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EP 197: When War Doesn’t Look Like War — Dr John Pennell, Former Senior US Diplomat, Explains Grey Zone Warfare

Full Transcript for EP 197: When War Doesn’t Look Like War — Dr John Pennell, Former Senior US Diplomat, Explains Grey Zone Warfare

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WEBVTT 00:00:01.250 --> 00:00:06.589 If you enjoy the security circle podcast, please like share and comment or even better. 00:00:07.009 --> 00:00:11.869 Leave us a fab review We can be found on all podcast platforms. 00:00:12.140 --> 00:00:13.310 Be sure to subscribe. 00:00:14.029 --> 00:00:16.370 The security circle every Thursday. 00:00:16.910 --> 00:00:17.899 We love Thursdays. 00:00:36.338 --> 00:00:46.598 Hi, I'm Yolanda And welcome to the Security Circle Podcast, produced in association with IFPO, the International Foundation for Protection Officers. 00:00:47.408 --> 00:00:58.359 This podcast is all about connection, bringing you closer to the greatest minds, boldest thinkers, trailblazers, and change makers across the security industry. 00:00:58.868 --> 00:01:09.248 Whether you are here to grow your network, spark new ideas, or simply feel more connected to the world of protection and risk, you are in the right place wherever you are listening from. 00:01:09.698 --> 00:01:12.608 Thank you for being a part of the Security Circle journey.. 00:01:16.319 --> 00:01:17.998 Okay, so what can I say? 00:01:18.088 --> 00:01:19.468 Uh, John, Dr. 00:01:19.468 --> 00:01:22.448 John, welcome to the Security Circle- Podcast. 00:01:22.459 --> 00:01:23.179 How you doing? 00:01:24.338 --> 00:01:25.039 I'm doing great. 00:01:25.039 --> 00:01:29.239 It's really, uh, great to be here, really happy to have, you hosting and have me on. 00:01:29.239 --> 00:01:29.929 It's an honor. 00:01:29.968 --> 00:01:30.399 Thank you. 00:01:30.679 --> 00:01:34.289 Well, no, it- I think the honor is all mine to have you here. 00:01:34.468 --> 00:01:34.938 There you go. 00:01:35.358 --> 00:01:37.358 Uh, the mutual appreciation society. 00:01:37.578 --> 00:01:45.858 John, uh, you've got a rather- exciting career, uh, that you're both in and have had. 00:01:45.888 --> 00:01:52.078 foreign service officer and a professor of practice at Arizona State University. 00:01:52.498 --> 00:02:05.968 You're gonna be talking to me about your extensive career serving in diplomatic roles across most regions of the world, including combat zones like Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as former Soviet states and the Middle East. 00:02:06.588 --> 00:02:11.628 And let's talk about your retirement from the foreign service in terms of what are you gonna do now. 00:02:11.908 --> 00:02:17.618 Did you always know you were gonna have this kind of exciting career or did it all just fall in your lap? 00:02:17.618 --> 00:02:18.818 It's a great question. 00:02:18.889 --> 00:02:42.598 Um, so for me, growing up in the Washington, DC area where you had our seat of government, if you will, for the US, where our, you know, federal national administration, most of the offices are based there, where most foreign embassies are based as well, I was exposed to many types of people, US public servants, diplomats, and others from around the world. 00:02:42.598 --> 00:02:47.239 And also Washington, DC itself is a fairly diverse city, uh, in and of itself. 00:02:47.239 --> 00:02:51.868 And so for me, it piqued a lot of interest in doing something in public service. 00:02:52.248 --> 00:03:02.609 And then also, uh, within my family, we had some public servants as well, and seeing their dedication to doing something for the country, if you will, inspired me. 00:03:03.008 --> 00:03:21.449 Certainly my grandparents, my grandfathers in particular, both volunteered, uh, to fight in World War II, one with the Army Air Corps, which later became the Air Force, and then one with the Navy, and then a great uncle who was a Marine, and so, um, and then a- actually another uncle who was a Marine in Vietnam. 00:03:21.848 --> 00:03:29.699 So kind of all of that really shaped my thinking about finding an opportunity to serve the US in, in some fashion 00:03:29.699 --> 00:03:31.769 did you always know that you wanted to do that? 00:03:31.769 --> 00:03:33.829 Because I kinda did as well. 00:03:33.829 --> 00:03:49.479 I remember applying to join the British police when I was 18, and they basically said, back in the day,"Go and get some life experience and come back." And then by the age of 29, there I am, about to join, which was literally, 11 months or so after 9/11. 00:03:49.479 --> 00:03:52.632 I was one of those very patriotic, kind of really purposeful recruit- you know, recruits. 00:03:52.632 --> 00:03:53.688 Mm-hmm. 00:03:53.989 --> 00:03:54.748 Mm-hmm. 00:03:55.348 --> 00:03:59.508 I always knew I wanted to do something for my country. 00:03:59.848 --> 00:04:02.368 Uh, did you always know that you wanted to do that? 00:04:03.799 --> 00:04:13.908 I, I did, although where I ended up wasn't necessarily on my radar, like in terms of being a foreign service officer or, a diplomat, if you will. 00:04:14.419 --> 00:04:25.338 I knew I wanted to do something, and I particularly wanted to do something outside of the US that also, um, supported the US in, in some way or, or f- fashion, if you will. 00:04:26.137 --> 00:04:38.016 But I also really like engaging with people from different backgrounds, cultures, and all of that, and also learning, you know, different languages, learning histories, et cetera, of different countries and regions. 00:04:38.026 --> 00:04:40.117 So I, I always was interested in that. 00:04:40.117 --> 00:04:43.607 But where exactly I ended up, uh, I didn't necessarily know. 00:04:44.226 --> 00:04:52.627 Interestingly enough, on my first day as a foreign service officer in training in Washington, DC, was September 10th, 2001. 00:04:53.836 --> 00:04:53.896 Oof. 00:04:53.896 --> 00:04:56.987 So one day before 9/11. 00:04:56.987 --> 00:04:59.276 Uh, I'll never forget my second day. 00:04:59.276 --> 00:05:05.857 I, I honestly don't even remember the first day, but my second day I'll always remember, because that was 9/11. 00:05:05.857 --> 00:05:26.687 And, and, uh, other foreign service colleagues, also their second day on the job, second day in training, if you will,
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were all grouped together in a room in Washington, DC, going through some mandatory introductory new hire types of meetings, and, uh, we had a senior official run into our room and, and talk about what just happened in New York. 00:05:27.237 --> 00:05:33.697 Um, it was a little bit unclear to many of us in the room, let alone I think around the world, what exactly was going on. 00:05:34.456 --> 00:05:57.750 Soon thereafter, he came back and said,"Another thing, uh, has happened." And then we turned the news on and saw, uh- Yeah, panic, uh, mayhem, if you will, um, not only in New York, but then reports kind of on the, the ticker at the bottom of the screen that planes may be heading towards the State Department or towards Washington, DC, et cetera, et cetera. 00:05:57.750 --> 00:06:01.271 And so at that point it was everyone must evacuate. 00:06:01.790 --> 00:06:13.130 And so that kind of set the tone for at least the early stages of my career, if not the entire career in the Foreign Service,'cause I did end up, uh, serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. 00:06:13.761 --> 00:06:17.290 I also worked on Somalia and Libya a- and then in Ukraine. 00:06:17.290 --> 00:06:30.141 And so, um, outside of Ukraine, most of those experiences were tied to what happened on 9/11 and countering terrorism, et cetera, et cetera. 00:06:30.141 --> 00:06:33.060 And so that had a huge impact on my career. 00:06:33.661 --> 00:06:41.310 I should imagine it probably underpinned an awful lot of the purpose behind how you approached everything that you did. 00:06:42.000 --> 00:06:46.271 But I wanna- It did take you back to your first overseas deployment. 00:06:46.437 --> 00:07:01.637 And I'm never gonna ask you to talk about anything that's confidential, but take me through kind of where you needed to draw on your skill set, and did you feel prepared, or were you thinking,"Oh my goodness, this really is neck in, I'm up to my neck in this, it's sink or swim. 00:07:01.666 --> 00:07:04.826 I'm either gonna make this work or I'm not." What was going through your mind? 00:07:05.507 --> 00:07:06.127 Sure. 00:07:06.257 --> 00:07:34.706 So before I started as a Foreign Service Officer, what we call a direct hire, US government officer, et cetera, I actually was a contractor for the US government, uh, for about two years in Ukraine, uh, working at our embassy, and that really exposed me to kind of the ins and outs, and this is just before 9/11, of what the US does overseas at a, at an embassy and how I could potentially support. 00:07:35.047 --> 00:07:41.226 Um, but as a contractor, my role was, you know, somewhat more limited and, and unique in that sense. 00:07:41.766 --> 00:07:51.266 Um, and it also meant maybe I was less prepared or less trained up, so to speak, than when I became a foreign service officer and a career officer. 00:07:51.637 --> 00:08:06.007 Um, so that let me know that particularly being exposed to, in the late'90s, Ukraine, still sort of in that post-Soviet transition
period, um, and at that time I hadn't really taken any Russian lessons. 00:08:06.007 --> 00:08:15.307 I did end up studying Russian intensively in Ukraine at that time, and particularly back then, Russian was more widely spoken than maybe it is, uh, these days. 00:08:15.906 --> 00:08:21.608 Um- After that, after I joined, went through the training, 9/11 had already happened. 00:08:22.129 --> 00:08:24.168 Uh, my first assignment was in El Salvador. 00:08:24.288 --> 00:08:27.088 I spent about two and a half years there. 00:08:27.088 --> 00:08:28.939 I was supposed to be there a little bit longer. 00:08:29.769 --> 00:08:32.928 I found it a fascinating place, a fascinating country. 00:08:33.479 --> 00:08:37.639 Uh, geographically close to the US, of course. 00:08:38.418 --> 00:08:40.629 A number of people in the United States speak Spanish. 00:08:40.658 --> 00:08:43.168 I was trained in Spanish before I got there. 00:08:43.629 --> 00:08:45.359 I spoke Spanish very, very well. 00:08:45.389 --> 00:08:46.739 Made my job much easier. 00:08:47.849 --> 00:08:57.369 And while the Salvadorans are great to work with, and I learned a lot from them, I, I felt like some- something more exciting was missing, if you will. 00:08:58.139 --> 00:09:10.399 And the war in Afghanistan had already started at that point in terms of the US, uh, i- invasion and going after the Taliban and, and Al-Qaeda and all of that. 00:09:10.818 --> 00:09:22.328 And so, um, I was looking at Afghanistan from afar as, you know, maybe one day I'll serve my country by volunteering to go there. 00:09:23.119 --> 00:09:39.158 Um, then fast-forward to March 2003, um, the US invades Iraq, uh, to go after weapons of mass destruction, and I think we all know what happened after that and, uh, the whole controversy over the WMDs, if you will. 00:09:39.548 --> 00:09:43.438 Um, but they were calling on people to volunteer immediately for that. 00:09:43.849 --> 00:09:47.078 So I, I put my name, uh, in the ring, if you will. 00:09:47.629 --> 00:10:10.908 And not surprisingly, I was relatively new, relatively junior, and they thought,"Yes, let's grab p- him and people like him who are willing to volunteer." The more experienced officers in our agency at the time, while a number of them did volunteer, I think it was more the younger cohort like me who they ended up pulling from, um, for a variety of different reasons. 00:10:10.908 --> 00:10:29.205 And so after about two and a half years in, um, in El Salvador, I ended up going to Iraq, and I spent about 18 months there And, um, sorry, on that point, back to your question about did I feel like I was prepared. 00:10:29.745 --> 00:10:49.225 Um, the training that we did have to go through, which was mandatory for going to Iraq, which obviously was an active combat zone, uh, when I got there in January of 2005, that was extremely helpful, but certainly probably not sufficient as the situation in Iraq, uh, unfolded. 00:10:49.254 --> 00:11:04.384 Obviously, I think while there was some excitement at the beginning among Iraqis and others that, you know, this dictatorship was toppled, uh, things fairly rapidly went south, if you will, unfortunately. 00:11:04.414 --> 00:11:16.965 And, um, so the 18 months that I was based in Baghdad, the security situation certainly got worse, political situation got worse, and definitely made my job more difficult. 00:11:17.605 --> 00:11:22.835 And we had to adapt quite often, had to be flexible quite often. 00:11:23.715 --> 00:11:33.657 Again, while the training I had beforehand was very helpful- The only way to get the training that you need, unfortunately, oftentimes is on-the-job training. 00:11:33.657 --> 00:11:46.647 And so, um, the 18 months I was there, I, I learned when to be worried about a duck-and-cover alarm, if there's incoming indirect fire from a rocket or a mortar, if there's gunfire, if there's a car bomb. 00:11:47.067 --> 00:11:51.326 Those things, unfortunately, would happen on a fairly routine basis multiple times a day. 00:11:51.746 --> 00:12:02.606 I was based in the Green Zone, so certainly I was safer than many, um, others, and particularly in our military and other partner militaries were who were actively fighting. 00:12:03.246 --> 00:12:10.736 Um, but the Green Zone, unfortunately, not surprisingly, was a favorite target of, of many on the outside of it. 00:12:10.767 --> 00:12:14.596 And so it was quite a difficult experience, but a good one overall. 00:12:15.716 --> 00:12:26.917 Of all the things that you've done in your career in the Foreign Service, what is the one thing that you look back on and you say,"Actually, that was a key defining moment for me," and why? 00:12:28.856 --> 00:12:30.226 That's a great question. 00:12:30.427 --> 00:12:35.726 I certainly think the 18 months I had in Iraq were probably the most 18... 00:12:36.216 --> 00:12:41.086 Sorry, the most intense 18 months of my life, and that's saying a lot. 00:12:41.937 --> 00:12:51.836 Maybe it's not gonna be surprising to any listeners, um, given that I also spent time in Somalia, Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, and other places. 00:12:52.947 --> 00:13:08.908 But it was such a difficult situation security-wise, but also Uh, mentally, um, because it really required you on a 24/7 basis to be mentally prepared for anything and everything. 00:13:09.448 --> 00:13:25.229 Um, not just because of the security environment, but because of demands from our administration back in Washington, DC for information, for, uh, achieving certain results that, uh, impacts that were set out for us. 00:13:26.479 --> 00:13:30.839 And it made it extremely demanding and, uh, e- exhausting, not surprisingly. 00:13:31.078 --> 00:13:52.208 But I think that helped me later on in my career to learn how to be more resilient, to learn how to, uh, not overdo it, when to take a break, uh, when I need to get more rest, when I need to exercise, when I need to eat better, and these types of things, which, you
know, later on in my career, um, I think was really, really helpful. 00:13:52.568 --> 00:13:54.729 And I, I learned a lot from that. 00:13:54.798 --> 00:13:57.578 I think that'll stay with me, you know, for the rest of my, my life. 00:13:58.349 --> 00:14:11.948 It sounds like resilience has been a key theme throughout your personal journey, and even now I know that resilience is something that I pride myself on having quite a high resiliency score. 00:14:12.379 --> 00:14:15.479 But even lately I've been a bit like,"Ugh, why does that have to change? 00:14:15.519 --> 00:14:16.678 Ugh, why do I have to change that? 00:14:16.678 --> 00:14:18.698 Oh, why do I have to change stuff all the time?" Mm-hmm. 00:14:18.719 --> 00:14:22.519 And then I realize that I have obviously layers of resiliency or tolerance. 00:14:22.548 --> 00:14:33.089 But of all the things that you've done, h- talk to me, tell me a story about why it was the resilience that you have that carried you through. 00:14:34.904 --> 00:14:35.465 Certainly. 00:14:35.514 --> 00:14:47.695 So, uh, in Afghanistan, uh, where I served from 2009 to'10, I, I think in, in my view, that's probably the one year in my career where I demonstrated the most resilience. 00:14:48.414 --> 00:15:11.544 Um, obviously related to my attempts of being resilient when I was in Iraq, but, um, the difficulties and the challenges I faced in Afghanistan were, of course, it was a difficult security environment, but at that time, Kabul, in our embassy, that en- environment was relatively safer than, than it had been later on, uh, during the, uh, the war in Afghanistan. 00:15:11.975 --> 00:15:28.715 Um, but the difficulties were more on the demands from Washington and the fact that prior to the election of President Obama, Iraq had been the focus, obviously, on the first, uh, uh, George W. 00:15:28.715 --> 00:15:39.605 Bush, um, or the first two admin- uh, terms of his administration, and then things shifted under the Obama administration, mostly from prioritizing Iraq to Afghanistan. 00:15:39.825 --> 00:15:56.664 And then within that, uh, a strategy unfolded o- on counterinsurgency, and then within that, civilians like myself and many others across the US government who were, uh, working in Afghanistan had a very, very central role. 00:15:57.394 --> 00:15:58.745 Not that we didn't before. 00:15:58.865 --> 00:16:35.274 Obviously, NATO, uh, US, and, and all, uh, particular countries who are NATO partners and even non-NATO partners who were fighting in Afghanistan played a, a critical role, but civilians had to take on more of the load, if you will, in terms of thinking about counterinsurgency and what we could do with soft power, what we could do to support Afghan farmers, to potentially, uh, focus on alternative, uh, agricultural production beyond opium and poppy, which, uh, was a main source of income for the Taliban and their activities. 00:16:35.325 --> 00:17:05.191 And so, um- What I learned in that environment was how
to operate effectively where the national focus of the country is solely on this, this one country more or less, and then within that, what civilians were doing, and then within that, what I was involved with in particular on the agriculture side, uh, along with many others, of course, in the military, US Department of Agriculture and elsewhere. 00:17:05.631 --> 00:17:58.721 Uh, but I had a lot thrown on my shoulders, and I think I was able to demonstrate some effectiveness in communicating and delivering results, and that allowed me to take on more responsibility quite rapidly in that environment, while at the same time, I think being confronted with some face-to-face many times, uh, for better or worse, extremely high level US government officials, uh, at very, very high levels who often would request that I brief them on developments related to what I was working on in person, and they would often come to Afghanistan and, uh, one particular person who, who is no longer with us, um, just had a, a reputation for notoriously being an extremely difficult person, and he often, uh... 00:17:58.760 --> 00:17:59.421 It was a he. 00:17:59.760 --> 00:18:03.250 He often, uh, you know, came after me pretty hard. 00:18:03.351 --> 00:18:05.211 Uh, but I, I did have support there. 00:18:05.211 --> 00:18:40.211 And so, um, I think that really helped me, and I had the support of my team, and I would often leave these meetings, um, sweating, but, uh, my colleagues telling me,"Well, you did a really, really great job, and, you know, you were really, um, the target of a lot of ire." Um, not that I or our team was doing anything wrong necessarily, but it was just the, the civilian focus on the counterinsurgency program that the US government and other partners were focused on. 00:18:40.901 --> 00:18:41.931 Is that because... 00:18:42.101 --> 00:18:48.121 I mean, was that before the weapons of mass destruction intelligence, brand failure? 00:18:48.381 --> 00:18:50.861 'Cause there was a huge brand failure for intelligence then. 00:18:50.871 --> 00:18:52.381 Intelligence, it took a big knock. 00:18:52.381 --> 00:18:58.510 It's just a bit like, you know, when the, the police screw up here, the police take a big knock to their brand, and you could, you... 00:18:58.570 --> 00:19:08.971 I guess you can kind of understand that if that man has got lives on the line, he is ultimately responsible for making decisions that deploy his men ultimately down the line to certain risky situations. 00:19:08.980 --> 00:19:10.540 He's like,"Is this intelligence good? 00:19:10.570 --> 00:19:11.221 Is it good? 00:19:11.310 --> 00:19:12.040 Is it good? 00:19:12.131 --> 00:19:15.560 Like, how can we rely on it?" He's looking for that reassurance. 00:19:15.560 --> 00:19:23.451 And so therefore, in your role, managing those expectations must have had to have been a very key part of your communication skill set, right? 00:19:24.820 --> 00:19:26.661 Absolutely, uh, w-without question. 00:19:26.830 --> 00:19:36.980 So managing expectations, be honest, uh, being upfront, you know, being able to deliver bad news or difficult news, uh, even when it's not convenient. 00:19:38.010 --> 00:19:56.221 You know, this person in particular, and frankly everyone in the administration that had to engage with, were extremely intelligent people who really, you know, knew their stuff for the most part, and you had to go into these meetings, these briefings extremely well prepared. 00:19:56.221 --> 00:20:01.961 A- a- even then, there's no guarantee whatsoever that you would come out of it unscathed. 00:20:02.391 --> 00:20:23.530 Uh, often I and others would still come out of these meetings highly unscathed, just because the, the demands are so high, but the pressure for the administration, again, o- on, uh, at that very highest levels in the White House, is to, uh, deliver some results that had been openly stated by our president, uh, multiple times. 00:20:24.121 --> 00:20:31.871 And that, and that also goes for the time in Iraq, and this is something that would, uh, we'd have to deal with in any administration, in any environment. 00:20:32.211 --> 00:20:37.320 But the stakes obviously were higher in Afghanistan at that time, and also in Iraq when I was there as well. 00:20:38.221 --> 00:20:42.580 In fact, I had a conversation today, which is where this comes from. 00:20:42.980 --> 00:21:03.621 Sometimes when you have to deliver news that isn't favorable, and it could be that the intelligence does or doesn't support a certain type of, um, action, ultimately all you can say is,"That's where the intelligence leads us." It's, it becomes, it's not subjective then or a- anymore. 00:21:03.671 --> 00:21:10.651 It literally is,"That's where the intelligence leads us." And moment to moment you're living with what you have at that given time. 00:21:10.651 --> 00:21:20.000 There's no bigger argument for saying,"We'd love to have more," or,"We'd like to get more confirmation, but that's what we have right now." It's a very difficult situation, isn't it? 00:21:21.221 --> 00:21:22.780 Absolutely, 100%. 00:21:22.780 --> 00:21:32.691 A- and in my role at that time in that capacity, although I was more senior at that time than when I was in Iraq, I was still relatively junior. 00:21:32.691 --> 00:22:02.730 And so, you know, me in that role as the so-called subject matter expert delivering the information on what we had and what we're doing to the best of my ability, um, and it also typically, not always, but typically it goes through many rounds of discussion at higher levels before it reaches that principle, if you will, just to make sure that everyone understands, everything is red teamed to the best that we can, and we're just prepared for those things. 00:22:03.691 --> 00:22:07.790 Um, doesn't always lead to happy people on the receiving end. 00:22:07.911 --> 00:22:12.376 It often does not But that's the best we can do. 00:22:12.826 --> 00:22:16.586 And then
you add in that inaction can be as harmful as action. 00:22:17.217 --> 00:22:20.007 So you think, it's like a double-edged sword. 00:22:20.007 --> 00:22:22.717 You're gonna cut yourself whichever way you're gonna go, right? 00:22:23.416 --> 00:22:23.826 Right. 00:22:23.936 --> 00:22:25.037 A- a- absolutely. 00:22:25.086 --> 00:22:32.106 Um, at the end of the day, we're all humans, and, there's only so much we can do, only so many hours in the day, et cetera. 00:22:32.646 --> 00:22:37.616 Um, can I deliver the best information and abilities that we can at a given time? 00:22:38.436 --> 00:22:47.317 Your LinkedIn profile really piqued my attention, because you mention a couple of things, and one of them is, gray zone warfare tactics. 00:22:47.527 --> 00:22:50.507 I just know this is gonna prick up a lot of men's ears in particular. 00:22:50.507 --> 00:22:53.116 Gray zone warfare tactics, let's hear about that. 00:22:53.116 --> 00:22:55.856 What are gray zone warfare tactics? 00:22:56.606 --> 00:22:57.057 Sure. 00:22:57.116 --> 00:23:24.186 So what's interesting for me is, and not necessarily all the, what I would call purists, if you will, would necessarily agree, but for me, gray zone, that concept, hybrid warfare, irregular warfare, um, political warfare, these are all a variety of different terms that I think from a scholarly perspective are each unique, even though admittedly, uh, related to another. 00:23:24.807 --> 00:23:27.346 Um, asymmetric warfare is another term as well. 00:23:28.436 --> 00:23:31.346 For me, I, I generally use those terms interchangeably. 00:23:31.467 --> 00:23:35.336 I think some would have, uh, you know, would contest that. 00:23:35.356 --> 00:24:05.196 But essentially what it is, what it means, regardless of whether you use gray zone or whether the other terms I just mentioned, is particularly tactics used by an actor, and that actor could be a state actor, could be a state-backed actor such as a proxy, or it could be a non-state actor, uh, it really doesn't matter, using a variety of techniques that are so-called below the threshold of overt active conflict, if you will. 00:24:05.717 --> 00:24:08.126 Things that could be plausibly deniable. 00:24:08.926 --> 00:24:13.497 Sometimes in the intelligence field, uh, the term is used false flag. 00:24:13.997 --> 00:24:19.047 Potentially you try to pin something on another actor who isn't involved. 00:24:19.656 --> 00:24:29.836 Um, things that are really difficult, murky to, uh, point out and attribute to one particular entity over another. 00:24:30.477 --> 00:24:42.987 And typically, uh, because it is about plausible deniability, it's about this murkiness, if you will, there's usually not, uh, a gun fired or something like that. 00:24:42.987 --> 00:24:52.926 It's typically things that are, again, when we talk about below the radar, plausibly deniable, part of in- an influence campaign. 00:24:52.977 --> 00:25:11.871 So particularly in the information domain, the cognitive domain, whatever we wanna call it, uh, disinformation, propaganda, misinformation, et cetera, all of these- Um, tools are widely used, in my view, more and more today than ever. 00:25:12.560 --> 00:25:25.471 Having said that, the information space, disinformation, deception, whatever you wanna call it, these are parts of warfare or conflict, you know, from the beginning of time. 00:25:25.471 --> 00:25:31.280 So none of that is new necessarily, but maybe some of the tools are new, some of the technologies are new, new. 00:25:31.290 --> 00:25:33.601 Uh, smartphones, et cetera. 00:25:33.621 --> 00:25:35.060 I could go on on this point. 00:25:35.300 --> 00:25:37.240 Well, I think we talked in the pre-chat, didn't we? 00:25:37.240 --> 00:26:03.840 And I said, you know, back in the day, we, I say we being the, uh, the NATO alliance, would drop leaflets out of a plane onto villages in a number of different South American countries, including African countries, you know, with information that we wanted them to absorb, and that's only the kind of physical version of what's happening logically now with social media and misinformation and disinformation. 00:26:03.840 --> 00:26:04.941 It's just an evolution. 00:26:05.280 --> 00:26:28.540 I know it's been one of our tactics, and if you look at World War II, you know, when we worked with Eisenhower, for example, over one of the big, big battles that ultimately ended up ending the war, uh, you know, misinformation and disinformation was part of our strategy all the way through to try and let the Germans think we were gonna do something that we weren't gonna do, so we had that element of surprise. 00:26:29.141 --> 00:26:43.310 And I just- Mm-hmm I just think what we're seeing now is a far more sophisticated and targeted way, that cognitive, uh, battle that we have for our sovereignty of our brains right now is key. 00:26:43.320 --> 00:26:47.881 How are you seeing that play out as technology gets better? 00:26:49.989 --> 00:26:51.439 100% agree with you. 00:26:52.538 --> 00:27:03.058 It is getting more and more difficult to, I think, mitigate and counter what's been happening given the fact that a lot of these technologies are superfluous. 00:27:03.989 --> 00:27:49.260 So many folks around the world have access to the internet, let alone a smartphone, let alone the apps you could download on a smartphone, let alone, you know, 24-hour news cycles and outlets, just the variety of media outlets and so-called media outlets and information available through, again, the internet or one of the apps you can download on your phone Information is superfluous to so many people, and it's very difficult, I think, more and more for, you know, particularly as, as any actor, again, it doesn't have to be a state actor, it can be a non-state actor, uh, engaging in this disinformation, misinformation, if you will. 00:27:50.240 --> 00:27:54.451 It's very difficult for the average person to discern what is fact from fiction.
00:27:55.530 --> 00:28:23.671 Even if there is an ability to fact check the information, I think for me what is more worrisome is many people, and I think this may also just be part of human nature, but many people, if they know something that they believe and they're fi- something they read is fact checked and turns out to be not true, they may still not accept that anyway because it confirms their, you know, previously held beliefs anyway. 00:28:23.671 --> 00:28:34.770 And, and I think that's where we are today more and more, and it's getting more and more difficult for, I think, any of us to counter this. 00:28:34.951 --> 00:28:44.530 Um, there are things that we've done overseas t- to do so, of course, and they're successful, you know, to varying degrees, but, um, it's very difficult. 00:28:45.881 --> 00:28:55.891 So I have to add that you were part of the huge DOGE, exodus, under this current administration in 2026. 00:28:56.310 --> 00:28:59.671 Have to say that in case someone listens in two years from now. 00:29:00.191 --> 00:29:05.471 now, there are some people that don't understand what that means, so in your own words, that would be very helpful. 00:29:05.520 --> 00:29:08.270 But you've had to kind of have a rethink, haven't you, about what you're gonna do? 00:29:08.310 --> 00:29:21.651 And I can only say, and I think I told you this in the pre-chat, John, that with the DOGE exodus, I can't imagine the amount of amazing intelligence we're losing ultimately. 00:29:21.871 --> 00:29:25.490 Uh, how d- how do you think that's gonna affect things? 00:29:27.853 --> 00:29:47.065 So I'll, I'll start by saying first I think anyone who's been a government employee would agree that how we do our work, how the government provides services, whatever that service may be, can always be more efficient, can always be improved. 00:29:47.625 --> 00:29:50.244 I generally don't think there's any debate about that. 00:29:50.255 --> 00:29:57.825 I think the question becomes, though, and this is where it was more challenging, is what's the best way to do that? 00:29:57.964 --> 00:30:01.335 And is the way we're doing that getting at the right problem? 00:30:01.954 --> 00:30:05.095 Are we addressing what the issue is or not? 00:30:05.884 --> 00:30:30.134 I think that DOGE, uh, the Department of Government Efficiency, which I understand was recently, uh, shuttered, uh, had a mandate to comb through the entire US government and identify what it found to be, in its view, using its own methodology, to be inefficiencies in terms of laws, policies, regulations. 00:30:30.494 --> 00:30:36.625 I guess probably more policies and regulations,'cause getting into laws would require Congress, congressional involvement. 00:30:37.295 --> 00:31:01.255 But policy and regulations or particular programs the US government was funding, or personnel who were identified, for whatever reason, based on certain criteria that they came up with, with, as maybe those who wouldn't necessarily
be right for the current administration. 00:31:02.045 --> 00:31:14.464 Now, certainly every administration does, regardless of party, ha- have a right to choose who its political appointees are, who its, you know, staffers are, and that happens in every administration. 00:31:14.464 --> 00:31:22.164 And in my 25 years in the foreign service, I've gone through Republican and Democratic administrations multiple times. 00:31:22.234 --> 00:31:30.515 Um, typically, though, the impact on career officers such as myself is very minimal, if at all. 00:31:30.974 --> 00:31:47.974 The only impact typically would be there's a, a, a new strategy, there's a new policy related to that strategy, or there's a new pro- program to implement the policy related to that strategy, and you, John, and/or your colleagues are gonna have to focus on that. 00:31:48.924 --> 00:31:53.394 Again, that's typical, and typically, historically, that's the only change. 00:31:53.775 --> 00:32:32.924 What was different, uh, this time was, uh, from my perspective, my view only, not everyone necessarily agree, but really at higher levels, encouraging, uh, under the rubric of, and again, whether one believes with this rubric, but under the rubric of saving taxpayer dollars that we would need to start laying off people, um, encouraging government employees to voluntarily retire or To seek options to retire early if you're not eligible to retire, et cetera. 00:32:32.924 --> 00:32:38.464 And so a number of folks did, uh, retire voluntarily. 00:32:39.075 --> 00:32:43.184 Others stayed on and were terminated or laid off. 00:32:43.835 --> 00:32:49.285 I had the option to, uh, voluntarily retire, and I chose that option. 00:32:50.484 --> 00:32:55.644 I wasn't necessarily planning on retiring at that point in time, but that's just the way things had worked out. 00:32:56.644 --> 00:33:07.625 Um, so it was extremely challenging and very different from any other change in administration that I had gone through, and I think I would say probably most of my colleagues had gone through as well. 00:33:08.615 --> 00:33:10.204 And so you decided to write a book. 00:33:12.154 --> 00:33:13.275 I did, yes. 00:33:13.484 --> 00:33:14.289 So, um- Did you 00:33:14.289 --> 00:33:15.934 have a lot of free time on your hands? 00:33:17.974 --> 00:33:22.684 Well, uh, fun- funnily enough, this will show you how committed I am. 00:33:22.704 --> 00:33:28.704 Um, I actually, uh, wrote the book while I was still working and before... 00:33:29.444 --> 00:33:30.865 And it came out in the fall of 2024. 00:33:32.134 --> 00:33:39.115 And so, um, I'm still working full time, and it was based on my PhD thesis. 00:33:39.144 --> 00:33:48.234 I got my PhD from King's College London, uh, which is a great university, and I was really excited to, to be a student there, and I learned a lot. 00:33:48.765 --> 00:33:55.464 Um, and I did that over a roughly six-year part-time period while I was still working overseas. 00:33:55.525 --> 00:34:01.464 And so I was able to take the thesis and convert that into a book, and the book's gotten very good reviews. 00:34:01.464 --> 00:34:02.894 I'm very excited about that. 00:34:03.325 --> 00:34:07.305 And, um, it's quite, yeah, quite exciting to do that. 00:34:07.545 --> 00:34:17.894 Um, exhausting, but I had a lot of support from, uh, our ambassadors and others who I work with overseas to do it, and a lot of encouragement, so I really appreciate that from their part. 00:34:17.905 --> 00:34:17.925 So 00:34:18.594 --> 00:34:21.344 tell me, what did you decide to write a book about? 00:34:23.085 --> 00:34:23.574 Certainly. 00:34:23.574 --> 00:34:35.985 So it was based on a mix of my practical work experience in Ukraine from 2015 to 2019, and also some of my experience in the, uh, in the Middle East. 00:34:36.514 --> 00:34:41.514 Uh, so looking at what Russia was doing in Ukraine, uh, but also in Syria. 00:34:41.565 --> 00:35:06.744 So while I was in Ukraine from 2015 to 2019, this is, uh, roughly a year or so after Russia had annexed Crimea and had been engaging in hybrid or regular warfare or gray zone warfare in eastern Ukraine, Donbas, and elsewhere across Ukraine, but also across Europe and frankly, uh, against the US a- and others as well. 00:35:08.925 --> 00:35:26.965 So being there in Kyiv at, at the time, in our embassy, seeing what was happening in real time, reading all the debates, scholarly debates, but also just in the news, the concept of hybrid warfare, you would hear that at that point probably a million times a day, kind of everywhere. 00:35:27.485 --> 00:35:30.985 And there's a lot of debate about, well, what is hybrid warfare? 00:35:30.985 --> 00:35:32.414 Where did this term come from? 00:35:33.195 --> 00:35:42.559 The idea that many espoused at the time that Russia invented a new form of warfare- Um, it really made me want to explore this further. 00:35:42.929 --> 00:35:52.648 I knew about King's, uh, from, from colleagues of mine who taught at the National War College in Washington, where I was also a student, uh, many years ago, and I really wanted to pursue that. 00:35:53.628 --> 00:36:14.259 Uh, so I did, and, uh, luckily for me, again, since I was in Ukraine working on these issues, I, I did have to get approval, and I did, uh, from our ambassador and others to, to focus on this, obviously using unclassified open source information and material, and of course, which I did. 00:36:14.608 --> 00:36:39.405 And although I wasn't able to travel to Syria, I, uh, myself,'cause at that time, 2015 to 2016, while Russia was already engaged in Ukraine, they also started more overtly engaging in Syria, and there was a lot of concern within the US policy circle, if you will, but also NATO partners that- What is Russia doing? 00:36:39.405 --> 00:36:51.094 And they're, for the first time in many, many years, actively engaged on multiple fronts, including one outside the former Soviet space, which they had not done in quite a long
time. 00:36:51.155 --> 00:36:56.755 Uh, I think not since the, their war in Afghanistan in the, in the'80s. 00:36:57.545 --> 00:37:01.474 So again, increasing interest, concern about what Russia's doing in this space. 00:37:01.485 --> 00:37:06.594 I really wanna be, uh, so really encourage myself to focus on this even more. 00:37:07.574 --> 00:37:09.014 No, I think it's great what you've done. 00:37:09.014 --> 00:37:11.545 And I, I was thinking while I was listening there. 00:37:11.554 --> 00:37:12.054 Mm-hmm. 00:37:12.135 --> 00:37:15.114 Uh, and it's kind of, uh, provoked me. 00:37:15.235 --> 00:37:27.355 So I actually had someone say- Mm-hmm uh, someone say to me today,"Oh, you know, Yoyo, what I really like about your podcast is it's edgy and inquiring, but not too, uh, pokey." But I've got something that's a little bit pokey, all right? 00:37:27.465 --> 00:37:27.585 Okay. 00:37:27.844 --> 00:37:30.724 Um, and I love that, not too pokey. 00:37:31.985 --> 00:37:40.735 But I understand, um, and I'm not aligning with any politic, uh, politic, po- political, political preference. 00:37:40.755 --> 00:37:47.925 But I understand that, um, the issue with Ukraine was down to a contractual agreement being broken. 00:37:48.335 --> 00:37:58.795 Putin made it very clear that there was to be no bordering country, no bordering nation that was formerly USSR was to ever become a member of NATO. 00:37:59.235 --> 00:38:20.494 But one of the previous, um, presidents, invited the Ukraine to become a member of NATO, and that that was the stimulus for the whole of this shit show that we're in at the moment- Right with money just being thrown at, now we understand it to be drone warfare. 00:38:20.525 --> 00:38:24.385 There's not even, you know, it's not even man on man, human on human. 00:38:24.394 --> 00:38:24.425 Mm-hmm. 00:38:24.925 --> 00:38:34.635 This is typically, it's like I'm feeling like it's a stage for people to just watch what's gonna happen here, and how does this technology work. 00:38:34.664 --> 00:38:40.244 It's like if you could get defense contractors to get their ideal wish, it would be,"Do you know what? 00:38:40.454 --> 00:38:41.344 There's a stage here. 00:38:41.344 --> 00:38:41.945 Come watch it. 00:38:41.945 --> 00:38:49.855 You'll see how all our drones work." I'm just being quite skeptical, but- Mm-hmm there's gonna be no end to this unless... 00:38:50.545 --> 00:39:02.894 Gene Roddenberry wrote about this in Star Trek when- Mm-hmm humans were plucked out with a bracelet to go and stand in a incinerator, and their life would be made extinct. 00:39:03.385 --> 00:39:14.945 And the moral of the story of that episode was that unless you're getting bloody, and that you're feeling the emotions of war and what it really means, you're never gonna be incentivized to stop it. 00:39:15.494 --> 00:39:20.304 And we're in this perpetuating cycle now with the Ukraine. 00:39:20.934 --> 00:39:23.485 And so you can see why my brain is thinking this. 00:39:23.525 --> 00:39:24.525 What are you thinking? 00:39:25.641 --> 00:39:26.070 Sure. 00:39:26.090 --> 00:39:31.791 So, um, this is definitely a more pokey question compared to some of the ear- earlier ones. 00:39:31.791 --> 00:39:43.731 So particularly the, the first part of it about, the US and the USSR having an agreement that, um, US would not support any former Soviet states becoming NATO members. 00:39:44.420 --> 00:39:47.871 I think from the US perspective, there was no such agreement. 00:39:48.061 --> 00:40:03.056 I think obviously from the Kremlin, Moscow, Putin perspective, there was Obviously, I, I wasn't in the room when any conversations such as those may or may not have taken place, but I certainly don't believe at all that that's the US perspective. 00:40:03.987 --> 00:40:13.786 The other thing I, I think is important to highlight here is that Ukraine is an independent sovereign state, as is Moldova, as is Georgia, et cetera, et cetera. 00:40:13.806 --> 00:40:33.257 And so just from my perspective, even if I weren't a former government official that served in Ukraine, et cetera, I would think as somebody who believes in the concept of democracy, that if an independent sovereign state wants to pursue NATO membership, for example, in this context, you're, you know, a country in the EU... 00:40:33.887 --> 00:40:36.586 or sorry, in the European, uh, continent. 00:40:37.396 --> 00:40:47.177 If they wanted to do that, they should have the right to do so, and obviously there are certain standards and certain requirements that have to be met before they can become so. 00:40:47.186 --> 00:40:54.277 So, uh, you know, I, I, I understand that that is the narrative out of Moscow a- and many backers. 00:40:54.876 --> 00:41:06.277 I, I, I don't believe that that is, is the case, and then even if it were, uh, I don't believe anything was formally signed at all, and I certainly don't think anyone in US government believes that either. 00:41:08.036 --> 00:41:08.726 On the- 00:41:08.726 --> 00:41:10.487 Beaut- beautifully answered. 00:41:10.487 --> 00:41:10.726 Now to the 00:41:10.726 --> 00:41:11.027 second part- about 00:41:11.027 --> 00:41:12.356 the drone stage. 00:41:12.356 --> 00:41:12.547 Yes. 00:41:12.547 --> 00:41:13.766 Yes, yes, definitely. 00:41:13.806 --> 00:41:32.746 Now, on the second part, so on the technology front, before talking about drones specifically, on the disinformation, misinformation front, we talked about new technology, like the smartphones and what that can provide in terms of downloading certain apps or going on the internet, et cetera. 00:41:32.996 --> 00:41:33.887 I didn't mention AI. 00:41:34.467 --> 00:41:36.907 I, I didn't mention cyber and how... 00:41:38.527 --> 00:41:45.327 and using those types of tools can also facilitate deep fakes, whether those are audios or videos, et cetera. 00:41:45.536 --> 00:41:45.887 Yeah. 00:41:45.896 --> 00:41:57.117 And I think we see on a daily basis how AI-enhanced videos or
produced videos, it, it's increasingly difficult to discern what is real, what's fact from fiction, if you will. 00:41:57.126 --> 00:41:57.146 Yeah. 00:41:58.907 --> 00:42:24.641 On the drone front, um, I fully agree with the concept that Ukraine is providing an opportunity for the US and others to See how it, it's advancing this technology and its defense, and how the US and others can learn from that. 00:42:25.050 --> 00:42:29.811 Obviously, adversaries of the US, the UK, NATO, et cetera, are also learning. 00:42:29.820 --> 00:42:33.471 They're also watching very closely, uh, what's going on. 00:42:34.030 --> 00:42:45.251 Um, but I think taking a few steps back further from that, uh, to the point you made about this war seemingly just never ending and just continuing and continuing, where is the end in sight? 00:42:46.030 --> 00:42:55.400 I think both from the Ukrainian perspective and from the Russian regime perspective, this war is existential on both fronts. 00:42:55.931 --> 00:43:03.210 Um, for Ukraine, this is about their nationhood, it's about their sovereignty, it's about their independence as a, a separate nation state. 00:43:04.400 --> 00:43:19.731 I think for the Kremlin, although I would also imagine, I know there's been polling done on this before, I think many Russians, the average Russian may also have a s- certain view of U- Ukraine, which may be different from, from myself or, or others in the West. 00:43:19.760 --> 00:43:29.630 But Ukraine's success in this war really undermines, in my view, the regime stability, and Putin in particular. 00:43:30.800 --> 00:43:43.420 And so based on that, I think the, the question we have to think about is, if both sides see the war as existential, uh, to each other, it's a great question to ask, where does it ever end? 00:43:43.990 --> 00:43:44.420 Um- 00:43:44.420 --> 00:43:45.971 Do, do you know where I think it does end? 00:43:46.391 --> 00:43:46.440 Tell me. 00:43:46.510 --> 00:44:00.010 I think it ends, it either ends when the money runs out, or it ends when a way can be found for both sides to cease without losing pride and face 00:44:02.911 --> 00:44:03.190 True. 00:44:03.210 --> 00:44:13.481 I, I think in any, ultimately, I think we're all hoping for a peaceful settlement for sure, and, um, hopefully that will come sooner than later of course. 00:44:13.510 --> 00:44:23.431 I, I know Ukrainians are suffering from, you know, the daily, numerous daily attacks, particularly on energy infrastructure, but also on civilian infrastructure as well. 00:44:24.161 --> 00:44:28.690 And, uh, Ukraine is heavily reliant on support from the US and others. 00:44:29.610 --> 00:44:52.050 Um, but again, to your point about the drones, they're making incredible advances in drone technology, but other technology as well, uh, military technology that I think indicates Or as another example of what I would refer to as the changing character of warfare rather than the nature, if you will. 00:44:52.291 --> 00:44:52.510 Yeah. 00:44:52.590 --> 00:44:55.210 And it goes back to your initial question about gray zone. 00:44:56.030 --> 00:45:26.994 Um, while drones are, uh, engaged in, I mean, not all drones of course, but in this context, drones are engaged in actual kinetic or military or hard power activity, um- They're another example of 21st century warfare where you don't necessarily need to have boots on the ground 24/7 engaging in what we would normally think of like World War II style, uh, combat with tanks and formations and all of that. 00:45:27.554 --> 00:45:39.644 Certainly, that has occurred in this war, but I think we see more and more that technology can be used as a proxy for actual traditional combatants for engaging. 00:45:39.684 --> 00:45:54.414 Again, these drones have some command and control, um, from civilians, if you will, but with AI, they're increasingly becoming more autonomous, and that, that is a whole other issue, uh, coming up very, very soon. 00:45:54.905 --> 00:46:04.994 Um, but I think it's an indication of how warfare today is not just solely boots on the ground with guns, tanks, et cetera, or missiles. 00:46:05.434 --> 00:46:08.695 Those are still important, but there's many other things that can be done. 00:46:09.244 --> 00:46:11.414 Same thing with an influence campaign. 00:46:12.155 --> 00:46:29.045 If you wanna shape a behavior or a decision by a particular target, you can use social media as a platform for disinformation or out different media outlets, if you will, that you would watch on TV, what have you. 00:46:29.445 --> 00:46:33.324 Let alone AI and cyber enabling deep fakes as well. 00:46:33.855 --> 00:46:42.505 Any of this, and often in unison or combined together to varying degrees, is used in the so-called battlefield of today. 00:46:42.855 --> 00:46:48.125 And from my perspective, Russia has been quite good at it, uh, over the years. 00:46:48.364 --> 00:46:53.585 I think Ukraine's become much better at, at it themselves and at combating what Russia's been doing. 00:46:54.315 --> 00:47:09.094 Um, I think the initial, Russia's initial foray into Ukraine in, in 2014, I think initially caught some people off guard and, and took folks by surprise, both in Ukraine and in the US and, and kind of within our NATO allies. 00:47:09.434 --> 00:47:13.494 But I think we've gotten much smarter on this and how to deal with it and combat it. 00:47:14.045 --> 00:47:15.804 Not at all to say that we've solved it. 00:47:15.804 --> 00:47:30.125 We h- we still have a lot, a lot to learn, but I do see Ukraine and what they're doing as an opportunity for, for us to learn from to try to adapt kinda going forward the way we also engage in, in conflict. 00:47:31.405 --> 00:47:42.655 I'd like to definitely take this opportunity to explain that the United Kingdom right now is, uh, suffering with the gray zones on your regular warfare, uh, pattern. 00:47:43.094 --> 00:47:46.945 Um, we talked about the disruption to infrastructure.
00:47:47.105 --> 00:47:54.432 So what's happening is, um- The, this, oh, how do I even start? 00:47:54.702 --> 00:48:06.762 But I, we talked about how they are using the cell-type structure for a r- for engaging criminal groups to carry out specific targets on our infrastructure. 00:48:06.762 --> 00:48:09.342 In fact, including our, our prime minister. 00:48:09.342 --> 00:48:12.902 Our former prime minister, Keir Starmer, had received a direct attack. 00:48:13.652 --> 00:48:39.463 And you combine that with the, the threats to our general, um, fiber cabling as well, uh, the cybersecurity attacks that are notoriously Russian footprint, and then the, you know, the ship up off the north coast of Scotland where all of our- Mm-hmm you know, our, our, well, that's where our nuclear base is anyway, but how they're mapping our, uh, seabed infrastructure. 00:48:39.842 --> 00:48:41.503 Uh,"Oh, no, we're just here. 00:48:41.583 --> 00:48:44.333 We're, we're on a little, uh, training mission." Really? 00:48:44.333 --> 00:48:45.492 No, bugger off. 00:48:45.552 --> 00:48:47.222 Uh, you're not supposed to be here. 00:48:47.452 --> 00:48:59.623 But I'm seeing all this narrative going around like, um, I'm gonna really exaggerate here, but rather than point guns at each other, we're doing this kind of like,"We'd really appreciate it that you weren't sailing in that area. 00:48:59.842 --> 00:49:03.322 Um, and, and please can you remove yourself from our airspace? 00:49:03.422 --> 00:49:05.293 It's really not good etiquette." You know? 00:49:05.943 --> 00:49:12.682 It's like- there's all of this very- Yeah flowery language because they're doing everything but escalating. 00:49:13.052 --> 00:49:20.572 They are communicating, but keeping the de-escalation very firm with very specific language, aren't they? 00:49:22.302 --> 00:49:22.802 Yes. 00:49:22.882 --> 00:49:26.202 Um, and that's something else we hadn't gotten to, and so I'm glad you brought that up. 00:49:26.413 --> 00:49:26.682 Good. 00:49:26.722 --> 00:49:36.202 Kind of the maritime domain, domain, particularly the undersea cables, um, not only off the coast of Scotland or the UK, but, but also around the Baltics as well, and elsewhere. 00:49:36.202 --> 00:49:44.733 We know the PRC's been active in some of these types of activities as well, like in the South China Sea and, and elsewhere- Yeah and in the Pacific, Indo-Pacific. 00:49:45.083 --> 00:49:53.072 Um- It's just another element again of the gray zone, if you will, the plausible deniability. 00:49:53.643 --> 00:50:03.103 Is it that they're really there to cut cables or monitor and listen what's happening, or are they doing something else, or maybe they're doing a little bit of both? 00:50:05.360 --> 00:50:18.960 Etiquette is great, uh, and I am very, um, humbled by British et- etiquette in general, but I, I, I think this is one of those situations where maybe m- more directness and less etiquette could be more helpful. 00:50:18.960 --> 00:50:19.516 Well,
you should see 00:50:19.516 --> 00:50:20.170 me after a few ciders. 00:50:20.170 --> 00:50:21.260 I don't have a lot of etiquette then. 00:50:22.141 --> 00:50:22.701 No, no, exactly. 00:50:22.740 --> 00:50:23.610 I become a pirate. 00:50:25.760 --> 00:50:40.331 But just in terms of, um, you know, uh, UK policy, and you mentioned, you know, criminal gangs a- and others who are y- who are being used by the Kremlin, if you will, to engage in some of these activities. 00:50:41.541 --> 00:50:47.130 That's another example of this 21st century gray zone warfare, if you will, using proxies. 00:50:47.130 --> 00:50:51.431 And a proxy could be a drone, if you will, let alone a human being. 00:50:51.431 --> 00:50:57.081 And a- as a person, it could be a criminal gang, somebody who is a sympathizer. 00:50:57.181 --> 00:51:15.340 Um,'cause we know in, since 2014, uh, at least prior to 2022, there were, uh, a number of forces or volunteers, if you will, from outside of, of Russia who went to Ukraine to fight on Russia's side, you know, from Chechnya, from Syria, a- and many other places. 00:51:15.351 --> 00:51:19.161 So you will find those sympathizers in these types of situations too. 00:51:19.161 --> 00:51:28.614 I, I think it's, it's really a tactic of Trying any and all tactics and seeing what works, seeing what sticks first, if you will. 00:51:29.224 --> 00:51:36.554 And Russia's been doing this not only in the UK, but across the European continent, uh, sabotage operations, assassination attempts. 00:51:36.824 --> 00:51:36.885 Yeah. 00:51:36.885 --> 00:51:49.105 You know, going after firms that support Ukraine in one fashion or another through, uh, you know, arms or other, you know, Ukrainian cultural centers or restaurants, et cetera, et cetera. 00:51:49.514 --> 00:51:49.985 It's kind... 00:51:49.985 --> 00:51:54.925 Any and all things are part of the, the target, uh, base, if you will. 00:51:55.324 --> 00:52:01.784 And the assassination attempt of the Ukrainian mogul, they called it, in Monaco, was unprecedented. 00:52:01.795 --> 00:52:01.844 Mm-hmm. 00:52:01.855 --> 00:52:04.034 That's kind of- Right James Bond stuff, right? 00:52:04.505 --> 00:52:10.684 Um, because even Monaco were kind of like,"What the hell?" I mean, it would've been it with- Mm a more French accent. 00:52:10.965 --> 00:52:21.635 But, uh, they- Mm they ultimately, what I've noticed is actually that there's been very little conversation other than the reporting of the incident. 00:52:21.655 --> 00:52:23.635 It's gone on radio silence. 00:52:23.934 --> 00:52:26.284 And you'll notice- Right these things probably do. 00:52:26.715 --> 00:52:29.275 There's an awful lot more going on behind the scenes, I'm sure. 00:52:30.244 --> 00:52:30.695 Right. 00:52:31.135 --> 00:52:38.144 But, but also even the UK, uh, I guess back in 20- I remember it was 2016 or'17, the Skripal attack. 00:52:38.724 --> 00:52:39.094 Yeah. 00:52:39.094 --> 00:52:43.295 Um, and we've seen that type of activity in other
places. 00:52:43.445 --> 00:52:55.505 When I was in Ukraine, there were assassinations of, uh, uh, Russian defectors, if you will, from, from their own Duma, their parliament, uh, let alone others. 00:52:55.514 --> 00:52:59.735 Anyone who was opposed to Russia's actions in Ukraine was a potential target. 00:53:00.264 --> 00:53:05.835 A- and a lot of times this would happen in public streets during daytime, uh, in Kyiv itself. 00:53:06.364 --> 00:53:06.684 Yeah. 00:53:06.684 --> 00:53:22.545 Um, and, and also hadn't mentioned yet, as another element of gray zone, focusing on Russia as an example, interference in elections across the European continent, funding of certain political parties, um, politicians, et cetera. 00:53:22.934 --> 00:53:48.905 And not necessarily those from one part of the spectrum or another, it's- Any and all who may either support Russian objectives or create chaos, instability, discord, what have you, in a particular society, which then kind of makes them more susceptible and less open maybe to supporting Ukraine, um, and more, more susceptible to, to Russian interference, if you will. 00:53:49.204 --> 00:53:51.005 But this isn't new either,'cause I was... 00:53:51.005 --> 00:53:53.735 W- I, I watch a lot of film noir, right? 00:53:53.925 --> 00:53:53.945 Mm-hmm. 00:53:53.954 --> 00:53:54.204 Love it. 00:53:54.704 --> 00:54:00.804 Uh, those were the days, yeah, the 1940s- black and white movies- Right with a bit of suspense- Yeah and romance. 00:54:01.155 --> 00:54:01.574 Um- 00:54:01.574 --> 00:54:01.994 Mm-hmm 00:54:01.994 --> 00:54:11.114 and there's a particular, um, film director called John Barry, and ultimately he was- Mm-hmm ostracized from the United States and accused of being a communist. 00:54:11.114 --> 00:54:18.275 And, and, and this was back then, and I'm thinking, what did communism really have anything to offer back in the 1940s? 00:54:18.324 --> 00:54:19.324 What was that all about? 00:54:19.335 --> 00:54:19.364 Right. 00:54:19.364 --> 00:54:20.894 Because there was quite a lot of bad. 00:54:21.135 --> 00:54:34.525 Like, gosh, if you sympathize with communists or, you know, or, or even if you thought,"Well, you know, Marxism's got a point, and capitalism's got a good- Mm-hmm uh, thing to offer, but communists- communism is good because of this," and then all of a sudden you're a communist. 00:54:34.525 --> 00:54:38.565 Or you go to a communism meeting to learn about it, and then you're a communist. 00:54:39.074 --> 00:54:40.344 What's, what was going on then? 00:54:40.355 --> 00:54:40.375 Mm-hmm. 00:54:40.385 --> 00:54:41.744 'Cause that felt a bit more... 00:54:42.005 --> 00:54:45.105 It felt like there was a bit more going on than, than the surface. 00:54:45.105 --> 00:54:51.405 I don't believe these people were trying to defect or reject the United States in any way. 00:54:51.494 --> 00:54:54.465 Bit, bit of a question that's a bit left of bang, that one. 00:54:55.054 --> 00:54:55.565 Yeah. 00:54:55.605
--> 00:55:16.844 It, it's, um, you know, there was that, I think in the US we called it the Red Scare, um, era, if you will, which I think lasted quite a long time- Yeah um, going after people they accused of, you know, with or without evidence or maybe questionable evidence of being sympathizers or actual, you know, Communist Party members. 00:55:17.355 --> 00:55:20.875 Um, that was, that was a difficult period particularly. 00:55:21.315 --> 00:55:23.784 I, I wasn't around at that time, but obviously- No, you don't 00:55:23.784 --> 00:55:24.394 look like you were. 00:55:25.195 --> 00:55:48.215 No, but, um, yeah, I, I, and I think that's something that potentially could still happen today, not necessarily in the US, but in many, many places, this, uh, perception that, um, somebody who may or may not espouse similar views may, um, be somebody you wanna target for, for a particular activity. 00:55:48.215 --> 00:56:03.284 Um, obviously there, there were some folks who were found to be, uh, trying to actively overthrow the US government and, and I think in those cases, they, they were lawfully, uh, detained and/or, and/or dealt with it, uh, if you will. 00:56:03.324 --> 00:56:16.045 But, um, I think that the point you made at the beginning, too, I think is also, uh, of that last part, um, about the newness or lack thereof and going back to the'40s, I think that's also extremely critical. 00:56:16.315 --> 00:56:16.545 Mm. 00:56:16.594 --> 00:56:40.487 That while, you know, here we are today in 2026, we're talking about Ukraine war and other things- The concepts of deception, plausible deniability, uh, maskirovka, as the Russians would call it themselves, um, false flags, uh, non-attribution, none of this is new whatsoever. 00:56:41.547 --> 00:56:53.887 I think what is new, though, is the use of these technologies that we discussed, and using them, but to achieve the same, maybe more traditional non-new effects, if you will. 00:56:54.186 --> 00:56:55.387 Do you know what it feels like? 00:56:56.067 --> 00:56:56.177 Like persuasion. 00:56:56.177 --> 00:56:57.677 It feels like- I guess imagine this. 00:56:57.777 --> 00:57:00.297 We're neighbors- Mm-hmm and there's a big fence between us. 00:57:00.827 --> 00:57:01.936 Uh- Mm-hmm it's a wooden fence. 00:57:01.956 --> 00:57:09.847 And over the years, you know, I, I kept noticing these little holes in my fence, and, like, every time I go to the fence and, you know, no matter how, I never see anyone there. 00:57:09.847 --> 00:57:11.686 I never see the holes being created. 00:57:12.016 --> 00:57:14.226 But the- Mm-hmm the holes are appearing, more holes. 00:57:14.226 --> 00:57:21.336 And then, and before you know it, you know, the, the, the neighbor's pets are being able to go through the, the, the holes in the fence. 00:57:21.887 --> 00:57:26.657 And, and if you move along a bit it's like we've got Ring camera- Mm-hmm doorbell cameras there. 00:57:26.657 --> 00:57:26.706 Right. 00:57:26.706 --> 00:57:31.036 And it's like,"Yeah, I can see who's actually c- creating the holes." Mm-hmm. 00:57:31.036 --> 00:57:35.797 And I'm like,"Yeah, can you stop making the holes, please?" And then they're like,"No, we're not gonna stop making the holes. 00:57:35.797 --> 00:57:42.217 We're just gonna go, like, a little bit passive-aggressive and not reply at all, but we're gonna keep making- Mm-hmm the holes in the fence." And I feel like that's where we're at. 00:57:42.226 --> 00:57:48.016 Like, we can actually see everything that's going on, uh, and- Right there's a kind of almost like a tolerance. 00:57:48.356 --> 00:57:52.867 So my question to you, with all of your experience, and I know this is a really tough question. 00:57:53.257 --> 00:57:58.487 At what point does someone turn round and say,"Right, this shit needs to stop now"? 00:58:00.317 --> 00:58:00.746 Or- 00:58:00.786 --> 00:58:01.657 Great question. 00:58:01.777 --> 00:58:01.956 Yeah, so- 00:58:01.956 --> 00:58:03.867 Is everyone benefiting from this? 00:58:06.989 --> 00:58:07.849 Great question. 00:58:08.128 --> 00:58:20.297 Um Back to the technology issue, it's certainly great to be able to have a smartphone and communicate more easily with family or friends or, or colleagues. 00:58:21.277 --> 00:58:35.617 Um, on the other hand, I, and I think maybe yourself and maybe many others, probably find ourselves with our, the phone in our hand all the time and can't have it out of our hand or can't be using this technology. 00:58:35.617 --> 00:58:38.206 We wouldn't, we wouldn't know what to do with ourselves. 00:58:39.387 --> 00:58:43.347 Um, that's not a good thing, of course. 00:58:46.081 --> 00:58:55.001 And it's always easier said than done, but I do think we're at a point where there's oversaturation of information because of these different tools. 00:58:55.251 --> 00:58:55.630 Yeah. 00:58:55.721 --> 00:59:04.860 And, or even surveillance and the opportunity to surveil because of Ring cameras or Google Nest or whatever you have, uh, at, at your home. 00:59:05.161 --> 00:59:13.300 Um, but you do have to wonder, um, kind of where, where am I now as a person? 00:59:13.300 --> 00:59:14.141 Where am I going? 00:59:14.581 --> 00:59:33.340 Uh, there's an app, uh, that monitors minute by minute in your geographic area no matter where you go in the US, you can download it on your phone for free, that lets you know if there's a break-in, if there's a robbery, if there's a car crash, if something bad is happening. 00:59:34.061 --> 00:59:37.831 And you could spend your entire day just looking at that and maybe... 00:59:38.110 --> 00:59:57.181 And it tells you the location freaking out, like,"Am I in a safe neighborhood?" And then for me, because I, I do sometimes look at that app- I remind myself that anywhere in the US, probably in most places of the world, if you had that app, you might see the same thing. 00:59:57.650 --> 01:00:02.650 Um, if you didn't have that app, would you be okay with it, not knowing?
01:00:03.311 --> 01:00:14.530 And so I, I think the issue is gonna be at some point with the oversaturation, when is enough is enough, and we need to take our time to, to step away a little bit. 01:00:15.070 --> 01:00:15.440 You know what? 01:00:15.481 --> 01:00:16.710 It's having that power cut. 01:00:16.740 --> 01:00:19.900 It's having- Mm-hmm that mobile phone run out of battery. 01:00:20.271 --> 01:00:28.891 It's taking- Mm-hmm that, uh, digital break, that digital- Mm-hmm vacation, and then realizing actually you don't need that stuff to function, that it's a novelty. 01:00:28.951 --> 01:00:29.181 Exactly. 01:00:29.221 --> 01:00:32.670 And it's a bit like, you know, we had this annoying ringtone called the frog. 01:00:32.670 --> 01:00:36.860 I think it was, I don't know- Mm 2016 or something, went ding, da-ding, ding- Mm-hmm ding, ding, ding. 01:00:37.041 --> 01:00:38.030 Like, everybody had it. 01:00:38.041 --> 01:00:38.061 Yeah. 01:00:38.061 --> 01:00:39.740 And then all of a sudden it was just like a novelty. 01:00:39.740 --> 01:00:41.880 It just, like, blew over really, really quickly. 01:00:42.340 --> 01:00:48.400 I don't even wanna do another impression of it'cause it will just l- be like a bee- in people's heads, and they will just- Mm-hmm be like ding, da-ding, ding, ding, ding. 01:00:49.300 --> 01:00:50.300 Everyone's gonna have 01:00:50.501 --> 01:00:50.561 it. 01:00:50.561 --> 01:00:51.061 I'm gonna have to look it up. 01:00:51.820 --> 01:00:52.981 It's dreadful. 01:00:53.101 --> 01:00:58.320 Um, but listen- Mm-hmm uh, finally, what's coming up for you now? 01:00:58.851 --> 01:00:59.771 More books? 01:00:59.931 --> 01:01:01.070 More professorships? 01:01:01.940 --> 01:01:03.130 Uh, what, what... 01:01:03.181 --> 01:01:09.070 And, and the other question I wanted to ask you is what are the students most interested in hearing about from you? 01:01:10.280 --> 01:01:10.690 Sure. 01:01:11.010 --> 01:01:16.710 So for me, um, going through and publishing one book was quite a heavy lift. 01:01:16.751 --> 01:01:19.661 I probably don't see myself doing that again. 01:01:19.981 --> 01:01:21.601 I, I never thought I would write a book. 01:01:21.670 --> 01:01:22.641 I'm glad that I did. 01:01:23.070 --> 01:01:40.150 Um, but certainly continuing to write maybe articles that get published in different academic journals or, um, you know, I've been working for the Department of Defense, or Department of War as it's now called in the US- Yeah a- as a contractor and doing quite a lot with them on a number of different issues, including some teaching. 01:01:40.550 --> 01:01:46.990 Um, but I definitely want to do more, uh, teaching as well at ASU and possibly other places. 01:01:47.110 --> 01:01:57.748 I've also been doing a lot of guest lectures at a number of, uh, US, uh- Public and private universities, uh, US military institutions, and all that. 01:01:57.778 --> 01:02:10.048 And, and actually, in just a couple of weeks, I'll be in Tampa, Florida, at, uh, our Special Operations Command, which has within it what's, uh, called the Joint Special Operations University, or JSOU. 01:02:10.048 --> 01:02:29.778 And I'll be teaching, uh, as lead instructor there with some, uh, former military colleagues, a course on how to conduct an inter-agency, so meaning all elements of the US government or a government, a integrated inter-agency, sorry, saying that twice, a, a regular warfare campaign. 01:02:30.438 --> 01:02:32.929 So that sounds nefarious and like word soup. 01:02:32.929 --> 01:02:33.969 What does that actually mean? 01:02:33.969 --> 01:02:51.518 So really about, particularly based on my career, how different elements of US government work together and should work together more effectively in a situation where you're dealing with an irregular gray zone hybrid threat, whether that's coming from Russia, from China, what have you. 01:02:51.518 --> 01:02:53.878 And so I'm really, really excited about that. 01:02:54.079 --> 01:03:09.949 And then the last part of your question about what the students look for or are interested in, I think mostly my experience as a practitioner for so long, and then also kinda how to get their foot in the door, so to speak, and any advice I have about doing that. 01:03:10.099 --> 01:03:12.059 So I'm more than happy to do that. 01:03:12.099 --> 01:03:16.639 I get contacted quite a bit on LinkedIn about that sort of thing, so it's great. 01:03:16.858 --> 01:03:19.708 Well, let me know if you ever get invited back to King's College. 01:03:19.728 --> 01:03:22.449 We'll have to- I will set up a coffee or- 01:03:22.619 --> 01:03:23.789 Yes, absolutely 01:03:23.829 --> 01:03:25.768 or a very British cup of tea. 01:03:26.469 --> 01:03:28.059 Well, I'm, I'm a big tea fan. 01:03:28.059 --> 01:03:30.239 I'm actually more of a tea drinker than coffee drinker, so. 01:03:30.849 --> 01:03:31.389 Perfect. 01:03:31.548 --> 01:03:33.889 I've really enjoyed- Yes our conversation today- Likewise Dr. 01:03:33.889 --> 01:03:34.429 John Pennil. 01:03:34.438 --> 01:03:37.449 Thank you so much for joining me on The Security Circle- Thank you, Tina podcast. 01:03:38.298 --> 01:03:38.688 Been great. 01:03:38.739 --> 01:03:39.228 Thank you.
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