Transcrição completa de Meta Muse: When Your AI Assistant Becomes the Attack Surface

people talking about it. 43 00:01:57,380 --> 00:02:00,140 And it's one I saw today was really kind of reminded me 44 00:02:00,140 --> 00:02:03,900 of something we've sort of lost track of. 45 00:02:03,900 --> 00:02:06,580 And that is even the companies 46 00:02:06,580 --> 00:02:08,060 that are creating these things 47 00:02:08,060 --> 00:02:10,140 don't know exactly how they work. 48 00:02:10,140 --> 00:02:11,300 No, they don't. 49 00:02:11,300 --> 00:02:13,500 It's kind of shocking. 50 00:02:13,500 --> 00:02:16,020 And I don't know if you saw the news the other day 51 00:02:16,020 --> 00:02:20,540 about all of the AI tech CEOs met with Donald Trump 52 00:02:20,540 --> 00:02:24,780 at the White House to create this like agreement 53 00:02:24,780 --> 00:02:29,780 that their companies will be regulating this on their own 54 00:02:30,220 --> 00:02:31,420 which is kind of hilarious 55 00:02:31,420 --> 00:02:33,620 because the government doesn't want to regulate it. 56 00:02:33,620 --> 00:02:37,180 And I saw the clip of Dario Amade, 57 00:02:37,180 --> 00:02:38,780 he was very, very awkward. 58 00:02:38,780 --> 00:02:41,420 Like, I mean, he's just a socially awkward individual. 59 00:02:41,420 --> 00:02:43,580 I mean, which tech CEO isn't, right? 60 00:02:43,580 --> 00:02:45,300 But he was kind of saying like, 61 00:02:45,300 --> 00:02:48,780 well, we're still talking about it about the dangers guys 62 00:02:48,780 --> 00:02:50,700 and we haven't agreed yet. 63 00:02:50,700 --> 00:02:52,460 And then, you know, Mark Zuckerberg 64 00:02:52,460 --> 00:02:54,260 and Trump are kind of snickering, you know? 65 00:02:54,260 --> 00:02:59,620 And it's like, they have no idea like how serious this is, right? 66 00:02:59,620 --> 00:03:00,740 No, no, no. 67 00:03:00,740 --> 00:03:02,620 So I'm not about to trust any of these things. 68 00:03:02,620 --> 00:03:03,780 Yeah. 69 00:03:03,780 --> 00:03:06,300 It's, you know, we're delegating our authority 70 00:03:06,300 --> 00:03:07,700 for sending emails. 71 00:03:07,700 --> 00:03:09,980 I mean, in the topic you're talking about today, 72 00:03:09,980 --> 00:03:11,820 I think it's less powerful 73 00:03:11,820 --> 00:03:15,100 because it's just an assistant that I guess is teeing stuff up 74 00:03:15,100 --> 00:03:17,300 and asking you if you want to send it 75 00:03:17,300 --> 00:03:18,580 or waiting for you to do it. 76 00:03:18,580 --> 00:03:22,020 But, you know, the whole industry seems to be moving 77 00:03:22,060 --> 00:03:25,340 towards more automation, which just in a funny way 78 00:03:25,340 --> 00:03:27,500 reminds me of the, there was a movie called Wally, 79 00:03:27,500 --> 00:03:28,340 do you remember that? 80 00:03:28,340 --> 00:03:29,180 Yeah, of course. 81 00:03:29,180 --> 00:03:31,660 Where the guys end up sitting on chairs getting moved. 82 00:03:31,660 --> 00:03:32,500 Yes. 83 00:03:32,500 --> 00:03:33,980 Nobody's spending any effort 84 00:03:33,980 --> 00:03:35,580 either physically or mentally

anymore. 85 00:03:35,580 --> 00:03:39,380 That's our target objective seems to be to do nothing. 86 00:03:39,380 --> 00:03:40,220 Yeah. 87 00:03:40,220 --> 00:03:41,460 We're living Wally in real life. 88 00:03:41,460 --> 00:03:42,300 We are. 89 00:03:42,300 --> 00:03:43,380 That's exactly what is happening. 90 00:03:43,380 --> 00:03:44,700 So talking about Muse, 91 00:03:44,700 --> 00:03:48,460 so this is Metta's really first attempt 92 00:03:48,500 --> 00:03:53,500 at introducing AI agents to a massive population of people. 93 00:03:54,180 --> 00:03:58,180 And AI agents, this isn't something that's brand new, right? 94 00:03:58,180 --> 00:04:00,980 We've been talking about agents for quite a while now. 95 00:04:00,980 --> 00:04:04,020 In fact, I'm using an AI agent, 96 00:04:04,020 --> 00:04:06,420 automate some of the podcast workflow 97 00:04:06,420 --> 00:04:08,500 and maybe we'll do an episode about that one day. 98 00:04:08,500 --> 00:04:10,780 But I've actually found it very useful, 99 00:04:10,780 --> 00:04:14,720 but I would say that it's something that I had to train 100 00:04:14,720 --> 00:04:18,340 after many weeks and months of fine tuning 101 00:04:18,340 --> 00:04:23,060 and of course, human loop oversight of what it's doing 102 00:04:23,060 --> 00:04:26,500 that I'm actually comfortable letting it do the things 103 00:04:26,500 --> 00:04:28,080 that it does for me. 104 00:04:28,080 --> 00:04:31,260 And even when it does those things for me, 105 00:04:31,260 --> 00:04:33,620 it doesn't always do it right. 106 00:04:33,620 --> 00:04:37,180 And even though I have written very specific, 107 00:04:37,180 --> 00:04:41,980 deterministic playbooks for things around the podcast 108 00:04:41,980 --> 00:04:43,580 in terms of like my editing 109 00:04:43,580 --> 00:04:46,700 and some of that manual work, 110 00:04:46,700 --> 00:04:49,700 I find that it still gets that wrong at times. 111 00:04:49,700 --> 00:04:51,980 Maybe 90% of the time it's right, 112 00:04:51,980 --> 00:04:54,700 but you still have to babysit it and oversee it. 113 00:04:54,700 --> 00:04:59,200 And I think that's the thing with this Muse agent. 114 00:04:59,200 --> 00:05:00,860 Of course, Facebook and Metta, 115 00:05:00,860 --> 00:05:03,220 they're saying that, oh yeah, we've tested this 116 00:05:03,220 --> 00:05:06,300 and we verified it and we have all these guardrails 117 00:05:06,300 --> 00:05:07,580 and these controls around it. 118 00:05:07,580 --> 00:05:09,260 And we can talk about some of those things. 119 00:05:09,260 --> 00:05:12,420 Like one, each agent runs in its own 120 00:05:12,420 --> 00:05:15,500 virtual segmented environment, right? 121 00:05:15,500 --> 00:05:16,660 So other agents are not. 122 00:05:16,660 --> 00:05:18,580 Probably ironclad sandbox, right? 123 00:05:18,580 --> 00:05:19,420 Yes, yes. 124 00:05:19,420 --> 00:05:20,540 They're thinking in and out of the chint. 125 00:05:20,540 --> 00:05:23,180 And probably using military grade encryption. 126 00:05:23,180 --> 00:05:24,300 And of course, right? 127 00:05:24,300 --> 00:05:26,060 Yeah, all the things in the troops 128 00:05:26,060 --> 00:05:28,380 that we've talked about that can be easily hacked, right? 129 00:05:28,380 --> 00:05:30,240 But I'm giving them the benefit of the doubt here. 130 00:05:30,240 --> 00:05:33,260 I mean, no doubt that they have tested this. 131 00:05:33,260 --> 00:05:34,420 But what I find interesting, 132 00:05:34,420 --> 00:05:36,180 and we'll link in the show notes the article 133 00:05:36,180 --> 00:05:37,940 from Metta itself. 134 00:05:37,940 --> 00:05:42,020 And they literally say that we know 135 00:05:42,020 --> 00:05:44,940 that Muse will not be right. 136 00:05:44,940 --> 00:05:47,100 Like we know it's going to make mistakes. 137 00:05:47,100 --> 00:05:50,500 We know there is going to be security vulnerabilities. 138 00:05:50,500 --> 00:05:52,380 We know it's gonna attack other websites. 139 00:05:52,380 --> 00:05:54,620 But, and I find it's hilarious. 140 00:05:54,620 --> 00:05:56,860 And they're like, well, now it's publicly available 141 00:05:56,860 --> 00:06:00,460 for anybody with a Metta account to use. 142 00:06:00,460 --> 00:06:04,220 So while on one hand you say, yeah, it's safe. 143 00:06:04,220 --> 00:06:05,300 We've tested it. 144 00:06:05,300 --> 00:06:06,620 And then on the other, 145 00:06:06,620 --> 00:06:09,820 it may do things that you didn't want it to do. 146 00:06:09,820 --> 00:06:11,260 And there could be security issues. 147 00:06:11,260 --> 00:06:13,900 Like we just saw, there was a zero day 148 00:06:13,940 --> 00:06:16,100 that was found recently in, 149 00:06:16,100 --> 00:06:17,780 I believe it was around the workflow 150 00:06:17,780 --> 00:06:20,440 of how this agent works. 151 00:06:20,440 --> 00:06:23,780 And so these things are gonna naturally happen. 152 00:06:23,780 --> 00:06:25,820 But despite all the controls, 153 00:06:25,820 --> 00:06:28,700 and we're not gonna go into every detail 154 00:06:28,700 --> 00:06:29,900 around those guardrails, 155 00:06:29,900 --> 00:06:32,940 but I think they've taken the safest approach 156 00:06:32,940 --> 00:06:35,820 that they can to let people use this. 157 00:06:35,820 --> 00:06:38,900 Now, there's all kinds of controversy already about this. 158 00:06:38,900 --> 00:06:41,580 I read a 404 media article recently 159 00:06:41,620 --> 00:06:45,820 about how Muse is actually using human agents. 160 00:06:45,820 --> 00:06:47,980 So when you tell your Muse agent 161 00:06:47,980 --> 00:06:51,060 to like schedule my doctor appointment for me, 162 00:06:51,060 --> 00:06:53,500 the agent doesn't go to like to your doctor's website 163 00:06:53,500 --> 00:06:55,940 and actually like go through the pages 164 00:06:55,940 --> 00:06:57,580 and schedule the appointment. 165 00:06:57,580 --> 00:06:59,460 It goes through the halfway around the world. 166 00:06:59,460 --> 00:07:00,900 Yeah, yeah, exactly. 167 00:07:00,900 -->

00:07:03,580 It actually gets a human in the loop 168 00:07:03,580 --> 00:07:05,740 to actually make the phone call. 169 00:07:05,740 --> 00:07:08,740 But of course, Metta didn't disclose this 170 00:07:08,740 --> 00:07:09,580 so lower or something. 171 00:07:09,580 --> 00:07:11,420 That's so funny really. 172 00:07:11,660 --> 00:07:14,220 It's come full circle to what people used to joke about. 173 00:07:14,220 --> 00:07:18,340 Like AI is really just a bunch of people in a sweatshop. 174 00:07:18,340 --> 00:07:19,180 Yeah, it is. 175 00:07:19,180 --> 00:07:21,700 There's always people behind the scenes doing things. 176 00:07:21,700 --> 00:07:23,340 And I've actually seen this 177 00:07:23,340 --> 00:07:26,700 with a lot of these AI startups too 178 00:07:26,700 --> 00:07:29,500 is they all claim the big one right now 179 00:07:29,500 --> 00:07:32,260 is in our industry is AI pen testing, 180 00:07:32,260 --> 00:07:34,820 fully autonomous pen testing. 181 00:07:34,820 --> 00:07:38,860 And it looks and appears to be an automated agent 182 00:07:38,860 --> 00:07:40,380 but behind the scene, 183 00:07:40,380 --> 00:07:43,460 there's actually a pen tester driving it. 184 00:07:43,460 --> 00:07:45,060 Well, that's the lean startup model, right? 185 00:07:45,060 --> 00:07:46,620 Is it do stuff that's not scalable 186 00:07:46,620 --> 00:07:48,860 until you find a market, right? 187 00:07:48,860 --> 00:07:49,980 I think it's interesting to me 188 00:07:49,980 --> 00:07:52,020 that since this is the first, 189 00:07:52,020 --> 00:07:56,700 what I would say mainstream AI agent 190 00:07:56,700 --> 00:08:00,020 that is available to the masses 191 00:08:00,020 --> 00:08:02,140 because let's be honest, I mean Metta 192 00:08:02,140 --> 00:08:06,340 because they own WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook. 193 00:08:06,380 --> 00:08:09,580 Like you're talking millions and millions of people 194 00:08:09,580 --> 00:08:11,620 that could be using this now. 195 00:08:11,620 --> 00:08:15,580 And where AI agents in the past and just the recent past, 196 00:08:15,580 --> 00:08:18,300 like literally a couple of months ago 197 00:08:18,300 --> 00:08:21,260 were either corporations and businesses using it 198 00:08:21,260 --> 00:08:24,340 through like Claude Cowork or co-pilot 199 00:08:24,340 --> 00:08:26,980 or open AI has it's now, 200 00:08:26,980 --> 00:08:28,900 I think they call it work or something 201 00:08:28,900 --> 00:08:31,060 where these agents are going out 202 00:08:31,060 --> 00:08:32,820 and doing things on your behalf. 203 00:08:32,820 --> 00:08:34,420 There's a whole open source community 204 00:08:34,420 --> 00:08:35,700 like I use Hermes, 205 00:08:35,700 --> 00:08:39,380 which is a very popular agent harness that's out there. 206 00:08:39,380 --> 00:08:41,020 There's many others as well. 207 00:08:41,020 --> 00:08:45,020 We've talked about Open Claw, all these things. 208 00:08:45,020 --> 00:08:47,900 So, but they've been kind of segmented 209 00:08:47,900 --> 00:08:50,740 to the tech community, right? 210 00:08:50,740 --> 00:08:54,100 But not the general user like my mom 211 00:08:54,100 --> 00:08:58,340 or your grandma can now use a muse agent 212 00:08:58,340 --> 00:09:00,420 and what does that mean? 213 00:09:00,420 --> 00:09:03,300 I think it's wild. 214 00:09:03,340 --> 00:09:06,220 Mobile apps are just part of everyday life now. 215 00:09:06,220 --> 00:09:09,420 Banking, healthcare, shopping, entertainment, you name it. 216 00:09:09,420 --> 00:09:11,940 And with that comes a lot of trust 217 00:09:11,940 --> 00:09:14,100 because users are putting their personal data 218 00:09:14,100 --> 00:09:16,180 directly into your app. 219 00:09:16,180 --> 00:09:17,300 But here's the reality. 220 00:09:17,300 --> 00:09:19,500 Mobile apps are a growing target. 221 00:09:19,500 --> 00:09:22,660 A recent survey found that 72% of organizations 222 00:09:22,660 --> 00:09:26,260 experienced a mobile app security incident last year 223 00:09:26,260 --> 00:09:29,980 and 92% say threats are only increasing. 224 00:09:29,980 --> 00:09:31,980 And the way attackers are going after apps 225 00:09:32,020 --> 00:09:33,580 is pretty sophisticated. 226 00:09:33,580 --> 00:09:35,260 They're reverse engineering them, 227 00:09:35,260 --> 00:09:38,300 modifying them and redistributing fake versions 228 00:09:38,300 --> 00:09:39,860 through phishing campaigns, 229 00:09:39,860 --> 00:09:43,220 side loading and even third party app stores. 230 00:09:43,220 --> 00:09:45,140 So from a user's perspective, 231 00:09:45,140 --> 00:09:47,860 everything can look completely legitimate. 232 00:09:47,860 --> 00:09:49,580 That's why taking a proactive approach 233 00:09:49,580 --> 00:09:52,060 to mobile app security really matters. 234 00:09:52,060 --> 00:09:53,580 You wanna stay ahead of these threats, 235 00:09:53,580 --> 00:09:56,300 not react after the damage is done. 236 00:09:56,300 --> 00:09:58,260 This is where Guard Square comes in. 237 00:09:58,260 --> 00:09:59,700 They provide advanced protection 238 00:09:59,740 --> 00:10:02,100 for both Android and iOS apps, 239 00:10:02,100 --> 00:10:04,340 along with automated security testing 240 00:10:04,340 --> 00:10:06,620 to catch vulnerabilities early 241 00:10:06,620 --> 00:10:08,540 and real-time threat monitoring 242 00:10:08,540 --> 00:10:11,220 so you can actually see what's happening out there. 243 00:10:11,220 --> 00:10:13,660 If your mobile app is critical to your business 244 00:10:13,660 --> 00:10:15,220 and it probably is, 245 00:10:15,220 --> 00:10:17,620 this is something worth paying attention to. 246 00:10:17,620 --> 00:10:20,420 You can learn more at guardsquare.com. 247 00:10:20,420 --> 00:10:24,830 That's guardsquare.com. 248 00:10:24,830 --> 00:10:26,230 It's wild for sure. 249 00:10:26,230 --> 00:10:29,670 I mean, another thing that comes to mind is liability, 250 00:10:29,870 --> 00:10:33,070 I mean, as we know, as you said just now, 251

00:10:33,070 --> 00:10:34,590 these things are gonna make mistakes 252 00:10:34,590 --> 00:10:36,750 and how costly are those mistakes gonna be 253 00:10:36,750 --> 00:10:39,270 or how dangerous or physically 254 00:10:39,270 --> 00:10:40,830 are those things gonna be, right? 255 00:10:40,830 --> 00:10:44,390 So it reminds me again of going back 256 00:10:44,390 --> 00:10:47,830 to the early market discussion 257 00:10:47,830 --> 00:10:49,070 around self-driving cars. 258 00:10:49,070 --> 00:10:50,270 Well, who's gonna be liable 259 00:10:50,270 --> 00:10:52,870 when the car kills somebody? 260 00:10:52,870 --> 00:10:54,430 At least with self-driving cars, 261 00:10:54,430 --> 00:10:55,590 you've got a physical object. 262 00:10:55,590 --> 00:10:57,630 You've got, you had software 263 00:10:57,630 --> 00:10:58,910 that was physically running in it 264 00:10:59,030 --> 00:11:02,990 and you could kind of identify who the owner was 265 00:11:02,990 --> 00:11:04,510 or who agreed to this stuff. 266 00:11:04,510 --> 00:11:07,190 But now everything is so ethereal, right? 267 00:11:07,190 --> 00:11:08,830 You don't really know, 268 00:11:08,830 --> 00:11:10,230 first of all, you don't know where it's running. 269 00:11:10,230 --> 00:11:13,670 You don't know whose authority it's running on 270 00:11:13,670 --> 00:11:16,190 and it's gonna be very complicated, I think, 271 00:11:16,190 --> 00:11:17,910 for this to get ironed out 272 00:11:17,910 --> 00:11:20,350 and if it ever gets ironed out in courts. 273 00:11:20,350 --> 00:11:24,310 It's sort of like when we accept shrink wrap software 274 00:11:24,310 --> 00:11:27,270 not really knowing if it's safe or not 275 00:11:27,270 --> 00:11:28,110 or who's liable 276 00:11:28,110 --> 00:11:30,910 but in the end the software company's got 277 00:11:30,910 --> 00:11:34,350 pretty much protected against anything 278 00:11:34,350 --> 00:11:36,230 other than the cost of the software itself. 279 00:11:36,230 --> 00:11:39,590 So this is gonna be a huge thing, I think, 280 00:11:39,590 --> 00:11:41,230 in terms of liability. 281 00:11:41,230 --> 00:11:43,510 Yeah, I guess I worry mostly 282 00:11:43,510 --> 00:11:46,390 about just the general user, right? 283 00:11:46,390 --> 00:11:48,830 That is not technically savvy. 284 00:11:48,830 --> 00:11:52,190 That doesn't really understand the power 285 00:11:52,190 --> 00:11:55,870 that the Muse agent actually has. 286 00:11:55,910 --> 00:11:59,950 I mean, this thing can answer your emails for you. 287 00:11:59,950 --> 00:12:01,870 It can schedule events. 288 00:12:01,870 --> 00:12:04,030 It can pay your bills. 289 00:12:04,030 --> 00:12:06,710 It can do very, very powerful things 290 00:12:06,710 --> 00:12:09,270 that people don't quite realize 291 00:12:09,270 --> 00:12:11,950 if something goes wrong and it probably will. 292 00:12:11,950 --> 00:12:14,030 Yeah, that wasn't me, that was the agent. 293 00:12:14,030 --> 00:12:14,870 Yeah, exactly. 294 00:12:14,870 --> 00:12:16,510 I've seen this with my own agent 295 00:12:16,510 --> 00:12:19,150 just on a simple thing like a podcast workflow. 296 00:12:19,150 --> 00:12:21,550 Make mistakes, I'll be honest. 297 00:12:21,550 --> 00:12:23,990 I will not trust that with my finances 298 00:12:23,990 --> 00:12:27,150 or making decisions and things 299 00:12:27,150 --> 00:12:31,070 that I as a human need to make 300 00:12:31,070 --> 00:12:33,590 but I worry about the general person 301 00:12:33,590 --> 00:12:37,870 that doesn't quite understand what they're getting into 302 00:12:37,870 --> 00:12:42,870 and we all know Meta does not have the best track record 303 00:12:42,870 --> 00:12:45,870 of user privacy, of security. 304 00:12:45,870 --> 00:12:47,190 These are just the facts. 305 00:12:47,190 --> 00:12:49,150 Like we've been, you could go back 306 00:12:49,150 --> 00:12:51,150 on the archive of this podcast. 307 00:12:51,150 --> 00:12:51,990 Yeah, yep, yep. 308 00:12:52,030 --> 00:12:54,470 Like going back to Cambridge Analytica 309 00:12:54,470 --> 00:12:56,310 and even before that, 310 00:12:56,310 --> 00:12:59,670 that Meta is a very difficult company to trust 311 00:12:59,670 --> 00:13:01,270 for many different reasons. 312 00:13:01,270 --> 00:13:03,310 Well, absolutely, it doesn't take too much, right? 313 00:13:03,310 --> 00:13:07,070 To imagine the discussion during early product roadmaps 314 00:13:07,070 --> 00:13:09,830 to say, you know, how much privacy are we gonna, 315 00:13:09,830 --> 00:13:11,910 you know, how much privacy protection 316 00:13:11,910 --> 00:13:12,870 are we gonna put into this? 317 00:13:12,870 --> 00:13:14,350 Well, our business model, 318 00:13:14,350 --> 00:13:16,310 we may wanna access that data someday, right? 319 00:13:16,310 --> 00:13:20,630 So it's clearly gonna be not as tight as we want. 320 00:13:20,630 --> 00:13:23,030 I mean, there's millions and millions of dollars at stake 321 00:13:23,030 --> 00:13:27,550 and this is obviously a way for Meta to make even more money 322 00:13:27,550 --> 00:13:30,830 and tie this to some subscription or, you know, 323 00:13:30,830 --> 00:13:31,990 something eventually. 324 00:13:31,990 --> 00:13:34,270 We've always said this about social media, 325 00:13:34,270 --> 00:13:36,950 about anything that these social media companies do. 326 00:13:36,950 --> 00:13:38,230 The end of the day, 327 00:13:38,230 --> 00:13:40,270 they are trying to find ways to make money 328 00:13:40,270 --> 00:13:41,870 off of your data. 329 00:13:41,870 --> 00:13:42,710 Yep. 330 00:13:42,710 --> 00:13:43,630 Plain and simple. 331 00:13:43,630 --> 00:13:44,670 That is their business model. 332 00:13:44,670 --> 00:13:45,870 It is, it is. 333 00:13:45,870 --> 00:13:48,350 So I'm interested to hear from all of you. 334 00:13:48,390 --> 00:13:51,030 Are you somebody that's going to try out Muse? 335 00:13:51,030 --> 00:13:54,430 Do you have friends or family members already using Muse? 336 00:13:54,430 -->

00:13:55,270 Let us know. 337 00:13:55,270 --> 00:13:58,550 We'd love to hear your thoughts and your feedback 338 00:13:58,550 --> 00:14:01,430 if this is something that scares the hell out of you 339 00:14:01,430 --> 00:14:05,030 or you are all in and you're using it every day. 340 00:14:05,030 --> 00:14:06,150 We'd love to know. 341 00:14:06,150 --> 00:14:07,030 Yes. 342 00:14:07,030 --> 00:14:09,030 So Scott, it sounds like you have an update 343 00:14:09,030 --> 00:14:11,590 about your digital legacy project. 344 00:14:11,590 --> 00:14:13,950 Yes, the digital legacy tree book. 345 00:14:14,830 --> 00:14:15,990 We're progressing. 346 00:14:15,990 --> 00:14:17,790 I'm probably a few weeks away hopefully 347 00:14:17,790 --> 00:14:19,190 from a Kindle version of it. 348 00:14:19,190 --> 00:14:23,870 So anybody who wants to read an early revision of it 349 00:14:23,870 --> 00:14:25,910 before I publish it can find it. 350 00:14:25,910 --> 00:14:29,030 I have the domain now digitallegacytree.com. 351 00:14:29,030 --> 00:14:31,310 So that's easy to find and you can just go there 352 00:14:31,310 --> 00:14:34,950 and say, start reading and send me your feedback in line. 353 00:14:34,950 --> 00:14:35,790 It's fun. 354 00:14:35,790 --> 00:14:36,630 It's easy to do. 355 00:14:36,630 --> 00:14:39,670 So happy to hear from people on that. 356 00:14:39,670 --> 00:14:43,070 But I mean, just today's discussion makes me think, 357 00:14:43,070 --> 00:14:47,030 first of all, the book itself is all about helping people 358 00:14:47,030 --> 00:14:49,150 ensure that their loved ones can access 359 00:14:49,150 --> 00:14:50,990 the important parts of their digital life 360 00:14:50,990 --> 00:14:52,030 when it matters the most. 361 00:14:52,030 --> 00:14:54,310 So when you die or when you're incapacitated 362 00:14:54,310 --> 00:14:57,910 or any other situations where you might be sort of 363 00:14:57,910 --> 00:15:00,330 long-term not able to access your own stuff. 364 00:15:00,330 --> 00:15:04,630 And certainly the idea of having agents 365 00:15:04,630 --> 00:15:07,070 with your identity acting on behalf of you 366 00:15:07,070 --> 00:15:10,110 which presumably will continue on after you die 367 00:15:10,110 --> 00:15:12,350 if you don't turn it off proactively. 368 00:15:12,350 --> 00:15:14,510 If you don't proactively say, I'm gonna die, 369 00:15:14,510 --> 00:15:15,910 stop doing this stuff, right? 370 00:15:16,910 --> 00:15:18,710 So that's an important discussion 371 00:15:18,710 --> 00:15:20,870 and I'd like to hear from people on whether or not 372 00:15:20,870 --> 00:15:22,350 we should have a session on that. 373 00:15:22,350 --> 00:15:26,270 So yesterday I held our second digital legacy network 374 00:15:26,270 --> 00:15:30,450 live session where we talked about setting up 375 00:15:30,450 --> 00:15:34,710 your emergency recovery contacts for Google, 376 00:15:34,710 --> 00:15:36,990 Facebook, Apple, et cetera. 377 00:15:36,990 --> 00:15:38,750 And

what's really interesting about them 378 00:15:38,750 --> 00:15:41,430 is every one of them does it very differently. 379 00:15:41,430 --> 00:15:43,550 So you might just think you're gonna go into 380 00:15:43,550 --> 00:15:45,150 your account settings and say, 381 00:15:45,150 --> 00:15:47,230 look for emergency recovery contacts 382 00:15:47,230 --> 00:15:50,070 that I can set up in case I die. 383 00:15:50,070 --> 00:15:53,510 And none of them really work exactly that way. 384 00:15:53,510 --> 00:15:56,470 So we had a good discussion and I'll be posting that in, 385 00:15:56,470 --> 00:15:57,630 there's a LinkedIn group called 386 00:15:57,630 --> 00:16:00,390 the Digital Legacy Network, DLN I call it. 387 00:16:00,390 --> 00:16:03,430 And so I'll be putting the recording in that group 388 00:16:03,430 --> 00:16:05,790 but feel free to come and join into that group 389 00:16:05,790 --> 00:16:09,790 and make comments, ask questions, et cetera. 390 00:16:09,790 --> 00:16:12,710 Cause I think the whole idea of the AI stuff 391 00:16:12,750 --> 00:16:14,150 is way beyond the scope of the book 392 00:16:14,150 --> 00:16:16,150 that I've covered so far. 393 00:16:16,150 --> 00:16:18,310 It was trying to get to the basics of making sure 394 00:16:18,310 --> 00:16:21,710 that your key important stuff can be accessed 395 00:16:21,710 --> 00:16:23,310 when needed by people. 396 00:16:23,310 --> 00:16:26,830 But the AI aspect of it needs to be discussed 397 00:16:26,830 --> 00:16:29,190 and people are gonna be asking, 398 00:16:29,190 --> 00:16:32,190 okay, how do I deal with these things now? 399 00:16:32,190 --> 00:16:34,190 It's a great question because you're right, 400 00:16:34,190 --> 00:16:36,710 like these AI agents will just continue on 401 00:16:36,710 --> 00:16:39,550 and they may not even know you're dead. 402 00:16:39,550 --> 00:16:40,390 That's right. 403 00:16:40,390 --> 00:16:42,950 But it's interesting that Google's product 404 00:16:42,950 --> 00:16:45,270 for doing recovery when you die is basically, 405 00:16:45,270 --> 00:16:47,750 it's called the Inactive Account Manager. 406 00:16:47,750 --> 00:16:52,310 And because Google has so many properties or services, 407 00:16:52,310 --> 00:16:54,710 it can sort of tell, if you stop using YouTube 408 00:16:54,710 --> 00:16:59,030 and Gmail all at once, then after some period 409 00:16:59,030 --> 00:17:01,150 of inactivity, a minimum of three months, 410 00:17:01,150 --> 00:17:04,950 which is I think crazy, but it will turn 411 00:17:04,950 --> 00:17:06,870 over your account. 412 00:17:06,870 --> 00:17:09,150 It won't make a determination whether you're dead 413 00:17:09,190 --> 00:17:11,110 or not, just saying this is inactive, 414 00:17:11,110 --> 00:17:13,630 so it has to go to somebody else now. 415 00:17:13,630 --> 00:17:16,430 But that whole idea of being inactive, 416 00:17:16,430 --> 00:17:19,790 how do you determine that when it lets your agent 417 00:17:19,790 --> 00:17:21,670 do stuff for you? 418 00:17:21,670 --> 00:17:22,870 Yep, exactly. 419 00:17:22,870 --> 00:17:24,870 Well, we'll have links to all of that 420 00:17:24,870 --> 00:17:26,950 that Scott just described in the show notes. 421 00:17:26,950 --> 00:17:28,430 So definitely check it out. 422 00:17:28,430 --> 00:17:31,830 We've had a lot of our audience help out with the book. 423 00:17:31,830 --> 00:17:34,510 Yeah, awesome, thanks so much to the listeners 424 00:17:34,510 --> 00:17:35,710 who already helped, yeah. 425 00:17:35,710 --> 00:17:36,710 Yeah, we really appreciate it. 426 00:17:36,710 --> 00:17:37,990 So only another week or two, 427 00:17:37,990 --> 00:17:41,070 but I think to get to comments in before I lock up 428 00:17:41,070 --> 00:17:43,990 this version and send it to Kindle, so. 429 00:17:43,990 --> 00:17:47,270 All right, well, thank you all for listening. 430 00:17:47,270 --> 00:17:50,110 And until next time, stay safe, stay secure, 431 00:17:50,110 --> 00:17:51,550 and stay privates. 432 00:17:51,550 --> 00:17:53,310 Thank you for listening or watching. 433 00:17:53,310 --> 00:17:56,070 If you liked this episode, hit subscribe, 434 00:17:56,070 --> 00:17:57,950 share it with your friends and colleagues, 435 00:17:57,950 --> 00:18:01,230 or jump into our community at sharedsecurity.net 436 00:18:01,230 --> 00:18:03,990 slash supporter to keep the conversation going. 437 00:18:03,990 --> 00:18:06,150 Thanks again, and we'll see you next week 438 00:18:06,150 --> 00:18:08,790 for another episode of Shared Security.