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In 2003, if you asked anyone in tech which social media platform would win, everyone would have said Friendstar.
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No one even really thought or considered Facebook.
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Given how it worked out both, that's even more savage.
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Right?
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Within four months of raising, he was basically ousted as CEO and told that he wasn't doing a good job.
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MySpace actually exploded massively, mostly with teenagers, initially musicians and creative kids, but it received over five million users within the first year alone.
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Do you remember Friendstar and MySpace?
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A little bit.
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A little bit.
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We probably weren't old enough to have it, really.
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More Facebook kids.
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Very much so.
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People often say being first to the market is a disadvantage, which is interesting because intuitively you would think that if you're first, you dress the gap and you develop a really cool product, you would win.
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But time and time and again, we see the first actually losing and the people who come after them winning.
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What are your thoughts on that?
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It's an interesting phenomena, and I think a lot of it comes down to acceptance.
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It's easier to accept something, a new product, a new idea, a new way of doing things when it has already been tried before, when it's less unfamiliar, like especially from an investment standpoint.
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If you've seen somebody do it before, now it doesn't feel as foreign, now you're more willing to put something behind it, and you can also see all the buzz that the last one generated.
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You can see all the all the opportunities and the product market fit that were there, and you can see people learning from those lessons.
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But if it's something that's truly brand new, it's really hard to convince people that it's worth doing because they have no reference point.
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Agreed, agreed.
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The second player to the market often has advantages, like you mentioned, about being able to copy what the first person did and make it better and avoid the mistakes, which is probably very costly for the first entrant to the market.
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Today we're actually going to dive into social media.
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So in 2003, if you asked anyone in tech which social media platform would win, everyone would have said Friendstar.
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No one even really thought or considered Facebook, which is fascinating, because Friendstar was not the first social media network to exist.
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The first was actually in 1997 and it was called Six Degrees.
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Have you heard of Six Degrees?
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I have.
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We have I actually did it until I did this research.
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But essentially, they built the first personal pages which linked you to your friends, and then you could kind of like list your friends in two various degrees of separations from each other.
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And it actually took off, but like only reached about 3.5 million users and actually got acquired in 1999 for$125 million.
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But the thing is, it sounds like it was on the rise, right?
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They closed down in 2001, two years before Friendstar.
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Why?
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Because high-spin internet adoption was not a thing.
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So at that time, internet was still up and coming, it wasn't as widespread as it is now, so they just didn't have the user base for it to grow.
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Yeah, that makes a lot of sense.
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And I think it's it's a common trend that you'll find solutions to problems that are ahead of their time that really struggle to find their place, even though if they just done it a few years later, they'd be a completely different game.
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Timing is a bitch sometimes.
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You could be right in every single way, you could do the right things, but timing and luck, yeah, is another thing.
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Absolutely.
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So in San Francisco in 2002, basically a year after Six Degrees failed, Jonathan Abrams, who is a Canadian programmer, was working in the Silicon Valley and was working at Netscape, who which was one of the first OG web browser companies.
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And so Netscape was really, really cool.
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If you worked in Netscape, you were like the top dog, but basically.
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And he had this idea of really wanting a social network, but from a dating perspective, because he thought how cool would it be to date people and be able to see their networks and their connections.
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And so he built Friendstar and he got the name Friendstar from Friend plus Napster, which is not that um original.
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And it honestly took off quite quickly.
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So he shared it with his immediate friends, and people just started, started um really piling on.
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And he really wanted to create something different because at that time the internet was filled with people who were very anonymous.
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So you really didn't know who you
Load full transcript
were speaking to or interacting on the internet, and he really wanted to bring that to the forefront more.
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And like I said, it really surprised him.
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I will get you to read quote number one from Jonathan himself.
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He was telling his friends about the early days of Friendstar.
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Yeah, and and when he was recalling it, um, the users were doing all the things I'd hoped they would do, and I was just watching it kind of in shock that it was working.
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Super interesting.
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Yeah.
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So it was, yeah, it was a surprise to him too.
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He really went into it with very little hope.
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And it's worth noting that in the early stages, Mark Zuckerberg was actually also registered in Friendstar.
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Really?
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He was an early-ish user.
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He kind of logged on apparently with his friend, played around with him, was like, oh, this looks a bit messy, like not sure about this, and kind of went on with his day.
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So research says.
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However, Friendstar continued to grow a lot.
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By mid-2002, while it was still a prototype, he actually got angel investor money.
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So he raised in his first round about$115,000.
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And then by 2003, he raised a million dollars from a lot of really big top dogs.
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So he raised money from Peter Thiel, who was a future PayPal founder, and also Reid Hoffman, who then went on to found LinkedIn.
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How fascinating.
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Yeah.
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And there was just so much buzz because a lot of people were just jumping on.
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And it got to the point where he actually appeared on Jimmy Kimmel.
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And this was really profound because Silicon Valley was not as cool as it is now.
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Tech boros were just in their own bubble doing their own thing.
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And so for one of them to be on Jimmy Kimball, which was a huge, huge show, was massive.
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And it really, really propelled Friendstar even more.
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And it's funny because Friendster was still a dating site app at this point.
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Apparently, he handed out condoms to people in the studio along that theme.
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Look, you always gotta be safe.
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This makes sense.
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So yeah, he was that's a very ballsy thing.
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Um, and interestingly, after the whole Jimmy Kimball appearance, Google offered him$30 million in Google stock to buy Friendstar.
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And the interesting thing is 30 million at the time to him sounded really small.
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But if you think about where Google now, that 30 million would have been worth, you know, billions of dollars now.
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But at the time he rejected it because he thought in his own right, Friendstar is probably going to be worth a billion dollars one day.
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I'm not gonna accept$30 million in stock for it.
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And so instead he raised a round from some VC investors and he managed to raise about$53 million in valuation from Kleiner Perkins and Benchmark, which are some of the biggest VC firms in America.
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And it sounds like his rounds were very, very competitive.
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Everyone wanted a piece of friend star, it was the buzz, and it grew really quickly.
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It's really impressive given the timing, too, right?
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It's like around the dot.com crash.
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It's not a good period to be trying to pitch yourself as a tech company.
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Um, and you're right, like Silicon Valley didn't have the reputation it has now back then.
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And so it's so interesting to hear someone turn down an offer from Google, but then raise such a large round still.
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I yeah, I what happened next?
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Well, I'm glad you asked.
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Basically, it just skyrocketed and it reached 835,000 users by June in the same year.
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So this is still 2003, and by fall of the same year, it became 3 million.
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So from 800,000 to 3 million in a couple of months.
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And so people honestly started using Friends to like a verb.
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Like it just became more now, um, I don't know, LinkedIn or Instagram, like it was just a common day language being used.
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And the interesting thing is a lot of celebrities were hopping on to it because we weren't on Friendstar, um, it seems like it was really cool to be friends with a lot of people.
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So it became a bit of like a brag's ride of like, oh, I've got like this many connections, etc., on Friendstar.
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But unfortunately, as the site got flooded, the tech could not handle the volume of users it had.
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And if you think back to what Abrams was trying to build, he he was so focused on the social graph.
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That to him was the core point of Friendstar.
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And so when you actually clicked on the page, it loaded everyone you were connected with in
terms of the three degrees of separation.
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So it he really, really wanted to make it visible of like, oh, Ryan, this is Ryan's page, these are his friends, and then these are the three to six degrees of separation between you and Ryan.
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But the unfortunate thing is back then computing was very expensive and slow.
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And they had more and more users coming on in the millions, and it meant that every time someone was clicking and trying to load their map, their network map, it got to a point where it would take 40 seconds for just one page to load.
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You can imagine how slow and frustrating that would have been.
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Nobody understands how long 40 seconds is, not anymore.
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Not anymore.
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We yeah, we're very sport for we have no patience.
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Yeah.
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Um, and this actually comes to a point that's really important to emphasize.
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People in tech often talk about scaling and technical debt, and I just want to explain what that actually means because everyone talks about how important it is to grow and to scale and to 10x everything, but the tech sometimes cannot handle that, which is what happened with Friendstar.
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The issue is when you rack up users' growth and user interactions with your website, which is really, really good.
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The tragedy is if you don't have that underlying technical solution to ensure that it operates, it it's really tough.
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But unfortunately, in reality, as we both know, you like spend heaps of marketing and like getting a buzz, but then you then have to like make money to then spend money in improving the system.
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And finding that balance is often really, really hard.
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Yeah, absolutely.
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And like it's easy coming from a dev background to see tech debt and think of it as a must-fix and be very obsessed with it.
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And it's very easy to also talk with management or people who aren't seeing it every day and have it dismissed.
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But part of the issue I imagine Friendster was having is that it's so early on, it's such a huge scale of something.
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Like what Google's very young at that point, too.
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There's not many sites that can even compare to the kind of traffic or adoption they're having.
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There isn't a precedent for scaling something like that, not at that time, not in the same way.
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And so your ability to understand how much that scale is going to have an impact on what your business is trying to do is just not there.
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Like you're going to find it out the hard way.
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You're a thousand percent right.
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And his internal engineers were telling him to slow down in growth, you know, we need to focus on the tech side, and he refused.
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They even suggested why don't we just pause showing the degrees of separation and just focus on the app side?
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So it eventually became a social media website and not just a dating website.
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But he said that no, the six degrees of separation, having that that network map was the most important part of the app.
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And so there was that internal friction.
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Um, and he just refused to budge on that, which was the biggest, I guess, um, computing power halt in terms of it performing properly.
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And as you can imagine, people became increasingly and increasingly frustrated by this.
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I will actually get you to read number three.
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Jim Scheinman, a former Friendstar executive, years later, was saying, uh, I remember coming into the office for months reading thousands of customer service emails telling us that if we didn't get our site working better soon, they'd be forced to join a new social networking site that had just launched called MySpace.
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Ouch.
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Given how it worked out for both of them, that's even more savage.
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Right?
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Can you imagine your customers being like, if you don't fix this, we're going to your competitor?
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I mean, yeah.
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Yeah, I can eventually.
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It's it's pretty common.
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I feel like customers are very it's something that gets invoked a lot as a way of of trying to regain some control over the situation that you're faced with.
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And, you know, in Australia, we're pretty lucky.
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We have a lot more control actually over what businesses do and a lot more support to make sure they're doing the right thing to look after people who've bought their products.
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But like, what was what was the method that he was making money in this circumstance?
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Like, how was this a paid service through Friendster?
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Was it free with ads?
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Like, like what what are the customers even suggesting beyond I would rather be on my space right now?
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Which, while a savage burn is only more savage in in the year we're living in than it was back then.
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Very, very good points and questions, which we'll
dive into.
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Yes.
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But it's worth noting that at this time, especially after Abrams raised a lot of money, he brought on a heavy duty board and also executives.
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And so it's funny, within four one well, not funny for him, but essentially within four months of raising, he was basically ousted as the CEO and he was made into the chair as a formal title and basically told that he wasn't doing a good job in terms of how he was managing things.
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And so eventually, Tim Kugel, who was the former CEO of Yahoo, took over.
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But unfortunately, within like three years, they went through three to four different CEOs.
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The board was very, they weren't really on the same page in terms of the focus of Friendsar.
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And if you like you said, um, this was a new and uncharted terrain.
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So Google was still a baby.
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We didn't really have any examples to draw on to in terms of how to make something like this work and how people being connected across the world could have could effectively be monetized and b could scale with the existing technology in place.
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And so unfortunately, his vision for where things wanted to go was very, very different to what the board wanted and was very different to what the executive wanted.
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And there was a lot of infighting, and this is a rabbit hole we can go down.
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There's a lot of interesting stories and anecdotes of what happened, and so yeah, he was voted out uh from his CEO position and became chair in 2000 at the end of 2003, but actually by 2005, he was completely voted out of the company as a whole.
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I'll get you to read number four.
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I did what you've always told to do as a young entrepreneur.
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I bought on experienced investors to help friends to fulfill its potential, but the all-star team was the curse of death.
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Ouch.
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Yeah, and it I feel like, at least from my experience too, there's there is a tension between what investors are pitched as and what investors actually do.
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What they've actually done is fund your business.
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And while that is not a small thing to do, it's not the same as being an expert across all sorts of fields, especially when you're working with pioneering tech, pioneering products.
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You that transferable experience often can be what leaves it behind.
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And we still see the same issue today where a lot of early founders will be placed into decorative, if not removed entirely, from businesses that they've scaled
because traditional methods of managing a business are seen to be superior and to solve whatever future problem that investors have put into the business.
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And so it this is a story that we've seen time and time again.
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Exactly right.
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And unfortunately, it's also just part of maturing as a company in the sense of you start off as the founder, you have the direction, you have the vision, you have the goals, but as your equity gets diluted, and we can explain what that means later on, you lose control over it.
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And you have, in his case, he had many, many big loud voices in the room.
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And on one hand, he thought, oh wow, like this is really exciting, everyone wants to play.
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I'm gonna bring the strongest, most you know, experienced people on the board.
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But unfortunately, they had their own, in some ways, maybe outdated mindset because this was a really new and uncharted terrain.
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And so it's always tough, I guess, deciding who you bring on.
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But unfortunately, it sounds like there are a few bad decisions or combinations there.
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Yeah, and it it is really challenging trying to work out who's gonna be in your corner and how to advocate and to retain control as a founder.
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Like it doesn't take much to end up in a position where you no longer have majority control in some capacity.
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And it's not just about voting power, a lot of the time it'll be personality, force of will, and similar sorts of things.
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And that that can all be an incredibly difficult thing, both as just a general adjustment as a founder, but also as an actual like impact on the business.
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Like it's just so much harder to work when the direction is not unified anymore.
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Agreed, agreed.
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Before we dive into MySpace, I thought it would be worth us clarifying what the hell network effects actually means.
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So essentially, I think of it as a product that becomes more useful the more people use it.
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As an example, imagine if in the entire world you're the only one with a mobile telephone.
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That would be incredibly useless because what would you use it for?
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Who would you communicate with?
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But then imagine a second person, me, I get a mobile phone, we can communicate together, and then the third, the fourth, the fifth, over time it becomes more and more useful the more people kind of sign on and have that product.
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And that's essentially what network effect is, and
which was the really cool thing about what Frenzer was achieving, because they were able to grow at scale and reach millions and millions of users, not just in the US but internationally, which becomes a pitfall.
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We'll get into that.
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Um, that the the usefulness of it really, really increased.
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Did you know the meaning of network effects?
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I did actually, but that that's mostly because it turns out you can apply it in a lot of circumstances, including maggots, but that's a maggots.
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We always come back to maggots.
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So it brings us to my space.
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I'm gonna take us slightly back to 2003.
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In Beverly Hills, there were two guys, being Chris DeWolf and Tom Anderson, who were watching Friends start to struggle.
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So they watched the buzz, they watched the big round razors, they watched the sky rocketing, and then they watched that it became really glitchy and slow, and people were becoming increasingly, increasingly frustrated.
00:18:02.960 --> 00:18:12.240
And so Friendsar was built with a very set and in some ways monotone way in terms of its look and its feel and how people interacted with it.
00:18:12.400 --> 00:18:21.680
And Chris and Tom essentially decided that way, like this is way too rigid, especially because Abrams was not willing to adapt the to the website or the platform at all.
00:18:21.839 --> 00:18:27.279
He was quite set about what he wanted, and so they thought, let's take this and make it even better.
00:18:27.599 --> 00:18:34.079
And they essentially removed the rigidness of Frenzer and they delivered MySpace.
00:18:34.160 --> 00:18:46.240
So the cool thing about MySpace was it let people put music on it, it had no set format, so people actually got to quote unquote code their own MySpace and really personalize their page for them.
00:18:46.640 --> 00:19:05.599
Um, and it was also really interesting because you had teenagers on there, there was no age restrictions, by the way, all the way to like older people, and a lot of musicians like Adele and also um Calvin Harris got their big break on MySpace because it was a platform that wasn't just only for like dating or connection.
00:19:05.839 --> 00:19:09.440
People could really be creative and put their creative assets into it.
00:19:09.599 --> 00:19:10.240
Did you know that?
00:19:10.480 --> 00:19:11.200
No, I did not.
00:19:11.279 --> 00:19:14.880
I did not know about Calvin Harris's origins being on MySpace.
00:19:15.519 --> 00:19:16.880
Exactly, exactly.
00:19:17.039 --> 00:19:28.079
And so MySpace actually exploded massively, mostly with teenagers initially, musicians and creative kids, but it received over five million users within the first year alone.
00:19:28.480 --> 00:19:29.839
That's insane.
00:19:30.160 --> 00:19:30.640
Right?
00:19:30.880 --> 00:19:31.359
Right?
00:19:31.599 --> 00:19:34.319
That's like a ridiculous amount of adoption for sure.
00:19:34.640 --> 00:19:35.359
Insane.
00:19:36.079 --> 00:19:43.839
And unfortunately, as Friends continued to poorly perform and the website was not improving, people will then leave Friendstar and join MySpace.
00:19:44.000 --> 00:19:52.480
So, in a way, like Friendstar was already training people in terms of using a social media platform and then just handing them off to MySpace rip.
00:19:52.799 --> 00:20:05.359
Yeah, it's like it it built the foundations for people to expect something from a social network, to create a network that went beyond just phone calls and address books and that Yellow Pages book that you have buried in your drawer somewhere.
00:20:06.319 --> 00:20:20.240
Yeah, it built all of that, but then somebody else capitalized on what MySpace on sorry on what Friendster wasn't doing by just trying to make it more about the people who want to use it rather than a specific tool for a very specific purpose.
00:20:20.480 --> 00:20:20.799
Yeah.
00:20:20.960 --> 00:20:30.720
And unfortunately for Friendstar, they just weren't listening to user feedback because a lot of the things on MySpace imposed and really made better, um, they just ignored it.
00:20:30.880 --> 00:20:40.400
So it goes to show that you really need to stay in touch with uh user feedback and ensuring that whatever you have is still a really good product market fit for what you're designing.
00:20:40.640 --> 00:20:44.400
But Myspace didn't just like pass Friends, it actually skyrocketed.
00:20:44.559 --> 00:20:50.319
It became the most visited social media website by 2005, which is crazy.
00:20:50.640 --> 00:20:57.359
And it also passed Google as the all-time visited site on the world in that same year in the United States.
00:20:57.440 --> 00:21:02.000
And at its peak, it had 75 million users, which is absolutely crazy.
00:21:02.319 --> 00:21:03.200
Especially for the time.
00:21:03.359 --> 00:21:08.559
That's a lot of people involved in an internet era where we did not even have gifts or meaning.
00:21:10.079 --> 00:21:13.519
Yeah, and they would have grown by mostly like word of mouth and things like that.
00:21:13.680 --> 00:21:16.640
Like you can just share or text people as easily as we can now.
00:21:17.039 --> 00:21:21.119
So you had to be really, really good to achieve that kind of viral growth.
00:21:21.359 --> 00:21:21.839
Absolutely.
00:21:22.160 --> 00:21:29.279
By 2005, Robert Murdoch bought MySpace for 580 million, which is really fascinating.
00:21:29.359 --> 00:21:36.480
So within two years, they built it, they scaled it insanely, and then exited at such a high valuation.
00:21:36.960 --> 00:21:37.599
It's crazy.
00:21:37.680 --> 00:21:42.880
Like you just don't get valuations like that, especially accounting for in inflation in that speed very often anymore.
00:21:43.039 --> 00:21:49.279
And I think a lot of
that goes to show just the barrier to entry for building things like that has changed completely.
00:21:49.440 --> 00:21:54.640
I mean, first of all, market is captured, it's a very difficult market to break into in the same way.
00:21:54.720 --> 00:21:59.680
But in the early days of the web, you took specialist skills.
00:22:00.240 --> 00:22:06.319
To make products like that, skills that you wouldn't easily access now, and AI obviously makes this even more so.
00:22:06.480 --> 00:22:10.480
It is the barrier to entry for building something like that is so much lower.
00:22:10.559 --> 00:22:16.480
And so the opportunities for skyrocketing evaluations like that are like few and far between.
00:22:16.799 --> 00:22:18.079
You have to be really, really good.
00:22:18.640 --> 00:22:28.319
Yeah, and you have to have great product market fit, which requires you either finding one of the few niches left in the world, or like genuinely creating something new.
00:22:28.400 --> 00:22:29.599
And that that is really challenging.
00:22:29.839 --> 00:22:36.960
And on top of that, you have to hire extremely well, get funding when you need it, and just like yeah, you need so many things to happen for you.
00:22:37.039 --> 00:22:41.279
You need luck, good timing, like you said, the good market gap, good product, good team.
00:22:41.440 --> 00:22:41.839
Gosh.
00:22:42.160 --> 00:22:43.839
And just stability whilst you're doing all of that.
00:22:44.000 --> 00:22:48.160
Like you just need events that would otherwise set things off course to just not happen.
00:22:48.240 --> 00:22:52.640
Don't have, I don't know, a COVID pandemic or something when you're trying to manufacture things on site.
00:22:52.799 --> 00:22:58.079
Don't have like supply chain disruptions around the world, things that are well and truly outside of your control.
00:22:58.480 --> 00:23:12.480
It's so easy to have a great idea and then still have literally no way to turn it into a product because there's just no capital, no people, no opportunity available to take it from anything beyond a napkin drawing to something it could be.
00:23:12.799 --> 00:23:13.039
Agreed.
00:23:13.119 --> 00:23:15.759
So what Myspace achieved was pretty incredible.
00:23:15.920 --> 00:23:16.480
Yeah.
00:23:16.720 --> 00:23:24.960
If we go back one year before MySpace was acquired in 2004, this is where Facebook enters the game.
00:23:25.440 --> 00:23:30.319
And essentially we have 19-year-old Harvard sophomore Mark Zuckerberg.
00:23:30.480 --> 00:23:32.400
And he launched the Facebook.
00:23:32.480 --> 00:23:35.759
It was called the Facebook, not Facebook, which was That's a terrible name.
00:23:35.920 --> 00:23:38.960
I mean, it's still a terrible name, but at least it wasn't that bad.
00:23:39.279 --> 00:23:43.119
He launched the Facebook from his dorm room with a few classmates.
00:23:43.200 --> 00:23:50.079
And at the at the time, the idea was basically you have real people with the photos and the real connections online.
00:23:50.400 --> 00:23:53.279
So essentially it was basically Friendstar and MySpace.
00:23:53.359 --> 00:23:59.279
It wasn't really anything new, but how he executed the Facebook was new.
00:23:59.440 --> 00:24:02.880
So instead of just opening it up to everyone, he made it very, very exclusive.
00:24:02.960 --> 00:24:07.359
So initially it was only in Harvard, and only people in Harvard could sign up to the Facebook.
00:24:07.519 --> 00:24:12.240
And over time he expanded to other really elite universities and colleges.
00:24:12.480 --> 00:24:15.200
And then with time it became more open broadly.
00:24:15.359 --> 00:24:16.000
Did you know that?
00:24:16.240 --> 00:24:19.839
I did, and it's it's an interesting thing because it solves two problems.
00:24:20.000 --> 00:24:26.240
One is your scaling tech problem, which I mean it makes sense, but that one's harder to foresee if you haven't had hindsight.
00:24:26.400 --> 00:24:32.400
But the other part is just you're confirming that you have product market fit in a safe way.
00:24:32.640 --> 00:24:38.880
Like the second that Friendster blows up or MySpace blows up, you now have to manage two problems at once.
00:24:38.960 --> 00:24:43.359
You have to manage a thousand customer requests and also stop all of your servers from catching fire.
00:24:43.519 --> 00:24:48.319
And that's way more work than, you know, just being a bit elitist, apparently.
00:24:48.559 --> 00:24:54.160
And um instead actually building a system that is designed for a smaller group.
00:24:54.400 --> 00:25:04.720
And yeah, it's also interesting to me that there's such a trend at this point towards removing like um pseudonymous communication and trying to make it more personal and more real.
00:25:04.799 --> 00:25:16.640
And yet it took until Facebook for it to be something that was about being real with real people that you know, and that was the core focus, rather than trying to use it as a way of discovering people.
00:25:16.799 --> 00:25:18.079
It's a very different approach.
00:25:19.039 --> 00:25:19.759
Good point.
00:25:20.079 --> 00:25:29.759
Because if I was at university and I had access to this app where everyone I knew, my friends and in terms of dating were on this app, how you interact with it was very different.
00:25:29.839 --> 00:25:39.920
And interestingly, I read some interviews of people back in the day who said that Facebook, the Facebook, sorry, was super super addictive.
00:25:40.000 --> 00:25:44.079
They were on there multiple times a day because that's where you got all the hot goss on campus.
00:25:44.240 --> 00:25:48.480
You you got like what's happening, you could stalk your crush and see what they were posting.
00:25:48.720 --> 00:25:49.039
Oh, great.
00:25:49.119 --> 00:25:51.359
I'm glad that we came to that one real early.
00:25:52.240 --> 00:25:53.839
But the your point is so right.
00:25:54.000 --> 00:26:08.720
The fact that it was elitist and it was really defined to people within the
same kind of like social, socioeconomic context, the value was greater to them than just a random, oh, there's a hundred thousand people on this platform, but maybe I know like two percent of them.
00:26:09.039 --> 00:26:09.599
Yeah, for sure.
00:26:09.680 --> 00:26:15.759
And like it changes the kinds of things you post, the kinds of things you engage with, because you want to see what's going on with people around you.
00:26:15.839 --> 00:26:19.920
Like, sure, we want to see what's going on in celebrity lives, but it's not the same kind of thing.
00:26:20.079 --> 00:26:21.599
We aren't going to post the same way.
00:26:21.759 --> 00:26:23.519
Although, to be fair, that did eventually change.
00:26:23.599 --> 00:26:32.319
But it's still like there's there's definitely an element of that closeness being a really important part of the early capitalization of Facebook.
00:26:32.559 --> 00:26:32.960
Agreed.
00:26:33.039 --> 00:26:34.640
I will get you to read number five.
00:26:35.839 --> 00:26:42.960
And Mark actually said this to the Harvard Crimson in 2004 about how Facebook differs from Friend Star.
00:26:43.440 --> 00:26:46.079
The type of information on the site is fundamentally different.
00:26:46.240 --> 00:26:48.880
People aren't as biased in how they represent themselves.
00:26:49.279 --> 00:26:49.839
Interesting.
00:26:50.000 --> 00:26:50.400
Interesting.
00:26:50.559 --> 00:26:54.319
So he saw it as more of a truth-telling people don't have the guard up um.
00:26:54.880 --> 00:26:55.599
It's so interesting.
00:26:55.759 --> 00:26:57.279
There's no way Facebook survived that.
00:26:57.440 --> 00:26:59.599
But I get I get that that's what it was trying to do.
00:26:59.839 --> 00:27:13.599
And like, I I guess in a sense, if it's if it is private, if it is basically just like, I don't know, a small hangout with your friends or the people you know on campus, like you you will present a version of you that's more authentic because candidly, you can't hide it.
00:27:13.759 --> 00:27:15.440
Like you're living on the same campus.
00:27:15.599 --> 00:27:20.640
So if you decide to be a completely different person, someone can can find you and then ask questions.
00:27:20.880 --> 00:27:27.359
And yeah, or then it achieved the goal of removing pseudonym Wow, gosh.
00:27:28.079 --> 00:27:40.480
It achieved the goal of removing those kind of avatar and alias-based communications and making it personal because you actually could know the people, and people had to be more authentic because they would be challenged if they weren't.
00:27:40.720 --> 00:27:41.440
They would, they would.
00:27:41.759 --> 00:27:47.440
Which is so interesting because MySpace was like open to everyone and it was so messy.
00:27:48.000 --> 00:27:51.920
Friends was like, oh, this is a dating app, but now we're not, we're open to people.
00:27:52.000 --> 00:27:58.000
And then the Facebook was, oh, we're the cool people, you know, this is the we're we're we're exclusive.
00:27:58.240 --> 00:28:07.920
So it's interesting how from the early stage and from just us as humans that Facebook, the Facebook succeeded because we all want to be part of the cool club.
00:28:08.079 --> 00:28:11.519
Like we all want to feel like we can reach that echelon.
00:28:11.680 --> 00:28:14.480
So it's free marketing chart into that for sure.
00:28:14.799 --> 00:28:28.559
It it is an interesting lesson for for new founders that not to be elitists, I don't think that's the lesson you take away from this, but to be targeting a smaller start, something that is more personal, something like again, it's a it's a niche, right?
00:28:28.640 --> 00:28:34.480
Like if you were to just go head to head with MySpace, but with better tech, you wouldn't win by default.
00:28:34.799 --> 00:28:39.920
And Myspace wasn't beating Friendstar because of the fact that Friendstar's tech stack was falling over.
00:28:40.079 --> 00:28:41.200
That wasn't the only part.
00:28:41.359 --> 00:28:45.519
It was because they had a product that actually responded to the customer feedback.
00:28:45.680 --> 00:28:54.160
And so even with all the conversations around tech debt being a significant problem for Friendstar, it clearly wasn't a thing that sold people on other platforms.
00:28:54.319 --> 00:29:00.799
They still actually required the product to be differentiated and to be more like what they wanted, even if they didn't know what that was at the time.
00:29:01.119 --> 00:29:02.079
They did, they did.
00:29:02.240 --> 00:29:08.960
And because of the Facebook's approach, apparently 80% of users would log on every single day because of that.
00:29:09.039 --> 00:29:10.960
That it was that addictive.
00:29:11.359 --> 00:29:21.680
But even with that high engagement rate, the the tech and the underlying system did not fault because it grew slow and steadily over time and was able to scale as you touched on effectively and efficiently.
00:29:21.920 --> 00:29:23.759
Mark himself is a very interesting person.
00:29:23.920 --> 00:29:25.359
That's a different rabbit hole.
00:29:25.599 --> 00:29:31.200
But in the same paper from the quote you read out, he said that he's not just a dumb programmer.
00:29:31.359 --> 00:29:38.000
He said, and I quote, and apparently he had this on his business card, I'm CEO bitch.
00:29:40.880 --> 00:29:42.160
Oh, Mark.
00:29:43.200 --> 00:29:53.839
It's just it's so weird to think about where he is now and the kind of person he is now versus that kind of tech bro sort of like I mean, I guess it makes sense.
00:29:53.920 --> 00:29:58.559
You're at an elitist institution that's making you feel better about yourself and more superior to other people.
00:29:58.720 --> 00:30:01.680
So writing something like that probably is the natural evolution of what you're doing.
00:30:02.079 --> 00:30:02.400
For sure.
00:30:02.480 --> 00:30:12.079
This is maybe his first taste of being cool now, because everyone was on his on his app and if he's cool, but that's
that's not that's not right to think about.
00:30:12.480 --> 00:30:14.720
I will get you to read number six.
00:30:14.960 --> 00:30:18.319
So Mark said this in terms of his expansion strategy.
00:30:18.720 --> 00:30:23.279
Yeah, he wanted to go to schools that would be hardest for us to succeed at.
00:30:23.759 --> 00:30:29.839
Which means that he was actually gunning for the super elite private schools and institutions.
00:30:30.079 --> 00:30:34.960
Because in his mind, if he could crack those, then the rest of the world would be a lot easier.
00:30:35.279 --> 00:30:36.559
Which is fascinating.
00:30:36.799 --> 00:30:40.640
Um and this brings us to the foundational patent.
00:30:40.799 --> 00:30:44.000
So do you remember the first social media app ever?
00:30:44.480 --> 00:30:44.640
No.
00:30:44.880 --> 00:30:46.079
Or that I mentioned at the start of this.
00:30:46.640 --> 00:30:47.920
Sorry, yes, of course.
00:30:48.160 --> 00:30:48.640
Yes.
00:30:48.799 --> 00:30:50.240
Um six degrees.
00:30:50.640 --> 00:30:51.039
There we go.
00:30:51.200 --> 00:30:51.839
We got there.
00:30:52.240 --> 00:30:52.640
Correct.
00:30:52.799 --> 00:30:58.720
So six degrees actually had the patent for this and it went up for auction around 2004.
00:30:58.799 --> 00:31:11.759
So around the same time that the Facebook was really starting to buzz around, and the same time that um MySpace was skyrocketing and everyone was using MySpace, and also the same time that Friendstar was struggling and in the dumps a little bit.
00:31:12.559 --> 00:31:22.319
And the interesting thing is Reid Hoffman and Mark Pinkus, who went on to build LinkedIn and then Zynga, which is interesting, bought that patent for$700,000.
00:31:22.960 --> 00:31:32.160
And if you remember, Reid Hoffman was actually one of the early investors in Friendstar, and he was also as part of the exec or board in Friendstar as well.
00:31:32.400 --> 00:31:39.440
And so he apparently bought the patent because he didn't want to give it to Abrams, because Abrams was apparently interested in it.
00:31:39.599 --> 00:31:44.079
And he wanted it to, he didn't want the ecosystem to be affected by who owned the patent.
00:31:44.160 --> 00:31:45.839
He essentially wanted a free market.
00:31:46.160 --> 00:31:53.039
And even though Mark Zuckerberg didn't know this, that actually really helped him because he didn't have to worry about that patent legal landscape.
00:31:53.359 --> 00:31:58.400
And that's like a ridiculous kind of just advantage you can get entirely by random chance.
00:31:58.480 --> 00:32:02.480
It's very easy to end up in a scenario where compliance stifles innovation.
00:32:02.559 --> 00:32:05.920
And don't get me wrong, compliance and patent law and stuff are useful.
00:32:06.160 --> 00:32:24.960
But like, I mean, there was the Pokemon lawsuit against PowerWorld recently, and while I don't agree that PowerWorld hasn't ripped anything from Pokemon, it's very clear that if the solution was Pokemon can just
throw their weight around and therefore you can't have any ideas that involve throwing a ball, like it just it just wouldn't work.
00:32:25.119 --> 00:32:36.720
And so when scenarios like that occur where just unbeknownst to you compliance problems are solved before you reach them, like it's a complete game changer as a founder.
00:32:36.799 --> 00:32:39.039
You just have an entire listing to worry about.
00:32:39.200 --> 00:32:46.799
You can just work on innovating, and you're not getting stifled by someone who's built something that does not manage your complexity and what you're trying to achieve.
00:32:47.039 --> 00:32:48.720
Lucky Mark, he's just on a roll, isn't he?
00:32:48.960 --> 00:32:49.440
Very lucky.
00:32:51.039 --> 00:33:03.359
And if you remember Napster and that Abrams, the founder of Friendster, worked at Napster, Sean Parker was a big supporter of Friendsta in the early days, and he was actually really tight with Abrams and supported Friends as a group.
00:33:03.519 --> 00:33:13.599
However, he also saw the inside mess that Friendstar was becoming and jumped shipped to Mark Zuckerberg, especially when Mark moved to the Silicon Valley.
00:33:14.079 --> 00:33:23.680
And he essentially apparently took a lot of the lessons learned from Friendster to the Facebook and helped the Facebook also grow in that aspect.
00:33:24.079 --> 00:33:28.000
Every time you say the Facebook, I just can't take it seriously.
00:33:28.640 --> 00:33:29.519
It is what it was called.
00:33:29.599 --> 00:33:30.240
It is what it was called.
00:33:30.480 --> 00:33:31.920
I'll get you to read number seven.
00:33:32.240 --> 00:33:37.440
So this is what Sean Parker, um, Napsa's co-founder said about Facebook.
00:33:37.839 --> 00:33:40.720
It was all about identity for me when I first saw Facebook.
00:33:41.359 --> 00:33:42.160
Super interesting.
00:33:42.400 --> 00:33:48.559
Yeah, it's it's interesting because it sounds like MySpace, in one sense, was also able to do that.
00:33:48.720 --> 00:34:14.320
You could customize, you could present yourself, but because the foundations of how Facebook was spread, which is not part of the product, it's part of the strategy for distributing it to some extent, for acquiring customers, because its method was targeting those smaller groups and more difficult groups, it made it much easier for it to solidify itself as something where you're like, people's identity matters here because you should be an authentic person on here.
00:34:14.480 --> 00:34:17.280
Everyone else who's on here is also being authentic.
00:34:17.440 --> 00:34:22.000
And because you're already encouraging that behavior, anyone who comes later will start to replicate.
00:34:22.159 --> 00:34:35.519
If you start with a behavior or user profile that makes it so people want to be seen as a celebrity or be seen as someone with something worth saying, then that is the kind of person you will invite to your platform and to your product.
00:34:35.679 --> 00:34:38.960
You will invite more of the same users you cultivate in a lot of scenarios.
00:34:39.199 --> 00:34:43.599
So cultivating a kind of user that's authentic completely changes what your app's going to be about.
00:34:44.000 --> 00:34:45.519
A thousand, a thousand percent.
00:34:45.760 --> 00:34:52.559
I do wonder if Sean Parker tried to get in on MySpace as well, or if he just skipped that and just Yeah, I do I find that I think it's a good thing.
00:34:52.719 --> 00:34:57.679
I feel like Silicon Valley Tech Bros would absolutely be trying to get in on anything they could so long as they could throw money at it.
00:34:58.000 --> 00:34:59.199
Of course, but it's on the deal.
00:34:59.360 --> 00:35:01.440
Um I didn't see anything about that.
00:35:01.599 --> 00:35:12.880
But so yeah, at this time, if you remember, MySpace was growing rapidly, and MySpace was roughly 10 times that of in Facebook then became Facebook after it stopped being the Facebook.
00:35:12.960 --> 00:35:16.159
I'm not sure when it stopped being the Facebook, but now let's just say Facebook.
00:35:16.480 --> 00:35:18.480
It's easily the best edition that was made in the history of Facebook.
00:35:18.559 --> 00:35:18.880
Oh my goodness.
00:35:19.199 --> 00:35:19.840
Much of a mouthful.
00:35:20.079 --> 00:35:21.199
Oh, it's just a terrible name.
00:35:21.440 --> 00:35:29.119
So MySpace was about ten times of Facebook's users, and it's funny, apparently Mark was very calm about it.
00:35:29.280 --> 00:35:37.599
He thought that MySpace wasn't really a tech company and it really lacked the rigor and vigour of what building good software was.
00:35:37.920 --> 00:35:50.000
And in his view, he said that um he talked a lot of shit basically about the MySpace CEO and founders and said that they were more of a media company and that Facebook was more of a tech company.
00:35:50.159 --> 00:35:52.320
I'll get you to read number eight.
00:35:53.039 --> 00:35:59.760
And this is MySpace co-founder Chris talking about um Mark's claim and jab about them.
00:36:00.079 --> 00:36:03.679
I I think we were both media companies and both technology companies.
00:36:03.840 --> 00:36:05.280
And I think that's a very fair point.
00:36:05.440 --> 00:36:11.280
It's to pretend Facebook wasn't a media company is wrong, and to pretend Myspace wasn't a tech company is also wrong.
00:36:11.360 --> 00:36:15.679
It's just it's a way of creating that antagonistic relationship.
00:36:15.840 --> 00:36:30.800
And that's, I mean, if you're going to become a Facebook and monopolize an entire industry in that regard, like you have to be able to put yourself out there as we aren't like them, rather than comparing yourself directly because it gives more like validity to your competitors.
00:36:31.039 --> 00:36:32.480
I actually disagree with you on this point.
00:36:33.039 --> 00:36:37.840
If you remember, MySpace had music, it was for creatives, and Facebook did not.
00:36:38.000 --> 00:36:43.280
So, and also a
lot of musicians got their big kind of push to fame from MySpace.
00:36:43.599 --> 00:36:51.840
So, in that sense, I can see Mark's point about MySpace being a bit more of a media company because that creativity was such a big value prop for them.
00:36:52.000 --> 00:36:52.400
I don't know.
00:36:52.719 --> 00:36:53.119
Interesting.
00:36:53.280 --> 00:37:02.159
Yeah, I think the main thought I have with that is that it's tricky now to look back on that and not think of it as a tech company.
00:37:02.400 --> 00:37:07.840
And the view we have now is very much basically everything that can be a tech company is a tech company.
00:37:08.079 --> 00:37:17.280
It's almost like to be a tech company is just to be a company that burns capital until they acquire enough users, and then once that's done, they have they've achieved something.
00:37:17.440 --> 00:37:17.760
Hopefully.
00:37:18.239 --> 00:37:18.400
Hopefully.
00:37:18.639 --> 00:37:19.519
Hopefully, they've achieved something.
00:37:19.679 --> 00:37:21.920
Just like everyone's now an AI company.
00:37:22.079 --> 00:37:22.159
Oh.
00:37:22.400 --> 00:37:28.719
It's and so like that that mess to me makes MySpace look like a tech company in that regard.
00:37:28.800 --> 00:37:30.719
And also, it again, it's early days of the web.
00:37:30.880 --> 00:37:37.679
Like to not call them a tech company is probably a touch unfair in that regard, but it does matter a lot about what your product's trying to do.
00:37:37.840 --> 00:37:46.800
If your product's trying to scale its user base so that it can acquire, like it's not uh sorry, Facebook's gonna be more agnostic to what it's trying to do for its users.
00:37:46.880 --> 00:37:51.519
It's gonna be open to user feedback because fundamentally it's a platform for the users.
00:37:51.679 --> 00:37:56.719
Whereas MySpace, like for instance to before it, still has a direction it's trying to push the platform in.
00:37:56.880 --> 00:38:00.960
And if your users want to change habits, it can't pivot the same way.
00:38:01.039 --> 00:38:05.440
Something that this is gonna sound mean, but without a soul, like Facebook can.
00:38:05.599 --> 00:38:13.440
Like if it doesn't have a specific direction, a specific purpose, it's just a vessel for your users, it becomes a really powerful platform.
00:38:13.519 --> 00:38:14.800
And we didn't have platforms then.
00:38:14.960 --> 00:38:17.119
This is a very new concept being built by Facebook.
00:38:17.440 --> 00:38:17.840
Agreed.
00:38:18.079 --> 00:38:22.000
And interestingly, the beef between Chris and Mark continued.
00:38:22.159 --> 00:38:26.000
And in 2005, Chris actually tried to buy Facebook.
00:38:28.079 --> 00:38:38.800
Um and apparently Mark turned up really late to the meeting and complained that oh, they were dealing with like some server crisis and that he wasn't interested in selling the company, and that yeah, like cool.
00:38:39.039 --> 00:38:44.800
And so it's funny because in in some ways Facebook had a lot
of a lot of leverage.
00:38:44.960 --> 00:38:54.559
Um, but also Mark's point about MySpace being more of a media company kind of seemed right, especially in 2005 when MySpace was acquired by News Corp.
00:38:55.119 --> 00:38:56.719
Yes, and that does make a lot of sense.
00:38:56.960 --> 00:38:57.360
Exactly.
00:38:57.440 --> 00:39:02.320
And so he's like, well, like in some ways, like Mark felt like he was vindicated.
00:39:03.280 --> 00:39:04.000
Um, yeah.
00:39:04.400 --> 00:39:10.159
I mean, I think he was, like, to be real, if it's getting bought by News Corp, it's not being bought for that kind of purpose, right?
00:39:10.320 --> 00:39:19.119
And and it that will also, as we've talked about with Friendster, like you've now got people who own enough equity who will shift the direction of that business.
00:39:19.280 --> 00:39:27.280
And so any potential for it to become a tech company, certainly in the way that it would have had to be back then, just would have been stifled.
00:39:27.599 --> 00:39:28.400
Agreed, agreed.
00:39:28.559 --> 00:39:33.280
And interestingly, touching back on Friendster, it basically just died.
00:39:33.360 --> 00:39:37.199
It never really recovered, but it became really big in Asia.
00:39:37.360 --> 00:39:44.960
And there was a point where it was growing rapidly in like the Philippines and Thailand, and there were more users from Asia than there was from the US.
00:39:45.119 --> 00:39:49.360
And from a user perspective, people in the US would log on and they were kind of like, what the hell?
00:39:49.519 --> 00:39:51.440
Like, all I'm seeing is people based in Asia.
00:39:51.599 --> 00:39:59.199
They didn't see people that they knew, and for them, the value of the platform got worse and worse over time, which just led to its demise even more.
00:39:59.519 --> 00:40:13.679
Um, and so yeah, it got its kind of like second wind of life in Asia, but then it just didn't really make sense in terms of like monetization and what they could do, and they eventually kind of shut down and then sold to a Malaysian company in 2009.
00:40:14.480 --> 00:40:17.519
And then in 2010, this is gonna hurt.
00:40:17.760 --> 00:40:21.199
Facebook bought Francis patents for$40 million.
00:40:21.840 --> 00:40:47.440
See, like I I get why that's the case, but also it's just I think it's one of those sorts of things that makes me quite frustrated with this whole ecosystem at the end of the day, is that someone who benefited from something like that being in the open, then acquiring and gaining a controlling power over it feels like it's just an unfair part of this and and unbeknownst to them to some extent at the time.
00:40:47.679 --> 00:41:09.920
It was in a position that they were allowed to become what they became because it was in the open, and the idea that if we just shut off our competition by owning the rights to whatever you pick the thing that today to be is just our stifles innovation, it stifles creativity, it prevents us from solving meaningful problems, not that social media needs more competitors, but like it's that kind of space, right?
00:41:10.000 --> 00:41:21.920
And if if founders who build something interesting are more willing to share it, are more willing to reveal the things they've done, to let other people innovate on it, sure.
00:41:22.079 --> 00:41:33.119
Maybe your company doesn't go to the moon the same way Facebook did, but you contribute to the people who helped you get there so much more, and you give the opportunity that you got back to people.
00:41:33.440 --> 00:41:34.320
Agreed, agreed.
00:41:34.400 --> 00:41:37.440
But that's such a hard thing to sell people, especially as we're humans.
00:41:37.679 --> 00:41:42.239
Everyone has ego, everyone wants to build the next unicorn, everyone's very sus about things.
00:41:42.400 --> 00:41:44.079
But I get your sentiment, yeah.
00:41:44.400 --> 00:41:46.800
It's a very, it's a very naive sentiment in one sense.
00:41:46.880 --> 00:41:59.519
I'm aware that capitalism doesn't allow any of this to happen, but it's it's something I think about often because when you're learning from startups that have failed, you get a lot more opportunity to learn because everything that they have now is just out there.
00:41:59.679 --> 00:42:02.800
You can just see it in their domain, unless someone bought part of it.
00:42:03.039 --> 00:42:06.880
And so you get a meaningful opportunity to actually learn from someone's mistakes.
00:42:07.199 --> 00:42:26.000
But for companies that have succeeded and then just like pull it all back together, surely it would make more sense for a bunch of other small companies to pop up to be invested in to make returns individually for the investors at the top of that company than it would for them to simply just take the easier route of solidifying their position in the current business.
00:42:26.559 --> 00:42:35.119
Facebook being a slight, sorry, a bad example of that to some extent, because yeah, they did get the monopoly and they did become one of the, I don't know, the fang group or whatever it was back in the day.
00:42:35.280 --> 00:42:37.920
Whatever the new version is now that they're meta or whatever it is.
00:42:38.079 --> 00:42:39.519
It's too hard to keep track of all of that.
00:42:39.760 --> 00:42:41.199
It is always changing.
00:42:41.360 --> 00:42:45.920
But I do really feel for Abrams because he took the biggest risks.
00:42:46.079 --> 00:42:58.159
He really built the well, he didn't build the first prototype, but he really perfected the six degrees one and was the first um kind of proper example that something like this could work at scale.
00:42:58.400 --> 00:43:03.920
And unfortunately, he never really got the respect he I think he deserves in SF.
00:43:04.239 --> 00:43:08.559
And he got turned into a lot of cartoons, so the press really tore him to shreds.
00:43:08.719 --> 00:43:14.719
And he was known as arrogant and like the the tech person that blew it, and some
people even called him a real asshole.
00:43:14.960 --> 00:43:16.719
Obviously, I don't know Abrams at all.
00:43:17.039 --> 00:43:21.039
This might be warranted, but from the outside, it just it seems a bit harsh.
00:43:21.119 --> 00:43:24.960
Someone even said he's a very lucky idiot servant.
00:43:25.119 --> 00:43:27.440
Something yeah, it was uh people were mean.
00:43:28.000 --> 00:43:30.800
And I'm gonna get you to read quote nine.
00:43:30.880 --> 00:43:36.079
And Abrams said this um at a Sanford talk about surviving entrepreneurship.
00:43:36.480 --> 00:43:41.039
Most people don't cross the fear chasm, and with good reason, because most startups fail.
00:43:41.199 --> 00:43:44.079
But to an entrepreneur, the ups and downs sound cool rather than scary.
00:43:44.239 --> 00:43:44.480
Yeah.
00:43:44.719 --> 00:43:45.519
It feels real.
00:43:45.760 --> 00:43:54.239
It's it having just like left a startup that has been liquidated, the the fear is an immense part of it.
00:43:54.480 --> 00:44:06.559
And being confronted every day with the fact that what you're building may just never Materialize regardless of what you do, regardless of how much effort you pour into it, is really challenging.
00:44:06.639 --> 00:44:09.760
And crossing that chasm to keep doing it is hard.
00:44:09.920 --> 00:44:12.239
But wanting to do it again is still something I feel.
00:44:12.400 --> 00:44:17.039
And I want to do it again because I think that doing something like that matters.
00:44:17.119 --> 00:44:18.000
It can have an impact.
00:44:18.159 --> 00:44:24.079
If you truly believe in a vision, then you should go for it, even though the odds are stacked against you.
00:44:24.239 --> 00:44:25.840
It's exciting to do that.
00:44:26.000 --> 00:44:35.440
And so to hear Abrams talk about that again, it's like, yeah, it is really hard, but it is a different kind of person to look at failure and go, I'm down for that.
00:44:35.599 --> 00:44:37.840
It just is a very different way of thinking.
00:44:38.159 --> 00:44:38.559
Agreed.
00:44:38.639 --> 00:44:40.320
It really shows his character and resilience.
00:44:40.400 --> 00:44:44.239
And actually he went on to found many companies, one being Instacart.
00:44:44.400 --> 00:44:54.079
So he actually won in many ways, but to bounce back from such a public, and I don't even want to say failure, but just public experience was was really tough.
00:44:54.239 --> 00:44:54.400
Yeah.
00:44:54.719 --> 00:44:54.880
Yeah.
00:44:55.039 --> 00:45:07.280
And it it's, you know, looking into it a little bit, it does seem like he's also been able to reveal a lot of the things that are challenging for venture-backed startups that come from that kind of experience.
00:45:07.440 --> 00:45:15.280
And being so public-facing, it's much easier to find stories of it than, you know, like small startups that have disappeared due to the same problems.
00:45:15.519 --> 00:45:23.360
It's just, it's such a large story, and it's often taught as an example
of what not to do in business, which is great in one sense.
00:45:23.440 --> 00:45:24.320
You can learn from it.
00:45:24.480 --> 00:45:25.920
But there are also other factors.
00:45:26.079 --> 00:45:30.320
Like if you've got a venture-backed board and they've brought all of their friends along.
00:45:30.639 --> 00:45:31.280
You're fucked.
00:45:31.440 --> 00:45:35.199
Yeah, you've seeded your power in a way that you don't know at the time.
00:45:35.280 --> 00:45:41.280
And for a lot of founders, like especially ones that have, you know, not founded several companies before, this is the first time.
00:45:41.519 --> 00:45:44.239
It's like this is the time you'll learn all of this.
00:45:44.400 --> 00:45:52.639
You will learn that you need to be really careful about who you choose to be your allies beyond just everybody wants to be my friend, I'll bring on the best of them.
00:45:52.800 --> 00:45:56.400
But you have to be really careful, and you learn that through an experience like this.
00:45:56.559 --> 00:46:02.239
You learn it personally, and then as a bonus, being so public, other founders can learn from it too.
00:46:02.719 --> 00:46:07.840
And we're not saying that it's a bad thing to bring heavyweight and really experienced people, not at all.
00:46:08.079 --> 00:46:08.159
No.
00:46:08.400 --> 00:46:12.639
It's just being really conservative and cautious about who you do bring on.
00:46:12.800 --> 00:46:23.360
Because I recognize a lot of founders go into fundraising as like a begging or like we're at a disadvantage, but really you should also be vetting and evaluating whose money you take on.
00:46:23.760 --> 00:46:25.679
There was a time where I think that was more true.
00:46:25.840 --> 00:46:29.840
And I think like in the 2010s in particular, that was very true.
00:46:30.000 --> 00:46:33.840
Because I mean, there are plenty of startups that turned out to be complete frauds.
00:46:34.000 --> 00:46:42.639
Um, like yeah, it's interesting when you look at companies like Theranos who raised ridiculous amounts of money without even having a viable product at the time that they did it.
00:46:43.280 --> 00:46:46.559
It's insane, and like people should definitely look into stories about them.
00:46:46.800 --> 00:46:58.400
But the the whole thing with that is it worked so well because at that point interest rates were low, capital was easy to access, and so people were basically begging for somewhere to put their money.
00:46:58.639 --> 00:47:01.360
And so, yeah, you had luxury of choice.
00:47:01.599 --> 00:47:07.599
The experience I've had on the other side of that in you know the inflation world, you just don't have luxury of choice.
00:47:07.760 --> 00:47:10.159
People aren't throwing money around like they were before.
00:47:10.239 --> 00:47:11.280
And to be fair, that's good.
00:47:11.360 --> 00:47:12.559
That's a good change.
00:47:12.719 --> 00:47:18.320
Um, but it just means that you no longer get to make those decisions in the same way.
00:47:18.400 --> 00:47:23.840
And if anything, what we want is other ways to raise that don't involve venture as your only method.
00:47:24.159 --> 00:47:24.480
Agreed.
00:47:24.639 --> 00:47:30.960
And if you wonder why Ryan sounds a bit hurt, go listen to the a few episodes before this and you'll find out why.
00:47:31.199 --> 00:47:31.679
Oh boy.
00:47:31.840 --> 00:47:34.000
And also the maggot references that have been going on.
00:47:34.239 --> 00:47:35.280
Yes, yes.
00:47:35.920 --> 00:47:41.519
It would be cool to now talk about Myspace and what happened to them post the News Corp acquisition.
00:47:41.760 --> 00:47:45.679
So if you remember, Murdoch purchased them for$580 million.
00:47:46.320 --> 00:47:51.679
And I spoke to someone who worked in marketing in MySpace after it was acquired.
00:47:51.760 --> 00:47:54.400
And so interesting, he's still in marketing SF.
00:47:54.480 --> 00:47:56.000
Um, we had a really cool chat.
00:47:56.159 --> 00:47:59.679
I feel like I want to do more of these and these like insider interviews.
00:47:59.920 --> 00:48:01.199
But it was so fascinating.
00:48:01.360 --> 00:48:12.320
He said that the company changed significantly after it was acquired, and essentially Murdoch didn't really understand MySpace and just really tried to make it more of a media company.
00:48:12.559 --> 00:48:14.480
And there was a lot of internal conflicts.
00:48:14.639 --> 00:48:21.199
The MySpace founders just kind of like did their time and then kind of left with their money, and it just kind of fell apart.
00:48:21.440 --> 00:48:27.119
Yeah, there was no direction, conflated interests, and it just ended and died a slow death.
00:48:27.519 --> 00:48:39.840
It's it's kind of unsurprising, but it if you think about it as something that was genuinely new and innovative, being molded into something old and traditional, because that is how we used to run those things.
00:48:40.000 --> 00:48:49.440
And like you can have opinions about News Corp all day long, but at the very least, it makes sense that it was trying to make it more like another News Corp business because that's what they know.
00:48:49.519 --> 00:48:53.360
That is how they made a profitable business, and that's how they still are a profitable business.
00:48:53.599 --> 00:48:58.159
And I think they were buying distribution, they were buying reach into audiences that maybe they didn't have as much.
00:48:58.320 --> 00:49:02.239
And interestingly, they ended up offloading MySpace for$35 million.
00:49:03.280 --> 00:49:05.360
And they bought it for$580 million.
00:49:05.679 --> 00:49:06.320
Yeah, that's a loss.
00:49:06.480 --> 00:49:07.199
That's certainly a loss.
00:49:07.360 --> 00:49:07.599
Right?
00:49:07.760 --> 00:49:10.400
Within a couple of years is getting fired for watching.
00:49:10.880 --> 00:49:11.440
Yeah.
00:49:12.000 --> 00:49:13.199
Super interesting.
00:49:13.440 --> 00:49:21.360
And we've touched on this a lot, but I really think this whole first mover versus fast follower is so fascinating.
00:49:21.519 --> 00:49:29.280
Because I mean, I don't really like copycats, but if you're gonna be a copycat, be a really good one, essentially, is what this is showing.
00:49:29.679 --> 00:49:30.079
For sure.
00:49:30.159 --> 00:49:34.239
And I I there's a um there's a lot of different ways that this gets looked at.
00:49:34.320 --> 00:49:38.239
Um, like drone technology is something that's starting to come back as a useful piece of tech.
00:49:38.639 --> 00:49:50.719
But there was a big chasm between the first time we were shown drones delivering pizzas to people's homes or whatever Amazon was showing off originally, versus what we see now, which is like drones dropping off medical supplies or stuff like that.
00:49:50.880 --> 00:49:54.559
But there was a huge gap for the technology to catch up to.
00:49:54.800 --> 00:50:03.599
And something that becomes really interesting, and I I suspect AI will follow a similar trend here, is that often we can find a new piece of tech without the home for it straight away.
00:50:03.760 --> 00:50:04.079
Oh, yeah.
00:50:04.320 --> 00:50:12.480
We can find stuff like this is kind of the opposite example with MySpace and Facebook, where it was immediately obvious what the home for this should be.
00:50:12.639 --> 00:50:20.000
But being the person who was able to react to the mistakes fastest was the winning position, being less rigid.
00:50:20.079 --> 00:50:37.599
And it's not just rigidity from from Abrams himself, it's rigidity from having a board of very specific individuals, or the rigidity of being an old media company that is buying a completely new system as if it's a newspaper to distribute rather than a um new way of connecting with people.
00:50:37.760 --> 00:50:47.119
It it means that you are now stifling what made your business work, which was you were capitalizing on a current moment's issues or on a current moment's product.
00:50:47.280 --> 00:50:52.239
And so Facebook just not going in that direction is it makes a lot of sense.
00:50:52.400 --> 00:51:08.880
It's easy to look at um Abrams declining the offer from Google and at Mark declining the offer from MySpace, and and it's just it'd be easy looking at them in isolation to go, Abrams made the wrong call.
00:51:08.960 --> 00:51:11.199
If he just gotten bought by Google, he'd be set.
00:51:11.440 --> 00:51:16.800
Um but if you're actually trying to build the product, that's not the goal you're aiming for.
00:51:16.880 --> 00:51:24.400
If you genuinely believe in it, it's not just about the valuation, it's also about like, I think this should be something that I want to be a part of for longer.
00:51:24.480 --> 00:51:26.159
And you know you seed a lot of your competition.
00:51:26.400 --> 00:51:28.639
And he was right, the technology prospects were there.
00:51:28.880 --> 00:51:30.800
The potential was there, it just wasn't him.
00:51:31.039 --> 00:51:32.800
No, no, unlucky guy.
00:51:33.119 -->
00:51:41.760
Very I'm I like what you said, and I really am intrigued in a few years to unpick what's going to happen in terms of like the vibe coding apps.
00:51:41.840 --> 00:51:49.840
We've got Lovable, Base44, all the others, all the note-taking ones, like there's so many very similar companies now, a lot of them AI.
00:51:49.920 --> 00:51:53.199
It will be so fascinating to see what that market share looks like over time.
00:51:53.519 --> 00:51:55.840
Yeah, so many of them have already started falling apart too.
00:51:56.000 --> 00:52:04.719
Lovable's a good example of that, but there are plenty that just like as soon as credit stopped being subsidized, your business model died.
00:52:04.800 --> 00:52:11.920
And it's like it's ridiculous to make a business model for a business that's been around for generously four years.
00:52:12.159 --> 00:52:22.400
Like, there's not enough history to define a long-term business model and long-term tech prospects because there isn't data on how to do that.
00:52:22.480 --> 00:52:32.239
And that's something you see with early Facebook, is they're not making decisions that are based on if we just do these three things, then we will be the best app in the world.
00:52:32.400 --> 00:52:41.039
It is trying to pioneer its own trail and it is doing it like in the moment, in the present, which is something that the other two businesses just didn't succeed at doing.
00:52:41.760 --> 00:52:45.840
I would say Friendstar really brought social media to life and scaled it.
00:52:52.719 --> 00:53:03.360
Facebook, the Facebook at that time, created something more exclusive that then scaled more effectively over time and just landed the execution a lot better than the others.
00:53:03.679 --> 00:53:17.280
And which brings me to the point that essentially being first to market can be a disadvantage because one, you make a lot of mistakes and you pay for the education that your your competitors don't.
00:53:17.519 --> 00:53:18.079
Oh boy, yeah.
00:53:18.320 --> 00:53:23.679
You get locked into early choices and you're less able to move because you're figuring it out as you go.
00:53:23.920 --> 00:53:27.440
You also hit the problems first and kind of like figure things out.
00:53:27.599 --> 00:53:32.639
Um, and timing risk is all yours because you you see the opportunity and you just go.
00:53:32.800 --> 00:53:36.159
Unfortunately, other people are able to be a bit more discerning about it.
00:53:36.320 --> 00:53:41.840
So what happens is followers can then outspend you and execute what you built a lot better, which hurts.
00:53:42.159 --> 00:53:44.960
Yeah, and especially if you die, you can just get bored by them.
00:53:45.039 --> 00:53:50.320
And so you just get to enjoy the process of watching somebody else like feast on what you were trying to build.
00:53:50.559 --> 00:53:52.320
But I don't think that should be a discouragement.
00:53:52.480 --> 00:53:54.000
Abrams is a good example of this.
00:53:54.079 --> 00:53:57.199
It's he's a serial founder, like that's a thing he likes to do.
00:53:57.360 --> 00:54:00.079
He likes to build lots of companies, and he's clearly quite good at it.
00:54:00.320 --> 00:54:00.480
He is.
00:54:00.800 --> 00:54:02.880
Friendsta did in many ways succeed.
00:54:03.039 --> 00:54:07.920
It just didn't succeed in the way that we usually measure success, which was what was your value valuation?
00:54:08.079 --> 00:54:09.360
What did you get bought for?
00:54:09.840 --> 00:54:14.880
And if you have an interesting idea, the success can be a less tangible result.
00:54:14.960 --> 00:54:16.400
It can be the impact you've had on the world.
00:54:16.559 --> 00:54:31.920
Friendstar, while not the talking point of today, maybe it's better for off that way, um, is actually still something that completely changed the way we use like media full stop and created a new kind in degrees that otherwise we wouldn't know.
00:54:32.000 --> 00:54:34.400
The six degrees model too, it's like the same deal.
00:54:34.480 --> 00:54:37.519
It's something else that pioneered all of this to be possible.
00:54:37.760 --> 00:54:39.519
And that is incredibly valuable.
00:54:39.599 --> 00:54:47.440
It's the kind of thing that's more valuable in the long term from a like social perspective than any valuation you can get.
00:54:47.599 --> 00:54:56.159
Again, easy to say these things when you're not being offered$500 million, but nonetheless, it's like that's the kind of space that isn't forgotten in one sense.
00:54:56.239 --> 00:54:59.440
You can always find who built these things and how it came to be.
00:54:59.679 --> 00:55:04.639
And I've purposely not gone into Facebook a lot more because it's still going on, it's meta, you know.
00:55:04.719 --> 00:55:05.519
I think that's a bit more.
00:55:05.599 --> 00:55:07.119
There's a lot of podcasts that talk about it.
00:55:07.280 --> 00:55:13.519
I think I was really more interested in the up and coming and the tension and what happened and why Facebook quote unquote won.
00:55:13.679 --> 00:55:18.320
But I agree wholeheartedly with your point that success can be measured in so many different ways.
00:55:18.480 --> 00:55:27.440
And you're right, Friendstar and Abrams achieved so much, but also there are there are a couple of first to market entrants that did win.
00:55:27.760 --> 00:55:30.239
Some would argue that Amazon is that kind of example.
00:55:30.400 --> 00:55:37.119
It's very much started off as selling books um online and then scaled quite rapidly into other like e-commerce essentially.
00:55:37.280 --> 00:55:40.400
Um, eBay also was I think first to market.
00:55:40.639 --> 00:55:42.960
So there are a couple of um of examples.
00:55:43.119 --> 00:55:44.079
Sony was one.
00:55:44.320 --> 00:55:48.079
It developed the first uh speaker or or something like that.
00:55:48.320 --> 00:55:53.039
So it exists, it's just a lot harder to execute and for you to keep that position over time.
00:55:53.360 --> 00:55:54.639
You have to be much more adaptive.
00:55:54.800 --> 00:55:55.920
Netflix is a great example.
00:55:56.079 --> 00:56:00.320
They adapted their business model so many times, and like there's plenty of books out there about it.
00:56:00.480 --> 00:56:07.920
But the biggest thing is until they started sitting still, you can see them owning the entirety of that market.
00:56:08.239 --> 00:56:14.800
The point where they started sitting still or they ran out of new ideas is the point where you watch those sorts of shares drop away.
00:56:14.960 --> 00:56:28.719
And you see that much faster in smaller companies that never get to that size, like um MySpace, where I mean, obviously MySpace was huge, but it did eventually stop being the innovator and being the changing and adapting thing.
00:56:28.960 --> 00:56:34.320
Like Facebook is resilient to that now because of the network effect, like you talked about earlier.
00:56:34.400 --> 00:56:41.840
Like it is something that now gives it a moat and a resiliency in case they do change something or don't innovate fast enough.
00:56:42.000 --> 00:56:52.159
But during that period where you're capturing market where the network effect isn't full yet, you have to be continuously changing and innovating and adapting, even if it's not the same place you originally started from.
00:56:52.480 --> 00:56:53.360
A thousand percent.
00:56:53.599 --> 00:56:58.480
And if you want us me to do more deep dives, I really liked it.
00:56:58.559 --> 00:57:01.599
And I a thousand percent will do more, so let me know.
00:57:01.679 --> 00:57:04.079
But Ryan, thank you for coming along the journey.
00:57:04.159 --> 00:57:07.840
I hope you learned some new things about social media.
00:57:08.239 --> 00:57:09.760
Super interesting, but yeah, thank you.
00:57:10.320 --> 00:57:10.639
Thank you.
00:57:10.719 --> 00:57:11.679
That was really good.