Full Transcript for 130. Cyber Attacktober: When the Internet’s Trust Model Breaks

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WEBVTT NOTE Transcription provided by Podhome.fm Created: 10/27/2026 1:28:11 AM Duration: 3504.013 Channels: 1 1 00:00:01.040 --> 00:00:01.760 Welcome. 2 00:00:02.080 --> 00:00:03.759 One, welcome all, 3 00:00:04.080 --> 00:00:05.440 ladies and gentlemen. 4 00:00:05.600 --> 00:00:06.960 Pod 256, 5 00:00:06.960 --> 00:00:08.480 number 130, 6 00:00:08.960 --> 00:00:11.759 10/26/2026. 7 00:00:13.675 --> 00:00:16.635 My gosh. Scott Still October. Tyler This this has been madness. 8 00:00:16.955 --> 00:00:18.315 October didn't 9 00:00:18.315 --> 00:00:20.635 really come, but we got Cyber 10 00:00:20.955 --> 00:00:21.994 Attacktober. 11 00:00:22.075 --> 00:00:23.595 Cyber Attacktober. 12 00:00:24.075 --> 00:00:29.279 With the breaking headlines, yeah, it feels like time has been stretched out. 13 00:00:29.840 --> 00:00:30.640 Just like 14 00:00:31.199 --> 00:00:32.239 like 15 00:00:32.800 --> 00:00:33.760 any 16 00:00:33.760 --> 00:00:37.600 one of these exploits by themselves would have been shocking. 17 00:00:37.920 --> 00:00:41.680 And then it's just like day after day, just like more and more exploits. 18 00:00:42.305 --> 00:00:44.945 I mean, we had, like, the PHP thing, 19 00:00:45.425 --> 00:00:46.945 the certificates thing. 20 00:00:47.425 --> 00:00:49.905 What else has there been? I know I'm missing some. 21 00:00:50.864 --> 00:00:51.824 There was both 22 00:00:54.220 --> 00:01:00.140 Keystone Wallet and Yep. Potentially this morning Foundation Wallet. Their, like, customer database has been breached. 23 00:01:00.300 --> 00:01:03.580 Oh, yeah. I saw something about email impersonation. 24 00:01:04.060 --> 00:01:04.780 Yes. 25 00:01:05.580 --> 00:01:06.220 Yeah. 26 00:01:06.380 --> 00:01:11.325 Last time I looked, it was still ongoing. They weren't sure, but one of their servers had been... 27 00:01:11.805 --> 00:01:14.125 One of their web servers had been compromised. 28 00:01:14.685 --> 00:01:17.165 Not good. Not good. I mean, it... 29 00:01:18.284 --> 00:01:19.325 It's like 30 00:01:20.220 --> 00:01:28.140 there have been people who have been very good at doing this for a long time, but it took a lot of time and resources to do it. So they were very focused attacks 31 00:01:28.540 --> 00:01:37.995 from, you know, like, state actors and things like that who really either wanted to go after something for a state reason or there was a bunch of money attached to it. But now 32 00:01:38.315 --> 00:01:39.595 you can just, you 33 00:01:40.315 --> 00:01:41.675 know, be working 34 00:01:41.675 --> 00:01:46.075 out in the gym and, like, launch some massive exploit from the convenience of your 35 00:01:46.619 --> 00:01:47.500 wherever. 36 00:01:47.740 --> 00:01:54.299 Just talk talk through it with your with your AI, assuming you have a open weight obliterated AI. 37 00:01:54.619 --> 00:01:57.740 Yeah. Shout out to Maple real quick. They now offer obliterated. 38 00:01:57.820 --> 00:02:01.500 Do they? They did that? Models directly in the TEE 39 00:02:01.784 --> 00:02:04.825 service. Yeah. All right. What's obliterated mean? 40 00:02:05.145 --> 00:02:06.025 Lobotomized, 41 00:02:06.025 --> 00:02:07.225 so it doesn't say no. 42 00:02:07.625 --> 00:02:08.825 These models are 43 00:02:09.065 --> 00:02:11.545 trained so that they have guardrails and 44 00:02:11.944 --> 00:02:14.185 Schnitzel's explained it as 45 00:02:15.180 --> 00:02:21.660 asking things that it would typically say no to and then seeing what neurons fire and taking them out until it does what Like you 46 00:02:22.380 --> 00:02:27.420 telling it to three d print a Glock on some network 47 00:02:27.420 --> 00:02:29.260 printer halfway around the world? 48 00:02:29.915 --> 00:02:32.395 Well, that was Just for a random example. 49 00:02:32.955 --> 00:02:35.515 Yeah. Air dropping freedom tech, you could say. 50 00:02:37.755 --> 00:02:46.840 I love it. Yes. Air dropping freedom tech. Yeah. So this this is like open weight models. Right? So you can see how it works. 51 00:02:47.160 --> 00:02:52.040 And so then I think you can you can go in and adjust 52 00:02:53.080 --> 00:03:00.815 things. Like, essentially, you can remove guardrails. Like, you can't do this on the Frontier Labs because they're not open weight models. You can't actually change the model at all. 53 00:03:01.135 --> 00:03:01.855 But when 54 00:03:02.095 --> 00:03:03.295 companies release, 55 00:03:03.535 --> 00:03:05.215 open weight models like, 56 00:03:06.015 --> 00:03:06.974 DeepSeq 57 00:03:06.974 --> 00:03:09.455 and Kimi and GLM 58 00:03:09.455 --> 00:03:13.350 and there's... I guess even Meta is releasing one now supposedly. 59 00:03:14.310 --> 00:03:15.030 You can 60 00:03:15.430 --> 00:03:21.750 ask it the naughty questions and and see, like, why it's refusing and, through some magic, remove 61 00:03:21.910 --> 00:03:22.470 that 62 00:03:22.995 --> 00:03:26.035 ability for it to refuse, which is interesting. 63 00:03:26.115 --> 00:03:28.595 It is also interesting that a lot of the open weight models, 64 00:03:29.395 --> 00:03:32.595 they're they're pretty wide open already. 65 00:03:34.355 --> 00:03:37.315 They they certainly aren't as locked down as the Frontier Labs models, 66 00:03:38.190 --> 00:03:42.430 but they do have some guardrails built in and I guess you could just... 67 00:03:42.830 --> 00:03:45.470 Well, and the obliterated models aren't just desirable 68 00:03:46.190 --> 00:03:47.310 for crime. 69 00:03:48.030 --> 00:03:55.455 We've also seen from since August the the red team effort and maybe some of the open weight models aren't as restrictive nowadays, but 70 00:03:56.254 --> 00:04:02.255 they were necessary to do that security research because the models would refuse to even help you defend your code base. 71 00:04:02.655 --> 00:04:05.295 Is it just me or was Coldcard 72 00:04:05.570 --> 00:04:08.210 like a canary in the coal mine for all this? 73 00:04:08.610 --> 00:04:09.890 It seems like it. 74 00:04:10.450 --> 00:04:14.450

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It seems like it. It was like a a high value target. Right? So someone was 75 00:04:14.690 --> 00:04:18.930 certainly motivated to start poking around at it. And Irreversible. 76 00:04:19.655 --> 00:04:20.775 Irreversible. 77 00:04:21.335 --> 00:04:26.615 You know, you used to to to gain quite a bit, and it it did happen right around the launch of, 78 00:04:27.335 --> 00:04:29.575 Kimi k three. Mhmm. 79 00:04:30.134 --> 00:04:30.695 So 80 00:04:31.574 --> 00:04:34.055 it's it's theorized that someone could have used that. 81 00:04:35.650 --> 00:04:40.130 The the actual bug in the cold card firmware that wasn't using the 82 00:04:41.010 --> 00:04:42.050 the true 83 00:04:42.370 --> 00:04:44.690 random number generator for the entropy 84 00:04:44.850 --> 00:04:46.370 wasn't that complicated. 85 00:04:46.930 --> 00:04:47.170 Yeah. 86 00:04:47.995 --> 00:04:48.715 It was 87 00:04:49.035 --> 00:04:50.795 was basically like one line. 88 00:04:52.074 --> 00:05:00.475 So... But, you know, they had missed it. I guess they they had independent audits. Supposedly, had missed it. So maybe it was just tricky. 89 00:05:00.875 --> 00:05:02.634 But I think that's the point is 90 00:05:03.420 --> 00:05:07.980 most tools and services and infrastructure probably has not that complicated 91 00:05:07.980 --> 00:05:09.580 small bugs inside of it. 92 00:05:09.980 --> 00:05:11.420 And that's what we're living through. 93 00:05:11.740 --> 00:05:13.900 The PHP one is very complicated. 94 00:05:14.300 --> 00:05:15.180 Let's Okay. Get into 95 00:05:15.900 --> 00:05:17.500 Yeah. Let's hear about PHP. 96 00:05:18.785 --> 00:05:21.585 So there's a a vulnerability called... 97 00:05:21.824 --> 00:05:27.745 It was named PHP two Shell that was introduced in the the PHP, 98 00:05:27.745 --> 00:05:30.945 which serves, like, dynamic websites. It's it's an app like 99 00:05:32.139 --> 00:05:37.660 Node or something that runs on the server that serves up these dynamic websites. It's also very old. So it's been 100 00:05:38.300 --> 00:05:41.979 it's been... It's used in a lot of websites because it's been around for so long. 101 00:05:43.324 --> 00:05:44.125 It's 102 00:05:44.125 --> 00:05:49.725 probably considered to be poor form to even use PHP these days because it's so old. 103 00:05:50.125 --> 00:05:50.845 But, 104 00:05:51.805 --> 00:05:54.605 yeah, PHP two shell was a 105 00:05:54.764 --> 00:05:58.285 very complicated mechanism, which I cannot even begin to understand 106 00:05:58.610 --> 00:06:00.770 as to how you could get 107 00:06:01.410 --> 00:06:04.290 shell access, so, like, terminal access 108 00:06:04.370 --> 00:06:07.810 on a machine that is serving a website, like, 109 00:06:08.610 --> 00:06:10.050 via the website, basically. 110 00:06:10.925 --> 00:06:12.285 They would allow you to 111 00:06:12.525 --> 00:06:16.125 run whatever commands you wanted on the server, install new server, 112 00:06:16.444 --> 00:06:21.724 install new software, change the way the website works, poke around at the files they might have on that server, 113 00:06:23.970 --> 00:06:26.850 and it affected, like, all PHP versions. 114 00:06:29.330 --> 00:06:31.170 There... In fact, there was a guy 115 00:06:31.730 --> 00:06:42.415 just... I think it was yesterday or the day before over the weekend who was like, this is bullshit. This isn't real. So I'm gonna set up a PHP website and put some Bitcoin on the web server 116 00:06:42.815 --> 00:06:45.695 and just, like, basically, as a bounty, like, 117 00:06:46.414 --> 00:06:47.854 if someone can take the Bitcoin 118 00:06:48.910 --> 00:06:53.550 to try and, like, call, you know, call someone's bluff on this. And I 119 00:06:54.110 --> 00:06:56.030 think it took a couple hours. Gone. 120 00:06:56.190 --> 00:06:56.990 Damn. 121 00:06:58.030 --> 00:06:58.590 Why 122 00:06:59.310 --> 00:07:00.590 did he think it wasn't real? 123 00:07:01.735 --> 00:07:07.895 Did he have any, like, good reasons? Like I'm not really sure. I'm not really sure. I mean, you know, these things... 124 00:07:08.455 --> 00:07:09.255 With these 125 00:07:09.655 --> 00:07:10.855 these security 126 00:07:11.495 --> 00:07:18.770 vulnerability announcements, especially that are circulating on Twitter, right, there... There's a lot of hype associated with them. We've seen that. Yeah. 127 00:07:19.650 --> 00:07:28.290 It seems more more often than not, like, you hear about some crazy vulnerability, and it sounds so bad. And then you kinda 128 00:07:28.690 --> 00:07:33.315 gather some more details about it and find out that, like, it requires 129 00:07:33.315 --> 00:07:35.955 physical access to the device or 130 00:07:36.835 --> 00:07:37.395 some 131 00:07:38.035 --> 00:07:38.915 crazy 132 00:07:39.075 --> 00:07:43.795 circumstance that is just totally unreasonable to find the average user in. 133 00:07:44.870 --> 00:07:47.270 Yeah. There was a a vulnerability 134 00:07:47.270 --> 00:07:51.270 or a set of 11 vulnerabilities that made headlines this weekend 135 00:07:51.670 --> 00:07:52.470 because 136 00:07:52.790 --> 00:07:54.230 it was in Tailscale. 137 00:07:55.030 --> 00:07:58.815 Tailscale is like remote access to your servers. 138 00:07:59.295 --> 00:08:03.215 So a lot of people use it in production and just a 139 00:08:03.695 --> 00:08:04.815 lot of machines 140 00:08:04.815 --> 00:08:07.135 provide remote access to 141 00:08:07.375 --> 00:08:10.815 authorized users via Tailscale. So that's a huge target. 142 00:08:11.470 --> 00:08:18.990 This researcher kind of made headways because they didn't do responsible disclosure or anything. They just straight up published all 11 vulnerabilities. 143 00:08:20.030 --> 00:08:27.645 But last I read is it it does have a catch. Like, you do need to have access to the server, like, already. 144 00:08:28.365 --> 00:08:29.085 So 145 00:08:29.165 --> 00:08:31.325 it's not just like a straight up, like, 146 00:08:31.565 --> 00:08:37.485 zero day exploit where anyone can just

get into your Tailscale machine. So they... You would have to 147 00:08:37.980 --> 00:08:44.220 have another exploit, I guess, to get access to the server in which then you could break Tailscale. So it's a problem, 148 00:08:45.180 --> 00:08:47.740 but not as severe as it would 149 00:08:48.220 --> 00:08:51.500 initially seem. I guess it's still developing, so we'll see. But 150 00:08:52.535 --> 00:08:54.535 Has Tailscale been patched? 151 00:08:54.935 --> 00:08:57.015 I'm asking because I'm using Tailscale. 152 00:08:57.575 --> 00:09:01.895 I don't know. I just And and this is the first I've heard of this exploit. 153 00:09:02.215 --> 00:09:02.855 Yeah. 154 00:09:03.975 --> 00:09:05.415 I don't know. I I 155 00:09:06.620 --> 00:09:10.620 originally read this, and the comments were like, no. No. No. It requires 156 00:09:11.019 --> 00:09:14.779 it requires low low access... Local access to the machine, 157 00:09:15.260 --> 00:09:15.900 but 158 00:09:17.820 --> 00:09:20.940 I don't know. I I would imagine that tail scales on it. 159 00:09:22.425 --> 00:09:23.385 I don't know. 160 00:09:24.265 --> 00:09:26.745 Make a make a note to to check that out. 161 00:09:27.305 --> 00:09:30.745 Yeah. I'll put that on my list of things to do this evening. 162 00:09:31.625 --> 00:09:33.225 But the PHP one, 163 00:09:33.785 --> 00:09:36.345 from what it seemed, because it was kind of a frenzy 164 00:09:36.670 --> 00:09:41.790 on X last week and I didn't even think the NSA chimed in. My understanding is 165 00:09:42.350 --> 00:09:47.470 you couldn't trust the certificates of websites so you could think you were on an authentic website. 166 00:09:48.590 --> 00:09:57.975 That was not the HP one. That's a new one we should definitely get into. Yeah. That was a whole separate issue. Oh my gosh. There's so many. Dude, yeah, that's what I'm saying. 167 00:09:58.375 --> 00:10:07.175 It's like every open. Yeah. Every day you wake up and there's, like, a new, like, groundbreaking exploit that, like, would have been the biggest exploit of the year on its own. 168 00:10:08.050 --> 00:10:16.770 But it's like they're... Like, the floodgates have just opened, like you said. Like Okay. So I got a quick timeline on the PHP to Shell exploit. 169 00:10:18.050 --> 00:10:18.610 It was... 170 00:10:20.465 --> 00:10:27.345 So they... Whoever found that or at least someone who found it did decide to do responsible disclosure. 171 00:10:27.425 --> 00:10:27.985 So 172 00:10:28.545 --> 00:10:31.825 they told the makers of PHP about it. 173 00:10:32.305 --> 00:10:32.705 And 174 00:10:33.500 --> 00:10:37.100 so this is October 21, so, like, five days ago. 175 00:10:38.060 --> 00:10:40.700 They told the makers of PHP about it, 176 00:10:41.339 --> 00:10:47.980 and they obviously did the right thing. They issued, like, CVEs, which are formal announcements of these problems and patches 177 00:10:48.845 --> 00:10:51.805 right away. And then I think the next day, 178 00:10:52.365 --> 00:10:53.005 they... 179 00:10:53.725 --> 00:10:55.245 On October 20, 180 00:10:56.045 --> 00:10:59.245 someone someone else found the exploit and released it. 181 00:11:01.709 --> 00:11:05.550 So that was kinda, like, in the middle of the official PHP patches. 182 00:11:06.670 --> 00:11:09.790 Oh, so they hadn't quite gotten the patches out? 183 00:11:10.350 --> 00:11:18.095 Yeah. So they did, like, this this, like, announcement that whoever had found it that there was a big problem in PHP, all versions are affected. Big deal. 184 00:11:18.495 --> 00:11:23.055 They supposedly told the PHP organization about it, and they were working on the patches. The next day, 185 00:11:23.695 --> 00:11:27.135 someone else independently found it, and it was leaked, 186 00:11:27.774 --> 00:11:29.855 what they were. And they So the attacks started happening. 187 00:11:30.620 --> 00:11:36.380 They woke up and chose violence that morning and decided not to do responsible disclosure. 188 00:11:36.540 --> 00:11:45.420 Someone else. Yeah. I mean, I guess when you're seeing all these sensationalist articles about it, you can't help but take your AI and be like, what? What's going on here? Find this. Right. 189 00:11:46.835 --> 00:11:51.955 So on the twenty first, so this is a day after the exploit got released publicly, 190 00:11:52.275 --> 00:11:54.515 PHP released their emergency patches. 191 00:11:55.155 --> 00:11:56.675 But I think a lot of, 192 00:11:57.235 --> 00:12:00.270 web hosting companies, which are the 193 00:12:00.510 --> 00:12:04.830 people running the servers that run most of the PHP, 194 00:12:05.310 --> 00:12:06.110 instances, 195 00:12:06.670 --> 00:12:08.589 they took, like, preventative measures. 196 00:12:09.070 --> 00:12:22.675 In fact, there was some, like, very prominent websites that just turned off. They're like Yeah. We don't... We know there's a problem. We don't know what it is. And out of an abundance of caution, we are just, like, turning off our website until further notice. And so that happened. 197 00:12:23.154 --> 00:12:26.355 I checked with my web host because I have just some 198 00:12:27.110 --> 00:12:28.389 some junky 199 00:12:28.389 --> 00:12:29.269 PHP 200 00:12:29.269 --> 00:12:32.310 websites that I made like twenty years ago 201 00:12:33.589 --> 00:12:34.230 that... 202 00:12:35.029 --> 00:12:38.070 Know? So I checked with my web host, they're like, yeah, we... We've taken 203 00:12:38.470 --> 00:12:39.670 precautionary measures 204 00:12:40.505 --> 00:12:41.065 to 205 00:12:41.545 --> 00:12:48.265 deal with it. I don't I don't know what that was. There's certainly not a... My websites were not a high value target there. 206 00:12:49.545 --> 00:12:50.185 And... 207 00:12:51.305 --> 00:12:52.345 Yeah. So 208 00:12:53.010 --> 00:12:55.810 PHP released new versions that patch the fixes, 209 00:12:56.210 --> 00:12:56.690 but 210 00:12:57.090 --> 00:13:01.170 there's a lot of web servers out there running PHP, a lot of, like,

government 211 00:13:01.650 --> 00:13:03.010 corporate websites 212 00:13:03.010 --> 00:13:07.650 that probably haven't been updated in a very long time, and they probably 213 00:13:07.154 --> 00:13:09.714 didn't update now. Right? Because they just... 214 00:13:10.675 --> 00:13:15.475 You know, like, the contractor that made that website is long since gone, and no one knows how it works. 215 00:13:15.954 --> 00:13:19.315 So the risk is the risk is someone can 216 00:13:20.900 --> 00:13:21.780 essentially 217 00:13:22.980 --> 00:13:27.140 remotely execute commands on that web server. 218 00:13:27.380 --> 00:13:28.020 So 219 00:13:28.580 --> 00:13:31.460 if that web server contains, say, it's like 220 00:13:32.020 --> 00:13:33.540 a healthcare company, 221 00:13:33.780 --> 00:13:34.180 and 222 00:13:34.980 --> 00:13:35.700 I mean, 223 00:13:36.100 --> 00:13:43.195 guess that begs the question. Like, like, I'm trying to gauge, like, what the risk is, and I guess it depends on how each of these 224 00:13:43.595 --> 00:13:45.995 entities set up their networking infrastructure. 225 00:13:46.315 --> 00:13:55.660 I mean, I guess, like is that, like, a lot of these websites use PHP to handle the login. So, like, if there's a website, like your bank or your, you know, your 226 00:13:56.380 --> 00:13:59.900 health care, this and that, any any website that you log into, 227 00:14:00.380 --> 00:14:00.940 that 228 00:14:01.580 --> 00:14:02.620 does it with PHP, 229 00:14:03.115 --> 00:14:08.475 there's, like, a very real risk that just someone else can access your account. 230 00:14:08.955 --> 00:14:12.795 And then any of the any of the files that are on that web server, 231 00:14:13.035 --> 00:14:15.755 which probably aren't like, you know, your 232 00:14:15.995 --> 00:14:18.635 your bank account or anything like that, 233 00:14:19.250 --> 00:14:22.850 Those files are at risk, but that's mostly, like, the web server files. 234 00:14:23.089 --> 00:14:26.450 But, yeah, they can't access now, like, your account. 235 00:14:28.130 --> 00:14:28.690 And, 236 00:14:29.970 --> 00:14:31.330 you know, other 237 00:14:31.490 --> 00:14:33.649 nefarious things could be installed on that server. 238 00:14:34.275 --> 00:14:44.755 It's it's a pretty big one just because of the, like, attack service of PHP. So many people use it, and it's so old. It's just not like people that are really on the the game of updating things. 239 00:14:45.235 --> 00:14:48.115 And so, like, end users, it's not like 240 00:14:48.720 --> 00:14:53.360 the end user has a path forward in this to 241 00:14:53.680 --> 00:15:02.880 protect themselves because they're relying on the person hosting the website to do the updates. Is that correct? Yes. That's right. That's right. Yeah. 242 00:15:03.524 --> 00:15:04.964 That sucks. 243 00:15:05.925 --> 00:15:08.644 I hate being dependent on other people to do shit. 244 00:15:09.685 --> 00:15:16.324 Yeah. But, like, in so many cases, we're forced into it.

Right? You think about Yeah. Right. The the DMV, 245 00:15:16.485 --> 00:15:18.644 the, you know, your your bank, 246 00:15:18.805 --> 00:15:21.280 like, anything to do with, like, 247 00:15:21.760 --> 00:15:22.560 governments, 248 00:15:22.640 --> 00:15:28.480 things like that. Right? These days, you just have to use their website, and we all know those websites are shitty. 249 00:15:28.800 --> 00:15:29.520 Yeah. 250 00:15:29.600 --> 00:15:34.160 And I'm sure that they are shitty not just in their user interface, but in their, like, actual 251 00:15:34.825 --> 00:15:35.785 implementation 252 00:15:35.785 --> 00:15:39.545 and security side of things. So that was a big one. 253 00:15:39.945 --> 00:15:44.585 And then what was the certificate one? Okay. So this this one is actually... This is a... 254 00:15:45.705 --> 00:15:46.825 I think that someone, 255 00:15:47.639 --> 00:15:56.600 apparently, there's some, like, severity scale for, like, breaches. Right? And this is, a 10 out of 10. Like, this is as bad as it gets. This has never happened before. 256 00:15:57.160 --> 00:15:57.720 The 257 00:15:58.120 --> 00:15:59.959 Internet literally broke. 258 00:16:00.199 --> 00:16:01.240 The Internet 259 00:16:01.525 --> 00:16:03.525 literally broke. So... 260 00:16:04.085 --> 00:16:07.285 Alright. Let's see if I can if I can summarize this. 261 00:16:08.325 --> 00:16:12.325 SSL or TLS, as it's actually called now, is 262 00:16:12.885 --> 00:16:14.325 what is how 263 00:16:15.899 --> 00:16:19.980 authentication and encryption is done on the Internet, so... On the web. 264 00:16:20.459 --> 00:16:24.620 So, like, whenever you see that lock icon up in your URL address bar, 265 00:16:24.940 --> 00:16:27.660 that is because the website is HTTPS, 266 00:16:27.740 --> 00:16:29.180 and it's using TLS. 267 00:16:30.115 --> 00:16:32.195 The s being for secure. 268 00:16:32.595 --> 00:16:33.235 Yes. 269 00:16:33.555 --> 00:16:34.355 Exactly. 270 00:16:36.274 --> 00:16:38.035 And the way that that's done, 271 00:16:38.675 --> 00:16:40.035 the way that the the 272 00:16:40.435 --> 00:16:41.555 secure 273 00:16:44.230 --> 00:16:45.270 communication 274 00:16:45.270 --> 00:16:49.430 or sort of authentication to make sure that you're communicating with who you think you are 275 00:16:49.830 --> 00:16:59.350 and to set up the encrypted communications between your browser and whatever website you're trying to access. The way that that's set up is through this centralized 276 00:16:59.025 --> 00:17:01.185 hierarchy of certificates. 277 00:17:01.825 --> 00:17:02.865 So there's, like... 278 00:17:03.665 --> 00:17:09.425 I forget how many of them there are, but they're all around the world. There are these companies that have been designated to set up certificates. 279 00:17:09.425 --> 00:17:10.865 So there are these trusted parties, 280 00:17:11.690 --> 00:17:14.490 and they all have created certificates, 281 00:17:15.450 --> 00:17:18.490 and your browser already knows who they are. 282 00:17:19.450 --> 00:17:26.065 So your your browser come... When you, you know, download any browser or your OS or any range 283 00:17:26.065 --> 00:17:32.545 of IoT devices, anything, it is aware of this whole hierarchy of certificate servers. 284 00:17:33.105 --> 00:17:36.065 And so if you're like, I wanna go to google.com, 285 00:17:36.545 --> 00:17:38.145 and I wanna go to httbs, 286 00:17:38.250 --> 00:17:39.690 you know, google.com, 287 00:17:39.690 --> 00:17:44.330 which is now the default. So if you just type google.com in your browser, it goes to the https 288 00:17:44.330 --> 00:17:45.049 version. 289 00:17:45.690 --> 00:17:47.290 Your browser will, 290 00:17:48.890 --> 00:17:50.169 connect to the server, 291 00:17:50.330 --> 00:17:53.049 and it'll use these certificates to authenticate 292 00:17:53.130 --> 00:17:53.850 that 293 00:17:54.625 --> 00:17:57.264 you are talking with google.com. 294 00:17:57.265 --> 00:17:59.585 Right? So the google.com has signed, 295 00:18:00.145 --> 00:18:03.264 has a signature saying, you know, this is our 296 00:18:03.424 --> 00:18:09.029 this is our website, and then the certificates that your browser know about knows about can check and see. 297 00:18:09.270 --> 00:18:15.750 Okay. Yeah. That's right. Like, let's set up the secure connection to google.com. We can be certain that it is google.com, 298 00:18:16.230 --> 00:18:17.269 and no one can 299 00:18:17.990 --> 00:18:22.414 spoof it and say, like, no. No. I'm google.com. Like, send me your secure data. 300 00:18:22.655 --> 00:18:23.695 So there's... 301 00:18:23.935 --> 00:18:25.294 Yeah. I think there's 302 00:18:26.415 --> 00:18:27.135 maybe 303 00:18:28.335 --> 00:18:30.335 20, 30 of these 304 00:18:30.575 --> 00:18:32.495 these companies that do 305 00:18:32.735 --> 00:18:33.375 this... 306 00:18:33.615 --> 00:18:34.495 These certificates. 307 00:18:35.280 --> 00:18:36.480 And one of them 308 00:18:37.280 --> 00:18:38.559 based in 309 00:18:39.600 --> 00:18:41.920 India... Where is it? Where are they based in? 310 00:18:42.800 --> 00:18:43.600 I think, 311 00:18:46.320 --> 00:18:53.365 alright. Well I think it was India. Yeah. It was definitely in India. I was trying to come up with a city, but they're called EMudhra, 312 00:18:53.365 --> 00:19:02.085 E M U D H R A. And they're a certificate authority. So they're, like, trusted by the Internet body to, like, sign... To create these certificates, 313 00:19:02.085 --> 00:19:03.925 and all the browsers ship with 314 00:19:04.399 --> 00:19:07.999 with eMudra in their list of certificate authorities 315 00:19:08.640 --> 00:19:12.399 that you can use to trust that you're communicating with who you think you are. 316 00:19:12.720 --> 00:19:13.279 Well, 317 00:19:14.960 --> 00:19:15.759 on, 318 00:19:17.519 --> 00:19:21.265 October 17, so ten days, nine days ago, 319 00:19:22.465 --> 00:19:25.985 they... A researcher was was just looking into it 320 00:19:26.385 --> 00:19:27.105 and 321

00:19:27.185 --> 00:19:28.465 discovered that 322 00:19:28.785 --> 00:19:31.585 the certificates from EMUADRA were 323 00:19:31.745 --> 00:19:37.509 not secure. In fact, he was able to brute force them because their their certificates 324 00:19:38.070 --> 00:19:40.149 were not generated with enough entropy. 325 00:19:40.470 --> 00:19:43.509 Sounds very familiar, right, the cold card incident. 326 00:19:44.950 --> 00:19:50.549 It definitely appears like they just fucked up. Like, this wasn't a malicious thing. I guess we don't know for sure, but it appears they just fucked up. 327 00:19:51.725 --> 00:19:53.245 And their 328 00:19:54.605 --> 00:19:55.325 actual 329 00:19:55.965 --> 00:19:59.165 private keys that were used to create these certificates 330 00:19:59.725 --> 00:20:00.445 were 331 00:20:00.685 --> 00:20:01.405 only, 332 00:20:02.605 --> 00:20:03.965 eight bits long. 333 00:20:04.950 --> 00:20:06.230 So normally, it's... 334 00:20:06.549 --> 00:20:09.590 Normally, these are 384 335 00:20:09.590 --> 00:20:12.549 bit private keys. Right? So that's two 336 00:20:13.190 --> 00:20:14.070 to three 337 00:20:14.230 --> 00:20:15.669 eighty four. That's like... 338 00:20:15.990 --> 00:20:16.309 You know, 339 00:20:17.315 --> 00:20:30.115 it should be... Should have an e number... Space. Numbers that... More numbers than there are, like, atoms in the observable universe by a long shot. Right? We talk about SHA two fifty six, which is two to two fifty six. This is more than that. This is a 340 00:20:30.435 --> 00:20:31.475 impossibly large number. 341 00:20:32.830 --> 00:20:38.750 EMU drift fucked up, and they generated their keys with only maximum of eight bits 342 00:20:38.830 --> 00:20:39.870 of entropy. 343 00:20:40.190 --> 00:20:42.590 So the the whole 384 344 00:20:42.590 --> 00:20:44.590 bit number was all zeros 345 00:20:44.750 --> 00:20:46.190 except for the last eight bits. 346 00:20:46.934 --> 00:20:52.934 And I think nine of their keys were made like this, and they were trusted by the entire Internet 347 00:20:53.255 --> 00:20:57.495 to to be able to verify the authenticity of who you're communicating with. 348 00:20:59.310 --> 00:21:01.950 And so this guy who goes by the name Wayne 349 00:21:03.550 --> 00:21:11.310 discovered this problem. He recovered the private keys, all nine of them. One of the private keys was literally the number four. 350 00:21:11.550 --> 00:21:12.510 That, like, 351 00:21:13.174 --> 00:21:18.455 that's your private key. Four. And the rest of them are all, like, less than two fifty six. 352 00:21:21.895 --> 00:21:32.359 The Well, less than eight bits. I mean, like, put that in perspective. Like, the number four is what? Four four bits. Right? One digit is four bits. Is that correct? 353 00:21:33.320 --> 00:21:35.399 So the the number four 354 00:21:35.480 --> 00:21:36.119 is 355 00:21:37.320 --> 00:21:38.039 is 356 00:21:38.679 --> 00:21:39.719 two bits. 357 00:21:40.039 --> 00:21:41.000 Two bits. Okay. 358 00:21:41.835 --> 00:21:43.114 Well, it's... 359 00:21:43.434 --> 00:21:47.835 I guess the number... Yeah. The number four would be three bits, but it's... 360 00:21:48.075 --> 00:21:58.550 If we're going... Yeah. The number four is three bits. Sorry. So they they totally fucked up. Like, it was... Lot of people speculated how this happened. We haven't got a lot of resolution as to how they did this, but, like, 361 00:21:59.110 --> 00:22:00.630 it seems like they 362 00:22:01.110 --> 00:22:11.005 they generated some, like, test keys or something because you can look at the history of, like, how they submitted this to the organization that manages it all. And they have one set of keys 363 00:22:11.165 --> 00:22:12.285 that was, like, 364 00:22:12.845 --> 00:22:15.164 very secure and hasn't been recovered. 365 00:22:16.205 --> 00:22:17.565 And then they, like, 366 00:22:18.445 --> 00:22:22.125 they, like, recalled those and issued these other ones 367 00:22:23.510 --> 00:22:27.429 They were all, you know, low entropy, completely insecure. 368 00:22:28.630 --> 00:22:32.309 But, like, eight bits at most is, like, four digits. Right? 369 00:22:34.309 --> 00:22:39.275 So eight bits represents the number zero to two fifty five. 370 00:22:39.675 --> 00:22:42.795 Two fifty five. Okay. Alright. So they might have interpreted 371 00:22:43.035 --> 00:22:47.835 two fifty six bits of entropy as pick a number between zero and two fifty five. 372 00:22:49.530 --> 00:22:54.170 Maybe. I mean, it was supposed to have 384 bits of entropy. I I think they just, like, 373 00:22:54.570 --> 00:22:56.330 totally fucked up. Like... 374 00:22:56.730 --> 00:22:57.370 Dude. 375 00:22:58.490 --> 00:23:00.490 So someone essentially could 376 00:23:00.890 --> 00:23:03.450 brute force a certificate and then 377 00:23:04.125 --> 00:23:05.965 set up a bullshit website. 378 00:23:06.045 --> 00:23:08.845 And when people would go browse the Internet 379 00:23:09.245 --> 00:23:12.845 and their browser would say, okay, who am I talking to? 380 00:23:13.165 --> 00:23:15.565 And the server would be like, I'm google.com. 381 00:23:15.565 --> 00:23:20.710 And the web browser is like, okay, prove it. And it's like, here's your certificate proving I'm google.com, 382 00:23:21.030 --> 00:23:25.830 and it'll be completely bullshit. And then your web browser will be like, yep. That checks out, and 383 00:23:26.470 --> 00:23:31.245 I'm gonna let the user enter all their sensitive information now. Yes. 384 00:23:31.325 --> 00:23:33.485 Yes. I mean, think you essentially... 385 00:23:34.765 --> 00:23:44.925 I think you have to do like a man in the middle attack, right? Yeah, don't you? Because otherwise you'd need the domain, right? Yeah, that's right. Yeah, you'd need to have the domain. But you could imagine 386 00:23:45.419 --> 00:23:47.899 if you are on a public Wi Fi 387 00:23:48.139 --> 00:23:48.940 network, 388 00:23:48.940 --> 00:23:52.139 you're on a private, you know, network, 389

00:23:52.539 --> 00:23:56.699 there could be another device on the network that is intercepting your traffic. 390 00:23:57.259 --> 00:23:58.699 And that device 391 00:23:58.940 --> 00:23:59.740 could 392 00:24:00.735 --> 00:24:01.774 officially 393 00:24:04.175 --> 00:24:04.975 Impersonate. 394 00:24:05.055 --> 00:24:06.015 Impersonate 395 00:24:06.015 --> 00:24:06.975 google.com 396 00:24:06.975 --> 00:24:08.335 or any website. 397 00:24:08.415 --> 00:24:09.054 Mhmm. 398 00:24:09.295 --> 00:24:19.669 Right? So that's that's the risk there is if if you're... If there's something on your device that's doing like a man in the middle attack and is spoofing it sort of before it gets to the public Internet. Because I think 399 00:24:20.070 --> 00:24:20.870 DNS, 400 00:24:20.870 --> 00:24:22.710 you know, public DNS isn't 401 00:24:23.350 --> 00:24:30.390 isn't hacked. Right? So you... Yeah. Like Tyler said, you would have to have the domain name, but, yeah, the risk comes for man in the middle attacks. 402 00:24:31.505 --> 00:24:34.305 And so the fallout of this was 403 00:24:34.705 --> 00:24:38.945 don't trust any website, any application, any service until 404 00:24:39.025 --> 00:24:40.065 they update 405 00:24:40.545 --> 00:24:41.745 any browser? 406 00:24:41.825 --> 00:24:43.425 Yeah. So you're assuming 407 00:24:43.825 --> 00:24:47.660 we're just talking about websites, your browser is what needs to update. Okay. 408 00:24:48.140 --> 00:24:49.260 And 409 00:24:49.900 --> 00:24:51.420 all the main browsers 410 00:24:51.580 --> 00:24:53.820 fixed it, like, immediately. 411 00:24:53.900 --> 00:24:59.020 So there's some sort of weird back channel there by which your browser is able to, like, revoke keys, 412 00:24:59.914 --> 00:25:02.715 which in this case is good because it saved our asses. 413 00:25:04.395 --> 00:25:09.114 Think Wait. Without the user doing a update in the browser software? 414 00:25:09.195 --> 00:25:10.875 Yeah. Is that what you're saying? Yeah. 415 00:25:11.970 --> 00:25:14.210 Woah. What? Like Yeah. 416 00:25:15.250 --> 00:25:18.609 Yeah. I think they they do have a mechanism to do that. 417 00:25:20.130 --> 00:25:20.929 Interesting. 418 00:25:21.010 --> 00:25:22.609 Yeah. It is interesting. So that 419 00:25:23.570 --> 00:25:26.850 implies, like, your browser... If I'm getting this correctly, 420 00:25:27.424 --> 00:25:29.985 your browser must be going to some, like... 421 00:25:30.544 --> 00:25:34.225 You know, like, say you're using Brave Browser. Brave Browser's checking 422 00:25:34.544 --> 00:25:37.664 a Brave Browser hosted server for these certificates. 423 00:25:37.745 --> 00:25:38.864 No. Let's see. 424 00:25:39.345 --> 00:25:42.705 Because if the certificates were, like, saved locally, 425 00:25:44.679 --> 00:25:46.039 surely the 426 00:25:46.360 --> 00:25:47.719 company or 427 00:25:48.440 --> 00:25:52.119 the project that makes the web browser wouldn't be able to go 428 00:25:53.080 --> 00:25:56.039 to your local device and update certificates. 429 00:25:56.745 --> 00:26:05.144 So it says modern browsers have mechanisms for distributing emergency certificate trust changes independently of normal browser software updates. 430 00:26:05.545 --> 00:26:11.000 Yeah. So Chrome has its root store and its CRL set. Safari, Apple can distribute 431 00:26:11.160 --> 00:26:14.520 trust changes throughout its operating system trust infrastructure. 432 00:26:14.920 --> 00:26:16.440 Yeah. So I think it's this whole 433 00:26:17.160 --> 00:26:20.200 chain of trust infrastructure that these browsers use 434 00:26:20.920 --> 00:26:23.000 by which they can just update that shit. So, 435 00:26:23.725 --> 00:26:28.124 yeah, someone attacks that, and we could be in problem. We could have a serious problem. 436 00:26:28.445 --> 00:26:29.484 Wow. The 437 00:26:29.725 --> 00:26:32.125 interesting thing is that... So browsers 438 00:26:32.125 --> 00:26:34.364 are very complex modern 439 00:26:34.605 --> 00:26:42.279 bits of software that can fix this automatically, but there's lots of other stuff that uses these certificates that can't update automatically, 440 00:26:44.120 --> 00:26:45.560 like IoT 441 00:26:45.560 --> 00:26:46.120 stuff. 442 00:26:47.160 --> 00:26:48.919 If you got into the weeds on this, 443 00:26:49.560 --> 00:26:54.424 I did this on the day, and then they had a website where you could check. Right? And it would just show you 444 00:26:55.385 --> 00:26:56.664 if your... 445 00:26:56.825 --> 00:26:59.945 Whatever you're using to access the Internet was, 446 00:27:00.265 --> 00:27:02.265 trusting EMUADRA certificates, 447 00:27:02.265 --> 00:27:04.505 and it would show you these, like, green or red checkboxes. 448 00:27:06.190 --> 00:27:09.230 I checked all my browsers immediately. They're all good. But 449 00:27:10.430 --> 00:27:26.185 the, curl, so a command line tool that's used to act... You can access websites through curl on the command line. I checked that on my Mac, and it was it was all red. Like, it was still trusting it. So even though the browser on my OS had updated its chain of trust, 450 00:27:26.425 --> 00:27:28.425 curl, a separate tool, had not. 451 00:27:28.905 --> 00:27:29.865 And then I checked, 452 00:27:30.745 --> 00:27:33.945 I checked signal, the application signal, and it was still. 453 00:27:34.560 --> 00:27:36.640 So that means that these applications, 454 00:27:37.040 --> 00:27:38.320 they have their own 455 00:27:38.800 --> 00:27:41.120 separate from the OS, their own, 456 00:27:41.600 --> 00:27:43.360 chain of trust mechanism. 457 00:27:44.080 --> 00:27:46.800 And so it was it was actually pretty wild. Signal 458 00:27:47.200 --> 00:27:47.920 was 459 00:27:48.934 --> 00:27:50.774 still trusting the eMudra 460 00:27:52.054 --> 00:27:52.934 certificates, 461 00:27:53.655 --> 00:27:55.894 well into that that day. 462 00:27:56.934 --> 00:28:02.615 Now I talked to my agent quite a bit about this, and he's like, no. No. No. Like,

SIGNAL encryption is not broken. 463 00:28:03.289 --> 00:28:07.770 All that Signal uses this certificate for is to download 464 00:28:07.770 --> 00:28:08.970 link previews. 465 00:28:08.970 --> 00:28:12.809 So when someone posts you a link in Signal and it shows you a preview, 466 00:28:13.370 --> 00:28:14.330 that could be 467 00:28:14.730 --> 00:28:15.769 spoofed. 468 00:28:15.929 --> 00:28:18.169 Seems like there's probably some problems there. Signal, 469 00:28:19.515 --> 00:28:20.875 later that day, 470 00:28:21.275 --> 00:28:22.395 had an update. 471 00:28:23.035 --> 00:28:26.955 So they were on it. But things that were... That are not 472 00:28:27.995 --> 00:28:30.315 gonna get fixed anytime soon is, 473 00:28:31.930 --> 00:28:33.690 like, IoT devices, 474 00:28:33.770 --> 00:28:35.529 any sort of embedded firmware. 475 00:28:36.330 --> 00:28:37.370 The Bitaxe 476 00:28:37.450 --> 00:28:40.010 ESP Miner was vulnerable. Routers? 477 00:28:40.410 --> 00:28:42.250 Routers. Yes. I 478 00:28:43.370 --> 00:28:44.810 checked my router right away, 479 00:28:46.174 --> 00:28:48.735 and it was... It's straight up vulnerable. 480 00:28:48.895 --> 00:28:49.455 I 481 00:28:50.575 --> 00:28:56.894 have, like, you know, a nicer router that has, like, a remote administration interface and things like that. 482 00:28:57.375 --> 00:29:02.909 Straight up vulnerable. I worked through how to patch it myself. I emailed the manufacturer, and I was like, 483 00:29:03.950 --> 00:29:04.989 WTF. 484 00:29:05.070 --> 00:29:06.829 And they're like, oh, yeah. We're aware of it. 485 00:29:08.110 --> 00:29:15.575 So, yeah, I mean, the... This is the the Bitaxe. We have a feature on ESP Miner where you can connect to 486 00:29:15.575 --> 00:29:18.135 a pool over TLS, 487 00:29:18.775 --> 00:29:24.054 which is kinda neat because you can now have encrypted communications with a pool. You can be 488 00:29:25.015 --> 00:29:29.095 certain that you're you're talking to the pool that you wanna be. You can't get man in the middle. 489 00:29:30.135 --> 00:29:30.935 But 490 00:29:32.270 --> 00:29:35.630 embedded devices like the one that runs the Bitaxe, 491 00:29:35.950 --> 00:29:42.670 doesn't have this dynamic chain of trust thing like your browser does, and so it won't be automatically updated. So 492 00:29:44.005 --> 00:29:46.884 did an update to the ESP Miner firmware to, 493 00:29:47.605 --> 00:29:52.965 distrust EMUADRA certificates, which we were definitely rolling into the firmware when it got built. 494 00:29:53.445 --> 00:29:58.325 So, yeah, this this is a big one. This this is, like, the first time anything like this has ever happened. 495 00:29:59.980 --> 00:30:00.940 I don't think 496 00:30:01.340 --> 00:30:02.219 that this... 497 00:30:02.539 --> 00:30:04.619 From what I read, this, like, emergency... 498 00:30:05.340 --> 00:30:06.779 What do they call it? The 499 00:30:07.580 --> 00:30:11.419 emergency certificate trust and revocation infrastructure. 500 00:30:11.740 --> 00:30:13.100 I don't think it's ever been used. 501 00:30:13.785 --> 00:30:14.585 Wow. 502 00:30:15.465 --> 00:30:16.184 Wow. 503 00:30:16.585 --> 00:30:18.585 Thanks for sharing that 504 00:30:19.465 --> 00:30:21.945 website that checks your certificates. 505 00:30:21.945 --> 00:30:24.425 So the night you shared that, I checked 506 00:30:24.665 --> 00:30:26.505 all the browsers on all my devices. 507 00:30:28.659 --> 00:30:38.899 For anyone who wants to do this at home, it's emudra.we-have-a-problem.com. 508 00:30:40.419 --> 00:30:43.974 I wish that was a little easier to remember. I feel like people need to be hitting this 509 00:30:44.695 --> 00:30:49.734 I know. Website. Average Gary will probably have no problem figuring that one out, 510 00:30:50.455 --> 00:30:54.909 based on the URLs I was spelling out last episode. 511 00:30:57.070 --> 00:30:58.029 Interestingly, 512 00:30:58.029 --> 00:30:58.829 Tor 513 00:30:59.149 --> 00:31:01.630 is still insecure. 514 00:31:01.630 --> 00:31:03.469 It's coming up with red Xs 515 00:31:04.110 --> 00:31:06.429 for some of these eMudra certificates. 516 00:31:06.509 --> 00:31:10.645 Let's see, one, two, three, four, five, six of them still. 517 00:31:11.765 --> 00:31:13.684 I'm just... I'm checking it right now. 518 00:31:14.005 --> 00:31:16.405 Have you updated your your Tor browser? 519 00:31:17.205 --> 00:31:18.165 So 520 00:31:18.165 --> 00:31:19.925 this is on version... 521 00:31:20.805 --> 00:31:24.645 Tor version 0 point 4 point 9 point 11. 522 00:31:25.360 --> 00:31:26.879 So let me check 523 00:31:27.279 --> 00:31:28.639 if that's the latest. 524 00:31:29.120 --> 00:31:31.440 They might not have that sort of emergency 525 00:31:32.480 --> 00:31:36.399 override backdoor in their browser. I don't know. I don't think they do. 526 00:31:37.279 --> 00:31:38.559 Yeah. I noticed that 527 00:31:39.015 --> 00:31:44.615 that Movad browser, which I think is based on the Tor browser, was the same. And I manually patched mine, 528 00:31:45.735 --> 00:31:47.174 which was not easy. 529 00:31:48.775 --> 00:31:50.055 What are the As people who 530 00:31:50.855 --> 00:31:52.855 you know, Tor runs very slow. Sorry. 531 00:31:53.530 --> 00:31:58.169 What are the people who don't use AI at all beyond chattybt.com 532 00:31:58.170 --> 00:32:01.690 supposed to do? And what do you guys think is coming for 533 00:32:02.170 --> 00:32:03.130 the world? 534 00:32:04.330 --> 00:32:05.370 Update everything? 535 00:32:05.770 --> 00:32:07.610 Yeah. That's always been kind of 536 00:32:08.745 --> 00:32:15.304 something that is sometimes not advised, right? You know, don't have auto updates on because then a vulnerability could be introduced accidentally. 537 00:32:15.865 --> 00:32:21.625 Yeah. Always, I thought about this a lot myself last week when this was going down because I, you know, I'm very like, 538 00:32:22.409 --> 00:32:23.769 I wanna manually 539 00:32:23.850 --> 00:32:31.289 approve

updates, like, especially on my phone Yeah. And not just have it auto download stuff. A lot of times, you'll see, like, 540 00:32:32.409 --> 00:32:38.734 functionality removed from an app when you run an update, and I always get really worried about that. Like, I don't wanna see 541 00:32:39.534 --> 00:32:47.695 something taken away from an app that I wanna use. Right? And so I'm very... You know, with with wallets and things like that. 542 00:32:49.039 --> 00:32:50.239 I think there was, 543 00:32:51.440 --> 00:32:52.879 Wallet of Satoshi, 544 00:32:52.880 --> 00:32:55.119 right, had some updates like that. Think, 545 00:32:56.799 --> 00:32:57.999 what's that other, 546 00:32:58.960 --> 00:33:03.665 Lightning wallet? I don't know. Anyways, there was, you know, some of them, like, they removed 547 00:33:04.705 --> 00:33:09.184 their app from the the iOS App Store. Yeah. And so, like, 548 00:33:09.665 --> 00:33:11.585 if you didn't if you didn't 549 00:33:12.625 --> 00:33:14.465 update your app, you could still use it. 550 00:33:15.120 --> 00:33:18.240 And then you update your app, and it was like, oh, this doesn't work anymore. 551 00:33:19.280 --> 00:33:20.640 So, yeah, I was always very 552 00:33:21.360 --> 00:33:26.480 worried about running updates without being on top of it. But in this kind of situation, like, 553 00:33:27.485 --> 00:33:29.005 you you definitely 554 00:33:29.005 --> 00:33:31.485 need to, like, run the updates ASAP. 555 00:33:31.885 --> 00:33:34.205 Yeah. And those app stores get so... 556 00:33:35.485 --> 00:33:37.645 They get so much control over 557 00:33:37.725 --> 00:33:39.965 how the apps in their app stores work. 558 00:33:41.360 --> 00:33:45.760 You know, for example, like Samurai Wallet in the Google Play Store, 559 00:33:46.560 --> 00:33:47.520 that version, 560 00:33:49.360 --> 00:33:52.320 they made Samurai Wallet remove the 561 00:33:52.880 --> 00:34:01.335 stealth mode feature where the app would actually look like a calculator or a QR code scanner or 562 00:34:01.335 --> 00:34:02.375 a notebook. 563 00:34:02.375 --> 00:34:06.215 So like, if someone got your phone, they wouldn't necessarily see 564 00:34:06.535 --> 00:34:08.455 a Bitcoin wallet application, 565 00:34:08.455 --> 00:34:17.050 they would just see a notepad application or something. And then there would be some like little trick, like you tap this corner a few times and it, 566 00:34:17.370 --> 00:34:21.290 you know, takes it out of stealth mode and launches the Bitcoin app. 567 00:34:22.410 --> 00:34:26.170 So that was something that the Google Play Store was like, Nope, you got to remove that. 568 00:34:27.425 --> 00:34:29.105 And then there are other features, 569 00:34:30.625 --> 00:34:33.665 and I know Apple has been very controlling 570 00:34:33.665 --> 00:34:34.465 over 571 00:34:35.505 --> 00:34:36.545 what apps 572 00:34:36.625 --> 00:34:42.680 are allowed to do, especially as it comes... As it's related to, like, accepting any sort of payments 573 00:34:42.680 --> 00:34:43.160 They for the 574 00:34:45.160 --> 00:34:46.200 want their cut. 575 00:34:46.680 --> 00:34:51.000 Yeah, exactly. On in app transactions, yeah. Yep. And then, 576 00:34:51.240 --> 00:34:54.760 which is interesting because then they seem to be very lax with 577 00:34:55.625 --> 00:34:56.505 scammers 578 00:34:56.505 --> 00:34:58.665 impersonating Sparrow Wallet. And 579 00:34:59.545 --> 00:35:02.345 there is no Sparrow Wallet iOS 580 00:35:02.505 --> 00:35:04.265 app for your iPhone, 581 00:35:04.585 --> 00:35:05.225 yet 582 00:35:07.385 --> 00:35:20.160 it practically took an act of Congress to get Apple to remove the scammer's app from their App Store, yet they're super controlling about, like, what your app can do, especially related to payments. Like, if there's 1¢ 583 00:35:20.160 --> 00:35:21.120 in it for them, 584 00:35:21.520 --> 00:35:23.600 they'll have teams of people working on it. 585 00:35:24.375 --> 00:35:31.895 The the case with Sparrow Wallet was very interesting because the developer, Craig Rai, he was having all kinds of problems with fake 586 00:35:32.135 --> 00:35:36.375 Sparrow... IOS Sparrow Wallet apps coming up because he was like, 587 00:35:36.775 --> 00:35:38.615 I just don't... I'm not... I don't wanna make one. 588 00:35:39.300 --> 00:35:40.020 And 589 00:35:40.340 --> 00:35:44.980 so then he actually ended up putting up a placeholder app. 590 00:35:45.380 --> 00:35:56.495 Right? Oh, that's right. It would be the first result when you search for Sparewell in iOS as opposed to these scam apps. And it was just a fake one that pulled up a screen that said there is no Sparewell app. 591 00:35:57.055 --> 00:35:58.095 And so then 592 00:35:58.255 --> 00:35:59.135 Apple 593 00:35:59.535 --> 00:36:03.855 caught wind of that and, like, disabled his his developer account 594 00:36:04.255 --> 00:36:07.295 because they thought he was putting up a fake app. And 595 00:36:08.240 --> 00:36:11.119 I think you actually need to have a developer account to get, 596 00:36:11.920 --> 00:36:22.319 like, proper signing or whatever on even on desktop apps. And so this is a big problem for Sparrow. I think he eventually got through to them, but it was just this really fucked up situation where, like, 597 00:36:23.145 --> 00:36:24.585 they were shutting down 598 00:36:24.985 --> 00:36:34.025 the real developer that was trying to help people from getting scammed and then leaving these these scam wallet apps, like approving them and putting them in the store. 599 00:36:34.345 --> 00:36:36.425 So messed up. So messed up. 600 00:36:37.070 --> 00:36:40.430 And now Google Play is, like, requiring 601 00:36:40.590 --> 00:36:42.110 developers to 602 00:36:42.590 --> 00:36:44.110 KYC themselves 603 00:36:44.110 --> 00:36:45.310 in order to 604 00:36:45.790 --> 00:36:48.510 submit applications to be available in their Play Store. 605 00:36:49.355 --> 00:36:51.275 Like, they literally have to upload 606

00:36:51.674 --> 00:36:56.075 selfies and driver's licenses or government issued IDs, 607 00:36:57.434 --> 00:37:00.795 you know? And that's part of the reason these alternative 608 00:37:01.660 --> 00:37:04.540 app store sources like F Droid 609 00:37:04.700 --> 00:37:06.780 or even Aurora Store, 610 00:37:06.940 --> 00:37:09.100 especially on Google or Android 611 00:37:09.100 --> 00:37:10.860 platforms, are so important 612 00:37:11.500 --> 00:37:13.580 because it gives people the ability to get 613 00:37:14.664 --> 00:37:15.625 powerful 614 00:37:16.585 --> 00:37:18.665 APK files, applications 615 00:37:19.385 --> 00:37:20.744 from places 616 00:37:20.744 --> 00:37:22.185 where they're being 617 00:37:22.424 --> 00:37:23.545 barred from 618 00:37:24.424 --> 00:37:26.744 being made available, like the Google Play Store. 619 00:37:28.029 --> 00:37:28.910 Unfortunately, 620 00:37:28.910 --> 00:37:30.030 with, like, Apple, 621 00:37:30.430 --> 00:37:34.750 it's it's much harder to do that. You know, there is... I'm not sure that there's 622 00:37:34.829 --> 00:37:36.590 an F Droid equivalent 623 00:37:36.750 --> 00:37:40.029 for an Apple iPhone. There might be. I'm just 624 00:37:40.674 --> 00:37:42.835 I'm not that familiar with that platform. 625 00:37:43.234 --> 00:37:46.435 It's... Yeah. The the walled gardens on the phones 626 00:37:46.595 --> 00:37:55.900 is is pretty insane. I think they stand to have a... To make a lot of money by locking that down, and so they're very motivated to to do that. 627 00:37:56.620 --> 00:38:03.100 The ones that get lining... Oh, sorry. Go ahead. I was gonna say I think it's just gonna get worse with this push for... 628 00:38:04.700 --> 00:38:10.015 They're they're doing it under the guise, under the veil of, like, protecting children 629 00:38:10.095 --> 00:38:11.775 and minors 630 00:38:12.015 --> 00:38:12.735 from, 631 00:38:13.455 --> 00:38:19.375 you know, dangerous content or situations online, and they're pushing for, like, age verification 632 00:38:19.935 --> 00:38:20.655 on... 633 00:38:21.055 --> 00:38:22.895 At the operating system level. 634 00:38:23.910 --> 00:38:25.190 I 635 00:38:25.190 --> 00:38:27.670 don't know if you guys recall, but a few months ago, 636 00:38:27.990 --> 00:38:29.270 it was pretty recently, 637 00:38:29.829 --> 00:38:32.790 there was kind of a big uproar over which 638 00:38:32.869 --> 00:38:34.150 Linux distributions 639 00:38:34.150 --> 00:38:36.230 were going to enable 640 00:38:36.549 --> 00:38:39.270 age verification at the OS level and which ones weren't. 641 00:38:39.935 --> 00:38:45.055 Right, because there was some European Union directive that OSs were going to have to do this, right? 642 00:38:45.455 --> 00:38:46.175 Yeah. 643 00:38:46.734 --> 00:38:49.455 And I think that if I recall correctly, that 644 00:38:49.695 --> 00:38:50.495 idea 645 00:38:51.135 --> 00:38:53.855 originally came from Mark Zuckerberg 646 00:38:54.210 --> 00:38:55.890 because they were 647 00:38:56.130 --> 00:38:59.010 talking to him about making Facebook... 648 00:38:59.410 --> 00:39:02.850 They wanted the applications to do age verification. 649 00:39:03.730 --> 00:39:04.370 And 650 00:39:05.330 --> 00:39:08.610 Facebook being one of the most widely used applications 651 00:39:08.770 --> 00:39:10.195 in the world, 652 00:39:12.515 --> 00:39:14.915 you know, he was part of that conversation. 653 00:39:15.954 --> 00:39:21.155 I do recall him meeting with Congress, and then shortly thereafter, it came out that 654 00:39:21.395 --> 00:39:30.320 they weren't going to require applications to do this, but but they're gonna start pushing to require at the operating system level on all of the devices. 655 00:39:31.040 --> 00:39:35.440 So then if you can control which operating systems people are putting on their devices, 656 00:39:35.760 --> 00:39:39.645 then you can corral them into these age verification 657 00:39:40.125 --> 00:39:40.765 schemes. 658 00:39:41.485 --> 00:39:42.925 This is tying 659 00:39:44.045 --> 00:39:45.645 it all back together. This 660 00:39:45.965 --> 00:39:49.645 is actually a silver lining of the eMudra certificate 661 00:39:50.445 --> 00:39:53.885 issue, right? Because now you have your age verification service 662 00:39:54.309 --> 00:39:57.030 that needs to communicate with a specific server 663 00:39:57.349 --> 00:39:58.630 over TLS 664 00:39:58.710 --> 00:40:00.150 to verify 665 00:40:00.150 --> 00:40:03.109 your age. Right? But now you just fake that server. 666 00:40:03.750 --> 00:40:05.590 Right. It's glorious. 667 00:40:05.990 --> 00:40:09.895 I think that all is just... Things are changing fast. I mean, 668 00:40:10.535 --> 00:40:12.535 to switch gears a little bit like 669 00:40:14.214 --> 00:40:14.775 with 670 00:40:15.655 --> 00:40:17.415 advanced threat vectors from 671 00:40:17.575 --> 00:40:20.055 agentic tools, there's also people like 672 00:40:21.609 --> 00:40:22.410 removing 673 00:40:22.410 --> 00:40:25.610 spyware from their home smart TVs and stuff. So the 674 00:40:26.250 --> 00:40:29.130 power is in both sides hands. It's just a matter of 675 00:40:29.770 --> 00:40:42.055 how proactive you want to be about it. That's why I asked earlier about like the average person's probably not going to do anything but you can defend yourself And the spyware stuff is super cool. I know Scott's been a long time hater of IoT stuff. So 676 00:40:42.615 --> 00:40:47.175 Yes. For this reason because, like, the thesis has always been they're fucking spying on you. 677 00:40:47.495 --> 00:40:52.859 Yes. Yes. They are spying on you. That was such an exciting for me development 678 00:40:52.859 --> 00:40:56.300 over this crazy last week was the Samsung TV, 679 00:40:57.740 --> 00:40:58.460 incident. 680 00:40:59.099 --> 00:40:59.900 There was... 681 00:41:00.540 --> 00:41:08.395 So I'm not exactly sure how they did it, but I I do know that some... Because I was talking about how the IoT devices have

these certificates baked into them, 682 00:41:09.035 --> 00:41:13.275 is a lot of people were able to root their devices because of this eMudra incident. 683 00:41:13.595 --> 00:41:20.670 So if you have a device that has to talk over SSL to a server to authenticate and, like, do 684 00:41:21.070 --> 00:41:21.870 whatever. 685 00:41:22.030 --> 00:41:26.030 Now you can fake that, and you can man in the middle, and you can actually, for the first time, 686 00:41:26.750 --> 00:41:30.830 get in via your devices, like, hard coded secure pathway. 687 00:41:31.869 --> 00:41:35.390 So there was some people working on that with smart TVs, but 688 00:41:35.945 --> 00:41:42.505 the the whole revelation this week over smart TVs... And we... We've known this for a while, but smart TVs 689 00:41:42.665 --> 00:41:45.705 are a scam. Right? They are... 690 00:41:46.585 --> 00:41:50.905 They're so cheap. Like, you can go to Costco and get, like, a 55 inch television 691 00:41:51.680 --> 00:41:54.640 for less than a thousand dollars. It's insane. 692 00:41:54.880 --> 00:41:58.400 Because you and all your personal activity are Probably $200. 693 00:41:58.480 --> 00:42:02.160 You're the product. Yes. That's literally less than an NVMe 694 00:42:02.160 --> 00:42:03.040 SSD. 695 00:42:03.360 --> 00:42:06.195 Yes. Like like a stick of gum. 696 00:42:06.595 --> 00:42:11.155 You can just get an obscene amount of TV for very little price. And 697 00:42:11.954 --> 00:42:16.035 we've known this for a while, but the reason is because they are harvesting 698 00:42:16.035 --> 00:42:17.715 your personal data, 699 00:42:17.875 --> 00:42:19.075 specifically 700 00:42:18.789 --> 00:42:21.030 what you're watching on your TV, 701 00:42:22.309 --> 00:42:25.109 and potentially what you're doing in your living room, 702 00:42:26.069 --> 00:42:28.390 and they're selling that to advertisers. 703 00:42:28.390 --> 00:42:32.549 That's how they're making the money back on these, like, essentially lost leader televisions. 704 00:42:33.805 --> 00:42:34.445 So, 705 00:42:35.485 --> 00:42:37.405 yeah, it came out that Samsung, 706 00:42:37.645 --> 00:42:39.965 which makes very high end televisions, 707 00:42:40.285 --> 00:42:40.845 is... 708 00:42:41.885 --> 00:42:44.525 There's software running on the television 709 00:42:45.085 --> 00:42:45.725 that, 710 00:42:45.965 --> 00:42:47.885 is sending back snapshots 711 00:42:48.110 --> 00:42:49.550 of your 712 00:42:49.950 --> 00:42:50.510 screen 713 00:42:51.390 --> 00:42:54.830 to Samsung servers to identify what you're watching. 714 00:42:55.230 --> 00:42:57.470 And it doesn't matter if you're, like, watching Netflix 715 00:42:57.470 --> 00:43:04.455 on your TV or you're, like, you got your PlayStation plugged into it or you're watching your home videos or whatever. 716 00:43:04.535 --> 00:43:07.895 Right? They're taking snapshots of that. They're sending that back. It's 717 00:43:08.215 --> 00:43:09.335 geotagged 718 00:43:09.335 --> 00:43:10.375 with where 719 00:43:11.095 --> 00:43:11.735 you... 720 00:43:11.974 --> 00:43:15.655 Your your IP address, and so they have a rough idea of where you are, 721 00:43:17.559 --> 00:43:24.920 And then all that juicy information about what you watch and how you use your TV is, you know, all sent back to their servers. And then there was there 722 00:43:25.799 --> 00:43:35.975 was some indication that some of these models have microphones in them. I think they use that so you can, like, talk to your remote and say, like, change the channel. I don't know what the fuck you'd use that for. But 723 00:43:36.615 --> 00:43:47.350 they have microphones in them so they can listen to what's going on in the room. They can also, because they're on your Wi Fi network. They can ping your Wi Fi network and try and discover what other devices you have on your network 724 00:43:47.910 --> 00:43:52.470 and get this whole profile of the way your home network is set up, 725 00:43:53.030 --> 00:43:54.150 your habits, 726 00:43:54.550 --> 00:43:57.030 everything, and send that back to Samsung. 727 00:43:57.885 --> 00:44:02.125 Well, and if they have access to your router, they can start using your 728 00:44:02.365 --> 00:44:04.125 WiFi signals to 729 00:44:04.365 --> 00:44:05.245 map 730 00:44:05.325 --> 00:44:06.205 objects 731 00:44:06.445 --> 00:44:07.565 in your house. 732 00:44:08.525 --> 00:44:12.845 Yes, that's right. That's right. That was a cool research project. People can use 733 00:44:14.579 --> 00:44:20.500 information from the radio that sends out the Wi Fi signals in your house to do 734 00:44:21.539 --> 00:44:22.820 essentially radar. 735 00:44:23.059 --> 00:44:26.099 Shout out to Alex Jones who called this a decade ago, 736 00:44:27.585 --> 00:44:28.865 infowars.com. 737 00:44:28.865 --> 00:44:31.585 But, dude, they can, like, map your heart rate. 738 00:44:32.305 --> 00:44:33.105 Yes. 739 00:44:33.105 --> 00:44:34.385 It's insane. 740 00:44:34.545 --> 00:44:35.985 That is insane. 741 00:44:36.465 --> 00:44:45.050 And, yeah, I mean, they might they might have access to your router depending on which one it is. Yeah. Also, your router manufacturer probably has access to that too, 742 00:44:45.530 --> 00:44:47.450 depending on which one you are. There's... 743 00:44:47.850 --> 00:44:52.890 I think this is what's burned on a lot of the whole, Chinese Wi Fi manufacturer ban 744 00:44:52.970 --> 00:44:56.650 from the US government was that there was several backdoors 745 00:44:57.385 --> 00:44:58.585 installed in 746 00:44:59.785 --> 00:45:00.825 Chinese made 747 00:45:01.145 --> 00:45:02.825 Wi Fi router hardware, 748 00:45:02.825 --> 00:45:04.425 which is all of them. 749 00:45:07.065 --> 00:45:08.345 All kinds of stuff. 750 00:45:09.180 --> 00:45:12.380 There was a cool there was a cool discovery. 751 00:45:12.380 --> 00:45:12.940 So 752 00:45:13.260 --> 00:45:16.940 there's this really janky brand of TV called Hisense. 753 00:45:19.099

--> 00:45:23.660 I have one because it's like We got three of them here at the space. It's the cheapest TV you can get in Cinza. 754 00:45:24.714 --> 00:45:25.355 But 755 00:45:25.595 --> 00:45:28.475 Hisense is doing the same thing. They they they 756 00:45:28.555 --> 00:45:33.995 send back everything that's going on in your TV. It doesn't matter if it's plugged in via external HDMI, 757 00:45:34.075 --> 00:45:34.875 everything. 758 00:45:34.875 --> 00:45:38.795 Right? So if you've connected your smart TV to the Wi Fi, they've got everything. 759 00:45:39.819 --> 00:45:40.380 And 760 00:45:40.780 --> 00:45:42.300 they had... 761 00:45:43.260 --> 00:45:46.700 So someone... And so they were sending that... All that data back to a server. 762 00:45:47.740 --> 00:45:54.140 But, apparently, that server had no login credentials whatsoever. It was totally wide open. My god. 763 00:45:54.984 --> 00:45:59.785 So some people got it, and they got all the data off of it. There was data for... 764 00:46:01.224 --> 00:46:02.585 Oh, I think it was 765 00:46:03.224 --> 00:46:04.105 10,000,000. 766 00:46:04.105 --> 00:46:05.945 I think it was 10,000,000 TVs. 767 00:46:07.460 --> 00:46:08.740 You know, that's, like, 768 00:46:09.539 --> 00:46:11.140 millions of of people. 769 00:46:11.460 --> 00:46:12.099 Right? 770 00:46:12.420 --> 00:46:15.619 All the data off their servers. Someone extracted it all 771 00:46:16.180 --> 00:46:17.060 and then 772 00:46:17.460 --> 00:46:22.660 put some malware onto the server that encrypted it all and demanded a Bitcoin ransom. 773 00:46:23.595 --> 00:46:26.475 Holy shit. Or Hisense to get their data back. 774 00:46:29.035 --> 00:46:34.075 Shit's getting wild out there. Did they get the ransom money? I don't know. I don't think so. 775 00:46:34.315 --> 00:46:38.475 So you So wait. Can't What? Go ahead. Go ahead. Was gonna say 776 00:46:40.940 --> 00:46:41.340 Nice. 777 00:46:41.980 --> 00:46:44.540 Dude, this delay on Riverside is bullshit. 778 00:46:44.619 --> 00:46:45.020 No. Go, 779 00:46:46.140 --> 00:46:46.540 Go. 780 00:46:47.020 --> 00:46:53.580 Okay. I'm going. It's like we're fucked. They're fucked. Everyone's fucked. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So if you can't trust home devices, 781 00:46:53.660 --> 00:46:53.900 right, 782 00:46:55.705 --> 00:46:56.585 is 783 00:46:56.585 --> 00:46:57.145 the 784 00:46:57.945 --> 00:47:03.705 proper solution the best thing to do first to have a good router and home network security setup 785 00:47:04.025 --> 00:47:07.385 to block devices from seeing each other or other 786 00:47:07.865 --> 00:47:08.665 personal devices? 787 00:47:09.680 --> 00:47:10.800 What do you do? 788 00:47:11.200 --> 00:47:12.240 Yeah. I think 789 00:47:13.120 --> 00:47:15.680 you have very good network hygiene, 790 00:47:16.320 --> 00:47:17.600 separate VLANs 791 00:47:17.600 --> 00:47:20.400 on your Wi Fi network. Be very cognizant of 792 00:47:20.800 --> 00:47:23.920 what random ass devices you're plugging into your network. 793 00:47:26.375 --> 00:47:39.495 I... I've been very outspoken about people buying, like, cheap ass BITX knockoffs with closed source firmware and plugging it into their network because, like, it's a first class citizen on your network. You don't know what it's doing. 794 00:47:39.815 --> 00:47:40.295 Mhmm. 795 00:47:41.150 --> 00:47:42.510 And you could just 796 00:47:42.830 --> 00:47:46.750 plug in some BITX knockoff that's running some China firmware, 797 00:47:46.990 --> 00:47:51.950 and it's a first class citizen on your network. It could be doing a lot of the shady shit that 798 00:47:52.350 --> 00:47:54.590 That's so funny you say that because I 799 00:47:54.830 --> 00:47:55.550 got 800 00:47:56.395 --> 00:48:02.555 a local AI to do some network sniffing at my place this weekend out of curiosity 801 00:48:02.875 --> 00:48:05.115 and it flagged the bid axe 802 00:48:05.355 --> 00:48:08.315 that I have as one of the things to double check 803 00:48:09.260 --> 00:48:22.140 And it was like anyone on the network can change the pool address blah blah blah blah blah. But then I was like and it had this whole list. This was like one of 10 things. And I just said keep digging and it checked the PIDX source repo and was like there's nothing. There's no funny business here. 804 00:48:22.955 --> 00:48:28.075 That's awesome. Yeah. Let's go. This is like, we need to normalize this kind of thing. 805 00:48:28.955 --> 00:48:32.315 But that is one of the, that's a really awesome. 806 00:48:32.395 --> 00:48:33.995 I didn't tell it to go look up the repo. 807 00:48:34.730 --> 00:48:37.690 But it just found it. It was like, cool, I checked it out. Yep. 808 00:48:37.849 --> 00:48:41.530 That's cool. Hence the importance of running open source. 809 00:48:41.930 --> 00:48:42.410 Yeah. 810 00:48:43.049 --> 00:48:44.329 It's like we 811 00:48:44.329 --> 00:48:46.090 are in this amazing age where 812 00:48:46.730 --> 00:48:48.570 you don't need to know 813 00:48:49.049 --> 00:48:50.010 how to verify 814 00:48:50.385 --> 00:48:54.465 the firmware yourself. If it's open source, you can be sure 815 00:48:54.625 --> 00:48:56.065 that that's what you're running. 816 00:48:56.465 --> 00:48:58.305 You can just ask an agent, 817 00:48:58.545 --> 00:49:00.945 is this legit? What's happening here? 818 00:49:01.425 --> 00:49:05.185 Yeah. Whereas not that long ago, you'd either have to be 819 00:49:05.680 --> 00:49:10.640 a programmer yourself to understand exactly what you're looking at or 820 00:49:11.040 --> 00:49:13.920 just trust. I think this is where most people fell. 821 00:49:14.320 --> 00:49:24.225 Just trust like a, you know, circle of friends around you or, like, even Internet friends around you, where it's like, well, you know, this this person I follow on Twitter has 822 00:49:24.545 --> 00:49:29.025 has been very reliable. I trust their opinion. They're, you know, deemed a good actor, 823 00:49:29.425 --> 00:49:33.345 and they say this is

legit. They haven't had any issues with this, 824 00:49:34.020 --> 00:49:37.300 and they know what they're looking at. So I'm just gonna kinda trust them. 825 00:49:37.860 --> 00:49:40.740 And, you know, I know I I found myself in that situation 826 00:49:41.300 --> 00:49:42.740 being a person who 827 00:49:43.060 --> 00:49:55.055 can't just pull up a repository and understand exactly what the code is doing. I have this circle of people that I look to and kind of just trust their opinion on a lot of these things. 828 00:49:55.615 --> 00:49:59.055 So I just think a lot of people fall into that. But with AI 829 00:49:59.375 --> 00:50:04.890 and having agents do it, now you have your own... You... It's possible... It's very easy 830 00:50:05.210 --> 00:50:08.170 and possible to have your own trusted 831 00:50:08.810 --> 00:50:13.210 AI agent look at this stuff and give you a full rundown 832 00:50:13.210 --> 00:50:15.530 and make it transparent and make it understandable. 833 00:50:16.085 --> 00:50:20.484 This is this is how we counter this stuff. Right? As if if, 834 00:50:21.765 --> 00:50:26.085 you know, the attackers are using AI to speed up their attacks. Right? AI 835 00:50:26.085 --> 00:50:33.770 is is our defense here. So if you have anything that you care about in your personal network, right, that's a very prudent thing to do. 836 00:50:35.130 --> 00:50:36.250 What do you think's 837 00:50:37.130 --> 00:50:39.370 gonna keep happening? Just more honeypots, 838 00:50:39.690 --> 00:50:40.890 kill your customer, 839 00:50:41.290 --> 00:50:41.850 attraction? 840 00:50:42.365 --> 00:50:48.365 You know, one thing I was thinking about today is like, I foresee a lot of autonomy 841 00:50:49.005 --> 00:50:51.085 going away, where it's like 842 00:50:52.045 --> 00:50:53.805 you sign into a website 843 00:50:53.805 --> 00:50:54.684 and 844 00:50:55.200 --> 00:50:56.720 you wanna do something, 845 00:50:57.520 --> 00:50:59.440 you're gonna find that, like, 846 00:51:00.080 --> 00:51:08.480 you're going to be relegated to asking an agent that's built into the website to do the thing for you. Like, for example, 847 00:51:10.915 --> 00:51:15.555 I will one day log in to my bank website, 848 00:51:15.635 --> 00:51:18.195 and I wanna check the balance in my bank account. 849 00:51:18.515 --> 00:51:24.115 Whereas today, I log in, and I click on the account, and I can see all the transactions, 850 00:51:24.609 --> 00:51:27.170 and I can peruse it manually. 851 00:51:27.570 --> 00:51:30.050 I I... And that is 852 00:51:30.930 --> 00:51:35.090 autonomy. Right? So I think that is going to be going away where 853 00:51:35.250 --> 00:51:38.290 in its place, I will log in to the bank's website, 854 00:51:39.204 --> 00:51:40.405 and it'll... 855 00:51:40.405 --> 00:51:45.125 I'll just be presented with an agent, and it'll say, what would you like your agent to do? 856 00:51:45.765 --> 00:51:47.765 And I'll have to ask the agent, 857 00:51:47.925 --> 00:51:49.845

show me my recent transactions. 858 00:51:49.925 --> 00:51:53.685 Mhmm. And the agent will go and fetch it and show me the transactions. 859 00:51:54.360 --> 00:51:54.920 But 860 00:51:55.160 --> 00:52:04.280 that pisses me off because I don't want to ask a fucking agent to do it for me. Like, I want to just click on it and see my transactions. Right? So I think, 861 00:52:04.840 --> 00:52:09.800 you know, now apply that to, like, every service that you log on to the Internet for 862 00:52:10.145 --> 00:52:13.905 and, you know, think about all the things you're doing manually, 863 00:52:14.145 --> 00:52:15.825 I really foresee us 864 00:52:16.385 --> 00:52:19.665 having all those manual tasks get replaced with 865 00:52:19.984 --> 00:52:22.545 agents and not even having the option 866 00:52:23.670 --> 00:52:31.750 to manually browse through stuff anymore. You're literally just gonna have to ask an agent to do it for you. Dude, I did that this morning. I had a dentist appointment 867 00:52:32.309 --> 00:52:33.190 and I 868 00:52:33.510 --> 00:52:46.855 told the dentist at the end, I was like, you wanna know something funny? He's like, what? It's a new dentist. I was like, I didn't schedule this appointment. Those four or five emails back and forth where you needed my old x rays, like my bot did it. I didn't 869 00:52:47.335 --> 00:52:49.494 research you guys. I said to find one. 870 00:52:50.349 --> 00:52:53.310 I said cash pay, blah blah blah. I had some criteria. 871 00:52:54.030 --> 00:52:57.150 And my agent just like interacted with the front desk person. 872 00:52:57.710 --> 00:53:03.630 And the guy was like blown away. He was like, yeah, was looking at your x rays, blah blah blah. I was like, yeah, didn't send shit. 873 00:53:05.595 --> 00:53:12.075 And they were none the wiser. No. It's not going be long until he was like, Yeah, didn't look at your shit either. Yeah, exactly. 874 00:53:13.435 --> 00:53:22.980 But you're right, Igo. I didn't go make an account on the portal or anything like that. I think hopefully that means maybe we'll be less reliant. Like, 875 00:53:24.020 --> 00:53:29.940 internet theory. Less people will just be bogged down doing the bullshit of the internet. The bullshit work. Well, the builders will still build. 876 00:53:30.420 --> 00:53:37.494 Yeah. But it's like, I mean, think about like What honey pots are created from this. Yeah. I see this happening with transportation 877 00:53:37.494 --> 00:53:39.015 too, like vehicles. 878 00:53:39.015 --> 00:53:39.494 Like, 879 00:53:39.895 --> 00:53:49.680 I wanna be able to get into my car and start it and control where it's going and move the steering wheel and control the brakes and control the acceleration, 880 00:53:50.400 --> 00:53:52.000 you know, I think we're 881 00:53:52.320 --> 00:53:54.560 heading straight into a world where 882 00:53:55.360 --> 00:53:56.640 empty 883 00:53:56.640 --> 00:53:58.720 car pulls up to where I'm standing. 884 00:53:58.880 --> 00:54:00.080 I get into it 885 00:54:00.924 --> 00:54:04.925 already, like, preprogrammed where I'm going, preplanned. 886 00:54:05.085 --> 00:54:06.125 It already knows, 887 00:54:06.765 --> 00:54:11.244 and it it takes me there, and it does... It surveys 888 00:54:11.565 --> 00:54:15.484 the streets to make sure they're safe and it's not gonna hit anything. 889 00:54:16.010 --> 00:54:18.010 It does the accelerating. 890 00:54:18.010 --> 00:54:21.450 It does the braking. It does the steering. I I mean, we have that right now, 891 00:54:21.770 --> 00:54:24.810 but I foresee us heading into a world where 892 00:54:25.050 --> 00:54:32.555 the optionality to drive your own vehicle and own your own vehicle and have your own property and have the autonomy to control 893 00:54:33.035 --> 00:54:35.194 a vehicle is getting 894 00:54:35.194 --> 00:54:37.115 engineered out of our lives. 895 00:54:37.355 --> 00:54:38.155 Yep. 896 00:54:38.555 --> 00:54:40.875 We gotta build the open alternatives 897 00:54:40.875 --> 00:54:42.075 to keep 898 00:54:42.075 --> 00:54:43.035 that autonomy. 899 00:54:43.835 --> 00:54:44.795 You just made me think. 900 00:54:45.789 --> 00:54:47.230 I saw that the new 901 00:54:47.869 --> 00:54:49.470 Luxe OS installer 902 00:54:49.470 --> 00:54:52.589 asked you to create an account. Oh, I saw that. 903 00:54:54.109 --> 00:54:58.510 Don't know why that made me think of it, to your point is, yeah, more accounts, more permissions, 904 00:54:58.510 --> 00:54:59.869 more walls, more steps. 905 00:55:00.555 --> 00:55:01.835 More honeypots. 906 00:55:01.835 --> 00:55:03.195 More honeypots and 907 00:55:03.835 --> 00:55:05.115 super intelligence. 908 00:55:05.675 --> 00:55:06.955 And more like 909 00:55:07.435 --> 00:55:11.835 more of these situations where you're like, if something goes wrong, 910 00:55:12.234 --> 00:55:13.675 you will find yourself 911 00:55:13.994 --> 00:55:14.795 completely 912 00:55:14.795 --> 00:55:15.275 stranded, 913 00:55:15.700 --> 00:55:16.420 like, 914 00:55:16.820 --> 00:55:17.460 unable 915 00:55:17.860 --> 00:55:18.500 to 916 00:55:18.740 --> 00:55:23.540 do any... Like, what happens when you no longer have access to your own vehicle 917 00:55:23.780 --> 00:55:26.020 and you need to, like, go somewhere? 918 00:55:26.340 --> 00:55:29.620 And it's, like, it's not on the predefined 919 00:55:30.335 --> 00:55:37.135 list of acceptable locations for you to be going or there's no pre planned route or 920 00:55:37.615 --> 00:55:40.575 when you need to look up information that's not 921 00:55:42.335 --> 00:55:46.870 approved for you to be browsing based on your citizen score? 922 00:55:48.150 --> 00:55:57.510 And I think this is a lot of what we fight for in open source Bitcoin mining, right, is we need to have the agency to control how this stuff that we own works. 923 00:55:58.070 --> 00:55:59.430 Mhmm. Exactly. 924 00:55:59.990 --> 00:56:00.630 And 925 00:56:01.075 --> 00:56:05.555 we need to be able to

audit what it's doing to be sure that it's doing 926 00:56:06.115 --> 00:56:08.275 what it says it is or what we think it is, 927 00:56:08.755 --> 00:56:11.155 and to be able to control it how we want. 928 00:56:11.635 --> 00:56:12.355 I really like... 929 00:56:13.310 --> 00:56:16.430 I'm conflicted about this, but I I imagine this scenario 930 00:56:16.670 --> 00:56:17.310 where 931 00:56:17.550 --> 00:56:18.590 what if 932 00:56:19.390 --> 00:56:20.350 companies 933 00:56:20.350 --> 00:56:28.670 were held liable for data breaches? So, like, if my personal information gets stolen off of a server, whoever runs that server is liable for some sort of damages. 934 00:56:29.244 --> 00:56:35.725 I don't like to see this lawfare or, like, additional restrictions imposed on people doing things, but 935 00:56:36.125 --> 00:56:37.085 that would 936 00:56:37.805 --> 00:56:41.724 have the effect of people would think twice about collecting personal information 937 00:56:42.220 --> 00:56:47.740 as if they are actually liable for keeping it secure. Maybe that will come naturally 938 00:56:47.820 --> 00:56:50.620 if the data breaches just keep happening and eventually 939 00:56:51.100 --> 00:56:51.820 the 940 00:56:51.900 --> 00:56:57.785 competitors that went out say, We're either really secure or we don't want to deal with that at all to begin with. 941 00:56:58.425 --> 00:56:59.385 But right now, 942 00:57:00.905 --> 00:57:04.905 all that software, all of the infrastructure was built before the agent ticket world. 943 00:57:05.385 --> 00:57:05.945 Yeah. 944 00:57:06.185 --> 00:57:08.425 Yeah. Right. I mean, this is like 945 00:57:08.665 --> 00:57:12.825 the biggest risk with the age verification stuff, right? Is there's just going to be these 946 00:57:13.520 --> 00:57:18.320 poorly secured databases everywhere with, like, personal information of, 947 00:57:18.560 --> 00:57:19.280 like, 948 00:57:19.760 --> 00:57:23.760 everyone. Dude, it makes me, like the, the Dune 949 00:57:23.920 --> 00:57:28.320 novel lore where the... They, like, banned all the thinking machines, all the AIs 950 00:57:28.715 --> 00:57:33.115 because they were just like, fuck this. They're getting into everything. Just take the technology out of everything. 951 00:57:34.555 --> 00:57:37.115 Cat might be out of the bag for that one. Yeah. 952 00:57:37.755 --> 00:57:40.955 I don't know all the answers, but I know for sure, 953 00:57:41.740 --> 00:57:43.740 like doubling down on 954 00:57:44.220 --> 00:57:45.180 KYC 955 00:57:45.820 --> 00:57:46.540 and 956 00:57:46.620 --> 00:57:48.940 making honey pots and like 957 00:57:49.260 --> 00:57:50.060 collecting 958 00:57:50.460 --> 00:57:53.260 personal data about people is not the answer. 959 00:57:53.580 --> 00:57:54.940 It is not. It's not 960 00:57:55.260 --> 00:57:56.220 gonna solve anything. 961 00:57:56.955 --> 00:57:57.915 Well said. 962 00:57:58.235 --> 00:57:58.795 Well, 963 00:57:59.035 --> 00:58:01.515 on that note, you guys, I gotta jump. 964 00:58:01.835 --> 00:58:02.635 Oh, right. 965 00:58:03.595 --> 00:58:06.235 About that time. All right. That was a fantastic We 966 00:58:06.875 --> 00:58:09.355 just went like, that was like a 100% tangent the whole time. 967 00:58:10.070 --> 00:58:13.350 Love it. That's what we're good at on this show. 968 00:58:13.750 --> 00:58:17.190 Yeah. I hate to cut it short, but I've got an So area I need to 969 00:58:18.470 --> 00:58:23.270 until next time, fellas. Alright. Thanks for joining us, everyone. Cheers, everybody. Week.

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