
00:27:49.920 --> 00:27:54.480
The level you're talking about, that measure, and we do it really well, is that decision support.
00:27:54.640 --> 00:27:56.720
We've got so many tools that can measure.
00:27:56.799 --> 00:28:02.640
But what those tools are never gonna tell us is why or what's going on that's driving those numbers.
00:28:02.799 --> 00:28:13.279
That's where when CyberCog Labs, when we talk about decision ecosystems, we're talking about understanding not only the metrics, not only the conditions, but also why.
00:28:13.440 --> 00:28:17.920
How are those coming together to actually determine the outcome?
00:28:18.720 --> 00:28:19.599
So rip off that one.
00:28:19.759 --> 00:28:20.000
Yeah, please.
00:28:20.799 --> 00:28:20.960
Please.
00:28:21.200 --> 00:28:25.920
So it's one of the other things that I would say that you want to measure is where do things get stuck?
00:28:26.240 --> 00:28:26.720
Yep.
00:28:26.960 --> 00:28:30.720
Not where people say things get stuck, where they actually get stuck.
00:28:31.599 --> 00:28:38.000
Because oftentimes, if you have a tech heavy crowd, your root problem is not your technology, right?
00:28:38.480 --> 00:28:39.680
I'll give us an example.
00:28:39.839 --> 00:28:49.839
I showed up and I looked at the new security readout that one of my employers was rolling out, a bit of a test, and log4j showed up as its own category.
00:28:51.039 --> 00:28:53.680
I said, that sounds bad, right?
00:28:54.240 --> 00:28:57.599
When I went to tell people, hey, this is showing up, what's happening?
00:28:57.759 --> 00:29:00.319
Their first reaction was, never mind, we fixed it already.
00:29:01.119 --> 00:29:04.720
And my reaction, even though I wasn't in security at time, I was like, really?
00:29:06.160 --> 00:29:11.440
Because it's showing up and you haven't looked at anything, right?
00:29:11.680 --> 00:29:16.480
So if I analyze like what is the problem in there, the problem isn't that the tool showed it, right?
00:29:16.640 --> 00:29:20.799
The problem isn't even that someone knew that you had supposedly fixed it, right?
00:29:20.960 --> 00:29:25.200
The problem is that wasn't enough to get someone to double check, right?
00:29:25.359 --> 00:29:33.759
That the prompt that should have triggered a human to do something didn't result in so much as a five-minute check, right?
00:29:33.920 --> 00:29:36.480
And so immediate dismissal, right?
00:29:36.960 --> 00:29:44.480
And knowing the situation a little bit bigger, I can say that the root there was that security work was very deeply deprioritized.
00:29:45.920 --> 00:29:46.319
Right.
00:29:46.480 --> 00:29:52.480
And so it wasn't that people were specifically revolting against it.
00:29:52.640 --> 00:29:58.640
It's not built in, just not part of the flow in their process.
00:29:59.599 --> 00:30:00.079
Yeah.
00:30:00.400 --> 00:30:06.799
The practical shift, I think, here is to stop treating all of these topics as a private personal trait.
00:30:06.960 --> 00:30:11.759
It's not the person is broken or the person is bad or the person is anything.
00:30:11.920 --> 00:30:18.799
It's the design of the workplace, the design of all of the environment is really at issue.
00:30:18.960 --> 00:30:28.880
You know, if people are in a position where they can't prioritize, they can't remember, they can't switch context, they can't escalate or follow through, leaders shouldn't ask what's wrong with the person.
00:30:29.119 --> 00:30:32.480
They should ask, what's wrong with the system we've built for them?
00:30:32.799 --> 00:30:33.599
Given everything we've got to do.
00:30:35.680 --> 00:30:41.039
We're using the word wrong, which is a bit of uh uh critique mentality, right?
00:30:41.200 --> 00:30:44.880
And what I would say instead is what could you say about the system?
00:30:45.119 --> 00:30:48.559
Yeah, rather than then finding it as an error.
00:30:48.880 --> 00:30:57.680
So in this particular scenario, I had I had been used to thinking about things in terms of a security flow and was quite frustrated by this answer I got.
00:30:58.480 --> 00:31:09.680
From the other person's side, though, what they had is some random person, not even from the security team, trying to hand them arbitrary investigative.
00:31:10.880 --> 00:31:11.279
Right.
00:31:11.519 --> 00:31:22.160
And what you say about the system there is neither right nor wrong, but this work doesn't have a place right now, it doesn't belong to anyone.
00:31:22.559 --> 00:31:24.079
Yeah, and and I think you're right.
00:31:24.160 --> 00:31:29.200
It's not about right or wrong in the context that we normally think about right and wrong.
00:31:29.279 --> 00:31:33.920
And and thank you for pointing it out because I think it's about is it not optimal?
00:31:34.079 --> 00:31:35.599
Is it not the best?
00:31:36.000 --> 00:31:39.039
So wrong is it wrong is a strong word, and you're right.
00:31:39.119 --> 00:31:40.079
You're absolutely right.
00:31:40.240 --> 00:31:48.000
Given everything we've discussed about the topics that we've discussed today, I want to close with the question we ask every one of our guests.
00:31:48.160 --> 00:31:53.200
This is the other question we ask everybody, and it's a really it's a really great one as well.
00:31:53.359 --> 00:31:58.720
What is one place where the cybersecurity field needs to slow down and think more carefully?
00:31:59.039 --> 00:32:23.200
So I think the cybersecurity field needs to slow down and think more carefully about
who they are as a team and what their real goals are, and not just trying to articulate them, but say why what are you trying to protect and why?
00:32:23.680 --> 00:32:28.319
What are you asking yourselves to do and why?
00:32:29.200 --> 00:32:32.880
What needs to change and why?
00:32:34.319 --> 00:32:36.720
And to be very honest, right?
00:32:36.880 --> 00:32:38.960
You have to be honest about the why.
00:32:39.440 --> 00:32:45.279
And I will also say, remember, you're allowed, like, this is also not something you have to share, right?
00:32:45.839 --> 00:32:52.400
For some people, like the and why might be something that makes them a little sorry.
00:32:52.559 --> 00:32:57.519
Like it might be that part of your job is legal butt covering.
00:32:57.839 --> 00:32:58.160
Yeah.
00:32:58.480 --> 00:33:04.640
But you should be aware of that, not negate it, not trying to will it away, right?
00:33:04.799 --> 00:33:12.079
It might be financial, and you should be aware of that and not try to pretend that it is moral.
00:33:12.720 --> 00:33:29.599
Yeah, and I think your and why element of it being personal as well, it really resonates because when I talk about being aware of your cognitive biases and decision making, it's not about pointing out the flaws, it's and it's not about punishing, shaming, any of the things.
00:33:29.759 --> 00:33:38.960
It's about you just being aware that you've got them so that if you choose to correct for them, you can make that decision.
00:33:39.200 --> 00:33:54.559
No one ever has to know that, oh, I introduced a biasy into my decision making as long as you correct, you address it, you're aware of it, and you say, I'm comfortable making the decision with this bias in play, which again is okay.
00:33:54.720 --> 00:33:55.920
I always use the example.
00:33:56.160 --> 00:34:09.440
You know, if you're in a room and a uh a deadly animal comes in and start comes at you, you don't need to explain to anybody or apologize for running running scared from the room.
00:34:09.760 --> 00:34:14.000
As long as you're aware that the reason you did that is I don't want to die.
00:34:14.239 --> 00:34:19.280
Like you don't need to share that with anybody, but be aware of that's why you made the decision.
00:34:19.519 --> 00:34:27.199
If you're making a decision and you're not aware why you're really making the decision, that's where the challenges and issues come into play.
00:34:27.280 --> 00:34:29.039
So I think what you've said is really great.
00:34:29.280 --> 00:34:40.239
Today's conversation challenges the assumption that people, not only that people behave rationally, but also that the squishy is not something we should be talking about.
00:34:40.400 --> 00:34:56.480
I think when we talked about this in the prep, I think we both agree the squishy stuff needs to come out and be in the open and be given the ability to actually be discussed because it's those squishy topics that are where real change can be impacting.
00:34:56.719 --> 00:35:02.960
No one is going to be 100% level 24-7, 3765, seven days a week.
00:35:03.119 --> 00:35:06.320
We all have moments where life happens and it's okay.
00:35:06.559 --> 00:35:21.599
Shoshana's, you've helped us examine what our assumptions around this topic myth, attention, capacity, morale, executive function, interruption, trust, follow-through, all topics that we talk about uh on these episodes.
00:35:21.840 --> 00:35:34.320
The human side of cybersecurity is not about telling people to care more or train them one more time or say, you're wrong, you're a bad person, your job is at risk because you didn't do something.
00:35:34.480 --> 00:35:45.119
It's about designing systems so that the real people can notice, can decide, can escalate, can act when the moment is messy, when it gets squishy.
00:35:45.280 --> 00:35:52.159
So my thanks to Shoshana for joining the conversation to Cybercog Labs and Cybersec Media for supporting the show.
00:35:52.320 --> 00:35:57.760
Until next time, look beyond the controls and pay attention to the human side of cybersecurity.
00:35:57.920 --> 00:35:59.519
We'll see everyone again soon.
00:35:59.920 --> 00:36:00.960
Thank you very much.
00:36:14.320 --> 00:36:18.000
It's directed by Bill Brenner, produced by Lauren Andrus.
00:36:18.079 --> 00:36:27.199
The views and opinions expressed in this show are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of any entities they represent.
00:36:27.440 --> 00:36:34.320
This show is for informational purposes only and does not render or offer to render personalized advice.
00:36:34.559 --> 00:36:37.360
Subscribe now so you never miss an episode.
00:36:37.599 --> 00:36:44.000
You can find all our podcasts, articles, blogs, and conference talks on cybersecmedia.com.
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