บทถอดความฉบับเต็มของ 0 Preface

--> 00:05:29.959 for each of which perhaps a special talent is required, 66 00:05:30.519 --> 00:05:35.600 and the combination of which in one person only produces bunglers. 67 00:05:37.000 --> 00:05:40.040 But I only ask here whether the nature of science 68 00:05:40.120 --> 00:05:44.000 does not require that we should always carefully separate the 69 00:05:44.040 --> 00:05:49.519 empirical from the rational part. And prefix to physics proper 70 00:05:50.120 --> 00:05:55.680 or empirical physics a metaphysic of nature, and to practical 71 00:05:55.720 --> 00:06:01.120 anthropology a metaphysic of morals, which must be carefully cleared 72 00:06:01.199 --> 00:06:04.680 of everything empirical, so that we may know how much 73 00:06:04.720 --> 00:06:09.600 can be accomplished by pure reason in both cases and 74 00:06:09.720 --> 00:06:14.800 from what sources it draws. This its a priori teaching, 75 00:06:15.279 --> 00:06:19.360 and that whether the latter inquiry is conducted by all 76 00:06:19.480 --> 00:06:24.600 moralists whose name is legion, or only by some who 77 00:06:24.680 --> 00:06:29.519 feel a calling there too. As my concern here is 78 00:06:29.560 --> 00:06:34.319 with moral philosophy, I limit the question suggested to this, 79 00:06:35.399 --> 00:06:39.399 whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct 80 00:06:39.399 --> 00:06:43.759 a pure thing which is only empirical and which belongs 81 00:06:43.800 --> 00:06:48.639 to anthropology, or that such a philosophy must be possible, 82 00:06:49.040 --> 00:06:52.480 is evident from the common idea of duty and of 83 00:06:52.519 --> 00:06:56.759 the moral laws. Everyone must admit that if a law 84 00:06:56.879 --> 00:07:00.040 is to have moral force, i e. To be the 85 00:07:00.160 --> 00:07:06.639 basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity. That, 86 00:07:06.720 --> 00:07:11.160 for example, the precept thou shalt not lie is not 87 00:07:11.360 --> 00:07:15.600 valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had 88 00:07:15.680 --> 00:07:18.519 no need to observe it, and so with all the 89 00:07:18.560 --> 00:07:23.480 other moral laws properly so called. That therefore the basis 90 00:07:23.519 --> 00:07:27.519 of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, 91 00:07:28.240 --> 00:07:31.040 or in the circumstances in the world in which he 92 00:07:31.160 --> 00:07:36.160 is placed, but a priori simply in the conception of 93 00:07:36.319 --> 00:07:40.879 pure reason. And although any other precept which is founded 94 00:07:40.920 --> 00:07:46.680 on principles of mere experience may be in certain respects universal, 95 00:07:47.560 --> 00:07:49.839 yet in as far as it rests even in the 96 00:07:49.959 --> 00:07:54.800 least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to 97 00:07:54.879 --> 00:07:59.040 a motive. Such a precept, while it may be a 98 00:07:59.160 --> 00:08:05.040 practical rule, rule, can never be called a moral law. Thus, 99 00:08:05.079 --> 00:08:10.160 not only are moral laws with their principles, essentially distinguished 100 00:08:10.160 --> 00:08:13.839 from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there 101 00:08:13.920 --> 00:08:19.560 is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly on 102 00:08:19.720 --> 00:08:24.680 its pure part. When applied to man. It does not 103 00:08:24.879 --> 00:08:29.839 borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself anthropology, 104 00:08:30.399 --> 00:08:35.080 but gives laws a priori to him as a rational being. 105 00:08:36.320 --> 00:08:40.799 No doubt, these laws require a judgment sharpened by experience, 106 00:08:41.600 --> 00:08:44.159 in order on the one hand, to distinguish in what 107 00:08:44.440 --> 00:08:48.559 cases they are applicable, and on the other, to procure 108 00:08:48.639 --> 00:08:52.240 for them access to the will of the man and 109 00:08:52.360 --> 00:08:57.159 effectual influence on conduct. Since man is acted on by 110 00:08:57.240 --> 00:09:01.759 so many inclinations, that though capable of the idea of 111 00:09:01.799 --> 00:09:05.840 a practical pure reason, he is not so easily able 112 00:09:05.879 --> 00:09:11.679 to make it effective in concreto in his life. A 113 00:09:11.720 --> 00:09:17.600 metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not merely for 114 00:09:17.720 --> 00:09:22.039 speculative reasons, in order to investigate the sources of the 115 00:09:22.120 --> 00:09:26.000 practical principles which are to be found a priori in 116 00:09:26.080 --> 00:09:31.240 our reason, but also because morals themselves are liable to 117 00:09:31.320 --> 00:09:35.279 all sorts of corruption as long as we are without 118 00:09:35.440 --> 00:09:40.840 that clue and supreme canon by which to estimate them correctly. 119 00:09:42.120 --> 00:09:44.759 For in order that an action should be morally good, 120 00:09:45.440 --> 00:09:48.840 it is not enough that it conformed to the moral law, 121 00:09:49.639 --> 00:09:52.360 but it must also be done for the sake of 122 00:09:52.440 --> 00:09:57.639 the law. Otherwise that conformity is only very contingent and 123 00:09:57.759 --> 00:10:03.440 uncertain principle, which is not moral. Although it may now 124 00:10:03.440 --> 00:10:08.360 and then produce actions conformable to the law, will also 125 00:10:08.360 --> 00:10:13.919 often produce actions which contradict it. Now, it is only 126 00:10:13.960 --> 00:10:16.799 to a pure philosophy that we can look for the 127 00:10:16.840 --> 00:10:21.320 moral law in its purity and genuineness, and in a 128 00:10:21.399 --> 00:10:26.120 practical matter. This is of the utmost consequence. We must 129 00:10:26.200 --> 00:10:31.759 therefore begin with pure philosophy metaphysic, and without it there 130 00:10:31.759 --> 00:10:37.320 cannot be any moral philosophy at all. That which mingles 131 00:10:37.440 --> 00:10:41.679 these pure principles with the empirical does

not deserve the 132 00:10:41.840 --> 00:10:47.240 name of philosophy. For what distinguishes philosophy from common rational 133 00:10:47.360 --> 00:10:51.639 knowledge is that it treats in separate sciences. What the 134 00:10:51.720 --> 00:10:57.279 latter only comprehends confusedly. Much less does it deserve that 135 00:10:57.360 --> 00:11:02.120 of moral philosophy, since by the confusion it even spoils 136 00:11:02.159 --> 00:11:06.679 the purity of morals themselves and counteracts its own end. 137 00:11:08.159 --> 00:11:11.000 Let it not be thought, however, that what is here 138 00:11:11.080 --> 00:11:15.960 demanded is already extant in the proper dutic prefixed by 139 00:11:16.000 --> 00:11:20.679 the celebrated Wolf to his moral philosophy, namely his so 140 00:11:21.000 --> 00:11:26.399 called general practical philosophy, And that therefore we have not 141 00:11:26.600 --> 00:11:31.639 to strike into an entirely new field. Just because it 142 00:11:31.840 --> 00:11:35.519 was to be a general practical philosophy. It has not 143 00:11:35.679 --> 00:11:40.919 taken into consideration a will of any particular kind, say, 144 00:11:41.000 --> 00:11:45.600 one which should be determined solely from a priori principles, 145 00:11:46.000 --> 00:11:49.759 without any empirical motives, and which we might call a 146 00:11:49.879 --> 00:11:55.679 pure will, but volition in general, with all the actions 147 00:11:55.679 --> 00:12:00.080 and conditions which belong to it. In this general signification. 148 00:12:01.080 --> 00:12:05.720 By this it is distinguished from a metaphysic of morals, 149 00:12:05.799 --> 00:12:09.039 just as general logic, which treats of the acts and 150 00:12:09.240 --> 00:12:14.639 canons of thought in general, is distinguished from transcendental philosophy, 151 00:12:15.200 --> 00:12:19.600 which treats of the particular acts and canons of pure thought, 152 00:12:20.440 --> 00:12:26.120 i e. That whose cognitions are altogether a priori. For 153 00:12:26.159 --> 00:12:29.840 the metaphysic of morals has to examine the idea and 154 00:12:29.919 --> 00:12:34.480 the principles of a possible pure will, and not the 155 00:12:34.519 --> 00:12:39.080 acts and conditions of human volition generally, which for the 156 00:12:39.120 --> 00:12:43.960 most part are drawn from psychology. It is true that 157 00:12:44.159 --> 00:12:48.759 moral laws and duty are spoken of in the general 158 00:12:48.840 --> 00:12:55.039 moral philosophy, contrary indeed to all fitness. But this is 159 00:12:55.120 --> 00:12:59.559 no objection, for in this respect also the authors of 160 00:12:59.600 --> 00:13:03.799 that science remain true to their idea of it. They 161 00:13:03.960 --> 00:13:08.080 do not distinguish the motives which are prescribed as such 162 00:13:08.159 --> 00:13:13.480 by reason alone, altogether a priori, and which are properly moral, 163 00:13:14.279 --> 00:13:19.320 from the empirical motives which the understanding raises to general 164 00:13:19.399 --> 00:13:26.320 conceptions merely by comparison of experiences. But without noticing the 165 00:13:26.360 --> 00:13:30.799 difference of their sources, and looking on them all as homogeneous, 166 00:13:31.360 --> 00:13:36.639 they consider only their greater or lesser amount. It is 167 00:13:36.720 --> 00:13:41.039 in this way they frame their notion of obligation, which, 168 00:13:41.080 --> 00:13:44.519 though anything but moral, is all that can be attained 169 00:13:44.559 --> 00:13:48.440 in a philosophy which passes no judgment at all on 170 00:13:48.519 --> 00:13:53.159 the origin of all possible practical concepts, whether they are 171 00:13:53.279 --> 00:14:00.759 a priori or only a POSTERIORI, intending to publish hereafter 172 00:14:01.120 --> 00:14:05.240 a metaphysic of morals. I issue, in the first instance 173 00:14:05.360 --> 00:14:11.200 these fundamental principles. Indeed, there is properly no other foundation 174 00:14:11.519 --> 00:14:16.480 for it than the critical examination of a pure practical reason, 175 00:14:17.519 --> 00:14:21.200 just as that of metaphysics is the critical examination of 176 00:14:21.240 --> 00:14:27.840 the pure speculative reason already published. But in the first place, 177 00:14:28.440 --> 00:14:32.120 the former is not so absolutely necessary as the latter, 178 00:14:32.679 --> 00:14:36.879 because in moral concerns, human reason can easily be brought 179 00:14:36.919 --> 00:14:41.240 to a high degree of correctness and completeness, even in 180 00:14:41.279 --> 00:14:46.519 the commonest understanding, while on the contrary, in its theoretic 181 00:14:46.679 --> 00:14:52.000 but pure use, it is wholly dialectical. And in the 182 00:14:52.039 --> 00:14:56.480 second place, if the critique of a pure practical reason 183 00:14:56.840 --> 00:15:00.039 is to be complete, it must be possible at the 184 00:14:59.799 --> 00:15:03.799 s same time to show its identity with the speculative 185 00:15:03.879 --> 00:15:08.480 reason in a common principle, or it can ultimately be 186 00:15:08.679 --> 00:15:12.320 only one and the same reason, which has to be 187 00:15:12.360 --> 00:15:18.080 distinguished merely in its application. I could not, however, bring 188 00:15:18.159 --> 00:15:23.080 it to such completeness here without introducing considerations of a 189 00:15:23.159 --> 00:15:27.039 wholly different kind, which would be perplexing to the reader. 190 00:15:28.000 --> 00:15:32.440 On this account I have adopted the title of fundamental 191 00:15:32.639 --> 00:15:37.279 principles of the metaphysic of morals instead of that of 192 00:15:37.360 --> 00:15:43.039 a critical examination of the pure practical reason. But in 193 00:15:43.120 --> 00:15:47.679 the third place, since a metaphysic of morals, in spite 194 00:15:47.720 --> 00:15:52.200 of the discouraging title, is yet capable of being presented 195 00:15:52.279 --> 00:15:57.080 in popular form, and one adapted to the common understanding, 196 00:15:57.840 --> 00:16:01.679 I find it useful to separate from it this preliminary 197 00:16:01.799 --> 00:16:06.120 treatise on its fundamental principles, in order that I may 198 00:16:06.200 --> 00:16:12.039 not hereafter have need to introduce these necessarily subtle discussions 199 00:16:12.200 --> 00:16:16.320 into a book of a more simple character. The present 200 00:16:16.440 --> 00:16:21.159 treatise is, however, nothing more than an investigation and establishment 201 00:16:21.240 --> 00:16:27.039 of the supreme principle of morality, and this alone constitutes 202 00:16:27.080 --> 00:16:30.840 a study complete in itself, and one which ought to 203 00:16:30.879 --> 00:16:36.480 be kept apart from every other moral investigation. No doubt, 204 00:16:36.639 --> 00:16:40.879 my conclusions on this weighty question, which has hitherto been 205 00:16:41.080 --> 00:16:46.720 very unsatisfactorily examined, would receive much light from the application 206 00:16:46.879 --> 00:16:50.840 of the same principle to the whole system, and would 207 00:16:50.879 --> 00:16:55.360 be greatly confirmed by the adequacy which it exhibits throughout. 208 00:16:56.320 --> 00:17:00.000 But I must forego this advantage, which indeed would be 209 00:17:00.200 --> 00:17:06.240 after all more gratifying than useful, since the easy applicability 210 00:17:06.279 --> 00:17:10.880 of a principle and its apparent adequacy give no very 211 00:17:11.079 --> 00:17:16.039 certain proof of its soundness, but rather inspire a certain 212 00:17:16.279 --> 00:17:21.880 partiality which prevents us from examining and estimating it strictly 213 00:17:22.200 --> 00:17:28.319 in itself, and without regard to consequences. I have adopted 214 00:17:28.400 --> 00:17:32.079 in this work the method which I think most suitable, 215 00:17:32.720 --> 00:17:37.400 proceeding analytically from common knowledge to the determination of its 216 00:17:37.559 --> 00:17:44.240 ultimate principle, and again descending synthetically from the examination of 217 00:17:44.319 --> 00:17:48.559 this principle and its sources to the common knowledge in 218 00:17:48.640 --> 00:17:53.319 which we find it employed. The division will therefore be 219 00:17:53.519 --> 00:18:00.720 as follows. One first section transition from the common rational 220 00:18:00.839 --> 00:18:08.160 knowledge of morality to the philosophical two. Second section transition 221 00:18:08.400 --> 00:18:14.680 from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysic of morals. Three 222 00:18:14.960 --> 00:18:20.640 third section, final step from the metaphysic of morals to 223 00:18:20.720 --> 00:18:28.079 the critique of the pure practical reason. End of preface 224 00:18:29.200 --> 00:18:39.119 recording by Martin Geeson in Hazelmere, Surrey,