Transcrição completa de The Detective's Files: True Crime Tales With Jacques Morrell – Police Surveillance

that's taking place. That's what they that's how the 74 00:04:31.439 --> 00:04:34.079 Chinese regime behaves. 75 00:04:34.360 --> 00:04:39.120 Sure, so some cultures are not necessarily comfortable with it, 76 00:04:39.199 --> 00:04:45.360 but they accept it or have to accept it a 77 00:04:45.399 --> 00:04:51.160 little bit like career criminals have to accept the pitfalls 78 00:04:50.480 --> 00:04:53.480 of being monitored, which. 79 00:04:53.360 --> 00:04:58.079 Is and something that happens electronically or something that happens 80 00:04:59.160 --> 00:05:04.040 in person by as you see in every Hollywood movie 81 00:05:04.079 --> 00:05:07.759 to do with detective work. A van full of guys, 82 00:05:07.839 --> 00:05:10.519 there's a real to real tape recorder in there, somewhere, 83 00:05:10.560 --> 00:05:13.959 there's someone wearing headphones, and at some point they either 84 00:05:14.000 --> 00:05:17.079 have to get out of there quick because they've been spotted, 85 00:05:17.360 --> 00:05:21.000 or they all go piling out and arrest somebody. Is 86 00:05:21.040 --> 00:05:23.600 that what happens in practice? I'd like to think it was. 87 00:05:23.720 --> 00:05:25.720 I'd like to think it was. You know, every job 88 00:05:25.759 --> 00:05:29.160 you did was like an episode of Homeland. 89 00:05:29.279 --> 00:05:32.759 It would be great, it would be great. This. I 90 00:05:32.800 --> 00:05:38.879 think we're both agreeing here that we as humans or 91 00:05:39.240 --> 00:05:44.399 do get nervous about the motives of another individual or 92 00:05:44.480 --> 00:05:49.079 an organization, you know, being sort of intrusive, sort of 93 00:05:49.120 --> 00:05:51.839 looking asking questions, are they you know, are they watching me? 94 00:05:51.879 --> 00:05:56.920 Are they are they following me? I mean, coming from 95 00:05:56.959 --> 00:06:05.040 a police background, I think we generally can can smell 96 00:06:05.079 --> 00:06:09.879 that unease in people because I guess, I guess being 97 00:06:09.879 --> 00:06:14.839 a court nobody, nobody really likes to engage with the police, 98 00:06:15.560 --> 00:06:19.480 whatever the scenario is. So there's an element of unease 99 00:06:19.759 --> 00:06:23.839 when the police interact with the public, and no one's 100 00:06:23.879 --> 00:06:28.759 really relaxed when a police officer is known to be present. 101 00:06:29.120 --> 00:06:33.800 And I guess that's natural and quite normal, until, of course, 102 00:06:35.040 --> 00:06:41.439 that unease becomes sort of more paranoid, more affecting your 103 00:06:42.439 --> 00:06:43.319 day to day life. 104 00:06:44.199 --> 00:06:47.040 I suppose if you've got nothing to hide, your conscience 105 00:06:47.120 --> 00:06:50.279 is clear, you shouldn't feel uncomfortable in the presence of 106 00:06:50.319 --> 00:06:52.720 a police officer, should you. 107 00:06:52.759 --> 00:06:55.240 No, But I think it's it's it is just natural 108 00:06:55.319 --> 00:06:58.720 because I don't know, maybe everyone thinks they've got something 109 00:06:59.600 --> 00:07:06.160 to hire not necessarily have committed a capital crime, but 110 00:07:06.480 --> 00:07:09.879 that you know, we've all done something. We think, oh yeah, 111 00:07:10.399 --> 00:07:14.959 why is that happening? Or am I being falsely accused 112 00:07:15.000 --> 00:07:17.560 of something or suspected of something? Yeah? I think it's 113 00:07:17.560 --> 00:07:19.439 just that general and ease in the population. 114 00:07:20.000 --> 00:07:22.959 That's interesting almost like a lack of trust, isn't it? 115 00:07:23.360 --> 00:07:27.560 And yet you've set that against policing by consent, people 116 00:07:27.800 --> 00:07:32.639 allow you to police them. So hmm, interesting philosophically, isn't 117 00:07:32.639 --> 00:07:35.560 it that one? I'm just wondering as well, if with 118 00:07:36.480 --> 00:07:39.480 three decades of experience as a copper on the beat 119 00:07:39.519 --> 00:07:43.839 and also as a detective, you develop an instinct for 120 00:07:44.120 --> 00:07:48.560 when somebody's being evasive, for when somebody is lying. I'm 121 00:07:48.560 --> 00:07:55.000 thinking about body language micro signals that you see sometimes 122 00:07:55.040 --> 00:07:59.600 on dramas and drama documentaries where a police officer or 123 00:08:00.879 --> 00:08:04.199 a trained investigatable go, aha, I know they're lying now 124 00:08:04.279 --> 00:08:07.639 because they look down and to the left, or you know, 125 00:08:07.680 --> 00:08:10.920 their pupils have dilated or something like that. You know, 126 00:08:11.600 --> 00:08:14.040 is is that what happens in practice? 127 00:08:14.240 --> 00:08:15.439 Could you do that to me? 128 00:08:15.600 --> 00:08:18.560 Could you walk out onto the street and say, don't 129 00:08:18.600 --> 00:08:20.319 like the look of him. He looks like a crook. 130 00:08:22.879 --> 00:08:26.399 I don't personally rely on that too much to a 131 00:08:26.439 --> 00:08:31.079 point that any human interaction you try and build up 132 00:08:32.080 --> 00:08:36.279 either an element of trust or lack of trust or 133 00:08:36.440 --> 00:08:38.919 en ease, but there can be there's so many factors 134 00:08:38.919 --> 00:08:42.799 involved there that you know you have to sort of 135 00:08:42.840 --> 00:08:48.200 read each scenario as it as it stands. I mean, 136 00:08:48.240 --> 00:08:52.879 it's interesting you say that. I do recall quite a 137 00:08:52.879 --> 00:09:00.000 bizarre sequence of meetings or interactions with a career criminal 138 00:09:00.120 --> 00:09:06.679 who I've known and seen over over many years, who 139 00:09:06.759 --> 00:09:12.159 knows my face. I know his face, and it was 140 00:09:13.080 --> 00:09:15.000 a couple of years ago. I'd not seen him for 141 00:09:15.000 --> 00:09:19.720 some time, and I was in a pub, a very 142 00:09:19.720 --> 00:09:25.080 busy pub. I'm tall, this individual is tall, and we

143 00:09:25.200 --> 00:09:28.639 sort of our eyes met over the sea of heads 144 00:09:28.639 --> 00:09:33.720 in this in this busy pub, and I sort of 145 00:09:33.720 --> 00:09:37.200 did a dtour because you know, I didn't particularly wasn't 146 00:09:37.240 --> 00:09:40.240 particularly interested in a conversation with him. I was there 147 00:09:40.279 --> 00:09:44.559 for other matters and worked my way round to the bar, 148 00:09:44.720 --> 00:09:47.360 and next minute he he appeared in front of me 149 00:09:47.440 --> 00:09:50.480 with a with a sidekick, and he was he was 150 00:09:50.600 --> 00:09:56.679 very chatty, which was absolutely fine. We sort of reminisced. 151 00:09:57.120 --> 00:10:02.559 He dropped out names of fellow officers going back twenty 152 00:10:03.120 --> 00:10:07.879 thirty years what more in fact, so he was referencing 153 00:10:07.960 --> 00:10:13.080 me to a long time ago, and it was all 154 00:10:13.200 --> 00:10:20.279 very superficial, but lighthearted. And I saw him in various 155 00:10:20.279 --> 00:10:24.159 scenarios two or three times in the following days or 156 00:10:24.159 --> 00:10:27.360 a couple of weeks. And at one time he was 157 00:10:27.759 --> 00:10:32.639 walking on the street with a child in school uniform. 158 00:10:33.960 --> 00:10:37.519 And we're acknowledged again because of that first interaction where 159 00:10:37.519 --> 00:10:43.759 he'd approached me and he said something in front of him, 160 00:10:43.759 --> 00:10:45.759 said that are you you know you're not following me? 161 00:10:45.840 --> 00:10:50.440 Are you again? In a joky way, but he chose 162 00:10:50.480 --> 00:10:54.360 to say it, so we laughed about that, and this 163 00:10:54.799 --> 00:10:56.919 seemed to carry on. It was one of these strange things, 164 00:10:56.960 --> 00:10:59.240 you know, where you end up you're in a remote 165 00:10:59.279 --> 00:11:02.720 airport in the world and you look across the carousel 166 00:11:02.759 --> 00:11:05.759 waited for your case, and you you see somebody you know, 167 00:11:05.919 --> 00:11:06.879 you know, it's all a bit. 168 00:11:07.159 --> 00:11:09.080 Yes, happened to me, It's happened to me. I'm sure 169 00:11:09.200 --> 00:11:10.320 it's happened to a lot of people. 170 00:11:10.559 --> 00:11:14.759 Yeah. And the final scenario was it was again I 171 00:11:14.799 --> 00:11:20.120 was with some friends and we were leaving a bar. 172 00:11:21.399 --> 00:11:23.360 I think we were going somewhere for a meal, and 173 00:11:23.440 --> 00:11:26.000 I knew there was a big football match on that 174 00:11:26.000 --> 00:11:29.320 that night, and he was there, and he was with 175 00:11:29.440 --> 00:11:35.279 a a girlfriend of some description at the time who 176 00:11:35.320 --> 00:11:40.159 stood there, and again there was an acknowledgment and I 177 00:11:40.200 --> 00:11:44.720 said to him, you know where you're going to watch 178 00:11:44.720 --> 00:11:49.600 the game tonight,

assuming he was he was doing just that, 179 00:11:49.799 --> 00:11:51.960 and he sort of just turned back and he said, 180 00:11:52.600 --> 00:12:02.120 wherever you're not as a way of closing down any lighthearted, 181 00:12:02.679 --> 00:12:07.000 friendly relationship that we'd sort of built up over the 182 00:12:07.039 --> 00:12:08.159 previous few weeks. 183 00:12:08.559 --> 00:12:11.000 So it's being confrontational. Then it wasn't another joke. 184 00:12:11.080 --> 00:12:13.480 It was a oh no, it was confrontational. Yeah. Whether 185 00:12:13.480 --> 00:12:17.080 it was to impress the girlfriend who he was with, 186 00:12:18.159 --> 00:12:22.159 don't I don't know. But it shut down. It shut 187 00:12:22.200 --> 00:12:27.000 down that bromance that was that had been developing between us. 188 00:12:27.919 --> 00:12:32.200 Quite funny really, so he yeah, he and the fact 189 00:12:32.240 --> 00:12:35.240 that it also announced on that first meeting that he was, 190 00:12:35.519 --> 00:12:39.200 you know, keeping out of trouble now he was going straight. 191 00:12:39.440 --> 00:12:42.840 He was this, that and the other. And then it 192 00:12:42.879 --> 00:12:46.080 got back to the well, I'm not having anything to 193 00:12:46.120 --> 00:12:48.600 do with you because you're a cop. 194 00:12:48.799 --> 00:12:52.000 Well, habits die hard. I suppose don't they. 195 00:12:52.120 --> 00:12:55.360 They do. I mean, if he'd not approached me that 196 00:12:55.840 --> 00:13:00.960 initial time, it would have been just an odd yeah, 197 00:13:01.159 --> 00:13:03.960 just eye contact, a nod. He knows who I am, 198 00:13:04.200 --> 00:13:06.639 I know who he is, and we get on with 199 00:13:06.679 --> 00:13:10.879 our lives separately, you know. But he was the one 200 00:13:10.919 --> 00:13:16.320 to initiate some conversation and then he was the one 201 00:13:16.360 --> 00:13:18.200 to completely close it down. 202 00:13:18.200 --> 00:13:20.600 Maybe he did think it was a form of surveillance. 203 00:13:21.000 --> 00:13:24.600 I'm thinking about I'm thinking about James Bond. Actually there's 204 00:13:24.600 --> 00:13:27.480 a lovely quote from I forget which book it is, 205 00:13:27.519 --> 00:13:31.559 but anyway, Ian Fleming, who was an intelligence officer who 206 00:13:31.559 --> 00:13:36.480 wrote all the James Bond books. Once his coincidence twice 207 00:13:36.519 --> 00:13:41.200 is unfortunate three times his enemy action, Yes, and maybe 208 00:13:42.159 --> 00:13:44.399 he had that in mind. 209 00:13:44.519 --> 00:13:46.480 And maybe maybe he was doing something criminal. 210 00:13:46.919 --> 00:13:48.399 It could have been he could have been up to 211 00:13:48.399 --> 00:13:50.440 no good on that particular even he were the last 212 00:13:50.440 --> 00:13:51.600 person he wanted to see. 213 00:13:51.960 --> 00:13:55.360 And yeah, so but long way that continue long made 214 00:13:55.399 --> 00:14:02.159 criminals be nervous of the authorities

and the police, because 215 00:14:02.200 --> 00:14:06.519 the day that comes that they're not will be a 216 00:14:06.559 --> 00:14:09.799 sad day, certainly for policing and for society. Yeah. 217 00:14:09.919 --> 00:14:17.200 Sure, thinking about society a large and growing part of 218 00:14:17.279 --> 00:14:20.600 society that is hidden from the general population is the 219 00:14:20.600 --> 00:14:25.639 prison population, isn't it. And I'm curious about how surveillance 220 00:14:25.679 --> 00:14:31.360 operates in prison. Our prisoners under surveillance the whole time 221 00:14:31.679 --> 00:14:35.639 is electronic surveillance used. What are the mechanisms, the legal 222 00:14:35.679 --> 00:14:39.600 mechanisms that allows that to take place? Because the punishment 223 00:14:39.639 --> 00:14:42.679 is deprivation of liberty, right, but you still have your 224 00:14:42.759 --> 00:14:46.879 human rights in prison. So how does it all work? 225 00:14:47.080 --> 00:14:50.519 Can prisoners be bugged? For instance? What goes on? 226 00:14:51.840 --> 00:14:58.000 Well? In simple terms, the police having the powers to 227 00:15:00.320 --> 00:15:07.919 monitor behavior of suspected criminals has always been there. Historically, 228 00:15:09.039 --> 00:15:14.799 authority was given through the command structure in terms of 229 00:15:16.120 --> 00:15:21.519 a written report to justify any surveillance activity, whatever that 230 00:15:21.600 --> 00:15:26.480 might be. It was then superseded in the year two 231 00:15:26.519 --> 00:15:34.120 thousand with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which really 232 00:15:34.200 --> 00:15:38.759 brought in all methods of surveillance, particularly now technology the 233 00:15:38.840 --> 00:15:45.639 digital world was coming and monitoring of cameras you mentioned 234 00:15:45.879 --> 00:15:51.840 and audio communications, that kind of thing was advancing rapidly, 235 00:15:51.879 --> 00:15:55.080 so it brought it up to date. The only real 236 00:15:55.120 --> 00:16:02.080 difference really with the prison population is that the governor 237 00:16:02.120 --> 00:16:07.759 of the prison needs to manage the discipline and well 238 00:16:07.799 --> 00:16:15.200 being of the establishment, you know, to avoid rioting unresk, 239 00:16:15.559 --> 00:16:21.600 threats to prison officers, threats to other inmates. So the 240 00:16:21.679 --> 00:16:26.679 level of authority is higher in terms of the final 241 00:16:26.720 --> 00:16:29.960 decision has to be made by the governor or on 242 00:16:30.080 --> 00:16:37.080 appeal to the Home Office simply because you know, you 243 00:16:37.120 --> 00:16:42.919 can't have that. There's got to be a control of 244 00:16:43.039 --> 00:16:46.480 discipline within the prison establishment. But other than that, if 245 00:16:46.519 --> 00:16:49.720 it's justified and all these any kind of surveillance has 246 00:16:49.799 --> 00:16:55.919 to be legal, It has to be justified and it 247 00:16:55.960 --> 00:17:02.440 has to be proportionate. There's no point point spending thousands 248 00:17:02.480 --> 00:17:08.240 of pounds to monitor where you go to do your shopping, 249 00:17:09.720 --> 00:17:14.519 you know, because we suspect that occasionally you put a 250 00:17:15.119 --> 00:17:17.720 you know, an extra tin of beans in your shopping. 251 00:17:17.720 --> 00:17:20.359 You know, it wouldn't justify doing a surveillance on that. 252 00:17:20.559 --> 00:17:26.079 It's not proportionate. So that level of authority and the 253 00:17:26.160 --> 00:17:29.599 level of surveillance will depend on the severity of the crime. 254 00:17:30.200 --> 00:17:33.839 The irony is that every time you click allow on 255 00:17:33.880 --> 00:17:37.640 the terms and conditions on a website, you are allowing 256 00:17:37.839 --> 00:17:40.119 your phone to follow you and say, yes, you did 257 00:17:40.119 --> 00:17:42.759 put an extra cann of beans in at tesco's so 258 00:17:43.400 --> 00:17:46.519 that happens. People allow that. They just accept it, don't they. 259 00:17:47.119 --> 00:17:49.599 It's going on, it's part of the warp and weft 260 00:17:49.640 --> 00:17:52.440 of everyday life. And yet when it comes down to 261 00:17:53.240 --> 00:18:00.440 monitoring criminal activity potential antisocial behavior, we get really prickly 262 00:18:00.480 --> 00:18:05.759 about it. Do you think that that's hypocritical that people 263 00:18:05.759 --> 00:18:08.680 have got dual standards. They'll accept it in one set 264 00:18:08.720 --> 00:18:11.519 of circumstances and in another it's a threat to civil liberties? 265 00:18:12.559 --> 00:18:16.319 Yes, exactly, because well we all don't. We all want 266 00:18:16.359 --> 00:18:19.839 to think the police are dealing with the bad people, 267 00:18:21.319 --> 00:18:23.880 But the police deal with a lot, a wide scenario 268 00:18:23.920 --> 00:18:27.559 of things, and when it starts to come on me 269 00:18:27.839 --> 00:18:30.920 or you as an individual, that's when it starts to 270 00:18:32.519 --> 00:18:33.359 great a little bit. 271 00:18:34.200 --> 00:18:40.160 It's interesting you used the words proportionate and justified when 272 00:18:40.559 --> 00:18:45.480 talking about the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, because that's 273 00:18:45.559 --> 00:18:51.559 the phraseology that's used by OFFCOM, the regulator of broadcasters 274 00:18:51.559 --> 00:18:54.319 in the media in the UK, when it comes to 275 00:18:54.680 --> 00:18:59.039 regulating what I'll call it bugging but surreptitious filming or 276 00:18:59.079 --> 00:19:06.279 recording for journalistic purposes. So OFCOM talks about warranted use, 277 00:19:06.519 --> 00:19:11.960 public interest, justification, proportionality, the word that you used. And 278 00:19:12.000 --> 00:19:15.920 again it's got to be a measure of last resort. 279 00:19:16.319 --> 00:19:19.720 You've got to have exhausted all other channels before you 280

00:19:19.880 --> 00:19:25.279 resort to surreptitious filming or recording. When I was at 281 00:19:25.319 --> 00:19:29.759 the BBC, the guidelines for producers talked about crime or 282 00:19:29.799 --> 00:19:35.200 extremely serious anti social behavior as one of the red 283 00:19:35.240 --> 00:19:39.000 flags that would perhaps justify in the minds of the 284 00:19:39.119 --> 00:19:44.640 editorial policy department surreptitious filming or recording. So there seems 285 00:19:44.640 --> 00:19:47.880 to be an alignment between my world and your world 286 00:19:48.079 --> 00:19:52.240 in that we're regulated by the same principles. 287 00:19:52.400 --> 00:19:59.160 Oh totally. You know, it's with the hacking scandal of journalism. 288 00:19:59.200 --> 00:20:01.079 I mean what we're talking out here. With surveillance, there's 289 00:20:01.079 --> 00:20:06.759 there's various methods. There's there's wire taps and bugging, the 290 00:20:06.759 --> 00:20:11.200 intercepting of communications, which is you know, pretty major stuff. 291 00:20:13.039 --> 00:20:16.079 Then there's directors surveillance, the following, the following of people 292 00:20:16.200 --> 00:20:18.839 who we think are going to commit a crime or 293 00:20:20.400 --> 00:20:22.960 are involved in criminality, and we're looking to establish what 294 00:20:23.000 --> 00:20:28.519 their lifestyle is about covert human intelligence sources, you know, 295 00:20:28.680 --> 00:20:33.720 undercover informers. Again, there's always that crossover. And then there's 296 00:20:33.799 --> 00:20:38.920 the the really intrusive one where you actually bugging a 297 00:20:39.039 --> 00:20:47.680 premises with a warrant to go into a premises covertly 298 00:20:49.160 --> 00:20:52.039 and to set up a you know, monitoring which is 299 00:20:53.960 --> 00:20:56.880 you know, if you or I discovered that somebody had 300 00:20:56.920 --> 00:21:00.880 set up a device in our homes, we would be mortified. 301 00:21:01.519 --> 00:21:05.119 So that level, certainly from a policing angle, has to 302 00:21:05.160 --> 00:21:10.960 be It's rare, extremely rare, and has to be so 303 00:21:12.039 --> 00:21:15.160 well justified and documented. I mean the paperwork to do 304 00:21:15.200 --> 00:21:17.680 this kind of thing is enough to put anybody off 305 00:21:17.720 --> 00:21:20.400 from applying. You know, you need to employ somebody for 306 00:21:20.440 --> 00:21:22.960 a couple of days to submit the documentation. 307 00:21:23.240 --> 00:21:24.960 So and then what you had do you have to 308 00:21:25.000 --> 00:21:27.119 go to a judge, to a court to get it 309 00:21:27.200 --> 00:21:29.079 authorized or how does it work? 310 00:21:29.440 --> 00:21:32.119 It goes through a level of authority. Yeah, down down 311 00:21:32.160 --> 00:21:37.160 to to London, to the Commissioners I think they're called. Yeah, 312 00:21:37.200 --> 00:21:40.400 there's there's there's various hoops to to to go through 313 00:21:40.440 --> 00:21:43.119 you know, through the Chief Constable and then through to 314 00:21:43.960 --> 00:21:46.400 an independent authority. 315 00:21:47.440 --> 00:21:53.559 What about the situation where somebody has their own security 316 00:21:53.640 --> 00:21:57.960 camera installed in the house. I'm thinking about the Nest 317 00:21:58.119 --> 00:22:02.480 system or something like that. What would be the justification 318 00:22:03.640 --> 00:22:08.759 for hacking a camera like that, which is something that 319 00:22:08.799 --> 00:22:13.119 criminals are supposedly able to do so with connected devices 320 00:22:13.160 --> 00:22:16.839 in the house. Would the police be able to do 321 00:22:16.880 --> 00:22:19.240 that and would they be allowed to do it? If so, 322 00:22:19.720 --> 00:22:21.960 what would be the route they took to get it justified? 323 00:22:22.000 --> 00:22:25.359 Would it be the same as authorizing bugging for instance. 324 00:22:28.119 --> 00:22:31.279 Yes, it would, and the risks I mean the risks 325 00:22:31.279 --> 00:22:34.599 involved there. If you think back to the days where 326 00:22:34.640 --> 00:22:40.759 you got permission to use someone's a building to conduct 327 00:22:40.759 --> 00:22:47.480 observations from, there's certain caveats on that. If the information 328 00:22:47.759 --> 00:22:52.839 that's subsequently obtained, if that's then sought to be used 329 00:22:52.839 --> 00:22:56.640 in evidence, the disclosure of where that came from, So 330 00:22:56.680 --> 00:23:00.839 there's extra layers of risk. And there's also a level 331 00:23:00.839 --> 00:23:06.160 of risk if you're using uh, you know, a system 332 00:23:06.279 --> 00:23:12.759 that there's in use by by other people. So again 333 00:23:12.799 --> 00:23:16.519 it all comes down to that and the other The 334 00:23:16.519 --> 00:23:18.960 other aspect of it is can the can the information 335 00:23:19.079 --> 00:23:22.880 you're seeking be obtained by other means and less intrusive 336 00:23:23.000 --> 00:23:29.960 or less complicated If the answer is yes, If if 337 00:23:30.000 --> 00:23:33.319 you have a human intelligence source that's going into these 338 00:23:33.359 --> 00:23:37.799 places as part of their natural day to day thing, 339 00:23:37.960 --> 00:23:42.559 can they recover the information you want, so, you know, 340 00:23:42.599 --> 00:23:44.599 there's a lot of thought goes into these things. 341 00:23:44.640 --> 00:23:48.000 And with things like video doorbells, dash cams, we see 342 00:23:48.039 --> 00:23:51.559 a lot of appeals for dashcam footage of incidents, accidents, 343 00:23:51.599 --> 00:23:55.240 that kind of thing, and the use of doorbell camera 344 00:23:55.279 --> 00:24:01.839 footage as well in criminal prosecutions. What's the threshold that 345 00:24:02.200 --> 00:24:07.319 police have to reach in order to seize footage from 346 00:24:07.880 --> 00:24:14.400 doorbell cameras and dash cam. 347 00:24:11.920

--> 00:24:14.319 That's a good question, and I have not to be fair, 348 00:24:14.319 --> 00:24:17.680 there's been such a explosion of this in the last 349 00:24:17.720 --> 00:24:24.359 ten years subsequent to my service, and the fact that 350 00:24:24.400 --> 00:24:32.000 the police now invite dashcam footage, invite ring bell footage. 351 00:24:34.079 --> 00:24:39.720 The department that has to look at this must be 352 00:24:39.960 --> 00:24:44.319 vast now because of the sheer amount of data that 353 00:24:44.440 --> 00:24:50.039 has to be logged and gone through. It is quite 354 00:24:50.039 --> 00:24:56.599 mind blowing. And that's you know that it's slightly away 355 00:24:56.759 --> 00:25:01.200 on a tangent because you're dealing with stuff. There's more 356 00:25:01.319 --> 00:25:04.920 that's overt that's over evidence. You know, a ring camera 357 00:25:05.079 --> 00:25:08.759 is on a doorstep is overt. A camera outside of 358 00:25:08.759 --> 00:25:16.240 property looking down is overt. But the covert activity is 359 00:25:18.119 --> 00:25:21.359 probably on the same level. I'm not saying it wouldn't 360 00:25:21.480 --> 00:25:26.000 use an easier means of getting the footage or seeing 361 00:25:26.480 --> 00:25:32.720 that the activity. But I guess I'm old school. I 362 00:25:32.799 --> 00:25:34.039 want to be out there for you. 363 00:25:34.000 --> 00:25:38.599 Know, well, yeah, the difficulty is with the reduction in 364 00:25:38.680 --> 00:25:44.000 police resources. Old school is expensive. So what does it 365 00:25:44.079 --> 00:25:46.799 take to put a tail on somebody? What does it 366 00:25:46.839 --> 00:25:50.559 take to sit a car outside of property? You're thinking 367 00:25:50.599 --> 00:25:53.720 of the overtime, I guess, aren't you, and justifying that, 368 00:25:54.119 --> 00:26:00.240 whereas if you can gather some doorbell footage or or 369 00:26:00.440 --> 00:26:04.000 CCTV from a pub, you don't have to spend all 370 00:26:04.039 --> 00:26:07.279 of that time and money following people around old school. 371 00:26:08.440 --> 00:26:11.039 Yeah, that's that's very that's very true. There's still there's 372 00:26:11.039 --> 00:26:14.079 still a I guess there's still a need for that 373 00:26:14.240 --> 00:26:21.960 human reading of a situation, particularly when you're looking at 374 00:26:22.200 --> 00:26:26.200 It's like cameras on a football match. You can have 375 00:26:26.240 --> 00:26:32.000 as many cameras on all corners of the stadia feeding 376 00:26:32.039 --> 00:26:37.839 all this scenario live, but something will happen off camera 377 00:26:38.559 --> 00:26:41.480 that the cameras never get that a player might have 378 00:26:41.559 --> 00:26:44.440 heard that a player might have heard somebody say, you know, 379 00:26:44.480 --> 00:26:46.680 we had that incident the other day, didn't we wear 380 00:26:47.160 --> 00:26:49.880 a player appeared to put his shirt over his mouth 381 00:26:49.920 --> 00:26:54.920

and then or to some racist. So you know, there's 382 00:26:54.920 --> 00:26:58.079 always something missed by the cameras, and so you've got 383 00:26:58.119 --> 00:26:59.480 to take take the thing as a whole. 384 00:27:00.759 --> 00:27:03.599 The training that you had for this, What was it like. 385 00:27:05.880 --> 00:27:10.920 For me? I feel very fortunate to have been trained 386 00:27:11.000 --> 00:27:17.079 to a level beyond the majority you know of police officers. 387 00:27:17.160 --> 00:27:24.720 They would they would know of terminology and potential use. 388 00:27:24.839 --> 00:27:30.839 But I went through the weeks of training in sort 389 00:27:30.880 --> 00:27:36.559 of agent handling, which involved surveillance and anti surveillance or 390 00:27:36.599 --> 00:27:43.440 counter surveillance. Anti surveillance meaning you trained to find out 391 00:27:43.480 --> 00:27:50.440 whether you're being followed. Counter surveillance is an even bigger level. 392 00:27:50.519 --> 00:27:54.279 So if a criminal wants to ensure that he's not 393 00:27:54.359 --> 00:27:57.720 being followed, he would deploy somebody else to check that 394 00:27:57.759 --> 00:28:05.960 they're not being followed. So quite a complex scenario. How 395 00:28:06.039 --> 00:28:07.039 might that work? Then? 396 00:28:07.640 --> 00:28:11.039 I'm thinking about the being followed in a car scenario 397 00:28:11.680 --> 00:28:16.200 where in the movie somebody turns around and goes, yeah, 398 00:28:16.279 --> 00:28:18.759 they've been following us. We need to take a hard left, 399 00:28:18.799 --> 00:28:20.599 and then they try and shake the car off and 400 00:28:20.640 --> 00:28:23.799 the car starts chasing them. Is it like that or not? 401 00:28:24.559 --> 00:28:31.039 The whole training with vehicles on foot is distinct because 402 00:28:31.039 --> 00:28:33.799 of obviously the nature of what it does. But the 403 00:28:33.920 --> 00:28:38.519 idea to be to have a team of people following 404 00:28:38.559 --> 00:28:43.480 somebody for a long period of time, maybe well potentially 405 00:28:43.519 --> 00:28:48.960 twenty four hours, has to remain covert by keeping that 406 00:28:49.680 --> 00:28:54.599 distance from the subject and yet close enough to know 407 00:28:54.640 --> 00:28:59.680 what they're doing and to ensure that you don't lose them. 408 00:29:00.119 --> 00:29:03.920 So it's interesting in my training that it was in 409 00:29:03.960 --> 00:29:12.000 London and I was asked to go from a chosen 410 00:29:12.119 --> 00:29:15.960 point A to a point B to what would be 411 00:29:16.319 --> 00:29:22.119 then a criminal exchange. But I needed to ensure that 412 00:29:23.799 --> 00:29:29.119 I wasn't being followed, and you put in various checks, 413 00:29:31.599 --> 00:29:36.640 various activity that you can do to throw off a surveillance, 414 00:29:37.319 --> 00:29:43.400 changing roots, directly, looking in windows, shop windows, just look 415 00:29:43.440 --> 00:29:47.039 what's behind you. You know, various sort of James Bond 416 00:29:47.079 --> 00:29:48.440 stuff that you've alluded to. 417 00:29:48.880 --> 00:29:52.599 So you're using the reflection in the plate glass window 418 00:29:52.640 --> 00:29:55.039 of say John Lewis. 419 00:29:56.000 --> 00:29:59.799 Yeah, you can stand there. It looks natural, you're looking 420 00:29:59.799 --> 00:30:05.400 through at the showroom dummy, and you're actually conscious of 421 00:30:05.440 --> 00:30:10.200 what's been reflected across the thing. So but the point 422 00:30:10.240 --> 00:30:12.079 I'm going to make here is that all those checks 423 00:30:12.079 --> 00:30:15.400 had failed, or I'd not identified that I was being followed, 424 00:30:15.599 --> 00:30:19.079 and you told that you will almost certainly will be followed. 425 00:30:20.880 --> 00:30:24.240 And the final check for me was And another aspect 426 00:30:24.279 --> 00:30:26.559 is to go from a busy, busy area to a 427 00:30:26.640 --> 00:30:30.559 quiet area, a long quiet road where if you are 428 00:30:30.599 --> 00:30:33.119 being followed, they're going to have to drop back some 429 00:30:33.160 --> 00:30:36.279 distance and you can haither use that for two is 430 00:30:36.480 --> 00:30:41.160 one one to disappear down alleyway and gone hopefully never 431 00:30:41.200 --> 00:30:48.359 picked up a game by the surveillance operatives, or put 432 00:30:48.400 --> 00:30:52.880 in another method. And this is the method I used 433 00:30:52.920 --> 00:30:58.319 on this long quiet road. It's somewhere off the horse 434 00:30:58.359 --> 00:31:01.160 Ferry Road. But it went from a the busy area 435 00:31:01.200 --> 00:31:04.480 to a quiet area. And but bear in mind had 436 00:31:04.480 --> 00:31:11.119 already wrecked this area. And what I did was I 437 00:31:11.119 --> 00:31:13.440 would appeared to have turned a corner, but actually on 438 00:31:13.480 --> 00:31:17.240 the corner there was an old telephone chaosk that was 439 00:31:17.279 --> 00:31:20.759 actually hidden by some hoarding from a property that was 440 00:31:20.839 --> 00:31:25.440 under renovation. So my plan was to appear to turn 441 00:31:25.960 --> 00:31:29.640 into a side street, stop, get in a telephone chaosk, 442 00:31:30.640 --> 00:31:35.119 and wait and wait I did. I was almost at 443 00:31:35.160 --> 00:31:39.359 the point of saying I'll carry on now, but I thought, well, 444 00:31:39.359 --> 00:31:43.480 I'll wait for the next person to walk past me, 445 00:31:46.000 --> 00:31:50.279 and I think the person before that was probably a 446 00:31:50.359 --> 00:31:55.599 woman in Arab dress with a small child. And I thought, well, 447 00:31:55.599 --> 00:31:59.680 if that's somebody deployed to follow me, that's very clever 448 00:32:00.680 --> 00:32:05.880 or extremely diligent and careful. So I thought I'd wait 449 00:32:05.880 --> 00:32:09.000 for the next person. And the next person to pass 450 00:32:09.079 -->

00:32:16.079 me was a young man on his own with genes 451 00:32:16.119 --> 00:32:21.759 and fairly ordinary bland clothing, a backpack of some description, 452 00:32:22.359 --> 00:32:29.759 and he was holding a street plan of London, and 453 00:32:29.960 --> 00:32:34.200 he walked past where I was. I think he clearly 454 00:32:34.279 --> 00:32:38.440 realized that I was there, and then he continued walking 455 00:32:38.440 --> 00:32:40.599 his way after consulting his map. And do you know 456 00:32:40.720 --> 00:32:48.160 what stood out for me about him? He had an 457 00:32:48.559 --> 00:32:54.160 almost military gait. He walked with that degree of sort 458 00:32:54.160 --> 00:33:01.200 of purpose, sort of military. And it's interesting because I 459 00:33:01.319 --> 00:33:06.519 then aborted my criminal activity because I was, I knew, 460 00:33:06.799 --> 00:33:08.880 or I believed I was, I was being followed. So 461 00:33:09.599 --> 00:33:15.680 officially I canceled what nefarious activity I was planning because 462 00:33:15.720 --> 00:33:18.200 i'd i'd suss them out. 463 00:33:19.279 --> 00:33:20.000 Was he following you? 464 00:33:21.920 --> 00:33:24.400 Yeah? The whole idea was that you didn't on this 465 00:33:25.200 --> 00:33:31.000 training scenario, you don't talk about it with the team. 466 00:33:31.039 --> 00:33:34.839 You go back to the classroom and you wait for 467 00:33:34.920 --> 00:33:39.400 further instruction and a debrief. As I was making my 468 00:33:39.440 --> 00:33:46.200 way back, I was at a crossing, a pedestrian crossing 469 00:33:46.400 --> 00:33:52.160 at the traffic lights, and a female voice side me, 470 00:33:52.799 --> 00:34:00.920 beside me said, my mate's not happy, and I said, 471 00:34:01.079 --> 00:34:03.960 as your mate with the ages out of London, and 472 00:34:04.000 --> 00:34:08.559 the backpack said yeah, And we ended up we ended 473 00:34:08.639 --> 00:34:11.239 up meeting up against the rules of the training, but 474 00:34:11.800 --> 00:34:15.199 it had to be done, and we had a debrief 475 00:34:15.239 --> 00:34:18.280 of our own about that. So it was a learning 476 00:34:18.400 --> 00:34:21.400 a learning curve for for us. 477 00:34:21.400 --> 00:34:23.679 All that's really interesting, though, isn't it? 478 00:34:24.000 --> 00:34:24.239 More? 479 00:34:24.440 --> 00:34:27.880 Maybe because there was more than one person involved in 480 00:34:27.920 --> 00:34:30.440 this exercise, So you could have been walking down horse 481 00:34:30.440 --> 00:34:33.920 Free Road, heading towards lambeth Bridge or Millbank or wherever, 482 00:34:34.159 --> 00:34:37.000 and there could have been half a dozen people who 483 00:34:37.079 --> 00:34:39.639 were following you or keeping tabs on you, or with 484 00:34:39.719 --> 00:34:42.280 a mobile phone going He's coming around your corner, now, 485 00:34:42.320 --> 00:34:42.800 may you know? 486 00:34:44.719 --> 00:34:49.519 That's it? That's it? And I don't know whether because 487 00:34:49.599 --> 00:34:54.239 I'd appeared to turn right down a side street, whether 488 00:34:54.280 --> 00:34:59.039 there were other people frantically making up ground to cover 489 00:34:59.159 --> 00:35:03.920 the exit. Had they done that and not seen me 490 00:35:04.119 --> 00:35:08.719 exit any further? There was then another check to see 491 00:35:08.920 --> 00:35:13.280 where I might be, So it was all for me. 492 00:35:13.400 --> 00:35:16.559 It was a wonderful trap and I'd caught them out. 493 00:35:16.599 --> 00:35:18.920 And that's the game. It's cat and mouse, isn't it. 494 00:35:21.760 --> 00:35:26.360 If the criminal suspect is aware of surveillance, so go 495 00:35:26.440 --> 00:35:26.719 on them. 496 00:35:26.760 --> 00:35:31.039 For amateurs sleuth's who like to sit there and people watch, 497 00:35:31.239 --> 00:35:37.440 which I do unashamedly. What do you look for in people? 498 00:35:38.280 --> 00:35:41.719 Is there a way that you could say that person's 499 00:35:41.800 --> 00:35:47.119 up to no good, or possibly, thinking about the podcast, 500 00:35:48.079 --> 00:35:52.079 that person looks like a psychopath? Could that be possible? 501 00:35:55.000 --> 00:36:00.719 I think in terms of surveillance, it would have to 502 00:36:00.800 --> 00:36:08.400 be the monitoring of communications, wouldn't it short interactions You 503 00:36:08.760 --> 00:36:12.119 might think you're uneasy about somebody, or or you just 504 00:36:12.199 --> 00:36:20.119 don't like them because of their character or personality. I 505 00:36:20.159 --> 00:36:28.360 would imagine that to identify someone's psychopathy, which we're obviously 506 00:36:28.400 --> 00:36:33.559 fascinated about, you would have to be monitoring their almost 507 00:36:33.599 --> 00:36:39.039 a private thought. So whether that would be in their diary, 508 00:36:39.079 --> 00:36:43.639 in their notes on their computer, or in their communication 509 00:36:44.239 --> 00:36:46.360 with social media and stuff. So it need a lot 510 00:36:47.760 --> 00:36:51.599 a lot more work to establish how these people are ticking. 511 00:36:52.440 --> 00:36:59.440 Yeah, So pure visual observation impossible. What about something less 512 00:36:59.440 --> 00:37:03.679 sinister but just as dangerous, somebody who's going to snatch 513 00:37:03.679 --> 00:37:08.119 a mobile phone. Could you tell when you're walking down 514 00:37:08.159 --> 00:37:12.039 a street whether the person who's coming towards you in 515 00:37:12.079 --> 00:37:15.679 a hoodie is likely to take your phone, is likely 516 00:37:15.760 --> 00:37:19.239 to rob you or not. Is there something that you 517 00:37:19.280 --> 00:37:21.400 could see in the way that they were walking, the 518 00:37:21.440 --> 00:37:22.880 way that they were looking. 519 00:37:24.760 --> 00:37:29.239 Well, without a doubt. If you imagine you talked about 520 00:37:29.320 --> 00:37:33.559 the numbers of cameras that are monitoring

the streets of 521 00:37:33.599 --> 00:37:38.119 the UK and in London, well imagine the operators of those, 522 00:37:39.440 --> 00:37:44.719 not necessarily police staff, they would they would know how 523 00:37:45.679 --> 00:37:51.960 groups of individuals move behave. I think we all know 524 00:37:54.639 --> 00:37:59.159 how to recognize a drug addict who's going to get 525 00:37:59.239 --> 00:38:02.119 their score. You know when you see them, they've got 526 00:38:02.119 --> 00:38:09.679 that gate, they've got that way of busily going for something, 527 00:38:09.679 --> 00:38:12.800 and you know, you almost know what's what's happening there. 528 00:38:12.880 --> 00:38:18.599 So people who regularly watch the public moving around Oxford 529 00:38:18.599 --> 00:38:24.079 Street in London or whatever would would soon see movement 530 00:38:24.239 --> 00:38:29.079 activity not necessarily profiling with you know, people talk about 531 00:38:29.679 --> 00:38:34.920 clothing profiling and whatever, but just you know that they're 532 00:38:34.960 --> 00:38:38.159 not walking like a shopper or like somebody going out 533 00:38:38.159 --> 00:38:41.039 for lunch from the office. You know, there'd be some 534 00:38:41.039 --> 00:38:45.519 some traits there that would identify potential criminal activity. 535 00:38:45.920 --> 00:38:49.559 So that's something that you could use. Walking down Tottenham 536 00:38:49.559 --> 00:38:53.320 Court Road at eleven o'clock at night, for instance, you'd 537 00:38:53.360 --> 00:38:55.559 think maybe I need to be on the other side 538 00:38:55.599 --> 00:38:56.679 of the road from that person. 539 00:38:57.519 --> 00:39:00.840 Well sure, but I mean the nighttime, which economy is 540 00:39:00.880 --> 00:39:04.920 a different board game, isn't it. You know, Yeah, you 541 00:39:05.000 --> 00:39:09.559 can have some quite odd you know. I remember seeing 542 00:39:09.599 --> 00:39:12.519 you know, you see footage of incidents when we follow 543 00:39:12.599 --> 00:39:18.000 up investigations and you see some quite again what appears 544 00:39:18.000 --> 00:39:24.440 on camera to be extremely odd behavior and movements that 545 00:39:24.519 --> 00:39:26.800 if you were actually there, it might be just a 546 00:39:26.840 --> 00:39:32.840 couple of students who who've have had too many Vodkas 547 00:39:33.159 --> 00:39:36.559 and red bulls and they're locking around, but it would 548 00:39:36.599 --> 00:39:39.480 look to a camera it looks extremely odd. You know, 549 00:39:39.519 --> 00:39:44.599 you're almost almost violent. So yeah, again I go back 550 00:39:44.639 --> 00:39:47.199 to the point that you know, cameras can only give 551 00:39:47.199 --> 00:39:47.760 you so much. 552 00:39:48.079 --> 00:39:55.360 Yeah, there's something looping back to the insidious surveillance conversation 553 00:39:55.519 --> 00:39:59.679 we had a little while ago. Recently in West Yorkshire, 554 00:39:59.679 --> 00:40:04.000 the police we're using facial recognition cameras that are deployed 555 00:40:04.039 --> 00:40:07.639 in a van so mobile unit and they were able 556 00:40:07.719 --> 00:40:16.039 to arrest an alleged persistent shoplifter using facial recognition from 557 00:40:16.119 --> 00:40:19.719 an approved watch list. And the other aspect of it 558 00:40:19.800 --> 00:40:24.840 is that as well as identifying criminals and potential criminals 559 00:40:24.920 --> 00:40:28.880 people who are wanted, it's also used to identify people 560 00:40:28.920 --> 00:40:31.840 who are missing. And I think that's something that we 561 00:40:31.920 --> 00:40:34.599 need to unpack a bit, isn't it is that surveillance 562 00:40:34.719 --> 00:40:42.679 has another face, which is reuniting people who are missing 563 00:40:43.159 --> 00:40:45.199 or at risk with their loved ones. 564 00:40:46.760 --> 00:40:50.599 That's interesting. That is interesting. I mean I have noticed 565 00:40:51.000 --> 00:40:56.360 certainly the trend now is for missing persons to be 566 00:40:57.760 --> 00:41:04.199 publicized by the police almost daily as a constant feed 567 00:41:04.480 --> 00:41:07.519 of images of people who are missing. And as we know, 568 00:41:07.559 --> 00:41:11.239 people go missing for a number of reasons, and people 569 00:41:11.280 --> 00:41:14.079 are reported missing for a number of reasons, and it 570 00:41:14.119 --> 00:41:17.800 seems I don't imagine that there are more people going missing. 571 00:41:17.840 --> 00:41:20.679 It's just that the public are more aware of more 572 00:41:20.719 --> 00:41:26.079 people and that can bring a problem because that facial recognition, 573 00:41:26.679 --> 00:41:34.079 whilst it's not infallible, it's it's judging things on an 574 00:41:34.119 --> 00:41:39.480 analytical basis rather than a human good feeling because we've 575 00:41:39.519 --> 00:41:43.440 had many cases where the public have been asked to 576 00:41:43.599 --> 00:41:47.159 help and they try to help, but they're actually giving 577 00:41:47.199 --> 00:41:52.800 lots of possible sightings. They don't want to they think 578 00:41:52.840 --> 00:41:56.519 it might have been the person and feel they must 579 00:41:56.880 --> 00:42:04.440 suggest it, which is fine, but the number of mistaken 580 00:42:04.679 --> 00:42:14.480 identities by humans is very high. Whereas I guess the 581 00:42:14.599 --> 00:42:23.079 camera identification is it's more accurate, or potentially more accurate, 582 00:42:23.400 --> 00:42:27.719 or there's less room for error. Of course, then you've 583 00:42:27.719 --> 00:42:28.679 got to do the follow up. 584 00:42:29.440 --> 00:42:34.079 I suppose it allows you to prioritize your resources in 585 00:42:34.119 --> 00:42:37.480 a way that wasn't possible when you were following up 586 00:42:38.239 --> 00:42:42.119 a dozen leads from members of the public who thought 587 00:42:42.159 --> 00:42:44.719 they might have seen the person you were interested

in. 588 00:42:45.199 --> 00:42:47.559 You can narrow it down and focus it, and that's 589 00:42:47.599 --> 00:42:48.239 more efficient. 590 00:42:48.559 --> 00:42:54.360 It's interesting, you're right about efficiency and good value. And 591 00:42:54.599 --> 00:43:04.760 is this I remember conducting a two two person surveillance 592 00:43:05.199 --> 00:43:09.119 on an individual. I call it a surveillance. It was 593 00:43:09.159 --> 00:43:15.639 actually part of a you know, completely lawful inquiry I had, 594 00:43:15.679 --> 00:43:22.000 and the scenario was this, we we'd been told that 595 00:43:22.119 --> 00:43:28.320 an individual was working under a false name illegally at 596 00:43:28.320 --> 00:43:33.519 a factory premises, and this information was was put before 597 00:43:33.559 --> 00:43:39.960 me to deal with it's it gave a description of 598 00:43:40.039 --> 00:43:45.519 the individual and I think a nickname, but but other 599 00:43:45.559 --> 00:43:49.360 than that, we couldn't identify who they were talking about. 600 00:43:50.480 --> 00:43:54.960 The problem was that that particular factory logistically was quite 601 00:43:54.960 --> 00:44:00.320 difficult to to get into. We'd we'd we conducted other 602 00:44:00.719 --> 00:44:05.440 multi agency investigations at this premises and it was very 603 00:44:05.440 --> 00:44:07.960 difficult by the time you've got access. If there was 604 00:44:08.000 --> 00:44:11.559 anyone there who didn't want to be spoken to, there 605 00:44:11.559 --> 00:44:19.320 were ways to get away. So it didn't justify. There 606 00:44:19.440 --> 00:44:23.360 was no reason reasonable justification to do a similar project 607 00:44:23.400 --> 00:44:30.440 like this. But this particular individual was was described as 608 00:44:30.639 --> 00:44:35.519 as black Jamaican, where the majority of people in this 609 00:44:35.559 --> 00:44:39.800 factory weren't of that description, and it gave I think 610 00:44:39.800 --> 00:44:45.880 it gave some timing of when the person worked there. Anyway, 611 00:44:46.000 --> 00:44:49.800 So I was in the area of this factory on 612 00:44:50.199 --> 00:44:54.119 other inquiries and I thought, I'll just I'll just park 613 00:44:54.199 --> 00:44:58.360 up and have a cigarette or a sandwich or whatever 614 00:44:58.480 --> 00:45:02.360 is doing and sitting watch at this relevant time. And 615 00:45:02.440 --> 00:45:07.480 sure enough, a person of this description exited the premises 616 00:45:10.360 --> 00:45:14.400 and we decided, and it was on foot we decided 617 00:45:14.440 --> 00:45:18.960 that we would we would follow him to see hopefully 618 00:45:19.000 --> 00:45:22.559 that he would go to a premises where he was living. 619 00:45:24.320 --> 00:45:27.320 So it involved me and my colleague who we'd got 620 00:45:27.320 --> 00:45:31.360 a car, me jumping out the car and a foot 621 00:45:31.400 --> 00:45:34.360 follow through the estate, the car going around picking me up, 622

00:45:34.599 --> 00:45:41.000 and we sort of plotted his route to a probably 623 00:45:41.000 --> 00:45:44.440 about a mile away, and we actually lost sight of 624 00:45:44.519 --> 00:45:52.559 him near some dwelling houses. Probably probably thought he'd gone 625 00:45:52.599 --> 00:45:56.880 into one of maybe four or five properties, but weren't 626 00:45:56.880 --> 00:46:03.880 sure which one. So far, so good. I then went 627 00:46:04.480 --> 00:46:07.960 the following week with an immigration officer who would need 628 00:46:08.000 --> 00:46:13.280 to be involved in this process, and we did the 629 00:46:13.320 --> 00:46:18.840 same thing. The individual came out, but rather than follow them, 630 00:46:20.519 --> 00:46:23.440 I drove round to the location where we'd followed him 631 00:46:23.440 --> 00:46:27.840 the week before and waited. I got a colleague in 632 00:46:27.880 --> 00:46:31.480 a mark police car on standby on the end of 633 00:46:31.559 --> 00:46:35.400 the radio just around the corner, and lo and behold 634 00:46:35.400 --> 00:46:40.480 he this man did the same route, got to the 635 00:46:40.519 --> 00:46:43.639 location where we'd lost sight of him a week before, 636 00:46:44.960 --> 00:46:53.199 got out the car, introduced myself, althovery, relaxed, yes, most apologetic, 637 00:46:55.559 --> 00:47:00.199 showed his passport. He was in the house nearby, was 638 00:47:00.239 --> 00:47:09.159 an overstayer, and he was dealt with appropriately, Possibly a 639 00:47:09.239 --> 00:47:12.719 perfect scenario. I think, I know what you're going to 640 00:47:12.760 --> 00:47:13.119 ask me. 641 00:47:13.679 --> 00:47:18.719 Yeah, so I assume you could visit the factory or 642 00:47:18.800 --> 00:47:21.239 even just stop him as he left the building. You'd 643 00:47:21.239 --> 00:47:22.519 be entitled to do that, wouldn't you. 644 00:47:23.159 --> 00:47:26.760 Yes, yes, absolutely, yes, yes we could have done that. 645 00:47:28.800 --> 00:47:33.559 The reasons why, well, the main reason why I didn't 646 00:47:33.599 --> 00:47:37.280 particularly want a chase on foot. I wasn't in the 647 00:47:37.320 --> 00:47:42.440 mood for him running. It was a busy, busy road 648 00:47:42.480 --> 00:47:45.960 where the factory was a lot of people about. Logistically, 649 00:47:46.239 --> 00:47:49.719 I thought, I just don't want this because you don't 650 00:47:49.760 --> 00:47:53.079 want to lose, lose your suspect, or lose the person 651 00:47:53.119 --> 00:47:56.760 you're interested in. And it had all the hallmarks of 652 00:47:58.440 --> 00:48:01.480 him running through traffic, cross traffic and all that. So 653 00:48:02.159 --> 00:48:05.559 I guess a health and safety aspect to the whole thing. 654 00:48:06.719 --> 00:48:11.480 The scenario where we were pretty sure that he was 655 00:48:11.519 --> 00:48:15.159 living at one of a number of a small number 656 00:48:15.199 --> 00:48:22.960 of premises was much better and easier to control, because equally, 657 00:48:23.079 --> 00:48:27.159 he hadn't got much wriggle room really in terms of 658 00:48:27.280 --> 00:48:29.960 he was outside the house where he was living, he 659 00:48:30.039 --> 00:48:33.679 was lodging with a family or an individual, and he 660 00:48:33.800 --> 00:48:36.119 got his passport there. In fact, he'd even got his 661 00:48:37.159 --> 00:48:43.440 case virtually packed with you know, with the airwaves tag 662 00:48:43.480 --> 00:48:44.039 still on it. 663 00:48:44.599 --> 00:48:47.800 I guess control is the key to that, isn't it. 664 00:48:47.880 --> 00:48:50.159 Because if you'd shouted. 665 00:48:49.840 --> 00:48:52.199 Oh stop police. 666 00:48:52.519 --> 00:48:56.360 And then started chasing him through a crowded area, then 667 00:48:56.400 --> 00:49:01.960 it becomes chaotic and uncontained and unpredictable, doesn't it. Members 668 00:49:01.960 --> 00:49:05.079 of the public are involved, people could be injured, et cetera. 669 00:49:05.239 --> 00:49:11.519 Whereas by using a stealthy approach you were able to 670 00:49:12.159 --> 00:49:15.559 complete the task without involving anybody else. 671 00:49:15.840 --> 00:49:23.039 Yeah, exactly. Yeah, stealth and guile and and I think 672 00:49:23.119 --> 00:49:27.400 good good value to get the job done with the 673 00:49:27.519 --> 00:49:30.760 least impact on resources. 674 00:49:30.679 --> 00:49:33.960 No drama, and you didn't break a sweat. So great. 675 00:49:34.239 --> 00:49:39.519 It's a successful round that Jack Morrell. That's fantastic. Catching 676 00:49:39.559 --> 00:49:43.360 criminals and investigating cases is basically good fun. 677 00:49:43.639 --> 00:49:47.800 Yeah it is. It is. Yeah, you know, let's be honest. 678 00:49:47.880 --> 00:49:51.000 You know, there's a serious sight to it, but there's 679 00:49:51.039 --> 00:49:52.840 some good fun and humor to be had as well. 680 00:49:53.719 --> 00:49:57.800 We hope you enjoyed this episode of Detectives Files True 681 00:49:57.840 --> 00:50:02.199 Crime Tales with Jack Morrell the Governor. We're working on 682 00:50:02.320 --> 00:50:06.039 some more of those and also some more psycho killer 683 00:50:06.119 --> 00:50:09.440 cases coming up in the not too distant future, but 684 00:50:09.519 --> 00:50:12.360 for now, thank you for your company and we'll see 685 00:50:12.400 --> 00:50:13.880 you again soon.