Full Transcript for Downstream Effects of Louisiana v. Callais: Race, Redistricting, and Representation

00:04:09.560 --> 00:04:13.360 was working for Senator Ted Kennedy. And I was working for, 68 00:04:13.439 --> 00:04:16.560 this may come as a surprise for some people, Peter 69 00:04:16.579 --> 00:04:21.110 Rodino and Emanuel Seller in the Judiciary Committee. First of all, 70 00:04:21.129 --> 00:04:25.310 I want to say, begin this conversation by saying that 71 00:04:25.649 --> 00:04:30.079 I think most people in the civil rights area regard 72 00:04:30.120 --> 00:04:33.980 the Voting Rights Act as perhaps the most important civil 73 00:04:34.040 --> 00:04:37.699 rights law ever passed. But it was also a very 74 00:04:37.779 --> 00:04:43.209 radical act, even in 1965 when passed. We now have 75 00:04:43.250 --> 00:04:46.129 the Kalei decision, along with Branovich and others that have 76 00:04:46.149 --> 00:04:50.430 been handed down over the years, which I really think 77 00:04:50.509 --> 00:04:55.569 go beyond this subject of voting and really get to 78 00:04:55.610 --> 00:04:59.790 the question of. How do you define racial discrimination? And 79 00:04:59.870 --> 00:05:02.230 so the discussion today is going to be about the 80 00:05:02.329 --> 00:05:09.189 downstream effects of the Kalei decision. And I think that 81 00:05:10.670 --> 00:05:13.230 we're going to try and stay away from some of 82 00:05:13.269 --> 00:05:17.189 the minutiae of the Voting Rights Act, although I will 83 00:05:17.310 --> 00:05:19.910 begin my first question to Michael Carvin with a little 84 00:05:19.949 --> 00:05:24.500 bit of minutiae. And that has to do with Section 85 00:05:24.500 --> 00:05:27.620 2 of the Act. Soon after the Act was passed 86 00:05:27.839 --> 00:05:33.860 in 1965, the Department of Justice decided to extend the 87 00:05:33.899 --> 00:05:37.410 way in which they interpreted the jurisdiction of the Act 88 00:05:37.430 --> 00:05:44.069 to not only allow for Blacks to have access to 89 00:05:44.089 --> 00:05:47.329 the polls, and it was primarily Blacks who were who 90 00:05:47.370 --> 00:05:53.040 were envisioned by this act, but also to ensure that 91 00:05:53.240 --> 00:06:00.009 the votes already cast were not diluted. DOJ blocked at-large 92 00:06:00.050 --> 00:06:02.910 elections and required that districts be drawn in such a 93 00:06:02.949 --> 00:06:06.480 way as to create safe districts to elect minority candidates. 94 00:06:07.040 --> 00:06:09.279 And I want, if you can, Mike, just to very 95 00:06:09.339 --> 00:06:12.860 briefly try to do it in under five minutes, walk 96 00:06:12.939 --> 00:06:17.899 us through how the 1980 up to amendments to Section 97 00:06:17.899 --> 00:06:23.389 2 led to an outcomes based standard. And from there, 98 00:06:23.610 --> 00:06:24.810 how we got to Calais. 99 00:06:27.430 --> 00:06:31.629 Sure, I'm happy to. In 1982, Congress was concerned with 100 00:06:31.649 --> 00:06:34.709 a recent decision by the Supreme Court, Mobile v. Bolden. 101 00:06:35.519 --> 00:06:38.300 which said that you needed to show intentional discrimination to 102 00:06:38.339 --> 00:06:42.379 violate Section 2. This was a challenge to an at-large 103 00:06:42.480 --> 00:06:47.610 district which diluted black votes. What they wanted to do 104 00:06:47.670 --> 00:06:52.430 was create a system where any kind of outcome that 105 00:06:52.490 --> 00:06:56.449 blacks didn't achieve would be violative of the law. 106 00:06:56.889 --> 00:06:58.800 But they couldn't say that directly. 107 00:06:59.060 --> 00:07:01.439 So what they did, frankly, was engage in a bit 108 00:07:01.459 --> 00:07:02.779 of subterfuge. 109 00:07:03.490 --> 00:07:05.149 They have this language. 110 00:07:04.750 --> 00:07:08.360 From the act, which has been studiously ignored until Brnovich 111 00:07:08.420 --> 00:07:12.540 and Calais, and said, look at the Senate report. The 112 00:07:12.579 --> 00:07:16.939 Senate report listed like nine factors, all of which reflected 113 00:07:17.500 --> 00:07:20.310 racial inequalities. And they said, if you can, under the 114 00:07:20.370 --> 00:07:22.759 totality of circumstances, take those off. 115 00:07:24.209 --> 00:07:26.660 Then you'll win. Of course, nothing like that's in the 116 00:07:26.699 --> 00:07:27.800 statutory language. 117 00:07:28.439 --> 00:07:30.699 This was pointed out to Justice Brennan when he wrote 118 00:07:30.740 --> 00:07:34.160 the Jingles decision in 1986, and he said, no, we'll 119 00:07:34.180 --> 00:07:38.439 just do the Senate report. Justice Brennan then invented his 120 00:07:38.540 --> 00:07:42.079 own test, not even found in the legislative history, called 121 00:07:42.139 --> 00:07:45.980 the Jingles preconditions, which essentially said, if you could create 122 00:07:46.579 --> 00:07:52.750 even a marginally compact black district... And blacks, I'm using 123 00:07:52.790 --> 00:07:55.730 blacks as a shorthand for all minorities. And if blacks 124 00:07:55.790 --> 00:07:59.389 are losing, then you have to create that district. And 125 00:07:59.430 --> 00:08:06.259 this went largely unimpeded until we saw Calais. And they 126 00:08:06.740 --> 00:08:10.720 returned for the first time since after the Brnovich decision, 127 00:08:10.740 --> 00:08:13.779 they said, well, let's look at the actual statutory language. 128 00:08:14.379 --> 00:08:17.980 And what the statutory language says is, is blacks are 129 00:08:18.019 --> 00:08:21.319 entitled to a system that is equally open to them 130 00:08:21.689 --> 00:08:24.589 where they don't have less opportunity than other groups. 131 00:08:25.189 --> 00:08:25.829 So it's not a. 132 00:08:25.829 --> 00:08:28.970 Standard which grants them preferential treatment and certainly not a 133 00:08:29.009 --> 00:08:33.070 standard that guarantees them any kind of electoral results. It 134 00:08:33.110 --> 00:08:36.850 just provides an equal opportunity. And that was the linchpin 135 00:08:36.889 --> 00:08:39.559 of the Calais decision. They said, well, how do we 136 00:08:39.600 --> 00:08:43.000

know if minorities have been treated worse than other groups, 137 00:08:43.039 --> 00:08:45.879 have less opportunity? Well, what you do is look at 138 00:08:45.919 --> 00:08:50.210 traditional districting principles that govern all the districts, and you 139 00:08:50.259 --> 00:08:55.190 ask yourself, has the minority district been disadvantaged with respect 140 00:08:55.210 --> 00:08:58.490 to those? And crucially, it said, One of the things 141 00:08:58.549 --> 00:09:03.720 that legislators typically look at is protecting incumbents and otherwise 142 00:09:03.889 --> 00:09:10.000 being partisan, helping the dominant party. And in Louisiana, for example, 143 00:09:10.059 --> 00:09:13.480 they wanted to create the second black majority district, but 144 00:09:13.519 --> 00:09:16.600 it came at the expense of a Republican incumbent. So 145 00:09:16.620 --> 00:09:18.399 they would have had to he would have had to 146 00:09:18.460 --> 00:09:22.169 lose his seat. Well, the Supreme Court quite sensibly said, look, 147 00:09:22.690 --> 00:09:26.429 no other group would the Republicans sacrifice one of their 148 00:09:26.549 --> 00:09:29.750 own and throw an incumbent out. So the notion that 149 00:09:30.149 --> 00:09:32.789 they didn't do it for the black voters hardly suggests 150 00:09:32.929 --> 00:09:36.639 less opportunity. The other important part of Kelly, and then 151 00:09:36.659 --> 00:09:39.179 I'll shut up, is not only did they say that 152 00:09:39.240 --> 00:09:42.159 was based on the statutory language, they said it was 153 00:09:42.220 --> 00:09:45.559 based on the fact that this is enforcing the 15th Amendment. 154 00:09:46.240 --> 00:09:51.250 And the 15th Amendment only prohibits intentional discrimination. So Section 155 00:09:51.250 --> 00:09:54.919 2 can't get at anything that's a pure results test 156 00:09:55.019 --> 00:10:01.159 or outcome-oriented. It's got to have a strong inference of intelligence. discrimination. 157 00:10:01.860 --> 00:10:04.480 In other words, they can go a little bit beyond 158 00:10:04.500 --> 00:10:07.759 the 15th Amendment under the enforcement power, but they have 159 00:10:08.279 --> 00:10:12.590 to be enforcing what's in the 15th Amendment, not a 160 00:10:12.649 --> 00:10:17.549 results-oriented effects test, when the 15th amendment is itself a, uh, 161 00:10:17.789 --> 00:10:20.990 intent test. So under two different ways of looking at it, 162 00:10:21.529 --> 00:10:25.450 did that, did the legislature depart from traditional districting principles 163 00:10:26.009 --> 00:10:29.110 in a different way for this district you're complaining about? 164 00:10:29.129 --> 00:10:32.730 And if they did, there'd usually be a strong inference 165 00:10:32.750 --> 00:10:36.450 that that was motivated by race. So either way, the 166 00:10:36.470 --> 00:10:43.470 standard now is have, uh, Black concentrations or minority concentrations 167 00:10:44.129 --> 00:10:47.990 been treated equally relative to others in the polity, where 168 00:10:48.429 --> 00:10:50.230 for 40 years the law had been they needed to 169 00:10:50.269 --> 00:10:53.049 be treated better. And if you could create a district, 170 00:10:53.100 --> 00:10:55.580 you had to do it. So there's a very important 171 00:10:55.620 --> 00:10:56.649 change in voting rights law. 172 00:10:58.230 --> 00:11:01.830 So, Jeff, Justice Kagan, who wrote the dissent in the 173 00:11:01.870 --> 00:11:06.200 Calais decision, argued that challengers now need to prove not 174 00:11:06.379 --> 00:11:11.379 only vote dilution, but also a race-based motive. And she 175 00:11:11.440 --> 00:11:14.340 said that this was going to be nearly impossible. In 176 00:11:14.419 --> 00:11:18.100 concrete terms, can you tell us what a plaintiff had 177 00:11:18.159 --> 00:11:21.299 to do before Calais and what they must now do? 178 00:11:22.899 --> 00:11:23.279 Sure. 179 00:11:23.399 --> 00:11:25.590 It's a pleasure being with all of you today. It's 180 00:11:25.629 --> 00:11:28.409 good to see Mike Carvin again. He and I worked 181 00:11:28.429 --> 00:11:34.509 together on different sides back in the 1990s, so we're 182 00:11:34.529 --> 00:11:40.840 still around. But Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, 183 00:11:40.919 --> 00:11:47.100 did dissent in Calais, arguing that the Supreme was transforming 184 00:11:47.159 --> 00:11:52.570 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act from an effects-based 185 00:11:52.639 --> 00:11:58.009 protection against racial vote dilution into something approaching an intent-based 186 00:11:58.149 --> 00:12:01.029 prohibition on intentional discrimination. 187 00:12:02.149 --> 00:12:04.970 Her objection goes down. 188 00:12:04.830 --> 00:12:10.049 To the argument that Congress, not the Supreme Court, made 189 00:12:10.090 --> 00:12:13.360 a policy judgment in 1982 when the Voting Rights Act 190 00:12:13.720 --> 00:12:19.700 was amended that discriminatory effects rather than discriminatory intent should 191 00:12:19.720 --> 00:12:25.700 determine Section 2 liability. Justice Kagan contends that the majority 192 00:12:25.759 --> 00:12:32.970 effectively overruled Congress's choice, weakening the Thornburg v. Jingles criteria 193 00:12:33.389 --> 00:12:38.570 and made Section 2 dramatically harder to enforce given the 194 00:12:38.629 --> 00:12:43.299 circumstances under which Congress created Section 2. She argues that 195 00:12:43.379 --> 00:12:49.059 Kelly essentially retained the Jingles framework, where you have to 196 00:12:49.120 --> 00:12:51.440 show three things from the Jingles case. 197 00:12:51.480 --> 00:12:52.679 You've got to show first. 198 00:12:52.440 --> 00:12:57.000 That the minority community is large enough by population, 50% 199 00:12:57.000 --> 00:13:03.149 plus minority voting age population. Second, that those voters vote cohesively, 200 00:13:03.450 --> 00:13:06.450 that their voting patterns are similar. And third, that there's 201 00:13:06.509 -->

00:13:11.309 a significantly high level of racially polarized voting. And if 202 00:13:11.350 --> 00:13:14.289 you meet those three factors, then you throw in the 203 00:13:14.389 --> 00:13:18.070 totality test that Mike talked about, that came out of 204 00:13:18.090 --> 00:13:22.549 the Senate Judiciary Committee factors, and you can move your 205 00:13:22.570 --> 00:13:27.919 case forward. The Calais decision retained the basic Jingles framework, 206 00:13:28.220 --> 00:13:32.000 but substantially modified it so that a Section 2 plaintiff 207 00:13:32.399 --> 00:13:36.840 must show a strong inference of intentional racial discrimination. They 208 00:13:37.320 --> 00:13:41.470 have to disentangle race from partisan and other neutral considerations. 209 00:13:42.000 --> 00:13:44.529 And you have to find that the. 210 00:13:44.450 --> 00:13:56.639 State's legitimate criteria, including compactness, incumbency protection, contiguity, all the state's. 211 00:13:57.889 --> 00:13:59.889 Criteria are also met. 212 00:14:00.929 --> 00:14:04.429 Her objection is that although the majority insists that it 213 00:14:04.529 --> 00:14:09.159 isn't an express intent requirement, the new structure effectively makes 214 00:14:09.720 --> 00:14:11.919 a race-based purpose. 215 00:14:13.100 --> 00:14:18.039 An argument in most cases now. The most useful way. 216 00:14:17.909 --> 00:14:22.169 To understand Justice Kagan's objection is that the pre-Kelley section 217 00:14:22.230 --> 00:14:27.210 to vote dilution cases were principally an effects situation. Now, 218 00:14:27.330 --> 00:14:31.169 after Kelley, the court has added a substantive purpose inquiry, 219 00:14:31.409 --> 00:14:36.289 which brings us back to the pre-1982 congressional amendments standard 220 00:14:36.309 --> 00:14:37.769 from the Mobile v. 221 00:14:37.830 --> 00:14:38.509 Bolden case. 222 00:14:39.860 --> 00:14:44.169 So, in concrete terms, the basic differences are that before Calais, 223 00:14:44.429 --> 00:14:47.230 you had to show that a minority group was sufficiently 224 00:14:47.330 --> 00:14:52.509 large and geographically compact to constitute a majority of voting 225 00:14:52.570 --> 00:14:56.529 age population in a district. That would still be required, 226 00:14:56.610 --> 00:14:58.149 but now you have to do much more. 227 00:14:59.049 --> 00:15:03.470 To also satisfy the state's criteria. Whereas you had to. 228 00:15:03.470 --> 00:15:07.059 Show political cohesion, that's still a requirement, but now there's 229 00:15:07.100 --> 00:15:10.340 a new wrinkle. Plaintiffs have to demonstrate that the relevant 230 00:15:10.379 --> 00:15:16.580 voting patterns persist after controlling for party affiliation, that you 231 00:15:16.679 --> 00:15:19.120 do the same basic inquiry, but you have to show 232 00:15:19.480 --> 00:15:25.960 that racial divergence can't be adequately explained by partisan affiliation alone. 233 00:15:26.799 --> 00:15:30.299 You've got to show the totality of

the circumstances test, 234 00:15:30.679 --> 00:15:34.860 but now the totality test must focus on present-day intentional 235 00:15:35.159 --> 00:15:40.750 racial discrimination, that old discrimination and present disparities attributable to 236 00:15:40.769 --> 00:15:46.110 the continuing effects of discrimination receive substantially less weight. 237 00:15:46.809 --> 00:15:51.169 And again, there's no need to prove discriminatory intent. 238 00:15:51.409 --> 00:15:54.250 You've got to show that there's strong inference that the 239 00:15:54.289 --> 00:15:58.570 state intentionally drew districts to give minority voters an opportunity 240 00:15:58.590 --> 00:16:03.899 to elect. So put very simply, the standard changes that 241 00:16:03.980 --> 00:16:08.700 you're creating an intent test really looking for a. 242 00:16:08.700 --> 00:16:11.039 Smoking gun, which is really very hard to do. 243 00:16:11.490 --> 00:16:14.409 So they're basically saying that this guts section to the 244 00:16:14.470 --> 00:16:17.639 Voting Rights Act is effective in the way it's been 245 00:16:17.679 --> 00:16:19.360 working for the last 40 some odd years. 246 00:16:20.769 --> 00:16:24.600 You know, Mike, as I read the Calais decision, I 247 00:16:24.679 --> 00:16:30.740 found some irony involved in terms of the racial block 248 00:16:30.779 --> 00:16:36.289 voting versus party block voting argument with the GOP now 249 00:16:37.090 --> 00:16:42.070 on the side of not favoring racial block voting. I'm 250 00:16:42.149 --> 00:16:45.629 sure you remember that in the late 80s, early 90s 251 00:16:45.720 --> 00:16:50.080 in particular, the uh, the Republican national committee and, and, uh, 252 00:16:50.179 --> 00:16:54.320 even the general counsel for the RNC, uh, I believe 253 00:16:54.539 --> 00:16:59.590 argued in favor, uh, along with the NAACP of, uh, 254 00:16:59.649 --> 00:17:05.670 these so-called minority safe districts, uh, with the, um, I guess, 255 00:17:05.930 --> 00:17:10.039 understanding that race and party, at least with respect to 256 00:17:10.099 --> 00:17:15.099 black voters are almost, uh, synonymous that, you know, at 257 00:17:15.140 --> 00:17:20.039 various times, as much as 85% of Black voters vote Democratic. 258 00:17:20.779 --> 00:17:24.650 It's much less true of Hispanics. But if you create 259 00:17:25.130 --> 00:17:30.069 safe Black districts, what happens is that you get surrounding 260 00:17:30.150 --> 00:17:37.369 districts that are whiter and more Republican. So I guess 261 00:17:38.569 --> 00:17:41.650 if you could just speak for a moment about that. 262 00:17:42.569 --> 00:17:48.849 Why suddenly the shift in the party on this position? And, 263 00:17:49.230 --> 00:17:53.369 you know, does this have to do with the success 264 00:17:53.809 --> 00:17:57.630 of the Republican Party in terms of having created these 265 00:17:59.059 --> 00:18:04.559 majority white districts in areas that are much more safely GOP'd? 266 00:18:06.140 --> 00:18:10.869 There's always been, and I actively participate in this, so 267 00:18:10.930 --> 00:18:14.309 I can say a very cynical effort, although, by the 268 00:18:14.349 --> 00:18:17.980 Republicans to use the Voting Rights Act for political advantage. 269 00:18:18.359 --> 00:18:22.579 And for the reasons you just articulated, Linda, if you 270 00:18:22.880 --> 00:18:23.279 used to be. 271 00:18:23.279 --> 00:18:27.890 30% say black districts, both of which would elect a 272 00:18:27.920 --> 00:18:31.309 white Democrat. If you put those together, then you've got 273 00:18:31.349 --> 00:18:35.069 a 60% black district and the adjacent district is wide 274 00:18:35.150 --> 00:18:38.349 open for Republicans. In fact, I think by 1996, I 275 00:18:39.450 --> 00:18:42.650 don't think there was a white Democrat in Congress who 276 00:18:42.670 --> 00:18:45.430 was only, they were only being elected from the majority 277 00:18:45.490 --> 00:18:48.910 minority districts. So it had a huge political advantage for 278 00:18:48.930 --> 00:18:52.670 the Republicans, which I'm not going to deny. which makes 279 00:18:52.759 --> 00:18:55.160 my stand all the more principled that I don't think 280 00:18:55.200 --> 00:18:56.559 you should do it even though. 281 00:18:56.400 --> 00:19:01.490 It helps my party. And in terms of racial block voting. 282 00:19:03.210 --> 00:19:06.440 It never made any sense, the initial decision. 283 00:19:07.480 --> 00:19:09.140 Even it was recognized in jingles. 284 00:19:09.759 --> 00:19:12.859 Brennan said, look, if there's a different election result, if 285 00:19:12.940 --> 00:19:15.980 only blacks were voting, then if whites were voting, you've 286 00:19:16.019 --> 00:19:19.119 got racial block voting. Well, we all know that 90 287 00:19:19.119 --> 00:19:23.440 plus percent of blacks vote Democratic. And, you know, almost 288 00:19:23.579 --> 00:19:29.240 all white communities are 50-50 or 60-40 Republican. So you're 289 00:19:29.299 --> 00:19:32.480 always going to have this gap. And Justice White, in 290 00:19:32.519 --> 00:19:36.609 his concurring opinion in Jingles, said, no, that's not the test. 291 00:19:36.960 --> 00:19:39.829 The test is the one they've now brought back in Calais. 292 00:19:40.329 --> 00:19:44.250 The test is, are white Democrats doing— are black Democrats doing 293 00:19:44.349 --> 00:19:47.150 worse than white Democrats? If it just happens to be 294 00:19:47.170 --> 00:19:52.039 a 60 Republican district, you can't throw that district out 295 00:19:52.119 --> 00:19:55.279 because of racial block voting. It just reflects the normal. 296 00:19:55.960 --> 00:20:00.769 We want partisanship, colorblind partisanship to decide these elections. So 297 00:20:00.809 --> 00:20:06.650 you can't condemn it that way. Amazingly, Brennan didn't get 298 00:20:06.730 --> 00:20:10.140 White's vote in that, so he was only a plurality 299 00:20:10.200 --> 00:20:12.839 on racial block voting. I've always thought there was

five 300 00:20:12.900 --> 00:20:16.440 votes rejecting that view of racial block voting, which is, 301 00:20:17.069 --> 00:20:22.890 do minorities win? But amazingly, for 40 years, the Supreme 302 00:20:22.970 --> 00:20:26.430 Court had 15 cases talking about racial block voting and 303 00:20:26.490 --> 00:20:29.319 never defined what it was until Calais. 304 00:20:29.700 --> 00:20:33.180 And this will have another important effect because. 305 00:20:32.960 --> 00:20:38.059 I think particularly these days, There are partisan differences, obviously, 306 00:20:38.099 --> 00:20:41.759 but I think there's very little racial differences among the electorate. 307 00:20:41.799 --> 00:20:45.279 The crossover voting you see, what we call crossover voting, 308 00:20:46.559 --> 00:20:51.500 for Obama and Kamala Harris was no different than really 309 00:20:51.579 --> 00:20:55.680 any other Democratic nominee. I can walk through state elections 310 00:20:55.720 --> 00:20:58.579 where that is equally true. So this notion of a 311 00:20:58.640 --> 00:21:04.470 monolithic white voting bloc defeating black-supported or black candidates is 312 00:21:04.529 --> 00:21:08.519 no longer true. And in any event, you shouldn't have 313 00:21:08.579 --> 00:21:12.440 a test that says voting Republican is violative of the 314 00:21:12.480 --> 00:21:16.029 Voting Rights Act, because that's what the old regime did. 315 00:21:17.359 --> 00:21:22.150 So Jeff, Justice Jackson and other critics of the decision 316 00:21:22.329 --> 00:21:26.190 warned that there would be utter chaos that would ensue 317 00:21:26.650 --> 00:21:31.009 in the wake of this decision. With the midterms literally 318 00:21:31.069 --> 00:21:34.190 just weeks away, what are you seeing in states and 319 00:21:34.259 --> 00:21:38.559 what do you expect will happen with respect to the 320 00:21:38.579 --> 00:21:44.019 Voting Rights Act and this decision before 2028? 321 00:21:44.859 --> 00:21:49.289 Yeah, the word chaos scares people, especially given the closeness 322 00:21:49.329 --> 00:21:53.799 of the elections and with what's happening. With mail-in voting, 323 00:21:53.839 --> 00:21:57.980 with Missouri redistricting, I hate to use the word, but 324 00:21:58.019 --> 00:21:59.720 there's an awful lot going on that could lead to 325 00:21:59.759 --> 00:22:00.460 some chaos. 326 00:22:01.279 --> 00:22:03.180 It's not really hypothetical. 327 00:22:03.619 --> 00:22:07.640 Since the decision came down in Calais in late April, 328 00:22:08.240 --> 00:22:12.319 courts have had to revisit existing cases and states have 329 00:22:12.339 --> 00:22:16.000 been testing the boundaries of the new standard. The Supreme 330 00:22:16.079 --> 00:22:19.500 Court itself has already vacated and remanded several cases for 331 00:22:19.539 --> 00:22:26.150 consideration since Calais. We've seen redistricting in states from Texas, Missouri, 332 00:22:26.190 --> 00:22:28.410 North Carolina, Ohio, Florida, Tennessee. 333 00:22:28.490 --> 00:22:29.809 Louisiana, California. 334 00:22:30.829 --> 00:22:33.710 Voters in Maryland will be taking up a constitutional amendment 335 00:22:33.750 --> 00:22:36.650 question to rejoin the map there just to eliminate one 336 00:22:36.690 --> 00:22:38.230 Republican district in November. 337 00:22:38.250 --> 00:22:41.309 And there's litigation continuing in many of these states. 338 00:22:41.880 --> 00:22:44.559 We just have to look at Missouri for the clearest 339 00:22:44.619 --> 00:22:48.619 example of the kind of confusion that we're seeing. The 340 00:22:48.660 --> 00:22:51.829 state has been fighting over whether to use a new 341 00:22:51.890 --> 00:22:55.730 congressional map enacted in 2025 or to use the map 342 00:22:55.789 --> 00:22:57.690 enacted in. 343 00:22:57.230 --> 00:23:00.190 2022 in November. We're seeing a fight between the. 344 00:23:00.170 --> 00:23:03.680 Federal courts and the state courts over different doctrines as 345 00:23:03.700 --> 00:23:04.900 to which map to use. 346 00:23:05.420 --> 00:23:05.900 While the U.S. 347 00:23:05.920 --> 00:23:13.039 Supreme Court has stayed use of a 2025 map, using 348 00:23:13.099 --> 00:23:16.630 the argument that you should not interfere with elections too 349 00:23:16.690 --> 00:23:22.349 close to Election Day. Another lawsuit was brought just after 350 00:23:22.369 --> 00:23:26.390 the Supreme Court held that, where a federal court judge 351 00:23:26.529 --> 00:23:30.349 stayed the use of the 2022 map to require the 352 00:23:30.470 --> 00:23:33.400 use of the 2025 Jordan map, because that was the 353 00:23:33.500 --> 00:23:37.279 one voters used to vote in the primary in August. 354 00:23:37.880 --> 00:23:40.230 And that the case was brought back to the U.S. 355 00:23:40.259 --> 00:23:43.779 Supreme Court where I think they've got to decide by 356 00:23:44.180 --> 00:23:48.019 September 28th. And it literally can happen any time on 357 00:23:48.039 --> 00:23:50.799 the shadow docket that we'll see whether the Supreme Court 358 00:23:50.819 --> 00:23:53.940 is going to step in again. But we've got the 359 00:23:54.019 --> 00:23:57.740 state courts holding that there was a referendum by the 360 00:23:57.819 --> 00:24:01.940 voters whether or not to use the redrawn map. And 361 00:24:01.980 --> 00:24:03.900 you have the federal court saying, no, use the 2025 362 00:24:03.900 --> 00:24:08.859 map because it was already used. And this is creating, 363 00:24:08.880 --> 00:24:11.049 I mean, there's no resolve to it as we speak 364 00:24:11.109 --> 00:24:18.650 right now. Looking at Alabama, the Supreme Court in 2023 upheld, 365 00:24:18.849 --> 00:24:25.420 using the traditional Thornburg versus Jingles criteria, an Alabama challenge 366 00:24:25.720 --> 00:24:26.960 that there was a violation of. 367 00:24:26.920 --> 00:24:27.819 The Voting Rights Act. 368 00:24:28.500 --> 00:24:32.240 And that case went through the courts after a remand 369 00:24:32.460 -->

00:24:35.579 and a second majority black district was upheld by the 370 00:24:35.640 --> 00:24:39.059 Supreme Court only to find that that's now being undone. 371 00:24:40.200 --> 00:24:43.680 So we were seeing really two tracks now. We see 372 00:24:44.079 --> 00:24:48.470 challenges to maps drawn after Calais and challenges to older 373 00:24:48.529 --> 00:24:51.809 maps that courts now have to reconsider because of Calais. 374 00:24:52.369 --> 00:24:54.670 So I think we're really going to see what goes 375 00:24:54.789 --> 00:24:57.950 on next depending on the outcome of this November's elections. 376 00:24:58.569 --> 00:25:01.660 Will the Democrats or Republicans have a how many seat 377 00:25:01.700 --> 00:25:06.079 majority in Congress? if the Democrats win control and if 378 00:25:06.240 --> 00:25:07.059 it's just by. 379 00:25:06.960 --> 00:25:10.259 Two, three, four seats, they've got a further challenge. 380 00:25:10.319 --> 00:25:13.960 The 2030 census will likely shift population from. 381 00:25:13.740 --> 00:25:16.809 Blue states to red states. So it might be more 382 00:25:16.849 --> 00:25:17.869 of an impetus. 383 00:25:17.569 --> 00:25:23.450 To mid-decade redistrict again before 2028 to make up the 384 00:25:23.470 --> 00:25:27.029 deficit they might suffer given the projected congressional losses they're 385 00:25:27.069 --> 00:25:29.490 going to see after 2030. 386 00:25:29.470 --> 00:25:29.970 If the. 387 00:25:33.049 --> 00:25:35.710 Republicans can maintain control of the House. 388 00:25:36.190 --> 00:25:38.230 Then we're going to see the Democrats even ramping up 389 00:25:38.269 --> 00:25:39.710 the fight even further to try. 390 00:25:39.609 --> 00:25:41.890 To win more in 2028. 391 00:25:41.890 --> 00:25:46.279 And we're looking at fights in states over literally one district. 392 00:25:46.319 --> 00:25:53.019 When you look at Missouri, it's over one district. In Maryland, 393 00:25:53.039 --> 00:25:56.579 it would be over one district. While in New York, 394 00:25:56.759 --> 00:26:00.329 the Democrats could have an opportunity of picking up three 395 00:26:00.369 --> 00:26:02.950 or four districts, that will be a major. 396 00:26:03.150 --> 00:26:06.250 Advantage for the Democrats. But they've got to go through. 397 00:26:06.049 --> 00:26:10.009 A constitutional amendment process where a poll showed back in 398 00:26:10.049 --> 00:26:13.480 June that about 40 percent of the state's voters opposed 399 00:26:14.279 --> 00:26:20.059 mid-decade districting. And if the Democrats do take over the House, 400 00:26:20.519 --> 00:26:22.180 I think you're going to see a lot of action, 401 00:26:22.220 --> 00:26:24.980 at least in the House of Representatives, to revisit the 402 00:26:25.019 --> 00:26:28.650 Voting Rights Act. and to go back to the standards 403 00:26:29.609 --> 00:26:31.150 from the 1982 amendments. 404 00:26:31.269 --> 00:26:33.670 Which required the use of the effects test. 405 00:26:34.309 --> 00:26:36.960 And if the Democrats win the White House, the Senate, 406 00:26:37.660 --> 00:26:41.180 and the House after 2028, I think you'll see much 407 00:26:41.240 --> 00:26:47.210 more action, including a likely ban on partisan gerrymandering at 408 00:26:47.230 --> 00:26:52.069 the congressional level. You'll see efforts to enact a Voting 409 00:26:52.150 --> 00:26:55.210 Rights Act number two to go back to the standards 410 00:26:55.250 --> 00:26:57.619 to the extent they can get around Calais. 411 00:26:57.640 --> 00:27:01.900 So a lot depends on this November's election. A lot 412 00:27:01.940 --> 00:27:05.200 depends on what might happen in the Democratic House next year. 413 00:27:05.759 --> 00:27:08.960 And an awful lot more depends on who wins as 414 00:27:08.980 --> 00:27:14.410 a Democratic trifecta in 2028. And if the Republicans retain 415 00:27:14.529 --> 00:27:17.269 either the House, the Senate or the White House, then 416 00:27:17.309 --> 00:27:20.490 all bets are off on anything impacting 2030. Or I 417 00:27:20.529 --> 00:27:22.769 think the Republicans would have to step up because of 418 00:27:22.829 --> 00:27:26.390 just the numbers speaking for themselves in the upcoming census. 419 00:27:28.180 --> 00:27:29.859 Mike, I want to turn to you sort of as 420 00:27:29.960 --> 00:27:34.440 a follow-up to that, because obviously elections have consequences, and 421 00:27:34.480 --> 00:27:38.509 you might see an attempt to change policies. Certainly, the 422 00:27:38.589 --> 00:27:44.509 re-election of Donald Trump had consequences in this area. We 423 00:27:44.549 --> 00:27:47.410 did have the Supreme Court decision handed down in Students 424 00:27:47.430 --> 00:27:53.049 for Fair Admissions, which essentially said racial preferences in college admissions, 425 00:27:53.109 --> 00:28:00.910 at least, are unconstitutional. You suggested that the Calais decision 426 00:28:00.930 --> 00:28:03.509 in the Voting Rights Act, that an effect standard that 427 00:28:03.609 --> 00:28:10.130 basically is going to give racial preference in terms of 428 00:28:10.289 --> 00:28:17.319 the drawing of district lines might also be unconstitutional. I'm 429 00:28:17.359 --> 00:28:21.680 not sure, and maybe you can elucidate whether the Calais 430 00:28:21.720 --> 00:28:27.440 decision itself went that far, but there are implications in 431 00:28:27.539 --> 00:28:31.640 other areas as well. We have the Office of Legislative Council, 432 00:28:31.700 --> 00:28:36.700 which is taken on the whole concept of disparate impact 433 00:28:36.759 --> 00:28:40.349 theory and employment law and other areas. And so it 434 00:28:40.400 --> 00:28:44.490 really does come down to a debate, again, about what 435 00:28:45.230 --> 00:28:50.289 racial discrimination means. Does it have to be intentional? Does 436 00:28:50.349 --> 00:28:56.519 it have to be explicitly race-based? And Or even if 437 00:28:57.339 --> 00:29:01.579 Jeff's preferred outcomes come true in terms of an

election, 438 00:29:02.500 --> 00:29:05.440 could Congress just simply rewrite the Voting Rights Act and 439 00:29:05.539 --> 00:29:10.440 put something into effect that would basically negate Calais? What 440 00:29:10.599 --> 00:29:12.240 is the solution in this area? 441 00:29:13.799 --> 00:29:17.039 I don't think they can restore the old regime pre-Calais 442 00:29:17.099 --> 00:29:22.400 for two reasons, both constitutional. Again, Calais was very explicit 443 00:29:22.420 --> 00:29:26.039 about that Congress's only power to affect voting in the 444 00:29:26.079 --> 00:29:29.619 racial area is the 15th Amendment. And if you're going 445 00:29:29.640 --> 00:29:34.009 to enforce an amendment that only prohibits intentional discrimination, you 446 00:29:34.049 --> 00:29:38.869 can't go to this entirely different regime, which requires preferential 447 00:29:38.950 --> 00:29:44.039 treatment and quotas. So it would exceed their enforcement power. Now, 448 00:29:44.059 --> 00:29:47.339 wholly apart from that, for example, in the Title VII context, 449 00:29:47.400 --> 00:29:51.769 where they might have some ability to impose an effects test, 450 00:29:53.079 --> 00:29:57.539 That would violate, in my view, the 14th Amendment quite clearly, right? 451 00:29:57.559 --> 00:30:00.559 An effects test is just a fancy name for a quota. 452 00:30:01.240 --> 00:30:05.059 A quota says you need to hire or promote consistent 453 00:30:05.099 --> 00:30:07.299 with the percentage. 454 00:30:06.880 --> 00:30:08.660 In the local. 455 00:30:08.400 --> 00:30:12.890 Community, right? You must hire 25%. An effects test says, 456 00:30:13.349 --> 00:30:17.430 if you don't hire 25%, that has a discriminatory effect. 457 00:30:17.829 --> 00:30:21.619 It's the same thing. So obviously, an effects test that 458 00:30:21.650 --> 00:30:28.380 requires you to engage in this sort of proportional representation through, 459 00:30:28.660 --> 00:30:33.339 quite clearly, racial preferences, I think is quite unconstitutional, not 460 00:30:33.400 --> 00:30:36.789 only under the Shaw cases, but the non-voting cases you 461 00:30:36.829 --> 00:30:44.089 mentioned that prohibit racial favoritism to non-minorities. So I think 462 00:30:44.130 --> 00:30:48.039 Congress is in a constitutional box. I think they'll want to, 463 00:30:48.720 --> 00:30:52.480 and it'll be interesting because as I say, as we 464 00:30:52.539 --> 00:30:56.599 alluded to before, the partisan results of Calais are not 465 00:30:56.640 --> 00:31:00.359 at all clear to me, because again, majority minority districts 466 00:31:00.500 --> 00:31:03.940 used to benefit Republicans. I think in a lot of jurisdictions, 467 00:31:03.980 --> 00:31:07.480 they still do. So we'll see really how intent they 468 00:31:07.640 --> 00:31:12.619 are at resurrecting the majority minority districts. From a political perspective, 469 00:31:12.700 --> 00:31:17.710 Democrats want 35% minority districts, because then you don't waste 470

00:31:17.769 --> 00:31:21.549 any votes and you elect Democrats. They don't want 50% 471 00:31:21.549 --> 00:31:23.009 majority minority districts. 472 00:31:24.980 --> 00:31:26.680 Jeff, I want to go back to you and ask 473 00:31:26.720 --> 00:31:30.740 you the question, again, sort of taking a look at 474 00:31:30.839 --> 00:31:34.460 what the results of this decision are going to be. 475 00:31:35.039 --> 00:31:40.539 What if it turns out that even under the Calais standards, 476 00:31:41.000 --> 00:31:44.339 we don't see a diminution in the number of black 477 00:31:44.420 --> 00:31:51.980 elected officials? You know, certainly when Proposition 209 was passed 478 00:31:52.160 --> 00:31:56.599 in the state of California last which was basically outlawing 479 00:31:56.640 --> 00:32:00.799 racial preferences in college admissions. Yes, there was a drop 480 00:32:01.180 --> 00:32:04.559 in attendance of blacks and Latinos at some of the 481 00:32:04.619 --> 00:32:08.809 flagship schools like Berkeley and UCLA. But in fact, there 482 00:32:08.849 --> 00:32:12.829 was an expansion of those students, not just attending the schools, 483 00:32:12.950 --> 00:32:18.589 but graduating from them at less competitive institutions in the 484 00:32:18.609 --> 00:32:25.059 California system. So what happens if the sky doesn't fall 485 00:32:25.519 --> 00:32:29.000 and you don't see a drop? Will there finally be 486 00:32:29.019 --> 00:32:33.319 a concession that, you know, maybe this effect standard is 487 00:32:33.829 --> 00:32:37.329 not all that it's cracked up to be and things 488 00:32:37.410 --> 00:32:40.170 are not as bad as we thought in terms of 489 00:32:41.269 --> 00:32:44.539 efforts to dilute the black vote? 490 00:32:45.789 --> 00:32:48.039 I think I'll have a better answer for you after 491 00:32:48.059 --> 00:32:50.200 the November election is to see. But what we are 492 00:32:50.640 --> 00:32:54.559 witnessing are efforts by the current black office holders in 493 00:32:54.599 --> 00:33:00.220 Congress running in the districts that were redrawn, especially North Carolina. 494 00:33:00.240 --> 00:33:03.660 I think it's the first district where the district was redrawn. 495 00:33:04.400 --> 00:33:09.329 Eastern North Carolina has been a traditionally democratic stronghold, electing 496 00:33:10.009 --> 00:33:13.410 black representatives to Congress for quite a while. 497 00:33:13.430 --> 00:33:14.849 The district was redrawn. 498 00:33:15.460 --> 00:33:19.059 And the black incumbent is running to win that district 499 00:33:19.140 --> 00:33:24.690 in a now majority white district. So we've seen in Memphis, 500 00:33:24.730 --> 00:33:27.990 the district that was redrawn there in Tennessee had a 501 00:33:28.069 --> 00:33:32.029 white representative in the black district. And not all minority 502 00:33:32.069 --> 00:33:34.950 districts are represented by minority office holders. 503 00:33:35.130 --> 00:33:37.490 And there are some white majority. 504 00:33:37.069 --> 00:33:40.990 Districts that have black elected officials or Hispanic elected officials. 505 00:33:41.049 --> 00:33:44.490 So there's no real one size fits all. ideally would 506 00:33:44.529 --> 00:33:50.089 like to see a colorblind society. But, you know, really, it's. 507 00:33:49.869 --> 00:33:51.109 A two-sided issue here. 508 00:33:51.190 --> 00:33:54.309 In some instances, you do have high levels of racially 509 00:33:54.369 --> 00:34:00.609 polarized voting, where it's almost impossible for a minority preferred 510 00:34:00.670 --> 00:34:05.559 candidate to win. In other places, you have communities electing 511 00:34:05.599 --> 00:34:09.420 minority preferred candidates where they don't control the vote. So 512 00:34:09.500 --> 00:34:13.980 it's really a situation where I like to think back 513 00:34:14.099 --> 00:34:18.489 to the Shelby County versus Holder decision from 2013 that 514 00:34:18.510 --> 00:34:21.469 eliminated the trigger for Section 5 of the Voting Rights 515 00:34:21.530 --> 00:34:27.159 Act where Chief Justice Roberts wrote a much different picture 516 00:34:27.179 --> 00:34:31.219 of what the country looked like than Justice Ginsburg did 517 00:34:31.239 --> 00:34:31.980 in her dissent. 518 00:34:33.900 --> 00:34:35.460 Chief Justice Roberts talked. 519 00:34:35.239 --> 00:34:40.159 About how America has changed dramatically since 1965. This decision 520 00:34:40.199 --> 00:34:44.050 came down in 2013 and that we've seen many, many 521 00:34:44.110 --> 00:34:51.969 more black and Hispanic candidates running for and winning election. 522 00:34:51.989 --> 00:34:57.610 Then we had Justice Ginsburg talking about not throwing away 523 00:34:57.630 --> 00:35:01.940 your umbrella while it's still raining if you're not getting wet. So, 524 00:35:01.960 --> 00:35:05.559 you know, this really really differs district to district, state 525 00:35:05.599 --> 00:35:09.519 to state. But leave it to say that there are 526 00:35:09.579 --> 00:35:12.730 still instances where it's going to be very hard for 527 00:35:12.750 --> 00:35:16.329 a minority for a candidate to win. And we'll have 528 00:35:16.369 --> 00:35:19.010 to just see what the Congress looks like next year 529 00:35:19.050 --> 00:35:20.530 to have a better conclusion on that. 530 00:35:21.820 --> 00:35:25.559 I noticed you used the term, Jeff, minority preferred candidate. 531 00:35:25.599 --> 00:35:28.679 Does that minority preferred candidate have to be a member 532 00:35:28.739 --> 00:35:29.800 of the same minority? 533 00:35:29.820 --> 00:35:33.119 No, it would be very clear on that. 534 00:35:33.320 --> 00:35:35.460 Thank you for asking. I'm very careful as to how 535 00:35:35.519 --> 00:35:36.199 I put it. 536 00:35:37.159 --> 00:35:42.050 The law does not require a minority candidate to run 537 00:35:42.199 --> 00:35:47.619 in and win in a minority election. district that the 538 00:35:47.679 --> 00:35:51.840 Voting Rights Act applies to the

voters, not to the candidates. 539 00:35:52.420 --> 00:35:56.449 This was actually litigated back in New York in the 540 00:35:56.469 --> 00:36:01.530 1980s when a white city council member was redistricted out 541 00:36:01.550 --> 00:36:04.329 of her district because she wasn't black. And she went 542 00:36:04.369 --> 00:36:07.550 to court and won her challenge saying that she need 543 00:36:07.590 --> 00:36:10.159 not be black to win a district. And she did 544 00:36:10.219 --> 00:36:13.219 win her reelection. This goes back now 40 years ago, 545 00:36:13.260 --> 00:36:14.219 but it's set a standard. 546 00:36:16.340 --> 00:36:20.840 Let me throw that to you, Mike. You know, as 547 00:36:21.099 --> 00:36:24.010 long as you have, at least in the black community, 548 00:36:24.190 --> 00:36:32.000 quite a polarized voting pattern that does a minority preferred 549 00:36:32.079 --> 00:36:36.539 candidate wrong. automatically mean a Democrat? I mean, I can think, 550 00:36:36.559 --> 00:36:39.019 you know, you have people like Byron Donalds running for 551 00:36:39.340 --> 00:36:41.960 governor in the state of Florida. He's obviously black. He's 552 00:36:42.000 --> 00:36:47.010 running on the GOP. And Hispanics throw another wrinkle into it. 553 00:36:47.039 --> 00:36:50.239 I wrote a whole book about the way in which 554 00:36:50.320 --> 00:36:56.300 Hispanics are somewhat different in terms of their trajectory into 555 00:36:56.340 --> 00:37:00.030 the American mainstream. So what are your thoughts on that? 556 00:37:01.369 --> 00:37:02.710 Well, Jeff's entirely right. 557 00:37:02.769 --> 00:37:05.630 It's absurd to think that you need to elect a 558 00:37:05.670 --> 00:37:09.059 black candidate for a black district. In fact, your old boss, 559 00:37:09.119 --> 00:37:11.840 I didn't realize you worked for Rodino, he came from 560 00:37:11.880 --> 00:37:16.159 a district of very high minority population. There have been 561 00:37:16.199 --> 00:37:19.590 other examples. I think there's one in Tennessee now where 562 00:37:19.630 --> 00:37:24.349 that happens. As a general matter, Voters are just taking 563 00:37:24.530 --> 00:37:27.400 much less account of race than they did when the 564 00:37:27.440 --> 00:37:30.500 Voting Rights Act was amended. Again, we can look at 565 00:37:30.559 --> 00:37:33.980 the national scene and Obama got support in all kinds 566 00:37:34.039 --> 00:37:36.570 of states, even Harris did, who was, I thought, quite 567 00:37:36.590 --> 00:37:37.769 a weak candidate there. 568 00:37:38.090 --> 00:37:39.550 And we see it all over. 569 00:37:40.010 --> 00:37:45.050 So I don't think these apocalyptic concerns about diminishing minority 570 00:37:45.110 --> 00:37:48.320 representation are probably going to come true. I think there's 571 00:37:48.340 --> 00:37:51.320 a couple other practical points, too, which is, as I've 572 00:37:51.340 --> 00:37:53.539 alluded to, I don't know that the Republicans will have 573 00:37:53.619

--> 00:38:00.510 much incentive to systematically dismantle majority minority districts because generally 574 00:38:00.570 --> 00:38:05.210 they like the status quo. They like siphoning off non-Republican voters. 575 00:38:06.050 --> 00:38:09.250 into those districts. And let's face it, there's a lot 576 00:38:09.269 --> 00:38:13.980 of problems with majority minority districts. If they are perceived, 577 00:38:14.539 --> 00:38:17.980 if you are perceived as a, quote, minority candidate, you're 578 00:38:18.000 --> 00:38:21.039 probably going to have a tough time getting more mainstream, 579 00:38:21.199 --> 00:38:25.139 wide open support. Barack Obama lost a primary to run 580 00:38:25.159 --> 00:38:30.489 in a predominantly black district for Congress. And it was 581 00:38:30.530 --> 00:38:33.210 very helpful to him that he lost that primary because 582 00:38:33.250 --> 00:38:36.039 if he'd won, he would have been stuck in, you know, 583 00:38:36.079 --> 00:38:39.260 what is sort of a legislative ghetto of being from 584 00:38:39.320 --> 00:38:42.840 a black district and being a black representative. Whereas he 585 00:38:42.880 --> 00:38:46.210 was forced out of that and started making bridges and 586 00:38:46.369 --> 00:38:51.309 creating a broader coalition. So even from the Democrats' perspective 587 00:38:51.349 --> 00:38:56.469 and even from the minority Democrats' perspective, these majority minority 588 00:38:56.510 --> 00:39:00.219 districts have always been a two-way street. And I think 589 00:39:00.239 --> 00:39:03.480 we'll see that these sort of the sky is falling 590 00:39:03.519 --> 00:39:05.320 predictions really won't bear out. 591 00:39:07.219 --> 00:39:13.559 Okay. Before I want to open up the Q & 592 00:39:12.860 --> 00:39:16.940 A from the audience, and we have several that have 593 00:39:16.980 --> 00:39:20.320 been submitted and anyone else who wants to ask a question, 594 00:39:20.409 --> 00:39:22.570 get it in there in the Q & A box. 595 00:39:23.670 --> 00:39:26.269 But I'm going to, it doesn't say which of you 596 00:39:27.170 --> 00:39:29.010 they want to answer the question. So I'll let you 597 00:39:29.050 --> 00:39:33.500 both have a chance at it. But one question came 598 00:39:33.940 --> 00:39:37.800 from Andy Jackson, who said, much has been made of 599 00:39:37.880 --> 00:39:41.099 the impact of Calais in the South, but how about 600 00:39:41.159 --> 00:39:45.789 states like Minnesota that specifically use racial data to draw districts? 601 00:39:48.269 --> 00:39:50.590 Go ahead. Go ahead, Mike. 602 00:39:51.949 --> 00:39:55.590 No, they were amazingly blatant about how racially driven these 603 00:39:55.650 --> 00:39:59.940 districts were. Then we had the Shaw cases, as you know, 604 00:40:00.420 --> 00:40:03.159 where if race was your predominant purpose, they could strike 605 00:40:03.219 --> 00:40:06.440 down the district. So just to show you what an 606 00:40:06.800 --> 00:40:10.579 incredibly incompetent

lawyer I was, I told all my clients 607 00:40:10.820 --> 00:40:13.280 when we were in New York with Jeff in the 90s, 608 00:40:13.809 --> 00:40:16.929 draw whatever majority minority districts you want. There's a case 609 00:40:17.010 --> 00:40:19.710 out there. They can be real ugly. Well, then Shaw 610 00:40:19.750 --> 00:40:23.130 comes along and says, no, you can't have race as 611 00:40:23.170 --> 00:40:26.550 your predominant purpose. I would not put any of the 612 00:40:26.610 --> 00:40:30.460 drafters of those plans on the stand to perjure themselves 613 00:40:30.519 --> 00:40:34.039 and say race wasn't the predominant purpose. in these districts 614 00:40:34.119 --> 00:40:39.860 because it inevitably was. And so I think even before Calais, 615 00:40:40.340 --> 00:40:44.460 those kinds of explicitly racially drawn districts would have been 616 00:40:44.500 --> 00:40:50.360 struck down under the Shaw. And now Calais will add 617 00:40:50.400 --> 00:40:52.300 even extra force to those cases. 618 00:40:53.280 --> 00:40:54.940 Do you want to weigh in on this, Jeff? 619 00:40:54.960 --> 00:40:58.730 Yes. Yeah, I mean, states and redistrictors have been faced 620 00:40:58.789 --> 00:41:01.039 with a really tough test for. 621 00:41:00.840 --> 00:41:02.280 A long time now. 622 00:41:02.500 --> 00:41:05.880 How do you achieve compliance with the Voting Rights Act 623 00:41:06.219 --> 00:41:11.610 where you have direct examples, clear as day examples of 624 00:41:12.010 --> 00:41:18.000 racial vote dilution? and remedying those situations by drawing new 625 00:41:18.059 --> 00:41:23.139 districts versus then drawing those districts and then not violating 626 00:41:23.159 --> 00:41:28.809 the 14th Amendment's bar against racial gerrymandering. It's the biggest 627 00:41:28.849 --> 00:41:31.670 question I've been asked. is one of the hardest to answer. 628 00:41:32.250 --> 00:41:36.530 And my answer has generally been that to determine a 629 00:41:36.590 --> 00:41:39.849 Voting Rights Act violation, you have to use race. 630 00:41:40.250 --> 00:41:42.070 It's plain as day. 631 00:41:42.090 --> 00:41:46.429 And that you should determine by having an expert come 632 00:41:46.489 --> 00:41:51.599 in and do all the algorithmic formulas to see is 633 00:41:51.639 --> 00:41:55.260 there racially polarized voting? And if there is, what percent 634 00:41:55.380 --> 00:41:59.860 of the population is needed to elect a minority preferred candidate? 635 00:42:00.460 --> 00:42:02.860 And then if you meet those tests to draw a 636 00:42:02.940 --> 00:42:07.159 district that is reasonably and rationally and objectively. 637 00:42:06.619 --> 00:42:10.139 Compact and meets other kinds of criteria, but. 638 00:42:10.039 --> 00:42:15.460 At least demonstrates the opportunity to elect a minority preferred candidate. 639 00:42:15.960 --> 00:42:19.320 If you go beyond that threshold, then you're going into 640 00:42:19.360 --> 00:42:23.789 the world of racial gerrymandering, wasting minority votes and violating 641 00:42:23.829 --> 00:42:28.000 the Constitution. And the Calais case got us away from 642 00:42:28.039 --> 00:42:32.179 that because there were other political considerations in Louisiana to 643 00:42:32.219 --> 00:42:35.949 protect incumbents that we won't necessarily get into now. But 644 00:42:36.050 --> 00:42:40.570 Calais was really the wrong case to get decided this year. 645 00:42:40.909 --> 00:42:44.550 If my advice had been followed that you've determined how. 646 00:42:44.469 --> 00:42:48.320 Far you have to go to comply at a threshold level, 647 00:42:48.949 --> 00:42:52.300 minimum level with the Voting Rights Act. and not go 648 00:42:52.400 --> 00:42:57.480 overboard to enter into 14th, 15th Amendment no-no land. 649 00:42:58.940 --> 00:43:00.679 We have a... Go ahead. Sure. 650 00:43:00.920 --> 00:43:01.360 Go ahead, Mike. 651 00:43:01.639 --> 00:43:03.000 I'm going to agree with Jeff, so I want to 652 00:43:03.019 --> 00:43:05.420 get in. That was the best advice and the same 653 00:43:05.480 --> 00:43:08.480 dilemma we all had. Section 2 is saying create these districts. 654 00:43:09.000 --> 00:43:12.239 14th Amendment is saying don't create these districts. And we 655 00:43:12.300 --> 00:43:14.860 all threaded the needle the way that Jeff said. But 656 00:43:14.940 --> 00:43:17.340 I don't think Calais allows you to do that anymore. 657 00:43:17.860 --> 00:43:18.800 You have this bizarre. 658 00:43:19.869 --> 00:43:23.300 notion in the Shaw case is that Section 2 provided 659 00:43:23.320 --> 00:43:27.159 a compelling government interest for race-based redistricting, which makes no 660 00:43:27.219 --> 00:43:31.329 sense because obviously a statute is subordinate to the Constitution. 661 00:43:31.409 --> 00:43:35.670 So Section 2 can't override the 14th Amendment. And Calais 662 00:43:35.690 --> 00:43:38.170 dealt with this issue directly. And it said, well, when 663 00:43:38.210 --> 00:43:40.380 we said that, we just meant a Section 2 that 664 00:43:40.409 --> 00:43:44.119 was consistent with the Constitution, not one that goes beyond 665 00:43:44.159 --> 00:43:45.000 the Constitution. 666 00:43:45.400 --> 00:43:46.300 And that gave them. 667 00:43:46.179 --> 00:43:50.360 The opening to talk about why Section 2, properly interpreted, 668 00:43:50.539 --> 00:43:53.679 is the same or roughly the same as the 15th Amendment. 669 00:43:54.199 --> 00:43:57.400 So I don't think you'll have any Section 2 justification anymore. 670 00:43:58.019 --> 00:44:01.679 Because Calais is clear you don't have to create these districts, 671 00:44:02.090 --> 00:44:05.510 so they've eliminated that pressure on you to create these districts, 672 00:44:05.969 --> 00:44:10.610 plus which they've made clear even if you misinterpret Section 2, 673 00:44:10.610 --> 00:44:12.929 it's not going to be an excuse under the 14th 674 00:44:12.969 --> 00:44:17.079 Amendment challenge to the race-based

district. Again, I think the 675 00:44:17.139 --> 00:44:20.900 practicalities of these might dictate a lot of this. 676 00:44:21.420 --> 00:44:22.900 I don't know that there's going to be a lot. 677 00:44:23.420 --> 00:44:26.019 I don't think they're going to create new majority minority 678 00:44:26.039 --> 00:44:28.679 districts under Calais, but I don't know that they're going 679 00:44:28.699 --> 00:44:33.050 to go back and revisit it. Black and Hispanic incumbents 680 00:44:33.090 --> 00:44:33.329 have a. 681 00:44:33.329 --> 00:44:37.630 Lot of power. You don't want to needlessly alienate their constituencies. 682 00:44:38.250 --> 00:44:41.670 And generally, Republicans in most of these states are pretty 683 00:44:41.750 --> 00:44:44.840 happy with the results of the map. So as Jeff 684 00:44:44.880 --> 00:44:47.980 mentioned earlier, you might be talking about one or two districts, 685 00:44:48.019 --> 00:44:51.159 but you're not talking about sort of a wholesale revision 686 00:44:51.590 --> 00:44:52.090 of a plan. 687 00:44:53.800 --> 00:44:56.760 I've got a very long question and a very detailed one, 688 00:44:56.820 --> 00:45:01.760 which I'm going to read, that was submitted by one 689 00:45:01.800 --> 00:45:06.809 of our attendees, an anonymous attendee. Can you focus on 690 00:45:06.849 --> 00:45:14.010 the majority's requirement that plaintiffs must simultaneously, A, meet the 691 00:45:14.050 --> 00:45:17.969 burden of demonstrating that a map could include an additional 692 00:45:18.070 --> 00:45:25.869 performing minority district, and B, create that demonstrative map without 693 00:45:25.969 --> 00:45:29.389 considering race the same way that a state would? And 694 00:45:29.449 --> 00:45:34.199 does that make any sense when 14A' s restriction prevents governments 695 00:45:34.239 --> 00:45:40.219 from considering race and plaintiffs are notoriously not states? How 696 00:45:40.280 --> 00:45:44.570 could the plaintiff ever prove the possibility of doing something 697 00:45:44.619 --> 00:45:45.769 they cannot consider? 698 00:45:47.889 --> 00:45:51.789 Yeah, I think he may be overly literalistic in his interpretation. 699 00:45:52.429 --> 00:45:55.230 The key point is plaintiffs are not states. So if 700 00:45:55.269 --> 00:45:58.210 you have a motivated minority group, they can say, look, 701 00:45:58.250 --> 00:46:00.409 we should have had a district here. And if you 702 00:46:00.449 --> 00:46:03.369 had applied the same criteria that you'd applied to the 703 00:46:03.409 --> 00:46:06.570 rest of the state, you would have created this district. 704 00:46:07.190 --> 00:46:13.099 That's a very daunting standard because legislatures typically don't treat 705 00:46:13.139 --> 00:46:16.840 minority concentrations worse. For 40 years, they've been treating them 706 00:46:16.940 --> 00:46:21.139 much better. So all that's being eliminated from the plaintiff's 707 00:46:21.639 --> 00:46:25.380 handbook is saying, look, you can create this district. Sure, 708 00:46:25.440 --> 00:46:28.980 it's not compact, and sure, you have to ignore incumbency, 709 00:46:29.019 --> 00:46:32.099 and sure, it's bad for the dominant party, but you 710 00:46:32.119 --> 00:46:35.300 need to go ahead and do it anyway. Now, they've 711 00:46:35.340 --> 00:46:38.119 got to come in and say something like, here's a 712 00:46:38.179 --> 00:46:41.519 district that's out there that doesn't hurt you politically, that 713 00:46:41.900 --> 00:46:44.429 satisfies your other traditional districting principles. 714 00:46:44.949 --> 00:46:45.550 I think that's a. 715 00:46:45.650 --> 00:46:50.969 Very thin set because in all candor, any majority minority 716 00:46:51.010 --> 00:46:54.099 districts that could have been created after what the Justice 717 00:46:54.139 --> 00:46:56.360 Department and the courts were forcing people to do in 718 00:46:56.380 --> 00:47:00.250 the 90s and the zeros and the tens, they're already there. 719 00:47:00.789 --> 00:47:03.949 So the notion that there's some new magical districts out 720 00:47:04.010 --> 00:47:08.239 there outside of, I guess, Alabama and Louisiana is not true. 721 00:47:08.519 --> 00:47:10.650 I mean, I litigated the Alabama case in the 90s, 722 00:47:10.760 --> 00:47:13.389 and it was the same issue. Should we create two 723 00:47:13.449 --> 00:47:18.010 or one black district? So I don't think there's anything 724 00:47:18.090 --> 00:47:23.150 new out have a dilemma, but it's not the dilemma 725 00:47:23.210 --> 00:47:27.070 the question goes to. You can always say this complies 726 00:47:27.090 --> 00:47:31.030 with your principles if you can come up with that district. 727 00:47:31.190 --> 00:47:32.630 I think the tough thing is going to be coming 728 00:47:32.670 --> 00:47:33.489 up with that district. 729 00:47:34.630 --> 00:47:36.429 You might be able to show that there's a district 730 00:47:36.469 --> 00:47:39.909 that's currently electing a minority candidate, him or herself, that 731 00:47:39.949 --> 00:47:43.090 might be majority white, that will elect that person for 732 00:47:43.110 --> 00:47:46.340 the time being. But once that person leaves, the district 733 00:47:46.400 --> 00:47:51.150 might not be seen as a minority held district. You know, 734 00:47:51.250 --> 00:47:53.590 it's a hard thing to really focus in on, but 735 00:47:54.190 --> 00:47:56.889 a lot of it might be personality driven, situation and 736 00:47:56.929 --> 00:48:00.789 circumstance driven, depending on how the voting patterns are in 737 00:48:00.829 --> 00:48:03.829 a given state. So much changes state to state, year 738 00:48:03.849 --> 00:48:04.219 to year now. 739 00:48:06.590 --> 00:48:10.289 We have a final question. Should every state after an 740 00:48:10.369 --> 00:48:15.969 election create their own redistricting laws accordingly by their own census? 741 00:48:16.030 --> 00:48:19.150 I'm not quite sure what they mean by their own census. 742 00:48:19.230 -->

00:48:23.070 I'm assuming they mean by the numbers in the official census. 743 00:48:23.150 --> 00:48:26.050 But that raises a bigger question since we're talking about 744 00:48:26.130 --> 00:48:31.079 downstream effects. And since clearly there was an imprimatur for 745 00:48:31.139 --> 00:48:37.550 being able to redistrict on partisan basis implied in this decision, 746 00:48:39.340 --> 00:48:44.360 Are we in a better place in terms of the 747 00:48:44.440 --> 00:48:47.599 scheme of the Constitution and the way we set up 748 00:48:47.679 --> 00:48:53.849 elections to have redistricting take place more than once every 749 00:48:53.849 --> 00:48:59.250 10 years? At what point does this become almost nonsensical 750 00:49:00.130 --> 00:49:03.949 and comical that we have every election you get a 751 00:49:04.010 --> 00:49:06.929 new map? I'll let you answer that first, Mike. 752 00:49:08.510 --> 00:49:12.260 Oh, I'm going to echo, I think, well, Jeff walked 753 00:49:12.280 --> 00:49:14.539 through all the problems that have been created. And I 754 00:49:14.579 --> 00:49:16.619 think they're less of Calais than I think there is 755 00:49:16.679 --> 00:49:22.670 just this newfound desire to engage in mid redistricting. And look, 756 00:49:22.969 --> 00:49:25.829 I guess Texas was pretty naked about it. They had 757 00:49:25.869 --> 00:49:28.590 a partisan intent. But then you had bizarre. I mean, 758 00:49:28.949 --> 00:49:31.969 California is like, no, we're going to wipe every Republican 759 00:49:32.070 --> 00:49:35.900 off the map. Illinois is, well, we've got two Republicans left. 760 00:49:35.920 --> 00:49:39.219 We're going to destroy them. Maryland's got one. They want 761 00:49:39.239 --> 00:49:43.940 to go take him out. Massachusetts has zero. So when 762 00:49:43.980 --> 00:49:47.280 I hear about all these Republican gerrymanders, I sort of giggle. 763 00:49:47.539 --> 00:49:50.219 New York, as Jeff points out, wants to do it 764 00:49:50.280 --> 00:49:54.610 as well. So do I think there's a good reason 765 00:49:54.630 --> 00:49:58.929 to do it? I generally think mid-decade redistricting is a 766 00:49:58.949 --> 00:50:03.710 bad idea with the caveat that sometimes the initial redistricting 767 00:50:03.750 --> 00:50:07.309 gets so involved in all this torturous litigation that always 768 00:50:07.369 --> 00:50:11.630 accompanies redistricting. You really don't have things settled till, say, 769 00:50:11.710 --> 00:50:13.090 four years into the decade. 770 00:50:13.510 --> 00:50:15.130 But other than that, no. 771 00:50:16.250 --> 00:50:20.579 I'm, you know, I'll argue differently if my clients got sued. 772 00:50:20.639 --> 00:50:23.719 But no, generally, there's no good reason to keep doing this. 773 00:50:24.179 --> 00:50:27.099 And as you've seen this cycle, it just leads to 774 00:50:27.139 --> 00:50:31.090 retaliation in other states. So it has this spiraling effect 775 00:50:31.530 --> 00:50:34.389 where nobody has any certainty

about their districts. 776 00:50:35.360 --> 00:50:39.110 And generally, I'll just add in 1964, Chief Justice Earl 777 00:50:39.139 --> 00:50:42.929 Warren in the decision Reynolds versus Sims, which first started 778 00:50:42.969 --> 00:50:47.280 spelling out how you actually draw districts, what federal standards are. 779 00:50:47.530 --> 00:50:51.190 This is all following the 1962 Baker versus Carr decision 780 00:50:51.210 --> 00:50:55.409 that said these are actually justiciable challenges to bring to court. 781 00:50:56.389 --> 00:51:01.949 The chief justice said that it's reasonable to redraw these district. 782 00:51:01.610 --> 00:51:03.159 Lines once every 10 years. 783 00:51:04.010 --> 00:51:07.599 That even though the population changes the day after the census, 784 00:51:08.139 --> 00:51:11.380 this snapshot of the population is good enough for a decade. 785 00:51:11.400 --> 00:51:15.750 And it wasn't until after 2000, when the Republicans took 786 00:51:15.829 --> 00:51:19.989 over the Texas legislature, where then-majority leader Tom DeLay thought, 787 00:51:20.349 --> 00:51:24.130 Let's redraw the congressional map because we can win more seats. 788 00:51:24.780 --> 00:51:27.099 And that, of course, got litigated. I think it was. 789 00:51:27.039 --> 00:51:30.659 Justice Scalia who opined that there's no federal bar to 790 00:51:30.719 --> 00:51:34.940 mid-decade congressional districting. And not that many states took up 791 00:51:35.000 --> 00:51:41.710 the challenge in the 2000s. And state constitutions that indicate 792 00:51:41.750 --> 00:51:44.929 you can only redistrict once per decade shall do it 793 00:51:45.050 --> 00:51:49.070 once per decade. But then you have Donald Trump calling 794 00:51:49.380 --> 00:51:52.780 Greg Abbott and saying, give me five more districts. And 795 00:51:52.800 --> 00:51:56.440 it's all falling apart for nothing more than partisan gain. 796 00:51:56.880 --> 00:52:02.090 And Democratic states, Republican states alike now have unleashed this fear. 797 00:52:03.460 --> 00:52:08.239 war down to the single districts to win control. And, 798 00:52:08.260 --> 00:52:12.429 you know, Maryland's Democratic leaders were opposed. The Senate president 799 00:52:12.449 --> 00:52:17.550 was opposed to mid-decade districting. He thought legally, rationally, sensibly, 800 00:52:17.570 --> 00:52:21.309 you know, not to do it. But then pressure writing 801 00:52:21.349 --> 00:52:24.230 on the wall that that state eliminated two seats there 802 00:52:24.250 --> 00:52:25.989 and two states there that have nothing left to do 803 00:52:26.030 --> 00:52:29.070 but to eliminate one state here. I think by 2028, 804 00:52:29.070 --> 00:52:32.750 we'll have eliminated or sought to eliminate so many One 805 00:52:32.789 --> 00:52:35.050 state differences. 806 00:52:34.869 --> 00:52:36.030 That will be in 2030. 807 00:52:36.030 --> 00:52:40.159 And this could all repeat itself over again because, you know, 808 00:52:40.179 --> 00:52:43.659 there's no bar to it unless state constitutions don't allow 809 00:52:43.699 --> 00:52:47.159 you to. If that happens, you amend your constitution. That's 810 00:52:47.179 --> 00:52:50.599 what we saw happen in California. It could happen in Maryland. 811 00:52:50.659 --> 00:52:52.699 It could happen in New York. It tried to happen 812 00:52:52.739 --> 00:52:56.619 in Virginia. And the courts stopped it on the technicality. 813 00:52:56.639 --> 00:52:59.199 And this is not what Mike and I ever thought 814 00:52:59.219 --> 00:53:01.000 we'd be getting into 30, 40 years later in our careers. 815 00:53:03.159 --> 00:53:05.920 But it's very good for redistricting lawyers because now it's 816 00:53:05.940 --> 00:53:06.480 a decade. 817 00:53:06.500 --> 00:53:09.079 People would see me this time of decade and say, 818 00:53:09.159 --> 00:53:09.960 why are you here? 819 00:53:10.019 --> 00:53:12.440 Like, what year is it? And now it's like, oh, 820 00:53:12.780 --> 00:53:15.480 you're back. Thank God you're here. We need you so badly. 821 00:53:15.960 --> 00:53:16.500 Yeah, right. 822 00:53:16.539 --> 00:53:19.139 Well, I will say, guys, you may be out of 823 00:53:19.659 --> 00:53:23.570 work soon anyway because AI could do this a lot 824 00:53:23.730 --> 00:53:26.349 quicker and probably more efficiently. 825 00:53:26.429 --> 00:53:27.590 We're dealing with that too. 826 00:53:28.170 --> 00:53:33.130 There's something called ensemble redistricting where mathematicians who've entered the 827 00:53:33.170 --> 00:53:37.349 redistricting world about five, six years ago run thousands of maps, 828 00:53:37.389 --> 00:53:38.889 but they have to give it to the lawyers to 829 00:53:38.969 --> 00:53:40.110 argue pro or con. 830 00:53:40.989 --> 00:53:46.340 That's true. Mike, any last thoughts before I turn this 831 00:53:46.440 --> 00:53:47.239 back to Lily? 832 00:53:50.630 --> 00:53:54.630 No, other than to say, I know this decision has 833 00:53:54.690 --> 00:53:57.510 engendered a lot of criticism, but I really think it's 834 00:53:57.530 --> 00:54:04.510 a very hopeful step in American society. In 2026, it's 835 00:54:04.510 --> 00:54:10.090 70 years, 72 years since Brown, 60 years since the 836 00:54:10.449 --> 00:54:11.309 Civil Rights Act. 837 00:54:11.909 --> 00:54:14.130 At some point, we really have. 838 00:54:13.900 --> 00:54:19.019 To stop making important decisions about who represents us, who 839 00:54:19.039 --> 00:54:22.860 gets into college, et cetera, based on skin color. And 840 00:54:22.900 --> 00:54:26.559 I think we've grown well past that. I think continuing 841 00:54:26.599 --> 00:54:31.659 to inject race into these questions is really injecting racism 842 00:54:31.699 --> 00:54:34.230 into where there is none to begin with. And I 843 00:54:34.289 --> 00:54:39.309 think we've seen all the polarized rhetoric that goes around this, 844 00:54:39.590 --> 00:54:42.679 which I think is very destructive to American society. So 845 00:54:42.699 --> 00:54:43.429 I think any. 846 00:54:43.260 --> 00:54:46.440 Steps the Supreme Court takes towards making. 847 00:54:46.099 --> 00:54:50.820 A society where race is no longer relevant is extraordinarily helpful. 848 00:54:50.860 --> 00:54:52.400 And I think that's what Kelly did. 849 00:54:53.630 --> 00:54:55.530 I assume, Jeff, you have a counter view. 850 00:54:55.969 --> 00:54:57.650 Well, I'll just add to it that I think we 851 00:54:57.730 --> 00:55:00.190 have come a very long way since 1965. 852 00:55:00.190 --> 00:55:01.969 You know, I show my law. 853 00:55:01.829 --> 00:55:08.780 School classes the voter application forms used in Mississippi in 1955, 854 00:55:08.780 --> 00:55:11.639 asking questions that are just leading them to want to 855 00:55:11.679 --> 00:55:14.280 know who's your minister, who's your employer, because if you 856 00:55:14.320 --> 00:55:16.519 try to register to vote and you're black, we want 857 00:55:16.539 --> 00:55:18.920 to get you fired. and get your minister out of 858 00:55:18.960 --> 00:55:21.360 town and all sorts of horrible things. We've come a 859 00:55:21.400 --> 00:55:24.750 long way from that point, but we're not totally there yet. 860 00:55:25.210 --> 00:55:26.769 And to the extent that there still. 861 00:55:26.969 --> 00:55:31.659 Is racial discrimination and polarized voting, there's still a need 862 00:55:31.960 --> 00:55:35.820 at some level of having voting protections for minority Americans. 863 00:55:37.070 --> 00:55:39.829 Well, we've had, I think, a very fruitful discussion. We've 864 00:55:39.869 --> 00:55:42.670 covered a lot of territory, and I want to thank 865 00:55:42.769 --> 00:55:47.989 both Mike Carvin and Jeff Weiss for participating, and I 866 00:55:48.610 --> 00:55:51.489 will turn it back now to Lily. Thank you so much. 867 00:55:52.230 --> 00:55:54.670 On behalf of the Federalist Society, I want to thank 868 00:55:54.750 --> 00:55:57.610 our experts for the benefit of their valuable time and 869 00:55:57.690 --> 00:56:00.469 expertise today. And I want to thank our audience for 870 00:56:00.510 --> 00:56:04.750 joining and participating. We also welcome listener feedback by email 871 00:56:04.889 --> 00:56:09.510 at fedsocforums at fedsoc.org. As always, keep an eye out 872 00:56:09.650 --> 00:56:12.909 on our website and your emails for announcements about upcoming 873 00:56:12.949 --> 00:56:15.639 virtual events. Thank you all for joining us today. 874 00:56:15.840 --> 00:56:16.659 We are adjourned. 875 00:56:17.840 --> 00:56:21.599 Thanks for listening to FedSoc Forums, a Federalist Society podcast. 876 00:56:22.000 --> 00:56:24.519 Be sure to subscribe wherever you get your podcasts so 877 00:56:24.559 --> 00:56:28.730 you won't miss an episode. To learn more, visit our website, fedsoc.org.