TRANSKRİPT 🔗
1
00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:05,340
All right, jumping into part three of our cold card Q&A and what we can learn from this,
2
00:00:05,540 --> 00:00:12,780
a little bit of white hat and black hat thinking and red teaming and best practices moving forward
3
00:00:12,780 --> 00:00:19,540
to recognize what we should learn from this and how to prevent something like this in the future.
4
00:00:21,460 --> 00:00:26,800
All right, jumping into it, Rarson. That's the craziest thing about this. It is not a hardware
5
00:00:26,800 --> 00:00:31,720
failure. It's a failure of the firmware itself dating all the way back to five to six years ago.
6
00:00:31,820 --> 00:00:35,960
So there's no mitigation for all of those keys generated during that time, even if the firmware
7
00:00:35,960 --> 00:00:42,200
gets patched and the device is updated. I got to say, I think CoinKite is cooked. I would be
8
00:00:42,200 --> 00:00:46,440
shocked if they come back from this. I know NVK rubbed a lot of people the wrong way,
9
00:00:46,540 --> 00:00:50,300
but this is a blow to the Bitcoin space. But luckily we can learn from this and Bitcoin will
10
00:00:50,300 --> 00:00:58,220
be even stronger. I don't see how, I don't know what's going on with NVK and his relationship to
11
00:00:58,220 --> 00:01:05,160
CoinKite, but I would doubt CoinKite survives with NVK at the head. I think if CoinKite wants to
12
00:01:05,160 --> 00:01:12,540
survive, they probably need to drop NVK and the CTO. Whether it's malicious or incompetence,
13
00:01:13,080 --> 00:01:19,000
is they could potentially survive as a company, but that's a high bar.
14
00:01:19,000 --> 00:01:22,220
trying to come back from this
15
00:01:22,220 --> 00:01:24,760
because this is the worst possible failure
16
00:01:24,760 --> 00:01:26,920
that a hardware wallet manufacturer could make.
17
00:01:27,200 --> 00:01:28,560
This is as bad as it gets.
18
00:01:29,200 --> 00:01:31,960
And it is absolutely a blow to the Bitcoin space.
19
00:01:32,420 --> 00:01:35,280
But I do think anti-fragility
20
00:01:35,280 --> 00:01:38,620
in a network and in a system like Bitcoin
21
00:01:38,620 --> 00:01:42,520
is not about bad things never happening
22
00:01:42,520 --> 00:01:46,380
or always surviving
23
00:01:46,380 --> 00:01:48,580
and never having terrible things
24
00:01:48,580 --> 00:01:53,240
or major stressors, it means quite the opposite, that every time a major stressor or a terrible
25
00:01:53,240 --> 00:02:00,260
thing happens, things adjust. And I have seen a lot of adjustment and a lot of response that
26
00:02:00,260 --> 00:02:06,900
makes me very hopeful. And I do think that we come out of this a lot stronger with a lot better
27
00:02:06,900 --> 00:02:13,340
practices and a lot more learned. And I only have my own life to go by. Every close call and every
28
00:02:13,340 --> 00:02:17,840
disaster and every scar only made my systems better, only made me more knowledgeable.
29
00:02:17,840 --> 00:02:23,160
only made it more clear what I needed to tell and share people over the years.
30
00:02:24,120 --> 00:02:28,100
So in the end, I think Bitcoin comes out of this fine, obviously.
31
00:02:28,860 --> 00:02:29,460
Baltimore Ace.
32
00:02:29,960 --> 00:02:32,420
Do you think the company will compensate anyone for any of this?
33
00:02:33,120 --> 00:02:35,640
Now that it seems like all of their hardware wallets are not secure,
34
00:02:35,800 --> 00:02:38,040
I wonder if they will offer any refunds or anything like that.
35
00:02:38,120 --> 00:02:39,000
Thanks for the update, Guy.
36
00:02:39,920 --> 00:02:41,160
Welcome for the update.
37
00:02:41,640 --> 00:02:44,420
No, I doubt they have the funds.
38
00:02:44,420 --> 00:02:51,180
and I don't even know how the process would be.
39
00:02:51,180 --> 00:02:57,380
You would need an entire business and structure and support line and everything.
40
00:02:57,560 --> 00:03:02,680
You would have to devote the entire business to years and years and years worth of work
41
00:03:02,680 --> 00:03:07,520
of just handing out money to people and trying to figure out how to KYC
42
00:03:07,520 --> 00:03:12,300
and know that they were actually the customer and they did actually have this Bitcoin
43
00:03:12,300 --> 00:03:37,540
And you'd probably get scammed with some portion of it, no matter how hard you worked and how difficult of a process you went through to try to make it right. So I don't even see it as meaningfully possible in a realistic sense. But even if it was, I'm not inclined to think they would do it anyway.
44
00:03:37,540 --> 00:03:41,100
I see them going dark
45
00:03:41,100 --> 00:03:42,100
you know
46
00:03:42,100 --> 00:03:43,680
they haven't posted very much
47
00:03:43,680 --> 00:03:44,800
NVK has said nothing
48
00:03:44,800 --> 00:03:45,740
he's disappeared
49
00:03:45,740 --> 00:03:48,360
they are not coming out
50
00:03:48,360 --> 00:03:49,620
in front of this thing
51
00:03:49,620 --> 00:03:51,560
they seem to be
52
00:03:51,560 --> 00:03:52,800
trying to lick their wounds
53
00:03:52,800 --> 00:03:55,080
and wait for people to forget
54
00:03:55,080 --> 00:03:56,040
I think
55
00:03:56,040 --> 00:03:58,340
never sleepy
56
00:03:58,340 --> 00:04:00,960
never ever trust an electronic device
57
00:04:00,960 --> 00:04:02,740
to create seed entropy for you
58
00:04:02,740 --> 00:04:04,480
NVK hated seed signer
59
00:04:04,480 --> 00:04:05,860
was this because it was superior?
60
00:04:05,860 --> 00:04:12,500
that's not a bad rule um you know one of the lessons that are pulled from this i think is kind
61
00:04:12,500 --> 00:04:18,380
of you know roll your own randomness to understand what entropy is and for the people who are like oh
62
00:04:18,380 --> 00:04:23,420
normal users should never have to worry about that and think about that that is true in some sense
63
00:04:23,420 --> 00:04:29,520
like from a broad perspective and when we're talking about the normie audience the idea that
64
00:04:29,520 -->
Load full transcript
00:04:35,500
they're going to have to like get a pair of dice and roll their own seed phrase or their own public
65
00:04:35,500 --> 00:04:39,260
or a private key is a little bit ridiculous.
66
00:04:39,260 --> 00:04:42,260
Like we want a better UX for self custody
67
00:04:42,260 --> 00:04:44,520
for the majority of people.
68
00:04:44,520 --> 00:04:59,548
But for the people who were doing cold cards that was not that audience right These were the people who did understand it These are the people who been doing this for five six seven years and knew how to hold their own keys back up your seed phrase understand how to use your signing device
69
00:04:59,948 --> 00:05:02,368
understand how to back up your wallet, et cetera, et cetera.
70
00:05:02,428 --> 00:05:06,728
All the other things that you have to learn, if you just have to add to that, that understand
71
00:05:06,728 --> 00:05:08,608
how entropy works and add a little bit of your own.
72
00:05:09,328 --> 00:05:13,608
For the people that we're talking about specifically, that's actually not that big of a deal.
73
00:05:13,928 --> 00:05:15,008
I love the SeedSigner.
74
00:05:15,108 --> 00:05:15,948
It's a cool device.
75
00:05:15,948 --> 00:05:18,608
I'm happy to recommend it
76
00:05:18,608 --> 00:05:20,808
and it would prevent people
77
00:05:20,808 --> 00:05:22,748
from doing what happened to the cold card
78
00:05:22,748 --> 00:05:23,708
and not know it.
79
00:05:24,168 --> 00:05:26,148
Pran 10,000 says
80
00:05:26,148 --> 00:05:28,308
the most shilled hardware wallet in Bitcoin
81
00:05:28,308 --> 00:05:30,788
just had its seed phrases guessed by LLMs.
82
00:05:31,308 --> 00:05:32,888
The future of money now requires
83
00:05:32,888 --> 00:05:35,188
a hundred dice rolling just to create a wallet.
84
00:05:35,368 --> 00:05:36,108
Let's face it,
85
00:05:36,228 --> 00:05:37,768
mass adoption was a psyop.
86
00:05:38,268 --> 00:05:40,368
Bitcoin will remain a niche internet currency
87
00:05:40,368 --> 00:05:41,368
like any other crypto.
88
00:05:41,708 --> 00:05:43,048
If you think you're getting total reserves,
89
00:05:43,268 --> 00:05:44,248
global reserve status,
90
00:05:44,728 --> 00:05:45,788
you might be delusional.
91
00:05:45,948 --> 00:05:56,748
I think this discounts how unintuitive and how complicated a lot of things that we do all the time really is.
92
00:05:57,088 --> 00:06:04,188
And the time span on which those things get integrated into society.
93
00:06:04,488 --> 00:06:07,368
We are heading into a future with AI.
94
00:06:07,868 --> 00:06:12,048
We are heading into a future where nothing in the digital world is safe.
95
00:06:12,048 --> 00:06:15,888
We are heading into the future where nobody has any privacy.
96
00:06:15,948 --> 00:06:22,048
we are heading into the future where everyone is dependent on large corporate and global
97
00:06:22,048 --> 00:06:29,468
government systems there will be no way that you do not have massive consequences and massive
98
00:06:29,468 --> 00:06:36,048
fallout from those things i believe the idea of understanding what a key is and how encryption
99
00:06:36,048 --> 00:06:43,248
works will simply be a necessity for survival in a sense and believe it or not humans are very very
100
00:06:43,248 --> 00:06:51,328
adaptable. Humans will learn what is necessary to survive. I believe this simply will become
101
00:06:51,328 --> 00:06:59,928
one of those necessary things. My kids will not grow up having confusion about what encryption is
102
00:06:59,928 --> 00:07:06,208
and how to handle keys. Now, not everybody will go or walk away from all of this with that level
103
00:07:06,208 --> 00:07:12,348
of knowledge and they won't have a dad who sits down with them and makes them do homework on it.
104
00:07:13,248 --> 00:07:19,648
But I do think it will become normalized because otherwise we're headed into a dystopian future where we're all slaves.
105
00:07:20,068 --> 00:07:24,588
And I don't think that's a way for humanity to survive.
106
00:07:24,928 --> 00:07:27,808
It's not just bad for freedom.
107
00:07:28,148 --> 00:07:29,988
It's also bad for evolution.
108
00:07:29,988 --> 00:07:31,988
It's bad for decentralization.
109
00:07:32,168 --> 00:07:34,288
It's bad for survival as a species.
110
00:07:34,908 --> 00:07:36,868
It's just going to hurt a lot along the way.
111
00:07:37,108 --> 00:07:42,608
And it's going to be a whole bunch of painful ass lessons before we realize that you should be learning these things at two years old.
112
00:07:42,608 --> 00:07:44,208
so I disagree
113
00:07:44,208 --> 00:07:46,488
people aren't that stupid
114
00:07:46,488 --> 00:07:48,848
they are simply stupid if they don't
115
00:07:48,848 --> 00:07:50,768
need to know anything
116
00:07:50,768 --> 00:07:52,828
and I think
117
00:07:52,828 --> 00:07:54,528
this is going to be a need to know one day
118
00:07:54,528 --> 00:07:56,568
X heart Z
119
00:07:56,568 --> 00:07:58,888
hey I've been listening to you for years now
120
00:07:58,888 --> 00:08:00,748
given the recent cold card hack I moved all
121
00:08:00,748 --> 00:08:02,728
my funds off cold card to river until my
122
00:08:02,728 --> 00:08:04,108
bit box comes cool
123
00:08:04,108 --> 00:08:06,668
I partially
124
00:08:06,668 --> 00:08:08,768
did some of that as well and the tons
125
00:08:08,768 --> 00:08:10,328
I know tons of people who moved to river
126
00:08:10,328 --> 00:08:18,968
which if if there was anything to trust to move bitcoin to it would be river um uh which is funny
127
00:08:18,968 --> 00:08:22,348
because a whole bunch of people say one of the lessons to learn is you should just use a big
128
00:08:22,348 --> 00:08:27,688
crypto exchanges and bitcoin only is not going to help you or whatever i still think river's the
129
00:08:27,688 --> 00:08:33,508
one of the only and best solutions for sending your bitcoin to because they do build stuff in
130
00:08:33,508 --> 00:08:39,068
house they don't use third parties
they built so much of their own stack they are very serious they
131
00:08:39,068 --> 00:08:42,608
They're very quiet and they just do the job and they are Bitcoin only.
132
00:08:43,288 --> 00:08:48,868
So to the contrary, I think River is a perfect example of when all of the rules that people
133
00:08:48,868 --> 00:08:53,148
went to cold card for work out great, even though it worked out like a disaster for cold
134
00:08:53,148 --> 00:08:53,308
card.
135
00:08:53,488 --> 00:08:55,468
But anyway, it's a weird transition.
136
00:08:55,628 --> 00:08:58,208
Do you as of now think Bitbox is a safe choice?
137
00:08:58,768 --> 00:09:00,288
I see they have dual entropy.
138
00:09:00,628 --> 00:09:02,628
I'm only concerned about the connection signing.
139
00:09:02,868 --> 00:09:03,848
It's not air gapped.
140
00:09:04,508 --> 00:09:06,868
Granted, I never send Bitcoin from my cold storage.
141
00:09:06,868 --> 00:09:10,288
I've heard you mention them in your pod and I decided to jump the cold card ship I just can't
142
00:09:10,288 --> 00:09:16,828
trust them anymore perfectly reasonable I just bought a queue this year sadly dude me too um
143
00:09:16,828 --> 00:09:24,568
so yes I have moved my stuff a lot of my stuff to a bit box I have swapped out some of my stuff to
144
00:09:24,568 --> 00:09:32,008
the bit box key I've been using bit box for a really long time I am trusting it but I was also
145
00:09:32,008 --> 00:09:49,377
trust in cold card So don just take oh I am also trusting and I am also putting my funds on it as the definitive statement I have done a lot of my own like just getting Kimmy to do an exploration and obviously doing a check on the entropy
146
00:09:49,377 --> 00:09:53,757
because this is the most obvious example
147
00:09:53,757 --> 00:09:55,677
of when things can go disastrous
148
00:09:55,677 --> 00:09:58,657
and it has found nothing of consequence.
149
00:09:59,457 --> 00:10:01,117
And I've read a couple of articles
150
00:10:01,117 --> 00:10:03,337
about like little bugs or edge cases
151
00:10:03,337 --> 00:10:07,597
that have been discovered by LLMs
152
00:10:07,597 --> 00:10:11,817
and luckily the Bitbox people are very responsive
153
00:10:11,817 --> 00:10:15,097
and very accepting of the criticisms,
154
00:10:15,437 --> 00:10:18,177
which is an attitude that I did not fully respect.
155
00:10:18,177 --> 00:10:21,677
And now I am very, very thankful for that.
156
00:10:22,157 --> 00:10:25,537
And it gives me a little bit more confidence about that.
157
00:10:25,977 --> 00:10:32,717
But all I can basically say is that I am still having Bitbox as a sponsor
158
00:10:32,717 --> 00:10:35,437
because I trust that they have a better attitude.
159
00:10:35,437 --> 00:10:37,777
They're much more serious as a fully open source wallet.
160
00:10:37,957 --> 00:10:41,277
And then I have also trusted to move my funds to Bitbox.
161
00:10:41,657 --> 00:10:43,297
But none of that is a guarantee.
162
00:10:43,617 --> 00:10:47,377
So do your own push against it.
163
00:10:47,737 --> 00:10:49,337
Think about the attack vectors.
164
00:10:50,097 --> 00:10:52,057
The Nova 2 is going to be much easier.
165
00:10:52,157 --> 00:10:56,537
Like I can plug it into my actual iPhone and Nunchuck is going to have it so that you can
166
00:10:56,537 --> 00:10:58,477
do it natively in their mobile wallet.
167
00:10:59,237 --> 00:11:05,317
But everything is best as a multisig, in my opinion, because multisig is the only thing
168
00:11:05,317 --> 00:11:06,457
that saved me with the cold card.
169
00:11:06,717 --> 00:11:08,317
But don't take it as foolproof.
170
00:11:08,877 --> 00:11:11,577
Make sure you understand the risks
171
00:11:11,577 --> 00:11:13,957
and the places where you could still be vulnerable.
172
00:11:14,757 --> 00:11:16,417
But I'm a huge fan
173
00:11:16,417 --> 00:11:17,897
and always have been a fan of Pitbox.
174
00:11:18,877 --> 00:11:20,977
Sven Volvo 164,
175
00:11:21,057 --> 00:11:22,677
maybe Seed Signer is the way.
176
00:11:23,197 --> 00:11:23,537
Peace.
177
00:11:24,277 --> 00:11:24,537
Yeah.
178
00:11:25,537 --> 00:11:27,257
Maybe Seed Signer is the way.
179
00:11:27,797 --> 00:11:29,617
I'm not like blindly trusting
180
00:11:29,617 --> 00:11:31,097
any of them anymore.
181
00:11:31,457 --> 00:11:33,797
I really like the whole two of three.
182
00:11:33,797 --> 00:11:38,877
it just feels like the clean setup and it can also be this kind of like perfect
183
00:11:38,877 --> 00:11:46,077
middle ground of convenient and secure so it's hard to say that you know seed signer is open
184
00:11:46,077 --> 00:11:52,797
source you can build your own elements from it and get your own hardware so you have a lot of
185
00:11:52,797 --> 00:11:59,577
options for getting your manufacturing stack and your your hardware stack not vulnerable to like
186
00:11:59,577 --> 00:12:03,517
somebody obviously looking for your email address you're both you're buying a hardware wallet and
187
00:12:03,517 --> 00:12:06,477
you're just buying a component of a thing off Amazon, right?
188
00:12:06,977 --> 00:12:10,697
So there's a lot to be said of a DIY hardware wallet
189
00:12:10,697 --> 00:12:12,297
that doesn't even keep your keys.
190
00:12:12,697 --> 00:12:14,397
So love the Seatsigner.
191
00:12:15,037 --> 00:12:18,017
Sven Volvo again, watch Mechanics last update.
192
00:12:18,117 --> 00:12:20,217
If you run knots, you can slow down the hack.
193
00:12:20,717 --> 00:12:22,657
Mempool replacement equals zero piece.
194
00:12:25,357 --> 00:12:28,437
I saw this for a little bit and I kind of went back and forth.
195
00:12:28,917 --> 00:12:30,477
A lot of people were saying that like,
196
00:12:30,477 --> 00:12:32,297
this is a ridiculous thing.
197
00:12:32,297 --> 00:12:38,297
and you're just trying to get people to run BIP 110 by downloading knots and all this stuff.
198
00:12:38,437 --> 00:12:40,857
And I don't think that's the case at all.
199
00:12:41,397 --> 00:12:44,777
You're looking for anything that's actually going to help the situation.
200
00:12:45,277 --> 00:12:49,877
And actually, RBF was a huge thing that could have helped.
201
00:12:49,877 --> 00:12:53,497
This is exactly why people were using Slipstream.
202
00:12:53,877 --> 00:12:59,257
My brother had someone who he had set up, a friend who had set up on Coldcard,
203
00:12:59,257 --> 00:13:02,217
and we told her to use Slipstream
204
00:13:02,217 --> 00:13:05,117
because she was actually late in the game
205
00:13:05,117 --> 00:13:07,017
for being able to get out.
206
00:13:07,097 --> 00:13:08,557
She was like traveling or something
207
00:13:08,557 --> 00:13:09,557
and then came back,
208
00:13:10,157 --> 00:13:12,217
but she was able to get her funds off of it.
209
00:13:12,277 --> 00:13:13,437
We were like, use Slipstream
210
00:13:13,437 --> 00:13:16,857
because she probably could have gotten hit
211
00:13:16,857 --> 00:13:18,437
in a very, very short window
212
00:13:18,437 --> 00:13:20,017
had she just posted to the blockchain.
213
00:13:20,377 --> 00:13:22,697
But this is the exact same kind of thing, right?
214
00:13:22,837 --> 00:13:25,097
Is try to get some of the network
215
00:13:25,097 --> 00:13:26,857
or hide it from part of the network
216
00:13:26,857 --> 00:13:35,577
so that if any case at all, you could potentially stop the propagation of one of the transactions
217
00:13:35,577 --> 00:13:38,677
and help the propagation of the legitimate transaction.
218
00:13:38,937 --> 00:13:43,057
You know, you just want to slow down the thief a little bit.
219
00:13:43,057 --> 00:13:48,817
Sure, that might not actually do anything, you know, but there's also the possibility
220
00:13:48,817 --> 00:13:55,077
that like one thief doesn't get through because of a 30 second or a one minute delay that
221
00:13:55,077 --> 00:14:02,717
pulls in a block and gets it through. I think this was totally in like full honest recommendation of
222
00:14:02,717 --> 00:14:07,077
like, maybe here's something we can do when everybody feels like they got their thumb up
223
00:14:07,077 --> 00:14:12,997
their ass and there's nothing to do to stop this or help this situation. McKenna was looking for a
224
00:14:12,997 --> 00:14:20,637
good option and he took a bad option or recommended a bad option amongst a list of no options,
225
00:14:20,637 --> 00:14:40,985
You know like bad is better than nothing So I don see anything wrong with this And maybe it could work or maybe it could do something for somebody Unlikely but I don think it was at all malicious or a download BIP or whatever that a bunch of people were saying I think it was an honest recommendation
226
00:14:40,985 --> 00:14:44,285
and not totally out of the realm
227
00:14:44,285 --> 00:14:46,385
of the reason people were saying use Slipstream.
228
00:14:46,885 --> 00:14:49,325
Same concept, just a different,
229
00:14:50,245 --> 00:14:54,145
less complete way to solve the same problem.
230
00:14:55,025 -->
00:14:56,085
Rarson again.
231
00:14:56,085 --> 00:15:01,005
I have a problem with white hats stealing funds.
232
00:15:01,585 --> 00:15:03,285
Once you've compromised the address,
233
00:15:03,545 --> 00:15:06,905
there's no way to verify who originally owned the address.
234
00:15:07,185 --> 00:15:11,665
So how can you know for sure that someone who claims they had owned that address actually owned it?
235
00:15:13,365 --> 00:15:15,605
I had a problem with this too.
236
00:15:15,965 --> 00:15:20,365
It feels like an impossible situation because you're like, how can you help somebody?
237
00:15:20,365 --> 00:15:23,965
How can you help the people who haven't been hit yet, but that are going to get hit?
238
00:15:24,525 --> 00:15:25,965
How do you help the people that are on vacation?
239
00:15:26,085 --> 00:15:53,105
And I actually reached out to a number of people privately on Signal and DMs and all this stuff being like, can we set up a white hat group? Can we just start stealing these funds and try to be as open about it as possible and then just keep them until we can figure out some sort of a way to figure out how to get it back to somebody.
240
00:15:53,105 --> 00:16:04,925
And of all things, it seemed like KYC was the only thing that would actually save us in that scenario because somebody could point to a KYC wallet that says, this is me.
241
00:16:05,005 --> 00:16:12,165
And then here is my wallet that I have used or from an exchange that they know it's me and I've proved that it's me.
242
00:16:12,245 --> 00:16:15,085
And this is the address that I sent it to from that wallet.
243
00:16:15,225 --> 00:16:16,465
This is how you know it's mine.
244
00:16:16,685 --> 00:16:21,105
Because obviously the keys themselves are not proof of anything.
245
00:16:21,885 --> 00:16:22,325
Right.
246
00:16:22,325 --> 00:16:29,085
so it would be very very difficult to find a point of kyc in which you were actually in some
247
00:16:29,085 --> 00:16:34,125
sequence of addresses or that it was moved to a different thing there's still the possibility that
248
00:16:34,125 --> 00:16:40,865
that could be faked or uh you could have somebody who actually sent those bitcoin away to somebody
249
00:16:40,865 --> 00:16:45,365
who had a cold card and then they're trying to claw it back and you know they they're trying to
250
00:16:45,365 --> 00:16:50,465
double spin they're like oh snap the person i sent it to got their cold card hacked i have a kyc
251
00:16:50,465 --> 00:16:55,305
transaction because I was the one that bought this. Maybe I can get those Bitcoin. That's a
252
00:16:55,305 --> 00:17:00,625
different thing from getting scammed from like a random person. It's a little bit slightly lower
253
00:17:00,625 --> 00:17:03,465
attack surface, but inevitably you have a whole bunch of people who care about privacy and they're
254
00:17:03,465 --> 00:17:07,625
not going to have that KYC. So what do you do with those coins? You know, burn them like you
255
00:17:07,625 --> 00:17:13,065
don't want to be like a white hat and be like, oh, oh, I conveniently just have a 40 extra Bitcoin.
256
00:17:14,105 --> 00:17:18,345
And so and that was basically all the conversations were like, how do you do this? How do you make
257
00:17:18,345 --> 00:17:22,665
this not a disaster? How do you make this not like a business that you have to run as like a
258
00:17:22,665 --> 00:17:28,845
for free, you know, a charity that you have to do for years and years? You run into as many
259
00:17:28,845 --> 00:17:35,165
complications and even legal risks just by trying to help in this situation. And so like,
260
00:17:35,505 --> 00:17:40,045
basically, we we never pulled the trigger. I just kind of sat there going like,
261
00:17:40,345 --> 00:17:45,465
what the hell are you going to do? And that I might even steal from somebody who now can't
262
00:17:45,465 --> 00:17:50,525
prove that they can get it back and who could have actually moved their own funds. You know,
263
00:17:50,585 --> 00:17:54,905
like I might steal from somebody who wasn't going to get hacked or was going to have time to get it.
264
00:17:55,325 --> 00:18:00,525
And now I've just contributed to them losing it because I can't prove that that's who owned it,
265
00:18:00,525 --> 00:18:07,305
you know? So it's just messy. I wish there was an easy solution, but there wasn't.
266
00:18:08,025 --> 00:18:12,725
All right. That'll wrap up today's episode. Like I said, I'll be doing more videos about it and
267
00:18:12,725 --> 00:18:14,785
getting more into things.
268
00:18:14,965 --> 00:18:16,265
But thank you guys for the comments.
269
00:18:16,525 --> 00:18:17,605
I really appreciate it.
270
00:18:18,545 --> 00:18:20,065
And don't forget to subscribe,
271
00:18:20,265 --> 00:18:21,785
to share this out with anybody.
272
00:18:22,205 --> 00:18:23,805
And keep pinging me,
273
00:18:23,945 --> 00:18:24,945
keep posting any questions.
274
00:18:25,105 --> 00:18:26,465
I'll try to do these a lot more
275
00:18:26,465 --> 00:18:27,965
to answer your questions
276
00:18:27,965 --> 00:18:29,205
and let you know what I think about it.
277
00:18:29,725 --> 00:18:31,185
I really do like this format.
278
00:18:31,305 --> 00:18:33,125
I think this is a great way for us to,
279
00:18:33,745 --> 00:18:35,265
for me to be able to address
280
00:18:35,265 --> 00:18:36,685
and answer some of these things
281
00:18:36,685 --> 00:18:37,545
when I don't really have time
282
00:18:37,545 --> 00:18:39,485
to go back and post in comments.
283
00:18:39,485 --> 00:18:41,025
I get something out of it
284
00:18:41,025 --> 00:18:43,345
and get to hang out with you guys
285
00:18:43,345 --> 00:18:45,345
and actually feel like I'm chatting.
286
00:18:45,645 --> 00:18:47,825
So with that, thank you guys so much.
287
00:18:47,885 --> 00:18:48,505
Don't forget to subscribe.
288
00:18:48,725 --> 00:18:49,205
Share it out.
289
00:18:49,605 --> 00:18:50,445
Check out Bitbox.
290
00:18:50,505 --> 00:18:52,065
I got a discount code if you're trying to get one.
291
00:18:52,665 --> 00:18:53,965
And use Multisig.
292
00:18:54,645 --> 00:18:56,125
Back up your wallet descriptor
293
00:18:56,125 --> 00:18:57,485
in as many places as possible.
294
00:18:57,925 --> 00:19:00,105
It's not a vulnerable thing for your funds.
295
00:19:00,545 --> 00:19:02,645
It's just a privacy concern.
296
00:19:02,825 --> 00:19:05,285
So feel free to email it to yourself if you need to.
297
00:19:06,265 --> 00:19:07,185
Stay safe.
298
00:19:07,525 --> 00:19:08,625
Learn everything you can.
299
00:19:08,625 --> 00:19:13,125
stack sats for all your own randomness and i will catch you on the next episode
300
00:19:13,125 --> 00:19:16,305
until then that is my two sats