บทถอดความฉบับเต็มของ Investigating the UNKNOWN: Former Acting Director of AARO- Tim Phillips

involved in the explosive 39 00:02:24.560 --> 00:02:28.280 allegations that came with extortion of the program, potentially into 40 00:02:28.319 --> 00:02:31.759 internal pressure within the office itself on how to do 41 00:02:31.919 --> 00:02:34.120 this stuff and go public with it. If you're ready 42 00:02:34.120 --> 00:02:36.719 to hear from someone who's been on the inside, someone 43 00:02:36.759 --> 00:02:39.280 who's seen the data, the politics, and the truth behind 44 00:02:39.280 --> 00:02:41.800 the headlines, you're in the right place. Hit subscribe, turn 45 00:02:41.879 --> 00:02:45.599 on notifications, and if you're listening on Apple Podcasts or Spotify, 46 00:02:45.680 --> 00:02:48.080 drop that five star review, because what we're about to 47 00:02:48.080 --> 00:02:51.120 hear you won't find anywhere else I'm asking the harder questions. 48 00:02:51.280 --> 00:02:54.199 We're talking about UFOs and nukes and how the fiery 49 00:02:54.319 --> 00:02:57.719 orbs and black giangle craft are among the most anomalists 50 00:02:57.719 --> 00:03:00.879 and Aro doesn't know what those are, which contradicts what 51 00:03:00.919 --> 00:03:03.479 the Wall Street Journal put out. Now, Tim does try 52 00:03:03.520 --> 00:03:06.120 to talk about this hazing ritual that the Wall Street 53 00:03:06.159 --> 00:03:08.599 Journal also talked about, and I did challenge him pretty 54 00:03:08.599 --> 00:03:11.120 hard on that. And when it comes to using specific 55 00:03:11.159 --> 00:03:14.400 language like aliens and not little gray men but for 56 00:03:14.479 --> 00:03:16.960 lack of a better term, instead of non human intelligence, 57 00:03:17.159 --> 00:03:19.479 is that a way of lying biomission these are tactics 58 00:03:19.479 --> 00:03:22.280 that they would have to be used. He even mentions 59 00:03:22.520 --> 00:03:25.039 that there are things that Arrow did and this doing 60 00:03:25.080 --> 00:03:28.199 that won't be unclassified for seventy five years. So we 61 00:03:28.240 --> 00:03:30.479 had a lot to discuss in this part one interview. 62 00:03:30.520 --> 00:03:32.159 Next time he'll be in studio. I really hope you 63 00:03:32.280 --> 00:03:33.960 enjoy it. I'm super excited I'll see you on the 64 00:03:33.960 --> 00:03:34.560 other side. 65 00:03:34.639 --> 00:03:50.520 This is total disclosure, a right welcome back. 66 00:03:50.639 --> 00:03:54.879 As I said in the intro, we are joined today 67 00:03:55.080 --> 00:03:58.759 by Timothy Philip. Welcome. I'm so happy to have you here. 68 00:03:58.840 --> 00:04:00.479 Tim, It's great to be today. 69 00:04:01.080 --> 00:04:05.479 I listen. I think and I and I've I've interviewed 70 00:04:05.680 --> 00:04:08.639 lots of people, lots of you know, And I'm not 71 00:04:08.759 --> 00:04:11.479 like like show voting or trying to like, you know, 72 00:04:11.599 --> 00:04:14.520 blow smoke up my own ass. But I've interviewed, like, 73 00:04:15.120 --> 00:04:18.560 you know, my fair share of big

hitters, and nothing 74 00:04:18.839 --> 00:04:24.279 has gotten the anticipation and the people in the community 75 00:04:24.680 --> 00:04:29.120 as riled up as doing this interview. I don't know 76 00:04:29.160 --> 00:04:33.360 what it is about you, but people, Uh, people are 77 00:04:33.399 --> 00:04:37.319 paying attention to people are paying attention. So I wanted 78 00:04:37.360 --> 00:04:41.639 to start off the conversation and listen, we talked about 79 00:04:41.639 --> 00:04:45.160 this in a in a pre phone call. So I 80 00:04:45.680 --> 00:04:48.920 just because so many people have talked about it, and 81 00:04:49.000 --> 00:04:52.920 so many people have put out these clips about these things, 82 00:04:53.199 --> 00:04:56.079 I'm not gonna start anyway. I want to start the 83 00:04:56.079 --> 00:04:59.120 way I always wanted to start. And Uh, if you 84 00:04:59.160 --> 00:05:02.920 can introduce your self to my audience, to the people 85 00:05:02.920 --> 00:05:05.680 who may have not heard you on shows I think 86 00:05:05.680 --> 00:05:08.079 you did on the Green Street, which we will touch 87 00:05:08.079 --> 00:05:10.800 on with Micwest, which you will touch on. We don't 88 00:05:10.800 --> 00:05:13.399 have to get too far into it, but can you 89 00:05:13.439 --> 00:05:15.680 tell me, I mean, who is Tim Phillips. 90 00:05:16.920 --> 00:05:19.439 I'm a retired government bureaucrat now, but. 91 00:05:21.600 --> 00:05:25.480 I kid from an Air Force family, son of an airman, 92 00:05:25.759 --> 00:05:32.000 grew up Europe and Asia, and my dad retired from 93 00:05:32.000 --> 00:05:34.680 the Air Force team seventy three. 94 00:05:36.639 --> 00:05:44.480 Tucson, Arizona, where I attended my last year of you know, 95 00:05:44.680 --> 00:05:49.079 started my college career at the University of Arizona. Joined 96 00:05:49.079 --> 00:05:50.480 the Marine Corps. 97 00:05:50.519 --> 00:05:54.839 Been about two years as a Marine, travel all over 98 00:05:54.879 --> 00:06:00.720 the world. Nine to eleven happened still in uniform, I 99 00:06:00.759 --> 00:06:04.560 had decided to retire a lot of the rules change 100 00:06:04.839 --> 00:06:10.759 concerning transitioning from active military to civil service. They needed 101 00:06:10.800 --> 00:06:16.040 people with qualifications and current accesses and clearances, and. 102 00:06:16.160 --> 00:06:19.360 One day I was a lieutenant colonel. 103 00:06:19.399 --> 00:06:22.199 On the next day I was the GS fifteen Division chief, 104 00:06:22.959 --> 00:06:26.240 working at the time at the Defense Information Systems Agency. 105 00:06:27.639 --> 00:06:30.279 And then shortly after I put my hand in the 106 00:06:30.319 --> 00:06:33.120 air and swore in I would, I was asked if 107 00:06:33.160 --> 00:06:36.680 I would volunteer for an assignment. 108 00:06:36.240 --> 00:06:38.000 And I asked them what it was, and they told 109 00:06:38.040 --> 00:06:38.920 me they couldn't tell me. 110 00:06:39.439 -->

00:06:41.920 So I went to the Pentagon and found out that 111 00:06:42.360 --> 00:06:46.399 I'd be invading a rock again in two thousand and three. 112 00:06:46.639 --> 00:06:51.360 So that was the introduction to the intelligence community. I 113 00:06:51.480 --> 00:06:54.519 was with DES for about four years and then when 114 00:06:55.079 --> 00:06:57.879 they were standing up the office, the Director of National 115 00:06:57.879 --> 00:07:05.079 Intelligence had worked with the staff of Ambassador MEGAPANI there 116 00:07:05.120 --> 00:07:08.959 and Baghdad. I became part of the OD and I 117 00:07:09.079 --> 00:07:13.720 as they were standing up, and had almost a twenty 118 00:07:14.160 --> 00:07:19.639 three year career as a senior National Intelligence Service executive 119 00:07:20.199 --> 00:07:24.160 and a senior Intelligence Service officer, so I got to 120 00:07:24.199 --> 00:07:28.000 work with our servant CIA. I was at DIA, the 121 00:07:28.120 --> 00:07:34.120 National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, So I had a pretty diverse career, 122 00:07:34.759 --> 00:07:39.920 and probably the most bizarre assignment I ever had is 123 00:07:40.040 --> 00:07:44.519 when my boss at the time, Lieutenant General Cruise, walked among. 124 00:07:46.040 --> 00:07:51.040 My last assignment and government service was the deputy and 125 00:07:51.079 --> 00:07:56.279 then serving as the acting director of ERROW, which was 126 00:07:56.360 --> 00:08:01.839 probably the most fascinating assignment during my forty five year career. 127 00:08:02.879 --> 00:08:08.319 I knew absolutely nothing about the UFO UAP world. I 128 00:08:08.360 --> 00:08:12.519 knew a lot about technical collection, national security, you know, 129 00:08:12.600 --> 00:08:15.959 I was very very aware of that. Did a lot 130 00:08:15.959 --> 00:08:22.040 of deployments down range in Iraq and Afghanistan, so I 131 00:08:22.160 --> 00:08:24.160 used to work in an war zone. But I had 132 00:08:24.360 --> 00:08:29.439 never been part of a large investigative team looking at 133 00:08:30.040 --> 00:08:33.080 anomalies and the maritime, air and space domain. 134 00:08:33.240 --> 00:08:36.159 So learned a lot about it worked with some amazing people. 135 00:08:37.399 --> 00:08:43.000 Never had the scrutiny that we enjoyed reporting back to 136 00:08:43.080 --> 00:08:49.080 twelve different committees, committees both the Senate and House. 137 00:08:48.879 --> 00:08:51.600 Side, never had anything like that before. 138 00:08:51.919 --> 00:08:54.080 And we kind of had a We had two bosses, 139 00:08:55.080 --> 00:08:58.519 the deputy you know with the Deputy Secretary of Defense 140 00:08:59.039 --> 00:09:02.840 and then working for the principal Director of National Intelligence, 141 00:09:02.840 --> 00:09:06.039 and often the Director of National Intelligence would be there 142 00:09:06.039 --> 00:09:08.879 and when we went back and briefed them on our 143 00:09:08.879 --> 00:09:14.360 developments or investigations. So work. 144 00:09:15.639 --> 00:09:17.519 Let me ask you, Let me ask you a question. 145 00:09:17.720 --> 00:09:24.720 So were you aware of when were you as being 146 00:09:24.879 --> 00:09:29.320 around not around the topic, but just being in the 147 00:09:29.360 --> 00:09:34.440 military and being up to speed on things. Did you 148 00:09:34.679 --> 00:09:37.159 I mean, before you were ever asked to be a 149 00:09:37.159 --> 00:09:41.240 part of Arrow, had you ever thought about UFOs? Had 150 00:09:41.279 --> 00:09:44.480 you ever, you know, thought about them in a more 151 00:09:44.720 --> 00:09:48.840 serious capacity, maybe even after the twenty seventeen New York 152 00:09:48.840 --> 00:09:54.639 Times article and the you know pentagon and the confirming 153 00:09:55.000 --> 00:09:59.720 you know all but confirming that there are unidentified had 154 00:10:00.120 --> 00:10:06.720 it ever peaud your interest as just a general person beforehand. 155 00:10:05.159 --> 00:10:07.919 Not so much the uf or UAP issue. 156 00:10:08.240 --> 00:10:12.080 Remember, I was working counter terrorism and dealing with counter 157 00:10:12.080 --> 00:10:15.480 proliferation of nuclear weapons, so I had a pretty defined 158 00:10:15.519 --> 00:10:19.120 problem set that I was working. We did have a 159 00:10:19.200 --> 00:10:25.440 couple of cases downrange, working in Afghanistan where we became 160 00:10:25.639 --> 00:10:29.919 aware of the danger of UASS. So we were able 161 00:10:29.960 --> 00:10:35.120 to find some moranean systems that had crashed outside some 162 00:10:35.200 --> 00:10:38.759 of our facilities in Afghanistan and we realized that we 163 00:10:38.759 --> 00:10:41.679 were being surveilled. They're using them for ISR, not strike 164 00:10:41.720 --> 00:10:44.720 at the time, but we realized how easy it would 165 00:10:44.759 --> 00:10:47.960 have been to weaponize these things and how vulnerable we were. 166 00:10:48.440 --> 00:10:52.120 The fact that these things had been flying against our 167 00:10:52.159 --> 00:10:55.159 basis for months at a time and we were unable 168 00:10:55.200 --> 00:11:02.039 to detect them. So kind of aware of having situational 169 00:11:02.080 --> 00:11:06.840 awareness domain was very, very important. And then I've got 170 00:11:06.879 --> 00:11:10.480 three years at sea, flew a little bit and I 171 00:11:10.600 --> 00:11:13.120 wasn't an aviator as always a grant officer, so you 172 00:11:13.159 --> 00:11:16.080 would see things you couldn't understand, you know, I couldn't 173 00:11:16.120 --> 00:11:21.720 identify what they were. But since there was never any 174 00:11:22.360 --> 00:11:25.639 aggression towards us, it's really never really thought about it. 175 00:11:26.039 --> 00:11:29.639 I had enemies who wanted to kill us I had 176 00:11:29.679 --> 00:11:33.399 to worry about, so I wasn't about u A, you know, 177 00:11:33.519 --> 00:11:37.360 UAP or UFOs during my time

in the service or 178 00:11:37.399 --> 00:11:40.440 the intelligence community before I served. 179 00:11:40.080 --> 00:11:44.799 With ARA interesting, you know, because you know, I find 180 00:11:44.919 --> 00:11:47.399 that a lot of people and I asked that for 181 00:11:47.519 --> 00:11:50.519 obviously specific reason. I'm trying to set your character up 182 00:11:50.559 --> 00:11:53.320 as someone who is you know, and how would you 183 00:11:54.279 --> 00:11:57.120 if if I were to ask you before you took 184 00:11:57.120 --> 00:12:02.919 the job an arrow your thoughts on and and I'd 185 00:12:02.960 --> 00:12:06.879 like you to be as honest as possible. If I 186 00:12:06.919 --> 00:12:09.200 were to ask you before you ever heard of arrow, 187 00:12:09.360 --> 00:12:13.639 before you ever step foot in any investigation capacity, if 188 00:12:13.679 --> 00:12:15.720 I were to ask you, are we alone in the universe? 189 00:12:15.960 --> 00:12:17.960 What would I mean? What would your answer be? Would 190 00:12:17.960 --> 00:12:18.600 it be yes or no? 191 00:12:19.759 --> 00:12:20.399 I would know. 192 00:12:22.039 --> 00:12:26.519 I have never had any you know, personal experience myself. 193 00:12:28.519 --> 00:12:32.120 I know there's credible people that have experienced things they 194 00:12:32.120 --> 00:12:35.879 couldn't understand and their their assessment was with some type 195 00:12:35.919 --> 00:12:37.120 of supernatural event. 196 00:12:38.279 --> 00:12:40.919 But to that. 197 00:12:42.960 --> 00:12:49.440 It never bothered me. I honored I knew these people professionally, 198 00:12:50.360 --> 00:12:54.080 they saw things they didn't understand. And during my generation, 199 00:12:54.440 --> 00:12:59.320 to report a UFO incident that could be queer ending. 200 00:13:00.399 --> 00:13:04.159 If you're flying and you reported something, the next thing 201 00:13:04.200 --> 00:13:06.639 you know, you're talking to the shrink. You're talking to 202 00:13:06.679 --> 00:13:09.600 the surgeon and you could be losing you know, your 203 00:13:09.639 --> 00:13:10.679 your tickets to fly. 204 00:13:11.480 --> 00:13:13.600 Right, you'd be flying a desk for the rest of 205 00:13:13.639 --> 00:13:14.960 your career exactly. 206 00:13:15.039 --> 00:13:19.159 My father flew. And that's just not something they discussed. 207 00:13:19.799 --> 00:13:21.960 They saw something they didn't understand, they kept it to 208 00:13:22.000 --> 00:13:26.679 themselves unless it was a threat, right, And I would 209 00:13:26.720 --> 00:13:29.440 say that's one of the great things we tried to 210 00:13:29.480 --> 00:13:32.639 do with the Office to remove that stigma, and that 211 00:13:33.480 --> 00:13:36.840 encourage military and intel personnel to report what they saw. 212 00:13:37.200 --> 00:13:39.440 We're not going to understand it unless people are free 213 00:13:39.480 --> 00:13:44.320 to report, you know, their experiences and working with DAFT 214 00:13:44.440 --> 00:13:47.759 J three and actually you know, getting directives out there 215 00:13:47.799 --> 00:13:50.919 to the Apartment of Fense saying if you have, you know, 216 00:13:51.600 --> 00:13:54.440 u a p u FO incident, you will report it. 217 00:13:54.519 --> 00:13:57.480 And more just as importantly, you're going to restain you know, 218 00:13:57.639 --> 00:13:58.879 retain data. 219 00:13:59.480 --> 00:13:59.679 You know. 220 00:13:59.799 --> 00:14:04.399 Part of the frustrating aspect of this job as we 221 00:14:04.399 --> 00:14:07.320 were looking back at cases twenty twenty five years old, 222 00:14:07.720 --> 00:14:11.440 the fact that there was no direction to the force 223 00:14:12.000 --> 00:14:15.600 actually to preserve data. So it was very frust used 224 00:14:16.440 --> 00:14:19.600 to go back and understand the cases. And of course 225 00:14:19.639 --> 00:14:23.200 our scientists want to work with the original data set. 226 00:14:23.360 --> 00:14:26.639 You know the zero ones and you know, apply tools 227 00:14:27.000 --> 00:14:30.320 to try to extract you know, some type of intelligence 228 00:14:30.360 --> 00:14:34.960 from what we were seeing. Right, So that was probably 229 00:14:35.000 --> 00:14:38.360 the biggest change, is the fact that you remove the 230 00:14:38.440 --> 00:14:41.039 stigma there was you know, there was actually a directive 231 00:14:41.159 --> 00:14:45.919 to report, and the fact that you could report these 232 00:14:45.960 --> 00:14:52.000 things without your credibility or sanity being questioned or you know, 233 00:14:52.480 --> 00:14:56.120 risk losing access or a security clearance. That was a 234 00:14:56.320 --> 00:15:01.320 that was a sea change in the government. Didn't happened before, right. 235 00:15:01.279 --> 00:15:04.759 Right, And this is you know, and then Congress has mandated, 236 00:15:05.240 --> 00:15:12.039 you know, Congress mandates the Arrow Office, and things are 237 00:15:12.159 --> 00:15:16.279 changing in the world, and I think, you know, the 238 00:15:16.399 --> 00:15:22.440 UFO community, on one hand, you know, we're really spoiled 239 00:15:22.600 --> 00:15:26.519 in that way that you know, twenty years ago, any 240 00:15:26.639 --> 00:15:31.360 one of these hearings, any one of these offices being 241 00:15:31.440 --> 00:15:36.200 established like Arrow, you know, aside from maybe you know, 242 00:15:36.440 --> 00:15:41.279 post Project Blue Book, of course, but you know this, 243 00:15:41.679 --> 00:15:44.320 it would be it would be the only thing talked 244 00:15:44.320 --> 00:15:47.000 about for years and years. And now it's you know, 245 00:15:47.279 --> 00:15:50.679 things are happening every day, and a lot you know, 246 00:15:50.879 --> 00:15:53.399 I know people don't think that Arrow does a lot, 247 00:15:53.879 --> 00:15:55.879 but you know, part of why we're here is to 248 00:15:55.960 --> 00:16:00.159 explain that you know there is or to to find

out, 249 00:16:00.600 --> 00:16:06.200 like should should ARROW continue to be funded? And so 250 00:16:06.240 --> 00:16:10.360 when did so? When were you asked to be a 251 00:16:10.399 --> 00:16:12.759 part of Arrow? And why? 252 00:16:14.639 --> 00:16:23.159 Going back we've been with the fall of twenty three 253 00:16:23.440 --> 00:16:24.120 is when. 254 00:16:25.440 --> 00:16:30.519 I was actually asked to be part of ARROW. So 255 00:16:30.639 --> 00:16:35.399 I think I got there in October of twenty twenty 256 00:16:35.440 --> 00:16:38.360 three is when I showed up as the deputy and 257 00:16:38.399 --> 00:16:46.360 then Sean left the government in December of twenty twenty three, 258 00:16:46.360 --> 00:16:49.799 and then I became the acting Well maybe we've been 259 00:16:49.840 --> 00:16:52.720 the following year twenty four, because say it's twenty five, Yeah, 260 00:16:52.759 --> 00:16:55.759 it would have been. I was there about eighteen months, 261 00:16:55.799 --> 00:17:00.600 so it would have been all of twenty four and 262 00:17:00.639 --> 00:17:04.240 it started in October twenty three working with Sean. 263 00:17:04.440 --> 00:17:08.160 So why do you think they asked you to be 264 00:17:08.200 --> 00:17:08.680 a part of that. 265 00:17:10.319 --> 00:17:15.640 They wanted a career intel officer that was absolutely neutral 266 00:17:15.680 --> 00:17:20.240 on the subject. I knew nothing about it. However, I 267 00:17:20.519 --> 00:17:27.559 was the former director of Technical Collection and OD and 268 00:17:27.640 --> 00:17:31.440 I I had worked a number of. 269 00:17:33.720 --> 00:17:35.680 Sensitive reconnaissance operations. 270 00:17:35.720 --> 00:17:39.799 I maintained the book for it to the SRO program. 271 00:17:40.039 --> 00:17:43.759 I was an expert with a lot of both airborne 272 00:17:43.920 --> 00:17:45.319 and overhead. 273 00:17:44.839 --> 00:17:46.279 National technical means. 274 00:17:46.599 --> 00:17:50.480 I knew a lot about collection and orchestrating collection, working 275 00:17:50.799 --> 00:17:55.920 with other INTEL collectors, working with foreigners, and as I 276 00:17:55.960 --> 00:17:59.279 talked to Sean about the possibility of working there, I 277 00:17:59.440 --> 00:18:03.039 saw as a hard problem, kind of fascinating wonder if 278 00:18:03.079 --> 00:18:06.640 you were to take all the elements of national you know, power, 279 00:18:06.720 --> 00:18:10.960 are capabilities to kind of understand this phenomenon. There has 280 00:18:11.200 --> 00:18:15.359 never been an organization that the government has established to 281 00:18:15.519 --> 00:18:21.480 actually investigate UAPs similar to ERROW. You know, if you 282 00:18:21.559 --> 00:18:25.039 go back at Project Bluebook and the derivatives after that, 283 00:18:25.559 --> 00:18:28.599 they never had They never worked at the cabinet level, 284 00:18:29.799 --> 00:18:33.920 They never had access to information any classification level the 285 00:18:34.000 --> 00:18:38.440 way ERROW had. They never had the authority to go 286 00:18:38.519 --> 00:18:41.160 out and have joint duty assignments and be able to 287 00:18:41.200 --> 00:18:46.039 recruit some of the best and brighters from throughout the government. 288 00:18:47.000 --> 00:18:51.920 Arrow had people come to us from NASA, DHF, FBI, 289 00:18:52.440 --> 00:18:55.880 all of the o D, all of the intelligence community. 290 00:18:56.599 --> 00:19:00.200 At one time we had four senior executives on the 291 00:19:00.240 --> 00:19:03.359 staff at ARROW. We had a lot of horsepower, we 292 00:19:03.400 --> 00:19:07.519 had a lot of expertise, We had an amazing, amazing budget, 293 00:19:08.599 --> 00:19:14.799 the very very well resourced and probably most important importantly, 294 00:19:14.920 --> 00:19:18.160 we had the support of the most senior members of 295 00:19:18.279 --> 00:19:22.200 the Department Offense and the inteligence community. So when I 296 00:19:22.240 --> 00:19:25.160 would go in and brief the Director of National Intelligence 297 00:19:25.720 --> 00:19:31.519 or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I would always be asked, Hey, 298 00:19:32.079 --> 00:19:33.599 is there anything we can do for you? 299 00:19:33.680 --> 00:19:35.400 Is there anybody not cooperating? 300 00:19:36.480 --> 00:19:42.839 Just unprecedented support and access to any program. You know, 301 00:19:42.920 --> 00:19:47.920 at one time we were investigating claims of over forty 302 00:19:48.319 --> 00:19:54.200 special access and controlled access programs allegedly dealing with the 303 00:19:54.319 --> 00:19:58.559 recovery or the exploitation of. 304 00:20:00.440 --> 00:20:02.880 UFO materials or uap. 305 00:20:03.759 --> 00:20:07.079 Okay e t that those are the claims that we 306 00:20:07.079 --> 00:20:14.440 were We had UH supporting investigations with both the Department 307 00:20:14.559 --> 00:20:18.880 Defense i G and the i C i G. We 308 00:20:18.960 --> 00:20:24.680 had a secure reporting mechanism were current and former government 309 00:20:24.880 --> 00:20:30.720 employees or our contractors could contact us securely. We would 310 00:20:30.960 --> 00:20:32.240 maintain their. 311 00:20:33.160 --> 00:20:37.079 UH anonymity absolutely absolutely. 312 00:20:37.319 --> 00:20:41.240 We'd give them a random number and we would protect 313 00:20:41.240 --> 00:20:45.359 their identities. And that's when I first realized that, you know, 314 00:20:45.359 --> 00:20:48.039 there were there were Americans that were scared to death 315 00:20:48.079 --> 00:20:48.839 to talk to us. 316 00:20:49.599 --> 00:20:51.799 They were very concerned about being harmed. 317 00:20:53.599 --> 00:20:56.519 I mean, I think that brings up a really good segue. 318 00:20:56.720 --> 00:21:04.000 And because and and and I I think if all 319 00:21:04.079 --> 00:21:09.160 of this was just light in the sky, I don't 320 00:21:09.200 --> 00:21:13.880 think people would be

scared for their life to come 321 00:21:13.960 --> 00:21:18.480 forward and to want to, you know, gain nothing from it. 322 00:21:20.079 --> 00:21:23.480 I mean some of the people that like you said 323 00:21:23.480 --> 00:21:26.200 that you had come to you, that they literally they 324 00:21:26.279 --> 00:21:29.480 feared for their life. Now I know that we I 325 00:21:29.519 --> 00:21:33.279 think most people in the UFO community, if they're smart, right, 326 00:21:33.599 --> 00:21:36.400 if they're up to speed, we know that ninety five 327 00:21:36.480 --> 00:21:40.519 percent of what seen can be prosaically explained. There is 328 00:21:40.559 --> 00:21:44.960 a five percent margin, and if I'm being very generous, 329 00:21:45.599 --> 00:21:50.119 two percent of that is really anomalous in my in 330 00:21:50.440 --> 00:21:55.359 statistical means, that is a very small percentage. So you know, 331 00:21:55.599 --> 00:21:59.519 arrows it seems what arrow is is at least mandated 332 00:21:59.559 --> 00:22:02.559 to do. Or the idea and the mission was to 333 00:22:02.640 --> 00:22:06.799 sift through all the data and find that two percent 334 00:22:08.119 --> 00:22:09.880 and the people that are coming to you that are 335 00:22:09.880 --> 00:22:13.960 fearing for their lives. I mean, it's got to make 336 00:22:14.000 --> 00:22:17.559 this pretty real, right, Well, it was. 337 00:22:17.599 --> 00:22:22.519 Real to them what we got from these individuals and 338 00:22:22.799 --> 00:22:28.519 be able to align that with hard evidence and data 339 00:22:28.599 --> 00:22:33.799 that we can scientifically examined to understand the phenomena. Really 340 00:22:33.920 --> 00:22:36.000 wasn't there a lot of these people who came in 341 00:22:36.039 --> 00:22:40.160 with these amazing claims that the government had recovered and 342 00:22:40.160 --> 00:22:47.599 were reverse engineering or exploit exploiting alien technologies. We never 343 00:22:47.640 --> 00:22:50.720 could find any hard evidence to back any of that up. 344 00:22:50.880 --> 00:22:51.960 There were a lot of drives. 345 00:22:53.359 --> 00:22:57.279 Can I ask you something sure when you say alien, 346 00:22:57.400 --> 00:23:00.759 this is something that arrow does and this is something 347 00:23:00.799 --> 00:23:05.640 I do want cleared up for myself. When you say alien, 348 00:23:06.200 --> 00:23:12.920 and when Arrows reports say extraterrestrial, why be so. 349 00:23:14.480 --> 00:23:20.519 We would refer to material sentient beings from a planet 350 00:23:20.599 --> 00:23:24.559 other than ours extraterrestrial using that that term. 351 00:23:24.839 --> 00:23:27.640 But wouldn't that so? But if you say you found 352 00:23:27.640 --> 00:23:31.160 evidence of ultra terrestrial something that that had been here 353 00:23:31.599 --> 00:23:38.960 for you know, somehow is been developing alongside us, and somehow, 354 00:23:39.319 --> 00:23:43.839 you know, is of avoiding us. Like and I'm just

355 00:23:43.960 --> 00:23:48.559 I'm really asking this as a question, and I I 356 00:23:48.559 --> 00:23:51.680 if something you know, to suspend a little belief here 357 00:23:52.039 --> 00:23:55.839 to walk with me. You know, if something had been 358 00:23:55.960 --> 00:23:59.599 here and maybe is now what people see as UFOs 359 00:24:00.119 --> 00:24:02.000 and it had been here the whole time, I mean 360 00:24:02.039 --> 00:24:05.599 by definition that would not be extraterrestrial. So what I 361 00:24:05.680 --> 00:24:09.319 mean is why be so specific because some people think 362 00:24:09.359 --> 00:24:13.640 that is Arrow trying to pin it on aliens in 363 00:24:13.680 --> 00:24:17.559 green men and then not address the fact that you know, 364 00:24:17.640 --> 00:24:21.640 angels and demons are non human intelligence. They're not aliens, 365 00:24:21.839 --> 00:24:26.359 but they're by definition non human intelligence, and I think 366 00:24:26.759 --> 00:24:29.960 that's what we should be looking for, not aliens, because 367 00:24:29.960 --> 00:24:30.839 that's specific. 368 00:24:31.920 --> 00:24:37.720 Okay, I see your point. We had no evidence of. 369 00:24:39.759 --> 00:24:44.359 Anything that we recovered or was given to us that 370 00:24:44.400 --> 00:24:48.839 we examined to come from any other planet. 371 00:24:48.519 --> 00:24:50.799 Than our own. 372 00:24:52.680 --> 00:24:56.720 The technologies that we did examine, the phenomenons that we 373 00:24:56.839 --> 00:25:03.000 did observe, were designed and operated by human beings. One 374 00:25:03.039 --> 00:25:06.920 of the things that was I think frustrated a lot 375 00:25:06.960 --> 00:25:11.359 of people didn't understand what was the value of ERROW. 376 00:25:11.759 --> 00:25:18.799 Errow produced quite a bit of new understanding of foreign 377 00:25:19.039 --> 00:25:22.039 technologies and new capabilities. 378 00:25:22.079 --> 00:25:25.799 So two of Arrow's missions that were not widely known. 379 00:25:25.720 --> 00:25:32.359 Was technological and operational surprise. ERROW would pick up we 380 00:25:32.400 --> 00:25:36.119 would have the services of the intelligence community using their 381 00:25:36.200 --> 00:25:41.599 operational platforms or ISR systems, would pick up a signature 382 00:25:41.680 --> 00:25:45.839 that didn't correspond with something known. So we would have 383 00:25:45.880 --> 00:25:52.480 a partial signature of a system that did not correspond with, 384 00:25:53.720 --> 00:25:56.640 say the enemy order battle capability. We didn't know what 385 00:25:56.720 --> 00:26:00.559 this was, so it would be reported to as a 386 00:26:00.680 --> 00:26:04.160 UAP and then we would throw a lot of science, 387 00:26:04.200 --> 00:26:07.240 a lot of sensors. We would put together some integrated 388 00:26:07.279 --> 00:26:12.160 collection plans trying to find exactly what is that, and 389 00:26:12.240 --> 00:26:16.079 then working with the community, try to put together the 390 00:26:16.079 --> 00:26:21.000 pieces to understand the puzzle. And there was and there 391 00:26:21.119 --> 00:26:27.119 was intelligence reporting, Okay, that originally started off as a 392 00:26:27.359 --> 00:26:32.000 UAP incident report. So we would have an F thirty 393 00:26:32.000 --> 00:26:36.240 five platform would pick up an unusual signature of something 394 00:26:36.240 --> 00:26:40.079 we didn't understand, and then Errow, working with the community, 395 00:26:40.160 --> 00:26:44.559 would go after it, and then we would able to 396 00:26:44.680 --> 00:26:51.960 produce new understanding of say a new or emerging foreign 397 00:26:53.519 --> 00:26:57.119 you know, aircraft capability that we just observed for the 398 00:26:57.160 --> 00:27:00.680 first time. Errol did a lot of that. Now that's 399 00:27:00.680 --> 00:27:03.200 going to be classified reporting, the public's never going to 400 00:27:03.240 --> 00:27:06.720 see it, and that was one of the frustrating things. 401 00:27:06.720 --> 00:27:08.119 People are saying, what does zero do? 402 00:27:08.759 --> 00:27:11.519 Erol did quite a bit, but you're not going to 403 00:27:11.599 --> 00:27:14.319 be able to see it declassified for seventy five years, 404 00:27:14.880 --> 00:27:16.559 so it's going to take a while for that to 405 00:27:16.599 --> 00:27:19.640 get out there. But we did work very very closely 406 00:27:20.720 --> 00:27:25.599 with the service Intelligence Lab, so we would work on 407 00:27:25.799 --> 00:27:31.559 the National Air and Space Intelligence Center or the National 408 00:27:31.599 --> 00:27:37.319 Space Intelligence Center. We would get reports and we look 409 00:27:37.440 --> 00:27:40.440 at it and the first thing that we would do 410 00:27:40.599 --> 00:27:45.759 is is there any other system that may have detected 411 00:27:46.079 --> 00:27:49.759 that incident? So we would start in space. Can we 412 00:27:49.799 --> 00:27:51.279 do a lot of space surveillance? 413 00:27:51.880 --> 00:27:52.160 Okay? 414 00:27:52.279 --> 00:27:56.960 Can we establish a track? Did anything de orbit? Was 415 00:27:57.000 --> 00:28:01.799 there any data that we could get from web radar? Okay, 416 00:28:01.839 --> 00:28:10.799 from air traffic control, radar, surveillance, radar, biostatic, you know, processing, 417 00:28:11.200 --> 00:28:14.880 So we can So there's an incident. Now we have 418 00:28:15.119 --> 00:28:18.559 hard data that can prove the exist and now we've 419 00:28:18.599 --> 00:28:22.079 got a heading, we've got a speed, we've got an altitude. 420 00:28:22.160 --> 00:28:24.359 So now we can build a track. And now we 421 00:28:24.839 --> 00:28:29.559 haven't observed of what happened. Where then can we take 422 00:28:30.039 --> 00:28:33.440 those facts and kind of have an understanding of what 423 00:28:33.480 --> 00:28:39.039 the incident was. Errol did a lot of that, and 424 00:28:39.359 --> 00:28:41.960 most of the data that we

needed was available. We 425 00:28:42.119 --> 00:28:45.400 just never had the network or the tools to be able, 426 00:28:45.880 --> 00:28:49.319 you know, to exploit it. So we're talking large data. 427 00:28:50.599 --> 00:28:54.359 You needed to have an architecture fast enough and large 428 00:28:54.440 --> 00:28:58.039 enough to take this data and you aggregate the data 429 00:28:58.200 --> 00:28:59.680 so now the data is going to be at a 430 00:28:59.759 --> 00:29:04.680 higher classification level than any individual data stream to kind 431 00:29:04.720 --> 00:29:08.799 of understand and build that common operational picture. So you 432 00:29:08.839 --> 00:29:13.119 can say, yeah, okay, that incident corresponds with that track 433 00:29:13.920 --> 00:29:14.640 what is it? 434 00:29:15.559 --> 00:29:21.920 And and I totally understand why ARROW in all of 435 00:29:21.920 --> 00:29:26.240 the ways that you just described doing that actual legwork 436 00:29:26.960 --> 00:29:31.359 is actually is really valuable. However, I can't help but 437 00:29:31.599 --> 00:29:38.279 hear a natural flaw in the process because if you 438 00:29:38.400 --> 00:29:43.279 had and and and forgive you know, not forgive me, 439 00:29:43.400 --> 00:29:47.039 but forgive me if I if I don't say the 440 00:29:47.119 --> 00:29:50.200 right words, because all the acronyms are they're sometimes a 441 00:29:50.240 --> 00:29:52.160 little bit confusing when you're trying to jumple them all. 442 00:29:52.400 --> 00:29:59.960 But you guys had title is it Title fifteen and title. 443 00:29:59.319 --> 00:30:08.119 Intelligence, Title ten is Department Offense, that's military, okay, okay. 444 00:30:08.200 --> 00:30:11.960 And then you would have legal authorities from law enforcement 445 00:30:12.000 --> 00:30:17.319 through the FBI or DS Title eighteen, Title fourteen, So 446 00:30:17.799 --> 00:30:22.119 we would work together in a task force. There would 447 00:30:22.160 --> 00:30:25.039 be an incident, and you would bring in officers from 448 00:30:25.079 --> 00:30:31.000 these other agencies. They would bring their authorities. ARROW would 449 00:30:31.599 --> 00:30:35.960 would be the aggregated think of AARROW as taking all 450 00:30:36.000 --> 00:30:38.839 these legal authorities inc but we have permission to work 451 00:30:38.839 --> 00:30:42.640 with everybody in their data and we could produce a 452 00:30:42.720 --> 00:30:47.240 common operational pitchers to kind of layout this is our 453 00:30:47.319 --> 00:30:50.480 understanding of what is going on, and then from that, 454 00:30:52.079 --> 00:30:57.000 if it's domestic DHS, FBI, local tribal, they could respond 455 00:30:57.119 --> 00:30:59.720 operationally got it. 456 00:31:00.839 --> 00:31:03.920 So that was kind of the work that ARROW did. 457 00:31:04.279 --> 00:31:06.559 Primarily when we would have. 458 00:31:08.200 --> 00:31:13.640 State, local tribal dhs, they would pick up things that 459 00:31:13.720 --> 00:31:16.319 they thought were UAPs, But as we got in and 460 00:31:16.400 --> 00:31:21.119 started to examine the cases, we realized there were uass 461 00:31:22.440 --> 00:31:26.519 So we started actually developing and researching a lot of 462 00:31:26.599 --> 00:31:31.279 counter UAS systems that were kind of that short range 463 00:31:32.359 --> 00:31:35.680 detection system. There's a lot of great systems out there 464 00:31:35.839 --> 00:31:39.759 that we would incorporate with our answer grids and our 465 00:31:39.839 --> 00:31:43.400 active sensors, so we would have passive and active emitters. 466 00:31:43.920 --> 00:31:45.960 So we would go into an area where we had 467 00:31:46.000 --> 00:31:49.880 a UAP incident and then we would try to capture 468 00:31:49.920 --> 00:31:52.680 it in near real time to understand what was going on. 469 00:31:53.200 --> 00:31:58.319 And since ERO is a DoD organization okay, partnering with 470 00:31:58.359 --> 00:32:02.000 the intelligence community, we were looking at it from a 471 00:32:02.279 --> 00:32:07.720 national security perspective. So we have detected some airborne system 472 00:32:08.079 --> 00:32:12.880 operating and restricted airspace. Okay, why is it there, who's 473 00:32:12.960 --> 00:32:17.160 operating it? And what are their interests? That was a 474 00:32:17.200 --> 00:32:20.559 great concern to us, because, as you can imagine, there's 475 00:32:20.599 --> 00:32:25.880 a lot of sensitive sites that our country wants. 476 00:32:25.319 --> 00:32:28.000 Which I will want to get to. But so what 477 00:32:28.039 --> 00:32:32.200 I what I meant by all that was now say Arrow, 478 00:32:32.480 --> 00:32:36.160 and again here here we go down down a little 479 00:32:36.160 --> 00:32:40.480 bit of the rabbit hole. Okay, say I'm Arrow as 480 00:32:40.599 --> 00:32:46.359 an entity, and I come across because I have the clearance, 481 00:32:46.759 --> 00:32:52.720 I come across a unacknowledged special access program, something that's 482 00:32:52.880 --> 00:32:58.480 deep black, deep covert, right, and I learn about something, 483 00:32:59.000 --> 00:33:02.680 And I mean, i'd like to have you probably address this. 484 00:33:02.799 --> 00:33:07.440 But even guys like Jim Lakatski have claimed that OSAPP 485 00:33:07.839 --> 00:33:11.200 breached the whole of a UFO. And I'm sure Green 486 00:33:11.279 --> 00:33:13.960 Street had brought that part up to you, But if 487 00:33:14.279 --> 00:33:16.519 they had, if you had come across something that was 488 00:33:16.599 --> 00:33:19.599 deep dark, and and you've already said it, some of 489 00:33:19.640 --> 00:33:21.200 the stuff that Arrow's done, we're not going to hear 490 00:33:21.200 --> 00:33:24.359 about seventy five years. So how do we know that 491 00:33:24.440 --> 00:33:27.480 you didn't find anything? And it's not just I mean, 492 00:33:27.759 --> 00:33:31.440 wouldn't you be required by law by your oath and 493 00:33:31.519 -->

00:33:34.599 by your duty to lie to me like and lie 494 00:33:34.680 --> 00:33:38.599 to and and I'm saying this really honestly, and and 495 00:33:38.599 --> 00:33:42.079 and in the most sincere way, Like, wouldn't it be 496 00:33:42.200 --> 00:33:44.880 your duty to tell me that you didn't find it 497 00:33:45.440 --> 00:33:48.480 for operational reasons? 498 00:33:49.480 --> 00:33:58.200 Well, ERROL never was a originating classification authority, so we 499 00:33:58.279 --> 00:34:02.960 didn't have a classification, but we provided guidance on how 500 00:34:03.000 --> 00:34:10.440 to classify UAP related topics. So the fact that a 501 00:34:10.599 --> 00:34:17.719 UAP exists or was detected wasn't necessarily classified or sensitive. However, 502 00:34:18.519 --> 00:34:25.119 if that incident occurred in restricted airspace or acknowledge some 503 00:34:25.400 --> 00:34:30.840 type of failure in a surveillance or a defensive system 504 00:34:30.920 --> 00:34:35.400 to protect that restricted or protected site, that would be 505 00:34:35.440 --> 00:34:43.039 a little bit sensitive. If ERROL had actually found a 506 00:34:43.199 --> 00:34:48.199 system that was not man made, and you know, we 507 00:34:48.320 --> 00:34:52.719 came across a you know, a crash site or you know, 508 00:34:53.159 --> 00:34:57.320 remains or some hard evidence that there was something an 509 00:34:57.360 --> 00:35:03.280 advanced capability or system that was not you know, engineered, 510 00:35:03.440 --> 00:35:08.360 manufactured and operated by humans. The fact that that existed, 511 00:35:08.400 --> 00:35:12.239 we actually talked with Public Affairs and thought that would 512 00:35:12.280 --> 00:35:15.920 well go well beyond the authority of the Aero Director 513 00:35:15.960 --> 00:35:18.800 and there'd be a lot of coordination with the executive 514 00:35:18.800 --> 00:35:22.039 and the White House on how they wanted to share 515 00:35:22.079 --> 00:35:24.559 that with the American people. That probably wouldn't be the 516 00:35:24.599 --> 00:35:29.559 director of VERO sharing the fact that we found remnants 517 00:35:29.679 --> 00:35:35.639 of a spacecraft that we couldn't identify with attributes of 518 00:35:36.000 --> 00:35:41.119 new technologies and capabilities that were not human made. If 519 00:35:41.159 --> 00:35:45.960 that happened, and it did not happen, we would probably 520 00:35:46.079 --> 00:35:48.559 kick that up to the White House and let them 521 00:35:48.599 --> 00:35:49.599 share that information. 522 00:35:50.519 --> 00:35:53.760 But you see my conundrum here, right, You do see 523 00:35:53.800 --> 00:35:57.440 my conundrum here, Probably I do. 524 00:35:57.599 --> 00:36:03.320 But part of the the task that Aarrow had from 525 00:36:03.639 --> 00:36:10.039 Congressional oversight, they were looking and as as federal officers, 526 00:36:10.119 --> 00:36:12.880 you know, we we had gun carrying law you know, 527 00:36:13.000 --> 00:36:15.360

federal law enforcement officers on our staff. 528 00:36:16.119 --> 00:36:20.559 So if we found evidence of a crime, if we found. 529 00:36:20.280 --> 00:36:26.320 A program that was being concealed from overside where they 530 00:36:26.320 --> 00:36:31.440 were using you know, federal funds without authority, that's a crime. 531 00:36:32.199 --> 00:36:36.519 And Congress was very very sensitive to that, and we 532 00:36:36.599 --> 00:36:40.360 actually had you know, a hotline. We had a way 533 00:36:40.440 --> 00:36:45.519 that people could call in their belief that there was 534 00:36:45.760 --> 00:36:49.880 a undeclared sapper cap that was being concealed from oversight, 535 00:36:50.519 --> 00:36:56.280 and we aggressively researched those and investigated those cases. 536 00:36:56.639 --> 00:36:59.119 And we did it in parallel with. 537 00:36:59.480 --> 00:37:04.079 IG with both the Department Offense and with the intelligence community. 538 00:37:04.880 --> 00:37:08.039 We would weekly meetings where we would say this is 539 00:37:08.079 --> 00:37:10.519 what we heard from the witness and we would go 540 00:37:10.599 --> 00:37:14.760 back and forth, you know, without comper minding our you know, 541 00:37:15.119 --> 00:37:22.239 our ability to honor NBA's and they're and agreements we 542 00:37:22.320 --> 00:37:26.840 had with witnesses. We would always protect those making protected disclosures. 543 00:37:27.400 --> 00:37:30.480 But there was a lot of coordination and there were 544 00:37:31.199 --> 00:37:34.920 plenty of JAG officers and attorneys with an Apartment of 545 00:37:36.039 --> 00:37:40.159 Justice to give us legal guidance on how to pursue 546 00:37:40.440 --> 00:37:41.119 these cases. 547 00:37:41.320 --> 00:37:43.840 Great, which is great, and that kind of brings me 548 00:37:43.920 --> 00:37:47.519 to a point here which I think is good. Uh 549 00:37:48.079 --> 00:37:55.960 it is now Uh With that being said, what what? 550 00:37:56.519 --> 00:37:58.599 And I want to wrap this in a bit ribbon here. 551 00:38:01.119 --> 00:38:03.639 Did you hear the claims that Jim mccatsky did make 552 00:38:03.679 --> 00:38:07.719 about preaching the whole of a craft of a of 553 00:38:07.760 --> 00:38:11.639 an unknown What he said, and this is again this 554 00:38:11.719 --> 00:38:16.760 is verbatim, breached the whole of a of an unknown 555 00:38:16.840 --> 00:38:20.280 craft that did not originate from here, and he was 556 00:38:20.760 --> 00:38:24.039 running the offset program. Have you heard that claim? 557 00:38:24.559 --> 00:38:25.559 We've heard claims. 558 00:38:25.960 --> 00:38:29.639 A lot of that was addressed and volume on of 559 00:38:29.679 --> 00:38:33.679 the historical report, which we did in a very compressive 560 00:38:33.679 --> 00:38:34.440 amount of time. 561 00:38:35.000 --> 00:38:36.360 Of course, Oh yeah, we got it. 562 00:38:36.519 --> 00:38:40.079 I'm sure there's an ademdum to it. With some new 563 00:38:40.119

--> 00:38:44.519 findings on that report after Sean left and some of 564 00:38:44.559 --> 00:38:48.440 the fallow up investigations that we had, and new claims 565 00:38:48.480 --> 00:38:52.360 that were brought in, new interviews, new referrals from Congress 566 00:38:52.519 --> 00:38:56.760 and the IG. We continue to research these claims because 567 00:38:56.760 --> 00:39:00.519 it was of interest both to the Cabinet Secretary and 568 00:39:01.039 --> 00:39:05.400 to the oversight officials and the committees that we worked 569 00:39:05.440 --> 00:39:09.039 with up on the hill. But we never, even when 570 00:39:09.039 --> 00:39:14.000 we had materials delivered or claims that these materials came 571 00:39:14.119 --> 00:39:19.760 from a non human craft or system. In every case 572 00:39:19.840 --> 00:39:24.719 where we had independent labs verify the you know, the 573 00:39:24.760 --> 00:39:30.079 identity of the materials, we never discovered or were able 574 00:39:30.079 --> 00:39:34.480 to validate any claim that that material came from a craft, 575 00:39:34.599 --> 00:39:37.199 not you know, a non human craft that did not 576 00:39:37.440 --> 00:39:41.039 happen during my time in era. And we spent millions 577 00:39:41.039 --> 00:39:53.440 of dollars doing these analysis of these materials. 578 00:39:54.519 --> 00:39:56.599 Okay, I'm getting I was muted. 579 00:39:56.719 --> 00:39:59.719 I was muted. That was my fault. I wanted to 580 00:39:59.719 --> 00:40:05.280 give you the floor. So with that, with that being said, 581 00:40:05.519 --> 00:40:08.519 so with materials, I find that to be very interesting 582 00:40:08.840 --> 00:40:14.719 because obviously guys like doctor Gary Nolan are saying different things. 583 00:40:16.000 --> 00:40:20.400 You know him at Stanford. What he's saying is they've 584 00:40:20.440 --> 00:40:27.880 come across any materials that the isotopic ratios don't match 585 00:40:27.880 --> 00:40:32.480 anything on Earth and they're atomically layered. Were you guys 586 00:40:32.519 --> 00:40:36.519 given any of those materials to also analyze and come 587 00:40:36.599 --> 00:40:43.320 up with maybe, you know, any collaboration with that effort. 588 00:40:43.960 --> 00:40:47.960 We didn't work with him. The labs that we used 589 00:40:48.000 --> 00:40:53.840 to do the material analysis were basically the old Manhattan programs, 590 00:40:53.920 --> 00:40:59.599 the Department of Energy Labs San Dia, Oakridge, we worked with. 591 00:41:00.519 --> 00:41:05.639 Do you think do you think is it possible? Is 592 00:41:05.760 --> 00:41:09.639 it I mean, I'm I'm and I'm really genuinely curious. 593 00:41:10.000 --> 00:41:15.360 Is it possible that there are there are metals or 594 00:41:15.679 --> 00:41:20.400 parts out there, uh, that people do have that may 595 00:41:20.599 --> 00:41:22.920 still be anomaloust. 596 00:41:23.679 --> 00:41:27.239 Nothing that was ever shared, There was no materials that 597 00:41:27.440 --> 00:41:32.599 was ever shared with Marrow that have any unusual characteristics. 598 00:41:32.920 --> 00:41:36.679 Everything now we looked at came from this planet. 599 00:41:36.719 --> 00:41:40.840 Okay, okay, and that's fair enough. I definitely think you know, 600 00:41:41.280 --> 00:41:43.840 you guys should run down I mean because because Gary Nolan, 601 00:41:44.039 --> 00:41:47.239 I'm pretty sure, uh is it works with the CIA, 602 00:41:47.440 --> 00:41:50.920 and or at least has worked with the CIA. So 603 00:41:51.400 --> 00:41:55.079 I'd be I'd be interested to find out why a 604 00:41:55.079 --> 00:41:59.679 guy like that would make claims like that, knowing and 605 00:41:59.800 --> 00:42:05.280 and and that had there's there's other stories. 606 00:42:06.039 --> 00:42:09.400 U a p UFO crash. Parts wanted to come to 607 00:42:09.519 --> 00:42:12.280 Aryon and say, hey, this is the pedigree. One of 608 00:42:12.320 --> 00:42:15.440 the one of the challenges we had when people had 609 00:42:15.639 --> 00:42:19.199 parts is we would go back and almost like it 610 00:42:19.280 --> 00:42:25.880 was evidence using a trial, so you know, proper custody 611 00:42:25.880 --> 00:42:29.400 and document who possessed it. 612 00:42:29.480 --> 00:42:30.920 You know, how was it controlled. 613 00:42:31.559 --> 00:42:37.400 And It's funny as you were getting closer to the 614 00:42:37.400 --> 00:42:41.840 the actual incident where the material was collected, a lot 615 00:42:41.880 --> 00:42:46.239 of that, you know, the details seemed to be lost. 616 00:42:47.800 --> 00:42:48.039 You know. 617 00:42:48.119 --> 00:42:51.559 We we had materials were sitting on a warehouse in 618 00:42:51.599 --> 00:42:53.760 a shell for the last forty years. But as we 619 00:42:53.880 --> 00:42:57.280 try to get back to where that matuial was collected, 620 00:42:57.920 --> 00:43:01.519 the trail would go cold. And we did have people 621 00:43:01.599 --> 00:43:06.000 that contacted er. We actually had citizens that went to 622 00:43:06.039 --> 00:43:10.599 their congressional representative and they wanted er to validate the 623 00:43:10.639 --> 00:43:14.440 fact that they actually had a UFO crash card. So 624 00:43:15.159 --> 00:43:17.599 I want to go on the road, and they wanted 625 00:43:17.639 --> 00:43:21.000 that seal of approval from RYW. You know, we're not 626 00:43:21.119 --> 00:43:25.280 in the business help people make money. However, if there 627 00:43:25.480 --> 00:43:28.440 was an entity that had worked with a part of 628 00:43:28.480 --> 00:43:31.960 the US government and they claimed they had material that 629 00:43:32.719 --> 00:43:36.920 was part of some type of UAP or UFO incident, 630 00:43:37.320 --> 00:43:41.920 Ero would love to help them go back and actually 631 00:43:41.920 --> 00:43:43.079 identify the material. 632 00:43:43.199 --> 00:43:46.360 We can do that. We have an active program. 633 00:43:46.719 --> 00:43:52.360 We've invested

millions of dollars in equipment and clean rooms 634 00:43:52.440 --> 00:43:57.159 and procedures where we could take custody of a piece 635 00:43:57.199 --> 00:44:01.119 of material, do a double blind study, have different teams 636 00:44:01.199 --> 00:44:05.079 work on different you know, parts of a you know, 637 00:44:05.159 --> 00:44:08.079 a piece of material and come up independently with what 638 00:44:08.119 --> 00:44:08.960 they thought it was. 639 00:44:09.599 --> 00:44:11.159 And we love that. 640 00:44:12.320 --> 00:44:16.280 And but every time that that was done, the materials 641 00:44:16.320 --> 00:44:21.039 came from this sort. 642 00:44:17.000 --> 00:44:22.239 Of okay, and and that's and that's fair enough. I 643 00:44:22.280 --> 00:44:26.199 want to I want to you know, speaking of parts 644 00:44:26.239 --> 00:44:32.280 and evidence. Uh, there there was this claim made and 645 00:44:32.840 --> 00:44:36.960 people have asked me to and we talked, like I said, 646 00:44:37.000 --> 00:44:41.559 we talked about this on the phone and you you 647 00:44:41.679 --> 00:44:44.119 had just brought up that's you know, Arrow try or 648 00:44:44.159 --> 00:44:46.920 someone tried to get Arrow's seal of approval. There was 649 00:44:47.000 --> 00:44:50.719 another claim made that there was a person and he 650 00:44:50.800 --> 00:44:55.400 now goes by whistling mic on on X I believe, 651 00:44:56.960 --> 00:45:02.960 and he's made some claims, and Burlison has said he's 652 00:45:03.000 --> 00:45:08.360 an interesting person and he's a defense contractor who's trying 653 00:45:08.400 --> 00:45:12.480 to get contracts with the US government and he came 654 00:45:12.559 --> 00:45:18.199 to Arrow with a story. And what you say is 655 00:45:17.880 --> 00:45:23.119 that there was an attempt at extortion. Can you address 656 00:45:23.159 --> 00:45:26.239 this and clear this up what happened there? 657 00:45:26.800 --> 00:45:30.239 Well, Errol doesn't comment on people that come to them 658 00:45:30.280 --> 00:45:37.320 with UAP incident claims. We protect their identities, but what if. 659 00:45:37.159 --> 00:45:39.039 They blow their identity. 660 00:45:39.480 --> 00:45:40.400 Well, that's up to them. 661 00:45:40.480 --> 00:45:44.039 We've had we had a referral when I was the 662 00:45:44.119 --> 00:45:48.360 acting director chairman of one of the oversight committees asked 663 00:45:48.440 --> 00:45:53.800 us to meet with an individual that claimed to have 664 00:45:54.400 --> 00:45:58.719 reported to US a UAP part. When we actually met 665 00:45:58.760 --> 00:46:03.119 with this individual, what we realized is the claim was 666 00:46:03.159 --> 00:46:10.679 that he recovered a part that fell from an advanced 667 00:46:10.800 --> 00:46:16.440 US Dealth aircraft. So the part that he recovered was 668 00:46:16.519 --> 00:46:18.920 actually a piece of government property. 669 00:46:20.519 --> 00:46:25.119 This individual came up with a new. 670 00:46:25.000 --> 00:46:33.000 Manufacturing process to duplicate the part, wanted, found a or 671 00:46:33.119 --> 00:46:38.039 developed a procedure to be able to detect these advanced aircraft. 672 00:46:38.760 --> 00:46:42.400 At one point there was a claim that wanted us 673 00:46:42.519 --> 00:46:45.800 to purchase the part or there was going to sell 674 00:46:45.800 --> 00:46:49.920 it to another foreign entity, such as the Chinese. To US, 675 00:46:50.039 --> 00:46:53.159 that sounded like it stortion, and that's how we treated it, 676 00:46:53.199 --> 00:46:55.519 and we referred it off to the FBI. But that 677 00:46:55.639 --> 00:46:57.880 was kind of the end of that. The fact that 678 00:46:58.039 --> 00:47:02.440 someone recovered apart from America raft, that right there means 679 00:47:02.480 --> 00:47:06.239 it's not it's not an arrows mission set. 680 00:47:06.159 --> 00:47:10.559 Aero investigates u A P right, if it's a US 681 00:47:10.599 --> 00:47:13.079 advanced aircraft, has nothing to do with you, ap. 682 00:47:14.559 --> 00:47:18.079 Okay, So there, there's so what And we don't have 683 00:47:18.119 --> 00:47:21.159 to talk about any We don't have to infer anyone. 684 00:47:21.559 --> 00:47:25.400 So what what the What the scenario was was there 685 00:47:25.760 --> 00:47:30.920 was a person who claimed to have a part. You 686 00:47:31.039 --> 00:47:34.079 discovered that it was from a next gen fighter, but 687 00:47:34.159 --> 00:47:35.840 it already been They claim. 688 00:47:35.519 --> 00:47:38.400 It was from an advanced concept. 689 00:47:38.760 --> 00:47:40.079 Oh gotcha, gotchat. 690 00:47:45.119 --> 00:47:50.480 The individual had some images, never shared any of those 691 00:47:50.559 --> 00:47:54.440 videos with us. We we'd asked for them we did 692 00:47:54.559 --> 00:47:58.360 from the the chairman, we did get a still image 693 00:47:59.000 --> 00:48:04.320 of a aircraft and advanced allegedly it was advanced stealth 694 00:48:04.920 --> 00:48:10.360 you know, aircraft that was in development. Congress was concerned 695 00:48:10.440 --> 00:48:14.920 that there's been some type of compromise and that these 696 00:48:14.920 --> 00:48:17.920 images of this aircraft that got out into the public. 697 00:48:18.360 --> 00:48:22.159 Was very concerned about a leak. That's one reason I 698 00:48:22.320 --> 00:48:25.920 was asked to go out to the Nevada Test Range 699 00:48:26.840 --> 00:48:29.960 to actually meet with the program managers that were developing 700 00:48:30.000 --> 00:48:33.880 the sixth generation aircraft out there, and I did that. 701 00:48:38.000 --> 00:48:41.840 We analyzed the image and the image looked like a 702 00:48:41.920 --> 00:48:48.639 promotion video that had come from an aircraft manufacturer. It 703 00:48:48.760 --> 00:48:52.400 kind of looked like an F one seventeen on steroids. 704 00:48:53.960 --> 00:49:00.719 The vast majority of our aerospace engineers thought it was, 705 00:49:01.920

--> 00:49:06.599 you know, a photoshop version of something that was in 706 00:49:06.639 --> 00:49:10.480 a promotional video. And that's what we reported back to 707 00:49:10.559 --> 00:49:14.320 the Hill. And again, it wasn't a UAP, it was 708 00:49:14.360 --> 00:49:17.079 a stealth aircraft. So it really wasn't in our lane. 709 00:49:18.280 --> 00:49:21.760 So so did this person ever even make it to 710 00:49:21.800 --> 00:49:22.280 a skiff? 711 00:49:24.639 --> 00:49:26.119 Yes, to talk to us? 712 00:49:26.519 --> 00:49:29.159 Okay, So there so there was a meeting and a 713 00:49:29.199 --> 00:49:32.559 skiff with that individual and then it was referred to 714 00:49:33.079 --> 00:49:38.519 federal law enforcement because there was a concern by Congress 715 00:49:38.639 --> 00:49:42.280 that there was a breed somewhere in that. Yeah. 716 00:49:42.320 --> 00:49:47.639 No, No, the concern was an extortion attempt. The other 717 00:49:47.760 --> 00:49:50.480 concerned Congress had it they could have had a compromise 718 00:49:50.880 --> 00:49:54.599 and you yeah, an individual with a you know, an 719 00:49:54.679 --> 00:49:59.800 image of an advanced concept aircraft, right, that was the concern. 720 00:49:59.880 --> 00:50:02.840 But again that's really not Arrow's mission set. We'll turn 721 00:50:02.880 --> 00:50:06.199 that over to you know, a d o DC will 722 00:50:06.280 --> 00:50:06.920 let them work that. 723 00:50:07.159 --> 00:50:15.719 Yes, totally totally understandable. And you know, I think that 724 00:50:15.880 --> 00:50:18.880 you know, that just goes to say uh or it 725 00:50:18.880 --> 00:50:21.679 goes to show at least how many So it does 726 00:50:21.760 --> 00:50:27.079 show that ARROW is working really and intently uh with 727 00:50:27.719 --> 00:50:33.480 other agencies. So you guys are cooperating and have in 728 00:50:33.719 --> 00:50:36.920 law enforcement that is working with you. That that that 729 00:50:36.960 --> 00:50:38.679 you you're able to refer these things too. 730 00:50:39.039 --> 00:50:39.239 Well. 731 00:50:39.480 --> 00:50:44.480 Absolutely, as a you know, as a country, we really 732 00:50:44.679 --> 00:50:48.360 really have to federate and work with state, local tribal 733 00:50:48.920 --> 00:50:54.360 authorities to understand the phenomena. We looked if we were 734 00:50:54.400 --> 00:50:57.000 working with North kom because one of the things that 735 00:50:57.039 --> 00:50:59.599 we were working that we were developing was a UAP 736 00:50:59.719 --> 00:51:02.639 record plan as you can imagine. 737 00:51:02.239 --> 00:51:06.199 Oh, an actual recovery plan. 738 00:51:05.159 --> 00:51:09.639 Because I was asked when early on members of Congress, 739 00:51:09.639 --> 00:51:12.679 a committee chairman came to me and wanted to see 740 00:51:12.719 --> 00:51:15.960 the plan. And I was pretty new to this business 741 00:51:16.119 --> 00:51:19.760 and Sean had left, so I had gone back and asked, 742 00:51:20.159

--> 00:51:23.400 do we have is there a UAP recovery plan? 743 00:51:23.559 --> 00:51:24.960 Can someone show something to me? 744 00:51:25.440 --> 00:51:28.679 So there was some things we found that they thought 745 00:51:28.719 --> 00:51:33.719 were part of the majestic program and the a was 746 00:51:34.280 --> 00:51:38.400 it was fake. But we had actually working with d 747 00:51:38.519 --> 00:51:42.199 O D in the Northern Command actually to put together 748 00:51:42.280 --> 00:51:46.159 an actual recovery plan. Is as you know, you know, 749 00:51:46.239 --> 00:51:52.360 we do have organizations that recover you know, fallen satellites 750 00:51:52.440 --> 00:51:57.599 or objects from space as things re entry into our atmosphere. 751 00:51:58.239 --> 00:52:02.400 Often they have had are just fuels or payloads and 752 00:52:02.559 --> 00:52:07.719 it could be dangerous. So we have doo D teams 753 00:52:07.840 --> 00:52:11.800 on standby actually to fly out and work with state, local, 754 00:52:11.840 --> 00:52:14.400 tribal authorities to help clean these things up. 755 00:52:14.760 --> 00:52:16.360 We do that, but. 756 00:52:16.400 --> 00:52:21.039 This could also I mean, is it safe to say 757 00:52:21.079 --> 00:52:26.320 that one of these protocols, if ever there was an 758 00:52:26.360 --> 00:52:31.400 incident with a crashed legitimate UFO, that this one of 759 00:52:31.440 --> 00:52:37.119 these recovery plans could be utilized in case of that 760 00:52:37.239 --> 00:52:38.039 kind of scenario. 761 00:52:38.840 --> 00:52:43.920 Yeah, yes, because to agree that DoD does extremely well 762 00:52:44.239 --> 00:52:45.199 is planned. 763 00:52:45.480 --> 00:52:50.800 Right, and that's what I think we've all assumed, you know, happened, 764 00:52:50.840 --> 00:52:51.440 but you'd. 765 00:52:51.239 --> 00:52:51.760 Have a plan. 766 00:52:52.400 --> 00:52:55.760 So Errol was work with Northcomb to put together a plan, 767 00:52:55.840 --> 00:53:02.360 and we realized the actual person you know, probability of 768 00:53:02.480 --> 00:53:07.599 a UAP landing on federal property or a military base 769 00:53:07.760 --> 00:53:11.079 is actually pretty small. It would actually land in the 770 00:53:11.199 --> 00:53:14.960 farmer's field or in state property, and then you have 771 00:53:15.280 --> 00:53:20.960 DoD providing support to domestic authorities. So that's why we 772 00:53:21.000 --> 00:53:26.199 had partner with the Northern Command because that's what they do. 773 00:53:26.280 --> 00:53:27.920 They're a defense of the homeland. 774 00:53:28.199 --> 00:53:31.480 And that's another way that Errow kind of got into 775 00:53:31.960 --> 00:53:35.519 the counter UAP or UAS mission. 776 00:53:36.159 --> 00:53:37.639 After the Langley incident. 777 00:53:37.760 --> 00:53:41.000 You're actually asked during the incident by the Joint Staff 778 00:53:41.079 --> 00:53:44.159 J three if we could bring some of our sensors 779 00:53:44.159 --> 00:53:48.599 and our scientists and help them recover and make tracks 780 00:53:49.000 --> 00:53:53.280 so the law Enforcement pass Force could narrow down their 781 00:53:53.360 --> 00:53:57.679 search area where they thought these uas is being launched from. 782 00:53:58.440 --> 00:54:01.000 You know, what was the past and what were the 783 00:54:01.199 --> 00:54:03.360 uas is interested in surveilling. 784 00:54:03.800 --> 00:54:05.880 So we had partnered. 785 00:54:05.320 --> 00:54:09.159 With MIT that were the British that helped invent radar 786 00:54:09.199 --> 00:54:13.360 and World War two, and we were helping reconstruct, you know, 787 00:54:13.599 --> 00:54:17.159 the forensic radar tracks, trying to make us make sense 788 00:54:17.239 --> 00:54:21.920 of what happened down in Langley a couple of years ago, 789 00:54:22.639 --> 00:54:28.320 and Aero developed and expertise. You know, we had our 790 00:54:28.320 --> 00:54:31.480 Grimlin systems that we would put out. We do long 791 00:54:31.559 --> 00:54:36.440 term surveillance of a fairly large area and of course 792 00:54:36.880 --> 00:54:40.960 we're looking for UAPs, but we would detect uass So 793 00:54:41.079 --> 00:54:43.440 what we want to do is have the ability to 794 00:54:43.519 --> 00:54:47.639 pass that track to that local commander responsible for the 795 00:54:47.719 --> 00:54:51.800 sense of the military installation, saying we've detected the uas 796 00:54:51.840 --> 00:54:54.960 in real time and passing the information so they could 797 00:54:55.000 --> 00:54:55.559 deal with it. 798 00:54:55.960 --> 00:54:57.519 That's not really our mission. 799 00:54:57.880 --> 00:55:00.679 In the same time, if they were to tech at 800 00:55:00.840 --> 00:55:05.039 UAP they're looking for uas as when they find a craft, 801 00:55:05.079 --> 00:55:08.199 they don't understand they know it's much larger in uas, 802 00:55:08.400 --> 00:55:09.079 they passed that. 803 00:55:09.199 --> 00:55:11.239 Todds, I am. 804 00:55:13.280 --> 00:55:20.199 So jumping back in tim I I I was listening 805 00:55:20.239 --> 00:55:24.960 to your interview and right at the end with Stephen 806 00:55:25.000 --> 00:55:30.639 Green the Street, you started talking about black triangles and 807 00:55:31.679 --> 00:55:36.840 the possibility that these so because Arrow, I mean Arrow 808 00:55:36.880 --> 00:55:40.880 did find some interesting things and you made some interesting 809 00:55:40.920 --> 00:55:45.760 comments about these triangles, and and let's be fair, Uh, 810 00:55:45.800 --> 00:55:49.519 these black triangles have been seen for a long time, 811 00:55:50.079 --> 00:55:53.880 a long long time by people. They've been reported the 812 00:55:53.920 --> 00:55:58.079 famous nineteen ninety seven Phoenix lights incident. Uh, that was 813 00:55:58.119 --> 00:56:01.000 a big you know, black triangle, if you will. There's 814 00:56:01.039 --> 00:56:07.119 also been a lot of of of reports of even 815

00:56:07.400 --> 00:56:11.440 up to this day, guys like Dylan Borland Uh just 816 00:56:11.480 --> 00:56:14.519 sat in front of Congress uh and testified to the 817 00:56:14.559 --> 00:56:18.320 fact that he and uh, you know, I'm just using 818 00:56:18.320 --> 00:56:21.719 that as an example. Many other people have seen these triangles. 819 00:56:23.239 --> 00:56:28.039 What what can you elaborate on on what you were 820 00:56:28.079 --> 00:56:30.920 saying with Steven in that interview and why the black 821 00:56:30.960 --> 00:56:33.760 triangles stand out you specifically. 822 00:56:34.000 --> 00:56:37.760 Yeah, the delta wing or the triangle or shape wing 823 00:56:37.840 --> 00:56:43.840 aircraft is the proven design. So he had asked me about, 824 00:56:43.880 --> 00:56:45.639 you know what, what what bothered you? 825 00:56:45.639 --> 00:56:47.280 You know what what we concerned about? 826 00:56:47.360 --> 00:56:50.039 And I had mentioned that the black triangles because we 827 00:56:50.440 --> 00:56:55.119 know it's a proven engineering design. It helps you know, 828 00:56:55.239 --> 00:56:58.840 the fly and we'll move from triangles to flying wings. 829 00:56:59.280 --> 00:57:03.599 You know, it actually has some inherent stealth characteristics. 830 00:57:04.320 --> 00:57:06.480 It minimizes to ratear cross section. 831 00:57:08.800 --> 00:57:12.000 I know that the first time I ever saw an 832 00:57:12.039 --> 00:57:15.599 F one seventeen uh Yuma, you know, before I knew 833 00:57:15.599 --> 00:57:18.039 what the hell they were, it looked like a flying 834 00:57:18.159 --> 00:57:20.840 black triangle from the angle the aspect I had on 835 00:57:20.880 --> 00:57:26.519 the ground. So when we detect force protection and security 836 00:57:26.599 --> 00:57:32.719 personnel at very sensitive site, that's a national security issue 837 00:57:32.760 --> 00:57:38.159 for me because we know that we have produced aircraft 838 00:57:38.960 --> 00:57:41.159 in systems that look like black triangles. 839 00:57:41.639 --> 00:57:42.599 It works, and. 840 00:57:42.639 --> 00:57:46.880 Our adversaries, you know, probably have as well. So when 841 00:57:46.920 --> 00:57:52.800 we have UAP incidents and we get credible reporting that 842 00:57:53.079 --> 00:57:55.400 it's a trianglar shaped aircraft, that's a. 843 00:57:55.559 --> 00:57:59.440 Huge concern to us. The other thing I had. 844 00:57:59.360 --> 00:58:06.000 Mentioned about is the corona or the plasma type discharge 845 00:58:06.360 --> 00:58:11.719 from a airborne system. We thought maybe that could be 846 00:58:11.960 --> 00:58:15.119 a form of stealth, using some kind to say a 847 00:58:15.239 --> 00:58:20.800 force field, to provide that minimize or of that small 848 00:58:20.920 --> 00:58:25.199 radar cross section, because that was another thing in the 849 00:58:25.840 --> 00:58:30.199 unexplained the true UAP cases, which as and I agree 850 00:58:30.239 --> 00:58:32.880 with you, it's about two percent of our cases. It's 851 00:58:33.000 --> 00:58:37.679 very very small, but we can confirm they're there, we 852 00:58:37.760 --> 00:58:40.119 can measure their speed and blossopy. We don't know what 853 00:58:40.199 --> 00:58:42.960 they are and we're trying to do much better to 854 00:58:43.000 --> 00:58:47.119 be able to detect and track these things. But those 855 00:58:47.199 --> 00:58:49.800 are the two things, the two shapes that I was 856 00:58:49.840 --> 00:58:55.280 concerned about, the triangular shape objects and then the fiery 857 00:58:55.519 --> 00:59:00.639 shares speeds. 858 00:58:59.280 --> 00:59:01.360 As relate to us by the witnesses. 859 00:59:01.400 --> 00:59:03.000 And one of the things I do want to say 860 00:59:03.559 --> 00:59:07.920 about the witnesses, we had some you know, early on 861 00:59:08.320 --> 00:59:11.440 during the historical report, people are coming to us and 862 00:59:11.679 --> 00:59:17.079 we wanted them to report on any reverse engineering, you know, 863 00:59:17.440 --> 00:59:24.360 or alien spacecraft exploitation programs. And we had some pregnary contractors, 864 00:59:24.440 --> 00:59:28.519 some dood personnel and talked about the amazing things that 865 00:59:28.679 --> 00:59:32.559 they saw and we listened to their claims. 866 00:59:32.599 --> 00:59:33.559 Then we thanked them for. 867 00:59:33.639 --> 00:59:37.599 The patriotism, remind them of the lifelong obligation under the 868 00:59:37.679 --> 00:59:40.960 non disclosure agreements they signed, and set them on their way, 869 00:59:41.400 --> 00:59:44.079 and then we would have to start the investigation what 870 00:59:44.440 --> 00:59:49.760 is this? And their descriptions were very, very accurate for 871 00:59:49.840 --> 00:59:54.159 the most part. We would actually get the videos, so 872 00:59:54.360 --> 00:59:56.840 we get the reports from what was being tested to 873 00:59:56.960 --> 01:00:00.960 develop and we saw the videos. Now we can understand 874 01:00:01.039 --> 01:00:07.920 the description. And there was one it was a spacecraft. 875 01:00:08.039 --> 01:00:11.519 It was on a launch platform that was described as 876 01:00:11.559 --> 01:00:16.199 an alien spaceship by a contractor. A support contractor was 877 01:00:16.599 --> 01:00:20.480 lawfully present but not part of that test, so it 878 01:00:20.599 --> 01:00:24.159 wasn't read into the program. But we looked at that 879 01:00:24.880 --> 01:00:28.280 and you grew up, you know, looking at fine By, 880 01:00:28.440 --> 01:00:32.199 you know sign you know science fiction movies, and you 881 01:00:32.599 --> 01:00:35.000 saw this craft, you. 882 01:00:35.039 --> 01:00:39.840 Would think it was an alien system. I think with Stephen, 883 01:00:39.960 --> 01:00:42.639 I think it was getting pretty late and I said. 884 01:00:42.480 --> 01:00:46.280 It looked like an alien you know, desh ship or something. 885 01:00:46.400 --> 01:00:49.480 But you look at it and

you can understand. 886 01:00:49.599 --> 01:00:53.960 And we wanted that image in the sap CAP version 887 01:00:54.320 --> 01:00:58.679 of the historical report. So we had a version of 888 01:00:58.760 --> 01:01:01.519 that report which was about eighty five percent of it 889 01:01:02.920 --> 01:01:06.039 which was public releaseable. Then there was a top secret 890 01:01:06.599 --> 01:01:10.480 sci version of that report, and then primarily for the 891 01:01:10.559 --> 01:01:11.800 Gag of eight, there was a. 892 01:01:11.920 --> 01:01:16.760 Sap CAP version of that report that got into some 893 01:01:16.960 --> 01:01:17.400 of these. 894 01:01:18.760 --> 01:01:23.320 Systems that we really really wanted to protect where people 895 01:01:23.480 --> 01:01:27.360 had assessed that they were part of some type of. 896 01:01:29.039 --> 01:01:32.559 You know, alien exploitation program that the government was running. 897 01:01:34.280 --> 01:01:38.440 Okay, we had about forty claims forty five claims that 898 01:01:38.599 --> 01:01:43.360 we had to research And another thing that was unique 899 01:01:43.400 --> 01:01:46.320 about the work we did when we would have an 900 01:01:46.400 --> 01:01:50.400 incident and it was actually, you know, we we couldn't 901 01:01:50.679 --> 01:01:54.840 cross reference it was something known a known air aircraft 902 01:01:55.000 --> 01:02:01.320 or some type of events such as exactly, we couldn't 903 01:02:01.360 --> 01:02:03.800 correlate it with that. Then we would have to do 904 01:02:04.119 --> 01:02:07.960 Blue Force deconfliction. Then we would have to go out 905 01:02:08.039 --> 01:02:11.119 into the R and D and they had the Research 906 01:02:11.199 --> 01:02:15.320 and Development of Science and Technology world and say were 907 01:02:15.360 --> 01:02:19.480 you all flying something or demonstrate in the system in 908 01:02:19.559 --> 01:02:22.599 this area at that time? And you had to be 909 01:02:22.920 --> 01:02:27.280 very very precise as you went back into that community 910 01:02:27.719 --> 01:02:30.440 to ask them because they're not going to They're really 911 01:02:30.559 --> 01:02:32.639 not going to give you anything, but you have to 912 01:02:32.679 --> 01:02:36.719 be very descriptive and give them very precise days and 913 01:02:36.800 --> 01:02:39.679 times places to get anything out of them, to kind 914 01:02:39.719 --> 01:02:42.440 of understand what they were doing because they wanted to 915 01:02:42.519 --> 01:02:47.639 compartmentalize and minimize exposure of these systems so they couldn't 916 01:02:47.679 --> 01:02:51.039 be compromised. And we understood that, but what we need 917 01:02:51.320 --> 01:02:54.920 to we needed to confirm that it wasn't one of 918 01:02:55.000 --> 01:02:57.000 our blue systems that was detected. 919 01:02:57.280 --> 01:02:58.599 It was truly a UAP. 920 01:03:00.360 --> 01:03:02.599 This brings me to one of my biggest points to uh. 921 01:03:02.800 --> 01:03:06.519 Tim And and you know, I again, I have so 922 01:03:06.800 --> 01:03:10.760 much respect for you. You are a true patriot and 923 01:03:11.400 --> 01:03:16.880 I sincerely, sincerely say that. But I've also worked with 924 01:03:17.440 --> 01:03:23.199 other true patriots and I The Wall Street Journal published 925 01:03:23.679 --> 01:03:28.440 an article and they claimed that the the Malmstrom uh 926 01:03:29.480 --> 01:03:34.119 nuclear shutdowns uh were part of a directed e m P. 927 01:03:34.440 --> 01:03:36.280 And I'm gonna go, I'll get this all out so 928 01:03:36.360 --> 01:03:38.519 you can kind of we can just have a general 929 01:03:38.599 --> 01:03:43.360 discussion about this because it ties into it, you know, 930 01:03:44.320 --> 01:03:49.519 so the Malmstrom case being an e MP training of 931 01:03:49.639 --> 01:03:54.079 some sort, and then you know, uh, but but Malmstrom 932 01:03:54.159 --> 01:03:58.360 is not the only uh nuclear base that you know 933 01:03:58.519 --> 01:03:59.360 dealt with these things? 934 01:03:59.599 --> 01:03:59.719 Uh? 935 01:04:00.039 --> 01:04:00.320 Why not? 936 01:04:01.039 --> 01:04:01.119 Uh? 937 01:04:01.440 --> 01:04:05.119 And they what they're saying is this, the fiery spheres 938 01:04:05.639 --> 01:04:09.559 are are are a very common thing, from Mario Woods 939 01:04:09.599 --> 01:04:13.519 at Ellsworth to Lowering Air Force Base in Maine to 940 01:04:14.239 --> 01:04:22.119 Langley to Malmstrom mine not Vandenberg nuclear witnesses have come forward. 941 01:04:22.559 --> 01:04:25.440 And and when those guys come forward, and I know 942 01:04:26.039 --> 01:04:28.800 some of them have testified to Arrow because they've been 943 01:04:28.840 --> 01:04:31.599 open about it. We don't have to go into any names, 944 01:04:31.679 --> 01:04:34.440 we don't have to go into any specifics. But these 945 01:04:34.519 --> 01:04:38.000 guys I find to be at least of the most 946 01:04:38.199 --> 01:04:46.079 concerning credible people. So when looking at that, how did 947 01:04:46.360 --> 01:04:49.519 how did the Wall Street Journal come to that conclusion? 948 01:04:49.960 --> 01:04:54.039 And people think that doctor Kirkpatrick was was giving information 949 01:04:54.159 --> 01:04:56.599 to them about that, So I just want to kind 950 01:04:56.599 --> 01:04:59.840 of clear that up because there's very conflicting reports. 951 01:05:00.159 --> 01:05:05.519 This now that was the fiery orbs was probably one 952 01:05:05.559 --> 01:05:09.880 of the most intriguing, most concerning cases we had because 953 01:05:09.880 --> 01:05:14.760 there seemed to be consistency and the visual, you know, 954 01:05:15.559 --> 01:05:26.199 descriptions from various very credible security personnel at these nuclear 955 01:05:26.639 --> 01:05:30.159 a lot of more nuclear weapon sites, not only here 956 01:05:30.320 --> 01:05:34.639 but overseas as well, and their descriptions of what they 957 01:05:34.760 -->

01:05:39.199 observed was very consistent. So I can see how the 958 01:05:40.039 --> 01:05:43.320 Wall Street Journal would have a story on it because 959 01:05:43.320 --> 01:05:46.039 they probably introduced some of the same witnesses we did. 960 01:05:46.719 --> 01:05:52.440 And we have actually partnered with, you know, organizations in 961 01:05:52.519 --> 01:05:55.840 the Apartment of Defense and Apartment of Energy to help 962 01:05:55.960 --> 01:06:01.239 improve the technology to be able to detect and you know, 963 01:06:01.480 --> 01:06:06.039 actually track these objects. In one case, at a very 964 01:06:06.239 --> 01:06:11.519 very sensitive location, there was a ground security force that 965 01:06:11.840 --> 01:06:16.079 actually followed one of these fiery orbs for you know, 966 01:06:16.360 --> 01:06:21.639 I would say fifteen miles and the ORBS was hovering, 967 01:06:21.880 --> 01:06:27.880 was moving slowly, a small car sized object in the air, 968 01:06:28.239 --> 01:06:34.239 hovering above a road, and when a truck departed main 969 01:06:34.440 --> 01:06:38.599 side was coming out on that range road, the system 970 01:06:39.280 --> 01:06:44.360 actually got off the road and hovered and turned off 971 01:06:44.440 --> 01:06:45.360 its NAB lights. 972 01:06:45.440 --> 01:06:47.679 There were red lights on the back of it that 973 01:06:47.880 --> 01:06:49.480 the security personnel could see. 974 01:06:51.599 --> 01:06:54.400 Not sure what it is, but the fact that it 975 01:06:54.679 --> 01:07:01.840 was following roads it attempted to evade detection, okay, and 976 01:07:02.000 --> 01:07:05.599 then after the threat, after the truck had passed, it 977 01:07:05.719 --> 01:07:08.840 got back on its merry way and headed back toward 978 01:07:09.480 --> 01:07:10.480 the main test area. 979 01:07:10.480 --> 01:07:14.079 At this location, to me, it tells me that there 980 01:07:14.280 --> 01:07:16.119 was a human in the loop. 981 01:07:17.239 --> 01:07:22.840 The concern was the distance from public access into the range, 982 01:07:23.280 --> 01:07:26.760 So how was it being control and what was the 983 01:07:27.039 --> 01:07:33.000 nature of that you know, that aroar or that that 984 01:07:33.320 --> 01:07:35.280 discharge around the object. 985 01:07:36.599 --> 01:07:40.199 So you guys are saying that you don't know, We 986 01:07:40.320 --> 01:07:40.679 don't know. 987 01:07:41.000 --> 01:07:43.559 And we found that to be very very alarming. 988 01:07:44.119 --> 01:07:47.519 And the people who observed it and tracked it, and 989 01:07:47.679 --> 01:07:51.960 then in one case there were two departments that had 990 01:07:52.079 --> 01:07:57.480 detected it actually went from the range one range onto 991 01:07:57.519 --> 01:08:02.199 another range and was detected by two or two independent organizations, 992 01:08:02.599 --> 01:08:04.639 so it tells us something's there. 993 01:08:05.800 --> 01:08:07.119 I'm not sure what it is. 994

01:08:07.880 --> 01:08:13.599 I think it's a an adversary capability or system, but 995 01:08:13.840 --> 01:08:14.360 there's not. 996 01:08:14.599 --> 01:08:18.119 You're not ruling out say something else, because it's still on. 997 01:08:18.279 --> 01:08:20.239 We don't know what it is, and now it'd be 998 01:08:20.319 --> 01:08:23.159 foolish to rule anything out. We need to understand it. 999 01:08:23.239 --> 01:08:25.439 We need to be able to detect it, Bill Tracks 1000 01:08:25.720 --> 01:08:27.239 and the mediate it to deal with it. 1001 01:08:28.439 --> 01:08:31.880 Okay, have you have you heard this other narrative that's 1002 01:08:31.960 --> 01:08:38.520 going around in the Washington Street Washington Street Jesus Wall 1003 01:08:38.600 --> 01:08:42.760 Street Journal tried to say that there is a hazing 1004 01:08:43.079 --> 01:08:46.880 ritual that has been going on in special access programs. 1005 01:08:48.399 --> 01:08:52.319 You know, hazing recruits UH to these special access programs 1006 01:08:52.319 --> 01:08:56.039 telling them there are UFOs. But then you know, in 1007 01:08:56.399 --> 01:09:00.600 my these in my experience with hazing, you the hazer 1008 01:09:00.760 --> 01:09:04.159 becomes the hazy, becomes the hazer and they get let 1009 01:09:04.199 --> 01:09:07.640 in on the joke. Have you heard these claims and 1010 01:09:09.439 --> 01:09:11.239 did you guys hear anything similar. 1011 01:09:11.720 --> 01:09:17.159 We actually came across the program, we investigated it, We 1012 01:09:17.319 --> 01:09:19.560 passed it back to the d O, d I G 1013 01:09:20.239 --> 01:09:24.439 and the service IG to actually investigate it, and we 1014 01:09:24.640 --> 01:09:30.079 actually thought that that could be the origins of a 1015 01:09:30.159 --> 01:09:36.039 lot of these UFO stories where we had the time. 1016 01:09:36.119 --> 01:09:38.840 It was an Air Force Special Access Management Office, the 1017 01:09:38.920 --> 01:09:42.840 SAP GO office that had come up with a. 1018 01:09:44.479 --> 01:09:45.840 False SAP. 1019 01:09:46.439 --> 01:09:50.720 Originally they were going to use it for training purposes, 1020 01:09:50.880 --> 01:09:54.359 so they didn't want to use a real SAP, so 1021 01:09:54.560 --> 01:09:57.199 they came up with a fake SAP program. 1022 01:09:57.760 --> 01:10:01.119 I actually saw it. It was beautiful, beautiful graphics. 1023 01:10:02.159 --> 01:10:04.960 It didn't say anything about a UFO or UAP in it, 1024 01:10:05.119 --> 01:10:10.119 but you had the image was a classic nineteen fifty 1025 01:10:10.319 --> 01:10:15.439 flying saucer hovering in a lab being surrounded by technicians 1026 01:10:15.479 --> 01:10:19.760 and white lab coats, and it was an anti gravity 1027 01:10:19.880 --> 01:10:23.680 motor or device, and that was the SAP. 1028 01:10:25.479 --> 01:10:30.880 It was used. It was created as a training program. 1029 01:10:31.079 --> 01:10:32.079 It went wild. 1030 01:10:33.520 --> 01:10:38.239 It was probably in existence for over twenty twenty five years, 1031 01:10:39.079 --> 01:10:45.319 where you know, personnel assigned to the base Special Access 1032 01:10:45.479 --> 01:10:49.680 Program Management Office were read into were aware of this 1033 01:10:49.920 --> 01:10:54.840 program without knowing that it wasn't a real program. So 1034 01:10:55.000 --> 01:11:02.159 you probably had you know, thousand, possibly tens of thousands 1035 01:11:02.199 --> 01:11:08.119 of military personnel who were exposed to a false SAP 1036 01:11:09.079 --> 01:11:16.479 dealing with this anti gravity motor that came from you know, 1037 01:11:18.520 --> 01:11:25.279 another world, you know, exraterrestrial exploitation that we possessed, and 1038 01:11:26.680 --> 01:11:31.159 some people thought that that could be the basis for 1039 01:11:31.520 --> 01:11:35.600 all these allegations that the US government has had these 1040 01:11:35.760 --> 01:11:42.520 unacknowledged SATs and caps dealing with recovery and exploitation of 1041 01:11:42.600 --> 01:11:44.000 alien technologies or. 1042 01:11:44.119 --> 01:11:51.359 Non human technologies. So I mean, but that we actually. 1043 01:11:51.199 --> 01:11:55.119 Found that the program had morphed a bit, had got 1044 01:11:55.199 --> 01:11:59.039 out to a different combatant command, had gone off into 1045 01:11:59.119 --> 01:12:05.760 a different servous, so that we were aware of a 1046 01:12:06.560 --> 01:12:13.079 false SAT program that was in existence for twenty years. 1047 01:12:13.520 --> 01:12:15.399 We never really we knew it got back into the 1048 01:12:15.520 --> 01:12:16.279 nineteen eighties. 1049 01:12:17.119 --> 01:12:20.319 You don't find that. A. That's ridiculous to try to 1050 01:12:20.359 --> 01:12:23.960 say that that would explain every UFO sighting, But B 1051 01:12:25.520 --> 01:12:29.880 that would also mean that anyone who was hazed, wouldn't 1052 01:12:29.920 --> 01:12:33.079 they have a pretty good wouldn't they have a pretty 1053 01:12:33.119 --> 01:12:34.520 good lawsuit against the the. 1054 01:12:36.199 --> 01:12:38.439 Progress It was it was a joke and then they 1055 01:12:38.560 --> 01:12:39.399 signed an NDA. 1056 01:12:40.359 --> 01:12:44.840 So these are service members that were managing a SAP 1057 01:12:44.960 --> 01:12:48.399 office and they would have in their portfolio, they could 1058 01:12:48.439 --> 01:12:53.239 have hundreds of different SAPs that were in existence that 1059 01:12:53.319 --> 01:12:56.720 are operational at that base from facility, and they would 1060 01:12:56.840 --> 01:13:00.600 just read people in and read people out. They didn't 1061 01:13:00.600 --> 01:13:05.319 actually participate in those programs. They were just administering the 1062 01:13:05.439 --> 01:13:08.920 clearances then and then writing people off after they you know, 1063 01:13:09.039 --> 01:13:11.560 had no longer had a need to have access to 1064 01:13:11.720 -->

01:13:12.399 that program. 1065 01:13:13.399 --> 01:13:16.800 I guess we'll we'll have to probably agree to disagree 1066 01:13:16.840 --> 01:13:20.520 on this because I find that to be I find 1067 01:13:20.960 --> 01:13:25.720 that to be really unethical to not let because what 1068 01:13:25.840 --> 01:13:28.359 if what if you got what if you got told 1069 01:13:28.439 --> 01:13:31.239 that there was UFOs and you see these amazing graphics 1070 01:13:31.359 --> 01:13:34.239 and then you live your life and no one no 1071 01:13:34.319 --> 01:13:36.479 one tells you, Like, isn't the best part of the 1072 01:13:36.560 --> 01:13:38.720 joke when they find out it's a joke. And now 1073 01:13:38.760 --> 01:13:41.000 we have one hundred thousand of these guys running around 1074 01:13:41.039 --> 01:13:44.239 thinking there's aliens out there and at any day the 1075 01:13:44.319 --> 01:13:48.600 world would you know, erupt into an intergalactic star wars 1076 01:13:48.960 --> 01:13:51.920 that would cause some psychological issues. Don't you take it. 1077 01:13:52.359 --> 01:13:55.439 Well that that was the concern of some cabinet officials. 1078 01:13:55.479 --> 01:13:59.840 They were how extensive, you know, was this hazing? How 1079 01:14:00.039 --> 01:14:03.920 many people were exposed to it? And it could be 1080 01:14:04.279 --> 01:14:08.840 could that be the basis for these claims? Your reaction 1081 01:14:10.000 --> 01:14:13.880 to discovering that this program existed was the same as 1082 01:14:14.000 --> 01:14:17.920 some you know Senny confirmed Cabinet officials when they were 1083 01:14:17.960 --> 01:14:22.520 briefed on the programs, they were actually concerned and angry 1084 01:14:22.600 --> 01:14:27.399 about it. And we had another we actually had another 1085 01:14:28.079 --> 01:14:32.319 I never could get the photos, but we had allegations that. 1086 01:14:33.840 --> 01:14:35.600 They're at one of the test sites. 1087 01:14:35.640 --> 01:14:37.680 They actually had a room, they had a gurney and 1088 01:14:37.760 --> 01:14:41.239 they had like a big rubber arm, like a you know, 1089 01:14:41.359 --> 01:14:46.760 a reptilian hand sticking out from underneath the white sheet 1090 01:14:46.840 --> 01:14:50.520 on a gurney. And there was a group of military 1091 01:14:50.640 --> 01:14:54.439 personnel going by and they haven't just a glance in 1092 01:14:54.600 --> 01:14:58.079 and see this, and then the staff rapidly went up 1093 01:14:58.119 --> 01:15:00.279 and shut the door and cut, you know, pull the 1094 01:15:00.520 --> 01:15:04.760 sheep back over the arm. And we heard in one 1095 01:15:04.920 --> 01:15:09.880 incident there was a young officer that was so shooken 1096 01:15:10.000 --> 01:15:16.880 up so in that of experience that she resigned from 1097 01:15:16.920 --> 01:15:17.439 the program. 1098 01:15:18.960 --> 01:15:19.760 That was a claim. 1099 01:15:20.359 --> 01:15:23.640 We also had a claim of a retired Air Force 1100 01:15:23.720 --> 01:15:26.760 flag officer that worked at one of the national test 1101 01:15:26.800 --> 01:15:32.960 sites where he was asked to deliver doctored photographs at 1102 01:15:33.000 --> 01:15:35.640 the Nevada test site what a lot of the public 1103 01:15:35.760 --> 01:15:41.319 refers to as Area fifty one's of traditional UFOs flying 1104 01:15:41.399 --> 01:15:46.199 over the test site and those photos, those images were 1105 01:15:46.319 --> 01:15:51.239 delivered to a bar to the east of the base. 1106 01:15:51.319 --> 01:15:56.239 There where a lot of the UFO observers and you know, 1107 01:15:56.359 --> 01:15:59.399 the people interested in this topic would go out to 1108 01:15:59.479 --> 01:16:03.720 eat and and you know discuss their experiences as they 1109 01:16:03.800 --> 01:16:08.319 observed the Nevada test site out there. So we've we've 1110 01:16:08.439 --> 01:16:13.800 got you know, witnesses that claim programs like that occurred. 1111 01:16:13.960 --> 01:16:17.319 We know that the Soviet Union in the Cold War 1112 01:16:17.880 --> 01:16:23.279 actually came up with UFO stories to try to undermine 1113 01:16:23.880 --> 01:16:28.520 Americans' confidence in their government's ability to protect them and 1114 01:16:29.119 --> 01:16:32.000 tell them the truth about aliens. There's been a lot 1115 01:16:32.760 --> 01:16:38.399 of disinformation when it came to UAP UFO, and that's 1116 01:16:38.479 --> 01:16:43.119 why I thought it was so brilliant to actually establish 1117 01:16:43.199 --> 01:16:46.520 an arrow office for the first time. He had an 1118 01:16:46.640 --> 01:16:51.399 organization with the horsepower working for the right people, with 1119 01:16:51.560 --> 01:16:55.279 a budget and the you know, the authority to work 1120 01:16:55.359 --> 01:16:59.399 across the US government that you know, to investigate these 1121 01:16:59.520 --> 01:17:03.359 claims and try to understand what's going on. And I 1122 01:17:03.479 --> 01:17:06.079 know there's a lot of frustration with the public that 1123 01:17:06.520 --> 01:17:09.520 you know, we didn't show them the Amian bodies or 1124 01:17:09.560 --> 01:17:12.720 the you know, the UFO crash site despite people who 1125 01:17:12.760 --> 01:17:16.039 have sworn under oath in Congress that you know they 1126 01:17:16.119 --> 01:17:22.520 have observed you know, you know, alien spaceships or non 1127 01:17:22.600 --> 01:17:26.479 earth you know, non human spaceships, and they found non 1128 01:17:26.600 --> 01:17:27.479 human remains. 1129 01:17:30.079 --> 01:17:30.800 We looked for that. 1130 01:17:31.920 --> 01:17:37.920 We investigated virtually every credible claim we had. I know 1131 01:17:38.079 --> 01:17:44.079 that our investigators hosted congressional delegations wanting to go out 1132 01:17:44.159 --> 01:17:50.239 to Dayton, you know, going to write Patterson to personally 1133 01:17:50.600 --> 01:17:54.720 investigate the claims that there was some type of

UFO 1134 01:17:54.920 --> 01:17:58.640 power source that was hidden underground at. 1135 01:17:58.560 --> 01:18:03.000 The base there. We know that we've hosted. 1136 01:18:04.079 --> 01:18:08.279 Investigators that wanted to go out to other ranges to 1137 01:18:08.359 --> 01:18:11.000 be able to investigate claims that were made under oath 1138 01:18:11.079 --> 01:18:14.439 the Congress. And we were part of that, and we 1139 01:18:14.680 --> 01:18:20.000 had authority to go anywhere to look. And I will 1140 01:18:20.079 --> 01:18:24.119 tell you during my tenure there, we never had anybody 1141 01:18:24.399 --> 01:18:29.520 attempt to block access to information or locations or materials. 1142 01:18:30.000 --> 01:18:33.119 Why you know, I worked at Arrow. That never happened. 1143 01:18:34.079 --> 01:18:38.199 So you're saying that no one and is it conceivable? 1144 01:18:39.000 --> 01:18:39.159 Is it? 1145 01:18:39.439 --> 01:18:40.960 Is it? At least community. 1146 01:18:43.399 --> 01:18:45.760 A lot of people think you were fired from Narrow. 1147 01:18:46.760 --> 01:18:48.840 That doesn't seem to be the actual case. 1148 01:18:49.399 --> 01:18:51.279 I wasn't fired from marrow. 1149 01:18:51.600 --> 01:18:55.840 Right, And I wanted to clear correct. I know, I know, 1150 01:18:56.399 --> 01:18:59.920 but people online said that you were fired. They put 1151 01:19:00.079 --> 01:19:03.159 these graphics up. But you were also given one of 1152 01:19:03.239 --> 01:19:12.199 the highest service honors and like a huge, like nice commendation, 1153 01:19:12.840 --> 01:19:16.159 and it seems like it was just your time for 1154 01:19:16.319 --> 01:19:19.479 retirement and you and the d O D for lack 1155 01:19:19.520 --> 01:19:23.439 of a better term, split up. Now, can you clear 1156 01:19:23.520 --> 01:19:25.840 that up? Because people think people like to say that 1157 01:19:25.920 --> 01:19:26.520 you got fired. 1158 01:19:26.960 --> 01:19:28.359 I want to make sure no, none at all. 1159 01:19:30.880 --> 01:19:35.920 Errol worked with the under Secretary for Intelligence Security and 1160 01:19:36.199 --> 01:19:42.279 as a senior executive, we actually had to come up 1161 01:19:42.319 --> 01:19:46.640 with the criteria on how we would rack and stack, 1162 01:19:46.720 --> 01:19:51.439 how we would prioritize a new intelligence officer assigned to 1163 01:19:51.640 --> 01:19:54.720 the department of a sense. So we came up with 1164 01:19:54.800 --> 01:20:01.319 the criteria on how if we had to executed a 1165 01:20:01.439 --> 01:20:06.319 reduction in force, who we would fire first. So I 1166 01:20:06.560 --> 01:20:09.359 was part of the working group that came up with 1167 01:20:10.159 --> 01:20:15.720 the It was almost a matrix on how we would 1168 01:20:15.800 --> 01:20:21.840 rack and stack, how we would fire our officers who 1169 01:20:21.880 --> 01:20:24.920 were still on probation. So we would spend a lot 1170 01:20:25.000 --> 01:20:28.800 of time assessing recruiting training. They had a two year 1171 01:20:28.920 --> 01:20:33.479 probationary period. And I just thought that by doing that, 1172 01:20:33.720 --> 01:20:37.920 by you know, firing these junior officers that never really 1173 01:20:38.000 --> 01:20:41.000 had an opportunity to work in the community, that we 1174 01:20:41.079 --> 01:20:46.039 were consuming our feed stock. I had forty five years 1175 01:20:46.359 --> 01:20:50.720 as military and as a civil servant, and I had 1176 01:20:50.880 --> 01:20:54.960 already told the D and I that I was going 1177 01:20:55.039 --> 01:20:58.399 to retire when my tour was up, and my tour 1178 01:20:58.520 --> 01:21:00.680 era was going to be up in October of this year. 1179 01:21:01.439 --> 01:21:04.720 So when they came out with a deferred resonation program, 1180 01:21:05.600 --> 01:21:08.680 we did not know what the number was if you 1181 01:21:08.720 --> 01:21:12.560 were looking for an eight percent or ten percent reduction 1182 01:21:12.760 --> 01:21:17.239 in force. So I thought I had a full career 1183 01:21:17.840 --> 01:21:21.239 and I was willing to give up my feat so 1184 01:21:21.760 --> 01:21:24.720 a new officer that we had recruited and brought into 1185 01:21:24.800 --> 01:21:26.800 the intelligence community could serve. 1186 01:21:28.159 --> 01:21:30.680 So that's what I did. 1187 01:21:32.039 --> 01:21:34.720 And I had talked to John, and I didn't want 1188 01:21:34.720 --> 01:21:37.680 to leave him high and dry, but we had actually 1189 01:21:37.840 --> 01:21:42.039 gone out and solicited. We put out an advertisement, and 1190 01:21:42.119 --> 01:21:46.199 we were actually interviewing people as the new deputy. I 1191 01:21:46.359 --> 01:21:50.199 was actually recruiting my replacement the same way I recruited 1192 01:21:50.640 --> 01:21:52.840 you know, John to bring him in as the director. 1193 01:21:52.920 --> 01:21:56.239 We were actually you know, try and ensure we had continuity, and. 1194 01:21:56.319 --> 01:21:57.199 That was the plan. 1195 01:21:57.880 --> 01:22:02.560 But the delay that we had in getting the new 1196 01:22:02.640 --> 01:22:08.760 administration's political officers confirmed through the Senate flowed things down 1197 01:22:09.319 --> 01:22:11.359 to get you know, to have people come in and 1198 01:22:11.520 --> 01:22:15.720 approve and make the appointments as a deputy and they understand. 1199 01:22:16.279 --> 01:22:19.960 The officer that we had recruited replaced me got frustrated 1200 01:22:20.319 --> 01:22:24.119 and he took the DRP and he resigned. So I 1201 01:22:24.399 --> 01:22:29.399 was actually I took the resonation program and left Arrow 1202 01:22:29.680 --> 01:22:34.800 and April, so I had already left Arrow and then 1203 01:22:34.880 --> 01:22:39.399 later on in July. One of the programs that we 1204 01:22:39.640 --> 01:22:42.159 have when you're on the DRP all. 1205 01:22:42.079 --> 01:22:44.560 The rules that you

have to follow. 1206 01:22:44.800 --> 01:22:49.199 As a title fifty Intel officers, You've got to report 1207 01:22:49.399 --> 01:22:54.119 foreign contacts. We've got to report our financial activities and 1208 01:22:54.399 --> 01:22:56.520 trains over a certain amount of money. 1209 01:22:56.640 --> 01:23:00.880 You have to report if you have. 1210 01:23:02.520 --> 01:23:06.079 You're publishing, you have to go through a published review 1211 01:23:06.199 --> 01:23:10.359 process to make sure that you're not revealing any sensitive. 1212 01:23:10.000 --> 01:23:11.199 A classified information. 1213 01:23:11.640 --> 01:23:14.760 And if you have contacts with the media, you have 1214 01:23:14.920 --> 01:23:16.840 to go up and you've got to ask permission to 1215 01:23:16.920 --> 01:23:22.239 do so. But to do those outsize activities, you have 1216 01:23:22.479 --> 01:23:24.880 to be in the system to get on and into 1217 01:23:24.960 --> 01:23:28.840 the database and say, hey, I've got this reporter that 1218 01:23:29.000 --> 01:23:31.479 wants to talk to me about this subject to get 1219 01:23:31.520 --> 01:23:34.720 permission to do so, you're outside of the system to 1220 01:23:34.840 --> 01:23:38.640 do that. That was one of the limitations about this DRP. 1221 01:23:38.800 --> 01:23:42.119 It's a very very weird thing because you're read out 1222 01:23:42.199 --> 01:23:47.760 of the programs. You're basically on terminal leave until thirty September. 1223 01:23:47.840 --> 01:23:49.880 When you were you know you would you would be 1224 01:23:49.960 --> 01:23:52.520 over and then you retire in one October. It's kind 1225 01:23:52.520 --> 01:23:57.039 of the plan. So I had made some interviews and 1226 01:23:57.159 --> 01:23:59.600 I thought I had followed the procedure. There was only 1227 01:23:59.840 --> 01:24:04.439 one one time where I was told not to proceed 1228 01:24:04.560 --> 01:24:07.880 in the interview with somebody, but I said something that 1229 01:24:08.000 --> 01:24:11.640 irritated somebody at the DNI, and then I got called 1230 01:24:11.680 --> 01:24:14.720 into the DNI. I had the counter intelligence and the 1231 01:24:14.920 --> 01:24:17.800 HR people pulled me in. Why I'm on leave. I 1232 01:24:17.840 --> 01:24:21.800 had already checked out, and I got a very nice 1233 01:24:22.359 --> 01:24:25.680 worded letter from the Director of National Intelligence tell me 1234 01:24:25.880 --> 01:24:28.159 that it was no longer in the interest of the 1235 01:24:28.239 --> 01:24:31.680 government for me to be employed with the Office of 1236 01:24:31.720 --> 01:24:33.279 the Director of National Intelligence. 1237 01:24:33.920 --> 01:24:36.640 And I was terminated and then I was put on 1238 01:24:36.760 --> 01:24:37.680 the retired roles. 1239 01:24:38.239 --> 01:24:41.479 So it's safe to say it was like an amicable 1240 01:24:43.159 --> 01:24:43.760 split up. 1241 01:24:45.359 --> 01:24:50.319 They just decided that they no longer required my services 1242 01:24:50.399 --> 01:24:54.520 as a senior National Intelligence Service officer and they retired me. 1243 01:24:54.640 --> 01:24:57.960 Yes, yeah, yeah, so pretty amicable because then you go 1244 01:24:58.039 --> 01:25:03.359 on and you're also given, uh, what was the the 1245 01:25:04.399 --> 01:25:05.239 medal you were given? 1246 01:25:05.920 --> 01:25:09.079 Well, I actually got to this year. I got one. 1247 01:25:10.319 --> 01:25:16.000 It was kind of like a civilian Achievement or Meritorious 1248 01:25:16.079 --> 01:25:21.039 Service medal. Henry Clinton got one. I got one, and 1249 01:25:21.239 --> 01:25:30.920 then I got the Secretary Defense Exceptional Service Medal. I 1250 01:25:31.000 --> 01:25:33.960 think I got two of them. One was civilian service 1251 01:25:34.039 --> 01:25:36.840 and one was as a d o D. I got 1252 01:25:36.920 --> 01:25:38.680 the highest ranking award they could give me. 1253 01:25:39.880 --> 01:25:43.079 So yeah, I got that. So yeah. 1254 01:25:43.960 --> 01:25:47.640 But it was the Department one of the Department Offense 1255 01:25:47.960 --> 01:25:51.640 that terminated me. I didn't work for the Department Offense. 1256 01:25:51.760 --> 01:25:55.840 I was on a joint duty assignment to the Apartment Offense. 1257 01:25:56.319 --> 01:26:00.600 I was an O d N I employed at the 1258 01:26:00.720 --> 01:26:03.960 time when the Director of National and Talent and gave 1259 01:26:04.000 --> 01:26:08.159 me the letter saying that my continued service was no 1260 01:26:08.279 --> 01:26:09.520 longer required. 1261 01:26:10.840 --> 01:26:14.960 So if you could change. We have two more questions 1262 01:26:15.000 --> 01:26:17.159 and we'll wrap up on this on this part one, 1263 01:26:17.359 --> 01:26:21.319 we'll call it if you could change one thing about 1264 01:26:21.439 --> 01:26:26.560 how the Pentagon handles this topic specifically, what would that be? 1265 01:26:29.199 --> 01:26:32.199 I think the way John and the last time we 1266 01:26:32.279 --> 01:26:34.520 were up on the hill, and I believe that was 1267 01:26:34.600 --> 01:26:37.720 around March, we came out of the skiff and then 1268 01:26:37.880 --> 01:26:40.920 and what what what John is the director decided to do, 1269 01:26:41.520 --> 01:26:45.760 is just to go public and actually admit that there 1270 01:26:45.840 --> 01:26:51.479 were actual UAP cases that we didn't understand. Another thing 1271 01:26:51.600 --> 01:26:55.399 I think I would have done much earlier is solicit 1272 01:26:57.960 --> 01:27:01.199 or our attempt to come up with a crowd sourcing 1273 01:27:01.800 --> 01:27:05.279 UH reporting of UAP and incidents. 1274 01:27:05.880 --> 01:27:07.920 These states have state fusion. 1275 01:27:07.680 --> 01:27:13.039 Centers to kind of control state level response to incidents. 1276 01:27:16.600 --> 01:27:21.600 We thought state, local, tribal. They're normally the first responders 1277 01:27:21.720 -->

01:27:24.640 if they hear or see something, you know, how can 1278 01:27:24.720 --> 01:27:28.880 we how can we operationalize that and get that reporting 1279 01:27:29.039 --> 01:27:33.079 back to ERROW as fast as possible so AERO could respond. 1280 01:27:33.279 --> 01:27:38.199 We had people on standby that could deploy the same 1281 01:27:38.359 --> 01:27:43.039 day to try to understand an incident, to gather evidence 1282 01:27:43.119 --> 01:27:47.720 and maybe capture the phenomenon near real time. I would 1283 01:27:47.720 --> 01:27:52.720 have solicited the support of the American public sooner we've 1284 01:27:52.760 --> 01:27:56.920 been working on a public reporting mechanism, and with the 1285 01:27:57.079 --> 01:28:01.640 change and the trend of amid frustration and the transitions, 1286 01:28:02.039 --> 01:28:08.199 we had to have some forms approved by GSA, you know, 1287 01:28:08.239 --> 01:28:11.000 as part of how they would report to the government. 1288 01:28:11.560 --> 01:28:14.399 I would have loved to have that in place and 1289 01:28:15.119 --> 01:28:20.319 using some of the large data, some of the machine. 1290 01:28:20.000 --> 01:28:23.319 Learning, the algorithms we developed to try to. 1291 01:28:26.039 --> 01:28:31.800 Speed the detection the building attracts and the operational response 1292 01:28:31.920 --> 01:28:36.079 to UAP incidents. And we were working very very hard 1293 01:28:37.000 --> 01:28:41.439 to get that capability in place in partnership with an 1294 01:28:41.479 --> 01:28:42.880 all the government reports, you know. 1295 01:28:44.479 --> 01:28:45.079 Response. 1296 01:28:45.359 --> 01:28:50.880 We found that Department of Homeland Security, especially CBP along 1297 01:28:51.000 --> 01:28:55.760 our country's borders, they have an amazing network of sensors 1298 01:28:56.359 --> 01:28:59.239 where they were willing to share us, share the feeds. 1299 01:29:01.039 --> 01:29:07.760 As we looked at the administration's desire to enhance air 1300 01:29:07.880 --> 01:29:10.439 defense and the cotton United States, you know about the 1301 01:29:10.520 --> 01:29:14.039 Golden Dome initiative, Well there's data there. 1302 01:29:14.520 --> 01:29:14.800 Okay. 1303 01:29:15.079 --> 01:29:17.840 If I know they're looking at threats, they're looking at 1304 01:29:18.039 --> 01:29:22.159 cruise missiles, are looking at ballistic missiles uass. But if 1305 01:29:22.239 --> 01:29:25.239 we invest in that sensor technology, we're going to pick 1306 01:29:25.319 --> 01:29:30.119 up things that may not be threats, but it's information, 1307 01:29:30.319 --> 01:29:33.199 it's anomalies that aero needs to investigate so we can 1308 01:29:33.279 --> 01:29:37.119 have an understanding. There was a little bit of frustration 1309 01:29:37.800 --> 01:29:41.720 because we had a bias in our collection because we 1310 01:29:41.880 --> 01:29:46.279 tended to put censors out in defenses around things that 1311 01:29:46.439 --> 01:29:47.920 we wanted to protect. 1312 01:29:48.479 --> 01:29:50.399 That include nuclear sites. 1313 01:29:50.680 --> 01:29:52.880 Absolutely included lucra sites. 1314 01:29:52.960 --> 01:29:56.880 But how do you know if we have a higher 1315 01:29:58.119 --> 01:30:01.199 number of incidents around nuclear when you don't know what's 1316 01:30:01.239 --> 01:30:05.079 going on over the cornfields of Nebraska. So one of 1317 01:30:05.159 --> 01:30:09.159 the things that we are actually researching was investing in 1318 01:30:09.479 --> 01:30:14.840 a series of unattended sensors. We were thinking of working 1319 01:30:14.880 --> 01:30:18.079 with Department as Interior and the Bureau of Land Management 1320 01:30:18.319 --> 01:30:22.000 where they have a series of towers. They're primarily looking 1321 01:30:22.079 --> 01:30:26.239 for fire detection and disasters at the national parks. But 1322 01:30:26.399 --> 01:30:30.159 if we could put out sensors staring up at the stars, 1323 01:30:30.560 --> 01:30:34.199 you have the networked you know, maybe we can detect 1324 01:30:34.239 --> 01:30:37.520 anomalies before the public sees them and start having a 1325 01:30:37.600 --> 01:30:42.159 more comprehensive understanding of what's going on because we don't 1326 01:30:42.720 --> 01:30:45.439 and I talk a lot about what's going on in 1327 01:30:45.520 --> 01:30:48.119 the air domain. That's where we had a lot of 1328 01:30:48.239 --> 01:30:53.239 sensor capability and understanding on in tools to be able 1329 01:30:53.279 --> 01:30:57.520 to exploit what's going on in the EO and IR. 1330 01:31:01.239 --> 01:31:03.039 Oh, but we were working in space. 1331 01:31:03.119 --> 01:31:06.720 We actually had a definition of what a UAP incident 1332 01:31:06.840 --> 01:31:09.840 was in space, and we were actually work gaming with 1333 01:31:09.960 --> 01:31:15.039 space Com and the Space Force, you know, trying to say, 1334 01:31:15.159 --> 01:31:18.960 how do we get UAP incidents that they detect in 1335 01:31:19.079 --> 01:31:24.439 space and at mission speed past those tracks to ERROW 1336 01:31:24.640 --> 01:31:28.319 so ERROW can apply some machine learning from AI, so 1337 01:31:28.479 --> 01:31:31.680 maybe we can detect things as they approach our solar system, 1338 01:31:31.760 --> 01:31:35.960 our planet and maybe re entry into the atmosphere. You know, 1339 01:31:36.079 --> 01:31:39.239 we wanted to kind of tie it together and do 1340 01:31:39.399 --> 01:31:45.359 it at operationally you know speed. It was frustrated to 1341 01:31:45.479 --> 01:31:49.520 be reactive or to go back and have to investigate 1342 01:31:49.560 --> 01:31:53.000 a USP case from twenty years ago when there's no data. 1343 01:31:54.079 --> 01:31:58.640 Another domain where frankly we didn't have a lot of 1344 01:31:58.640 --> 01:32:02.560 success were just starting was in the maritime environment. So 1345 01:32:02.800 --> 01:32:07.399 there were incidents that's in the

maritime environment, but the 1346 01:32:07.560 --> 01:32:11.520 community is even more compartmentalized than they are in space, 1347 01:32:12.000 --> 01:32:16.399 and their primary concern was the sound of metal moving 1348 01:32:16.439 --> 01:32:16.920 through water. 1349 01:32:18.039 --> 01:32:18.840 That's what they were. 1350 01:32:18.800 --> 01:32:24.239 Focused on, and if it didn't really correspond, it wasn't 1351 01:32:24.279 --> 01:32:25.119 part of that threat. 1352 01:32:25.119 --> 01:32:25.840 They didn't care. 1353 01:32:26.359 --> 01:32:31.640 Well, we care, and we partnered a couple of times 1354 01:32:32.199 --> 01:32:36.079 with the Maritime Committee and help them. We actually had 1355 01:32:36.159 --> 01:32:39.920 worked with some cases with them, but we really didn't 1356 01:32:40.239 --> 01:32:43.039 have a good foothold there. We were most our success 1357 01:32:43.600 --> 01:32:46.319 tended to be in the air domain. We were starting 1358 01:32:46.399 --> 01:32:50.279 to build some partnerships and space, but we were the 1359 01:32:50.520 --> 01:32:54.079 all domain Anominate Resolution Office, and we were still addressing 1360 01:32:55.159 --> 01:32:58.600 the maritime domain. And when I separated and I went 1361 01:32:58.680 --> 01:33:01.000 into retirement, but there's a lot of work to be done. 1362 01:33:01.800 --> 01:33:04.399 Another thing that we thought was fascinating and had a 1363 01:33:04.439 --> 01:33:08.640 lot of potential. I talked a little about crowdsourcing. NASA 1364 01:33:09.960 --> 01:33:13.760 used to have these public competitions where they would have 1365 01:33:14.119 --> 01:33:14.840 a problem. 1366 01:33:15.319 --> 01:33:18.399 They would have non classified, nonsensitive. 1367 01:33:17.760 --> 01:33:20.119 Data and kind of give a science problem to the 1368 01:33:20.199 --> 01:33:23.439 public and ask them, hey, you know, what can you 1369 01:33:23.560 --> 01:33:26.760 do to help us solve this. We would like to 1370 01:33:26.880 --> 01:33:30.800 do that with UAP cases, and I know the current 1371 01:33:31.359 --> 01:33:33.760 John was actually working on how do we do that? 1372 01:33:34.239 --> 01:33:37.239 And a lot of things got slowed down due to 1373 01:33:37.359 --> 01:33:40.199 the transition and the changing government, the fact that we 1374 01:33:40.359 --> 01:33:44.600 no longer had the politicals to report to and get 1375 01:33:44.640 --> 01:33:48.680 permission to execute from Hey, I'm actually on low battery 1376 01:33:48.800 --> 01:33:52.159 right now. We've been talking for about ninety minutes and 1377 01:33:52.399 --> 01:33:53.960 I'm going to have to get off or I'm going 1378 01:33:54.039 --> 01:33:57.119 to lose the signal. But I would love to do 1379 01:33:57.319 --> 01:34:01.159 this again, but I'll make sure on a computer next time, 1380 01:34:01.239 --> 01:34:02.600 or we're face to face to do this. 1381 01:34:03.359 --> 01:34:05.600 Yeah, well real quickly. I just want to

say thank 1382 01:34:05.680 --> 01:34:09.720 you for being a patriot. I know we have differing views, 1383 01:34:10.520 --> 01:34:12.840 and I know that there's much more to be to 1384 01:34:12.960 --> 01:34:16.680 be spoken about. You know, I know what I've seen, 1385 01:34:17.159 --> 01:34:21.359 and uh maybe you know we can help educate the 1386 01:34:21.399 --> 01:34:25.880 community on you know, what what UAPs really are and 1387 01:34:26.119 --> 01:34:29.479 how how to investigate them. And I really hope that 1388 01:34:30.520 --> 01:34:33.399 some people get something out of this and learn who 1389 01:34:33.520 --> 01:34:36.239 you really are, because you're you're you are a hard skeptic, 1390 01:34:36.319 --> 01:34:39.319 but I don't think you're opposed to the actual evidence 1391 01:34:39.439 --> 01:34:42.479 being shown. And if it shows that there is something 1392 01:34:42.600 --> 01:34:45.840 non human, I think you'd be Is it fair to 1393 01:34:45.880 --> 01:34:47.239 say you'd be at least open to it? 1394 01:34:47.960 --> 01:34:48.119 Oh? 1395 01:34:48.199 --> 01:34:52.319 Absolutely, Let the evidence speak for itself. We like diversity 1396 01:34:52.399 --> 01:34:55.159 of thob We don't want group think care, but show 1397 01:34:55.239 --> 01:34:57.119 us the evidence. If you make a you make an 1398 01:34:57.119 --> 01:34:59.840 amazing claim. You should have the evidence to back it 1399 01:34:59.920 --> 01:35:03.279 up up. So don't come to me when you've got 1400 01:35:03.359 --> 01:35:06.359 to claim and say I can't tell you because it's classified, 1401 01:35:06.800 --> 01:35:10.439 or you get sick when we invite you into a skiff, 1402 01:35:10.960 --> 01:35:14.119 or we fly fifteen hundred miles to interview, and now 1403 01:35:14.199 --> 01:35:18.520 you get squarely on us. Look, if you you believe 1404 01:35:18.600 --> 01:35:22.920 in something, share with us. You know, we're I hope 1405 01:35:22.960 --> 01:35:25.800 we all are in a search for the truth, and 1406 01:35:25.960 --> 01:35:30.560 we shouldn't let the truth, you know intimidators. Intimidators are 1407 01:35:30.560 --> 01:35:31.000 scared of us. 1408 01:35:31.199 --> 01:35:32.239 We want to know the truth. 1409 01:35:32.760 --> 01:35:35.600 I look at it as a you know, as a 1410 01:35:35.720 --> 01:35:38.800 retired marine, as an intel officer. I'm concerned for the 1411 01:35:38.920 --> 01:35:44.560 national you know, security issue here. Something we don't understand 1412 01:35:45.159 --> 01:35:49.960 that's operating, you know, in close proximity to sensitive locations 1413 01:35:50.079 --> 01:35:51.319 or operational forces. 1414 01:35:51.600 --> 01:35:54.319 I want to know what the hell it is because 1415 01:35:54.399 --> 01:35:55.760 we don't and we need it, so. 1416 01:35:55.840 --> 01:35:59.640 We don't and it's a concern. And maybe next time 1417 01:35:59.680 --> 01:36:02.560 we get together we'll start on that. But I'm gonna 1418 01:36:02.600 --> 01:36:05.760 lose you. All right, It's been great. I hope you 1419 01:36:05.880 --> 01:36:09.039 got enough to you know, add this and put put 1420 01:36:09.119 --> 01:36:09.760 something together. 1421 01:36:10.239 --> 01:36:14.039 Oh, don't worry. I definitely did, Tim, So we will 1422 01:36:14.159 --> 01:36:17.119 uh well, we'll we'll talk soon. And again you're you're 1423 01:36:17.159 --> 01:36:20.479 a patriot, and again you know, I think, uh, we 1424 01:36:20.640 --> 01:36:24.439 need not surround ourselves in echo chambers, and we have 1425 01:36:24.560 --> 01:36:27.359 to talk to people that you know, are skeptical and 1426 01:36:27.479 --> 01:36:30.279 have opposing views to to my own. And you've been 1427 01:36:30.319 --> 01:36:33.159 in the official capacity. So thank you for your service, Tim, 1428 01:36:34.279 --> 01:36:36.760 and thank you everyone for being here. Tim, you can 1429 01:36:36.800 --> 01:36:38.880 get out of here. I know your battery is gonna die. 1430 01:36:40.039 --> 01:36:47.760 That was Tim Phillips, everybody, former acting director of Arrow 1431 01:36:49.199 --> 01:36:55.520 and now retired looking for his next adventure. So with 1432 01:36:55.680 --> 01:36:59.119 that being said, make sure to like, share, subscribe, and 1433 01:36:59.199 --> 01:37:01.520 if you want to be able to watch early access 1434 01:37:01.560 --> 01:37:05.840 to these episodes, please become a member and help support 1435 01:37:05.920 --> 01:37:08.279 the show. It is not free to run this kind 1436 01:37:08.319 --> 01:37:13.479 of program and it is not easy. So with with 1437 01:37:13.640 --> 01:37:16.039 all that, I love you guys, and I'll see you 1438 01:37:16.119 --> 01:38:00.760 on the other side and back. 1439 01:38:11.119 --> 01:38:11.319 Yeah,