TRANSCRIÇÃO 🔗
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We use a reactive AI in our methodology to actually
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pick the right countermeasure which blocks the technique that the
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attacker is using that in that moment in time.
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Welcome, Everyone's the Industrial Security Podcast. My name is Nate Nelson.
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I'm here with Andrew Ginter, the vice president of Industrial
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Security at Waterfall Security Solutions, who's going to introduce the
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subject and the guest of our show today. Andrew, how's going.
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I'm very well, Thank you, Nate. Our guest today is
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Gary Southwell. He is the general manager and vice president
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at ARIA Cybersecurity Solutions, and we're going to be talking
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about AI, a new use for AI in protecting critical infrastructure.
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Then, without further ado, here's your conversation with Gary Southwell.
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Hello Gary, and thank you for joining us. Before we
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get started, can I ask you to, you know, say
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a few words about yourself for our listeners, and you know,
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say a few words about the good work that you're
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doing at ARIA Cybersecurity.
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A little bit about me, So my background, I've been
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in cybersecurity really since the early days. I was a
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system engineer in the nineties, you know, working on some
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of the initial checkpoint deployments as firewalls. Spent a lot
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of time at Juniper Networks trying to improve the way
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we did network security with more of an intrusion detection
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prevention systems. Moved on into a company called Secon where
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we worked on adding artificial intelligence to a SIM product
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so that we could do more advanced managed detection response
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solutions for MSSPs. And really over the last seven years
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I've been here at ARIA Cybersecurity and we've really looked
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at how do we actually stop the tax that we're
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seeing in the news. And if you date back, you
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know the attacks we're talking about are the ones that
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are really going after the critical assets that are out there,
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everything from the colonial pipeline on. We want to make
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sure that we've got a better way to actually go
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in utilize the artificial intelligence properly to find and stop
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these types of attacks.
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Thanks for that. And our topic today is using AI
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to protect critical infrastructure. And my understanding of the way
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you know that you folks use AI is in the hosts.
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I mean, you know, outfits like Juniper and others have
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used AI in their firewalls for a long time to
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look at the messages coming to and try and figure
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out you know, do these things? Are these things attacks?
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You're doing something different? Is my understanding. You're not focused
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on the firewalls, You're focused on the hosts. So you know,
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we already have in a sense anti virus on the hosts.
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We have whitelisting on the hosts. What is the problem
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you guys are trying to solve and why isn't it
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already solved with antivirus and whitelisting.
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We believe you want to actually stop the attacks at
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the point where they're actually attacking their critical applications, which
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is what drives your critical infrastructure. So the challenge with
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solutions we call these active solutions that they're going on
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the host is that if you look at traditional anti
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virus that's been around with us for twenty years, is
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that they are looking for files typically that land on
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the device and they have a known bad signature that's
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calculated off of looking at the file. You can calculate
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a hash and it comes up with a value. If
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it matches something bad that I've been told about, I
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can block it from running. It's a great concept. The
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problem is malware of all kinds, including your ransomware. The
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signatures are now polymorphic really over the last five years,
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so you get different value every time it lands on
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a different device. That approach really isn't effective anymore as
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we've entered this decade. The other approach, as you mentioned,
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is whitelisting. It kind of got a bad name
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because
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it's been difficult to use, But whitelisting just means, or
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we call it access control these days. Is it says
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I can delineate which application should be running on this device.
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I can check their SERTs and then make sure that
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it is that application and then allow it to run,
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and by default I'll block everything else. So these are
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good approaches if we could make them work in today's environments.
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So we start there. We were saying, we need to
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make sure that the applications, the critical applications can run,
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and anything else that would land like a file based
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malware ransomware, we're not run. That's just your very basics.
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The challenges with these zero data attacks, as I said before,
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that they can't detect detect them with signatures. So the
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industry kind of evolved over the last five years to
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looking at patterns of behavior or what we really cause.
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The industry indicators of compromise. When something bad lands on
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a device, it does this, and then this and then
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this through the kill chain, we can identify the pattern.
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Once we know the pattern, if we have a way
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to then block one of those steps, we can disable
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the attack. We call that next generation anti virus. So
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vendors like CrowdStrike, Centa one one do a really good job,
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you know with those types of approaches. However, when we
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get into what are the rest of the attacks, these
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are more sophisticated level attacks like the ones we've seen
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in the industry, starting with Solar Winds, where you've actually
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got humans behind the attacks. They may use some form
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of credential use or deposit software through a legit channel
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like they did with Solar Winds, and then they progress
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an attack once they get in, get a foothold, and
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they begin to take additional steps. So we've got a
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myriad of attacks. So bringing this back to how do
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we use AI. We want an approach that can actually
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detect the various
attack techniques that are happening, and if
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they are somehow adult trading an application, trying to deposit
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a new one on the device, or you're coming in
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and using existing processes against themselves. We used to call
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those advanced persistent threats. They're more generic, very specific ones
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are like living off the land, where they're using the
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actual OS processes against the actual device. We need to
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be able to detect that and apply the right measure
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to stop that type of attack. And this is what
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we believe is the role of AI on the device.
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It's not your generative AI. Just make sure you understand
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that the typicoally needs massive horse power. This is the opposite.
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We use or reactive AI in our methodology to actually
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pick the right countermeasure which blocks the technique that the
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attacker is using in that moment in time.
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Andrew, I would just like to second a lot of
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the points that Gary has made here. It feels like
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we might have crossed some sort of vague threshold in
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recent years where traditional detection antivirus has started to work
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a little bit less. I mean, as he mentioned, the
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number of variants and samples out there of your typical
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malware can get really crazy. I mean, only in recent months.
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I recall a report about mobile malware. I think this
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was published by I Forget the vendor, where you wouldn't
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think of mobile malware as necessarily quite as subject to
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security analysis as traditional PC malware, and yet so many
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malware families that target mobile devices these days have hundreds
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or thousands of samples out there. There's a malware called
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Godfather with well over a thousand nexus sedarit picks pirate.
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So those kinds of solutions that would have picked up
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based on traditional fingerprints may not suffice anymore, even in
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the mobile realm let alone PCs where we would expect it.
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And there's also the fact of he highlighted briefly their
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behavioral indicators of compromise. This to me seems like where
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cybersecurity across IT and OT has been going lately. Traditional
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indicators of compromise can help. But I recently came across
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report from Mandiant about Chinese ORB. They call them networks
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ORB being short for Operational Relay Box Networks. It's not
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an entirely new concept, but basically in China there is
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an entire economy of folks who provide infrastructure to thread
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actors across the Chinese spectrum. And so where once we
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might have been able to say, you know, look out
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for these servers they've been used by this group, well
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now those same servers are being used by all kinds
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of groups, and so it's less helpful now. So the
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way that we are adapting is by tracking behaviors of
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threat actors rather than static indicators like that. So this
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is a very long way to say that I agree
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with all of the points that CARRY has made.
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Yeah, and you know you're talking about polymorphic. These our
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viruses that change frequently. Either the bad guys change them frequently,
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so there's thousands of variants out there, or they change
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themselves they sort of self evolve. So again there's thousands
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of variants out there, so that signature based solutions have
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a hard time keeping track, you know, publishing enough signatures
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fast enough to track things as they change. The traditional
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sort of alternative to signature based anti virus in the
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industrial space has been whitelisting or application control some people
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call it or allow listing. What it is is a
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list of programs that's allowed to run on your industrial
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computer and blocks everything else. So it doesn't matter what
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the latest signature of the virus is if it isn't allowed,
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if you know it's not on the list of allowed,
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then it's blocked. But you know that class of solution
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allow listing is itself limited. So for example, when you
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install software updates, you have to
update the list of
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allowed applications because you've just changed a whole bunch of
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your applications. You've changed their signatures, you've changed their sizes
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and their you know, so having changed all that, that's
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a vulnerability. If the bad guys can get in there
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and hack the update process, they can get their nasty
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listed as an allowed executable and they're off to the races.
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Other ways that allow listing is is you know, limited,
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Everything is limited. I'm not knocking allow listing. It's a
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it's a useful solution, but bear in mind that you know,
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it tends to focus entirely on executable codes. So DLLs,
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dot xs, dot COM's coming off the hard drive into memory,
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and that's when they apply their checks. If your malware
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is scripted, well, i'm sorry. The Pearl dot x is
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allowed because the operating system needs it, or the the
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control system needs it. Python dot x might be allowed,
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and now you're loading a nasty as text off the drive,
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and allow listing is kind of blind to that. They
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don't really check text files. And you know another class
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of application that that are of bad stuff that you know,
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allow listing is blind to is in memory attacks. So
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if you can comprom something and start executing with a
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buffer overflow or something and start executing your own code
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and inject insert the malware into memory. Again, allow listing
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looks at things coming off the disc. It doesn't look
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at what's happening in memory. So yeah, you know we
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need as well, malware becomes more sophisticated, We need more
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sophisticated tools to diagnose it and deal with it. And
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you know, here's a new kind of tool. And these
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are some examples of why we are always looking for
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sort of the next step in these tools. You talked
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about sort of attacks that can defeat the access control
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as well. Can you go into a little more detail.
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You know, we're going to talk about AI in a second,
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but you know, can we nail down what is sort
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of a modern advanced piece of malware?
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What's it look like?
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And you know, can you sort of not comprehension, not
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every kind of a maount where that come after us?
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Can you give us sort of one example of the
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kind of thing that existing anti virus and access control
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might struggle with.
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Let me pick one example to let the audience get
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their heads around the use of advanced malware and what
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do I mean by a sophisticated level of attack. So
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one comes to mind I mentioned a minute ago, and
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this was the type of attack that really set the
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industry kind of its ear. So I'll date myself back
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to January twenty twenty one. This is when the discovery
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of the Solar Winds attack was happening. Now, this was
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a nation state backed attack and if I step into
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it a minute, it was very very clever. The way
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they did it. It was called a sunburst attack used malware,
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but the way they decided to get in was to
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actually go into Solar Winds infestrutructure and as they were
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packaging there oryan software for an update, they actually put
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in we call a shim form of malware inside that update,
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very very small so that would go through and not
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be easily detected. You didn't want to be doubling the
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size of the update that might get picked off. So
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it was very very thin and its sole objective was
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to get in and as they orian software update was initiated,
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it would be ready to do its one task, and
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that's one task was to call back out of the
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location back to a commanding control location where the rest
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of the attack had happened. Okay, so this is very
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very small piece of malware. Actually being embedded as one
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of the tool sets inside of the Orion update was clever,
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but they also made it what would call polymorphic, so
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as it deposited inside there, it
slightly modified itself so
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that if you were to calculate a signature, it would
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be slightly different for each form of deposit. This makes
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it a lot harder for us to go and say
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we can pick it off, and because it's now embedded
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to a tool set, that makes it very difficult because
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most of today's more sophisticated solutions weren't looking at that
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level trying to figure out what was happening, and it
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only really exhibited one behavior, it did a callback. What
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happened next, though, was after the callback, the attack actually
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had twelve more steps, and the callback brought in another
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form of malware, and that was more what I would
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call it the business end of the attack, so that
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had more capabilities inside of it to launch and step
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up the attack to allow it to figure out what
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was on. And then its other role was then to
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attempt to spread inside the environment if it could, and
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then pull back information and that's when humans would get
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involved and then would begin to take additional steps. So
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that's an example of polymorphic malware enabling the beginning of
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a sophisticated attack that would get by most of the
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protections we have today as an industry. So the next
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part of the attack as it began to evolve, had
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multiple steps, and one of the steps that was in
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the attack, and this was brought up in the Senate
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hearings where they brought in some of the industry leaders
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Palo Alto and CrowdStrike. Of course, Microsoft and Solar Winds
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were in the panel, and they said to them and
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they all agreed, it's like in some of the situations
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you were present on these devices when this attack was occurring.
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I'm trying to quote Marco Ruby Oakes. He asked the
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question it was reported that you were bypassed, and everyone
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in the panel said yes, that was in fact the case.
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So bypass just means that in effect, they either couldn't
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see the attack or more likely, the attackers are actually
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able to have control of the system and basically disable
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them at the task master location at least temporarily. They
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probably come back right up and boot up, but it
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then lets them get by if they're doing something else
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that they might might see an attack. So these were
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fundamentally new sets of challenges that the industry now had
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to face. That you could use basic tools like malware,
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but in the hands of sophisticated actors, they could do
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an awful lot of harm. And as we saw with
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solar winds, it went on for almost a year without
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actually being detected. It was fortunate enough that fireri actually
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saw some of their tools actually leaving their environment, and
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that was the first time that was ever picked up.
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Since then, we've had a series of similar I think
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the industry, the OT industry itself from last count had
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about seven hundred of these types of attacks actually happening,
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not all from the same actor, by the way, but
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other actors, because once the formula was figured out, sophisticated
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attackers could then utilize some of these same techniques. So
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this has been so The ones right after it were
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the colonial pipeline that was a simplified variant of what
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we just heard about, But there's other types of attacks
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that have gone over the years.
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Can we talk about AIE. You know, this is the
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topic here. If we had a magic AI sitting in
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our industrial control system hosts, what would that AI do?
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How would it detect attacks like this?
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Well, that's the part that's the most challenging, and that's
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why you need some form of AI. There are very
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different techniques that are being applied by the attack type.
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Some cases, it's just recognizing that there's form code that's
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appeared here. In other cases, it's like I've got to
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understand that there's an abnormal operation happening in conjunction with
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this legitimate application. There's some form I will call adulteration
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going on here. In other cases, it's the application is
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running fine, but for some reason, it's going from a
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user level trying to escalate itself to a system level
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that allows them to get control of the application. Or
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it's trying to use processes inside the OS that are
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not affiliated with an application, or it's a spoofed application
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variant that's actually trying to initiate the processes on the OS.
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Some of these. I'll bring that up. Is it came
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out in the Pool Party attacks that the last Blackhead
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in the UK. They showed eight different forms of thread
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processes that are available from the OS for the applications
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to use that attackers could easily take advantage of. So
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I've really described three different types of techniques and the
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inside there there's a variety of combinations. So this makes
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it very difficult to figure out how to stop all
319
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forms of attack. If I want to make sure that
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we're doing the best job we can at the host
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to stop whatever may be happening, whether it's a zero
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day form of malware or ransomware that we haven't seen before,
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we haven't seen the IOC patterns and it's trying to
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just do its thing, or it's one of these variations
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of attacks that these sophisticated typically nation state back but
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now it's a crime backed attacks that are out there.
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That these kits are out there and they can vary
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their attacks. So the AI really needs to make sure
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it's saying I can pick off what's happening, and then
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what do I do about it, just like a human would.
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I've identified it's a sophisticated attack, someone's using a privileged escalation.
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I'm going to apply this countermeasure to block it. I've
333
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discovered this is an interesting piece of code that's arrived
334
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here and I need to block it. I recognize that
335
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this application is no longer working the way it should.
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--> 00:21:43.960
It's actually coppying things off into buffer spaces that it
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normally doesn't do. I need to stop that from happening
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and block that operation. Or I've got unattached processes from
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the OS that should not be running. I need to
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make sure I can block them at this moment in time.
341
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So this is where the AI comes into play from
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our experience here in the industry.
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Okay, so let's get specific here. You know, we've been
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talking about the problem sort of in the abstract and we're
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drifting into you know, you folks have this stuff. Can
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you give us just a quick rundown? What do you have?
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How does it work?
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You know?
349
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Why do people deploy it? What are we talking about?
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You? So, in our particular application of this technology is
351
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we built a very lightweight agent and it's different from
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your typical agents. We are going in at If you
353
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understand kernels, especially in the Windows environment or Linux environment
354
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where we play is wetach it ring zero right at
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the kernel level. The reason we do that is we
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want to see everything that's going on as far as
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processes from applications that are leveraging what's happening into the
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kernel and vice versa. The other thing that we do
359
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that makes us fairly unique. We actually have some patents
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on this, so we're hoping it'll stay unique is that
361
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we actually watch device memory continuously. This is the way
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that we can actually pick off some of these techniques
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when you've got adorable use of bupper memory, or you're
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actually seeing some process kicking off where something's being written
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over here into notepad and that's now being imported into
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the application because it's probably giving them access to some
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form of change the application that they want to leverage.
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We do that inside our agent. The markets that we've
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chosen to go after, though, you know, have a variety
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of requirements. We're typically talking about operational technology environments, and
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there's many of them. You know, if you think about manufacturing,
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we're talking about manufacturing floors. We think about utilities. We
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are in the process devices out there that have an
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OS on them that are helping them run and control
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electrical generation and distribution. You're talking about oil and gas,
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same way you're dealing with the processes. So these are
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environments we chose to go after because they are high
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value targets. As we saw what the colonial pipeline is
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a good example. When we get into these environments, we
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also find that you have got other constraints. Typically there's
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not continuous Internet connectivity. In fact, they purposely try to
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limit that as one of the protections. They often have
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limited processing power available left to anything else that's going
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to run besides the production applications. In some cases, some
385
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of these devices that are old or they're running what
386
00:24:51.279 --> 00:24:54.440
I would call old versions of the OS because they've
387
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been trying to sweat that asset for many, many years.
388
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You know. For example, we're deployed in a a large
389
00:25:00.640 --> 00:25:07.039
pharmaceutical around the world, and different locations will have devices
390
00:25:07.319 --> 00:25:10.880
that are in these various lines and you'll see, oh,
391
00:25:10.920 --> 00:25:13.200
I see Windows Server two thousand and eight over here.
392
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Some locations we actually see Windows XP typically service pack too,
393
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which is nice because it's got nice controls. And they're
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still using that asset because they built their applications on
395
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top of that, and everything just runs and in typical
396
00:25:28.359 --> 00:25:32.200
OT fashion, if it works, don't change it. And then
397
00:25:32.240 --> 00:25:37.200
their hope was let's wall off the environment using passive
398
00:25:37.200 --> 00:25:40.319
protections from the networks if we can. And yet what
399
00:25:40.359 --> 00:25:44.279
they found is supply chain attacks get around the network protections.
400
00:25:46.200 --> 00:25:51.160
So what we did is made sure that our application
401
00:25:51.359 --> 00:25:55.759
could run on these older operating systems. It could run
402
00:25:55.839 -->
00:25:59.720
with very very limited amounts of CPU and limited amounts
403
00:25:59.759 --> 00:26:06.799
of memory, so that we could perform and not impact
404
00:26:06.960 --> 00:26:10.839
the performance of the production applications. The benefit of this
405
00:26:10.960 --> 00:26:15.400
approach is that we can go on a myriad of
406
00:26:15.440 --> 00:26:21.000
these devices with many, many different forms of applications. And
407
00:26:21.039 --> 00:26:23.640
I'll go one step further here is when we're deploying
408
00:26:23.640 --> 00:26:27.720
in these environments, we expect to see tens of applications.
409
00:26:27.759 --> 00:26:30.119
In fact, in some cases we actually see upwards of
410
00:26:30.160 --> 00:26:35.359
a thousand of these applications. So our approach as we
411
00:26:35.440 --> 00:26:40.359
deploy is to prevent the adulteration of applications. One of
412
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the side benefits is in these environments is that when
413
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you have this many applications, you're going to have known
414
00:26:49.240 --> 00:26:54.440
vulnerabilities inside those applications by published by cvees, and the
415
00:26:54.559 --> 00:26:57.720
chance of for ever having in them all continuously patched
416
00:26:58.400 --> 00:27:01.440
even an IT environment is almost know and when you
417
00:27:01.480 --> 00:27:04.599
only have a chance to patch maybe once a quarter
418
00:27:04.640 --> 00:27:08.119
at the fastest and more likely in this pharmaceutical company,
419
00:27:08.160 --> 00:27:11.079
it's once a year. You're never going to be patched.
420
00:27:11.920 --> 00:27:14.880
So one of the side benefits was because we go
421
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in and protect these applications from adulteration, the ability to
422
00:27:21.319 --> 00:27:26.920
exploit these vulnerabilities becomes significantly less. I won't say zero,
423
00:27:27.039 --> 00:27:29.440
but we can go down to you a ninety nine
424
00:27:29.519 --> 00:27:32.519
percent chance that we are going to block the exploit
425
00:27:32.559 --> 00:27:35.640
of these applications. And this then becomes a real benefit
426
00:27:35.640 --> 00:27:41.599
because now you've dramatically improved the likelihood that we can
427
00:27:41.680 --> 00:27:46.200
keep these operations operational even during an attack because we
428
00:27:46.279 --> 00:27:50.279
will continuously block those attackers. That's the benefit. When people
429
00:27:50.319 --> 00:27:53.559
went through the risk analysis, they're saying, Okay, I can
430
00:27:53.599 --> 00:27:55.359
look at it. The cost of my line if it
431
00:27:55.359 --> 00:28:00.119
goes down for X number of hours is thousands of dollars,
432
00:28:00.400 --> 00:28:03.279
and if it goes down for a month, it's millions
433
00:28:03.279 --> 00:28:05.519
of dollars. And if you've taken down my risk by
434
00:28:05.559 --> 00:28:08.519
a factor of ninety nine percent, I can actually calculate
435
00:28:08.559 --> 00:28:11.960
a value to that. So these are the benefits that
436
00:28:11.960 --> 00:28:17.559
we're offering. No, the challenge really that is you've got
437
00:28:17.599 --> 00:28:21.319
all these applications, how do we actually make it easy
438
00:28:21.599 --> 00:28:26.839
for these operators to use this technology, so.
439
00:28:26.759 --> 00:28:28.839
There was a lot of stuff there. Nate, let me
440
00:28:28.880 --> 00:28:31.759
come back to the Solar Winds example. Gary said, the
441
00:28:31.799 --> 00:28:35.000
malware came in as part of the Solar wind security updates.
442
00:28:35.039 --> 00:28:39.160
So that would have defeated the white listing the application
443
00:28:39.240 --> 00:28:41.480
control I was talking about, because it would have come
444
00:28:41.519 --> 00:28:45.480
in saying, hey, here's a new authorized executable and the
445
00:28:45.519 --> 00:28:53.279
malware had been flagged as authorized. And then what the
446
00:28:53.319 --> 00:28:56.759
malware was, you know, was something that phone home that
447
00:28:56.880 --> 00:28:58.519
called out to the Internet and said, hey, boss, I
448
00:28:58.519 --> 00:29:00.680
got a live one here, and did not much else.
449
00:29:00.920 --> 00:29:04.079
It was very thin, it was small, It was benign looking.
450
00:29:04.720 --> 00:29:07.279
A lot of malware phones home to the vendor. Not
451
00:29:07.680 --> 00:29:10.160
just malware, a lot of legit software phones home to
452
00:29:10.200 --> 00:29:12.440
the vendor and says, you know, here's what's going on,
453
00:29:12.559 --> 00:29:16.279
because the vendor is helping manage the software. So it's
454
00:29:16.279 --> 00:29:20.160
not that suspicious, you know that the malware is phoning
455
00:29:20.160 --> 00:29:24.599
out to the Internet. The alarming thing is that what
456
00:29:24.640 --> 00:29:26.920
it got on the Internet was here's another whole bunch
457
00:29:26.960 --> 00:29:30.000
of code, and it copied the code that it got
458
00:29:30.279 --> 00:29:33.559
from the Internet into memory and started executing it. And
459
00:29:33.640 --> 00:29:36.839
at that point it became dangerous. It really started doing
460
00:29:36.960 --> 00:29:41.079
nasty stuff, and so again, you know, whitelisting would have
461
00:29:41.160 --> 00:29:43.880
missed it as part of the software update, would have
462
00:29:43.960 --> 00:29:47.559
missed it as in memory, you know, pulling stuff off
463
00:29:47.559 --> 00:29:51.599
the internet or off the socket the connection out to
464
00:29:51.640 --> 00:29:54.480
the internet and inserting it into memory and starting to
465
00:29:54.480 --> 00:29:57.240
execute it. This is where we need, you know, sort
466
00:29:57.240 --> 00:30:00.319
of a deeper insight into execution so that I think
467
00:30:00.319 --> 00:30:03.920
that one example sort of hit all the marks there.
468
00:30:06.680 --> 00:30:10.720
You're doing things that that antivirus and access control don't.
469
00:30:11.880 --> 00:30:14.720
Can I ask, you know, just a clarifying question, when
470
00:30:14.880 --> 00:30:17.160
when your stuff is deployed, do you tend to see
471
00:30:17.160 --> 00:30:20.279
it deployed in addition to antivirus or you know, whitelisting
472
00:30:20.319 --> 00:30:24.359
access control, or are you deployed sort of instead of that.
473
00:30:24.880 --> 00:30:27.039
We've seen it both ways. We designed it so it
474
00:30:27.079 --> 00:30:29.559
would run in parallel, you know, with some of these
475
00:30:30.400 --> 00:30:32.839
ab solutions that are out there, because again we're trying
476
00:30:32.880 --> 00:30:34.759
to go in there and say we're not disrupting your
477
00:30:34.799 --> 00:30:38.720
existing infrastructure. If you have a reason to keep running that, great,
478
00:30:39.200 --> 00:30:45.279
we'll just come in and run alongside. We've never gone
479
00:30:45.359 --> 00:30:48.960
in and they've kept an application. Whitelisting solution there they've
480
00:30:49.000 --> 00:30:52.359
typically just moved to us. So in many cases they
481
00:30:52.400 --> 00:30:56.000
will be running things like Windows Defender and we're running
482
00:30:56.359 --> 00:30:57.559
in addition to that.
483
00:30:58.400 --> 00:31:01.920
You know, your stuff is installed in the kernel. In
484
00:31:01.960 --> 00:31:08.240
my experience, there's longstanding reluctance to deploy any kind of
485
00:31:08.240 --> 00:31:13.559
security technology on existing hosts, in existing OT network, you know,
486
00:31:13.640 --> 00:31:14.559
existing systems.
487
00:31:15.200 --> 00:31:15.880
You know, the.
488
00:31:16.319 --> 00:31:19.720
Vendors sometimes push back and say no, no, no, you've
489
00:31:19.720 --> 00:31:23.319
installed somebody else's software on my system. I don't support
490
00:31:23.359 --> 00:31:26.480
this anymore. You're on your own. There's vendor support agreements,
491
00:31:26.519 --> 00:31:30.880
there's legal agreements that it gets complicated. Can you talk
492
00:31:30.920 --> 00:31:34.400
about that? How you know, how has this technology been
493
00:31:34.440 --> 00:31:38.119
received in an environment that just doesn't want to change anything.
494
00:31:39.000 --> 00:31:41.079
Well, that's an excellent point that you're making, and it
495
00:31:41.160 --> 00:31:44.880
is one of the inhibitors you know, we see, but
496
00:31:44.960 --> 00:31:49.559
it is changing the The industrial automation vendors typically which
497
00:31:49.559 --> 00:31:55.279
you speak are recognizing that there's problems here, and you know,
498
00:31:55.559 --> 00:31:58.319
they can either be part of the solution or they
499
00:31:58.359 --> 00:32:01.519
can be held liable as part of the problem. And
500
00:32:01.920 --> 00:32:04.880
you're seeing a movement there. You know, for instance, we
501
00:32:04.960 --> 00:32:09.559
have just gone public with a relationship with Rockwell and
502
00:32:09.599 --> 00:32:12.039
they are bringing US now in as part of their
503
00:32:12.079 --> 00:32:17.000
solution to solve these types of problems where appropriate. And
504
00:32:17.000 --> 00:32:20.240
we're having these discussions with these other other vendors. In
505
00:32:20.279 --> 00:32:22.960
some cases they are very very regimented, and others are
506
00:32:23.039 --> 00:32:29.079
much more open to provide more modern approaches, if you will,
507
00:32:29.480 --> 00:32:32.440
to stopping these threats, because they are happening, and they're
508
00:32:32.480 --> 00:32:35.599
starting to happen in increasing fashion. So they can't just
509
00:32:36.359 --> 00:32:40.839
tell the customer my leug agreement with you says you
510
00:32:40.880 --> 00:32:45.000
can't run protection to that I haven't approved on your system,
511
00:32:45.960 --> 00:32:49.319
and then find out that their system was compromised because
512
00:32:49.519 --> 00:32:52.799
their applications had vulnerabilities in them that were exploited. So
513
00:32:52.839 --> 00:32:57.160
you can see the challenge is there, right, So these
514
00:32:57.240 --> 00:33:00.359
vendors are now starting to move and it is something
515
00:33:00.359 --> 00:33:02.200
that really has just really happened over the last couple
516
00:33:02.240 --> 00:33:02.599
of years.
517
00:33:03.680 --> 00:33:07.680
You know, you were talking about bad stuff, shims that
518
00:33:08.039 --> 00:33:12.519
download other bad stuff. You know, the shim looks benign,
519
00:33:12.640 --> 00:33:16.319
but it winds up downloading code and xing executing Code's
520
00:33:16.400 --> 00:33:20.039
that's not so benign, you know, just thinking about it,
521
00:33:20.640 --> 00:33:24.880
this is what happens in browsers. Browsers download JavaScript routinely,
522
00:33:24.920 --> 00:33:29.400
they execute the code routinely. You know, if if your
523
00:33:29.440 --> 00:33:33.839
AI forbids downloaded code, does it break the browser? How
524
00:33:33.880 --> 00:33:34.960
do you work with browsers?
525
00:33:36.279 --> 00:33:38.599
Yeah, so that's that's an interesting point. So you know,
526
00:33:38.599 --> 00:33:41.480
when we get into OT environments, you don't typically see
527
00:33:41.519 --> 00:33:46.839
these types of behaviors happening. So they're not downloading apps
528
00:33:46.880 --> 00:33:52.319
through browsers and dynamically executing code, so that's not your
529
00:33:52.319 --> 00:33:55.960
typical behavior that you're going to see. We do have
530
00:33:56.079 --> 00:33:58.640
certain countermeasures though, to all all of us to deal
531
00:33:58.680 --> 00:34:02.720
with things like malicious javascripts running and picking off those
532
00:34:02.960 --> 00:34:05.880
those types of techniques because that may be running independent
533
00:34:05.920 --> 00:34:09.639
of your typical browser download. So we do stop that.
534
00:34:11.119 --> 00:34:14.079
There's a lot of applications in an IT environment, and
535
00:34:14.880 -->
00:34:16.719
to a lot of people surprised, there's a lot of
536
00:34:16.760 --> 00:34:20.760
applications in an industrial control system environment as well. You
537
00:34:20.840 --> 00:34:24.320
might imagine that. You know, there's fewer control systems in
538
00:34:24.360 --> 00:34:28.679
the world than IT networks, but there's still a huge
539
00:34:28.719 --> 00:34:33.679
diversity of applications of software of even hardware out there.
540
00:34:36.039 --> 00:34:39.199
Is it I mean, is it possible for you guys
541
00:34:39.280 --> 00:34:42.559
to learn all of those applications and keep track of
542
00:34:42.599 --> 00:34:45.719
them as vendors release new security updates? Do you do
543
00:34:45.800 --> 00:34:49.360
this sort of centrally, how do you manage that diversity?
544
00:34:50.119 --> 00:34:53.119
Yeah, there are multiple ways to do this, and we
545
00:34:53.159 --> 00:34:58.000
do try to work with the larger industrial automation vendors
546
00:34:58.360 --> 00:35:01.199
in advance to get as many of these as we can.
547
00:35:02.440 --> 00:35:05.400
But we realized early on that we couldn't depend on that,
548
00:35:05.559 --> 00:35:10.280
so we built our application so that once our agent
549
00:35:10.320 --> 00:35:14.599
became active on the device, it would quickly inventory everything
550
00:35:14.639 --> 00:35:18.559
had found running on the host, and they would slowly
551
00:35:18.599 --> 00:35:23.000
also look at everything that was over on the disc. Again,
552
00:35:23.559 --> 00:35:25.880
the word slowly is there because we're trying to make
553
00:35:25.880 --> 00:35:28.639
sure we stay within operational parameters, so we don't slow
554
00:35:28.679 --> 00:35:33.000
down the device at all. So when we do that,
555
00:35:33.280 --> 00:35:36.480
we can inventory everything and in some cases we'll say
556
00:35:36.519 --> 00:35:40.000
we find one hundred applications, you know, we'll build that
557
00:35:41.480 --> 00:35:44.920
list on the device, and each of our individual agents
558
00:35:44.920 --> 00:35:49.840
and all devices will build a list. Now, to make
559
00:35:49.880 --> 00:35:54.559
it easy on the operator, we can come up in
560
00:35:54.639 --> 00:35:57.320
a mode we call prevent mode where we say, okay,
561
00:35:57.440 --> 00:36:00.519
we're going to assume that all the application is we
562
00:36:00.760 --> 00:36:06.320
just built are good, right, Chances are that probably the situation,
563
00:36:07.679 --> 00:36:10.119
and then we have these additional countermeasures that are going
564
00:36:10.199 --> 00:36:14.280
to watch and see if anything else happens which is
565
00:36:14.280 --> 00:36:17.360
not good, you know, one of these tech techniques, and
566
00:36:17.400 --> 00:36:21.480
then those will then trigger us to stop those techniques
567
00:36:22.159 --> 00:36:25.280
and zero it in on the application so that that
568
00:36:25.320 --> 00:36:28.719
can be explored. So this allows the vendors to deploy
569
00:36:28.760 --> 00:36:32.199
our agents out on the devices and just say, okay,
570
00:36:32.239 --> 00:36:35.000
you come up and prevent you allow everything that's running
571
00:36:35.000 --> 00:36:38.039
to run. You turn on your countermeasures to look for
572
00:36:38.079 --> 00:36:42.320
bad techniques. And then what they do is they communicate
573
00:36:42.360 --> 00:36:46.559
to a centralized application that's running inside this customer site
574
00:36:47.159 --> 00:36:52.199
typically and it could be right down on these manufacturing lands.
575
00:36:52.199 --> 00:36:55.079
In some cases we've got running an air gapped environment
576
00:36:55.239 --> 00:36:58.199
factory flowers as we speak, so they don't have normal
577
00:36:58.199 --> 00:37:02.000
connectivity outside world. But the one hundred devices in a
578
00:37:02.000 --> 00:37:05.480
manufacturing floor communicate everything that they've learned on their devices,
579
00:37:05.519 --> 00:37:09.599
and it builds the central manifest and then now you've
580
00:37:09.639 --> 00:37:13.079
got depopulated stuff you like, but now you've actually got
581
00:37:13.320 --> 00:37:16.840
an inventory of every single application on which devices or
582
00:37:16.880 --> 00:37:19.800
which lines, because it'll actually give you that capability to
583
00:37:19.880 --> 00:37:23.239
name the lines. And we found that of extreme use
584
00:37:23.280 --> 00:37:25.119
to a lot of these manufacturers because a lot of
585
00:37:25.159 --> 00:37:28.800
things they don't know. All the applications or the application
586
00:37:28.920 --> 00:37:31.840
variants that are running there on each of their OS platforms,
587
00:37:32.280 --> 00:37:34.679
So it gives them visibility of that, and then they
588
00:37:34.679 --> 00:37:36.880
can say, okay, this is a great I can now
589
00:37:36.920 --> 00:37:39.639
have an approved level of manifest and if something goes wrong,
590
00:37:40.079 --> 00:37:42.719
I can look through that and take out those those
591
00:37:42.719 --> 00:37:45.599
bad applications. Or I can say, you know what, I'm
592
00:37:45.599 --> 00:37:47.599
looking through this list and I really don't like that
593
00:37:47.679 --> 00:37:51.480
notepad is running on these applications because that's something that
594
00:37:51.519 --> 00:37:53.840
could be used by an attacker. So I'm going to
595
00:37:53.880 --> 00:37:57.639
say I want to block that. So the centralized control
596
00:37:57.679 --> 00:38:00.519
system we call our trust center can then an update
597
00:38:00.559 --> 00:38:04.639
out and say block the use of Noepad. So it's
598
00:38:04.639 --> 00:38:06.559
a way for you to control the policies in which
599
00:38:06.599 --> 00:38:10.880
you allow certain applications to run. So this was well
600
00:38:10.880 --> 00:38:15.440
received because I said, we have this large global manufacturer
601
00:38:16.000 --> 00:38:20.400
and they were like, this is good because the
people
602
00:38:20.440 --> 00:38:22.559
on the site trying to run these things don't have
603
00:38:22.639 --> 00:38:26.039
time to go figure everything out. They need something that's simple.
604
00:38:26.480 --> 00:38:29.440
But then when we're looking and doing some periodic reviews,
605
00:38:29.480 --> 00:38:32.559
we can sit there and say, okay, we can examine
606
00:38:32.559 --> 00:38:34.440
what we have here. We can decide what we don't
607
00:38:34.480 --> 00:38:38.119
like running, and we also can get an indication of
608
00:38:38.199 --> 00:38:41.360
all the different variants of these various applications so that
609
00:38:41.400 --> 00:38:44.760
we can do better planning going forward. In the meantime,
610
00:38:44.800 --> 00:38:48.159
they're fully protected from these types of attacks that they're
611
00:38:48.440 --> 00:38:51.800
most concerned with, everything from the zero day ransomware and
612
00:38:51.840 --> 00:38:54.840
malware all the way up to these very sophisticated nations
613
00:38:54.880 --> 00:38:58.199
date backed attacks. They're typically coming in through their supply chain, by.
614
00:38:58.119 --> 00:39:04.119
The way, So that struck me as interesting, Nate. You
615
00:39:04.119 --> 00:39:06.119
know a lot of people have been on the show
616
00:39:06.159 --> 00:39:09.320
talking about asset inventory. You can only protect what you
617
00:39:09.360 --> 00:39:14.199
know you have, but asset inventory in most implementations, in
618
00:39:14.199 --> 00:39:18.760
my understanding, tends to focus on what kind of devices
619
00:39:18.760 --> 00:39:22.880
are there. There's PLCs, there's RTUs, there's protective relays. You know,
620
00:39:22.920 --> 00:39:26.559
there's Windows machines, there's Linux machines. What version of what
621
00:39:26.599 --> 00:39:29.360
OS are they running? What's what version of the OS
622
00:39:29.360 --> 00:39:31.719
are they running, what patch level are they running? What
623
00:39:31.880 --> 00:39:35.719
software has been installed? Has this software been patched? What
624
00:39:35.800 --> 00:39:37.519
these folks are doing is sort of coming at it.
625
00:39:37.920 --> 00:39:41.360
I assume all of that, and and they're going through
626
00:39:41.400 --> 00:39:44.199
and making a long list of all of the executables
627
00:39:44.280 --> 00:39:46.119
that are installed on the machine, which is sort of
628
00:39:46.280 --> 00:39:48.800
the next level of detail. I mean, you know, he
629
00:39:48.880 --> 00:39:52.280
mentioned the example of Notepad. Notepad. You know, there's no
630
00:39:52.800 --> 00:39:56.079
there's no there's nothing in the list of installed software
631
00:39:56.119 --> 00:40:00.199
that says notepads installed. It installs when you install all
632
00:40:00.199 --> 00:40:03.079
the OS. It's not a separate install So having that
633
00:40:03.159 --> 00:40:07.119
sort of more detailed asset inventory is you know, to me,
634
00:40:07.199 --> 00:40:10.079
is interesting. It strikes me as potentially useful in terms of,
635
00:40:10.960 --> 00:40:13.800
you know, additional hardening that you can apply to these machines.
636
00:40:14.880 --> 00:40:16.760
You know, I'm not sure that this was the point
637
00:40:16.800 --> 00:40:19.079
of what you just said there, but you mentioned notepad,
638
00:40:19.119 --> 00:40:23.480
and he mentioned Notepad. I'm wondering, why is Notepad coming
639
00:40:23.480 --> 00:40:25.719
into any of this. That's just the application that I
640
00:40:25.800 --> 00:40:26.920
never use on my computer.
641
00:40:27.519 --> 00:40:30.280
Yeah, it's an application I never use either. It's it's
642
00:40:30.320 --> 00:40:33.400
an application that lets you edit text files. And you know,
643
00:40:33.519 --> 00:40:36.079
if you ever read me file, nobody wants to edit it.
644
00:40:36.159 --> 00:40:38.159
They want to read it. You can read it in
645
00:40:38.519 --> 00:40:40.360
lots of things, the browser will let you read it.
646
00:40:42.760 --> 00:40:47.920
Notepad lets you create text files as well, and apparently attackers,
647
00:40:48.079 --> 00:40:50.119
you know, it's it's one of the tools that attackers
648
00:40:50.159 --> 00:40:53.360
tend to use more than regular users, because the attackers
649
00:40:53.360 --> 00:40:56.440
always need to put some script file you know, down
650
00:40:56.480 --> 00:40:59.679
so you can execute it, or you know, put a
651
00:40:59.719 --> 00:41:02.199
store and license key into a text file so it
652
00:41:02.199 --> 00:41:05.239
can be imported, and so on. So I guess this
653
00:41:05.400 --> 00:41:10.320
is again one of the tools that owners and operators
654
00:41:10.400 --> 00:41:12.480
might look at and say, I never use that, We
655
00:41:12.519 --> 00:41:14.800
don't need that. The only people that are going to
656
00:41:14.880 --> 00:41:17.159
use that are the bad guys. Take it off the machine.
657
00:41:17.239 --> 00:41:20.599
You know, we had an episode I think recently talking
658
00:41:20.599 --> 00:41:23.199
about living off the land when touched on it briefly,
659
00:41:23.239 --> 00:41:25.559
the using tools that are part of the operating system
660
00:41:25.599 --> 00:41:29.599
to launch attacks. This sounds like one of those tools.
661
00:41:30.159 --> 00:41:32.360
Never really occurred to me. But yeah, you know, when
662
00:41:32.360 --> 00:41:35.960
you say it, I never use notepad either. So if
663
00:41:35.960 --> 00:41:38.320
it's only the bad guys doing it, you know, that's
664
00:41:38.519 --> 00:41:43.639
a candidate to take off the machine. You were talking
665
00:41:43.639 --> 00:41:46.000
about the ability to run in sort of an advisory
666
00:41:46.000 --> 00:41:50.280
mode versus an enforcing mode. Is this relevant to let's
667
00:41:50.320 --> 00:41:52.760
call it upset conditions? I mean, how often do you
668
00:41:52.800 --> 00:41:57.119
start the plant from scratch, maybe once a year, and
669
00:41:57.679
--> 00:42:01.079
everything behaves a little bit differently during start up? How
670
00:42:01.119 --> 00:42:04.599
often do you do an emergency shutdown? Hopefully no more
671
00:42:04.639 --> 00:42:07.800
than every few years. And in an emergency shutdown, everything
672
00:42:07.840 --> 00:42:13.280
is different, everything is changing. Do do you make sort
673
00:42:13.280 --> 00:42:16.599
of provision make exceptions in those cases?
674
00:42:17.519 --> 00:42:19.639
Prevent mode is our normal mode. But when we go
675
00:42:19.719 --> 00:42:23.440
into these let's call them updates, usually it's maintenance windows
676
00:42:23.519 --> 00:42:27.800
emergency shutdowns, we just asked that the operators turn us
677
00:42:27.840 --> 00:42:33.000
into detect mode. That way the product keeps running. But
678
00:42:33.119 --> 00:42:35.760
as they make these changes, we're not going to try
679
00:42:35.760 --> 00:42:39.000
to get in the way of things happening, especially like
680
00:42:39.039 --> 00:42:41.960
you said, when there's an emergency going on, or you're
681
00:42:41.960 --> 00:42:44.840
just getting a batch of updates coming in, you know,
682
00:42:44.880 --> 00:42:48.119
from patches to the new revisions of applications coming in
683
00:42:48.480 --> 00:42:53.199
across the board. Then once things settle down, you can
684
00:42:53.480 --> 00:42:57.440
look at what we detected as showing alerts you or not.
685
00:42:57.679 --> 00:43:00.400
It depends on what they want to do. It depends
686
00:43:00.400 --> 00:43:02.519
on the situation, of course. And then if you see
687
00:43:02.519 --> 00:43:06.079
everything is fine from what we reported, you just accept
688
00:43:06.159 --> 00:43:10.760
all those changes. You can say these are all okay
689
00:43:10.760 --> 00:43:17.320
to run as is, basically started fresh and move back
690
00:43:17.320 --> 00:43:20.239
into prevent mode. So all the changes have been accepted
691
00:43:20.639 --> 00:43:23.519
and we run from there. So that's the way that
692
00:43:23.559 --> 00:43:25.920
we deal with that and we find it works out
693
00:43:25.960 --> 00:43:28.519
pretty well because it's just simple toggling of a switch
694
00:43:29.079 --> 00:43:31.760
and then toggling it back on once everything is stabilized,
695
00:43:33.599 --> 00:43:35.760
and you still have an ability to track everything that
696
00:43:35.880 --> 00:43:40.360
happened during that mode where you're doing all those changes.
697
00:43:40.480 --> 00:43:44.039
So we have all these wonderful operational logs to tell
698
00:43:44.079 --> 00:43:46.559
you about exactly what happened. So in a lot of
699
00:43:46.599 --> 00:43:50.320
these environments that are definitely under a lot of scrutiny
700
00:43:51.440 --> 00:43:54.599
compliance reasons, now you now have a complete history of
701
00:43:54.639 --> 00:43:55.280
what's happened.
702
00:43:56.239 --> 00:43:58.559
Well, this has been great, Gary, thank you for joining us.
703
00:43:59.079 --> 00:44:00.719
Before I let you go, so can I ask you
704
00:44:00.760 --> 00:44:02.719
to sum up for us what should know? What should
705
00:44:02.760 --> 00:44:05.199
we be thinking about when we're thinking about this space.
706
00:44:06.239 --> 00:44:09.039
Well, as I start off, you've got to make sure
707
00:44:09.079 --> 00:44:11.840
you've got a solution that has an ability to stop
708
00:44:11.880 --> 00:44:15.440
all these different variations of attack. It doesn't help if
709
00:44:15.440 --> 00:44:17.800
you're only covering twenty percent of the attacks out there.
710
00:44:18.360 --> 00:44:20.599
You've got to cover the full level of attacks in
711
00:44:20.679 --> 00:44:25.320
order to have a solution with efficacy. The other point
712
00:44:25.519 --> 00:44:28.800
I think we want to briefly touch on is that
713
00:44:29.440 --> 00:44:32.159
you can have the best solutions out there, but if
714
00:44:32.159 --> 00:44:36.239
they're not easy to actually implement and deploy and update,
715
00:44:36.920 --> 00:44:40.599
then the solution will not be successful. That's going to
716
00:44:40.599 --> 00:44:45.679
be that simple that operators with minimal training can figure
717
00:44:45.679 --> 00:44:48.239
out how to deploy it. They can come up and
718
00:44:48.280 --> 00:44:51.239
then deal with this as they go through their normal operations,
719
00:44:51.280 --> 00:44:54.239
as they run it or are going through a period.
720
00:44:54.280 --> 00:44:56.719
Whenever I've got a maintenance window running and they're making
721
00:44:56.920 --> 00:45:00.400
updates to all their applications in their environment, I would
722
00:45:00.440 --> 00:45:02.360
say there's a call to action going on right here,
723
00:45:02.400 --> 00:45:06.719
because for so long the industry has tried to stick
724
00:45:06.760 --> 00:45:09.360
with the old ways and the old ways in the
725
00:45:09.400 --> 00:45:12.239
OT world where or try to use passive defenses as
726
00:45:12.320 --> 00:45:15.679
much as possible air gap which means there's no Internet
727
00:45:15.679 --> 00:45:20.519
connectivity as much as possible, and yet the attacks keep coming.
728
00:45:21.800 --> 00:45:27.239
The problem is there's the human element. The industrial automation vendors.
729
00:45:27.559 --> 00:45:30.280
I don't want to pick on them, but they have
730
00:45:30.320 --> 00:45:32.800
to update their applications at some point, so either they're
731
00:45:32.800 --> 00:45:36.719
bringing in people, or they've got third parties that are
732
00:45:36.719 --> 00:45:39.320
coming in, or the customer has third parties coming in.
733
00:45:39.840 --> 00:45:43.119
And that's when we have people walking past the network
734
00:45:43.440 --> 00:45:47.440
and then plugging into these devices, often with USB sticks
735
00:45:47.599 --> 00:45:51.199
or I mean it's laptops and the updates happen, and
736
00:45:51.320 --> 00:45:55.119
so do the problems. So you can't be myopic and
737
00:45:55.199 --> 00:45:57.880
think we can get away with approaches that worked in
738
00:45:57.920 --> 00:46:02.199
the last decade when there's actually ways that defeat them
739
00:46:02.519 --> 00:46:06.159
every day in our environments. So I would say the
740
00:46:06.199 --> 00:46:09.719
takeaway is you're going to look at a solution. You've
741
00:46:09.760 --> 00:46:14.320
got to find one that will work well, drastically reduce
742
00:46:14.400 --> 00:46:18.400
your risk, that's easy to deploy, and then can deal
743
00:46:18.440 --> 00:46:30.000
with these situations where traditional defenses just don't cover the problem.
744
00:46:30.199 --> 00:46:33.000
So Andrew to close out here, Gary's talking a lot
745
00:46:33.039 --> 00:46:37.079
about choosing the right solutions, which solution is a tricky word, right,
746
00:46:37.159 --> 00:46:41.320
Are we really solving something here or are we iterating
747
00:46:41.719 --> 00:46:45.519
on a long history of what we've been doing prior.
748
00:46:46.599 --> 00:46:49.239
That's a good question. I would use the word innovating
749
00:46:49.440 --> 00:46:54.199
rather than iterating. The bad guys keep getting better at
750
00:46:54.440 --> 00:46:57.639
what they're doing. They keep inventing new and different and
751
00:46:57.960 --> 00:47:02.960
subtler ways of a acting us, and so our defenses
752
00:47:03.360 --> 00:47:06.320
need to become more capable. You know, as time goes
753
00:47:06.320 --> 00:47:08.719
by as well as the threat environment changes. And here's
754
00:47:08.760 --> 00:47:12.719
an innovation. Here's a way to address a kind of
755
00:47:12.760 --> 00:47:17.719
attack that is becoming more widely used by the sophisticated,
756
00:47:17.760 --> 00:47:21.920
the high end of the attack spectrum. You know, putting
757
00:47:21.920 --> 00:47:26.719
something benign looking into a software update, putting something benign
758
00:47:26.760 --> 00:47:30.000
looking on a machine, and then loading the nasty in
759
00:47:30.159 --> 00:47:33.920
memory into that benign looking thing. This is you know,
760
00:47:34.039 --> 00:47:36.280
this is the world we live in. This is starting
761
00:47:36.280 --> 00:47:40.760
to happen reasonably regularly. We need technology that's going to
762
00:47:40.800 --> 00:47:44.960
address this threat, you know, the bad guys innovates we
763
00:47:45.679 --> 00:47:46.440
need to as well.
764
00:47:47.199 --> 00:47:50.079
Well. Thank you to Gary Southwell for speaking with you, Andrew.
765
00:47:50.119 --> 00:47:52.320
And Andrew is always thank you for speaking with me.
766
00:47:53.039 --> 00:47:54.440
It's always a pleasure. Thank you, Nan.
767
00:47:55.119 --> 00:47:58.960
This has been the Industrial Security podcast from Waterfall. Thank
768
00:47:59.000 --> 00:48:01.159
you to everybody of their listening.
769
00:48:10.679 --> 00:48:11.119
Mm hmm