TRANSCRIÇÃO 🔗
WEBVTT
00:00:03.759 --> 00:00:07.919
You are now listening to the Secure AF Podcast.
00:00:11.599 --> 00:00:14.960
Hello and welcome to another episode of the Secure AF Podcast.
00:00:15.039 --> 00:00:19.120
I'll be your host for today, Tainer, and I've got with me here Andrew Hickman.
00:00:19.839 --> 00:00:22.160
You'll notice that we are wearing hoodies today.
00:00:22.239 --> 00:00:25.280
It has finally cooled off here in Oklahoma.
00:00:25.440 --> 00:00:26.879
I'm super thrilled about it.
00:00:27.120 --> 00:00:31.120
We can finally be uh be hackerman in our in our hoodies over here again.
00:00:31.280 --> 00:00:32.640
So I'm I'm very excited.
00:00:32.880 --> 00:00:40.880
But um a lot of you may not know this about Andrew, but he is actually a world-renowned ghost hunter and cryptid hunter.
00:00:41.280 --> 00:00:46.479
Um and we are going to talk today about well, why don't you why don't you let us what's our what's our topic?
00:00:47.039 --> 00:00:48.000
I don't know about world renowned.
00:00:48.640 --> 00:00:50.240
Internationally, absolutely.
00:00:50.719 --> 00:00:51.840
I've done some things.
00:00:52.240 --> 00:00:56.320
Uh yeah, so today we are, you know, it's how it's Halloween season, you know.
00:00:56.560 --> 00:00:57.039
Spooky season.
00:00:57.439 --> 00:00:58.159
Middle October.
00:00:58.320 --> 00:01:10.879
We figure we'd uh let's let's see if we can like uh how can we correlate Halloween and spooky stuff like ghost hunting or cryptids into like what we do?
00:01:11.120 --> 00:01:18.799
So I figured I can think of nobody better than to explain how ghost hunting can teach you about threat hunting.
00:01:19.200 --> 00:01:21.200
I guess that's that's you're the guy.
00:01:21.439 --> 00:01:21.680
Sure.
00:01:21.840 --> 00:01:22.400
Yeah, yeah.
00:01:22.480 --> 00:01:23.200
I've done a little bit.
00:01:23.280 --> 00:01:24.000
I've dabbled.
00:01:24.079 --> 00:01:24.879
I've dabbled.
00:01:25.120 --> 00:01:26.000
It's fun.
00:01:26.239 --> 00:01:29.920
Yeah, so uh I guess let's let's get started.
00:01:30.239 --> 00:01:33.599
Um so what is what what is what is what is ghost hunting?
00:01:33.760 --> 00:01:46.079
All right, ghost hunting, you know, like think of it like when you and your friends in high school, you're trying to, you know, you're bored, you're looking for something to do, you find some spooky building to go into with permission.
00:01:46.799 --> 00:01:50.000
And uh, you know, you you go look for ghosts.
00:01:50.239 --> 00:01:57.040
Um and there's some things, some tools, you know, ghost hunters use, like EMF detectors or voice recorders.
00:01:57.200 --> 00:02:04.879
Maybe you're fancy enough and you got a nice uh IR camera or maybe a thermal camera, you know, you go try to find proof of ghosts in a place.
00:02:05.120 --> 00:02:13.360
And then it got me thinking, you know, we were talking earlier, it's kind of funny because ghost hunting is kind of a lot like pen testing in a way, you know.
00:02:13.520 --> 00:02:13.840
Okay.
00:02:14.400 --> 00:02:22.560
Because, you know, you're going into a building, like you're going into a customer's environment, you know, they're both typically abandoned.
00:02:22.800 --> 00:02:23.439
Yes.
00:02:23.759 --> 00:02:27.120
And uh, you know, you're looking for you're looking for spooky things.
00:02:27.199 --> 00:02:29.199
You're looking for things that would scare them.
00:02:29.439 --> 00:02:29.759
Right.
00:02:29.919 --> 00:02:33.360
Uh and so I I just thought this would be a fun episode.
00:02:33.439 --> 00:02:34.719
Let's see what happens.
00:02:34.960 --> 00:02:40.639
Uh the alias Halloween uh spooked Toberfest, I don't know, whatever you want to call it.
00:02:40.960 --> 00:02:42.080
Should have worn Halloween costumes.
00:02:42.319 --> 00:02:43.919
We should have worn Halloween costumes.
00:02:44.159 --> 00:02:44.560
Oh wow.
00:02:44.800 --> 00:02:45.759
Missed opportunity.
00:02:46.000 --> 00:02:46.159
Yeah.
00:02:46.639 --> 00:02:49.840
You're you could say you're you're dressed up as the Duck Dynasty guy for Halloween.
00:02:50.159 --> 00:02:50.879
Oh, I don't say that.
00:02:50.960 --> 00:02:51.919
I get that every year, dude.
00:02:52.000 --> 00:02:52.400
Yeah, I know.
00:02:52.560 --> 00:02:52.960
Every time.
00:02:53.120 --> 00:02:53.280
Yeah.
00:02:53.599 --> 00:02:54.879
Oh, camo and a beard.
00:02:55.039 --> 00:02:56.960
You must be Duck Dynasty.
00:02:57.120 --> 00:02:57.520
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
00:02:57.759 --> 00:02:58.159
Whatever.
00:02:58.479 --> 00:03:02.240
Um so actually I I have I have ghost hunting questions.
00:03:02.560 --> 00:03:03.919
Oh, you have ghost hunting questions?
00:03:04.319 --> 00:03:06.240
I have threat threat hunting questions.
00:03:06.960 --> 00:03:08.479
We'll get we'll get a little into this.
00:03:08.960 --> 00:03:12.159
So, what how much um I guess validity?
00:03:12.240 --> 00:03:15.360
I guess obviously this depends on what people believe and think about ghosts and whatnot, but yeah.
00:03:15.520 --> 00:03:18.159
How much validity do you think there is behind any of the equipment?
00:03:18.319 --> 00:03:20.639
Like uh what equipment is is useful?
00:03:21.039 --> 00:03:22.080
Uh I don't know.
00:03:22.240 --> 00:03:25.199
I mean, to be honest with you, it's all it's all just kind of fun.
00:03:25.439 --> 00:03:35.759
Like, I think everyone, like, I don't know, thinking about the late 90s, early 2000s, where people got really into ghost hunters, they made it really, I guess, a lot more mainstream than it was.
00:03:36.080 --> 00:03:36.639
Ghost Bros.
00:03:36.879 --> 00:03:37.039
Yeah.
00:03:37.199 --> 00:03:42.080
And then Ghost Adventures, I mean, think what you want about whether it's real or not.
00:03:42.240 --> 00:03:43.280
They're definitely entertaining.
00:03:43.439 --> 00:03:43.680
Oh, yeah.
00:03:44.560 --> 00:03:48.080
So like uh that drew a lot of attention.
00:03:48.240 --> 00:04:00.400
And uh the equipment that people use, I mean, it varies, right,
Load full transcript
depending on how much money you have, whether you're a full-scale TV production or whether you're just a guy in his mom's basement that likes to go ghost hunting as a hobby, right?
00:04:00.479 --> 00:04:03.439
So most people will carry like a voice recorder.
00:04:03.599 --> 00:04:03.919
Okay.
00:04:04.080 --> 00:04:08.240
You know, like to get what's called EVPs, electronic voice phenomena.
00:04:08.400 --> 00:04:11.120
And so is that proof of anything?
00:04:11.759 --> 00:04:12.800
You know, I don't know.
00:04:12.960 --> 00:04:20.399
Some people are like, oh, I carry around a digital one because it's just more convenient because you can record and plug it into a laptop and review from there.
00:04:20.480 --> 00:04:24.160
And other people are, you know, carry like analog, like it records to tape.
00:04:24.319 --> 00:04:28.720
And so you have to go and they think it's a lot more sensitive, I guess.
00:04:28.959 --> 00:04:29.199
Okay.
00:04:29.360 --> 00:04:31.120
Um, so that's one of the things.
00:04:31.279 --> 00:04:39.680
Um and then there's also uh EMF detectors, which is all just kind of a pseudoscience, you know, with ghosts.
00:04:39.839 --> 00:04:48.480
Uh, but it's just a device that um that measures electromagnetic electromagnetic frequencies in an environment.
00:04:48.879 --> 00:04:51.040
So it can be Which is a real thing, though.
00:04:51.439 --> 00:04:58.480
Can an EMF detector be set off by like uh I don't know, you're standing next to a point-to-point wireless fiber.
00:04:58.800 --> 00:04:59.360
Oh, for sure.
00:04:59.680 --> 00:05:00.319
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
00:05:00.480 --> 00:05:03.360
Any anything where there's like an electrical current or signal.
00:05:03.600 --> 00:05:06.240
I don't know about fiber, because that's just light, right?
00:05:06.399 --> 00:05:08.879
Um Well, the the I'm saying the wireless fiber.
00:05:08.959 --> 00:05:12.160
The points of wireless radios, like something like that.
00:05:12.720 --> 00:05:14.240
That's a strong signal points.
00:05:14.800 --> 00:05:28.240
It's anything anything generating like any kind of electromagnetic one that everyone's gonna recognize, like a breaker box, um, that produces a lot of electricity because a lot of electricity goes through that.
00:05:28.480 --> 00:05:28.800
Right.
00:05:29.040 --> 00:05:42.720
Um, and there's um there are people who are super sensitive to electromagnetic frequencies, and it causes them like to get dizzy or nauseous or you know, even maybe even as much as like uh hallucinate things.
00:05:42.879 --> 00:05:48.399
So um, you know, whether that's the the the cause of it or I don't know.
00:05:48.480 --> 00:05:51.680
It's how much better should all saw when it turns out he was a hypochondriac.
00:05:52.079 --> 00:05:52.480
You know what?
00:05:52.560 --> 00:05:56.800
That's probably that's that's probably more frequently the case than not.
00:05:56.959 --> 00:05:57.040
Yeah.
00:05:57.279 --> 00:05:59.759
You know, people just scare themselves into
things.
00:05:59.920 --> 00:06:06.000
And you know, that's a lot of the times that sounds a lot like uh threat hunting and incident response.
00:06:06.240 --> 00:06:07.199
Yeah, yeah, yeah, absolutely.
00:06:07.279 --> 00:06:07.519
Yeah.
00:06:07.680 --> 00:06:10.879
Again, this all correlates quite nicely for what we do.
00:06:11.040 --> 00:06:15.040
You know, I mean think about the people who call us who are like, hey, I'm being hacked.
00:06:15.360 --> 00:06:19.600
It's a lot like the people we used to talk to who'd be like, hey, my house is haunted.
00:06:19.920 --> 00:06:20.319
You know?
00:06:20.560 --> 00:06:20.720
Yeah.
00:06:21.040 --> 00:06:25.759
So there's like it's like the okay, tell me how is your house haunted?
00:06:25.920 --> 00:06:26.319
You know?
00:06:26.560 --> 00:06:33.279
And it's like, oh, I have a dead relative that, you know, they visited me in my my dream and now stuff's moving in my house.
00:06:33.439 --> 00:06:38.240
And um, you know, how can that correlate to people who think they're hacked?
00:06:38.319 --> 00:06:46.639
It's like, hey, I have this relative that works for XYZ three-letter agency, and I made them mad, and now they're, you know, they're hacking me.
00:06:46.879 --> 00:06:49.199
I mean, pretty similar.
00:06:49.759 --> 00:06:51.040
Probably both equally likely.
00:06:51.279 --> 00:06:51.519
Yeah.
00:06:51.759 --> 00:06:53.439
Both equally likely.
00:06:53.680 --> 00:06:56.720
Uh and it, yeah, in those cases, like, are you being hacked?
00:06:56.879 --> 00:06:58.160
Are you being haunted?
00:06:58.399 --> 00:06:59.120
Probably not.
00:06:59.279 --> 00:07:02.000
There's probably, you know, a reasonable explanation there.
00:07:02.160 --> 00:07:04.319
But you know, sometimes you gotta call people.
00:07:04.399 --> 00:07:10.560
You gotta bring in, you know, the experts, like the ghost hunters or alias to help, you know, figure that out for you.
00:07:10.959 --> 00:07:11.519
Very true.
00:07:11.680 --> 00:07:12.399
Very true.
00:07:12.720 --> 00:07:13.120
Yeah.
00:07:13.360 --> 00:07:16.399
Um, other stuff, I don't know, like cameras.
00:07:16.560 --> 00:07:17.600
We use cameras and stuff.
00:07:17.759 --> 00:07:18.000
Okay.
00:07:18.240 --> 00:07:22.399
But I don't know, that doesn't really correlate with the uh I mean, yeah.
00:07:22.720 --> 00:07:23.199
Sure.
00:07:24.079 --> 00:07:25.360
Okay, okay.
00:07:25.759 --> 00:07:33.199
So there's uh people try to kind of I guess uh put some science in there to uh to to put it, or is it all just anti-conscious?
00:07:33.360 --> 00:07:33.920
Oh, for sure.
00:07:34.000 --> 00:07:42.079
It's all, you know, anytime you can inject some kind of scientific basis and in it is going to they, you know, they want validity.
00:07:42.240 --> 00:07:42.560
Right.
00:07:42.800 --> 00:07:43.040
Right.
00:07:43.199 --> 00:07:50.639
And so that that helps increase that validity because or you know, otherwise you're just some kook running around looking for things that aren't real, right?
00:07:51.360 --> 00:07:53.040
Yes, absolutely.
00:07:53.360 --> 00:08:05.839
So I guess uh taking that to kind of what we do day to day, so it's uh how often would you say you get an alert or a uh somebody reaching out where there's just something weird happening?
00:08:06.160 --> 00:08:10.800
Like I mean, on our side, it's probably pretty frequently, you know.
00:08:10.959 --> 00:08:12.560
That's a lot of what we do.
00:08:13.199 --> 00:08:17.519
Where we're in an environment, we see something weird, we go and investigate.
00:08:18.079 --> 00:08:24.240
I mean, again, talking about why we're talking about this and ghost hunting, like you know, you see something weird, you go check it out.
00:08:24.319 --> 00:08:27.680
Is this legitimate or is there a reasonable explanation for this?
00:08:28.000 --> 00:08:35.039
And so on the blue team side, uh threat hunting in an environment is just like ghost hunting, really.
00:08:35.279 --> 00:08:35.600
Yeah.
00:08:35.759 --> 00:08:38.879
Uh you go look for something, you document it.
00:08:39.120 --> 00:08:45.279
Um, do we have like a valid reason for this to be malicious or not malicious?
00:08:45.679 --> 00:08:48.559
Um, and so you get a lot of false positives.
00:08:48.799 --> 00:08:51.679
So it's like, you know, a little more latency in this thing.
00:08:51.840 --> 00:08:52.639
Why is that happening?
00:08:52.720 --> 00:08:55.840
Let's go investigate and see why this process is now slow.
00:08:56.240 --> 00:08:56.559
For sure.
00:08:56.720 --> 00:09:02.080
Or, you know, like, hey, we, you know, this user logged in from this location, we haven't seen that before.
00:09:02.240 --> 00:09:06.480
And it could just be like, oh, well, you know, they're on vacation and they check their emails.
00:09:06.720 --> 00:09:12.720
But whenever you have a login from, you know, Aruba and you've never seen that before, you go check it out.
00:09:12.879 --> 00:09:16.480
Um so sometimes the spooky ghost is a guy on vacation in Aruba.
00:09:16.799 --> 00:09:17.600
Yeah, 100%.
00:09:18.000 --> 00:09:18.159
Yeah.
00:09:18.320 --> 00:09:20.879
I mean, think of it like this way you're in a spooky building, right?
00:09:21.039 --> 00:09:22.480
It's definitely haunted.
00:09:22.720 --> 00:09:27.200
You hear what sounds like someone knocking on a door down a hallway.
00:09:27.600 --> 00:09:29.279
But you're there to look for ghosts.
00:09:29.600 --> 00:09:30.720
So you're gonna go check it out.
00:09:30.960 --> 00:09:31.440
Right, obviously.
00:09:31.600 --> 00:09:32.159
You go down the hallway.
00:09:32.399 --> 00:09:34.320
Because you're looking at it through the framework of ghost.
00:09:34.559 --> 00:09:34.799
Yeah.
00:09:35.039 --> 00:09:38.159
Not the framework of uh who could be in this building.
00:09:38.399 --> 00:09:38.639
Right.
00:09:38.720 --> 00:09:39.200
Yeah, yeah.
00:09:39.600 --> 00:09:52.480
Uh, but let's say you, you know, you're walking down the hallway and uh, you know, you keep hearing this
knocking, and you finally find the rumor, and it sounds like it's coming from, and it sounds like someone's knocking up against a wall or something.
00:09:52.720 --> 00:10:01.360
And you go in and there, you know, there's a window open, a slight breeze, and there's like an old panel of something hanging down that's you know knocking on the wall.
00:10:01.440 --> 00:10:09.519
So you you heard something that seemed weird and unexplainable, but when you go look it out, or when you go check it out, you know, it's benign.
00:10:10.240 --> 00:10:13.200
So um a lot like again, threat hunting.
00:10:13.360 --> 00:10:16.159
Again, like the the guy in Aruba, where hey, that's weird.
00:10:16.320 --> 00:10:20.559
Let's go down this hallway and check it out, but then you know, ah, that guy's on vacation.
00:10:20.720 --> 00:10:22.320
But you got to go look at it first, right?
00:10:22.480 --> 00:10:22.799
Right.
00:10:23.039 --> 00:10:24.159
So, you know.
00:10:24.639 --> 00:10:25.200
Right.
00:10:25.519 --> 00:10:26.879
Okay, okay.
00:10:27.360 --> 00:10:29.200
So, so all right, all right.
00:10:29.279 --> 00:10:32.879
Let's let's do uh let's do a couple uh like A B story here.
00:10:33.039 --> 00:10:33.840
So um Okay.
00:10:34.159 --> 00:10:48.159
You got any uh any stories that were like uh thought was nothing turned out to be something on the ghost side or turned out to be I'm sure you're not like we've proved ghosts, but like that was weird, we can't explain that.
00:10:49.200 --> 00:10:53.039
I mean, yeah, there were times that uh I I was in a old building.
00:10:53.120 --> 00:11:04.639
I I won't name any building names just for you know privacy and and things like that, because I don't want a bunch of people just showing up to some building that, you know, I heard on this cybersecurity podcast this place was haunted.
00:11:04.879 --> 00:11:16.960
Um but you know, there were there were a couple times where um we were in an old building in a place in western Oklahoma that uh had been abandoned for at least 40 or 50 years at the time.
00:11:17.279 --> 00:11:34.080
And um there was a room that occasionally um people would smell a perfume, like a like a floral perfume, and not just like flowers, but specifically like you know, that that fresh perfume bottle scent.
00:11:34.399 --> 00:11:48.159
And uh we were hanging out in that in that room, and it was probably about midnight, one o'clock in the morning, and um, you know, uh that smell came through, and like there were three or four of us that were in there.
00:11:48.240 --> 00:11:59.440
No one wears perfume or clone or anything when we go do this stuff, and uh sure enough, uh just randomly it's like it like a like it whiffed through and then it went away.
00:11:59.679 --> 00:12:00.960
So I don't know what that was.
00:12:01.200 --> 00:12:02.639
That's kind of a weird, yeah.
00:12:02.960 --> 00:12:04.720
How do you disprove or prove a smell?
00:12:04.879 --> 00:12:06.080
Uh I don't think you do.
00:12:06.240 --> 00:12:11.120
I think it's just one of those, well, that's interesting, and then you, you know, you kind of keep it.
00:12:11.279 --> 00:12:11.919
I don't know.
00:12:12.240 --> 00:12:12.879
Yeah.
00:12:13.279 --> 00:12:22.720
Uh but uh, you know, similarly, like you know what we do, like we see things that we don't necessarily action on immediately, right?
00:12:22.960 --> 00:12:28.320
What's some things that you've seen that are like, oh crap, we gotta get on that, and it actually is just benign.
00:12:30.799 --> 00:12:35.840
I can think of one where we had a client who uh was taking pen testing classes.
00:12:36.000 --> 00:12:36.159
Yeah.
00:12:36.559 --> 00:12:39.759
This was back years ago, whenever I was more involved in in the stock.
00:12:40.080 --> 00:12:49.200
And uh they were using secret stump to try to target their domain controller to see if they could dump uh ntds.dit off of the domain controller.
00:12:49.440 --> 00:12:59.039
And so the alert that we got was known M packet utility, secret stump.py executed credential harvesting from domain controller.
00:12:59.360 --> 00:13:00.399
Yeah, that sounds terrifying.
00:13:01.120 --> 00:13:01.919
Yeah, that's bad.
00:13:02.080 --> 00:13:05.120
Immediately quarantining stuff before we're even calling.
00:13:05.200 --> 00:13:06.399
Like immediately.
00:13:06.639 --> 00:13:10.960
Guy doesn't answer the phone, we're kind of freaking out, we're immediately trying to begin remediation.
00:13:11.120 --> 00:13:11.360
Yeah.
00:13:11.519 --> 00:13:13.440
20 minutes later we get a hold of him.
00:13:13.679 --> 00:13:17.279
Oh, yeah, I was just I'm taking these classes and I was checking okay.
00:13:17.679 --> 00:13:30.559
Yeah, and that's one of those situations where like you wish people would like, especially with what we do, like give us a heads up, you know, just because we're not, we're not we try not to be just reactionary, you know.
00:13:30.799 --> 00:13:36.000
We like to have a baseline and you know, we see odd things in people's environments all the time.
00:13:36.240 --> 00:13:54.639
But we typically try to have it, you know, a solid baseline where you know, oh, someone's using an MM MMC to perform a backup for a certain servers in an environment, which you know might look weird regarding like what's going on with Windows shadow copy or something, but you know, it's normally benign.
00:13:54.879 --> 00:14:03.759
Um, but if stuff's if stuff starts messing with like shadow copy on multiple servers all at once, um, that looks pretty weird from our perspective.
00:14:03.919 --> 00:14:04.000
Right.
00:14:04.159 --> 00:14:06.960
You know, we're gonna be like, who's doing this?
00:14:07.039 --> 00:14:08.720
You know, why is this happening?
00:14:08.960 --> 00:14:12.799
Um so what's uh I guess other side of that coin, maybe.
00:14:13.200 --> 00:14:21.919
What what do you got where like uh you know somebody maybe is not sure, or maybe you see something that looks uh well, it's a
little weird.
00:14:22.000 --> 00:14:22.799
I don't know, let's look.
00:14:22.879 --> 00:14:27.679
We're really having to like actually investigate, and then it turns out, oh, there are ghosts in this network.
00:14:27.919 --> 00:14:28.639
Oh man.
00:14:28.799 --> 00:14:32.879
Uh some of my favorite ones revolve around living off the land things.
00:14:33.039 --> 00:14:33.360
Yeah.
00:14:33.679 --> 00:14:43.360
Because unfortunately, a lot of customers still utilize things like Quick Assist uh for legitimate purposes in their environment.
00:14:43.759 --> 00:14:51.279
And Quick Assist is abused a lot by threat actors for um different fishing engagements.
00:14:51.919 --> 00:14:52.720
Yeah, I've used it.
00:14:53.120 --> 00:15:01.120
And I there's been several times where I've seen Quick Assist pop up on a device and we've been like, network contain, no thank you.
00:15:01.279 --> 00:15:07.200
And then we reach out immediately, like, you know, hey, this is uh super suspicious, this gets abused a lot.
00:15:08.159 --> 00:15:16.320
And what's worrisome is that it when it happens in environments where you know the customer does use quick assist legitimately, yeah.
00:15:16.639 --> 00:15:25.200
It's like I'm still making that call that we haven't seen it from specific users or like from from source to destination before.
00:15:25.440 --> 00:15:30.879
And so like we just anytime we see like quick assist pop up, we're probably gonna kill it.
00:15:31.360 --> 00:15:33.519
It's almost like they need a self-signed quick assist or something.
00:15:33.919 --> 00:15:36.000
Yeah, or some other literally anything else.
00:15:36.159 --> 00:15:36.320
Yeah.
00:15:36.480 --> 00:15:42.799
Uh just I don't want to tell them not to use it because like it's there's nothing wrong with the utility other than the fact that it's commonly used before.
00:15:43.120 --> 00:15:44.320
It's commonly abused, yeah.
00:15:44.480 --> 00:15:47.279
Which is, you know, it's it's terrible that that's the case.
00:15:47.440 --> 00:15:49.440
But um, it's it's built in.
00:15:49.519 --> 00:15:51.759
I mean you can hit it with hotkeys.
00:15:52.159 --> 00:15:54.399
And that's why that's why threat actors love it.
00:15:54.639 --> 00:15:55.759
They don't have to install anything.
00:15:56.080 --> 00:15:59.120
I don't have to talk in it to in anyone into doing anything weird.
00:15:59.200 --> 00:16:00.480
Like, it's a built-in backdoor.
00:16:01.039 --> 00:16:01.360
Yeah, yeah.
00:16:01.519 --> 00:16:02.720
I'm your IT team.
00:16:02.879 --> 00:16:04.879
You know, ignore my Russian accent.
00:16:04.960 --> 00:16:06.960
Aaron Powell Or do you see it from clickfix?
00:16:07.120 --> 00:16:10.159
Aaron Powell I don't we don't see it much from click click to fix.
00:16:10.480 --> 00:16:10.720
Really?
00:16:10.960 --> 00:16:11.360
Yeah.
00:16:11.679 --> 00:16:14.879
Um click to fix has some other indicators.
00:16:15.039 --> 00:16:21.360
Um Well, clickFix is essentially it's it's whatever the user
types in, right?
00:16:21.519 --> 00:16:25.200
That's one of the reasons why it's so hard to define what the clickfix attack is.
00:16:25.519 --> 00:16:30.080
It's where you go to a website and it says press Windows R, paste this, right?
00:16:30.720 --> 00:16:32.879
Yeah, it's yeah, it's having you run a command.
00:16:33.200 --> 00:16:37.919
But that's where where the quick assist is is different, is it's most typically Vishing.
00:16:38.320 --> 00:16:38.480
Okay.
00:16:38.960 --> 00:16:47.840
Because they're they're asking you, you know, hit Windows Q, uh, it's gonna ask for a code, and then they need that code to be able to connect into your system.
00:16:48.080 --> 00:16:48.240
Right.
00:16:48.480 --> 00:16:50.799
I mean, we utilize it in our vishing engagements too.
00:16:51.120 --> 00:16:56.799
Yeah, I usually tell people, hey, we're gonna connect, hey, I need to verify your two-factor code to verify your auth, your identity.
00:16:57.039 --> 00:16:57.200
Right.
00:16:57.519 --> 00:16:58.879
Let me verify your identity.
00:16:59.039 --> 00:16:59.200
Yeah.
00:16:59.440 --> 00:17:01.120
And then they read me the code and then we're in.
00:17:01.440 --> 00:17:02.240
Then you're in, yeah.
00:17:02.399 --> 00:17:03.600
Yeah, that's pretty common.
00:17:03.759 --> 00:17:29.680
But I mean, that that's uh one of those situations where we've seen a quick assist pop up when we network contain, you know, first, and then start calling people, and it turns out that yeah, that individual took a call from their IT department, ignored that they were calling from an external team's phone number, but because it came through Teams, it gave it a little bit more legitimacy.
00:17:29.920 --> 00:17:30.319
Oh, okay.
00:17:30.480 --> 00:17:46.319
And so instead of this individual reaching out to their actual security team or their IT team, they just read, you know, company name IT on this team's call and said, okay, well, you're calling from our IT, so obviously you're trying to help me, you know.
00:17:46.480 --> 00:17:55.920
So um, but being able to like identify that and then lock out the system, you know, um, kill those connections, change passwords, things like that.
00:17:56.000 --> 00:18:16.000
Because there's always the concern that, you know, once they got connected, regardless of how long they were in there, you know, most of it's like, well, they connected, and then I saw, you know, a black window open up, you know, and so they were open up command prompt or some kind of PowerShell to try to look through something or maybe try to pull data real quick, um, something like that.
00:18:16.240 --> 00:18:26.240
So, you know, any kind of we always recommend in those instances that those those end users or any account that's on that system have passwords changed.
00:18:26.480 --> 00:18:26.559
Right.
00:18:26.799 --> 00:18:32.000
Because you know you never know what they may have quickly scraped in that that short amount of time that they were in.
00:18:32.079 --> 00:18:33.440
So I'm even worse.
00:18:33.519 --> 00:18:34.720
I re-image that thing.
00:18:34.880 --> 00:18:35.680
Re-image that machine.
00:18:35.920 --> 00:18:36.000
Yeah.
00:18:36.160 --> 00:18:39.279
I mean, yeah, but that's you know how I am with that.
00:18:39.359 --> 00:18:41.759
If uh something inconveniences me, I rebuild the machines.
00:18:42.000 --> 00:18:42.319
That's true.
00:18:42.559 --> 00:18:46.000
Yeah, and a lot of the times, like that's just easier.
00:18:46.319 --> 00:19:01.039
But we see these organizations that they have virtual environments, and so you know, you might have 20 or 30 users logging into the same virtual machine somewhere on different accounts, and that creates issues, right?
00:19:01.359 --> 00:19:02.079
Yes, it does.
00:19:02.319 --> 00:19:05.039
Uh it's kind of painstaking, which I you know, I get it.
00:19:05.119 --> 00:19:06.079
There's nothing wrong with that.
00:19:06.160 --> 00:19:10.799
Um well, it's a better case for roaming desktop or if you're you know using a thin cloud.
00:19:11.279 --> 00:19:16.079
Especially like especially being like you know, remote work, work from home and stuff.
00:19:16.400 --> 00:19:26.000
Um you don't have to have such a um you know capable system if you're just using it to log into some other resource somewhere.
00:19:26.160 --> 00:19:27.440
So it makes sense.
00:19:28.000 --> 00:19:38.880
Um off topic, how do you feel about I kind of have a feeling, but how do you feel about uh people using thin clients versus using full clients for security purposes?
00:19:38.960 --> 00:19:40.319
Aaron Powell For security?
00:19:40.480 --> 00:19:41.599
I kind of get it.
00:19:41.759 --> 00:19:56.240
Um but also that adds another layer of complexity to it as well, because now you have a whole nother client that controls everything that you have to keep as secure as possible, or else people get into literally everything.
00:19:56.640 --> 00:20:12.640
I mean, we saw that talk at DEF CON uh where it really seemed like a lot of the thin client vendors weren't that concerned or just weren't that mindful of security behind those.
00:20:12.960 --> 00:20:21.920
I mean, we saw a guy uh getting um like TPM keys from a uh an Ubuntu USB.
00:20:22.079 --> 00:20:28.720
Yeah, he was just uh booting to Ubuntu and was able to pull all the keys.
00:20:31.680 --> 00:20:32.799
That's terrifying.
00:20:33.039 --> 00:20:33.279
Yeah.
00:20:33.759 --> 00:20:36.480
Talk about spooky stuff in October, like Yeah.
00:20:36.720 --> 00:20:44.079
Uh yeah, I think that um at the end of the day, you're still operating on a Windows system from most likely, and it's not really any more secure.
00:20:44.240 --> 00:20:44.400
Right.
00:20:44.640 --> 00:20:49.119
It only adds something else for people to touch because that thin client does have an IP.
00:20:49.279 --> 00:20:49.440
Yeah.
00:20:49.680 --> 00:20:57.359
So if you have some kind of a zero day on the thin client or some kind of an unpatched old thin client
or something like that, I feel like it actually adds something else that can be hit.
00:20:57.519 --> 00:21:01.839
Um I think it's uh pretty unlikely that it's actually your concern.
00:21:01.920 --> 00:21:05.279
I think I think most likely it doesn't change anything.
00:21:05.599 --> 00:21:12.400
But people seem to have this idea that it makes more security because they're like, oh, we don't have these computers on our desk that you can just come.
00:21:13.039 --> 00:21:17.839
If anything, it might get into that obscure that security by obscurity stuff.
00:21:18.160 --> 00:21:18.480
Maybe.
00:21:18.720 --> 00:21:22.720
You know, because you're making the environment a little more complex.
00:21:23.279 --> 00:21:31.920
But honestly, once someone gets into the environment, if they can get to your thin client, like I mean, they're gonna hit the thin client too, right?
00:21:32.079 --> 00:21:43.519
Like especially these threat actors that that are the ransomware actors where they're uh they're motivated by money, they want to cause as much disruption and damage as possible for the most case.
00:21:43.680 --> 00:21:47.519
I mean, some of them just, you know, exfiltrate data and extort.
00:21:47.920 --> 00:21:52.319
But I mean, talk about ransom re ransoming like thin clients and stuff.
00:21:52.640 --> 00:21:53.920
Oh, yeah, that'd be gnarly.
00:21:54.079 --> 00:21:56.160
Yeah, I I don't I don't know.
00:21:56.400 --> 00:21:57.759
That's probably a brick thin client.
00:21:57.920 --> 00:21:58.240
Yeah, yeah.
00:21:58.400 --> 00:22:01.759
Cause I at what like how do you Back up all of that.
00:22:02.240 --> 00:22:03.279
Well, there's nothing to back up.
00:22:03.440 --> 00:22:04.079
You just have to have a lot of things.
00:22:04.240 --> 00:22:04.880
That's what I'm saying.
00:22:06.799 --> 00:22:08.480
Like you gotta have.
00:22:09.119 --> 00:22:15.519
I mean, in my mind, you have to have like physical replacements to be able to put into place, right?
00:22:15.680 --> 00:22:16.319
Yeah.
00:22:16.559 --> 00:22:25.200
Um that costs money and it kind of in a small way defeats the purpose of ThinClient to begin with, because it's supposed to be more cost effective.
00:22:25.440 --> 00:22:28.240
I haven't run across that in the wild yet, but I'd be curious.
00:22:28.559 --> 00:22:29.440
A ransom thin client?
00:22:29.599 --> 00:22:30.960
I've never heard of that either, actually.
00:22:31.039 --> 00:22:35.200
So, you know, like I said, I don't think it's super likely, but I mean, it's possible.
00:22:35.359 --> 00:22:36.319
It'd be crazy.
00:22:36.480 --> 00:22:37.519
I kind of want to do it.
00:22:37.759 --> 00:22:38.160
It's true.
00:22:38.319 --> 00:22:40.799
Hey, I have the guy's contact who uh who did that talk.
00:22:41.119 --> 00:22:42.799
We may, yeah.
00:22:44.799 --> 00:22:46.799
Hey, what'd be the best way to poke at this?
00:22:47.039 --> 00:22:47.200
Yeah.
00:22:47.359 --> 00:22:49.680
Help me ransom these thin clients in my lab.
00:22:49.920
--> 00:22:50.559
Yeah.
00:22:51.680 --> 00:22:55.680
That'd be a good, that'd be another, you know, next year DEF CON talk to you, for sure.
00:22:55.920 --> 00:22:56.079
Yeah.
00:22:56.160 --> 00:23:01.200
Hey, last year he he did this, but this year, ransoming.
00:23:01.279 --> 00:23:02.960
Uh no, that's pretty cool.
00:23:03.279 --> 00:23:04.079
All right, man.
00:23:04.240 --> 00:23:09.359
So so let's talk about it from the perspective of like a vulnerability assessment side.
00:23:09.599 --> 00:23:09.759
Okay.
00:23:09.920 --> 00:23:10.160
All right.
00:23:10.319 --> 00:23:11.039
Let's hear it.
00:23:11.279 --> 00:23:19.359
So again, we're going into as a ghost hunter, you're going into environments that are, you know, sometimes they're benign.
00:23:19.440 --> 00:23:24.319
You know, they don't it's some new building, but there's a terrible story, you know.
00:23:24.720 --> 00:23:30.319
Or you're going into an old abandoned asylum and it's just spooky in general, but really there's nothing there.
00:23:31.279 --> 00:23:34.880
What's one of the scariest things that you ran into on a pen test?
00:23:35.440 --> 00:23:36.240
Oh man.
00:23:36.640 --> 00:23:45.599
Um, there's been quite a few times where we found, you know, criticals on a live external where I'm calling them immediately like, hey, this is a big problem.
00:23:45.759 --> 00:23:56.079
Um, one of them was for a state government, and I had root access to the districting software on ArcGIS so we could redistrict things.
00:23:56.799 --> 00:23:58.799
So that's gerrymandering.
00:23:58.960 --> 00:23:59.119
Yeah.
00:23:59.359 --> 00:24:06.640
Um so theoretically, with that access, you could have gerrymandered districts very subtly and changed elections for the whole state.
00:24:06.880 --> 00:24:07.119
Yeah.
00:24:07.680 --> 00:24:09.039
That's a pretty bad critical.
00:24:09.200 --> 00:24:09.599
Yeah.
00:24:09.920 --> 00:24:15.200
Um we've had one, it was a big MSP.
00:24:15.359 --> 00:24:23.119
I was able to dump uh through uh an API, I don't want to get too specific, uh, all of their client data, essentially.
00:24:23.359 --> 00:24:30.480
So who all their clients are, their contacts with the clients, what services they do for their clients, the IPs, the licenses, the hosts, everything essentially.
00:24:30.960 --> 00:24:34.720
I mean, it was it was the full, full database, being able to dump it.
00:24:34.880 --> 00:24:46.799
Um I've had lots of times where you know it's hey, we got root on this web server, or um another or fun one that I've had a couple of times is uh Ike aggressive mode on your firewalls.
00:24:46.960 --> 00:24:48.240
A lot of people overlook that.
00:24:48.559 --> 00:24:48.960
Oh, for sure.
00:24:49.279 --> 00:24:58.160
Um so you know, you're going to, and you don't necessarily know that it's it's not super commonly exploited for some reason, but you know, you'll go, oh, I think this network's you know probably fine.
00:24:58.240 --> 00:25:03.440
You write, you know,
they've done pen tests before, they've been around, I'm not aware of them being hacked, they're in a reasonable environment.
00:25:03.680 --> 00:25:08.240
You find Ike aggressive on something, you can negotiate it with it if you get to pull the hash.
00:25:08.480 --> 00:25:10.079
But it comes down to can you crack the hash?
00:25:10.319 --> 00:25:10.640
Right.
00:25:10.880 --> 00:25:12.000
Sometimes the answer is yes.
00:25:12.160 --> 00:25:12.319
Yeah.
00:25:12.559 --> 00:25:14.880
Sometimes that secret key is not like that strong.
00:25:15.039 --> 00:25:18.160
They just think about it like, okay, I need this phrase to get these things to negotiate.
00:25:18.240 --> 00:25:18.799
They don't think about it.
00:25:19.200 --> 00:25:20.559
Right, nothing else is ever gonna hit it.
00:25:20.640 --> 00:25:20.720
Yeah.
00:25:21.039 --> 00:25:22.640
They don't think about it the same way as a password.
00:25:22.799 --> 00:25:22.960
Right.
00:25:23.119 --> 00:25:25.759
Because oh, you have to actually have Ike can associate to this.
00:25:25.839 --> 00:25:28.240
Who's gonna set up a firewall and create an Ike tunnel?
00:25:28.319 --> 00:25:28.720
I will.
00:25:28.880 --> 00:25:29.119
Yeah.
00:25:29.359 --> 00:25:36.160
Um but but yeah, and then you can bridge your network to theirs, and then suddenly you're you're in full network.
00:25:36.319 --> 00:25:38.079
I mean, it's uh Yeah, that's pretty scary.
00:25:38.240 --> 00:25:41.359
And a lot of people use that Ike aggressive just because it is easier.
00:25:41.519 --> 00:25:53.519
There's less you have to fiddle with, and people are like, you know, they think with the IPsec and stuff that it's like, oh, you know, it's so much more secure, but it's still got something out on the internet listening, right?
00:25:53.680 --> 00:25:53.920
Yeah.
00:25:54.000 --> 00:25:59.920
Like it's still got an interface that's that's listening for a certain protocol that other people might be able to hit.
00:26:00.160 --> 00:26:08.400
And, you know, the SSL VPN stuff is kind of going on the wayside now just because how often it's abused and people poke at it all the time.
00:26:08.480 --> 00:26:13.359
And there's not a really good way to prevent people from poking at it, right?
00:26:13.680 --> 00:26:17.920
Uh yeah, SSL VPN is a huge, huge opening.
00:26:18.480 --> 00:26:21.039
Um most people have it at this point.
00:26:21.200 --> 00:26:23.039
I mean, you kind of largely have to.
00:26:23.279 --> 00:26:31.359
If you still have a mostly on-prem environment and you have remote workers or mobile workers or anything like that, I mean you largely need an SSL VPN of some sort.
00:26:31.680 --> 00:26:47.039
Um and it typically comes down to in days, I will say, not necessarily zero days, but in days where it might not be a zero day, but it might have been released a day ago or two days ago.
00:26:47.359 --> 00:26:50.319
And how quickly are you guys actually updating and patching your firewalls?
00:26:50.559 --> 00:26:50.640
Right.
00:26:50.880 --> 00:27:00.799
So even if your vendor has your vendor says, hey, there was this thing that got, you know, this exploit happened, somebody finds the exploit, they ride a POC same day.
00:27:01.200 --> 00:27:16.559
Your day one, if you have a five-day window to update your firewall, and that POC hits Twitter on day one, or it hits a crime forum or something like that, uh, your threat actors grab it, they're gonna start spraying that across the whole internet.
00:27:16.960 --> 00:27:17.119
Sure.
00:27:17.359 --> 00:27:26.160
They don't care who you are, they don't care what you do, they care that you run a sonic wall on this particular firmware and you are vulnerable to this.
00:27:26.480 --> 00:27:28.559
And you are getting hit because you are vulnerable to it.
00:27:29.359 --> 00:27:32.400
Um that's typically how I see SSL VPN get popped.
00:27:32.559 --> 00:27:38.079
I mean, of course, there's the phished credentials, stolen tokens, things like that, obviously, right?
00:27:38.319 --> 00:27:38.400
Right.
00:27:38.640 --> 00:27:48.880
But one of the one of the worst things I feel like that comes in is as far as like standard exploitation initial access is coming through those firewall vendor early exploits.
00:27:49.200 --> 00:27:49.440
Yeah.
00:27:49.599 --> 00:27:59.200
And I I think that's kind of like one of the scariest things that we see on on firewalls and SSL VPNs is like there's no hardening to it at all.
00:27:59.359 --> 00:27:59.680
Yeah.
00:27:59.920 --> 00:28:11.359
Um, like they're just like, oh, well, you know, they have to have a username and a password, like no one could ever figure out, you know, like their username is, you know, their first name, last name of whatever.
00:28:12.160 --> 00:28:30.240
Um and then again, a lot of the times, if you're the type of person that reuses the same password for everything, and you had an account from 10 years ago for some company that got breached, and there's a name and a password, well, there's something that someone could try right there.
00:28:30.400 --> 00:28:30.720
Yep.
00:28:30.960 --> 00:28:36.880
And a lot of the times it's gonna be the same password because you reuse the same password everything so you can remember it.
00:28:37.039 --> 00:28:40.960
Uh, and then, you know, when there's no MFA on it, then people get right in.
00:28:41.119 --> 00:28:41.279
Yeah.
00:28:41.599 --> 00:28:46.160
Um, and so yeah, that's definitely scary.
00:28:46.319 --> 00:28:47.920
We see a lot of that, unfortunately.
00:28:48.160 --> 00:28:48.319
Yeah.
00:28:48.480 --> 00:28:54.240
I mean, that's been a big portion of the incident responses that that we've worked has been unsecured SSL VPN.
00:28:54.559 --> 00:28:55.519
Oh, yeah, for sure.
00:28:55.759 --> 00:28:59.839
Um, I think uh obfuscating usernames is actually pretty good to do.
00:29:00.319 --> 00:29:02.400
I always recommend it, and no one ever does it.
00:29:02.720 --> 00:29:03.519
It's a pain to do.
00:29:03.680 -->
00:29:03.839
Yeah.
00:29:04.079 --> 00:29:10.160
Um, especially if you're doing it with email because then you have to set up an alias for your email, or or there's other things that you have to do.
00:29:10.400 --> 00:29:13.039
This goes back to doing whatever we were doing OneDrive enumeration.
00:29:13.279 --> 00:29:13.680
Right.
00:29:13.920 --> 00:29:22.160
Um, where I was uh for years able to enumerate, and there's still ways to do this on Teams, it's harder, but you can still do it on Teams.
00:29:22.400 --> 00:29:30.319
Where you essentially would take the US Census database, and I would take every possible first name, last name at with with the format, right?
00:29:30.400 --> 00:29:30.480
Right.
00:29:30.720 --> 00:29:37.119
So you would create lists that was first initial, last name, first name, dot last name, last name, first initial, whatever.
00:29:37.359 --> 00:29:40.640
And you would create all these lists of the US Census database.
00:29:40.880 --> 00:29:42.640
And there's other countries that have databases too.
00:29:42.720 --> 00:29:45.440
You don't just have to use US, but if you're targeting US.
00:29:45.599 --> 00:29:55.519
Um and then we would throw it at uh Microsoft's OneDrive, and it would tell us essentially this account has the wrong password when you try to log in, right?
00:29:55.680 --> 00:29:57.359
Or it would tell you this account does not exist.
00:29:57.599 --> 00:29:57.680
Right.
00:29:58.000 --> 00:30:01.920
And so and that's an oversimplification of how to actually work, but that's that's essentially what it was.
00:30:02.240 --> 00:30:07.359
Um and so you could spray the entire US Census census database in like 14 hours.
00:30:08.160 --> 00:30:08.640
That's wild.
00:30:09.039 --> 00:30:10.480
So and I would do that every engagement.
00:30:10.559 --> 00:30:12.960
And I would always get all their usernames for years.
00:30:13.119 --> 00:30:15.279
And everybody would ask me, how do we fix this?
00:30:15.440 --> 00:30:17.200
And I'm like, well, it sucks, but here's what you do.
00:30:17.359 --> 00:30:17.440
Yeah.
00:30:17.680 --> 00:30:21.359
Um you either have to disable my personal sites, which a lot of people are using.
00:30:21.519 --> 00:30:23.119
That means you can't have your own personal OneDrive.
00:30:23.359 --> 00:30:23.519
Right.
00:30:23.759 --> 00:30:25.680
A lot of people use that, so that's not an option.
00:30:25.839 --> 00:30:30.319
And if that if that's the case, well you need to be able to use uh a different email.
00:30:30.559 --> 00:30:32.720
So no, everybody gets to change their email address.
00:30:32.960 --> 00:30:36.480
So the only the only answer to it sucks, really.
00:30:36.960 --> 00:30:39.200
Um but that's that's sometimes what it is.
00:30:39.599 --> 00:30:39.759
True.
00:30:39.920 --> 00:30:42.160
Yeah, sometimes it is what it is.
00:30:42.720 --> 00:30:49.119
You want to go into any any other kind of uh uh ghost hunting methods or cryptid hunting methods?
00:30:51.039 --> 00:30:53.839
I don't know, ghost hunting is other spooky we got.
00:30:57.119 --> 00:31:05.440
Trying to think of like how I ask you about terrifying things you've seen out out out there.
00:31:06.319 --> 00:31:09.920
Oh gosh, what can I say?
00:31:10.079 --> 00:31:13.599
There's a lot of things I I think of that I'm not sure that I want to say on a podcast.
00:31:13.920 --> 00:31:14.319
That's fair.
00:31:14.400 --> 00:31:14.559
Yeah.
00:31:14.640 --> 00:31:23.440
Um I have seen where every user in an environment had admin to absolutely everything and people weren't aware of it.
00:31:24.720 --> 00:31:25.440
I've seen that.
00:31:25.759 --> 00:31:26.720
That's super terrifying.
00:31:27.039 --> 00:31:28.079
Um yeah, it is.
00:31:28.319 --> 00:31:28.960
It is.
00:31:29.359 --> 00:31:31.599
Uh won't come into too much detail there.
00:31:31.759 --> 00:31:31.920
Yeah.
00:31:32.160 --> 00:31:34.400
But that one's uh that one's pretty terrifying.
00:31:34.720 --> 00:31:35.920
How many users?
00:31:36.400 --> 00:31:36.720
Oh.
00:31:37.279 --> 00:31:39.119
How many admin users were there?
00:31:39.279 --> 00:31:40.160
Just for the audience.
00:31:40.400 --> 00:31:41.359
Was roundabout.
00:31:41.759 --> 00:31:44.559
I want to say it was like 9,000.
00:31:45.119 --> 00:31:46.720
9,000 admin users?
00:31:47.519 --> 00:31:47.599
Yeah.
00:31:47.839 --> 00:31:50.960
9,000 users with administrator to every workstation.
00:31:52.319 --> 00:31:53.680
Yeah, it's pretty spooky.
00:31:53.920 --> 00:31:54.160
Yeah.
00:31:54.480 --> 00:31:55.039
That's pretty bad.
00:31:55.440 --> 00:31:55.759
It was.
00:31:55.920 --> 00:31:56.160
It was.
00:31:56.400 --> 00:31:56.720
Yeah.
00:31:57.759 --> 00:31:59.279
Um man.
00:32:00.079 --> 00:32:05.119
So we could always get into the like campfire story portion.
00:32:05.839 --> 00:32:06.160
Okay.
00:32:06.319 --> 00:32:08.480
You know, sitting around a campfire.
00:32:08.799 --> 00:32:11.440
You're telling your your spookiest ghost stories.
00:32:11.680 --> 00:32:12.000
All right.
00:32:12.319 --> 00:32:20.720
I guess uh do you have any real spooky like what what's a what's a you know, like a an actual ghost story?
00:32:20.880 --> 00:32:23.200
You got any you got anything interesting?
00:32:24.960 --> 00:32:25.279
No.
00:32:26.240 --> 00:32:33.039
Never experienced anything weird or nothing spooky ever happened at your house or no, not too much.
00:32:33.279 --> 00:32:33.920
Not too much.
00:32:34.240 --> 00:32:34.960
That's boring.
00:32:35.119 --> 00:32:35.759
Yeah.
00:32:36.240 --> 00:32:37.599
That's a shame.
00:32:39.519 --> 00:32:41.759
Ever seen anything weird fly in the sky?
00:32:42.160 --> 00:32:44.000
Like, I can't explain that.
00:32:45.359 --> 00:32:46.240
Probably.
00:32:46.400 --> 00:32:46.880
Yeah.
00:32:47.039 --> 00:32:47.440
Yeah.
00:32:47.599 --> 00:32:52.880
I usually I don't know, I'm very like, I just assume I'm wrong about things like, oh wow, that's crazy.
00:32:53.039 --> 00:32:55.279
That's some
satellite I've never seen.
00:32:55.519 --> 00:32:58.000
Like the first time I saw Starlink, that freaked me out.
00:32:58.160 --> 00:32:58.880
Oh, yeah, for sure.
00:32:59.039 --> 00:33:00.240
I was like, what the heck?
00:33:00.400 --> 00:33:04.799
I just I looked at it for like 15 minutes before I started Googling and I figured out it was the Starlink.
00:33:05.039 --> 00:33:05.599
Starlink, yeah.
00:33:05.920 --> 00:33:06.640
Yeah, it's pretty cool.
00:33:07.039 --> 00:33:08.240
I've never seen it, it's very cool.
00:33:08.480 --> 00:33:08.640
Yeah.
00:33:08.720 --> 00:33:12.240
Have you seen like the SpaceX launches and like the weird I've seen photos?
00:33:12.480 --> 00:33:12.720
Yeah.
00:33:13.119 --> 00:33:14.319
Those are pretty cool.
00:33:14.559 --> 00:33:20.000
And apparently we like people have been like, we've been ro launching rockets for a long time.
00:33:20.160 --> 00:33:21.519
Like, well, we've never seen this.
00:33:21.599 --> 00:33:25.599
And really, it turns out because we just used to always launch them during the day.
00:33:25.759 --> 00:33:26.000
Oh.
00:33:26.319 --> 00:33:28.480
So you never never saw them.
00:33:28.799 --> 00:33:30.240
Yeah, so that's kind of interesting.
00:33:30.480 --> 00:33:32.400
What about the if wonder if there's a reason they do it at night?
00:33:32.480 --> 00:33:33.839
Some astrophysicists tell us.
00:33:34.160 --> 00:33:34.559
Yeah, yeah.
00:33:34.640 --> 00:33:43.599
If you're an astrophysicist or rocket scientist, hit us up on social media or um, I would love to talk to you about launching rockets.
00:33:43.839 --> 00:33:46.799
Yeah, we'll talk to you on the podcast about launching rockets.
00:33:47.119 --> 00:33:48.480
Honestly, that'd be pretty cool.
00:33:49.359 --> 00:33:51.279
What's the security behind rockets?
00:33:51.519 --> 00:33:52.240
I have no idea.
00:33:52.799 --> 00:33:54.160
This is this is unfounded terrorism.
00:33:54.400 --> 00:33:55.839
It's gotta be it's gotta be pretty high right now.
00:33:56.000 --> 00:33:57.119
Yeah, anyways, yeah.
00:33:57.279 --> 00:34:02.880
Astrophysicists, rocket scientists, space, SpaceX people, NASA, whatever, whatever.
00:34:02.960 --> 00:34:03.519
Hit us up.
00:34:03.920 --> 00:34:05.680
What's your what's your favorite spooky story?
00:34:06.079 --> 00:34:08.079
My favorite spooky story?
00:34:08.559 --> 00:34:09.920
Man, I don't I don't know.
00:34:10.000 --> 00:34:27.840
There's uh in the in the terms of not my story, there's a really interesting story about Sasquatch that is told by a woman who uh was doing uh an extended hike through the marble mountains out west.
00:34:28.159 --> 00:34:32.480
Um, and I I implore everyone to go like uh listen to that.
00:34:32.559 --> 00:34:33.519
It's pretty terrifying.
00:34:33.760 --> 00:34:49.679
Or basically, like she's out hiking on her own and she stops at this like escarpment to uh just go to sleep for the night, and then she just hears this thing screaming through the woods, you know, getting closer and closer to her until like she encounters it.
00:34:49.920 --> 00:34:54.480
But I I wouldn't do it any justice by listening to it, but I would I would look it up.
00:34:54.800 --> 00:34:55.840
Did she say she saw it?
00:34:56.159 --> 00:34:57.679
Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
00:34:57.840 --> 00:34:58.159
Yeah.
00:34:58.480 --> 00:35:00.960
Did it like gesture towards her or anything, or just like run around?
00:35:01.280 --> 00:35:07.039
Yeah, it's like uh she saw it and it saw her and it got like uh oh.
00:35:07.440 --> 00:35:08.239
And it was scared.
00:35:08.400 --> 00:35:09.679
It was like, oh my god, it's a human.
00:35:10.239 --> 00:35:14.000
It was scared, but it was like it was like shocked, you know?
00:35:14.239 --> 00:35:18.320
It's kind of what anyways, I wouldn't do it any justice, but I I would go do that.
00:35:19.119 --> 00:35:20.320
Where can people find that?
00:35:20.719 --> 00:35:23.039
Uh they can find it, yeah, yeah.
00:35:23.119 --> 00:35:25.679
They could find it on the uh Bigfoot and Beyond podcast.
00:35:26.000 --> 00:35:26.159
Okay.
00:35:26.559 --> 00:35:26.719
Yeah.
00:35:27.039 --> 00:35:28.800
It's a shout-out, it's a plug for the Bigfoot and Big Foundation.
00:35:28.880 --> 00:35:29.440
Bigfoot and Beyond.
00:35:29.679 --> 00:35:31.360
Uh shout out to my buddy Matt Pruitt.
00:35:31.760 --> 00:35:32.800
Uh anyways.
00:35:33.039 --> 00:35:35.440
Um otherwise.
00:35:35.840 --> 00:35:37.440
That's that's what we got for our for our spooky.
00:35:37.840 --> 00:35:43.679
Spooky Halloween, spooky cybersecurity stories, and some ghost hunting quips, I guess.
00:35:43.840 --> 00:35:47.599
So I have a spooky ghost story to close this out on.
00:35:47.920 --> 00:35:48.000
Okay.
00:35:48.320 --> 00:35:50.000
Not a ghost story, an admin story.
00:35:50.079 --> 00:35:51.920
Aaron Powell Oh, a spooky admin story.
00:35:52.239 --> 00:35:52.400
Yeah.
00:35:52.639 --> 00:35:52.880
Yeah.
00:35:53.119 --> 00:35:53.440
Okay.
00:35:53.599 --> 00:35:53.760
All right.
00:35:54.239 --> 00:36:01.679
One time I had an admin who told me to see what we could find, and he was positive that we would not find anything.
00:36:02.000 --> 00:36:10.480
So I walked into the office next door of his system admin, and I opened his top right drawer and I found all his passwords in a notebook.
00:36:12.400 --> 00:36:13.920
And we'll close out on that.
00:36:14.320 --> 00:36:15.360
Jump scare.
00:36:15.760 --> 00:36:16.159
All right.
00:36:16.400 --> 00:36:22.800
Thank you everybody for joining us on a uh really light-hearted, little less serious uh secure AF episode.
00:36:23.280 --> 00:36:24.559
Just a fun Halloween episode.
00:36:25.039 --> 00:36:26.000
Happy Halloween, everyone.
00:36:26.800 --> 00:36:27.519
We'll catch you next time.
00:36:27.760 --> 00:36:28.079
Bye.
00:36:29.119 --> 00:36:33.920
The Secure AF podcast is a production of Alien Cybersecurity.
00:36:34.079 --> 00:36:37.840
Visit us online at aliascybersecurity.com.
00:36:38.000 --> 00:36:39.599
All rights reserved.