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Welcome to the Center Edge.
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I'm Evans Torchdrover.
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For the better part of a decade, governments around the world have been battling with big tech companies over their size, power, and impact on competition.
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The European Union designated American big tech companies as digital gatekeepers, imposing regulations and issuing fines.
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The global efforts go beyond Europe, though, with Japan, South Korea, Brazil, and Australia all seeking to rein in these companies through a mix of enforcement and legislation.
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Here at home, the U.S.
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Justice Department beat Google twice in court on search and on ad tech and has a pending case against Apple.
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The Federal Trade Commission lost to Meta is appealing that ruling, and its case against Amazon still awaits trial as the agency continues to investigate Microsoft.
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In Congress, there's been a lot of talk but no action.
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Surprise, surprise.
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We've had investigations and hearings, followed by intense lobbying, and then nothing getting enacted.
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But the Senate Judiciary Committee is taking another swing.
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On June 11th of this year, Chairman Chuck Grassley and Senator Amy Klovachar reintroduced the American Innovation and Choice Online Act, which we will call ICOA on this show, and it's co-sponsored by Senators Durbin, Hawley, Whitehouse, and Corey and Booker.
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The bill applies to what it calls systemically important platforms, and it bars them from favoring their own products over rivals, using sellers' non-public data to compete against them, cutting off competitors' access to platform features, locking users into defaults, tying access to the purchase of unrelated services, and retaliating against businesses that complain.
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The Justice Department, the FTC, and State Attorneys General would enforce the bill in federal court on an expedited clock, and platforms would get defenses for privacy, security, and legal compliance.
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Now, an earlier version of the bill passed the same committee 16 to 6 in January of 2022, but it never saw a floor vote.
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Many blame that on big tech lobbying and a lack of political courage by Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer, who led their party's delegations at the time.
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But after all those years, does the bill still make sense?
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We've seen judges show reluctance to intervene significantly in tech markets given the advent of artificial intelligence.
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Will AI make tech more competitive, or will it simply
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cement the dominant positions that these companies developed in past iterations of technology like Web 2.0?
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And as the Trump administration rails against European regulation of American tech companies, what lessons should be drawn from across the pond?
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That's the backdrop for today's show, which will be our first debate between two experts that view these issues very differently.
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The debaters will answer two related questions.
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First, do we need new competition laws for tech platforms at all?
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Or are existing antitrust laws like the Sherman Act adequate to deal with any potential problems?
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And then the second question: if we do need new laws, should Congress pass ICOA?
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Will the benefits of that law outweigh the downsides?
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Arguing the affirmative that yes, we do need laws and yes, we should pass ICOA is Slade Bond.
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Slade chairs the public policy and legislative affairs practice at the law firm Cuneo, Gilbert, and LaDuca.
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Before that, he was Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs at the Justice Department under former A.G.
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Merrick Garland.
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And before that, he was chief counsel of the House Antitrust Subcommittee, where he ran the 16th month investigation into Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google that produced a very long report and also the first version of the bill that we're debating today.
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Arguing the opposition that we don't need new laws and we shouldn't pass ICOA.
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Jeffrey Manney, he is the founder and president of the International Center for Law and Economics.
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Many in DC know it as ICLE.
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He started that organization in 2009.
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He's also a distinguished fellow at Northwestern Center on Law, Business, and Economics.
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He teaches antitrust as a visiting professor at IE University in Madrid, and he was a law professor at Lewis and Clark Law School before that.
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So we'll start with some opening statements and then I'll moderate the discussion.
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Hopefully you won't be hearing much from me, and then we'll end with closing statements.
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We'll get into lessons learned from antitrust cases here and in Europe, whether ICOA really means the end of Google Maps in two-day shipping and more.
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Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining the show.
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It's a pleasure to be here.
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Thanks for having me.
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So, Slade, I'm going to start with you for your opening statement.
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Well, first of all, thank you so much for having me.
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It's an absolute pleasure to join you both.
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I have tremendous respect for you, Evan, and Jeff, as a real uh leader in the antitrust community.
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We don't agree on much, and that's probably going to come out in today's debate, but it's still a pleasure to join you both.
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So, as Evan mentioned, I was Chief Counsel of the ALS Antitrust Subcommittee when we conducted a 16-month top-to-bottom uh review of these issues.
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And some time has passed since then.
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So my open in today's discussion is sort of walk through the issue that Evan teed up, really like, are these bills still necessary in the era of agentic AI, or are they are they trying to solve yesterday's problem, fight yesterday's war?
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Uh, which I think we'll talk about quite a bit today.
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Um as Evan also mentioned, I spent a 10, uh, I did a stint at the Justice Department under A.
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G.
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Garland, also working very closely with Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Cantor, where the Justice Department um litigated many of these issues that have now since percolated through the federal courts, some fully adjudicated, some not.
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Um so I'm happy to draw from that experience today as well.
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Um, but obviously can't speak to any ongoing matter, any non-public matter.
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Um so I thought it might be helpful to tee off uh this conversation um with a discussion of what exactly is ICOA trying to solve, right?
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So this is this is the most important thing in any discussion on these bills, and sometimes there's a temptation to jump straight into like the most technical um aspects of these debates and 30 years of antitrust jurisprudence or how fast moving digital markets may or may not work.
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Um, but really the first question is like, what is this bill trying to do and why does it even exist?
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Um so where I usually start with that conversation is thinking about power, right?
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So particularly gatekeeper power, um, which is a shorthand to describe bottlenecks or intermediaries or dominant firms that really connect customers uh to businesses or businesses to other businesses or serve as really central nodes in the market.
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Um and that's how this bill thinks about competition.
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It's really about allowing scrappy, dynamic firms, you know, today's innovators, to compete on the merits by overcoming what I view as moats that dominant firms create
around their different lines of business.
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And so um the way I think about this bill, and I think we'll probably debate this today a little bit, is it's not necessarily about bigness.
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I've got a portrait of Lewis Brandt behind me, and he, you know, I truly believe in the curse of bigness, but that's not what the bill is about.
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It's not about punishing successful companies.
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Um there's an old saying on that front that antitrust is not the reward for creating successful firms, and I don't think this bill is any different.
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What it's really designed to do is create rules where a dominant platform uh really has essential gateways over markets and can use those gateways to manipulate rankings, defaults, to degrade interoperability.
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Um it's designed to address those situations where the platform can really weaponize its role as an intermediary um in the market and advantage its own products and services or disadvantage rivals.
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Um and so I'm sure we'll talk about some of that conduct.
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We'll also talk about how it uh plays out in the world with AI today.
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Um and there's a very live issue where I don't think there are right or wrong answers.
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But you know, this is also playing out in the courts.
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So in various cases, we are now seeing what is the end result of five to seven years of investigations of litigations and litigations, and and Google's just to take Google's example, Google's been adjudicated a monopolist in six different mark markets by federal courts uh in uh you know different different markets, different cases.
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Um but the outcomes are uncertain.
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The remedies have been uh broadly decried by people who generally support enforcement as being too weak or really not willing to address competition as it presents itself.
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Um, and that's a good example for you know some of the debates that's shaking out really where enforcement has been successful and the outcome is nevertheless in doubt.
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On the other end of the spectrum, you have the Facebook and Meta litigation.
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I'm gonna call it Facebook, so we're not confused about Judge Meta, the judge in the Google search case.
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Um, and obviously they're called MetaNow.
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So in that litigation, um, you know, we've seen how difficult it is to enforce the Sherman Act over a multi-year period in dynamic markets, um, particularly around 30 years of jurisprudence that judges um really have expressed uncertainty in uh adjudicating these different complaints around.
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And so, in particular, one of the things that I'm most concerned about is antitrust and time.
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That's something that ICOA cares about.
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And the ability for an alleged monopolist to change its products during the tendency of litigation, such that litigating market definition issues becomes incredibly tricky for the government and for generalist courts.
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Um that's that's more or less the why, and you know, something that ICOA um is really motivated to address, and we could talk more about what it does um a little later.
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Um the second thing I want to talk about just from the opening get-go is what are the benefits of competition, what is the butt for world, right?
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That's something that we really care a lot about um and antitrust generally and Congress is you know uh at the center of in these debates is like what is it you're exactly like what exactly are you trying to achieve through this legislation?
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So we have gatekeeper power, that's the concern, but the ultimate objective of ICOA really is this question about what would markets look like with more meaningful competition.
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Because in 20th century markets, we all know what the benefits of competition are.
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It's lower prices, it's better products, greater choice, in some cases, more innovation.
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But those are the traditional benefits that antitrust is designed to protect.
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In digital markets, the benefits are not always going to show up in lower sticker prices, and that's one of the you know things that's been part of this debate for so long.
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A decade ago, um, some people would say that antitrust uh has nothing to say in non-price markets.
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And so today we know that competition really means a bunch of different things.
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It means better quality, it means more privacy, essentially, new features, better terms of service, code for customers and businesses, um, more openness, fewer walled gardens, and entirely new products in some cases.
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And the way I really think about it is if you lined up a hundred different small businesses, developers, little middle tech companies, what they would start talking about is making the best version of their products, right?
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They really want to bring new products and services to market.
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Uh, they do want to compete on the merits.
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It's not like they want a hand up.
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Um, and they want to make products that people love and um that work.
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Um and the other thing they they want is not to be snuffed out, right?
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So this is very much also about the ability to weaponize your platform um and do something that the Sherman Act has long cared about, which is economic bullying.
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So it's not just the idea that you have a moat around your business, but you're able to uh use your market power in a way that is ultimately very destructive to competition.
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Um very long opening and what I hope is more of a dialogue, but I'll stop there and let Jeff respond.
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Go ahead, Jeff.
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Okay.
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Thanks, uh, thanks, Evan, for having me and uh Slade.
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It's great to um it's great to spar with you.
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Um uh I I think that um I think Slade, you know, kind of presents obviously a one-sided presentation of uh of the issues here and what ICOA might do about them.
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Um fundamentally, I think what that presentation misses is that uncertainty is endemic to antitrust, to the antitrust enterprise.
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What we're trying to assess in antitrust is is competitive effects, usually in the future of conduct we may or may not have seen before in a uh factual environment that we haven't experienced before.
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We know way less than we don't know in these contexts.
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That's one of the reasons why antitrust litigation takes so long.
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Um I'll come back to that in a second, but it's also one of the reasons why we are reluctant to prejudge the outcomes in anti-competitive in antitrust cases because ultimately we're trying to do what's best for consumers under the current standards.
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We can debate the current standards, but the current standard is the consumer welfare standard.
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We try to maximize the competitive process for the benefit of the consumers of products.
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And um introducing a set of restrictions, as ICOA does, that basically tells these big companies how they can design their products presumes, I think for it to be justified, it has to presume, and ideally has evidence to demonstrate that those forms of design actually lead to better products, to uh better quality, to more competition, et cetera.
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Now, I I agree with Slade that there are theories as to why some of these companies in these so-called gatekeeper positions could exercise that uh that role in a way that potentially impedes competition.
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But the problem is that the exact same things that might look like impeding competition are also improving their products, are also actually improving competition, depending on all of these other factors, none of which are actually factored into the language of ICOA.
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So let me make this
a little more concrete because that's all very abstract.
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The main thing that ICOA targets is um is preferencing, is integration, the way the way these companies integrate their own products or other companies' products with their platform.
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And um you can see sort of the story that underlies the the concern here, and that is um a company like Google shows maps in its search results.
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Yelp would like for its map or its uh you know, restaurant reviews to show up when someone searches for a restaurant.
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Google puts it its map at the top and it makes it harder for Yelp to get clicks.
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And it's very true.
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I mean, uh you know, that part of the premise is true that Google, preferencing its own maps at the top of its search result page, makes it harder for Yelp to get traffic.
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That doesn't make it a competitive problem, however.
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The thing is that most consumers who are searching for a restaurant, if you type in the address of a restaurant, let's say, you're almost certainly looking for a map to get there.
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You don't want to go to Yelp.
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You don't want to click through six other sites in order to find the information you need.
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Google's product is made better by integrating its map and putting it at the top of the search results.
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And uh the problem with a bill like ICOA is it says that we're gonna presume that this kind of behavior harms Yelp and that that cost is way more than the cost to consumers.
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But there is zero basis for making that conclusion.
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There's zero empirical basis.
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Um, and uh we have some evidence in in the case of what's happened in Europe.
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You you mentioned this at the outset, I think.
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Europe has this bill called the Digital Markets Act, the DMA, uh, that does a lot of what the ICOA bill would do.
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There are obviously differences in how it's enforced and it's a different jurisdiction and all of that, but it's pretty similar.
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And we it's been in effect for about two and a half years, and in that two and a half years, we've seen uh we've seen the results, and the results are not very exciting.
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Um, the commission itself reviewed its results.
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It pointed to a couple of uh of presumed benefits.
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One of the biggest ones was uh an alarm can now sound on your iPhone when it's turned off, a third-party alarm, even though it used to be that uh only Apple's alarm, I guess, could would sound if your phone was turned off or you know the volume was turned off.
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This is this is uh small stakes, right?
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Meanwhile, uh it has meant that Apple has degraded that Google has degraded the way it presents maps in Europe.
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All the big tech companies have delayed or or are not going to be rolling out new products.
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And it's exactly what you would expect to happen.
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You have a rule, uh a sort of no self-preferencing kind of rule in Europe that increases the risk of adopting perfectly pro-competitive integrations of products.
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Um uh in Europe's case, without any possibility of defense, at least under ICOA, there are some defenses, which we can talk about that.
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But in Europe's case, basically you just can't do it at all.
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So now, so companies won't do it.
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They won't roll out products that they think requires an integration of one of their services with another service.
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And again, it's the same question.
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That obviously um benefits the certain competitors who want to be able to offer that secondary service on Google's platform or whoever's platform, but it also harms consumers.
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Interestingly, the DMA is very explicitly not a pro-consumer bill.
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It's not about helping consumers, it's not even about competition.
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It explicitly pursues different objectives.
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Um, and ICOA, by contrast, purports to be a competition bill.
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It purports to be amending the antitrust laws.
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Um, and I think what you actually find is that what ICOA is doing is in fact putting a thumb on the scale, whether they want it or not.
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So in favor of these uh these sort of smaller competitors who are having trouble competing with the big uh tech companies, not because they're engaging in exclusive behavior, but because they are improving their products in ways that these companies would like to, would prefer to have greater uh ability to compete against these companies.
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Just because they want it doesn't mean that it's beneficial.
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And again, to sort of bring this full circle, what's problematic, most problematic about ICOA is not the assumption that that could be problematic, that that kind of self-preferencing behavior could be problematic.
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It's the assumption that it almost always is.
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And there's no reason for assuming that, and that will only harm consumers.
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Slate, in your response, uh I just want to see get your take on one of the arguments
we've seen that that gets at what Jeff is talking about in Europe.
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So ITIF, which actually held a debate on this exact same piece of legislation, you should check that out, uh, between uh the president of Digital Progress Institute, Joel Thayer, and uh Joseph Canelio.
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Um and one of the things that Joseph brings up is that in the DMA's desire to improve competition in uh the search uh aspect that Jeff was talking about with having intermediaries to have a better deal, right?
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What ITIF argues is that instead of just sending traffic directly to hotels thanks to the DMA, Google is just sending traffic to more intermediaries like Expedia and Booking, which just makes it take longer for the consumer to find what they're looking for, and those companies take a commission of the hotel.
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So is that really helping the consumer?
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So uh Slade, I wanted to get your take on this idea that you know, both DMA and ICOA, as Jeff says, it just according to this line of argumentation, is just about helping competitors.
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It's not necessarily improving the consumer's livelihood or experience.
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You know, on the point that you raised, Judge Diane Wood um had a great uh saying, which is it's really hard to have competition without competitors.
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Um and so inherent in this debate is this question about is this really about small businesses um not having access to features that large companies develop that consumers like um because they want a handout, or is it about very subtle ways that dominant firms, again, manipulate default rankings, preferences, basically the functionality of software and marketplaces such that it's impossible to be on those evening?
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Um I want to backtrack though and answer a few of Jeff's points just because if I don't answer them, I concede them.
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And I don't want to lose uh on the basis of conceding an argument.
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Then I had to do the same thing.
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That's the idea, folks.
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No.
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Um so Jeff made a really good point that uncertainty is part of antitrust.
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Um the counter to that is that Congress passed the antitrust laws, and they did so in a time when the way that Congress spoke with courts was more general, like quasi-constitutional statutes of the early uh 20th century, you know, really were written in a way that was designed to allow courts to gap-fill expert agencies to enforce in a way that really was forward-looking.
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Um, we live in a different world today, and Congress is both in terms of responding to Supreme Court precedent, but also how laws are written in the 21st century, they must
be prescriptive.
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Um, and you must be very specific about the thing you're trying to do.
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You must be very careful on how you're delegating authority to enforcement agencies and so on.
00:21:17.599 --> 00:21:47.599
And so the whole point of legislation like ICOA, and it's not the first bill to try to do this, is to create presumptions in enforcement, such that um an expert agency that is litigating on taxpayer funded um dollars and had that really doesn't have you know the same army and litigation of budget as a Google, as a meta, is nevertheless able to show in court why something is illegal and it doesn't take you know$100 million to do so.
00:21:47.839 --> 00:21:49.759
Um that is antitrust litigation today.
00:21:49.920 --> 00:21:59.759
We learned over the weekend in the settlement with Paramount that the attorney's fees in that case were uh$40 million in a settlement, um, and that was for two and a half months of.
00:22:00.160 --> 00:22:00.640
Litigation.
00:22:00.720 --> 00:22:03.039
So these cases are incredibly expensive.
00:22:03.200 --> 00:22:05.119
Experts are incredibly expensive.
00:22:05.279 --> 00:22:12.079
And to the extent that Congress weighs in and establishes presumption, in many ways, that's good for the public fisc, right?
00:22:12.240 --> 00:22:22.319
Because Congress is making, you know, a democratically accountable choice about what competition laws should or should not care about and allowing judges to suss out some of these issues.
00:22:22.480 --> 00:22:26.319
The second point that Jeff made was that the current standard is consumer welfare.
00:22:26.559 --> 00:22:28.880
We may not like it, but that's what courts think about.
00:22:29.839 --> 00:22:32.640
Like it or not, I think consumer welfare is in this bill, right?
00:22:32.720 --> 00:22:40.559
So any party that has been accused to have violated ICOA can show that the conduct is nevertheless protective of competition.
00:22:40.799 --> 00:22:43.039
That's something that's usually lost in these debates.
00:22:43.279 --> 00:22:46.720
And we can quibble about how that interacts with different portions of the bill.
00:22:46.880 --> 00:23:02.799
But it is not correct to say that a party is going to be helpless when it comes to violating the law and not able to show that its conduct, though potentially illegal, nevertheless promoted competition, improved products, protected privacy, and so on.
00:23:02.960 --> 00:23:09.279
And I will say that the lens of competition today, and what we know it to care about, is much bigger than it was 10 years ago.
00:23:09.680 --> 00:23:23.279
And you see that in the Apple litigation where the whole uh debate around what is pro-competitive conduct, how does it relate to privacy and uh security on devices is something that competition cares about and is something courts grapple with.
00:23:23.519 --> 00:23:30.480
The third point that Jeff made is that the thing that we're really upset about is where a dominant firm is improving their products.
00:23:30.640 --> 00:23:32.240
This is really where I take issue.
00:23:32.400 --> 00:23:42.000
Um so what I have heard from app developers, small and medium-sized tech companies is not about, oh, Google is showing up search first in results.
00:23:42.079 --> 00:23:44.319
It has these sticky defaults, they're insurmountable.
00:23:44.400 --> 00:23:46.960
There's like a lawsuit from Yelp that does allege that.
00:23:47.039 --> 00:23:51.119
I agree and we'll just fiat that that's you know something that's been out there in debate for a long time.
00:23:51.359 --> 00:24:04.880
But what I really hear from these smaller firms is about the very subtle ways that these companies preference their, they basically preference or um advantage their own products and services throughout the ecosystems that they oversee.
00:24:05.039 --> 00:24:07.039
And so um that's issue one.
00:24:07.119 --> 00:24:19.440
But issue two is not just this idea that you have privileged access to your own features, that you roll out a new great product, as Jeff mentioned, um, and you are the only one that have access to it in this walled guardian you've created and oversee.
00:24:19.759 --> 00:24:24.000
It's also that you're degrading the ability of others to do certain things.
00:24:24.240 --> 00:24:35.599
Um and I think about my consumer experience using various apps in my smartphone, um, where you know the volume button does not work for certain apps, certain devices, certain third-party speakers.
00:24:35.759 --> 00:24:39.279
But if you switch over to Apple Music, um, it certainly does their.
00:24:39.359 --> 00:24:49.119
Um, and this happens and plays out on different devices at different levels of operating systems um all over the place from the very beginning of the user experience using these devices.
00:24:49.279 --> 00:25:07.759
So, like if I'm a so I care about privacy a lot, and if I want to use an email uh communication platform that is not Gmail as my default at the very beginning of the process of using um an Android device, that is very hard to do because Google will automatically be the result.
00:25:07.839 --> 00:25:12.000
It will make it very difficult to create an off-ramp to competing alternatives.
00:25:12.240 --> 00:25:15.039
And if if Google's products are the best, they should be the best.
00:25:15.200 --> 00:25:17.200
Like if consumers want them, they should use them.
00:25:17.440 --> 00:25:21.519
But it's not just that it's making it impossible to leave their walled garden.
00:25:21.680 --> 00:25:27.440
It's also that it's degrading the ability for those other services to even be discovered in the first place.
00:25:27.680 --> 00:25:32.079
The fourth point that Jeff made is really about the DMA.
00:25:32.480 --> 00:25:34.400
Um, am I am I keeping track?
00:25:35.119 --> 00:25:38.240
Uh I'm trying to keep track, but I but I don't know if I'm doing it.
00:25:38.480 --> 00:25:39.519
I'm keeping
track, I'm keeping track.
00:25:39.759 --> 00:25:40.160
Okay, okay.
00:25:40.319 --> 00:25:41.440
Somebody's keeping track.
00:25:41.759 --> 00:25:50.799
Um so one of the final points I'll say that Jeff made um that I'll respond to is this whole issue around the DMA, the results of the DMA are not very exciting.
00:25:50.960 --> 00:25:51.680
Um, I agree.
00:25:51.920 --> 00:25:55.519
Like the results are not exciting, and I think it's due to a lack of enforcement.
00:25:55.599 --> 00:25:57.920
And we're seeing uh an approach in Europe.
00:25:58.079 --> 00:26:01.200
I think Europe has been tremendous when it comes to problem identification.
00:26:01.279 --> 00:26:02.480
I think they get these issues.
00:26:02.640 --> 00:26:04.400
The area where I disagree is the solutions.
00:26:04.559 --> 00:26:09.759
ICOA is completely different than the DMA in that respect, in a way I'll get into in a moment.
00:26:09.920 --> 00:26:17.359
Um but I do think the lack of enforcement and the sort of brother may I approach to regulation is one that I certainly don't subscribe to.
00:26:17.440 --> 00:26:18.799
I don't think it's appropriate in America.
00:26:18.880 --> 00:26:25.039
It's not how our justice system works, it's not how our regulatory or enforcement apparatus works, and so I don't think it's the right approach here.
00:26:25.200 --> 00:26:35.519
Um the other point that I would make is that companies have been changing their products in response to the DMA in really pro-consumer, pro-welfare ways.
00:26:35.680 --> 00:26:42.160
Um, but it's not like they roll out this like notification brought to you by the Digital Markets Act every time they do that.
00:26:42.319 --> 00:26:59.440
And so you have to like go to a bureaucratic blog post where like someone from the European Commission or DG Connect is telling you how, okay, so Apple just rolled out this new feature and it deals with privileged access and it allows audio switching and proximity pairing and notification to third-party apps.
00:26:59.599 --> 00:27:05.519
And so if you want to use a headphone that's not an AirPod and you want to connect it to your call, it will automatically switch.
00:27:05.599 --> 00:27:07.839
And that's something that Apple's products do on their own.
00:27:07.920 --> 00:27:11.200
But now you can use this other, you know, peripheral device or whatever.
00:27:11.359 --> 00:27:19.279
That that's that's kind of the butt for world, and it's not super exciting, and it's like very um iterative in terms of you know pro-competitive outcomes.
00:27:19.359 --> 00:27:20.720
Like I will agree with that.
00:27:20.880 --> 00:27:36.480
Um, but it's not like nothing is happening, it's just not something that you know is super obvious, you know, to the to the green bubble crowd or or whomever benefits from like the ability to thumbs up a comp like as something in the chat, the group chat that has both Google and Apple users on it.
00:27:36.720 --> 00:27:45.759
Um the very, very last thing I think Evan mentioned is this idea of competition versus competitors, or we're just helping various firms versus the overall landscape.
00:27:46.000 --> 00:27:48.559
And I want a competition that doesn't care, right?
00:27:48.720 --> 00:27:50.160
Like a competition system that doesn't care.
00:27:50.240 --> 00:27:57.920
It doesn't care if you're a big company, it doesn't care if you're a small company, it cares about how you're using market power and how the use of market power affects other firms.
00:27:58.160 --> 00:28:06.160
And here it is just it's not the case that uh there's no predicate, as Jeff said, for this conduct happening and being bad.
00:28:06.240 --> 00:28:11.519
As I mentioned at the start, Google has been an adjudicated monopolist in a number of different markets.
00:28:11.680 --> 00:28:14.480
Um and that's just one of these companies.
00:28:14.640 --> 00:28:34.559
And in those different markets, whether it's ad tech or search or um the mobile marketplace, the um Android marketplace, um there's a rich, you know, hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of page record of where you know judges across the you know the system and different federal courts have found different sets of conduct to be illegal and some to be illegal, right?
00:28:34.720 --> 00:28:43.119
And so this idea that you know there are solutions in search of a problem or there is no problem, or what are we even talking about, to me is an argument from like 2018, right?
00:28:43.200 --> 00:28:51.279
It's not one that really uh responds to the current debate, the current set of litigation, what Congress has done, what international enforcers have done.
00:28:51.440 --> 00:29:01.039
Um and you know, I invite anyone to go back and read any of the Google decisions, like any of them, they're all like 230 pages long, and then tell me, like, oh, there's nothing to see here, right?
00:29:01.200 --> 00:29:11.839
Because at the end of that death mark, she'll say, well, you know, maybe I agree with the judge here, I disagree with the judge there, but you have dozens of sets of conduct and issues um analyzed.
00:29:11.920 --> 00:29:17.680
And again, there's a pretty rich predicate for uh not everything is working as as it should, I think.
00:29:18.000 --> 00:29:27.599
Well, on the on the the uh uh sort of structural government point, um I I'm not I I'm not sure what you uh what you point to as the basis for that.
00:29:27.759 --> 00:29:32.400
I I mean I you know the common law, it's true, it's old, but it served us well for a long time.
00:29:32.559 --> 00:29:45.759
Um I don't think that I would sort of toss out the judicial system and the you know the uh the common law system, which the the antitrust laws, you know, um mimic um and and opt into essentially.
00:29:45.920 --> 00:29:48.960
Um I don't think I would throw them out because times are complicated.
00:29:49.119 --> 00:29:50.880
Times have always seemed complicated.
00:29:51.119 --> 00:30:00.160
And what you're suggesting and
inherently is that government bureaucrats know better than the market does how things should operate.
00:30:00.400 --> 00:30:13.920
And while of course it's true that the market won't always lead to always, it usually does, but won't always lead to pro-competitive outcomes, you have to weigh that against the ability of the government to know what actually would lead to pro-competitive outcomes.
00:30:14.240 --> 00:30:17.119
A great example of this is in the Google search case, right?
00:30:17.200 --> 00:30:38.400
Um, where you have Google uh uh loses the case on liability, and then uh the DOJ asks for for extremely onerous remedies, including breaking up Google, and the judge refuses to Judge imposes pretty onerous remedies, but he doesn't break up Google, and mainly his reason is because AI has come along and it's changed the competitive landscape.
00:30:38.720 --> 00:30:42.799
And um it's true that AI has come along and changed the competitive landscape.
00:30:42.960 --> 00:30:53.359
And interestingly, since ICOA was first written in 2020 or 2022, I can't remember what year, um, i i AI has changed the competitive landscape considerably.
00:30:53.519 --> 00:30:57.119
ICOA hasn't changed on that dimension in particular.
00:30:57.279 --> 00:31:02.319
Um and uh it's it's exactly the problem with those prescriptive rules.
00:31:02.480 --> 00:31:08.640
They um they are set in stone, and then when the world changes around them, they're virtually impossible to change.
00:31:08.960 --> 00:31:11.839
I don't know how you can say that one of those is inherently better than the other.
00:31:11.920 --> 00:31:20.720
I have very strong reasons to think that we're much better off with the more adaptive evolutionary uh system, even though I'll freely admit that it's often more expensive.
00:31:21.039 --> 00:31:33.119
The thing that you often point to, and I think you mentioned earlier, is is that that sort of expense of litigation, the expense of going through that uh that process and then maybe getting what seems like an unsatisfying result.
00:31:33.759 --> 00:31:40.160
The problem with all of that is that it sort of assumes that the alternative is more correct and um less expensive.
00:31:40.640 --> 00:31:49.440
And the reality is that you can't assume that either, that uh the expense is a function of the uncertainty that I mentioned and that you conceded exists.
00:31:49.759 --> 00:31:52.160
The expense is a function of trying to get it right.
00:31:52.480 --> 00:32:02.880
And the fact that you can pick rules in advance and that makes it cheaper to get an outcome doesn't mean that you're getting that you're any more likely to get the right outcome.
00:32:03.200 --> 00:32:05.599
And I think we should care about getting the right outcome.
00:32:05.759 --> 00:32:17.759
I don't think that we should be uh imposing prescriptive rules just because doing so is cheaper than litigation if those prescriptive rules are actually harmful to consumers.
00:32:18.160 --> 00:32:26.319
Um and again, uh nothing has demonstrated to me that the specific rules in ICOA or this type of rule are uh particularly beneficial.
00:32:27.119 --> 00:32:30.079
In fact, the AI point makes this point even stronger.
00:32:30.240 --> 00:32:39.359
You know, the the again, I think that the majority of the ICOA rules are against various forms of um uh integration of products.
00:32:39.839 --> 00:32:55.680
And what's interesting about the the uh the way that uh AI has been rolling out with these you know chatbots, AI assistants, the the gen AI stuff, is that they are kind of like infinitely uh customizable platforms.
00:32:55.839 --> 00:33:01.200
They'll integrate whatever informational type of engagement you want.
00:33:01.359 --> 00:33:03.200
You want a map, you can get a map from them.
00:33:03.359 --> 00:33:12.480
You want to use uh AI instead of search, you can search, and then right there in the same in the same chat with your AI, you can ask it to do something else.
00:33:12.720 --> 00:33:20.799
Uh what I mean, what I'm getting at is one of the things that has changed or is in the process of changing, seems to be in the process of changing.
00:33:20.960 --> 00:33:31.200
We don't know exactly what's gonna happen, but seems to be in the process of changing, is that AI has facilitated a kind of infinite integration of capabilities into a single product.
00:33:31.279 --> 00:33:46.640
Uh does it make sense to simultaneously introduce a bill that tells AI's biggest competitors you can't integrate different products, different capabilities into your product when that is precisely where competition is going?
00:33:46.880 --> 00:33:58.880
I think I think the technological and and sort of consumer environment has just left ICOA in the dust for this, at least for this one very specific reason.
00:33:59.279 --> 00:34:06.480
And that's the real danger of picking prescriptive rules, especially if you don't have any strong justification for them.
00:34:06.720 --> 00:34:13.360
Again, there isn't empirical evidence to say that uh that elf preferencing is is particularly harmful.
00:34:13.599 --> 00:34:17.360
There's a lot of there's not a lot, there's a fair amount of empirical evidence.
00:34:17.519 --> 00:34:20.639
I have a paper on this, you're you're welcome to read.
00:34:20.800 --> 00:34:23.440
Um I'm sure you'll want to read all 80 pages of it.
00:34:23.519 --> 00:34:27.760
Uh Evan knows well how how very terse my writing is.
00:34:28.079 --> 00:34:32.960
Um uh the evidence is at best inconclusive.
00:34:33.039 --> 00:34:36.079
Um there are situations in which it can be harmful to competition.
00:34:36.159 --> 00:34:47.360
There are lots of situations in which it benefits competition, and by the way, doesn't just benefit the the incumbent, the platform or the gatekeeper, actually leads to benefits for uh for competitors as well.
00:34:47.519 --> 00:34:51.920
Increasing demand increases the viability of competing products.
00:34:52.159 -->
00:35:04.880
Um there's just no basis to say that it's uh harmful to begin with, and then in this AI environment where where you know sort of infinite integration seems to be where we're moving, it's really hard to justify.
00:35:05.519 --> 00:35:23.760
Um The thing about uh uh about the the nature of these companies as gatekeepers that always gets me is the the statements that you that of the sort that you made, Slade, that about about degrading their product or not allowing third parties to have the same level of access that they have and the like.
00:35:24.079 --> 00:35:26.639
Um, or or or the notion of market power.
00:35:26.800 --> 00:35:41.280
Like market power usually comes from investing a massive amount in RD, creating an innovation, creating a product that people want, and selling it to them, and them liking it so much that everybody uses your product and all of a sudden you have market power.
00:35:41.519 --> 00:35:51.920
Market power rarely, and and in not even in the cases where where companies have been found to have violated the antitrust laws, it is far from the only thing that led to their market power.
00:35:52.000 --> 00:35:58.320
In the Google case, it's there, the judge makes clear over and over and over again how much better Google is at doing what it does.
00:35:58.800 --> 00:36:18.719
Um that if that's the source of market power, you are starting from an assumption that this thing that consumers that that this company has invested in massively, taken huge risks to produce for consumers, should be constrained in some way precisely because consumers like it so much.
00:36:19.280 --> 00:36:33.119
Now, I don't I'm obviously I'm sort of oversimplifying for the for the point of argument here, but uh but fundamentally what you're saying is these companies don't have a right to control their own property and the and the thing that they created the way they want to.
00:36:33.599 --> 00:36:43.679
And it's uh it it's uh I understand the logic of it, of course, but you need a a sort of a theory of why and how much they owe something to their competitors.
00:36:44.559 --> 00:36:46.719
We have this theory of essential facilities.
00:36:46.960 --> 00:36:47.920
There's a theory, right?
00:36:48.079 --> 00:36:58.159
If you create something that is an essential facility that a competitor simply cannot compete without access to, it might make sense to mandate some access to that.
00:36:58.559 --> 00:37:03.119
That's uh and that's been used here, that's been trotted out here, but that's not really what these companies are.
00:37:03.360 --> 00:37:07.199
But in any case, that's not the basis of ICOA, and that's not the basis of your argument.
00:37:07.360 --> 00:37:20.880
Your argument is not that this is an essential facility that they they which has certain standards for how you you sort of you know assess what's what kind of uh uh requirements it that imposes, et cetera, et cetera.
00:37:21.119 --> 00:37:27.599
But but and I I don't and let
me be very clear, these are not essential facilities in my mind, although we probably disagree on that.
00:37:27.920 --> 00:37:51.199
But in any case, my point is that you would impose these restrictions on on uh platforms, whether they are uh proven to be essential facilities or not, and that assumes that they owe something, that they don't actually get to control the product that they create, um, weirdly, simply because they have actually opened it up to third parties.
00:37:51.440 --> 00:38:00.480
The irony is that if you produce a completely closed product that a third party has absolutely no access to, none of these rules apply at all.
00:38:00.719 --> 00:38:02.239
We don't do anything about that.
00:38:02.400 --> 00:38:17.679
If Apple stayed of the walled garden that it's often claimed to be, even though it's not a walled garden at all, if it didn't allow any other headphones to connect, if the only headphones you could use on Apple were its headphones, there would be no uh problem here.
00:38:17.840 --> 00:38:20.880
There would be no antitrust problem, there would be no iCoA problem.
00:38:21.119 --> 00:38:22.960
Now, Apple might have a problem.
00:38:23.199 --> 00:38:25.119
This is this is what makes it interesting.
00:38:25.440 --> 00:38:33.760
Apple doesn't do that precisely because their product is more valuable if they allow third-party headphones to interact with their platform.
00:38:34.000 --> 00:38:36.320
I know that because that's what they do.
00:38:36.559 --> 00:38:40.719
If it weren't more valuable, they would only allow their own headphones to interact.
00:38:40.880 --> 00:38:49.039
Just the same way, by the way, before you you think that's crazy, only Apple's screens are allowed to operate on Apple devices.
00:38:49.199 --> 00:38:57.280
They come with a screen pre-installed, and if you want a different manufacturer's screen on your iPhone, it's a massive headache.
00:38:57.440 --> 00:38:58.239
You can't really do it.
00:38:58.320 --> 00:39:00.239
You basically have to have Apple Screen.
00:39:00.400 --> 00:39:03.440
We're all okay with that because it just seems logical.
00:39:03.519 --> 00:39:04.079
It makes sense.
00:39:04.159 --> 00:39:05.440
That's how you sell a phone.
00:39:05.519 --> 00:39:06.960
You wouldn't sell a phone without a screen.
00:39:07.039 --> 00:39:07.920
You put a screen on it.
00:39:08.079 --> 00:39:08.719
Of course, it's okay.
00:39:08.800 --> 00:39:11.199
Of course, they're gonna pick their screen.
00:39:11.440 --> 00:39:14.719
Uh there's no reason the same couldn't be true of headphones.
00:39:15.440 --> 00:39:18.239
I'm glad to hear that you believe in the essential facilities doctrine.
00:39:18.400 --> 00:39:18.960
That's good to know.
00:39:19.039 --> 00:39:20.559
I was skeptical that you did.
00:39:20.639 --> 00:39:31.679
Um, I think one of the things that's missing are how these bills work, and the whole point of what's called a systemically important platform now is that it's basically a proxy
for you or an essential facility.
00:39:31.840 --> 00:39:40.639
And when I wrote the bill back in 2020, the first three paragraphs were meant to be the essential facilities doctrine for digital markets.
00:39:40.719 --> 00:39:42.000
Like that was the intent of the bill.
00:39:42.159 --> 00:39:43.519
Um but I appreciate your point.
00:39:44.000 --> 00:39:46.400
You can't just say that and and make it be true, right?
00:39:46.480 --> 00:39:47.440
Like, why do you think they're not gonna be able to do
00:39:48.559 --> 00:39:48.639
that
00:39:48.639 --> 00:39:48.880
fuller?
00:39:49.119 --> 00:39:49.199
You
00:39:49.199 --> 00:39:53.280
can create proxies for market power, but I do want to respond to another one of your points.
00:39:53.599 --> 00:40:00.079
Um, so you started out by noting that the common law system works and that we wouldn't throw it out just because times are complicated.
00:40:00.320 --> 00:40:03.840
Um, and and there are a couple of strawmen arguments here that I want to respond to.
00:40:04.000 --> 00:40:08.800
So nothing about the bill replaces common law case-by-case adjudication.
00:40:09.039 --> 00:40:28.880
The whole point of the bill is to make a determination by Congress in the same way that Congress determined that we should have an economy that is open and competitive by passing the Sherman Act in the first place, that there's certain conduct that when employed by a firm that is dominant is presumptively illegal, it's presumably anti-competitive.
00:40:28.960 --> 00:40:30.880
I've done that with drug price competition bills.
00:40:30.960 --> 00:40:33.360
So the CREATES Act is one that we worked on.
00:40:33.519 --> 00:40:39.920
People told us it was going to end innovation, that it was going to make uh you know medicine less safe and people more sick.
00:40:40.000 --> 00:40:43.280
And it turns out that the craziest thing happened after Congress passed it.
00:40:43.519 --> 00:40:46.159
The company that was engaging in the illegal behavior stopped.
00:40:46.320 --> 00:40:46.480
Right.
00:40:46.639 --> 00:40:55.760
And that's that's by the way, like common law uh-based uh system too, where you pass a law and it's enforced on a case-by-case basis through a body of precedent.
00:40:55.920 --> 00:41:00.000
Um I I will skip up to your AI point because I do think we should go back and forth on this.
00:41:00.400 --> 00:41:02.159
Well, can I just can I just make a point?
00:41:02.639 --> 00:41:04.400
Yeah, especially a point of agreement, really.
00:41:04.480 --> 00:41:08.400
Like I I I I I agree, you know, Congress is free to make stupid laws.
00:41:08.480 --> 00:41:09.199
They do it all the time.
00:41:09.360 --> 00:41:17.280
Like that's I mean, you're totally right that that like there's nothing anti-democratic about writing and passing this law.
00:41:17.440 --> 00:41:21.760
Um, what I mean, but that isn't that isn't enough of an answer to me.
00:41:21.840 --> 00:41:27.280
I mean, I I think it's incumbent on us to debate whether Congress should enact this law or not.
00:41:27.440 --> 00:41:28.159
But you're right.
00:41:28.320 --> 00:41:39.199
If for non-competition reasons, if because they want to, you know, whether Yelp wants it or not, Congress wants to help Yelp at consumers' expense, Congress is free to do that.
00:41:39.519 --> 00:41:47.840
My argument was that they shouldn't do that, and that that they don't have a competition, a strong competition basis for writing this bill.
00:41:48.000 --> 00:41:50.559
But that doesn't mean that they're not allowed to do it.
00:41:51.199 --> 00:41:51.679
Fair enough.
00:41:51.760 --> 00:41:52.239
Fair enough.
00:41:52.320 --> 00:42:01.280
Um, I was gonna get into AI uh briefly, and I will say that we are in this really interesting competitive moment that's like, you know, once in a generation.
00:42:01.440 --> 00:42:04.800
I was I was in high school, I was like an AOL kid.
00:42:04.880 --> 00:42:09.440
So like I wouldn't have thought about antitrust during the first you know wave of one point 1.0.
00:42:09.599 --> 00:42:12.000
And it's fascinating to watch how competition plays out.
00:42:12.159 --> 00:42:19.280
One of the ways I think of ICOA and AI, going back to this idea of gatekeeper power, I know that you don't believe in gatekeeper power, I do.
00:42:19.519 --> 00:42:23.920
Um, is you have the ability to suppress agents, right?
00:42:24.000 --> 00:42:32.480
We're in an era of agentic warfare where people want agents to do things for them, and other platforms don't want that, right?
00:42:32.639 --> 00:42:36.960
They don't want a buying agent on Amazon, I mean for security purposes, you know.
00:42:37.599 --> 00:42:46.159
Um but that that is essentially a different take on the same fact pattern, which is you know, I want to do this uh on this platform.
00:42:46.320 --> 00:42:47.599
Here's how I want to do it.
00:42:47.760 --> 00:42:52.320
And the platform senses a competitive threat and it sort of shuts the whole ecosystem down.
00:42:52.559 --> 00:42:56.159
But what we really should be talking about is how competition presents itself, right?
00:42:56.320 --> 00:43:08.880
And here, um, the way these dominant firms are presenting to the rest of the market is this issue of like telling consumers, no, you can only use that feature if you're using it on my devices and my products.
00:43:09.039 --> 00:43:11.119
And I just don't see how that's welfare enhancing.
00:43:11.199 --> 00:43:24.719
I don't see how people who really care about the consumer welfare standard can then say, no, they built it, they can lock it down, particularly when they induce, they induce other businesses to use the platform.
00:43:24.880 --> 00:43:26.079
There is an app for that.
00:43:26.239 --> 00:43:28.559
That was the whole point of the app store.
00:43:28.719 --> 00:43:35.280
Um, and there were many companies that received um deals from Apple to come to the platform, and it was a huge deal.
00:43:35.440 --> 00:43:49.119
I remember the
event when I think it was Rupert Murdoch said he was developing a Wall Street Journal app for the iPad, and Steve Jobs like celebrated it, and now they're charging 30% commission just because they can and degrading certain platform features, et cetera.
00:43:49.199 --> 00:43:54.239
I don't want to make this all about Apple, again, a very innovative company, and I use basically all of their products.
00:43:54.320 --> 00:43:59.760
But that doesn't, that doesn't, you know, hide the fact that you know we really want to have um an economy.
00:44:00.239 --> 00:44:07.280
Where we have the dynamic competition that you say exists, where we have leapfrogging companies that are always coming out with new products and services.
00:44:07.440 --> 00:44:11.280
And they really can't do that if they have to innovate around market power.
00:44:11.360 --> 00:44:16.320
And again, it's not this issue of market power in its own sake and that comes from innovation.
00:44:16.480 --> 00:44:18.159
It's about the abuse of market power.
00:44:18.239 --> 00:44:23.440
It's about not just controlling your own products, but controlling what everybody else can bring to market at the end of the day.
00:44:24.239 --> 00:44:28.559
Again, you're not you're not wrong because it's not the full story, I guess.
00:44:28.800 --> 00:44:41.440
By the way, going making the point about um about Apple inviting other people to, you know, to to uh complimenters to produce apps and that that increases the value of their product.
00:44:41.519 --> 00:44:49.199
This is why I love debating with Slade, because that I've been waiting for whenever I make this point, I've been waiting for someone to point out exactly that.
00:44:49.440 --> 00:44:53.039
You're very you're thank you for finally you know reaching that point.
00:44:53.119 --> 00:44:54.880
Uh um people forget.
00:44:55.039 --> 00:45:09.599
Like when I say uh um, you know, uh Apple could just as likely have a closed system, they happen to have an open system, it's not that they happen to have an open system, it's that they think they benefit from having a more open system.
00:45:09.920 --> 00:45:12.719
They invite other companies to use that system.
00:45:12.880 --> 00:45:14.559
And then here's where we disagree.
00:45:14.800 --> 00:45:18.320
And this is why I'm glad we're having this conversation and not a different one.
00:45:18.480 --> 00:45:26.880
So everyone should definitely listen to this and and be glad that they're getting a real you know, down and dirty conversation of the sort they won't usually get.
00:45:27.280 --> 00:45:36.239
The question is um is uh um how much it's not do they owe anything at all.
00:45:36.320 --> 00:45:42.559
It's sort of how much does Apple owe to the companies that it's invited to use its platform?
00:45:42.880 --> 00:45:54.320
And uh the reason I think this is important uh discussion to have is that just as I said, the answer is not an infinite amount, or even the amount ICOA says it is, it's also probably not zero.
00:45:54.639 --> 00:45:58.159
The problem is somewhere between uh zero and infinite.
00:45:58.400 --> 00:46:00.960
You know, the problem is what's the line from when Harry Matsali?
00:46:01.119 --> 00:46:02.960
It's between you know two minutes and all night.
00:46:03.199 --> 00:46:04.559
That's the that's the problem.
00:46:04.800 --> 00:46:07.119
The question is, where do we draw that line?
00:46:07.360 --> 00:46:31.920
And and this is goes back to the uncertainty that we don't know in antitrust, and that why I think it's problematic to prescribe certain outcomes and or even to uh uh set presumptions that are effectively extraordinarily difficult to um counteract on the basis of a kind of, I don't know, sort of aesthetic preference.
00:46:32.400 --> 00:46:44.400
If there were strong economic evidence that this sort of approach would lead to greater competition and greater value for consumers, I would I would feel very differently about where we are.
00:46:44.559 --> 00:46:51.039
I don't know that I would uh approve it because there are there are structural institutional problems with it, but I do think it would be different.
00:46:51.199 --> 00:46:56.960
Instead, we have these we have this kind of, you know, we we have we have slogans.
00:46:57.039 --> 00:47:09.199
We have we have um Elizabeth Warren saying, you know, you can't be a player and the umpire at the same time, as if that proves that we need these kinds of rules to, you know, to sort of break open these ecosystems.
00:47:09.440 --> 00:47:10.400
It doesn't prove that.
00:47:10.719 --> 00:47:21.119
It proves that there could be a level at which there is uh uh uh an extent of control that it would be better for the world if we we sort of broke into that.
00:47:21.599 --> 00:47:27.280
But uh some of that control is necessary to induce these firms to make the investments in the first place.
00:47:27.519 --> 00:47:33.119
Some of that control is necessary to how they design their very complicated platforms.
00:47:33.280 --> 00:47:49.519
In some cases, you call it abuse, and sometimes it might be, I don't know, but but some of the things that you call abuse may be a perfectly appropriate platform decision to subsidize certain parts of the platform by closing off other parts of the platform.
00:47:49.760 --> 00:48:18.000
There is no you can't say presumptively that uh Apple's decision not to allow third-party headphones to have quite the same amount of uh connectivity that it has is bad for consumers because it may mean, and they they may very well assume it means more people will buy more of their headphones, and the revenue they get from the more headphones lets them keep some other aspect of the platform completely free and open to third parties.
00:48:18.400 --> 00:48:32.559
And uh the reality is that that these platforms are very complicated, and uh that these companies are managing these trade-offs all the time at lots of different levels, almost constantly.
00:48:32.960 --> 00:48:43.920
And I will totally concede that some of those could be being done for anti-competitive purposes, and also you have to concede that some of them are not, and that it's often very hard to know the difference.
00:48:44.239 --> 00:48:45.920
Yeah, I'll make two points.
00:48:46.159 --> 00:48:52.639
Um, so Jeff has said a few times now that Apple is in a wolf garden and it has an open uh system.
00:48:52.800 --> 00:48:59.920
And the funny thing was during that uh during this debate, I tried to download the Jeff Manny app outside the App Store, and it's not working for some reason.
00:49:00.000 --> 00:49:03.119
And I'm wondering if the open system is just not working for me.
00:49:03.280 --> 00:49:03.679
He also said
00:49:04.719 --> 00:49:06.159
not fully open, but it's open.
00:49:06.239 --> 00:49:09.119
I mean it's uh I tried
00:49:09.280 --> 00:49:11.760
the funny thing was I downloaded on my MacBook and it worked there.
00:49:11.840 --> 00:49:12.719
So maybe there's just a piece
00:49:12.719 --> 00:49:12.719
of the
00:49:12.960 --> 00:49:13.119
What's
00:49:13.119 --> 00:49:14.079
the Jeff Manny app?
00:49:14.559 --> 00:49:18.480
Uh it's it's the best content you can get about libertarian economics on the side of the
00:49:18.480 --> 00:49:18.480
phone.
00:49:20.239 --> 00:49:28.400
So you also said that extracting monopoly rents from AirPods allows them to offer other services for free.
00:49:28.719 --> 00:49:29.280
I said it could.
00:49:29.760 --> 00:49:34.559
As I mentioned, this company is addicted to monopoly rents, and I it's the first time I've heard that argument.
00:49:34.719 --> 00:49:46.159
I think it's very generous for a company with a market cap of$4.96 trillion to subsidize other products through its monopoly rents through AirPods, which are probably a Fortune 100 company on themselves.
00:49:46.480 --> 00:50:06.719
No, the only other point I was gonna make, and I don't want to make this too much about one company, so it's good to switch gears, um, is uh this issue about government bureaucracies knowing best that there's an inherent choice in legislation, you know, stupid or smart, that you know, um companies don't know how to, you know, run their businesses and the government knows better.
00:50:06.960 --> 00:50:12.559
You know, the the reality is that there were multiple decades between the Microsoft case and the Google case.
00:50:12.719 --> 00:50:15.519
And that these cases come around very rarely.
00:50:15.599 --> 00:50:17.679
We've had a spate of them recently.
00:50:17.920 --> 00:50:37.039
Um but for the most part, like the big stick section two cases are rare, they're really hard to bring, they cost lots of money, they take years of investigations, and as we saw in Facebook litigation, um, you know, the company can just redesign its products during litigation, even on the eve of litigation on the eve of trials.
00:50:37.280 --> 00:50:40.079
Um and there's really not much an enforcer can do about
that.
00:50:40.239 --> 00:50:50.880
But one of the things that I think is really important to reiterate is that it's not like the FTC and DOJ um are are staffed by an expert, you know, lawyers and economists.
00:50:51.039 --> 00:50:58.559
They have their own lawyers, their own economists, some of them are the best in the world, and they have to convince a generalist court that the conduct is anti-competitive.
00:50:58.719 --> 00:51:11.360
Like nothing in ICOA or the Sherman Act says um no matter what, uh integrating your product uh you know, or or innovating or making new products and and services is illegal.
00:51:11.440 --> 00:51:19.199
And I know that's this this sort of against straw man argument about these bills, but I I think in a post-ICOA world, these cases are still going to take a long time.
00:51:19.360 --> 00:51:31.280
That's also why the bill in the newest version, which I think is really innovative, creates a fast-track litigation process so that you know people's children aren't in college by the time they see the outcome of litigation.
00:51:31.440 --> 00:51:32.320
Um I'll stop there though.
00:51:32.400 --> 00:51:33.920
So Evan, I know you wanted to jump in on that.
00:51:34.159 --> 00:51:34.239
Well,
00:51:34.320 --> 00:51:35.360
actually, that you read my mind.
00:51:35.440 --> 00:51:39.760
I wanted to ask Jeff this question because Jeff earlier you said let's not throw out the judicial system.
00:51:39.840 --> 00:51:40.800
I'm I'm paraphrasing.
00:51:40.880 --> 00:51:42.639
I know that's not exactly what you what you meant, but
00:51:43.039 --> 00:51:44.400
I said it because Slade said it.
00:51:44.559 --> 00:51:47.360
Well, it's not it's okay, so uh fair fair enough.
00:51:47.440 --> 00:51:49.280
But I want to ask you this question.
00:51:49.760 --> 00:51:54.559
One of the arguments against ICOA, and you made this argument, right, is that it it's it makes these presumptions, right?
00:51:54.639 --> 00:51:58.159
It makes these these regulations effectively about certain behavior.
00:51:58.400 --> 00:52:02.000
But in the bill, right, every case has to go to a federal judge, right?
00:52:02.159 --> 00:52:10.559
The the government still has to prove its case, not like even if certain behavior like self-preferencing, they still have to prove that it materially harms competition.
00:52:10.800 --> 00:52:21.920
You know, what is the what is the the huge risk here for companies if they have affirmative defenses for privacy security to prove that it's not harmonying competition, it's still going to litigation.
00:52:22.159 --> 00:52:24.639
Isn't this effectively guidelines for the court?
00:52:24.719 --> 00:52:26.320
It's not prescriptive regulation.
00:52:26.639 --> 00:52:27.599
Yeah, that's a great point.
00:52:27.760 --> 00:52:40.159
I mean, the the the the sort of Slade started this by by um saying, you know, we're gonna talk about these things and not necessarily get into the weeds.
00:52:40.480 --> 00:52:43.760
And um, and I'm sure everybody is grateful for that.
00:52:44.000 --> 00:52:47.039
But uh let me get into the weeds just briefly here.
00:52:47.280 --> 00:53:05.679
And that is to say, I I think, you know, uh you're right that that it's it is a it's a shorthand to say that the bill, you know, just creates substantive standards and and and presumptions, and that that it's really about um assigning fault liability uh ex ante.
00:53:06.079 --> 00:53:08.320
It's not, it has a lot more than that in it.
00:53:08.559 --> 00:53:25.440
And the real question about the value of the bill, as I've been sort of stressing, is taking the sum total of all of the effects that it would create, including possibly reducing the cost of litigation, but also possibly increasing the likelihood of getting it wrong, is it uh you know a net positive?
00:53:25.679 --> 00:53:34.000
But I think you're right to point out that unlike, say, the DMA, the bill does have um uh provisions for defenses.
00:53:34.239 --> 00:53:50.719
It took out from the earlier version that Slade wrote um the most important defense in the original version of the bill, it said if you make your product better, if the if the conduct is necessary to improve core functionality of your product, or I don't think it said necessary, I can't remember the language exactly.
00:53:50.800 --> 00:53:50.880
But
00:53:51.280 --> 00:53:55.679
it had like five five words, so it had to be, you know, nearly tailored recently.
00:53:56.079 --> 00:53:56.320
Exactly.
00:53:56.480 --> 00:54:00.559
But paraphrasing, paraphrasing, and you won't agree with the paraphrase, but it's kind of true.
00:54:00.639 --> 00:54:05.519
It's if this makes your product better, um, and show us that, and that's a valid defense.
00:54:05.679 --> 00:54:09.519
That should still be in the bill, and that would be a very, uh, a very valuable defense.
00:54:09.679 --> 00:54:14.639
But there are defenses, and there are different standards for um applying them.
00:54:14.880 --> 00:54:22.400
So I want to totally want to commend Evan for pointing out this bill is a lot more complicated than the sort of simple version of it.
00:54:22.480 --> 00:54:32.400
And there are a lot of things you could tweak that ultimately could get could change the calculus from it being, I think, a net negative to being a net positive.
00:54:32.639 --> 00:54:43.760
Now, I happen not to think that any of them that start with a presumption that this kind of conduct is bad is going to get us to the right point, but I could imagine it, and I think that would be worth having a discussion about.
00:54:44.000 --> 00:55:01.840
Because at the end of the day, the language that's been chosen is in fact chosen because of the vagaries of the legislative process, not because some you know uh infinitely wise economists and political scientists had determined this is the exact language that gets us the exact result we want.
00:55:02.079 --> 00:55:05.360
Let's be honest, we're seeing the sausage being made,
right?
00:55:05.519 --> 00:55:09.360
The language of, you know, material uh what it what's the language now?
00:55:09.599 --> 00:55:18.000
You have to show that it's a material harm, which means a reasonable chance of uh non-de minimis harm to the process of competition.
00:55:18.159 --> 00:55:24.239
Every single one of those words is a function of legislative horse trading, I assume.
00:55:24.400 --> 00:55:28.559
It's not a function of someone who did a calculus to figure out exactly what the right words were.
00:55:28.639 --> 00:55:32.239
And every one of them is going to be litigated, and who the hell knows what they actually mean.
00:55:32.480 --> 00:55:41.280
But they are new words that aren't part of the traditional antitrust process, which is to me is you know not where we should be going.
00:55:41.440 --> 00:55:44.559
We should be trying to sort of adapt the existing process.
00:55:44.880 --> 00:55:58.960
But at the end of the day, the question is going to be how do courts interpret all of those words so that companies can decide how likely it is, I mean, if this bill ever passed, and I think it's not ever gonna pass.
00:55:59.039 --> 00:56:01.280
So maybe we shouldn't have been bothering with the
00:56:01.840 --> 00:56:03.199
not with that attitude, Jeff.
00:56:03.440 --> 00:56:04.559
Exactly, exactly.
00:56:04.800 --> 00:56:07.840
Not with the rate at which sponsors keep dropping off of its slate.
00:56:07.920 --> 00:56:09.920
You gotta get more of those sponsors on there.
00:56:10.320 --> 00:56:25.119
But uh uh um leaving that aside, uh that's the the ultimate um, you know, judging of the bill is gonna come down to how exactly those sort of words are interpreted.
00:56:25.199 --> 00:56:32.480
Because it could be, but courts see all of these new words and they say, this is I mean, come on, let's just do what we did before.
00:56:32.639 --> 00:56:33.840
Let's just not really change anything.
00:56:34.159 --> 00:56:35.599
I I don't disagree with you at all.
00:56:35.760 --> 00:56:46.480
And it's funny on that last point about the definition of mere material harm to competition, like there are a lot of choices that policymakers make in these bills that are least worst options.
00:56:46.639 --> 00:56:54.480
And you know, using the word uh systemically important platform instead of market power is an exact example of that, it's tough.
00:56:54.719 --> 00:56:56.719
Um, I do it's funny.
00:56:56.880 --> 00:57:00.000
I looked up the House version that I wrote versus the Senate version.
00:57:00.159 --> 00:57:02.000
I can't take credit for the provision you liked.
00:57:02.079 --> 00:57:03.280
That was in the Senate text.
00:57:03.519 --> 00:57:19.119
Yeah, and and it's funny because usually if there is a criticism of ICOA, well, we can talk about that in a second, and I'm not in Congress anymore, but if there's a criticism of ICOA, you could usually go back to the House version, and it's like that may be true, right?
00:57:19.280 --> 00:57:36.719
It's like there are there are parts of the House version that we originally drafted that you know it's it it's like the the sort of opening salvo where it's the hardest-hitting version of a bill and gradually gets you know um softened over time, and what we're seeing with the current version is improvements in some areas.
00:57:36.880 --> 00:57:41.360
Um in particular, I like I like the the way that the process of the bill works now.
00:57:41.440 --> 00:57:47.360
I think that you know the Senate sponsors have done a lot of great work around the prohibitions in particular.
00:57:47.519 --> 00:57:57.039
Um I'm sorry that your favorite defense is no longer there, but um they do have you know this sort of meta defense around harm to competition.
00:57:57.360 --> 00:58:10.800
And again, if you can show that you know your product was uh innovative and increased output and consumers are better off for it, then that's not harm to competition by any traditional sense of the uh of of of the case laws.
00:58:11.119 --> 00:58:20.960
All right, so I want to move to uh closing, and I'm gonna throw some material at each of you that hopefully you can respond to in your closing since it's things that we didn't get to specific questions.
00:58:21.199 --> 00:58:28.239
And I think if I remember the order correctly, it's it's gonna be Jeff first and then Slade uh last because it's the reverse of the opener.
00:58:28.960 --> 00:58:45.119
So, Jeff, I think one of the things that someone listening to that they hear you on the unintended consequences, they hear you on the potential for something that may look bad, uh, that a company is doing, that that behind the scenes it's for a good purpose and maybe they're getting something subsidized.
00:58:45.280 --> 00:59:00.400
But if if you could in your closing maybe uh address this idea of why can't or why shouldn't Congress just identify something that seems bad, seems anti-consumer, and solve it when it when it seems obvious, right?
00:59:00.559 --> 00:59:03.119
Something like, why is my volume button not working, right?
00:59:03.199 --> 00:59:05.039
Why is my headphone not connecting well?
00:59:05.199 --> 00:59:12.960
Why is Amazon taking confidential information about a seller's product and then using it to copy it and then undercut them?
00:59:13.039 --> 00:59:18.639
And now a small business maybe is is put out of business because Amazon decided to sell a basic version of it.
00:59:18.719 --> 00:59:21.039
Like, why aren't those things just bad?
00:59:21.199 --> 00:59:26.239
And what is the downside of just saying those things are bad, let's make them not okay?
00:59:26.480 --> 00:59:31.360
And uh that doesn't have to be your whole closing statement, but just something I wanted to hear you respond to.
00:59:32.400 --> 00:59:46.159
If only the the really bad things were were well specified in the bill and that's all it made uh illegal or or made presumptibly bad, um, again, we would have be having a somewhat
different debate.
00:59:46.320 --> 00:59:49.840
Unfortunately, uh that would be like a waste, right?
00:59:49.920 --> 00:59:51.360
Why would you just specify one thing?
00:59:51.519 --> 01:00:01.599
What you do is you specify the kind of conduct, the sort of type of conduct that you think is problematic and you prohibit that or you make it uh, you know, uh uh you deter it.
01:00:01.920 --> 01:00:04.400
And that's where you get into problem.
01:00:04.480 --> 01:00:16.159
Because for every example you could uh uh produce, and I'm not saying I agree with your examples, but even if they were uh anti-competitive examples, the exact same dynamic leads to pro-competitive outcomes as well.
01:00:16.320 --> 01:00:29.679
And you just have to understand that if you're prohibiting the whole class of conduct, or if you're if you're deterring the whole class of conduct, you're you're uh deterring some of the pro-competitive conduct to capture some of the anti-competitive conduct.
01:00:29.840 --> 01:00:40.639
And the problem that I have is that the evidence of the existence of and harm of those anti-competitive examples you could uh you could assess are is virtually non-existent.
01:00:40.800 --> 01:00:51.199
There's a handful of examples, and you're talking about these companies that are that are massive multi-trillion dollar companies that have been around for 20 years, allegedly completely unchallenged for 20 years.
01:00:51.360 --> 01:00:59.360
And the best you can do is say they once copied a trunk organizer uh uh from someone.
01:00:59.519 --> 01:01:15.199
And and I mean obviously I'm minimizing it intentionally, but my but the point stands, I you know, the kinds you there is not like this this deep evidence of systemic harm that has been visited because of this sort of conduct.
01:01:15.360 --> 01:01:19.360
And in fact, simultaneously, there's lots of evidence of benefits from this sort of conduct.
01:01:19.519 --> 01:01:27.920
So so if you could be as specific as you as you suggest, Evan, I would I would say, sure, that's you know, that would make a lot more sense to me.
01:01:28.079 --> 01:01:32.480
You would at least have, you know, sort of some evidence that this is bad conduct and we should deter it.
01:01:32.559 --> 01:01:35.760
But I don't think you have that with the language in the bill that as we have it.
01:01:36.079 --> 01:01:50.079
Let me just say, sort of in closing, that along these lines, I guess, that that um uh you know trying to uh we're never going to know exactly this is the uncertainty point about antitrust.
01:01:50.159 --> 01:01:58.159
We're never going to know exactly um, you know, the optimal way to structure the antitrust system so that we get the optimal outcome.
01:01:58.559 --> 01:02:05.519
And I can't say with any more certainty than anyone else that the current system is optimal or even that ICOA is sub-optimal.
01:02:05.679 --> 01:02:09.440
But I have reasons to believe that ICOA is worse than the current system.
01:02:09.679 --> 01:02:14.079
But you do also have to look at everything we've gotten with the current system.
01:02:14.239 --> 01:02:20.719
And again, it's easy to sort of point to these alleged or sometimes quite clearly sort of harmful examples.
01:02:20.960 --> 01:02:36.079
Meanwhile, in an environment in which we're alleged to have had these power-hungry, venal um uh uh gatekeepers with no competitive check on their power, look at what they have built for us.
01:02:36.320 --> 01:02:43.760
I mean, just take a step back and look at the shit that they have given us and and marvel at it, I guess.
01:02:43.920 --> 01:02:53.760
And I of course the answer that everyone would should should make is well, but we don't know how much more we would have gotten if the competitive environment were different.
01:02:54.000 --> 01:02:54.800
That's fair.
01:02:55.039 --> 01:03:03.840
But in the meantime, what we do know is that the competitive environment was not so bad that we just got a bunch of crap from these companies.
01:03:04.000 --> 01:03:22.400
Actually, what we've gotten is tens, hundreds of billions of dollars of investment, risky, risky investment by these companies to produce products that have gotten only better and better and better, and that have given us massive amounts of joy and increased productivity.
01:03:22.559 --> 01:03:25.360
And yeah, also pornography and social media.
01:03:25.440 --> 01:03:28.639
So, you know, maybe it's a wash, I don't know, but people like that stuff.
01:03:28.800 --> 01:03:32.480
I mean, they're giving us, not give and when I say giving us, I don't mean for free.
01:03:32.559 --> 01:03:35.840
I mean they're providing for the world all of this great stuff.
01:03:36.000 --> 01:03:41.039
That doesn't prove by any stretch that they are absolutely, you know, they can do no wrong.
01:03:41.199 --> 01:03:48.400
But it does prove that you have a kind of a high hurdle to come to to say, these guys are terrible and we need to rein them in.
01:03:48.719 --> 01:03:52.480
So, Slade, in closing, Jeff got at some of this.
01:03:52.719 --> 01:03:56.559
But, you know, someone listening to this might say, what what problem are we trying to solve here, right?
01:03:56.639 --> 01:04:01.280
The real debate is about AI and like the future of the human race is what I'm seeing on TV.
01:04:01.440 --> 01:04:05.920
And these guys are debating like headphones and and you know, two-day shipping and maps, et cetera.
01:04:06.079 --> 01:04:08.800
They might just feel like this is kind of small potatoes.
01:04:08.960 --> 01:04:15.599
And uh, you know, one of Jeff's, I would say, allies in um in Antitrust World, Professor Hoven Camp at Penn, right?
01:04:15.679 --> 01:04:19.360
He points out e-commerce sales are growing all the time, right?
01:04:19.519 --> 01:04:29.840
They're uh like entry barriers are lower thanks to the internet and these platforms for businesses than they would otherwise be if they had to try to to to hack it and getting
into the Walmart shelf or the Costco shelf, right?
01:04:30.000 --> 01:04:32.639
Um these products are enormously popular, right?
01:04:32.719 --> 01:04:35.039
Hundreds of millions of Americans are using maps and prime.
01:04:35.199 --> 01:04:43.599
And and why would I support legislation that even has a small chance of disrupting two-day shipping or the functionality of my of my GPS app?
01:04:43.760 --> 01:04:47.280
You know, this all just seems kind of small potatoes in the grand scheme of things.
01:04:47.440 --> 01:04:51.039
So if you could uh respond to that sentiment in your closing.
01:04:51.519 --> 01:04:52.239
Yeah, I can.
01:04:52.400 --> 01:04:54.159
I I would just thank you as a moderator.
01:04:54.239 --> 01:04:58.719
I feel like you've more effectively made my argument for me in your posing question to Jack.
01:04:59.519 --> 01:05:00.480
I was gonna say the same thing.
01:05:00.559 --> 01:05:01.039
That was like my
01:05:01.840 --> 01:05:03.920
really affected closing question.
01:05:04.559 --> 01:05:07.679
Hopefully, I didn't uh you know, I should have disclosed up top, obviously.
01:05:07.760 --> 01:05:11.199
I I support the bill, DPI, but the sponsor of this podcast supports the bill.
01:05:11.280 --> 01:05:12.559
Hopefully, I was neutral.
01:05:13.280 --> 01:05:14.639
You were up until the very end.
01:05:14.960 --> 01:05:16.639
I was gonna say it's a revealed preference.
01:05:16.800 --> 01:05:17.840
That's very funny.
01:05:18.079 --> 01:05:28.400
Um, you know, it's funny, Senator uh Hart, when he was chair of the Citadrust subcommittee, once complained that the subcommittee was so conservative he would not have been able to pass the Sherman Act through it.
01:05:28.559 --> 01:05:38.400
And I fear that Jeff's standards for what would be pro-competitive legislation Congress could pass are similarly, similarly conservative and unlikely to happen.
01:05:38.639 --> 01:05:40.719
I I don't know if there's any bill that meets his test.
01:05:41.039 --> 01:05:52.719
But I will say this um on the why should we care question, um, and to your point, particularly the current events being what they are, aren't we just you know debating on you know sect terrorism and Titanic, whatever?
01:05:52.960 --> 01:06:03.679
Um I do think this stuff matters because you know when we think about competition and these bigger high-minded concepts like humanity, um, I don't think these are inherently intention.
01:06:03.760 --> 01:06:17.760
And I think that you know the backbone of the economic system that we are in is this idea that if you have the best idea, the best product, it should succeed, whether it's in the AI marketplace or in you know 20th century widgets or whatever.
01:06:18.000 --> 01:06:31.679
And I think this debate ultimately comes down to a pretty straightforward question, which is when a company controls an important gateway to customers and also competes against those businesses, how should that relationship exist?
01:06:31.840 --> 01:06:33.840
What rules should govern that relationship?
01:06:34.079 --> 01:06:40.880
And the concern around ICOA is not that successful companies like Jeff mentioned are too big, that we shouldn't marvel at innovation.
01:06:40.960 --> 01:06:42.639
And I frankly think more is more.
01:06:42.800 --> 01:06:52.880
We want more innovation, we want more popular services, and we don't want to break apart services that work that aren't inherently um pro-competitive, which we could just outlined a bunch that seem to be.
01:06:53.039 --> 01:07:02.159
The alternative world is really what matters, which is more competition does not mean a worse Google Maps, it does not mean a worse App Store or anything else.
01:07:02.320 --> 01:07:13.679
It means those companies have the economic incentive to keep improving their product, while other companies that want to be the next Google, next Apple, have the economic incentive to build the next great thing.
01:07:13.840 --> 01:07:25.440
Um and in that world, a worse product can still lose, and a better product can still have a meaningful opportunity to reach consumers because we've created a truly even playing field, which is the thing that Antitrust cares the most about.
01:07:25.679 --> 01:07:37.280
So, in terms of like, you know, a listener who's thinking, I'm reading about really scary things in the news, and you know, shouldn't we be talking about that instead of you know uh widgets and defaults and what have you?
01:07:37.519 --> 01:07:46.079
Um I would just say this like I I think that you know guardrails matter, and we should have a Congress that reacts to current events, which kind of don't.
01:07:46.239 --> 01:07:54.719
Um, and we should have a Congress that takes the time to investigate these issues, to develop expertise, um, staff that's really dedicated over multiple years.
01:07:54.800 --> 01:07:55.760
And we have that here.
01:07:55.920 --> 01:07:59.199
We have a legislative record that is 10 years long.
01:07:59.360 --> 01:08:02.639
We have a 4 to 50 page report, an investigation.
01:08:02.719 --> 01:08:04.800
We have litigations from federal enforcers.
01:08:04.960 --> 01:08:07.119
And so I think the time is right to act on these things.
01:08:07.199 --> 01:08:10.079
I don't think this is something where we need to recreate the wheel.
01:08:10.159 --> 01:08:13.920
I think Congress has the solutions it needs, you know, readily at hand.
01:08:14.559 --> 01:08:16.159
Thank you so much to both of you.
01:08:16.239 --> 01:08:18.800
Uh, I want to make sure that folks know where to find you.
01:08:18.960 --> 01:08:24.000
So Jeff Manny is the president and founder of ICLE, the International Center for Law and Economics.
01:08:24.159 --> 01:08:27.600
You can read all their great work at laweconcenter.org.
01:08:27.680 --> 01:08:32.880
And we recently had Dirk Auer on the show to talk about antitrust in the AI context, which was a great episode.
01:08:33.039 --> 01:08:37.920
Uh Slade Bond is at Cuneo, Gilbert, Flannery, and Laduca.
01:08:38.000 --> 01:08:39.840
That's cuneolaw.com.
01:08:39.920 --> 01:08:41.680
You can also follow him on LinkedIn and Twitter.
01:08:41.760 --> 01:08:45.039
He is not shy about writing about and talking about these topics.
01:08:45.359 --> 01:08:46.079
Really enjoy this.
01:08:46.159 --> 01:08:47.439
Thank you, gentlemen, both.
01:08:47.920 --> 01:08:48.159
Thank you.
01:08:48.479 --> 01:08:49.359
Thank you for finding
01:08:49.359 --> 01:08:53.199
this podcast in Apple Podcasts, YouTube, wherever you get your podcast, please leave us a review.
01:08:53.279 --> 01:08:54.319
It'll help others find the show.
01:08:54.399 --> 01:08:57.199
Shoot me an email at evan at corepointstrategies.com.
01:08:57.279 --> 01:09:01.039
The show is sponsored by Digital Progress Institute, produced by Vulgate Media.
01:09:01.359 --> 01:09:03.359
Otherwise, we'll catch you next time.