TRANSCRIPT 🔗
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Pete: In today's podcast, we address
topics around workplace violence that
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could be disturbing or emotionally
challenging for some listeners.
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It is truly not a conversation
for children and listener
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discretion is advised.
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Bart Womack: No profession,
level of education, ideology,
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or religion is above reproach.
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There is no profile.
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The insider threat is
closer than you think.
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Pete: Hello out
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there in podcast land.
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You are listening to the
MEMIC Safety Experts podcast.
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I'm your host, Peter Koch.
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Safety in the workplace includes more
than just identifying physical hazards
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and addressing them using the hierarchy
of controls like OSHA asks you to.
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Providing a workplace free from recognized
hazards that can cause serious or fatal
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injuries and illnesses also includes
addressing possible threats to the workers
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that may come from the outside or maybe
even originate from other employees.
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So, a number of years ago, just
a quick story, I was working on
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site with a policyholder reviewing
a new injury reporting system
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that they wanted to implement.
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Fine.
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We had just gotten back to the safety
manager's office when he had received
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a call from a supervisor from a remote
location stating that one of their team
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members was acting kind of strangely
and not wanting to return to work
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after receiving a call during a break.
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He was thinking about just letting
the person go home, uh, and
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not putting them back to work.
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But we asked him to hold off and we
went to their location and met with
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the supervisor and the team member.
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So after some discussion and really trying
to establish some trust with the employee,
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it was determined that the team member had
gotten a message from a friend that her
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Ex husband was coming to the workplace.
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He had worked there previously and
had not been rehired this year.
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So we weren't really sure
what was going to happen.
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And
Load full transcript
when we dug into it a little
bit further, it turned out that
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there was a restraining order
against the ex husband for domestic
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violence towards the team member.
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So together with the employee, we
contacted the local sheriff and
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the sheriff met the ex husband
that he came onto the property
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and they escorted him off.
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And the safety manager then took a further
step and connected that employee with
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some, a local support group and she left
work with friends to manage the situation.
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So had the supervisor not paid attention
to the warning signs or the team member,
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uh, was maybe too scared to speak up and
say something, the situation could have
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gone in a very, very different direction.
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So unfortunately, reports of violence
in the workplace have escalated over
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the last 10 to 20 years, and despite
laws and rules that have been put
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in place to prevent these situations
from happening, we still see them.
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Um, so as a business owner,
I ask you a question.
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What can you do?
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Are you prepared to manage
a situation once it starts?
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Or better yet, do you know the warning
signs and have a plan to de escalate
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the situation before it begins?
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Well, today on the Memex Safety Experts
podcast, Command Sergeant Major, United
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States Army Retired, Bart Womack, author
of the book Embedded Enemy and screenplay
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for the feature film of the same name,
joins me to discuss the issue of workplace
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violence using his expertise, his
experience and knowledge from a survivor's
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perspective on insider's threats.
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After 29 years of distinguished
service with the U.
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S.
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Army, culminating in dual roles as
the Commandant of the 101st Airborne
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Division, Non commissioned Officers
Academy and Command Sergeant Major
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of the 101st Airborne Division, Bart
retired from active service and pursued
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work as a military technical advisor
in Hollywood, as well as serving on the
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advisory board for the GI Film Festival.
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His post military career spanned
many, many achievements, from training
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armies in Afghanistan and Nigeria,
volunteering as a mentor to Army ROTC
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cadets, serving as a program manager
for the Institute for Veterans and
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Military Families, and as a board
member of Veterans Retreats Foundation.
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Recently, Bart has published his book
in screenplay titled The Embedded
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Enemy, recounting an American soldier's
first hand account of a deadly insider
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attack against 101st Airborne Division.
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He is an accomplished speaker and
a thought leader in safety and
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security, calling us to action
with proactive approaches to safety
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and security in the workplace.
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Bart, welcome to the podcast today.
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Bart Womack: Thank you very
much, Peter, for having me.
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I appreciate it.
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Pete: Yeah.
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I appreciate you being here.
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And I'm excited for this conversation,
not just because of the events
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that have occurred in New Orleans.
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So we'll place this podcast in
time and we'll get to that later.
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But thank you Workplace violence,
uh, is a big deal and it's one
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of those hidden things that we
don't usually think about it.
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Or plan for it until it happens to
us, or we see it in the news, so.
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But before we get talking about
that, you have a very interesting
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history, and I wanted to give you
the opportunity to tell us a little
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bit more about your background.
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I've only took a very small
snippet of your life history.
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You have so much more to, uh, to
offer, uh, which really places you as
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an expert within, within this realm.
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So tell me a little bit about
you, yourself, your story, and how
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you got to where you are today.
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Bart Womack: Yeah, thank you for that.
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I'll, uh, jump straight into that.
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Uh, in my workplace, in 101st
Airborne Division, in March, uh,
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23rd, 2003, was the, the attack
that happened in my workplace.
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We were poised to cross the border, to
go into Iraq, um, early morning hours
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of March 23rd, 2003, we were attacked.
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Uh, being so close to the
border of
Iraq, of course, we thought it was the
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Iraqi insurgents that were attacking us.
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Uh, grenades were exploding,
people were being shot.
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It was, uh, you know, one
o'clock in the morning.
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Uh, so, darkness.
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We had one light set on our, in our
particular area that was not lit.
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Uh, keep in mind that this is a
camp that has 5, 000 people in it.
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Our particular part of the headquarters
of The Bastogne Brigade, 101st Airborne
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Division, you know, probably had about 200
people, but then we'll be caught our pad.
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So that was the part that was being
attacked almost right in the middle
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of a, of a forward operating base.
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That's about, uh, uh, I struggle
trying to describe this.
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I mean, 10 football fields, you know,
in a circle in motion, pretty huge
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with us in the middle and all our other
units surrounding us with a 12 ft.
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Burn on the outside of that.
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So how did the enemy get into our camp?
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Which is what I was trying to figure out.
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So all these things will happen
is explosions, like I said, and
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gunshots and people wounded.
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We had to get him evacuated.
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But just fast forward.
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We learned, um, that grenades were
missing and ammunition was missing and it
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was one of our soldiers was missing and
that then he became the prime suspect.
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Fast forward more.
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We learned that it's an
insider threat attack.
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This particular attack was planned
by him, you know, a long time ago.
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Uh, he had written things in his
diary that were anti American and
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extremist, uh, unbeknownst to us.
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So this particular attack in alignment
with other workplace Well, and
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sometimes it's similar with workplace
violence is that we don't know.
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We don't know the clues.
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We don't know the signs and
all these types of things.
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But that's what propelled me
to get into this industry.
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I felt that we were, you know, we were,
we were tripped and we didn't know.
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And we're supposed to know everything
about our soldiers and their
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families and all those things,
which still has me to this day
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saying that there were some signs.
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Now the sign wasn't that ammunition
is going to come this day.
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This guy's going to do this.
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Um, of course, he didn't know
that he had planned this by
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writing things in his diary, you
know, years and years in advance.
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But him being isolated from the
rest of the platoon, if one platoon,
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the platoon is way over here and
he's on the other side and not kind
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of playing in the reindeer games
frequently is a sign of something.
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So even in that deployed environment, to
me, I always say that it begs a question.
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Some things people are doing,
some things we're going to talk
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about here today in the workplace.
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of behavior begs a question.
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Someone has to ask that question.
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Let's hear what comes out of their mouth.
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It may tell us what the problem is,
maybe underlying, but more importantly,
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let's hear them talk about what it is.
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Those things didn't happen,
which I say are some signs.
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Um, now he wasn't going to say that he
was going to kill everybody as soon as
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the ammo comes, but what we don't know
what he was going to say is the point.
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But that's what led me to this work that
knowing that there had to be science.
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So, Realizing that this story was not
known as much to the world, I felt
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compelled to write a book about it.
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I wanted the public to know about
insider threats, and that if it happened
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in the close knit brotherhood of the
armed forces, that it can happen to any
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campus, community, organization, at any
time, anywhere, that domestic terrorism,
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you know, was real, and our threat.
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Uh, 2003, by the time I published the
book in 2013, the hook for the book,
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for me, was watching and tracking other
mass shootings and how they happen.
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And the hook in the book is
these strategies that I put
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in place that I think that any
everyday person can execute.
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It doesn't have to be people like us
who work in the security industry.
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Uh, they're very simple if
people are paying attention, you
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know, so I developed my talk.
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It's called situational awareness,
security, mitigating the threat, whether
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the threats in a workplace, whether
threats in place of worship, uh, academic
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institution, it doesn't matter where it
is now, every, every mass shooting, uh,
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doesn't align with those strategies.
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It just depends on it.
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Does it align with those things?
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Does it follow anything in there of signs?
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And we'll get to what those are
here in detail here shortly.
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But that led me to get into this
industry and doing that homework
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to come up with those strategies.
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I've learned these, these attacks
often follow those strategies.
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And if they follow those strategies,
then they could be mitigated.
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And I felt that the world was
missing out on a way to prevent
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these things without even knowing it.
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You know, a lot of things will be
talked about in the security realm of
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technology and, and, and it's always guns.
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And we'll get into that.
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This is what I say about the guns.
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It's a hard one.
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And I'd rather see the focus,
obviously that's going to stay
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there, but there's other areas that
need attention paid to, really the
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gun thing to me kind of goes like
Einstein's, um, definition of insanity.
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But what is it if you, uh, doing
the same thing over and over again,
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expecting a different result.
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The result hasn't changed.
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I don't care what the administration is.
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It doesn't change.
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So it's a very, very hard one because
that, you know, the amendment is
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going to come up every single time.
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So it's a tough one.
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Uh, how we can assist with that, I would
say in terms of control is I have a hard
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time trying to figure out who in the daily
public needs a silencer, for example.
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I mean, just Like, why is that needed?
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I can understand the weapons are
going to happen, the different types
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of weapons are going to happen, the
mass ammunition is going to happen,
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maybe you can do something to reduce
the magazines, but the silencer?
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So it's little steps.
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Is that, is that an amendment, right?
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The silencer?
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I don't think so.
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So it's, it's kind of baby steps.
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Pete: Yeah.
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Bart Womack: Um, but that's
a huge one because now we
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don't know where it came from.
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I'm getting off track, but the,
the book was, was the thing to do.
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And really those strategies to put
out in the world by, by speaking
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about this, uh, so people would
know that there's, there is a way.
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So I call in the public.
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Learners of these strategies, I
think in the workplace and all those
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places I mentioned, people that are
there are the first line of defense.
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They are the first line of defense,
just like the story you just told.
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That guy who got that message in
that particular environment, he
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became the first line of defense.
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Had he not been there or had not, more
importantly, he's the hero of that because
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he's the one who had the courage to do it.
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Had he not.
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We don't know what would happen.
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And if we do the backstory on most
of these incidents, it's something
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00:13:01,065 --> 00:13:06,634
like that, or a person like that, who
has done something or failed to do
229
00:13:06,634 --> 00:13:12,224
something, that's really the kind of
underlying thing that can stop it or,
230
00:13:12,734 --> 00:13:13,969
unfortunately, allow it to happen.
231
00:13:14,690 --> 00:13:17,470
And then they're saying, we hear that
on the news, why you told me, but I,
232
00:13:17,620 --> 00:13:21,210
I didn't, I have a case here that I
want to go over when we get to that
233
00:13:21,210 --> 00:13:25,430
particular part, um, of how someone
knew something they didn't do, they
234
00:13:25,439 --> 00:13:26,719
didn't have the courage to do it.
235
00:13:27,130 --> 00:13:32,479
In most cases, well not most cases,
sometimes that happens, the closer we are
236
00:13:32,479 --> 00:13:39,040
to the person, the more, the more we are
to ignore what those, those signs are.
237
00:13:39,425 --> 00:13:43,375
Pete: Yeah, I can definitely relate to
that and bringing up that particular
238
00:13:43,375 --> 00:13:49,595
example with the supervisor, uh, he
was seconds away from the decision of
239
00:13:49,595 --> 00:13:55,195
ignoring that and something in the back
of his head said, I should just call it.
240
00:13:55,255 --> 00:13:59,204
We'll just call the resource, the
safety guy and run this by him
241
00:13:59,584 --> 00:14:03,144
because it was weird that the thing
that he picked up was the odd bit.
242
00:14:03,415 --> 00:14:05,714
behavior, not the request to not work.
243
00:14:05,714 --> 00:14:06,564
I mean, that happens.
244
00:14:06,885 --> 00:14:10,495
You're talking about, uh, pretty
low income, low wage position,
245
00:14:10,865 --> 00:14:12,314
uh, happens all the time.
246
00:14:12,324 --> 00:14:14,274
People like, ah, you know, I
don't really don't want to finish
247
00:14:14,285 --> 00:14:17,444
my job today or something has
to happen or something came up.
248
00:14:17,844 --> 00:14:18,574
We'll send you home.
249
00:14:18,584 --> 00:14:19,294
No big deal.
250
00:14:19,694 --> 00:14:22,444
And he connected those two things and.
251
00:14:22,610 --> 00:14:23,534
That's what's going on.
252
00:14:23,534 --> 00:14:26,077
And he never made a call,
which was the right thing.
253
00:14:26,077 --> 00:14:28,900
Because like you said, you never
know, like that could have been
254
00:14:28,900 --> 00:14:34,030
something, uh, the situation could
have escalated and not just involved
255
00:14:34,080 --> 00:14:39,269
the ex husband and the employee, but
there's multiple other individuals
256
00:14:39,269 --> 00:14:42,750
that he would have had to have gone
through to get to that particular point.
257
00:14:42,750 --> 00:14:44,700
So it could have been a lot, a lot worse.
258
00:14:45,630 --> 00:14:47,770
Bart Womack: And would not have a
problem going through those people
259
00:14:47,770 --> 00:14:50,159
to get to whatever his goal was.
260
00:14:50,190 --> 00:14:53,990
And You know, so we can get
it as, but those signs, you
261
00:14:53,990 --> 00:14:54,990
know, that, that was the sign.
262
00:14:54,990 --> 00:14:57,160
It wasn't just not wanting to work.
263
00:14:57,339 --> 00:14:57,750
Okay.
264
00:14:58,010 --> 00:14:58,480
That can happen.
265
00:14:58,660 --> 00:15:02,560
He'd sit with anybody, but the, the,
the behavior they're displaying,
266
00:15:03,219 --> 00:15:07,420
that's, that's the situational
awareness part of the security.
267
00:15:07,560 --> 00:15:07,749
Pete: Yeah.
268
00:15:08,219 --> 00:15:10,909
Bart Womack: So we, we, we can
put in all kinds of means within
269
00:15:10,920 --> 00:15:13,250
organizations that will cost money.
270
00:15:13,480 --> 00:15:14,040
I get it.
271
00:15:14,110 --> 00:15:14,870
But I would say.
272
00:15:15,814 --> 00:15:20,124
And, and, and a lot of cases in
workplaces, security is probably
273
00:15:20,134 --> 00:15:23,614
once they have cameras and you know,
someone at a desk and all those types
274
00:15:23,614 --> 00:15:27,474
of things, a sign of man or whatever
case may be the budget for that.
275
00:15:28,465 --> 00:15:30,104
You may know this better than I do.
276
00:15:30,135 --> 00:15:31,615
It's not very much.
277
00:15:32,325 --> 00:15:35,785
So it, these places are, are reliant.
278
00:15:36,224 --> 00:15:40,135
On that first line of defense that I
speak of, because they are the eyes
279
00:15:40,135 --> 00:15:44,395
and the ears where even the security
cameras, unless you're monitoring it
280
00:15:44,405 --> 00:15:48,055
24 seven and you have multiple cameras,
you're just not going to get it.
281
00:15:48,154 --> 00:15:52,275
You're not going to be at the water cooler
to hear what someone saying what happened
282
00:15:52,304 --> 00:15:55,025
at home, what has been going on at home.
283
00:15:55,265 --> 00:15:58,824
They were they're coming to work
and they're saying, I'm going
284
00:15:58,824 --> 00:16:02,194
to end out on whatever they're
saying, but who's listening to
285
00:16:02,194 --> 00:16:03,535
it and doing something about it.
286
00:16:03,975 --> 00:16:04,705
Pete: Yeah, right.
287
00:16:04,965 --> 00:16:10,564
How did you connect and you talked
about, um, some of the experience with
288
00:16:10,594 --> 00:16:12,704
the event that happened with the 101st.
289
00:16:13,305 --> 00:16:16,635
Um, how did you connect what you missed?
290
00:16:16,939 --> 00:16:22,319
Or in the investigation afterwards, what
might've been missed or all of those dots?
291
00:16:22,319 --> 00:16:25,390
How did you connect all those dots
and come up with, you know, this is
292
00:16:25,400 --> 00:16:30,439
not just something that the military
can do with all of their resources.
293
00:16:30,439 --> 00:16:33,469
Cause if you think about, I always
think about the military being.
294
00:16:34,945 --> 00:16:38,435
You have a lot more control
over your environment.
295
00:16:38,445 --> 00:16:42,514
You have at least the environment
that is within your perimeter, right?
296
00:16:42,515 --> 00:16:45,135
You don't have control of when
people go out and you have
297
00:16:45,135 --> 00:16:49,955
control over your people in a very
particular way that the employer.
298
00:16:50,200 --> 00:16:53,330
doesn't necessarily have
the same control over.
299
00:16:53,330 --> 00:16:56,790
So it's, it's, it's a different
relationship, employer to employee
300
00:16:56,800 --> 00:17:02,040
versus a, uh, uh, someone who, uh, who
is commissioned in the military or a
301
00:17:02,040 --> 00:17:03,750
non commissioned person in the military.
302
00:17:04,090 --> 00:17:07,559
So how did you connect those things
and think about, well, this is not
303
00:17:07,559 --> 00:17:11,800
just something that's applicable to our
military and changes that the military
304
00:17:11,800 --> 00:17:14,925
can make, but it can be used outside.
305
00:17:15,075 --> 00:17:18,014
And we'll move from there, I think,
to maybe what those signs are.
306
00:17:18,035 --> 00:17:22,885
So how did you make the connections
and how did you shift from military
307
00:17:22,885 --> 00:17:24,984
thought to private industry thought
308
00:17:25,625 --> 00:17:27,165
Bart Womack: those strategies
that we're going to get into
309
00:17:27,165 --> 00:17:28,945
was really, really what it was.
310
00:17:28,985 --> 00:17:33,804
And following different stories is I
was looking for a hook for the book.
311
00:17:34,264 --> 00:17:35,074
It wasn't just okay.
312
00:17:35,074 --> 00:17:35,614
This happened.
313
00:17:35,614 --> 00:17:39,435
Everyone should read Authors want
people to read their books, but
314
00:17:39,455 --> 00:17:41,005
what's going to make them come there?
315
00:17:41,025 --> 00:17:45,195
So that was, that was the alignment
is that, okay, this didn't just happen
316
00:17:45,195 --> 00:17:47,125
to us in 101st Airborne Division.
317
00:17:47,384 --> 00:17:49,065
This is happening routinely.
318
00:17:49,255 --> 00:17:53,374
These are insider threat attacks,
people going inside and however
319
00:17:53,374 --> 00:17:55,774
they're plotting what they're
doing to do what they want to do.
320
00:17:56,324 --> 00:18:00,104
So I looked at those cases very closely
of the ones that I, that I found.
321
00:18:00,435 --> 00:18:02,305
and align them again.
322
00:18:02,305 --> 00:18:03,615
They had to meet the strategies.
323
00:18:04,375 --> 00:18:08,825
But even even that night of the
attack after it was apprehended and
324
00:18:08,825 --> 00:18:12,925
everything, one of our guys had said
that he thought he saw someone else.
325
00:18:13,244 --> 00:18:16,524
Now the investigators were
sure that he was the only one.
326
00:18:17,755 --> 00:18:19,514
I had known the
investigator for four hours.
327
00:18:19,534 --> 00:18:20,735
Why the new investigation?
328
00:18:20,735 --> 00:18:24,045
The guy who said he saw someone
else I had known for 14 years.
329
00:18:25,085 --> 00:18:27,394
So I was still leaning on the side of him.
330
00:18:28,114 --> 00:18:30,584
Maybe there was, you know,
our mission continued.
331
00:18:30,604 --> 00:18:34,655
We crossed the border, go into Iraq
to fight the war 48 hours later.
332
00:18:35,175 --> 00:18:37,815
So there was no time to stop
and really think about that.
333
00:18:39,115 --> 00:18:43,465
The attack happened at zero 100
hours on that one day of the 23rd.
334
00:18:44,004 --> 00:18:47,054
We have that whole day to go through.
335
00:18:47,875 --> 00:18:50,375
We learned that day, later on
that day, that we were going to be
336
00:18:50,375 --> 00:18:52,045
crossing the border within 48 hours.
337
00:18:52,605 --> 00:18:55,835
But because he said he thought that
there was someone else in our little
338
00:18:55,835 --> 00:19:00,155
area, like, you know, picture this, 10
football fields or whatever I said it was,
339
00:19:00,175 --> 00:19:05,784
it's so massive, 5, 000 people in this
camp, and we're, our little 200's in the
340
00:19:05,784 --> 00:19:09,915
middle, and around us is our soldiers.
341
00:19:11,195 --> 00:19:13,175
I had security in place.
342
00:19:13,865 --> 00:19:22,165
Around our little pod or pad, I should
say, of 200 to protect us from us.
343
00:19:23,295 --> 00:19:29,824
So immediately, which is the first
strategy trust, it went out the window.
344
00:19:30,794 --> 00:19:33,074
All these people were
wearing the same uniform.
345
00:19:33,074 --> 00:19:38,064
I am all these people took the oath
to defend the constitution against
346
00:19:38,064 --> 00:19:39,735
all enemies, foreign and domestic.
347
00:19:39,834 --> 00:19:40,865
Just like I did.
348
00:19:41,665 --> 00:19:42,715
Guess who else did that?
349
00:19:43,774 --> 00:19:46,014
The guy who shot people in the back.
350
00:19:46,095 --> 00:19:49,274
The guy who ended up killing
two and wounding twelve others.
351
00:19:50,855 --> 00:19:52,665
So, the first one was trust.
352
00:19:53,445 --> 00:19:56,395
I don't want to jump too far ahead
and get into those strategies there,
353
00:19:56,585 --> 00:19:59,965
but that was the time to lay the
foundation, if you will, of what these
354
00:19:59,975 --> 00:20:04,715
things would be and how they relate
to, uh, a whole bunch of these attacks.
355
00:20:05,625 --> 00:20:11,514
Um, and as I began to, to form them again,
they were derived from other attacks.
356
00:20:12,264 --> 00:20:15,835
So another one that I found immediately
was inside of dread attacking a military,
357
00:20:15,885 --> 00:20:19,325
but the Canadian armed forces, this
was a commander of an air force base.
358
00:20:19,895 --> 00:20:21,544
He had served.
359
00:20:22,074 --> 00:20:24,014
for protection with the
Queen and everything.
360
00:20:24,024 --> 00:20:26,145
And that kind of helped him,
you know, rise to the top to
361
00:20:26,145 --> 00:20:27,354
get his own base in Canada.
362
00:20:28,335 --> 00:20:31,335
Well, he was, he was
breaking into people's homes.
363
00:20:31,974 --> 00:20:33,825
And he did it over and over again.
364
00:20:33,915 --> 00:20:37,025
He ended up killing one of his own
soldiers in the process because
365
00:20:37,025 --> 00:20:38,475
that's the one he was stalking.
366
00:20:39,085 --> 00:20:40,304
You know, and they finally caught him.
367
00:20:40,734 --> 00:20:44,764
But, I mean, just like ours, you can't
get any closer to the inside of that.
368
00:20:44,925 --> 00:20:47,665
It's like I'm smiling in your face
in the daytime and I'm stalking you
369
00:20:47,665 --> 00:20:52,774
at night and I might kill you if I
feel like it, until he was caught.
370
00:20:53,845 --> 00:20:54,675
No one saw that.
371
00:20:55,495 --> 00:20:58,235
His superiors didn't see it,
his subordinates didn't see
372
00:20:58,235 --> 00:20:59,715
it, his friends didn't see it.
373
00:20:59,865 --> 00:21:03,045
One friend said, well, I see some things,
I saw some things begin to change a little
374
00:21:03,045 --> 00:21:04,755
bit, but never thought it would be that.
375
00:21:05,565 -->
00:21:10,615
So, it led me to this quote, that is,
no profession, level of education,
376
00:21:10,674 --> 00:21:13,034
ideology, or religion is above reproach.
377
00:21:13,055 --> 00:21:14,415
There is no profile.
378
00:21:14,455 --> 00:21:16,635
The insider threat is
closer than you think.
379
00:21:16,885 --> 00:21:18,075
So we can't just look at.
380
00:21:18,735 --> 00:21:22,605
A particular demographic or religion
or anything like that and think,
381
00:21:22,605 --> 00:21:25,764
well, uh, it's possible in that
group or it's possible in that group.
382
00:21:25,815 --> 00:21:28,925
It's possible in any group you go outside.
383
00:21:29,135 --> 00:21:30,534
It's possible by your neighbor.
384
00:21:30,655 --> 00:21:34,674
If you wait long enough, unfortunately,
but it was those looking at those
385
00:21:34,705 --> 00:21:38,745
incidents and things like it that
led me to, uh, to, to the strategies
386
00:21:38,745 --> 00:21:40,435
and they get to get into this work.
387
00:21:40,435 --> 00:21:43,804
I would say for a reason, a
grenade exploded in my tent and
388
00:21:43,814 --> 00:21:45,294
somehow I didn't get touched.
389
00:21:47,265 --> 00:21:50,035
Two other people in my tent, one
was hit with shrapnel and one got
390
00:21:50,045 --> 00:21:53,485
shot, you know, so there was a
gunshot, you know, around my tent
391
00:21:53,794 --> 00:21:55,125
as well as other things that night.
392
00:21:55,165 --> 00:21:59,504
I don't, so God saved me to do
this work is the way I look at it.
393
00:22:00,005 --> 00:22:04,544
So I'm going to do this work and
put everything into it and come up
394
00:22:04,545 --> 00:22:10,115
with everything I can to educate
people to save lives in the future.
395
00:22:10,565 --> 00:22:14,410
Pete: But I think that's, it's truly
important because There's not often that
396
00:22:14,410 --> 00:22:21,889
you, you can combine an experience like
you survived, uh, cause that it happens
397
00:22:22,269 --> 00:22:25,860
in the military, it happens outside
of the military, but someone with your
398
00:22:25,860 --> 00:22:32,719
experience prior to that event, um,
there's not often that those two things
399
00:22:32,820 --> 00:22:38,200
combine into one person, and so for you to
have the fortitude to bring that outside
400
00:22:38,200 --> 00:22:43,060
of the military into, into the public
sector where, private sector where, where
401
00:22:43,460 --> 00:22:48,940
more people can, um, can benefit from
that experience I think is fantastic.
402
00:22:49,110 --> 00:22:53,580
So let's talk about those, those
strategies and what are some of the
403
00:22:53,580 --> 00:22:57,370
other signs that, uh, that you would need
to look for and what are some of those
404
00:22:57,370 --> 00:23:04,430
strategies that, uh, that employers can or
even individuals can use to help identify
405
00:23:04,725 --> 00:23:07,095
Some of the potentials that could happen.
406
00:23:07,715 --> 00:23:10,754
Bart Womack: Yeah, I'm gonna go back
to the
top of trust and you know,
407
00:23:10,754 --> 00:23:15,175
I explained why why um That's big
for me and why that's number one.
408
00:23:15,485 --> 00:23:18,835
So I always say trust no one when I when
I'm speaking in audiences about this and
409
00:23:18,835 --> 00:23:22,824
I say trust no one they hit you can see
oh come on you gotta trust somebody okay
410
00:23:22,835 --> 00:23:26,105
I'm trying to plant the seed of trusting
no one because I know they're going to
411
00:23:26,105 --> 00:23:30,754
question that but what I want them to
question is how they trust because some
412
00:23:30,754 --> 00:23:34,185
people say well I trust you until uh
well I trust people until they show me
413
00:23:34,185 --> 00:23:39,694
otherwise uh in this line of work you
could be dead okay by trusting them in
414
00:23:39,694 --> 00:23:42,764
that manner but I want people to think
about you know how they trust I'm not
415
00:23:42,764 --> 00:23:49,699
trying to Tell them how I want them to
truly think about how they trust We can't
416
00:23:49,709 --> 00:23:55,620
just give people in space Cart blank trust
417
00:23:55,959 --> 00:23:56,279
Pete: right?
418
00:23:56,320 --> 00:23:59,989
Bart Womack: So think about you know, how
you trust that would be the first one The
419
00:23:59,989 --> 00:24:02,050
next one is observe listen and report.
420
00:24:02,750 --> 00:24:08,814
So here's an example where I was in
a process of writing the book Uh, and
421
00:24:08,814 --> 00:24:13,364
another experience happened that, that
outlined this particular strategy.
422
00:24:14,095 --> 00:24:19,854
I was, um, I'd gotten out of the military,
started my, my path in Hollywood there.
423
00:24:20,054 --> 00:24:24,195
I found a role as a, a, um,
apartment building manager right
424
00:24:24,195 --> 00:24:25,634
across the street from UCLA.
425
00:24:26,024 --> 00:24:28,714
And, uh, I just ran like a
military barracks, right?
426
00:24:29,654 --> 00:24:33,234
I think, um, it was 60, 60 rooms in there.
427
00:24:33,234 --> 00:24:35,764
One of them was mine, so
that, that was paid for.
428
00:24:36,114 --> 00:24:37,944
And, uh, two other.
429
00:24:38,690 --> 00:24:42,140
Apartments were professors who worked
at UCLA and the rest were students.
430
00:24:42,370 --> 00:24:43,620
So I just ran like a barracks.
431
00:24:44,030 --> 00:24:45,050
So when I first took over.
432
00:24:45,430 --> 00:24:48,820
Uh, I had to go outside for something,
one of their doors and it was, you
433
00:24:48,820 --> 00:24:54,040
know, getting close to dark and this is
kind of January, February of, uh, 2007.
434
00:24:54,870 --> 00:24:57,049
It's getting a little dark and
I just happened to look up and
435
00:24:57,049 --> 00:24:58,679
see that this light wasn't on.
436
00:24:59,450 --> 00:25:01,720
So, I started a security
check of the building in terms
437
00:25:01,720 --> 00:25:03,339
of, uh, it's lights, right?
438
00:25:03,939 --> 00:25:05,370
So, I saw that one.
439
00:25:05,690 --> 00:25:09,409
Then I saw another one, so I
went back in, got a pen and paper
440
00:25:09,409 --> 00:25:11,370
and started writing down things.
441
00:25:11,370 --> 00:25:15,670
I'd go in, come out on a different
level, look up, all around, back
442
00:25:15,670 --> 00:25:17,380
in, I kept repeating this process.
443
00:25:18,109 --> 00:25:22,869
So when I came out one time, I
said, well, if anyone is watching
444
00:25:22,869 --> 00:25:25,944
me right now, they should think
that this is suspicious behavior.
445
00:25:26,345 --> 00:25:27,195
You know, I'm casing.
446
00:25:27,515 --> 00:25:29,295
It could be, but I'm apartment manager.
447
00:25:29,325 --> 00:25:30,015
They don't know that.
448
00:25:30,285 --> 00:25:32,085
If they see me, they should
think it's suspicious.
449
00:25:32,535 --> 00:25:34,895
So, I go back in.
450
00:25:35,014 --> 00:25:38,385
Then I start doing an inspection
of the interior lighting.
451
00:25:38,395 --> 00:25:41,795
Since I'm ordering all these lights, I
might as well order them all at one time.
452
00:25:42,495 --> 00:25:45,204
I get up to the fifth floor
and I'm walking and I hear,
453
00:25:45,235 --> 00:25:47,645
Oh, no, actually I hear freeze.
454
00:25:48,225 --> 00:25:48,875
So I freeze.
455
00:25:49,295 --> 00:25:56,395
Now, In my raising, when you hear freeze,
that's Someone behind you with firearms.
456
00:25:56,455 --> 00:25:56,605
Pete: Mm-hmm
457
00:25:56,965 --> 00:25:58,370
.
Bart Womack: So you don't
turn around and look.
458
00:25:58,435 --> 00:25:59,635
'cause that's a sudden movement.
459
00:25:59,695 --> 00:26:00,685
I hear the voice.
460
00:26:00,685 --> 00:26:02,455
It sounds much younger than mine.
461
00:26:02,814 --> 00:26:05,245
So obviously you comply, freeze.
462
00:26:05,695 --> 00:26:08,185
Put your hands up, I drop your
head, drop whats in your hand.
463
00:26:08,185 --> 00:26:09,835
There goes the pen, there goes the paper.
464
00:26:09,835 --> 00:26:12,325
Put your hands on your, on your back,
put 'em on your head, et cetera.
465
00:26:12,325 --> 00:26:12,835
Go on your knees.
466
00:26:12,835 --> 00:26:13,465
I get handcuffed.
467
00:26:14,279 --> 00:26:21,290
And then five police officers are
there, five, okay, we're getting that
468
00:26:21,290 --> 00:26:22,840
here shortly, but five are there.
469
00:26:23,010 --> 00:26:26,060
So they said, well, we got a
call about a suspicious person
470
00:26:26,389 --> 00:26:27,499
that was blah, blah, blah.
471
00:26:27,499 --> 00:26:29,760
I said, well, no, that's not suspicious.
472
00:26:29,770 --> 00:26:31,850
That, that, that fits your description.
473
00:26:31,859 --> 00:26:32,479
No, it was me.
474
00:26:33,039 --> 00:26:35,209
I'm the, you know, I'm the
building manager and I was doing
475
00:26:35,209 --> 00:26:37,649
an inspection of the building
for lights and blah, blah, blah.
476
00:26:38,060 --> 00:26:39,290
They were asking me for my ID.
477
00:26:39,290 --> 00:26:40,770
I showed them my military ID.
478
00:26:40,770 --> 00:26:43,030
And then from that point, they
start calling me Sergeant Major
479
00:26:43,030 --> 00:26:44,789
and they take the cuffs off.
480
00:26:45,745 --> 00:26:52,375
So, um, I was right in that if someone saw
that behavior to think it's suspicious.
481
00:26:53,265 --> 00:26:56,505
Now, why five police officers had
to show up for a person armed with
482
00:26:56,505 --> 00:26:58,834
a piece of paper and a pencil,
I don't know about that one.
483
00:26:59,465 --> 00:27:01,175
But, someone did come.
484
00:27:01,505 --> 00:27:07,885
So, I like to say that in that
reporting process, in most cases,
485
00:27:08,585 --> 00:27:10,285
maybe that's the worst that happens.
486
00:27:11,024 --> 00:27:14,865
Especially if they don't send five,
then it's, you know, it's, it's less
487
00:27:14,865 --> 00:27:19,334
of a menacing, you know, incident,
but that's the worst that can happen.
488
00:27:19,774 --> 00:27:24,415
And I'd rather people take that, that
chance, if you will, that it be the worst
489
00:27:24,415 --> 00:27:28,464
thing that happens in that regard, but
that the person, in my opinion, regardless
490
00:27:28,464 --> 00:27:34,465
of the outcome for me, Um, it didn't
go bad that they did the right thing.
491
00:27:34,895 --> 00:27:37,785
I said it to myself, I
don't know where they were.
492
00:27:38,535 --> 00:27:41,695
I haven't, I have an idea where they
were, but I don't know exactly where they
493
00:27:41,695 --> 00:27:44,194
were, but that they did the right thing.
494
00:27:44,835 --> 00:27:47,635
The other part of the story is for
a different conference or different
495
00:27:47,635 --> 00:27:50,435
event, but they did the right thing.
496
00:27:50,645 --> 00:27:51,014
Yeah.
497
00:27:52,145 --> 00:27:55,375
Pete: Can you, can you talk a little
bit more about the observe part of that?
498
00:27:55,434 --> 00:27:57,094
Because I think that's, that's a key part.
499
00:27:57,094 --> 00:28:00,355
I mean, I like the, you,
the description of trust.
500
00:28:00,734 --> 00:28:06,624
Um, and I think for me to summarize what
you said about trust is trust, but verify.
501
00:28:06,644 --> 00:28:09,935
Like I'm gonna trust, but I'm gonna
verify what you do, what you say, who
502
00:28:09,935 --> 00:28:14,104
you are, so that I can get to know you a
little bit better before I, I give you.
503
00:28:14,385 --> 00:28:18,385
My full cooperation, my full
trust without, without question.
504
00:28:18,385 --> 00:28:22,024
And even then, that's
not for very many people
505
00:28:24,125 --> 00:28:29,295
observing is like a key part
of establishing trust and then
506
00:28:29,325 --> 00:28:30,375
understanding who that is.
507
00:28:30,375 --> 00:28:34,275
So talk a little bit more about
like as a supervisor, a manager,
508
00:28:34,304 --> 00:28:38,325
or, you know, even the, the other
people in your building there, how,
509
00:28:38,355 --> 00:28:39,945
how can you be a good observer?
510
00:28:40,525 --> 00:28:41,784
Bart Womack: Yes, that's a good question.
511
00:28:42,219 --> 00:28:46,990
And because I don't know who was
observing, so where the apartment
512
00:28:46,990 --> 00:28:49,510
building was right beside it was
a frat house and a frat house.
513
00:28:50,510 --> 00:28:54,429
All the people in my building
know who I am, so I doubt that
514
00:28:54,570 --> 00:28:57,649
they were saying that the property
manager is casing his own building.
515
00:28:58,570 --> 00:29:02,744
But the other two entities next
door didn't know who I was.
516
00:29:03,475 --> 00:29:08,125
So, I guess I have to jump forward here,
you're going to come up again, but one of
517
00:29:08,125 --> 00:29:10,195
the other strategies further down is gut.
518
00:29:10,585 --> 00:29:13,384
They saw something, they
observed something, and their gut
519
00:29:13,384 --> 00:29:14,865
said, this doesn't look right.
520
00:29:15,295 --> 00:29:15,684
Gotcha.
521
00:29:15,684 --> 00:29:20,374
So, in a workplace, you know, you hear,
so let's go back to the case that you
522
00:29:20,374 --> 00:29:25,275
used in the very beginning about your, the
employee there, now he didn't get a chance
523
00:29:25,275 --> 00:29:31,285
to, he didn't get a chance to observe this
different behavior from this employee.
524
00:29:31,705 --> 00:29:33,255
But he was told about it.
525
00:29:33,955 --> 00:29:37,535
But in the workplace, if you work
with someone on a regular basis
526
00:29:37,535 --> 00:29:40,805
and they're displaying something
that they haven't before, you have
527
00:29:40,805 --> 00:29:43,144
something that's coming out of their
mouth, so you're listening to that.
528
00:29:43,145 --> 00:29:45,495
And the two together are
very, very important.
529
00:29:45,695 --> 00:29:48,375
What you're observing, is that in
alignment with what they're saying?
530
00:29:48,595 --> 00:29:49,785
Or is it the complete opposite?
531
00:29:49,785 --> 00:29:51,675
And what is the history,
et cetera, et cetera.
532
00:29:51,945 --> 00:29:53,305
So it goes hand in hand.
533
00:29:53,305 --> 00:29:54,945
I don't think you can do
one without the other.
534
00:29:54,955 --> 00:29:56,205
Some situations you can.
535
00:29:56,415 --> 00:29:59,315
But in this particular case, he
couldn't hear what I was doing.
536
00:29:59,775 --> 00:30:02,075
You just observed what I was
doing and then reported it.
537
00:30:02,425 --> 00:30:03,305
Pete: Yeah, that makes sense.
538
00:30:03,615 --> 00:30:09,735
So, that connection of, uh, is what
you're seeing, does what you observe match
539
00:30:09,735 --> 00:30:11,515
up with what you think you should see?
540
00:30:11,784 --> 00:30:16,735
Which goes to Have you established
trust in the things that are happening
541
00:30:16,735 --> 00:30:21,015
in your neighborhood with what's
happening within your team, you
542
00:30:21,025 --> 00:30:22,435
know, the people within your team.
543
00:30:22,765 --> 00:30:25,984
And I think that leads us, and you
talked about observe, listen, and
544
00:30:25,984 --> 00:30:31,284
report, but you have, one of your other
strategies is, is particular to listening.
545
00:30:31,295 --> 00:30:35,925
So I think that kind of leads us into
that, that particular section there.
546
00:30:35,925 --> 00:30:38,895
So talk about the importance
of listening and the difference
547
00:30:38,935 --> 00:30:41,665
that you see between listening.
548
00:30:42,345 --> 00:30:46,825
Correctly, or properly, or just
listening as most people typically do.
549
00:30:48,115 --> 00:30:50,905
Bart Womack: Yeah, depending, I guess,
you know, in the workplace, it's
550
00:30:50,905 --> 00:30:53,494
going to be different in how people,
you know, what they're listening to.
551
00:30:53,605 --> 00:30:55,364
What they're hearing and
what they're listening to.
552
00:30:55,835 --> 00:30:57,684
I advocate that it's important to listen.
553
00:30:57,945 --> 00:31:01,435
I know it can be hard, people are working,
but some things are going to be said
554
00:31:01,494 --> 00:31:04,024
like, It's that thing that says, Hmm.
555
00:31:04,205 --> 00:31:06,925
It kind of triggers the gut
again, you know, but you had to
556
00:31:06,935 --> 00:31:08,665
listen first as opposed to hear.
557
00:31:09,245 --> 00:31:12,835
You can be at the wall crew and you
know, several discussions going on,
558
00:31:12,835 --> 00:31:15,865
but what is that one thing that stood
out that you, that you listened to?
559
00:31:16,075 --> 00:31:18,745
It could be something, you know,
good for work for that matter,
560
00:31:19,144 --> 00:31:20,815
uh, amongst all the discussion.
561
00:31:20,825 --> 00:31:22,085
So it's here is a particular case.
562
00:31:22,615 --> 00:31:27,695
In, in a college classroom, there's no
preference on speaking to organizations,
563
00:31:27,695 --> 00:31:32,185
uh, about the workplace or whether
it be an academic institution or,
564
00:31:32,225 --> 00:31:35,064
or not, because I think obviously
an academic institution, even though
565
00:31:35,064 --> 00:31:39,865
the mass shooting may happen by a
student in a classroom, to me, that's
566
00:31:39,865 --> 00:31:40,984
their, that's their place of duty.
567
00:31:41,035 --> 00:31:41,954
That's their place of work.
568
00:31:42,035 --> 00:31:44,045
They came to school to do academia.
569
00:31:44,415 --> 00:31:47,625
The professor or the
teacher came there to teach.
570
00:31:47,625 --> 00:31:49,045
That's their workplace.
571
00:31:49,395 --> 00:31:51,235
So they all go hand in hand with me.
572
00:31:51,995 --> 00:31:52,405
Okay.
573
00:31:52,585 --> 00:31:53,245
I digress.
574
00:31:53,965 --> 00:31:59,625
In a college classroom, in criminology,
it's a sophomore class, they start talking
575
00:31:59,625 --> 00:32:02,795
about guns, on the subject of guns.
576
00:32:03,645 --> 00:32:07,064
And it kind of goes back and forth,
people say I have a gun, I have a gun,
577
00:32:07,064 --> 00:32:08,714
this one student says I have a gun.
578
00:32:09,095 --> 00:32:10,875
He describes what type of gun he has.
579
00:32:10,875
--> 00:32:13,165
I'm sure the others described
the type of gun that they had.
580
00:32:13,915 --> 00:32:15,505
Then he goes on to say, well, I have it.
581
00:32:15,515 --> 00:32:18,775
I have an AK 47 and it's
in the trunk of my car.
582
00:32:19,255 --> 00:32:23,064
So at this particular academic
institution, uh, which was a military
583
00:32:23,074 --> 00:32:28,614
school, but I'm sure now on any
academic institution, you're probably
584
00:32:28,615 --> 00:32:30,305
not allowed to have a firearm.
585
00:32:30,975 --> 00:32:33,045
But he went on to say that it
was in the trunk of his car.
586
00:32:33,445 --> 00:32:36,555
Uh, what makes the military one a
little different in that someone could
587
00:32:36,555 --> 00:32:39,284
probably investigate that a little bit
faster because of that environment.
588
00:32:40,635 --> 00:32:45,495
However, all these students in the
classroom, one night, you know, a student,
589
00:32:45,505 --> 00:32:50,725
when he said I have an AK 47 and it's
in the trunk of my car, knowing that his
590
00:32:50,725 --> 00:32:54,035
car was on campus, he, he was listening.
591
00:32:54,535 --> 00:32:58,514
Everyone else heard him say that, but
listening is probably going to make you do
592
00:32:58,514 --> 00:33:00,254
something about it versus just hearing it.
593
00:33:00,785 --> 00:33:03,835
You know, I heard Mike McCarthy might
get fired by the Dallas Cowboys.
594
00:33:04,315 --> 00:33:06,555
It's probably a bad example because
I have nothing to do with that.
595
00:33:07,495 --> 00:33:08,425
I can't use that.
596
00:33:08,854 --> 00:33:13,235
However, this Nigerian student heard
that and he said, he was listening and
597
00:33:13,235 --> 00:33:16,664
he said that sounded a matter of fact.
598
00:33:17,804 --> 00:33:22,305
Not that it just could be
there, that it is there.
599
00:33:22,655 --> 00:33:24,505
And my car is here today.
600
00:33:25,225 --> 00:33:28,945
So, in doing so, went back to
administrators, told them about it.
601
00:33:28,975 --> 00:33:34,234
They went on and proceeded to,
uh, um, inspect his car, and got
602
00:33:34,235 --> 00:33:35,434
about a hundred yards from his car.
603
00:33:35,434 --> 00:33:38,145
And the student said, Hey, before
we get to my car, I want you to
604
00:33:38,145 --> 00:33:39,675
know I have an AK 47 in my car.
605
00:33:39,684 --> 00:33:41,985
I wasn't supposed to have
a firearm on, on a campus.
606
00:33:42,795 --> 00:33:45,944
Now, in this particular case,
nothing ill was, was planned.
607
00:33:46,175 --> 00:33:50,705
Um, he mislinked up, uh, with,
with the, uh, fellow student.
608
00:33:50,925 --> 00:33:54,325
He was supposed to take it to that
guy's father's house, who approved
609
00:33:54,355 --> 00:33:55,855
the firearm to be kept there.
610
00:33:56,360 --> 00:33:59,970
for shooting practice in a
rural area on the weekends.
611
00:33:59,990 --> 00:34:02,550
They just mislinked up the day before.
612
00:34:03,110 --> 00:34:07,240
But the mistake was, and the
mistakes that mitigates these things,
613
00:34:08,010 --> 00:34:14,049
and all these violent stains, is
listening because they will, they
614
00:34:14,050 --> 00:34:16,140
will slip up and tell you something.
615
00:34:17,220 --> 00:34:18,660
His mistake was talking.
616
00:34:19,830 --> 00:34:20,990
And they often will.
617
00:34:21,510 --> 00:34:25,930
Sometimes it's verbal, sometimes it's
via text, you know, in social media.
618
00:34:26,660 --> 00:34:29,910
And those planned attacks, You
know, they utilize the social
619
00:34:29,910 --> 00:34:33,220
media to kind of tell you, like,
almost like they want you to know.
620
00:34:33,570 --> 00:34:37,980
Whether it be minutes prior to the
attack or something eluding to it prior.
621
00:34:38,289 --> 00:34:40,160
Now, you probably say, well
Bart, how are we going to
622
00:34:40,170 --> 00:34:41,600
mitigate that in the workplace?
623
00:34:41,619 --> 00:34:45,849
Well, that person has followers
or friends or something.
624
00:34:46,720 --> 00:34:51,170
And, and when they're posting,
and I say it's 2025 now.
625
00:34:51,280 --> 00:34:55,130
And now when they're posting that stuff,
you know, it's not a joke anymore.
626
00:34:55,130 --> 00:34:56,210
It's not odd.
627
00:34:56,210 --> 00:34:57,670
It's not, it's
628
00:34:58,070 --> 00:34:58,910
Pete: It's a red flag.
629
00:34:58,920 --> 00:35:01,560
Bart Womack: You have to, that's
right, you have to deduce it
630
00:35:01,560 --> 00:35:03,320
as a possibility of something.
631
00:35:03,720 --> 00:35:06,500
And that's when you go into
your reporting phase, you know,
632
00:35:06,500 --> 00:35:07,770
as best as you can about it.
633
00:35:08,800 --> 00:35:13,780
The shooter in the, um, called Parkland
High School in Florida a few years back
634
00:35:14,010 --> 00:35:19,870
had posted this, this image, a picture
of him with a firearm, high school
635
00:35:19,870 --> 00:35:24,780
student, but a firearm posted on social
media amongst his high school friends.
636
00:35:24,850 --> 00:35:26,480
with the firearm.
637
00:35:27,870 --> 00:35:32,110
To me, that needs to go to the
administrators of the school.
638
00:35:33,600 --> 00:35:34,670
Does he possess one?
639
00:35:34,670 --> 00:35:36,810
He possessed one in that
picture, so we don't know.
640
00:35:37,100 --> 00:35:38,180
So do you bring in the parents?
641
00:35:38,180 --> 00:35:39,339
You talk to them about it?
642
00:35:39,800 --> 00:35:43,409
Like, again, it begs questioning.
643
00:35:44,080 --> 00:35:45,979
He showed you something
that didn't look right.
644
00:35:46,270 --> 00:35:51,800
I don't want my kid going to school with
fellow students that have guns without the
645
00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:53,180
administration doing something about it.
646
00:35:53,875 --> 00:35:55,745
First of all, I don't want it to
happen, let's get that part clear.
647
00:35:56,025 --> 00:35:59,875
But if it is happening, I want the
administrators to know and I want them
648
00:35:59,875 --> 00:36:01,495
to
begin to do something about it.
649
00:36:01,645 --> 00:36:02,885
It begs a question.
650
00:36:03,124 --> 00:36:04,415
It begs an action.
651
00:36:04,885 --> 00:36:07,994
Pete: And I think it goes
back to the first strategy
652
00:36:07,994 --> 00:36:09,255
around the trust piece, right?
653
00:36:09,784 --> 00:36:15,470
And I think a lot of people In
the workplace, in an educational
654
00:36:15,470 --> 00:36:21,600
institution, have this false sense of
trust that comes from a, I don't want
655
00:36:21,600 --> 00:36:23,180
to deal with the messy part of this.
656
00:36:23,209 --> 00:36:28,989
So I'm going to trust you without
actually having a reason or a purpose.
657
00:36:29,285 --> 00:36:30,335
for the trust.
658
00:36:30,595 --> 00:36:35,765
So like in that particular situation, I
think these days we have to, we have to
659
00:36:35,765 --> 00:36:42,914
assume or we have to trust that parents
might not know what their kids are posting
660
00:36:42,915 --> 00:36:46,544
on social media, what their kids are
doing when they're not home with, with two
661
00:36:46,544 --> 00:36:51,185
parents in the workforce and a kid coming
home well before the end of the workday.
662
00:36:51,505 --> 00:36:56,744
There's opportunities there for
kids to get into things that
663
00:36:56,805 --> 00:36:59,205
are, are, can be pretty scary.
664
00:36:59,205 --> 00:36:59,325
Yeah.
665
00:36:59,675 --> 00:37:00,665
Or adults too.
666
00:37:00,675 --> 00:37:02,195
It doesn't need to be just kids.
667
00:37:02,215 --> 00:37:05,435
So, uh, trust is a big deal.
668
00:37:05,435 --> 00:37:09,305
And if, if it, if, if you're
not sure what it smells like,
669
00:37:09,355 --> 00:37:11,634
then ask a question, right?
670
00:37:12,395 --> 00:37:12,765
Bart Womack: Right.
671
00:37:13,065 --> 00:37:17,854
And, and this back to kids in
school and the parents, like I
672
00:37:17,854 --> 00:37:22,845
say, it's 2025 and it's time, you
know, and time you investigate it.
673
00:37:22,855 --> 00:37:26,375
When these, when, when a shooting happens
at a school in a different state or
674
00:37:26,375 --> 00:37:28,845
whatever, and the parent knows about it.
675
00:37:29,360 --> 00:37:34,220
And their, their child is the same
school age, it should make some change.
676
00:37:34,780 --> 00:37:37,570
Now, you know, parents are going to do
different things in terms of discussion
677
00:37:37,579 --> 00:37:38,920
about and all that type of stuff.
678
00:37:39,319 --> 00:37:43,899
But when they find out that there were
social media posts and things put on
679
00:37:43,899 --> 00:37:49,240
there, which means to us, some things,
it could have been mitigated in some
680
00:37:49,240 --> 00:37:51,330
ways by paying attention to that.
681
00:37:51,770 --> 00:37:54,720
Then a parent should put
some things in place.
682
00:37:54,805 --> 00:37:58,795
I mean, that, that, that's, they become
the first line of defense right there.
683
00:37:59,155 --> 00:37:59,385
Pete: Yep.
684
00:37:59,565 --> 00:38:02,305
Bart Womack: Let me see what
my, my child said, X, Y, and Z.
685
00:38:02,315 --> 00:38:06,865
Again, the closer you are to the
potential threat, almost the less you do.
686
00:38:07,275 --> 00:38:11,405
Like, I can't believe that
it's my cousin, friend, nephew,
687
00:38:11,445 --> 00:38:12,664
daughter, you know, whatever.
688
00:38:13,195 --> 00:38:17,465
Or, you know, it's, it's, it's mental
health that's causing or whatever.
689
00:38:17,465 --> 00:38:19,035
Then you got to have to get that address.
690
00:38:19,955 --> 00:38:24,255
Now we could go spend five hours
in the mental health aspect of it.
691
00:38:25,490 --> 00:38:27,760
That's going to, that's
going to play a role as well.
692
00:38:28,160 --> 00:38:31,180
And workplaces have to figure out,
you know, how they address that.
693
00:38:31,190 --> 00:38:33,829
It's one thing that they have, and one
thing they know about it, you know,
694
00:38:33,829 --> 00:38:37,360
they can't hire against it or for it,
but they do have to pay attention.
695
00:38:37,430 --> 00:38:40,380
You know, when you know something,
I'm not saying use it against them,
696
00:38:40,380 --> 00:38:41,370
you just have to pay attention.
697
00:38:42,780 --> 00:38:48,710
I mean, I, I know, I know guys that have,
you know, PTSD and mental health issues,
698
00:38:48,710 --> 00:38:50,690
but they don't, they're not outta control.
699
00:38:51,580 --> 00:38:53,260
But if people know about it, okay, boom.
700
00:38:53,920 --> 00:38:56,380
But it's like anybody else, whether
you do or not or being diagnosed
701
00:38:56,380 --> 00:38:58,090
or not, it still goes back to
702
00:38:58,690 --> 00:39:00,010
What's coming outta your
mouth and what do you.
703
00:39:00,520 --> 00:39:00,920
Pete: Right.
704
00:39:01,490 --> 00:39:05,410
And I think in some of those
cases too, it, I think we're
705
00:39:05,410 --> 00:39:06,670
all challenged with this, right?
706
00:39:06,690 --> 00:39:10,700
So if someone brings up a potential
flaw or a challenge with us, we
707
00:39:10,700 --> 00:39:12,540
get it, we get defensive about it.
708
00:39:13,049 --> 00:39:18,535
But the reality of some of that is And,
and if the other people have goodwill
709
00:39:18,535 --> 00:39:23,475
towards you, which is important, um,
then that person can be an ally for you.
710
00:39:23,485 --> 00:39:26,825
Like if, if you're having these
challenges, these feelings, these issues,
711
00:39:27,205 --> 00:39:30,945
and you are, you are the potential
perpetrator because of a mental health
712
00:39:30,945 --> 00:39:33,674
issue or because of whatever it is.
713
00:39:34,015 --> 00:39:37,095
If someone close to you who
has your best interest in mind,
714
00:39:37,095 --> 00:39:38,475
who has goodwill towards you.
715
00:39:39,120 --> 00:39:42,900
can understand you best, and
listens, not just hears what you say.
716
00:39:43,290 --> 00:39:47,330
They can, they can be that first
step, they can be the first,
717
00:39:47,700 --> 00:39:51,929
uh,
first line of, of defense to
offer that helping hand to you.
718
00:39:52,340 --> 00:39:58,660
And if it happens early enough, then the
outcome may very well be, be mitigated.
719
00:39:59,070 --> 00:40:02,060
If it happens too late, it could
be too far down the road for that
720
00:40:02,070 --> 00:40:04,885
initial Initial help to truly be help.
721
00:40:04,885 --> 00:40:08,365
You can't, you can't resurrect
the drowning man once he's been
722
00:40:08,365 --> 00:40:10,395
underwater for too long, right?
723
00:40:10,395 --> 00:40:16,905
Bart Womack: And in terms of workplace
from a security standpoint, I think
724
00:40:16,915 --> 00:40:20,045
organizations have to have you
know Some of these discussions and
725
00:40:20,045 --> 00:40:21,515
more importantly these trainings.
726
00:40:22,324 --> 00:40:22,654
Yes.
727
00:40:22,655 --> 00:40:25,765
Everyone needs to know what to do
when the bullets start flying But what
728
00:40:25,765 --> 00:40:29,245
we're talking about is mitigating long
before the bullets long before that's
729
00:40:29,315 --> 00:40:35,750
that's happening And that that's the
work that's not happening Um, whatever
730
00:40:35,750 --> 00:40:42,020
they're doing to mitigate things and
training is not what we're talking about.
731
00:40:42,770 --> 00:40:46,519
I don't say it's insinuated that
it might happen based on employees,
732
00:40:46,520 --> 00:40:48,280
but they have to be trained in this.
733
00:40:48,590 --> 00:40:55,129
And especially again, the closer
someone is to the potential threat
734
00:40:55,189 --> 00:40:59,430
or attacker, the long before they
Or thinking about it more, they're,
735
00:40:59,430 --> 00:41:04,210
they're discussing some things that
sound different, but the closer you
736
00:41:04,210 --> 00:41:06,110
are to it, it doesn't sound different.
737
00:41:06,700 --> 00:41:09,080
And that's the awakening
part that we have to get to.
738
00:41:09,299 --> 00:41:12,400
It's like, to me, it's, I call
it, it's like bombing airport.
739
00:41:12,830 --> 00:41:17,300
Remember way back before 9 1 1, we
could say, you know, there's this
740
00:41:17,300 --> 00:41:18,460
thing, oh man, that's the bomb.
741
00:41:18,720 --> 00:41:19,650
But what was the movie?
742
00:41:19,750 --> 00:41:20,300
Rush Hour.
743
00:41:20,740 --> 00:41:23,930
Where Chris, Chris Tucker
says, ah, that's the bomb.
744
00:41:24,335 --> 00:41:26,835
And then, uh, Jackie Chan
said, you said it was a bomb.
745
00:41:27,355 --> 00:41:27,905
I said, that's a bomb.
746
00:41:27,905 --> 00:41:28,845
She said, the bomb.
747
00:41:28,845 --> 00:41:29,585
Yeah, it's that.
748
00:41:29,795 --> 00:41:34,645
My point is, no, no one uses that slang
anymore, you know, that they put up,
749
00:41:34,645 --> 00:41:37,515
you know, it's dope or it's this or
whatever, it's different words for it.
750
00:41:37,735 --> 00:41:42,624
But one that it isn't, it's not
the bomb, rather in the airport,
751
00:41:42,645 --> 00:41:43,665
was it said, don't say
it there.
752
00:41:43,665 --> 00:41:44,675
You can say it every place else.
753
00:41:44,925 --> 00:41:48,385
But what happened with the public,
they threw it out of their vocabulary.
754
00:41:48,825 --> 00:41:51,335
Like no one says that, don't even
come close to saying it anymore.
755
00:41:52,364 --> 00:41:54,515
But the point there is.
756
00:41:55,045 --> 00:41:57,945
There's some things that people are
saying that we have to pay attention
757
00:41:57,945 --> 00:42:01,955
to that we can't we can't write off
Oh, he's always talks like that.
758
00:42:02,015 --> 00:42:08,344
Oh, he's always so here's a case and
Somebody's I want to get to this before
759
00:42:08,344 --> 00:42:10,174
the other strategies if you don't mind
760
00:42:12,604 --> 00:42:18,865
The San Jose Railroad railroad rail
yard attack that happened in May 2021
761
00:42:19,370 --> 00:42:23,600
Yeah, so a worker there gunned down
nine employees before taking his own
762
00:42:23,600 --> 00:42:26,650
life Uh now he targeted certain people.
763
00:42:26,650 --> 00:42:29,010
He didn't shoot everybody just
targeted certain people which
764
00:42:29,070 --> 00:42:32,440
gets to disgruntled employees You
know, what did we do about that?
765
00:42:32,569 --> 00:42:36,119
I always say that we when i'm talking
to hr groups like, okay, well you do
766
00:42:36,119 --> 00:42:41,300
great at hiring But are you firing
the way you hire you put a lot into
767
00:42:41,300 --> 00:42:45,719
hiring, onboarding all these different
things, but as every company do the same
768
00:42:45,720 --> 00:42:47,150
thing when it's time to let them go.
769
00:42:48,080 --> 00:42:53,390
And what we don't know is what that
person is going through at the, at
770
00:42:53,390 --> 00:42:54,990
the time of that if they're fired.
771
00:42:55,039 --> 00:42:58,810
Okay, obviously there's a process for
that there's, there should have been
772
00:42:58,810 --> 00:43:02,280
counseling related to that along the way.
773
00:43:02,815 --> 00:43:05,515
Unless they did something that was
one incident, you know, you can't
774
00:43:05,515 --> 00:43:08,205
do, you know, you get fired for
it and BAM happened right then.
775
00:43:08,485 --> 00:43:11,234
But if it's in terms of performance,
there should have been some type of,
776
00:43:11,615 --> 00:43:14,155
you know, routine performance review.
777
00:43:14,295 --> 00:43:17,404
So there was no surprise at the end
of six months when I told you you
778
00:43:17,404 --> 00:43:20,425
were doing this thing or whatever,
you know, that is that happening?
779
00:43:20,734 --> 00:43:22,725
How did they respond to
those types of things?
780
00:43:22,725 --> 00:43:25,145
You want to get in that
situation that can, I'm going
781
00:43:25,145 --> 00:43:26,005
to watch a little bit closer.
782
00:43:26,005 --> 00:43:28,675
We're going to do monthly counts at
the end of six months or whatever,
783
00:43:28,954 --> 00:43:30,415
you know, if you haven't improved.
784
00:43:30,585 --> 00:43:31,505
You know, I'm gonna have to let you go.
785
00:43:31,515 --> 00:43:34,225
Whatever the process is,
how do they respond to that?
786
00:43:34,265 --> 00:43:37,175
And we have to pay attention to those
things nowadays, because we don't
787
00:43:37,185 --> 00:43:41,004
know who's going to come back the
next day, just grow on how they feel.
788
00:43:41,005 --> 00:43:45,845
And, but we have to observe and listen
to, you know, how they respond to that.
789
00:43:45,864 --> 00:43:48,005
They might not tell the person
that's talking to them or they might.
790
00:43:50,165 --> 00:43:52,635
They're probably more inclined to
share it with their coworker that
791
00:43:52,635 --> 00:43:54,285
they feel they can trust and tell.
792
00:43:54,795 --> 00:43:57,335
And when they start talking about
things, I'm going to come back here.
793
00:43:57,395 --> 00:43:58,105
It's one thing.
794
00:43:58,155 --> 00:43:59,225
I don't like so and so.
795
00:43:59,275 --> 00:44:00,255
So and so is pissing me off.
796
00:44:01,005 --> 00:44:01,894
Then they keep coming back.
797
00:44:01,894 --> 00:44:02,675
I don't like so and so.
798
00:44:02,695 --> 00:44:04,285
So and so is really pissing me off today.
799
00:44:05,865 --> 00:44:10,575
And then it escalates to, I don't like
so and so, blah, blah, blah to so and so.
800
00:44:11,255 --> 00:44:15,071
Once you start saying I oughta,
you begin to develop a plan.
801
00:44:15,071 --> 00:44:19,004
And if so and so keeps doing that thing
that that person doesn't like, even
802
00:44:19,005 --> 00:44:22,684
though so and so doesn't know that
you're doing it, that plan doesn't work.
803
00:44:23,195 --> 00:44:25,855
It gets more and more improved.
804
00:44:27,315 --> 00:44:29,695
And once you start forming a
plan, it's just a matter of time
805
00:44:29,705 --> 00:44:30,755
before you execute the plan.
806
00:44:31,885 --> 00:44:34,885
In most cases, they're telling
someone a little bit about that plan.
807
00:44:35,555 --> 00:44:41,844
Once they start verbalizing it, or maybe,
and maybe it's in their home, then it
808
00:44:41,845 --> 00:44:43,234
gets closer and closer to happening.
809
00:44:43,495 --> 00:44:45,025
Just like anything else we manifest.
810
00:44:45,265 --> 00:44:46,135
This is no different.
811
00:44:46,575 --> 00:44:50,265
Once you begin to manifest it and
talk about how, and the way, and
812
00:44:50,265 --> 00:44:53,074
what you're going to use, and all
these, all these things you use.
813
00:44:53,435 --> 00:44:54,445
It's just a matter of time.
814
00:44:55,055 --> 00:44:58,585
So this particular case, this,
this rail yard, so his ex wife
815
00:44:58,585 --> 00:44:59,985
had said he struggled with anger.
816
00:45:00,035 --> 00:45:00,465
Okay.
817
00:45:00,915 --> 00:45:04,545
Uh, the gunman came in and worked
with a duffel bag, hadn't come
818
00:45:04,545 --> 00:45:05,725
to work with a duffel bag before.
819
00:45:05,865 --> 00:45:06,115
Okay.
820
00:45:06,115 --> 00:45:09,355
So first
time, because the ex
wife saying, struggling with anger
821
00:45:09,355 --> 00:45:11,004
at home, uh, that was at home.
822
00:45:11,015 --> 00:45:12,204
A lot of people get upset.
823
00:45:12,204 --> 00:45:13,214
It depends on what that is.
824
00:45:13,275 --> 00:45:14,025
Duffel bag.
825
00:45:14,265 --> 00:45:16,035
That was one that coworkers could see.
826
00:45:16,905 --> 00:45:19,225
Unfortunately, it was on the
same day of the attack, pulls out
827
00:45:19,225 --> 00:45:20,545
the weapon and starts doing it.
828
00:45:21,585 --> 00:45:25,585
People who knew him said he was, you know,
struggling with alcohol issues for years.
829
00:45:25,980 --> 00:45:30,900
He had often talked about hatred
of his workplace, like routinely.
830
00:45:30,900 --> 00:45:34,160
According to the Department of
Homeland Security in 2016, after
831
00:45:34,160 --> 00:45:35,330
a trip to the Philippines, U.
832
00:45:35,330 --> 00:45:35,470
S.
833
00:45:35,490 --> 00:45:40,219
Customs officers detained him and found
that he professed hatred of his workplace.
834
00:45:40,630 --> 00:45:42,000
Now the attack happened in 21.
835
00:45:42,230 --> 00:45:43,490
They found us in 2016.
836
00:45:44,040 --> 00:45:47,700
They also found a black memo filled
with lots of notes about how he hated
837
00:45:47,970 --> 00:45:50,950
the Valley Transportation Authority
where he worked, his workplace.
838
00:45:51,785 --> 00:45:52,605
Start writing about it.
839
00:45:53,605 --> 00:45:55,425
When you start talking about it,
then you start writing about it.
840
00:45:56,165 --> 00:45:58,535
Now, after the attack, they
learned that he had books about
841
00:45:58,535 --> 00:46:00,645
terrorism and fear and manifesto.
842
00:46:00,874 --> 00:46:05,164
His ex wife says he talked about
killing people at work more than a
843
00:46:05,164 --> 00:46:07,274
decade ago, so prior to the attack.
844
00:46:08,535 --> 00:46:14,915
So in 20, it happened in 2021, so 2011,
he talked about killing people at work.
845
00:46:15,695 --> 00:46:17,805
She says, I never believed him.
846
00:46:18,620 --> 00:46:20,790
And it never happened until now.
847
00:46:21,330 --> 00:46:26,160
I think it's one thing to sit around
the dinner table and have an after
848
00:46:26,410 --> 00:46:28,430
work discussion about certain things.
849
00:46:29,060 --> 00:46:33,060
Again, the closer they are, the
more apt they are not to believe.
850
00:46:33,610 --> 00:46:38,490
But when the spouse says, Oh,
you have expressed hatred for
851
00:46:38,740 --> 00:46:41,220
where you work for a long time.
852
00:46:41,875 --> 00:46:44,765
And now that it's
escalated to killing them.
853
00:46:45,045 --> 00:46:45,495
Pete: Mm hmm.
854
00:46:45,835 --> 00:46:47,505
Bart Womack: Then all
we need is, is the plan.
855
00:46:47,515 --> 00:46:48,795
Maybe not gonna talk about the plan.
856
00:46:49,455 --> 00:46:51,135
But he's talking about
killing people at work.
857
00:46:51,355 --> 00:46:52,965
That, that, that's your work day?
858
00:46:53,125 --> 00:46:54,304
You come home from work and have dinner.
859
00:46:54,305 --> 00:46:55,455
I'm gonna kill people at work.
860
00:46:56,025 --> 00:46:58,025
And it's not, you know, a joke?
861
00:46:58,755 --> 00:46:59,115
No.
862
00:46:59,425 --> 00:47:02,535
When he said that, they had
been divorced for 10 years.
863
00:47:03,115 --> 00:47:05,975
But while he was working there and while
they were married, he did say that.
864
00:47:07,195 --> 00:47:10,205
You know, you earn 160,
000 a year working there.
865
00:47:10,205 --> 00:47:15,415
So, you know, kind of back to that, uh,
The professional level of education,
866
00:47:15,455 --> 00:47:17,445
ideology, or religion is above reproach.
867
00:47:18,705 --> 00:47:21,295
In most cases, people say
he made a lot of money.
868
00:47:21,575 --> 00:47:21,935
Pete: Yeah.
869
00:47:22,015 --> 00:47:24,625
Bart Womack: But still
hated, hated the workplace.
870
00:47:25,284 --> 00:47:28,685
And apparently certain people,
not everybody, but he, he
871
00:47:28,685 --> 00:47:30,294
targeted certain people.
872
00:47:31,025 --> 00:47:32,024
But, but there were signs.
873
00:47:32,065 --> 00:47:33,334
There were plenty of signs.
874
00:47:33,715 --> 00:47:36,225
Kind of too late with the duffel
bag, but, but it was something.
875
00:47:36,435 --> 00:47:36,705
Pete: Yeah.
876
00:47:39,045 --> 00:47:40,085
Let's take a quick break.
877
00:47:41,360 --> 00:47:45,640
In our experience here at Mimic,
successful companies are safe companies,
878
00:47:45,840 --> 00:47:48,030
and those companies all have good leaders.
879
00:47:48,470 --> 00:47:52,570
From frontline seasonal supervisors
to middle management and beyond,
880
00:47:52,860 --> 00:47:56,449
growing the leadership team is
a critical part of your success.
881
00:47:56,900 --> 00:48:00,930
Mimic recognizes the value of
leadership and safety, and that not
882
00:48:00,980 --> 00:48:04,570
all supervisors and managers have
had formal leadership training.
883
00:48:05,100 --> 00:48:09,740
That's why we've created a series of
resources and workshops specifically
884
00:48:09,750 --> 00:48:14,650
for supervisors and managers called
Integrating Safety into Business Goals.
885
00:48:15,129 --> 00:48:19,759
From the breakdown of the three basic
skills every supervisor needs through
886
00:48:19,760 --> 00:48:24,179
how recognition works and conflict
management, integrating safety into
887
00:48:24,179 --> 00:48:28,740
business goals is a great addition to the
development path of your leadership team.
888
00:48:29,270 --> 00:48:30,680
Already a Mimic Policy Holder?
889
00:48:31,225 --> 00:48:33,535
Well, then reach out to
your Mimic safety management
890
00:48:33,535 --> 00:48:35,325
consultant for more information.
891
00:48:35,625 --> 00:48:39,235
And if not, but you're interested
in how Mimic can partner with you
892
00:48:39,245 --> 00:48:43,755
for workplace safety, contact your
independent insurance agent today.
893
00:48:44,065 -->
00:48:46,555
Now let's get back to today's episode.
894
00:48:50,370 --> 00:48:55,520
You know, honestly, if they, from an
employer standpoint, like the employer
895
00:48:55,650 --> 00:48:59,140
wouldn't know necessarily about
things that are happening in the home.
896
00:48:59,860 --> 00:49:05,350
They wouldn't necessarily know about
when he was detained through customs
897
00:49:05,800 --> 00:49:09,119
and what he talked about then, unless
they did a background check and if
898
00:49:09,140 --> 00:49:12,190
that could be exposed during the
background check, but even then, right?
899
00:49:12,190 --> 00:49:15,570
So how does that, how does that preclude
you from employment or change anything?
900
00:49:15,570 --> 00:49:18,139
It doesn't really, but if they had a way.
901
00:49:18,455 --> 00:49:23,435
Or if they had a, a rule at work
around what you bring to work and
902
00:49:23,435 --> 00:49:29,025
what gets checked, um, then that
could have been something that may
903
00:49:29,025 --> 00:49:30,605
have mitigated the circumstances.
904
00:49:30,605 --> 00:49:33,715
It might have pushed him to do it
differently, but certainly it would
905
00:49:33,715 --> 00:49:37,404
have prevented him from bringing it
onto the property in the first place.
906
00:49:37,405 --> 00:49:40,165
And they would have
noticed a change, right?
907
00:49:40,185 --> 00:49:41,875
Because he doesn't typically do this.
908
00:49:41,875 --> 00:49:43,305
No one brings it because we have a rule.
909
00:49:43,305 --> 00:49:44,825
They haven't done it in 20 years.
910
00:49:45,390 --> 00:49:46,410
Something's different.
911
00:49:47,070 --> 00:49:51,860
Bart Womack: We can speculate, and we
weren't the investigators, but I would
912
00:49:51,860 --> 00:49:56,950
highly speculate that you don't have
that amount of hatred for something
913
00:49:56,950 --> 00:50:00,460
in an environment you go to every
day and something doesn't come out.
914
00:50:01,130 --> 00:50:05,720
Something doesn't come out to
observe and hear and listen to.
915
00:50:05,720 --> 00:50:06,424
You know what I mean?
916
00:50:07,065 --> 00:50:11,545
It's just, it's just, it was just, it
happened for so long that something
917
00:50:11,545 --> 00:50:14,045
had to have been displayed by him.
918
00:50:14,205 --> 00:50:14,455
Pete: Yep.
919
00:50:15,535 --> 00:50:16,765
Bart Womack: No, I'm sure he
didn't tell him he was going to
920
00:50:16,775 --> 00:50:17,914
come in here and kill him one day.
921
00:50:18,805 --> 00:50:22,285
Another part of this in terms of we
weren't there to do an investigation,
922
00:50:22,295 --> 00:50:27,665
but we would like to think that Homeland
Security informed the workplace of
923
00:50:27,734 --> 00:50:32,795
the things that he had, you know, had
written down, I would like to think that
924
00:50:32,795 --> 00:50:34,985
they told him that, but we don't know.
925
00:50:36,045 --> 00:50:36,864
Pete: Definitely don't know.
926
00:50:37,504 --> 00:50:42,705
But, you know, the reality then, um, you
have, you have strategies as an employer.
927
00:50:43,345 --> 00:50:46,165
for things that are happening
within the workplace.
928
00:50:46,165 --> 00:50:51,155
And then there needs to be strategies
for, uh, preventing things from getting
929
00:50:51,215 --> 00:50:53,125
into the workplace in the first place.
930
00:50:53,135 --> 00:50:54,765
Not, not just the hiring practices.
931
00:50:54,765 --> 00:50:55,674
You talked about those.
932
00:50:55,675 --> 00:50:56,835
People do a really good job.
933
00:50:57,234 --> 00:51:02,025
Um, but what are those security
measures that you have at the, at
934
00:51:02,025 --> 00:51:05,465
the entry door, at those points of
entry where your employees come in
935
00:51:05,465 --> 00:51:09,875
and out of from their vehicles on
break or, uh, from the beginning of
936
00:51:09,875 --> 00:51:11,445
the day to the, to the end of the day?
937
00:51:11,725 --> 00:51:13,035
And I, I.
938
00:51:13,595 --> 00:51:17,945
I think another key point we
talked a little bit about, but
939
00:51:17,945 --> 00:51:19,755
it's the, how do you terminate?
940
00:51:19,755 --> 00:51:21,025
How do you fire people?
941
00:51:21,465 --> 00:51:28,234
That's a really interesting thought
around a defensive strategy from workplace
942
00:51:28,365 --> 00:51:33,435
violence prevention and how, how do you
manage performance within your company?
943
00:51:33,435 --> 00:51:38,025
We've talked about it forever
at, at Mimic around how.
944
00:51:38,470 --> 00:51:42,450
How performance management, regular
performance management, not even
945
00:51:42,450 --> 00:51:45,480
just do you wear your safety glasses,
performance management, but regular
946
00:51:45,480 --> 00:51:50,079
performance management and leadership
have an effect on a positive or a
947
00:51:50,079 --> 00:51:51,870
negative workplace safety culture.
948
00:51:52,210 --> 00:51:55,520
And part of that process is how
do your people know how they're
949
00:51:55,520 --> 00:51:57,589
doing throughout the year?
950
00:51:57,600 --> 00:51:58,239
Are they surprised?
951
00:51:58,239 --> 00:51:59,390
You brought up a great point.
952
00:51:59,440 --> 00:52:05,350
Are, are you surprising someone at the,
at their year end evaluation or at their
953
00:52:05,350 --> 00:52:07,800
termination that they haven't made?
954
00:52:07,970 --> 00:52:11,750
The cut, are they surprised
about it or have you been able to
955
00:52:11,780 --> 00:52:13,630
communicate that effectively to them?
956
00:52:13,650 --> 00:52:17,220
Because if that was brewing, if
something was brewing there for a
957
00:52:17,220 --> 00:52:20,699
while and all of a sudden you throw
that at them, there's a better chance
958
00:52:20,699 --> 00:52:22,510
that something negative will happen.
959
00:52:23,579 --> 00:52:23,869
Bart Womack: Yeah.
960
00:52:23,869 --> 00:52:27,229
And you know, what's going on at home,
what happened, what happened in their
961
00:52:27,229 --> 00:52:31,010
life or what's
happening in their life at
the time of this termination, especially
962
00:52:31,010 --> 00:52:35,210
the kind of hit blindsided in, in
especially that, but at the same time.
963
00:52:35,745 --> 00:52:39,215
even if they are performing well and
they think they weren't given the tools
964
00:52:39,505 --> 00:52:42,545
to do what they were being asked to do.
965
00:52:42,625 --> 00:52:46,845
And they have these underlying issues
at home of, if I'm not working,
966
00:52:47,234 --> 00:52:48,645
those four kids don't get fed.
967
00:52:48,645 --> 00:52:52,244
They don't, you know, all those, all the,
like all those things that, and that,
968
00:52:52,584 --> 00:52:54,125
that could be a trigger to certain people.
969
00:52:54,125 --> 00:52:56,345
It just all depends on where they are
in their life at that particular time.
970
00:52:56,675 --> 00:52:59,765
If what we don't know, more importantly,
an employer doesn't know possibly.
971
00:53:00,995 --> 00:53:05,930
If they're In some cases, if they, in
terms of using these strategies, if they
972
00:53:05,930 --> 00:53:10,790
are on the verge of termination and that's
been talked about or layoffs or whatever,
973
00:53:11,340 --> 00:53:16,519
and they know that that's a possibility,
they begin to express how the hardship
974
00:53:16,520 --> 00:53:19,430
is going to be on their family, and
they're sharing that with a co worker,
975
00:53:19,709 --> 00:53:23,060
I don't know what I'll do, you know, and
something comes, and this is where they
976
00:53:23,060 --> 00:53:28,130
observe and listen really comes into
play, uh, of where they are in their life
977
00:53:28,510 --> 00:53:31,190
and what the impact of that might be.
978
00:53:31,655 --> 00:53:35,065
It is a time of picking
up on those two things.
979
00:53:35,475 --> 00:53:37,155
You know, I, I just, I just kill myself.
980
00:53:37,605 --> 00:53:40,035
Those types of those things
aren't jokes anymore.
981
00:53:40,615 --> 00:53:42,925
That's kinda like the
bomb, you know, alignment.
982
00:53:42,955 --> 00:53:44,665
They, those things aren't jokes anymore.
983
00:53:44,875 --> 00:53:44,995
Yeah.
984
00:53:44,995 --> 00:53:47,035
They'll be taken serious
in any work environment.
985
00:53:47,825 --> 00:53:51,485
I guess the level of job, you
know, blue collar, white collar,
986
00:53:51,485 --> 00:53:54,985
how they hire and fire, those
are, those are going to differ.
987
00:53:55,835 --> 00:53:56,825
They do differ.
988
00:53:57,205 --> 00:54:01,365
I don't think they should,
but they do, and that matters.
989
00:54:01,780 --> 00:54:03,880
Knowing your people matters.
990
00:54:03,950 --> 00:54:06,990
If you know your people, you know
what that hardship could possibly be.
991
00:54:06,990 --> 00:54:10,480
If you're talking to them routinely,
you have a process to communicate
992
00:54:10,480 --> 00:54:15,209
them, um, you know, routinely to see
how things are, to check in with them.
993
00:54:15,440 --> 00:54:18,240
And it sounds like a lot, but we're
trying to mitigate things, right?
994
00:54:18,949 --> 00:54:21,570
Are we really human
resources, which is people?
995
00:54:21,990 --> 00:54:23,670
If we're going to do
people, let's do people.
996
00:54:23,670 --> 00:54:27,510
If you do people, you're
going to find out some things.
997
00:54:27,865 --> 00:54:30,875
If you don't do people, you're too
busy, you worry about your bottom
998
00:54:30,875 --> 00:54:35,545
line and all these other things
that you can't do people, then
999
00:54:36,445 --> 00:54:37,725
you're kind of opening yourself up.
1000
00:54:38,645 --> 00:54:39,515
You just have to do people.
1001
00:54:40,045 --> 00:54:45,025
And that's the thing about our
attack, because we were professionals
1002
00:54:45,385 --> 00:54:49,065
at taking care of people and
the welfare of their family.
1003
00:54:49,065 --> 00:54:51,405
Now this one was an outlier.
1004
00:54:51,575 --> 00:54:55,995
Like I said, he planned it, he was,
you know, an Islamic extremist.
1005
00:54:56,864 --> 00:55:00,795
We didn't know anything about
that particular part, but.
1006
00:55:01,230 --> 00:55:04,300
In every other case, you know,
we did in terms of knowing people
1007
00:55:04,300 --> 00:55:05,670
and all those types of things.
1008
00:55:06,020 --> 00:55:09,020
So, that's what made that
one kind of stand out.
1009
00:55:09,020 --> 00:55:10,620
It's like, you know, how did we not know?
1010
00:55:10,650 --> 00:55:12,250
You're supposed to know
everything about everybody.
1011
00:55:12,920 --> 00:55:13,300
Yeah.
1012
00:55:13,950 --> 00:55:15,290
And we didn't know that, you know.
1013
00:55:15,449 --> 00:55:16,770
And here's the deal with that.
1014
00:55:17,320 --> 00:55:21,270
You have to come up with
something of an exchange for it.
1015
00:55:21,320 --> 00:55:25,880
And what I learned in that particular
case, and just like we're talking about
1016
00:55:25,880 --> 00:55:29,080
here, we don't go home with them at night.
1017
00:55:30,880 --> 00:55:31,990
So we don't know what's going on.
1018
00:55:32,709 --> 00:55:34,190
In today's world.
1019
00:55:34,800 --> 00:55:43,250
People, and they're getting younger and
younger, are finding themselves, they want
1020
00:55:43,250 --> 00:55:48,910
to take a, a side, they want to align with
something that means something to them,
1021
00:55:49,350 --> 00:55:56,640
they are forming their, their ideologies,
and they are following it with more
1022
00:55:57,070 --> 00:56:03,540
conviction than ever before, and that's
becoming younger and younger and younger.
1023
00:56:03,890 --> 00:56:08,660
As seen by the protests on campuses,
um, you know, this past school
1024
00:56:08,660 --> 00:56:10,240
year, but, but it's happening.
1025
00:56:11,250 --> 00:56:15,590
Now, they displayed theirs in
public on, on, on a campus, but what
1026
00:56:15,590 --> 00:56:17,480
about the workers in a workplace?
1027
00:56:17,600 --> 00:56:19,089
Are they talking about it at work?
1028
00:56:19,320 --> 00:56:21,480
Is it
allowed to be talked about at work?
1029
00:56:22,249 --> 00:56:27,240
What side is the, is, is the
organization on if they are on a side?
1030
00:56:27,630 --> 00:56:30,590
And if you allow it, then it can manifest.
1031
00:56:31,895 --> 00:56:38,405
And people again are becoming more
and more and more aligned and want
1032
00:56:38,405 --> 00:56:42,855
to play a key role in what they're
following in their ideology.
1033
00:56:43,405 --> 00:56:48,374
And they sometimes they follow it so
close that they become radicalized.
1034
00:56:49,820 --> 00:56:54,590
And then they begin to lash out
against those who, uh, against
1035
00:56:54,590 --> 00:56:58,810
those who are against their ideology
and what they feel strongly about,
1036
00:56:59,040 --> 00:57:00,740
and then they start acting on it.
1037
00:57:01,230 --> 00:57:03,730
So in the workplace, are these
things being talked about?
1038
00:57:03,780 --> 00:57:04,880
You know, are they allowed?
1039
00:57:04,999 --> 00:57:06,190
I would say mitigate them.
1040
00:57:06,709 --> 00:57:09,680
If it has nothing to do with our work,
we shouldn't allow it to be talked about.
1041
00:57:10,790 --> 00:57:13,790
Because it can go wrong
before it goes right.
1042
00:57:15,100 --> 00:57:18,280
So that's something that they
can put into place and then
1043
00:57:18,280 --> 00:57:19,450
people will still gonna do it.
1044
00:57:19,520 --> 00:57:21,150
They're going to do it around
the corner someplace where they
1045
00:57:21,150 --> 00:57:22,220
think people aren't listening.
1046
00:57:22,310 --> 00:57:25,200
But they're talking to somebody and
they'll walk around talking to themselves.
1047
00:57:25,600 --> 00:57:28,330
So that person is listening,
like what are they saying?
1048
00:57:28,710 --> 00:57:31,359
Because some people want to take
that thing to another level and then
1049
00:57:31,360 --> 00:57:33,059
another level and another level.
1050
00:57:33,389 --> 00:57:35,690
Some of those levels start
getting to be combative.
1051
00:57:36,480 --> 00:57:40,600
Then, depending on the level of
the company, their resources, more
1052
00:57:40,600 --> 00:57:45,140
importantly, they should probably start
following their employees on social media.
1053
00:57:45,950 --> 00:57:51,460
Because When we don't go home with
them at night, the way that we can
1054
00:57:51,460 --> 00:57:55,220
get exposed to what's happening at
home, they'll put it on social media.
1055
00:57:55,360 --> 00:58:00,560
And those who go to, you know, I haven't
gotten to the extremists of, of course,
1056
00:58:01,080 --> 00:58:06,820
their ideology yet, but as they start
to trend, they can't keep it inside.
1057
00:58:07,300 --> 00:58:09,139
So now you want to let
me talk about at work?
1058
00:58:09,420 --> 00:58:10,710
Kind of makes it worse for them.
1059
00:58:10,760 --> 00:58:14,270
Now you have to wait till they get to
the car or some place around the corner
1060
00:58:14,270 --> 00:58:17,770
where they think is in private and then
what's the other way to talk about it so
1061
00:58:17,840 --> 00:58:21,090
other people can know it is social media.
1062
00:58:22,330 --> 00:58:26,360
Some organizations follow that,
and they rule by that, and they
1063
00:58:26,360 --> 00:58:30,679
make, I don't want to say judicial,
but they enforce that, you know,
1064
00:58:30,680 --> 00:58:32,840
in a certain way, and some don't.
1065
00:58:33,700 --> 00:58:40,010
Pete: It's probably the only way
these days that you get to know who
1066
00:58:40,010 --> 00:58:44,900
your employees are, especially in
a large organization, um, outside
1067
00:58:44,900 --> 00:58:46,440
of, outside of the workplace.
1068
00:58:46,480 --> 00:58:48,770
And I do think it's important.
1069
00:58:48,780 --> 00:58:53,520
People People tend, like you
said, to wear their heart on
1070
00:58:53,520 --> 00:58:55,410
their social media badge, right?
1071
00:58:55,410 --> 00:58:58,590
So that's, that's where, that's
where they try to be, or that's
1072
00:58:58,590 --> 00:58:59,770
where they try to be most real.
1073
00:58:59,770 --> 00:59:02,940
If they can't be real at work or at
home, then they're gonna be their,
1074
00:59:03,159 --> 00:59:05,789
their own selves on social media.
1075
00:59:06,559 --> 00:59:10,445
You, you talked about the the,
the radicalization or the,
1076
00:59:10,455 --> 00:59:12,235
the extremist side of things.
1077
00:59:12,235 --> 00:59:16,375
And that led me to think about
the, the most recent, um, domestic
1078
00:59:16,375 --> 00:59:18,955
terrorist attack here in New Orleans.
1079
00:59:19,285 --> 00:59:23,895
Uh, and I wonder if you had any thoughts
about that, if there's enough information
1080
00:59:23,905 --> 00:59:27,275
that you've been able to process so
far that you could, you could talk a
1081
00:59:27,275 --> 00:59:31,315
little bit about that and how it might,
how some of your strategies, uh, that
1082
00:59:31,315 --> 00:59:37,195
you've discussed so far might fit into,
uh, if we had it to do over again.
1083
00:59:37,990 --> 00:59:41,980
If those strategies, uh, what strategies
might have been important to pay
1084
00:59:41,980 --> 00:59:45,270
attention to for, uh, for that situation.
1085
00:59:45,340 --> 00:59:46,590
And it's a difficult situation.
1086
00:59:46,600 --> 00:59:50,709
My heart goes out to all those families
that, uh, lost family members, that lost
1087
00:59:50,720 --> 00:59:53,519
friends, uh, that were injured out there.
1088
00:59:53,519 --> 00:59:55,349
It's a horrible, horrible situation.
1089
00:59:55,810 --> 01:00:00,750
Not trying to make it so that we're,
we're profiting from it from a publicity
1090
01:00:00,750 --> 01:00:04,810
standpoint, but I think it's important
since we are talking with an expert like
1091
01:00:04,810 --> 01:00:10,850
yourself, Bart, uh, that understands the
impact, um, and then the potential, uh,
1092
01:00:10,850 --> 01:00:12,500
what we could do differently next time.
1093
01:00:12,500 --> 01:00:15,720
And that's really
what the, the
focus is not, not to popularize
1094
01:00:15,740 --> 01:00:18,240
this, but to think about it from
how do we prevent it from happening
1095
01:00:18,240 --> 01:00:20,030
again, something tragic like this.
1096
01:00:21,490 --> 01:00:23,130
Bart Womack: Yeah, I
guess we'll start there.
1097
01:00:23,320 --> 01:00:29,570
And first and foremost, we have to add to
the, uh, weaponry, if you will, a vehicle.
1098
01:00:30,149 --> 01:00:30,439
Pete: Yeah.
1099
01:00:30,479 --> 01:00:33,759
Bart Womack: You know, we've talked about
the guns in places like Canada, where
1100
01:00:33,760 --> 01:00:38,100
they don't have guns, like, as much as
we do, um, in the inventory to be sold.
1101
01:00:38,700 --> 01:00:39,900
The processes are different.
1102
01:00:40,540 --> 01:00:45,440
Um, there are knife attacks in lieu of, or
some other type of attack without a gun.
1103
01:00:46,230 --> 01:00:47,910
But then, then we have these vehicles.
1104
01:00:48,270 --> 01:00:52,189
I would say immediately, we have to learn
from, we have to take lessons learned.
1105
01:00:52,250 --> 01:00:54,900
So a place like Canada where you don't
have guns, it's like, it's vehicles.
1106
01:00:55,160 --> 01:00:58,350
So you have to begin to, begin
to protect areas where this,
1107
01:00:58,389 --> 01:00:59,859
something could potentially happen.
1108
01:01:01,019 --> 01:01:01,890
So we have to start there.
1109
01:01:01,890 --> 01:01:03,760
I think those things are called bowlers.
1110
01:01:04,150 --> 01:01:07,340
The kind of pole that comes up to
keep you from, you know, driving in.
1111
01:01:08,810 --> 01:01:13,160
As, as nice as it is, and I appreciated
some time of dining on the street,
1112
01:01:13,160 --> 01:01:16,780
I think it's real nice, al fresco
to do that, uh, you know, lovely,
1113
01:01:16,790 --> 01:01:20,979
kind of takes you to Europe, if you
will, uh, they do it well over there.
1114
01:01:21,330 --> 01:01:23,660
But now we have to begin to look
at some of those things, because
1115
01:01:23,990 --> 01:01:25,649
that's the part that we can control.
1116
01:01:25,859 --> 01:01:31,490
We can't control the person who's going
to come and use their vehicle as a weapon,
1117
01:01:31,700 --> 01:01:33,770
because we don't know who that is next.
1118
01:01:34,470 --> 01:01:37,770
So with this particular one,
without all the information.
1119
01:01:38,540 --> 01:01:43,370
It's a tough one, you know, became
radicalized, you know, about four years
1120
01:01:43,370 --> 01:01:49,460
ago, unless you were close to him and
all of a sudden he began to express
1121
01:01:50,329 --> 01:01:57,479
allegiance, you know, to ISIS more and
more than, than what were the signs.
1122
01:01:57,539 --> 01:01:59,550
Now he posted on social media.
1123
01:01:59,965 --> 01:02:03,575
Just prior to the attack, you
know, so if you weren't watching,
1124
01:02:03,935 --> 01:02:06,615
you know, just minutes prior then
you weren't going to catch it if
1125
01:02:06,615 --> 01:02:08,355
you were, you know, following him.
1126
01:02:08,565 --> 01:02:09,934
But it does, it does prove your point
1127
01:02:09,935 --> 01:02:10,355
Pete: though there.
1128
01:02:10,355 --> 01:02:15,295
I don't mean to interrupt, but it does
prove your point that people, people
1129
01:02:15,344 --> 01:02:17,615
cannot not talk about something.
1130
01:02:18,264 --> 01:02:23,915
So when, when, as As the event comes
closer, it becomes more formalized
1131
01:02:23,955 --> 01:02:26,545
or materializes, as you said.
1132
01:02:26,905 --> 01:02:30,834
It becomes harder and harder not to say
something, not to make a proclamation,
1133
01:02:30,835 --> 01:02:34,865
not to So, again, strategy of listening.
1134
01:02:34,875 --> 01:02:40,444
And not that the people that were affected
by that could have listened and then
1135
01:02:40,444 --> 01:02:45,195
done anything about it, but someone
closer to him may have been able to
1136
01:02:45,255 --> 01:02:47,435
recognize something if they listened.
1137
01:02:48,255 --> 01:02:50,274
And again, Hindsight 2020.
1138
01:02:50,450 --> 01:02:53,140
Not pointing fingers, but we're
just looking at different areas.
1139
01:02:53,140 --> 01:02:53,460
Right.
1140
01:02:54,150 --> 01:02:54,580
Bart Womack: Yeah.
1141
01:02:54,640 --> 01:02:57,870
I mean, so if there was anything
posted on social media prior,
1142
01:02:57,870 --> 01:03:01,970
which, which, and I've been watching
this like every day for updates.
1143
01:03:02,020 --> 01:03:05,519
So, so far there wasn't, they haven't
put out anything that there was
1144
01:03:05,570 --> 01:03:08,009
any type of posts in that regard.
1145
01:03:08,730 --> 01:03:13,920
So what would be key here is when
he began to get closer and closer
1146
01:03:13,920 --> 01:03:18,250
to ISIS and, and, you know, that
alignment, because those closest to him.
1147
01:03:18,655 --> 01:03:21,075
I'm sure he would have said something,
they would have saw or heard something
1148
01:03:21,095 --> 01:03:22,485
possibly, possibly different.
1149
01:03:22,495 --> 01:03:24,685
We don't know, we can only
speculate in this particular case.
1150
01:03:24,935 --> 01:03:27,805
That would have probably been,
you know, one of the few signs.
1151
01:03:28,284 --> 01:03:33,435
Now I've learned that he had gone to
New Orleans twice prior to do a recon.
1152
01:03:34,305 --> 01:03:37,835
You know, I've been in New Orleans
and, and this, this particular
1153
01:03:38,075 --> 01:03:43,415
method could happen all day, every
day there, you know, down in Bourbon
1154
01:03:43,415 --> 01:03:44,885
street and all those particular areas.
1155
01:03:45,775 --> 01:03:48,835
So that's something they're going to have
to, they're going to have to address.
1156
01:03:49,044 --> 01:03:53,205
Uh, I understand that their bullets were
something malfunction or they need to
1157
01:03:53,205 --> 01:03:54,884
fix some things or something like that.
1158
01:03:54,885 --> 01:03:57,225
And just, and it just hadn't gotten
to it.
1159
01:03:58,055 --> 01:03:59,525
Um, but now they're going to get to it.
1160
01:04:00,385 --> 01:04:03,235
And then other cities
need to get to it as well.
1161
01:04:04,455 --> 01:04:08,135
And that makes it a tough one without
the, um, you know, without the
1162
01:04:08,145 --> 01:04:10,675
inside information and being there.
1163
01:04:10,704 --> 01:04:13,704
And like I said, we don't
go home with him at night.
1164
01:04:13,704 --> 01:04:15,105
So when did the flip happen?
1165
01:04:15,605 --> 01:04:16,395
So to think about it.
1166
01:04:16,435 --> 01:04:17,015
Okay.
1167
01:04:17,344 --> 01:04:18,044
I raised my hand.
1168
01:04:18,045 --> 01:04:18,764
He raised his hand.
1169
01:04:19,765 --> 01:04:26,294
You know, so it could have happened a
long time ago inside the military could
1170
01:04:26,294 --> 01:04:31,064
have, you know, in these, in people
who serve in the military or veterans,
1171
01:04:31,084 --> 01:04:33,049
you know, have done these things since.
1172
01:04:33,530 --> 01:04:36,360
The attack of March 23rd, 2003.
1173
01:04:36,390 --> 01:04:37,100
I will tell you this.
1174
01:04:37,100 --> 01:04:41,890
I will stand firm on this
with all my possessions.
1175
01:04:42,120 --> 01:04:45,400
You're not going to get much out of
that, but with all my possessions, that
1176
01:04:46,109 --> 01:04:53,300
Asan Agbar's attack on March 23rd, 2003,
opened the gateway for others to follow.
1177
01:04:54,090 --> 01:04:56,480
All these, all these things are copycats.
1178
01:04:57,630 --> 01:04:59,450
So soldier.
1179
01:05:00,395 --> 01:05:03,905
Inside the military active
duty to miss this attack.
1180
01:05:04,035 --> 01:05:08,295
And there have been many since
now, some of them go off.
1181
01:05:08,305 --> 01:05:13,185
Someone will foil because they
made mistakes, but they knew
1182
01:05:13,215 --> 01:05:14,884
that I can, I can try this.
1183
01:05:15,515 --> 01:05:18,665
Is everyone watching as close as
we think they're watching because
1184
01:05:18,665 --> 01:05:20,105
we're all wearing the same uniform?
1185
01:05:20,865 --> 01:05:22,815
They took that chance and
tried to do it anyway.
1186
01:05:24,235 --> 01:05:28,185
But there's been many others
since that time where there was
1187
01:05:28,195 --> 01:05:30,645
none, you know, for the most part.
1188
01:05:30,945 --> 01:05:37,385
Not, not by, because of an ideology or
radicalized and all those types of things.
1189
01:05:38,795 --> 01:05:45,245
To the point where a Coast Guard officer
this past fall had targeted Democratic
1190
01:05:45,245 --> 01:05:49,275
politicians because of his ideology.
1191
01:05:49,940 --> 01:05:57,010
Radicalized to the point of one, one
political side versus the other to
1192
01:05:57,010 --> 01:06:00,940
launch an attack against the other just
because they were on the other side.
1193
01:06:01,350 --> 01:06:06,809
Had a, had a list, had a list, while in
the Coast Guard that he was going to kill.
1194
01:06:07,889 --> 01:06:12,370
And
they went to his house and just had
a bunker of ammunition in his house.
1195
01:06:12,845 --> 01:06:13,755
To carry it out.
1196
01:06:14,315 --> 01:06:20,925
So, like I said, more and more people
are getting in alignment with something,
1197
01:06:21,575 --> 01:06:27,005
uh, with their ideology, they becoming
more and more radicalized by it.
1198
01:06:27,505 --> 01:06:29,535
And then after a while,
you're just an extremist.
1199
01:06:30,540 --> 01:06:34,670
So we should not associate extremism
with, you know, a particular
1200
01:06:34,870 --> 01:06:36,230
foreign terrorist organization.
1201
01:06:36,390 --> 01:06:38,090
It can go to extreme with anything.
1202
01:06:38,290 --> 01:06:39,300
You can go to extreme with it.
1203
01:06:39,440 --> 01:06:40,489
Extreme is extreme.
1204
01:06:41,570 --> 01:06:45,290
Well, this, you know, back to the New
Orleans attack, it's just, um, there's
1205
01:06:45,290 --> 01:06:52,200
becoming more and more that people are
following their ideology to an extreme,
1206
01:06:52,450 --> 01:06:54,210
um, you know, become radicalized about it.
1207
01:06:54,540 --> 01:06:56,320
And then they become extreme about it.
1208
01:06:56,320 --> 01:07:00,230
And then they're taking action on
that based on, based on their belief.
1209
01:07:00,270 --> 01:07:03,429
If you, if you're against their belief,
then they take action against it.
1210
01:07:03,429 --> 01:07:06,310
And that's happening, I would
say, younger and younger.
1211
01:07:06,559 --> 01:07:10,090
People just taking things into their
own hands just because someone in
1212
01:07:10,090 --> 01:07:14,169
alignment with what they are in
alignment with, uh, in all realms.
1213
01:07:15,159 --> 01:07:19,235
You know, we had on there with a Coast
Guard person that wanted to, uh, Went
1214
01:07:19,235 --> 01:07:22,965
to kill, you know, politicians on the
other side and had a long list to do it
1215
01:07:22,975 --> 01:07:25,375
with enough ammunition to pull it off.
1216
01:07:25,675 --> 01:07:31,475
But, just because it's belief of
one political party versus another.
1217
01:07:31,784 --> 01:07:33,664
But that's, that's where we are.
1218
01:07:34,204 --> 01:07:35,034
That's where we are.
1219
01:07:35,374 --> 01:07:40,044
I remember my time in the military, in all
of my time in the military, Yeah, we knew
1220
01:07:40,064 --> 01:07:43,324
the election was coming up, but no one
even talked about the election coming up.
1221
01:07:43,594 --> 01:07:47,405
You know, whatever your side was, or
your side wasn't, you voted, and probably
1222
01:07:47,405 --> 01:07:51,230
you remember way back in the days that
You know, you had the poles and you
1223
01:07:51,230 --> 01:07:52,920
had the curtain and all kinds of stuff.
1224
01:07:52,920 --> 01:07:55,030
I know I'm dating myself,
but that's the way it was.
1225
01:07:55,220 --> 01:07:57,670
And no one talked about it
outside of those curtains.
1226
01:07:57,930 --> 01:08:01,629
Now you might as well just put a
poster, you know, on your chest and
1227
01:08:01,630 --> 01:08:05,489
walk around with it just to show kind
of where you are, because it's going
1228
01:08:05,490 --> 01:08:08,470
to, it's going to come up, but they,
they are more and more and more.
1229
01:08:08,680 --> 01:08:12,580
I think the whole, and we'll get
off the political side of it.
1230
01:08:13,100 --> 01:08:16,410
But, but it is important because people
bringing that to work, but that's how
1231
01:08:16,420 --> 01:08:23,469
deep and that's how, you know, vested
they are with that, with that thing to
1232
01:08:23,470 --> 01:08:28,370
the point where even after an election,
it's like it still has to continue to go.
1233
01:08:29,100 --> 01:08:32,430
If you are against that particular thing
that was said, they're going to take
1234
01:08:32,430 --> 01:08:34,210
it further and further and further.
1235
01:08:34,565 --> 01:08:36,805
And it is just escalating.
1236
01:08:37,655 --> 01:08:38,485
Pete: Yeah, it makes sense.
1237
01:08:38,515 --> 01:08:40,825
And I think it's an important point.
1238
01:08:41,065 --> 01:08:46,065
And it highlights, I think, for
business owners in particular, and,
1239
01:08:46,855 --> 01:08:50,315
you know, government officials, that
There's only so many things that you
1240
01:08:50,315 --> 01:08:55,345
can control and as you were talking
what, uh, What connected for me is
1241
01:08:55,345 --> 01:08:57,715
your first strategy around trust?
1242
01:08:58,215 --> 01:09:02,504
And I think as a thought exercise
for business owners, for business
1243
01:09:02,505 --> 01:09:07,965
leaders, as they think about workplace
violence and workplace safety, that
1244
01:09:07,965 --> 01:09:15,315
first question is If I don't trust,
then what can I do to protect against
1245
01:09:15,315 --> 01:09:17,905
those things that are threats?
1246
01:09:18,115 --> 01:09:21,045
Because if I trust everything, then
nothing is a threat, and I don't
1247
01:09:21,045 --> 01:09:22,454
have, I'm not going to worry about it.
1248
01:09:22,454 --> 01:09:28,545
But it's almost, uh, sitting down and
tabletopping the, the disaster response
1249
01:09:28,545 --> 01:09:30,494
exercise, where what could go wrong?
1250
01:09:30,845 --> 01:09:32,035
What don't I trust?
1251
01:09:32,035 --> 01:09:32,975
I don't trust this.
1252
01:09:32,975 --> 01:09:33,875
I don't trust that.
1253
01:09:33,875 --> 01:09:37,025
So what can I put in place and
make sure those things are in
1254
01:09:37,025 --> 01:09:42,495
place so that the external threat
can't make it into my my building?
1255
01:09:42,495 --> 01:09:44,275
And that could be my hiring practices.
1256
01:09:44,625 --> 01:09:46,845
It could be my security practices.
1257
01:09:46,874 --> 01:09:51,874
Um, as people enter into the workplace,
uh, you know, I know, uh, Yeah.
1258
01:09:52,345 --> 01:09:56,375
There are different businesses,
mine included, that do training
1259
01:09:56,385 --> 01:10:00,935
around, um, because we have entrances
that lead
out into public ways.
1260
01:10:01,335 --> 01:10:07,034
How do you, how are you supposed
to act when a stranger, someone
1261
01:10:07,035 --> 01:10:11,094
you don't know, tries to access
the door that you're going through?
1262
01:10:11,895 --> 01:10:12,135
Right?
1263
01:10:12,135 --> 01:10:16,185
And there's particular protocols that
we're asked to follow so that we don't
1264
01:10:16,540 --> 01:10:20,830
inadvertently let a stranger in that
doesn't have a badge because, you know,
1265
01:10:20,830 --> 01:10:23,230
if you work for a company that has a
few hundred people, you're not going
1266
01:10:23,230 --> 01:10:28,799
to know everybody who sits two floors
below you or three floors above you.
1267
01:10:29,470 --> 01:10:33,209
So I think that to, to me, that was an
interesting connection that the thought
1268
01:10:33,209 --> 01:10:37,269
exercise of trust, if I don't trust, then
what are the things that could go wrong?
1269
01:10:37,289 --> 01:10:39,709
And how do I, how do I
protect against that?
1270
01:10:40,329 --> 01:10:43,980
Does that sound like a fair
strategy or something to do?
1271
01:10:44,310 --> 01:10:47,745
Bart Womack: The first thing with
trust, Is in their regard in terms
1272
01:10:47,745 --> 01:10:51,165
of an employer is don't fall for.
1273
01:10:51,625 --> 01:10:53,995
I trust that nothing's ever
going to happen here like that.
1274
01:10:54,925 --> 01:10:57,625
That's, that's like the worst thing ever.
1275
01:10:57,705 --> 01:11:00,675
And you hear that in schools, like I
never thought it would happen here.
1276
01:11:01,345 --> 01:11:04,505
You know, if you're saying that in an
attack that happened, I don't even care
1277
01:11:04,505 --> 01:11:08,965
in the last 15 years, more important
last 10, no, you have enough evidence
1278
01:11:08,965 --> 01:11:10,295
to say they can happen anywhere.
1279
01:11:11,100 --> 01:11:13,600
But if the administrators think that
it's never going to happen here,
1280
01:11:14,120 --> 01:11:17,310
then you're not putting resources,
you're not doing anything to attempt
1281
01:11:17,320 --> 01:11:19,480
to mitigate it, especially with
all the stuff we talked about.
1282
01:11:20,270 --> 01:11:23,600
Whether it be an academic institution
or a workplace, it's all the same.
1283
01:11:23,670 --> 01:11:27,759
What's an academic institution,
my assessment, is a workplace.
1284
01:11:27,820 --> 01:11:30,914
So you must trust that
something can happen here.
1285
01:11:31,485 --> 01:11:33,785
Now, what can happen and
how can you mitigate it?
1286
01:11:33,895 --> 01:11:35,745
That, that's, that's kind of the process.
1287
01:11:36,255 --> 01:11:39,185
And what you said about the, you
know, going out of a door in terms
1288
01:11:39,185 --> 01:11:41,195
of access onto a street, etc.
1289
01:11:41,195 --> 01:11:46,014
I think coming upon the employee,
obviously try to close the door
1290
01:11:46,014 --> 01:11:46,825
if they don't recognize them.
1291
01:11:46,945 --> 01:11:48,794
I don't care if they worked there
or not and went out for a smoke
1292
01:11:48,795 --> 01:11:49,555
and didn't have their badge.
1293
01:11:49,695 --> 01:11:52,715
The rule is you have to
have your badge to enter.
1294
01:11:54,145 --> 01:11:56,925
I'm sorry, but you know
this if you're an employee.
1295
01:11:57,175 --> 01:11:59,485
If you're not an employee, you just
try to get aid when you're supposed to.
1296
01:11:59,915 --> 01:12:01,915
Just like I, I don't like it.
1297
01:12:02,975 --> 01:12:07,105
Bart doesn't like it, but
Bart the security guy respects
1298
01:12:07,105 --> 01:12:08,695
it when he's at a hotel.
1299
01:12:09,110 --> 01:12:12,240
And he just went there for a
minute to get that, Oh man,
1300
01:12:12,240 --> 01:12:13,720
I forgot my, I forgot my key.
1301
01:12:14,170 --> 01:12:18,310
Now I can't come in that door and
the person who's coming out shut
1302
01:12:18,310 --> 01:12:20,020
it because they're security minded.
1303
01:12:20,460 --> 01:12:20,690
Yep.
1304
01:12:20,690 --> 01:12:21,530
Thank God for them.
1305
01:12:21,740 --> 01:12:22,540
Bart's wrong.
1306
01:12:22,820 --> 01:12:23,530
He's mad.
1307
01:12:23,629 --> 01:12:26,650
Then now he has to go back all the
way around the building to the front.
1308
01:12:27,090 --> 01:12:27,510
Okay.
1309
01:12:27,770 --> 01:12:28,640
I messed up.
1310
01:12:29,280 --> 01:12:30,160
They did the right thing.
1311
01:12:30,700 --> 01:12:30,950
Pete: Yep.
1312
01:12:31,900 --> 01:12:32,100
Yeah.
1313
01:12:32,100 --> 01:12:33,020
It's funny you bring that up.
1314
01:12:33,020 --> 01:12:36,250
I was at a hotel, I don't know,
about a month or so ago now.
1315
01:12:36,250 --> 01:12:40,715
And uh, It was one of those back doors,
if not the front door, that you needed
1316
01:12:40,715 --> 01:12:44,215
your key card to get in from the outside
and it had a little sign that said this
1317
01:12:44,215 --> 01:12:47,725
door will be locked from this time to
this time, you know, for your safety.
1318
01:12:48,825 --> 01:12:52,105
Uh, and it was well before
the time that it should have
1319
01:12:52,105 --> 01:12:53,625
been opened and it was open.
1320
01:12:54,175 --> 01:12:57,390
And I was like, this is My family's
staying here and I went to the front
1321
01:12:57,540 --> 01:13:00,600
desk and they're like, well, yeah,
that lock doesn't work anymore.
1322
01:13:00,610 --> 01:13:02,740
I'm like, that's, that's not cool, man.
1323
01:13:04,140 --> 01:13:04,490
Bart Womack: Yeah.
1324
01:13:04,770 --> 01:13:05,060
Yeah.
1325
01:13:05,069 --> 01:13:05,169
Not
1326
01:13:05,170 --> 01:13:05,400
Pete: cool.
1327
01:13:05,460 --> 01:13:08,789
Bart Womack: In the same, same
target, you try to get that access
1328
01:13:09,179 --> 01:13:10,600
and then people will be nice.
1329
01:13:11,670 --> 01:13:14,850
I, I, if I took a tally and say,
we're going to do this all day and
1330
01:13:14,860 --> 01:13:17,170
see who's going to let me in and
who's not going to let me in, there'll
1331
01:13:17,170 --> 01:13:21,000
be more people who let me in than
not because people are just nice.
1332
01:13:21,620 --> 01:13:22,530
Oh, here you are.
1333
01:13:22,550 --> 01:13:23,599
You know, thank you.
1334
01:13:23,939 --> 01:13:26,109
But I mean, this is what I say.
1335
01:13:26,490 --> 01:13:31,670
They watch, they blend,
they befriend, then BOOM!
1336
01:13:32,150 --> 01:13:37,180
The unthinkable, the unlikable, uh,
the unlikeliest of things happens.
1337
01:13:37,400 --> 01:13:37,700
Yeah.
1338
01:13:38,619 --> 01:13:39,870
You know, but that's what you do.
1339
01:13:40,050 --> 01:13:42,969
I'm supposed to not look
like I'm gonna do it.
1340
01:13:43,350 --> 01:13:46,739
If there's one thing I can
possibly control, it is that.
1341
01:13:47,315 --> 01:13:48,925
That's what I'm supposed to do.
1342
01:13:49,195 --> 01:13:51,865
So that's why the neighbor says,
He just seemed like a regular guy.
1343
01:13:52,005 --> 01:13:53,135
Well, he's supposed to.
1344
01:13:53,735 --> 01:13:54,845
Find the other thing.
1345
01:13:56,734 --> 01:13:57,615
They'll show it to you.
1346
01:13:57,734 --> 01:13:58,765
Find the other thing.
1347
01:13:59,215 --> 01:14:00,105
They're supposed to do that.
1348
01:14:00,345 --> 01:14:00,665
Pete: Yeah.
1349
01:14:01,645 --> 01:14:06,434
And I think that goes to the training
part that you talked about earlier.
1350
01:14:06,434 --> 01:14:11,425
Like, how are we training our
employees to respond, to act, to
1351
01:14:11,425 --> 01:14:13,475
observe, to listen, to report.
1352
01:14:13,495 --> 01:14:14,485
How do you do that?
1353
01:14:14,855 --> 01:14:19,595
And how do you do that in a way that
still respects the dignity of the other
1354
01:14:19,595 --> 01:14:25,005
person because you can do all of those
things in a real Nasty way and you're
1355
01:14:25,005 --> 01:14:28,984
not going to help the situation either,
but there's I think there's training
1356
01:14:28,984 --> 01:14:34,874
out there that's that's available for
employers to to help their employees with
1357
01:14:34,874 --> 01:14:38,470
so that they they can Be a good observer.
1358
01:14:38,480 --> 01:14:39,600
They can be a good listener.
1359
01:14:39,600 --> 01:14:45,210
They can be a good reporter and interact
with each other with, uh, with respect,
1360
01:14:45,680 --> 01:14:50,100
but also from a security standpoint
to do it in a, in a, in a good way.
1361
01:14:51,200 --> 01:14:51,510
Bart Womack: Yeah.
1362
01:14:51,560 --> 01:14:54,919
And as I mentioned before, about a
security budget and depending on how
1363
01:14:54,919 --> 01:14:58,819
much money people spend into that,
put into that, you know, how much
1364
01:14:58,819 --> 01:15:00,529
of that affects your bottom line.
1365
01:15:00,559 --> 01:15:04,509
If those employees aren't there,
that whole thing's gone, you know,
1366
01:15:04,519 --> 01:15:06,989
then, then are you getting your
work done if you don't have them?
1367
01:15:07,355 --> 01:15:09,925
Because you didn't protect them, right?
1368
01:15:10,005 --> 01:15:14,245
Or, so, you had to put measures in place.
1369
01:15:14,245 --> 01:15:18,915
And, and, and, I, I got into
this business to, to save lives.
1370
01:15:19,234 --> 01:15:24,735
Because I didn't want people to
fall victim to what I fell to.
1371
01:15:24,924 --> 01:15:29,545
So, even though there weren't many of the
things that I talk about there, I know
1372
01:15:29,545 --> 01:15:34,065
that if we put these things in place,
you will help to mitigate an attack like
1373
01:15:34,065 --> 01:15:38,835
that happening from the inside, as it
relates to, you know, the workplace.
1374
01:15:39,365 --> 01:15:39,635
But.
1375
01:15:40,250 --> 01:15:41,660
What I'm talking about is simple.
1376
01:15:41,670 --> 01:15:44,740
Okay, you have to bring me there
so you can hear it and do workshops
1377
01:15:44,740 --> 01:15:45,500
and all that type of stuff.
1378
01:15:46,070 --> 01:15:47,110
Those are easy things.
1379
01:15:47,120 --> 01:15:48,830
I don't think they understand, Peter.
1380
01:15:49,430 --> 01:15:52,540
They don't understand that their
employees are the first line of defense.
1381
01:15:52,740 --> 01:15:54,050
They think they need a thing.
1382
01:15:54,550 --> 01:15:56,329
They need something in technology.
1383
01:15:56,629 --> 01:16:01,079
They need the, the bowler,
and they may need the bowler.
1384
01:16:01,490 --> 01:16:05,400
Um, those people on the inside are
the ones that are gonna hear it first.
1385
01:16:05,400 --> 01:16:08,040
They're the ones that's watching
their fellow employees, social
1386
01:16:08,040 --> 01:16:09,570
media and all those things.
1387
01:16:09,570 --> 01:16:10,740
It, it, it's them.
1388
01:16:11,120 --> 01:16:14,240
It's not necessarily, you know,
some other things in terms of
1389
01:16:14,240 --> 01:16:15,680
a system that's part of it.
1390
01:16:15,920 --> 01:16:16,700
Pete: Mm-hmm
1391
01:16:16,701 --> 01:16:18,825
.
Bart Womack: But even I, I
feel that it even cost, it,
1392
01:16:18,970 --> 01:16:20,800
it, it's, it's cost effective.
1393
01:16:21,070 --> 01:16:25,110
It doesn't cost as much to have
workshops to get them trained.
1394
01:16:25,470 --> 01:16:28,020
'cause they, they don't even know that
they're the first line of offense.
1395
01:16:28,820 --> 01:16:33,000
And I never advocate for someone
to put themselves in between,
1396
01:16:33,320 --> 01:16:36,730
you know, the potential shooter
and who they're trying to shoot.
1397
01:16:37,030 --> 01:16:40,110
You know, that's not what I'm talking
about when we say mitigate the
1398
01:16:40,110 --> 01:16:43,560
threat is what you brought up in the
very beginning, that boy who heard
1399
01:16:43,560 --> 01:16:47,189
something, someone called him, they
told him what the situation was, and
1400
01:16:47,189 --> 01:16:48,600
he just went and told somebody else.
1401
01:16:49,350 --> 01:16:50,650
And then they took it from there.
1402
01:16:51,200 --> 01:16:51,270
Yeah.
1403
01:16:51,850 -->
01:16:52,900
That's the way it should happen.
1404
01:16:53,560 --> 01:16:53,800
Pete: Yeah.
1405
01:16:53,800 --> 01:16:54,050
And I think.
1406
01:16:54,090 --> 01:16:54,860
I wanted to touch on.
1407
01:16:54,960 --> 01:16:55,740
Bart Womack: No, please go ahead.
1408
01:16:56,380 --> 01:16:56,500
Yeah.
1409
01:16:56,500 --> 01:16:59,120
I wanted to touch on the, the other
strategies because I kind of got
1410
01:16:59,120 --> 01:17:02,329
sidetracked and go through them, but, but
we talked about them before I got to them.
1411
01:17:02,699 --> 01:17:04,170
So just, just to run them all down.
1412
01:17:04,510 --> 01:17:07,189
So, like I said, trust no one or the
trust, and we've kind of talked about
1413
01:17:07,190 --> 01:17:08,620
that, the observed listen report.
1414
01:17:08,900 --> 01:17:11,450
I say, know that neighbor, you know,
what's happening next door in your
1415
01:17:11,450 --> 01:17:14,490
house, but what's happening next door
in your cubicle, what's happening at the
1416
01:17:14,490 --> 01:17:16,770
water cooler, what's happening in your
break room, what's happening throughout
1417
01:17:16,770 --> 01:17:18,400
the entire workplace in terms of what.
1418
01:17:18,765 --> 01:17:21,025
You know, people are saying, I
need you to pay attention to that.
1419
01:17:21,215 --> 01:17:22,625
Do you know him like
you think you know him?
1420
01:17:22,965 --> 01:17:24,305
But we don't go home with him at night.
1421
01:17:25,055 --> 01:17:26,095
Listen, don't dishear.
1422
01:17:26,125 --> 01:17:27,655
We talked about that in the example.
1423
01:17:27,905 --> 01:17:30,514
We talked about the gut check
even before we got into the
1424
01:17:30,514 --> 01:17:32,935
uh, into the um, the strategy.
1425
01:17:33,014 --> 01:17:34,815
And then we also talked about signs.
1426
01:17:35,194 --> 01:17:37,335
So they all kind of
align in terms of signs.
1427
01:17:37,335 --> 01:17:41,615
But if you're not situation aware,
then you don't know what the signs are.
1428
01:17:41,665 --> 01:17:42,635
You don't know what you're looking for.
1429
01:17:43,145 --> 01:17:45,085
And some people just go to work,
do their work and they go home.
1430
01:17:45,385 --> 01:17:46,015
And that's great.
1431
01:17:46,185 --> 01:17:48,505
But we kind of need all
of them to participate.
1432
01:17:48,925 --> 01:17:51,595
Coactively in this first line of defense.
1433
01:17:51,645 --> 01:17:52,455
They just don't know.
1434
01:17:53,120 --> 01:17:54,920
That they are the first line of defense
1435
01:17:55,070 --> 01:17:59,120
Pete: truly And and I think they
they make all the external lines of
1436
01:17:59,120 --> 01:18:02,470
defense more effective like you talked
about You might need the bowler.
1437
01:18:02,470 --> 01:18:04,029
You might need security cameras.
1438
01:18:04,029 --> 01:18:09,639
You might need this and that that
are external to the employee but the
1439
01:18:09,660 --> 01:18:14,470
the employees and how they interact,
and how they listen, and
how they
1440
01:18:14,650 --> 01:18:18,390
use those different strategies,
make everything else effective.
1441
01:18:18,930 --> 01:18:24,050
There's, there's thousands of hours of
security camera footage out there, right?
1442
01:18:24,280 --> 01:18:25,790
And it's all after the fact.
1443
01:18:25,840 --> 01:18:27,660
They all show what has happened.
1444
01:18:28,489 --> 01:18:28,909
Right.
1445
01:18:30,770 --> 01:18:34,449
What could have prevented it from
happening was someone saying something
1446
01:18:34,599 --> 01:18:40,670
about something that didn't quite sit
right with their gut, that they Listened
1447
01:18:40,770 --> 01:18:44,690
properly, they observed something, thought
about it differently, and then there was
1448
01:18:44,690 --> 01:18:50,230
a process in place within their company
that they could make a call to a resource
1449
01:18:50,270 --> 01:18:54,229
like their human resources or like their
security group or like their safety
1450
01:18:54,229 --> 01:18:57,130
people in order to make that next step.
1451
01:18:58,379 --> 01:19:01,050
Bart Womack: Yeah, and I think in
those, in those conversations and
1452
01:19:01,050 --> 01:19:05,100
in that training, I put all my
money again on, in the onboarding
1453
01:19:05,760 --> 01:19:11,410
process, does the employee even know
where to take that particular thing?
1454
01:19:12,005 --> 01:19:15,285
Hey, you would think the supervisor,
but who's the supervisor?
1455
01:19:16,895 --> 01:19:19,535
I won't say how old is the supervisor,
but I guess that kind of matters.
1456
01:19:19,535 --> 01:19:23,115
Experience overall, not just work
experience, but life experience.
1457
01:19:23,115 --> 01:19:24,525
Like what, what are they
going to do with it?
1458
01:19:25,065 --> 01:19:28,885
And cause you, you will begin to
think, well, every time I take them
1459
01:19:28,885 --> 01:19:32,274
something, they do whatever or they
don't do, they don't do anything with it.
1460
01:19:32,275 --> 01:19:34,925
I'm not going to take
them something like this.
1461
01:19:35,435 --> 01:19:38,215
And they're going to continue to
say that, that thought process is
1462
01:19:38,215 --> 01:19:39,395
going to come into the person's head.
1463
01:19:39,925 --> 01:19:41,785
So I'm not going to take it
to them, but who I go to next.
1464
01:19:41,785 --> 01:19:44,795
And if I don't know who to go to next
with this particular thing, because it's
1465
01:19:45,075 --> 01:19:48,854
different and it's not really, it's in
a workplace, but it's not work stuff.
1466
01:19:49,184 --> 01:19:50,215
So who do I take it to?
1467
01:19:50,604 --> 01:19:52,614
Do I take it to the
inexperienced person in HR?
1468
01:19:52,615 --> 01:19:54,685
Who in HR has experience with this?
1469
01:19:55,405 --> 01:19:57,085
You know, do they even know what to do?
1470
01:19:57,845 --> 01:20:00,175
So that's why you have to have
the workshops and all that.
1471
01:20:00,175 --> 01:20:02,375
What, what is your escalation process?
1472
01:20:03,360 --> 01:20:04,520
Do you call security?
1473
01:20:04,580 --> 01:20:06,840
Can I call security as an employee?
1474
01:20:06,840 --> 01:20:10,150
Do I have to call my, tell my
supervisor, how does that work?
1475
01:20:10,940 --> 01:20:17,839
Because what I wanted to talk to him about
is not work per se, it's a security issue.
1476
01:20:18,320 --> 01:20:19,870
But then who is that person?
1477
01:20:20,220 --> 01:20:20,480
Right.
1478
01:20:20,519 --> 01:20:21,750
And how much experience do they have?
1479
01:20:21,809 --> 01:20:25,070
Who did, who did the organization
really hire in the first place?
1480
01:20:25,650 --> 01:20:27,110
Which is, which is another problem.
1481
01:20:27,110 --> 01:20:31,010
But I have cameras and everything,
but who is that person that's there?
1482
01:20:32,000 --> 01:20:36,180
You know, during the work hours or 24
7, if you have it set up like that,
1483
01:20:36,180 --> 01:20:40,320
because depending on how much money
you put into security, you can only
1484
01:20:40,320 --> 01:20:42,930
hire what your, your budget allows.
1485
01:20:43,715 --> 01:20:49,735
And I, I can't, I can't from a data
standpoint, give me, you know, specifics
1486
01:20:49,735 --> 01:20:54,774
on that from a percentage standpoint, but
I know a guy who does that and the quality
1487
01:20:54,775 --> 01:20:58,775
of person is not very good and they
definitely know nothing about security
1488
01:21:01,034 --> 01:21:05,195
and the over, and the overturn
is, is very, very frequent.
1489
01:21:05,955 --> 01:21:09,875
So you get what you pay for, but are
you really trying to secure your place
1490
01:21:09,875 --> 01:21:10,905
or are you just checking a block?
1491
01:21:11,925 --> 01:21:12,965
Pete: That's a very good point.
1492
01:21:13,415 --> 01:21:15,475
Hey, so we're, we're, uh, God, it's hard.
1493
01:21:15,505 --> 01:21:18,765
It's hard to know that we've been talking
now for almost an hour and a half.
1494
01:21:19,095 --> 01:21:25,275
Um, so I, I'm wondering if of, out of
all the things that we talked about,
1495
01:21:26,045 --> 01:21:31,594
uh, with your experience and, uh, the
private sector, public sector, workplace,
1496
01:21:31,594 --> 01:21:39,545
military, um, it, If you had to give
business leaders some advice, those that
1497
01:21:39,545 --> 01:21:43,545
are really struggling to address violence
in their workplace, whether they have
1498
01:21:43,545 --> 01:21:48,885
a known situation and they just don't
know what to do, or they listen to this
1499
01:21:48,895 --> 01:21:55,250
podcast and it opens their eyes to, uh,
An issue that they have not yet addressed
1500
01:21:55,580 --> 01:21:56,930
because they haven't realized it.
1501
01:21:57,230 --> 01:21:59,350
What would be, what would be your advice?
1502
01:21:59,350 --> 01:22:03,929
What are some steps that they could
initially take, initially do to
1503
01:22:04,169 --> 01:22:07,089
understand how ill prepared they are?
1504
01:22:07,119 --> 01:22:11,079
Or
what to do to better
prepare for an event?
1505
01:22:11,089 --> 01:22:16,650
How do they prepare their, their workplace
or their, their, uh, their employees for
1506
01:22:16,650 --> 01:22:18,780
the possibility of something happening?
1507
01:22:18,790 --> 01:22:25,400
Because like you said earlier, If
you think that it won't happen where
1508
01:22:25,400 --> 01:22:29,150
you work, or at your business, then
you're sticking your head in the sand.
1509
01:22:29,160 --> 01:22:34,240
Because as we go down the line and people
become more and more aligned on one side
1510
01:22:34,240 --> 01:22:38,629
or the other, there's going to be conflict
and it could escalate to the point where
1511
01:22:38,629 --> 01:22:40,599
it can become violent at your workplace.
1512
01:22:40,840 --> 01:22:42,090
It's just a matter of time.
1513
01:22:42,090 --> 01:22:43,100
So how do we prepare?
1514
01:22:43,110 --> 01:22:44,250
What's your advice for them?
1515
01:22:45,375 --> 01:22:48,805
Bart Womack: Yeah, I mean, I think
it goes back to the training and the
1516
01:22:48,815 --> 01:22:51,875
investment in security, if you're really
serious about it, if you really want to
1517
01:22:51,875 --> 01:22:55,445
do something about it, you have to invest
in security and, you know, I know they
1518
01:22:55,445 --> 01:22:59,175
want to spend their money, you know,
wisely, but that in terms of what their
1519
01:22:59,175 --> 01:23:02,475
budget is, some will be able to do more.
1520
01:23:02,485 --> 01:23:05,245
Some will don't have
the money to do as much.
1521
01:23:06,030 --> 01:23:08,750
You know, it's not about bringing
me in to talk to you, but it is
1522
01:23:08,750 --> 01:23:12,430
kind of about bringing people like
me in to talk to you because that's
1523
01:23:12,450 --> 01:23:17,080
probably the least expensive way to,
uh, hear different ways of how to
1524
01:23:17,570 --> 01:23:19,090
assist in mitigating those things.
1525
01:23:19,740 --> 01:23:22,809
You know, these strategies that I
spoke of, I believe in those because
1526
01:23:22,810 --> 01:23:27,370
I think they align and they work, not
all of them, but, but knowing them,
1527
01:23:28,240 --> 01:23:31,560
you can not only just do that in your
workplace, but in your everyday life.
1528
01:23:32,220 --> 01:23:32,610
Right on.
1529
01:23:32,630 --> 01:23:35,990
You know, and how you trust,
observing this report.
1530
01:23:36,310 --> 01:23:38,980
You know, know your neighbor, know who
you're working with, know who you live
1531
01:23:38,980 --> 01:23:40,140
beside, all those types of things.
1532
01:23:40,280 --> 01:23:41,280
Listen, don't just hear.
1533
01:23:41,280 --> 01:23:43,150
I mean, gut check, and then the signs.
1534
01:23:43,150 --> 01:23:44,910
Like, what is, what is
being put out there?
1535
01:23:46,040 --> 01:23:50,089
Of which I put into, under the umbrella
of situational awareness security.
1536
01:23:50,190 --> 01:23:51,765
That anybody can do.
1537
01:23:51,765 --> 01:23:55,490
That's why I use the example of
that 19 year old in a college
1538
01:23:55,490 --> 01:23:56,870
classroom, because he's just 19.
1539
01:23:58,030 --> 01:23:59,490
With other 19 year olds in a room.
1540
01:23:59,550 --> 01:24:03,160
And an adult who didn't hear,
wasn't listening, was just hearing.
1541
01:24:03,705 --> 01:24:07,055
And did nothing about it, which
is why I say, you know, people
1542
01:24:07,055 --> 01:24:08,545
are the first line of defense.
1543
01:24:09,415 --> 01:24:13,135
Um, so it would be those strategies and it
would, it would be the training, you know,
1544
01:24:13,135 --> 01:24:17,295
make that quarterly, make that semi annual
or some, but, but you have to have it.
1545
01:24:17,515 --> 01:24:19,685
And I know it has to be in
accordance with their budget.
1546
01:24:20,985 --> 01:24:25,785
For me to believe that that's the,
um, that's the beginning of an answer.
1547
01:24:26,405 --> 01:24:30,194
The sophistication of the
would be attacker is just, is
1548
01:24:30,194 --> 01:24:31,384
just going to be different.
1549
01:24:31,785 --> 01:24:37,465
But understand that more and more
people are beginning to take things in
1550
01:24:37,475 --> 01:24:44,325
their own hands based on how they feel,
which makes it extremely unpredictable.
1551
01:24:44,425 --> 01:24:45,725
We just don't know.
1552
01:24:46,205 --> 01:24:49,984
So our job when we do controls
is to be prepared as best we can.
1553
01:24:50,645 --> 01:24:54,195
Pete: Yeah, so understand that
it's dynamic, that it's not a
1554
01:24:54,195 --> 01:24:56,415
one size fits all situation.
1555
01:24:56,765 --> 01:25:00,865
So what you do today is really just
a foundation of what you are going to
1556
01:25:00,875 --> 01:25:02,685
build on tomorrow and the next day.
1557
01:25:02,685 --> 01:25:03,705
And it's going to keep going.
1558
01:25:03,954 --> 01:25:07,504
Like anything, whether it be safety,
whether it be performance management,
1559
01:25:07,814 --> 01:25:11,125
and certainly within workplace
violence prevention and security
1560
01:25:11,125 --> 01:25:15,425
within the workplace, the foundation
that you build is going to allow
1561
01:25:15,425 --> 01:25:17,305
you to be successful in the future.
1562
01:25:17,324 --> 01:25:21,380
But if you As with anything else, if you
build a foundation and then you never
1563
01:25:21,380 --> 01:25:25,280
touch it again, it's just going to end
up crumbling and it's going to find
1564
01:25:25,280 --> 01:25:28,799
holes and you're going to get, you're
going to get rats inside your house if
1565
01:25:28,809 --> 01:25:34,429
you don't maintain and continue to put
time and effort into that foundation
1566
01:25:34,429 --> 01:25:35,910
that you've, you've started with.
1567
01:25:36,509 --> 01:25:39,669
Bart Womack: And that attacker
is on the inside already.
1568
01:25:40,689 --> 01:25:44,339
They either are currently there
or they were there recently.
1569
01:25:44,885 --> 01:25:47,875
It's not just this guy walking down
the street, deciding, Oh, I like
1570
01:25:47,885 --> 01:25:49,075
that building, let me go do this.
1571
01:25:49,165 --> 01:25:51,615
It isn't that, you know.
1572
01:25:51,685 --> 01:25:56,634
Now, the other mass attacks, where it's
aligned with someone's, um, you know,
1573
01:25:56,635 --> 01:26:00,025
they've been radicalized or extremists,
or whether it be a foreign terrorist
1574
01:26:00,365 --> 01:26:03,994
organization, or they're just aligned
with that, you know, like in New
1575
01:26:03,994 --> 01:26:06,665
Orleans, that's even more difficult.
1576
01:26:07,065 --> 01:26:11,975
But in terms of workplace,
those attackers work there.
1577
01:26:14,020 --> 01:26:14,630
Or used to.
1578
01:26:14,750 --> 01:26:17,350
You let them go over there, or
just whatever the case may be.
1579
01:26:18,065 --> 01:26:20,675
It's a known entity if you
were paying attention to it.
1580
01:26:20,895 --> 01:26:21,135
Pete: Yep.
1581
01:26:21,455 --> 01:26:22,065
That's great.
1582
01:26:22,195 --> 01:26:22,985
That's great advice.
1583
01:26:23,025 --> 01:26:23,835
Really good advice.
1584
01:26:23,975 --> 01:26:29,245
So if one of our listeners is
interested in bringing somebody in and
1585
01:26:29,255 --> 01:26:33,545
having them speak to their, uh, their
supervisory department or talking to
1586
01:26:33,545 --> 01:26:34,945
them about what they should do next.
1587
01:26:35,420 --> 01:26:36,730
And they like your story.
1588
01:26:36,910 --> 01:26:42,100
Where do they find out more about
you, Bart, and what you do and, um,
1589
01:26:42,110 --> 01:26:44,090
what services that you might offer?
1590
01:26:44,500 --> 01:26:47,360
Bart Womack: Well, I have a book called
Embedded Enemy, The Insider Threat
1591
01:26:47,370 --> 01:26:50,650
that you can find on Amazon and also
list those strategies as well as a
1592
01:26:50,650 --> 01:26:54,689
website, post things on the website,
but you can contact me there to, uh,
1593
01:26:54,749 --> 01:26:58,989
to book me as a speaker to come in,
uh, either do keynotes or workshops.
1594
01:27:00,330 --> 01:27:00,730
Pete: That's great.
1595
01:27:00,730 --> 01:27:05,680
It will list the website and some of those
resources on our, uh, the podcast page
1596
01:27:05,710 --> 01:27:07,869
when we publish the, the, uh, the podcast.
1597
01:27:07,869 --> 01:27:10,440
So our listeners, if you wanted
to go there, that's great.
1598
01:27:10,500 --> 01:27:12,300
You can go to embedded enemy.
1599
01:27:12,310 --> 01:27:17,600
com, uh, and that will get you to Bart's
website and you can find the resources
1600
01:27:17,600 --> 01:27:19,095
that he's talking about there as well.
1601
01:27:19,095 --> 01:27:22,575
So, uh, I, uh, I appreciate you
being on the podcast today, Bart.
1602
01:27:22,575 --> 01:27:23,845
This has been a great conversation.
1603
01:27:23,845 --> 01:27:28,894
I do have one more question for you,
uh, before we leave though, and, uh, you
1604
01:27:28,895 --> 01:27:33,644
know, you bring so much great
experience
to this particular topic and you've had
1605
01:27:33,655 --> 01:27:39,275
a lot of leadership experience on your
own, both leading people, um, within
1606
01:27:39,285 --> 01:27:42,975
the military, leading people outside
of the military, and then being led
1607
01:27:42,975 --> 01:27:47,985
yourself as you, as you, uh, grew your
own experience within the military.
1608
01:27:49,470 --> 01:27:52,960
Who was the leader that inspired
you most and shaped your
1609
01:27:52,960 --> 01:27:54,990
path to where you are today?
1610
01:27:54,990 --> 01:27:56,880
And what were they like?
1611
01:27:56,880 --> 01:27:57,989
Bart Womack: Hmm
1612
01:27:58,670 --> 01:27:58,850
Pete: good
1613
01:27:58,850 --> 01:27:59,430
Bart Womack: question.
1614
01:28:00,680 --> 01:28:07,170
I would say it's uh, It was it was many
and in the beginning it was it was two
1615
01:28:07,170 --> 01:28:13,640
guys that were army rangers Um and just
watching how they move how they act how
1616
01:28:13,640 --> 01:28:20,490
they performed how professional they were
Inspired me to become an army ranger Uh,
1617
01:28:20,530 --> 01:28:22,520
so that was probably the first part of it.
1618
01:28:22,620 --> 01:28:28,080
And one of them shared with me that Bart,
although the Army's big, and in the, in
1619
01:28:28,080 --> 01:28:33,970
the infantry space that you're in, it's
big too, but you only have to compete
1620
01:28:34,080 --> 01:28:37,399
with 20 percent of them, not all of them.
1621
01:28:38,530 --> 01:28:44,895
I mean, and just 20 percent that are,
you know, your rank and your position.
1622
01:28:44,895 --> 01:28:46,759
Only 20%.
1623
01:28:48,120 --> 01:28:52,090
So I felt like that made things
a lot easier to be elite.
1624
01:28:53,195 --> 01:28:57,345
And then I learned that, well,
that made it, made things
1625
01:28:57,345 --> 01:29:01,105
easier to compete and succeed.
1626
01:29:01,405 --> 01:29:08,035
But then to be lead, it wasn't 20 percent
and maybe I was two or maybe even one,
1627
01:29:08,125 --> 01:29:13,645
if you, you know, you drive a little
harder, but from 20, you're knocking
1628
01:29:13,645 --> 01:29:17,905
off 18 percentage points, if you were
to get the two or 19 to get the one I
1629
01:29:17,905 --> 01:29:20,065
found was even, I found was even easier.
1630
01:29:20,625 --> 01:29:21,135
You know, once you.
1631
01:29:22,525 --> 01:29:23,425
That's what you want to do.
1632
01:29:24,115 --> 01:29:26,065
So I would say it's those two leaders.
1633
01:29:26,425 --> 01:29:31,295
And then, as I progressed in my career,
I kind of watched, you know, several
1634
01:29:31,295 --> 01:29:35,710
leaders and developed, developed this
thing called a, um, leadership kit bag.
1635
01:29:35,980 --> 01:29:39,840
A kit bag is something that once you
jump out of an airplane, you get this kit
1636
01:29:39,870 --> 01:29:43,260
bag and you, you know, you land on the
ground and you take your parachute off,
1637
01:29:43,260 --> 01:29:44,690
you put it in a
thing called a kit bag.
1638
01:29:44,710 --> 01:29:45,479
It's a big old bag.
1639
01:29:45,979 --> 01:29:49,780
Uh, so it's kind of a crazy,
it's called a leadership kit bag.
1640
01:29:50,520 --> 01:29:57,560
And I've watched leaders and the things
that I liked, I put in the bag and the
1641
01:29:57,560 --> 01:29:59,890
things I didn't, didn't go in the bag.
1642
01:30:00,590 --> 01:30:02,060
So it didn't matter who they were.
1643
01:30:02,745 --> 01:30:06,735
It was just a few things that I
might like about them, but they, it
1644
01:30:06,745 --> 01:30:10,814
wasn't just a sole influence that I
would just follow, you know, a person
1645
01:30:10,815 --> 01:30:13,714
per se, it was probably, I want to
say even a group of people, it was
1646
01:30:13,715 --> 01:30:17,895
just things that would happen that
person did as a leader that I like.
1647
01:30:17,895 --> 01:30:21,175
And I'd put that in there and it
may be one thing, maybe two things
1648
01:30:21,175 --> 01:30:24,565
in some cases, no matter what their
position was, I didn't like any of it.
1649
01:30:24,575 --> 01:30:29,074
So none of it went in there, but that
helped me form my leadership style,
1650
01:30:29,464 --> 01:30:31,615
uh, and how I related to people.
1651
01:30:31,615 --> 01:30:31,684
Yeah.
1652
01:30:32,315 --> 01:30:38,015
And it really is the, the thing of
people, somehow out of nowhere, this
1653
01:30:38,015 --> 01:30:42,974
quiet little skinny kid in Columbus,
Ohio joins the military and then, you
1654
01:30:42,974 --> 01:30:46,825
know, becomes this thing who wasn't
necessarily people oriented, you know,
1655
01:30:46,825 --> 01:30:49,974
when he was growing up, you know, had
friends and all that type of stuff, but
1656
01:30:49,975 --> 01:30:57,575
not, you know, let alone lead, but I
just became that I lived out the credos
1657
01:30:57,585 --> 01:31:03,495
of the ranger creed and, uh, Army creed
and the NCO creed and the drill sergeant
1658
01:31:03,495 --> 01:31:08,824
creed and the tomb guard, uh, signals
creed, you know, all those things.
1659
01:31:08,885 --> 01:31:13,375
I just, I just lived those things to
where, you know, I, I embodied them.
1660
01:31:14,145 --> 01:31:15,964
Now they say you're supposed to embody it.
1661
01:31:16,194 --> 01:31:20,424
Everyone doesn't embody it, but
I, I worked hard to embody it.
1662
01:31:20,425 --> 01:31:22,575
Uh, you know, I say do the right
thing when no one's looking.
1663
01:31:22,585 --> 01:31:25,665
I always live my life as
if someone was looking.
1664
01:31:26,800 --> 01:31:29,850
Saturday, Sunday weekend,
someone's always looking.
1665
01:31:30,200 --> 01:31:31,450
So I have to do this.
1666
01:31:31,460 --> 01:31:35,949
I have to do what I embody money through
Friday when I have the uniform on.
1667
01:31:36,200 --> 01:31:38,460
You know, in front of my soldiers,
setting an example, I have to
1668
01:31:38,460 --> 01:31:41,100
do that all the time, because
someone's watching all the time.
1669
01:31:41,330 --> 01:31:42,450
Like, Bart, no one's in your house.
1670
01:31:42,460 --> 01:31:44,800
Everybody says, nope, they can see me.
1671
01:31:45,479 --> 01:31:46,320
There's cameras.
1672
01:31:46,570 --> 01:31:47,830
I have to do that.
1673
01:31:48,280 --> 01:31:49,899
And that's the way I live.
1674
01:31:51,630 --> 01:31:57,420
So no, I think because that was me
always practicing what I preached.
1675
01:31:58,160 --> 01:32:00,000
And I would tell, I would
tell my soldiers, like, you're
1676
01:32:00,000 --> 01:32:01,000
never going to catch me wrong.
1677
01:32:01,950 --> 01:32:03,310
I don't care what time of day it is.
1678
01:32:03,320 --> 01:32:07,120
You're never going to catch me not
doing what I'm telling you to do.
1679
01:32:08,085 --> 01:32:11,475
I've either done it or I'm doing
it right here in front of you.
1680
01:32:12,185 --> 01:32:12,825
Pete: That's awesome.
1681
01:32:13,045 --> 01:32:18,385
As you're talking, uh, I hear the
strategies that you've, you've put forth.
1682
01:32:18,444 --> 01:32:19,155
They're there.
1683
01:32:19,165 --> 01:32:23,235
It's the, the trust, but verify
it's the observe and listen.
1684
01:32:23,265 --> 01:32:27,694
And it's taking those things that you
have determined that you can trust.
1685
01:32:28,635 --> 01:32:32,355
You believe those things, and it
becomes part of you as you go through.
1686
01:32:32,355 --> 01:32:34,775
And I think the interesting
part about your story there
1687
01:32:34,785 --> 01:32:37,845
is, it wasn't just one person.
1688
01:32:38,725 --> 01:32:43,575
Multiple people that you were watching,
that you were influenced by, that you were
1689
01:32:43,575 --> 01:32:47,624
able to take one little piece from each
individual, and it becomes who you are.
1690
01:32:47,624 --> 01:32:52,455
And I think the lesson for some of
our, uh, some of our leaders today
1691
01:32:52,765 --> 01:32:55,175
is doesn't matter what you do.
1692
01:32:55,235 --> 01:32:56,635
Well, it does matter what you do.
1693
01:32:57,005 --> 01:32:58,374
It doesn't matter when it is.
1694
01:32:58,415 --> 01:33:01,095
Somebody is going to be watching,
someone's paying attention and
1695
01:33:01,095 --> 01:33:04,385
you are going to influence the
person that you're leading, that
1696
01:33:04,385 --> 01:33:05,714
you're next to, that you're with.
1697
01:33:06,164 --> 01:33:07,294
So you can't.
1698
01:33:07,935 --> 01:33:12,385
Just assume that you're off duty
today, and it doesn't matter.
1699
01:33:12,405 --> 01:33:16,184
It does matter, and it matters
what you do, what you say, how
1700
01:33:16,185 --> 01:33:19,895
you purport yourself, and what
you, how you manage yourself, and
1701
01:33:19,975 --> 01:33:21,135
what you do with those people.
1702
01:33:21,135 --> 01:33:21,784
I love that story.
1703
01:33:21,784 --> 01:33:25,324
I really appreciate you sharing that,
and I thank you for putting the thought
1704
01:33:25,325 --> 01:33:28,844
into that last minute question for you,
because I
didn't really prep you for it.
1705
01:33:28,844 --> 01:33:29,604
So that's great.
1706
01:33:29,664 --> 01:33:30,164
Thank you.
1707
01:33:31,505 --> 01:33:31,815
Thank
1708
01:33:31,815 --> 01:33:32,135
Bart Womack: you.
1709
01:33:32,675 --> 01:33:34,725
Pete: Uh, so we're right at the,
about the end of the podcast.
1710
01:33:34,735 --> 01:33:38,285
Is there anything else that you'd
like to share with our listeners?
1711
01:33:38,455 --> 01:33:41,095
Anything that you'd like,
any last words of advice that
1712
01:33:41,095 --> 01:33:42,075
you'd like to share with them?
1713
01:33:42,645 --> 01:33:46,205
Bart Womack: I'm going to leave my
quote, and that is no profession,
1714
01:33:46,495 --> 01:33:48,544
level of education, ideology.
1715
01:33:49,080 --> 01:33:51,020
Or religion is above reproach.
1716
01:33:51,190 --> 01:33:52,470
There is no profile.
1717
01:33:52,860 --> 01:33:55,140
The insider threat is
closer than you think.
1718
01:33:56,080 --> 01:33:57,110
Pete: I appreciate that Bart.
1719
01:33:57,120 --> 01:33:58,149
Thank you for your time.
1720
01:33:58,219 --> 01:34:02,870
Thank you for your expertise and
uh, good luck in your endeavors and
1721
01:34:02,870 --> 01:34:05,709
uh, I'd like to talk to you some
other, another time on the podcast.
1722
01:34:05,709 --> 01:34:06,179
I appreciate it.
1723
01:34:06,180 --> 01:34:07,210
Thanks for being on today.
1724
01:34:07,210 --> 01:34:08,874
Bart Womack: Appreciate you having me.
1725
01:34:10,585 --> 01:34:14,465
Pete: The MMIC Safety Experts Podcast
is made possible by MMIC, a workers
1726
01:34:14,465 --> 01:34:18,565
comp insurance carrier whose mission
is to make workers comp work better.
1727
01:34:18,805 --> 01:34:20,095
Check us out at MMIC.
1728
01:34:20,135 --> 01:34:20,525
com.
1729
01:34:20,915 --> 01:34:24,585
If you would like to hear more about
a particular topic on our podcast or
1730
01:34:24,585 --> 01:34:29,595
have questions about workplace safety,
send them in to me at podcast at MMIC.
1731
01:34:29,595 --> 01:34:29,925
com.
1732
01:34:30,275 --> 01:34:33,375
Often, your questions will turn
into a podcast episode like this
1733
01:34:33,375 --> 01:34:36,565
one, where one of our guests
will dig deep into your topic.
1734
01:34:36,955 --> 01:34:39,615
Also, check out our show notes
for this episode at memic.
1735
01:34:39,685 --> 01:34:44,395
com forward slash podcast, where
you can find Memec's entire podcast
1736
01:34:44,405 --> 01:34:48,445
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1737
01:34:48,914 --> 01:34:53,265
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1738
01:34:53,265 --> 01:34:55,615
of our articles or safety news updates.
1739
01:34:56,040 --> 01:34:59,340
And if you haven't done so already,
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1740
01:34:59,530 --> 01:35:03,340
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1741
01:35:03,340 --> 01:35:05,240
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1742
01:35:05,590 --> 01:35:08,339
And if you've already done that,
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1743
01:35:08,340 --> 01:35:10,570
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1744
01:35:10,950 --> 01:35:14,249
Please consider sharing this show
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1745
01:35:14,259 --> 01:35:17,059
or family member who you think
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1746
01:35:17,470 --> 01:35:20,220
And as always, thank you
for the continued support.
1747
01:35:20,610 --> 01:35:25,430
Until next time, this is Peter Koch
reminding you that listening to the Mimic
1748
01:35:25,500 --> 01:35:31,160
Safety Experts podcast is good, but using
what you learned here is even better.