TRANSCRIPT 🔗
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On November ninth through the eleventh,
the Federal Society hosted the twenty twenty three
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National Lawyer's Convention in Washington, DC. This year's theme was Originalism on the
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Ground and it featured many excellent speeches, debates, and discussion panels covering a
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wide range of important legal and policy
issues. This recording comes from that event
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and we help you enjoy it.
Now onto our panel, and we do
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have an all star group today.
Our first our moderator. Judge Michael Park
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was appointed to the US Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in May of
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twenty nineteen. He earned his undergraduate
degree Medicum laud. From Princeton University,
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has jd from the Law School,
where he served as the managing editor of
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the y Law Journal. After graduation
from law school, Judge Park served as
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a law clerk to then Judge Sam
Alido on the Third Circuit, for whom
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he also coorked at a Supreme Court
during the two thousand and eight term.
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Judge Park also served as an Attorney
advisor in the US Department of Justice Office
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of Legal Counsel, was a partner
in the New York office of the Decker
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Law Firm, and later joined as
a named partner of the law firm of
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Consuvoy, McCarthy and Park. During
this time, he also served as an
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adjunct professor at the Antonin Scullia School
of Law at George Mason University. With
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that, I will turn it over
to Judge Park as our moderator, and
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thank you again for serving today.
Thank you Brian, thank you ron Da
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Paul, thank you Brian for the
kind introduction, and thanks for everyone for
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being here. Welcome to our discussion
on originalism in the Communications Act of nineteen
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thirty four, the bounds of the
FCC's regulatory authority in the modern era.
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Just a quick description of what we're
going to discuss. The US Senate recently
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confirmed the third Democratic FCC Senate Commissioner, putting the agency at full force for
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the first time since January twenty twenty
one. This panel, we'll focus on
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the FCC's likely agenda as we look
to twenty twenty four, and we'll explore
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the bounds of the Communication Act of
nineteen thirty four as updated by the Telecommunications
Load full transcript
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Act of nineteen ninety six when applied
to modern technology, areas for possible legislative
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reform, and how the existing regulatory
authority from Congress impacts the Commission's initiatives in
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the year head, It's my pleasure
to introduce to our distinguished panel. First,
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we have FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr to
my left. Commissioner Car is the
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senior Republican on the FCC, and
he previously served as the agency's General Council.
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Commissioner Car was nominated to the FCC
by President Trump and was confirmed unanimously
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by the Senate. He's been described
as the FCC's five G crusader. Commissioner
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Car has led the FCC's work to
modernize its infrastructure rules and to accelerate the
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build out of high speed networks.
His reforms have got billions of dollars in
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red tape, enabled the private sector
to construct high speed networks across the country,
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and extended America's global leadership in five
G. Before joining the agency as
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a staffer back in twenty twelve,
Commissioner Car worked at Wiley Ryan in the
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firm's litigation and telecommunications practices, and
before that he clerked on the US Court
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of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for
Judge Dennis Shehad. He attended Georgetown University
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and earned his jd Magna cum laide
from the Catholic University of America's Columbus School
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of Law. To his left is
Commissioner Nathan Simington. Commissioner Simington was nominated
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to the FCC by President Trump and
was confirmed by the Senate in twenty twenty.
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Before joining the FCC, Commissioner Simington
served as the Senior Advisor at the
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National Telecommunications and Information Administration the NTIA, where he worked on many aspects of
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telecommunications policy, including spector allocation and
planning, broadband access, and the US
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government's role in the Internet. Before
joining the FCC, Commissioner Symington was senior
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counsel to bright Star Corporation, an
international mobile device services company, where he
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led and negotiated telecommunications equipment and services
deals with providers in over twenty countries.
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Before joining bright Star, he worked
in private practice. Commissioner Simington is a
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graduate of Michigan Law School and also
holds degrees from the University of Rochester and
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Lawrence University. To his left is
mister Jordan Adelsceine, former Commissioner of the
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FCC. Mister Adelstein is President and
CIO CEO of WIA, the Wireless Infrastructure
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Association, which represents over two hundred
companies building telecommunication facilities across the world.
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Mister Adelstein served as the FCC Commission
as an SEC Commissioner from two thousand and
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two to two thousand and nine,
for which he was twice nominated by President
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George W. Bush and confirmed unanimously
by the Senate. At the FCC,
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he achieved bi parts in progress on
issues like broadband expansion, widening assets to
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the Internet, and media diversity.
In two thousand and nine, Commissioner Adelstein
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was nominated by President Obama to serve
as the Administrator of the US Department of
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Agriculture's Rural Utility Service, where he
over saw a six billion dollar portfolio of
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rural electric, water, and telecommunications
infrastructure loans. Previously, Commissioner Adelstein held
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a number of legislative staff positions over
fifteen years in the US Senate, culminating
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as a senior policy advisor to the
Senate majority leader. Commissioner Addlsteins received an
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MA in history and a BA in
political science from Sandford and attended the Kennedy
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School of Government at Harvard and,
last, but not least, former FCC
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commission Mignon Clyburn, his principal of
MLC Strategies. Commissioner Clyburn spent nearly nine
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years at the FCC, affirming her
commitment to closing persistent digital and opportunity divides
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that challenge rural, native and low
health communities. Commissioner Clyburn served as Commissioner
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of the SEC from two thousand and
nine to twenty eighteen and as Acting FCC
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Chairwoman from May to November of twenty
thirteen. As an FCC Commissioner, she
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pushed for the modernization of the FCC's
Lifeline program, which assists low income consumers
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and defering the costs of voice and
broadband service. She championed diversity and media
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ownership, initiated inmate telephone calling services
reforms broke her to technical solution that eliminated
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long standing bottlenecks that prevented small and
rural telecommunications characters
carriers SORRY from expanding their
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network services nationwide. She emphasized diversity
and inclusion in the STEM fields, and
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she fought to preserve a free and
open internet. Commissioner Clyburn's government service began
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with her election to the South Carolina
Public Service Commission in nineteen ninety eight,
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where she served for eleven years.
Before that, Commissioner Clyburn worked in a
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variety of media and telecommunications positions for
over fourteen years as publisher and general manager
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of The Coastal Times, a family
founded Charleston based weekly newspaper focusing on issues
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affecting the African American community. It's
my pleasure to then introduce all of you,
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thank you for joining us today,
and we'll begin in terms of format,
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with opening statements from each of the
panelists, followed by a discussion,
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and we'll conclude with the Q and
A taking questions for members of the audience.
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So with that we'll hear from Commissioner
car Thank you so much. Judge.
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Great to have you on the bench
and it's great to be with all
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of you here today. I guess
for maybe an opening, I'll ask you
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for a show of hands of how
many people remember the Great Net neutrality repeal
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of twenty seventeen. We've got a
couple of veterans here. Of those who
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their remember it, did you survive? Did you survive? Show hands?
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If you survived the Great Net Neutrality
Repeal? I want to talk really briefly
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about sort of two SEC proceedings and
then sort of explain to you why they
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aren't isolated pin pricks and why what
you're seeing at the FCC in those instances
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is something that you're seeing reflected more
broadly across the administrative state right now.
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The first is what I call Title
two, what has been popularly branded as
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net neutrality. So is remember,
for the very first time ever, the
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last two years of President Obama's administration, the FCC reclassify the Internet from a
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Title I Information service, a regulated
service but lightly regulated, to a Title
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I regulated service. Title two was
the sort of utility style, heavy handed
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regulations that were first invented to reign
in the mobel telephone monopoly of a point
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in time of a sort of New
Deal era legislation where it was really hard
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to distinguish between government and private sector. The FC did that for two years
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than when the administration changed over the
Trump administration, I was a commissioner and
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we reversed that two year experiment,
and if you remember when we did that,
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the predictions, if you remember,
were quite astonishing. Senator Bernie Sanders
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had said that this is the end
of the Internet as we know it.
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If this passes the Internet in the
free exchange of information we've come to know,
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will cease to exist. CNN ran
a banner headline that said end of
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the Internet as we know it.
I got a message. Chrisian Clapman likes
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the story. I got a message
from a high school ex girlfriend at the
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time, and she said that repealing
natraality I was about to make the second
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biggest mistake of my life. I
can assure you that neither neither breaking up
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with her nor repealing Title two was
a mistake, he says in front of
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you. Yea right, and you
know, but what we were told was
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speeds would slow down. You get
the Internet one word at a time.
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And what has happened since that twenty
seventeen repeal of Title iiO Internet speeds in
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the US are up sixfold. Millions
of Americans have been brought across the digital
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divide because of private sector build out
and COVID nineteen was the ultimate stress test
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of global telecom policy. In Europe, they were very worried that their continents
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networks were going to break under the
sudden strain of Internet traffic that surged as
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people started working from home and schooling
their kids remotely. We didn't have that
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worry here because we had heavy investment
in our networks. And so just recently,
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as the judge indicated, we're back
to three to two at the FCC
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for the first time. Crustio Simonson
and I are in the minority. We're
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two two for a while, two
two is my second best thing compared to
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being in the majority. It was
a pretty good run. But now we're
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in the minority. The very first
thing the FC does is now proposed to
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bring back that title to regulatory regime, which I think is going to be
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a mistake. Following right on the
heels of that, the FCC has launched
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what is called a Digital Equity proceeding
and we're actually going to vote on a
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final order next Wednesday. President Biden
had the Commerce from a way in at
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the FCC and encourage us to take
a very strident interpretation of a one page
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section of the thousand plus page Infrastructure
law that was passed in twenty twenty one.
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It was a provision called digital Discrimination
that said the FCC should you know,
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work to identify or eliminate discrimination that
takes place in the broadband markets.
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The SEC has taken this one page
law in reddit as giving us effectively unbounded
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authority over every single type of Internet
service and infrastructure in the country. If
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you just read through the list of
the things that the FC is saying this
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one page bill, which is not
quite prophylactic, but it's mostly horritory,
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mostly forward looking. What we're doing
there is we're exercising control over where infrastructure
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can be built, how much profit
and ISP can realize, the prices that
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can be charged, everything from down
to the length of time that an installation
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should take. And we're gonna be
second guessing all of those decisions. And
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if we reach the decision that it's
somehow resulting in a harm to equity,
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then you're potentially liable for unlimited fines
from the FCC. And so I think
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you're seeing, you know, whether
it's Title II, whether it's digital equity,
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or again some of the actions you
see in other agencies. What's going
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on? And this is where I
short of started, which is to say
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these aren't vigil pieces of glass.
There's mosaic going on. And what's happening
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right now with the ministrative state,
in my view, is that you've got
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this very progressive win and the Democrat
Party, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren,
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that has real outside influence when it
comes to the Ministry of Agencies right now
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in this administration, and we aren't
having a reason debate right now within the
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agencies about you know, okay,
a debate between the forties. This person's
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00:12:26.919
a Democrat. You know, they
have their perspective. Elections have consequences.
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I get it. We're not having
some of the type of reason debate that
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you would expect in the divided government
right now. What's happening is that wing
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in the Democrat Party is using the
administrative state to really fundamentally alter the relationship
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between the government and the private sector. And it really goes back to this
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whole sort of title to New Deal
era mindset that we haven't really had a
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debate about in this country, let
alone from electoral perspective, settled on fundamentally
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changing our relationship between the government and
the private sector. But it's happening right
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now in the Ministry of Agencies.
The good news alin with this is where
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the Supreme Court is in terms of
looking at some of the excesses of administrative
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agencies. West Virginia versus EPA effectively
took what had been a dissent from the
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SEC's prior title to decision by Judge
Kavanaugh the DC Circuit and is approximately making
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it the majority opinion at the Supreme
Court. So, while we're engaging in
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a lot of these regulatary excesses right
now with the FCC in other agencies,
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I'm very confident that these are going
to be rained back in eventually by the
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Supreme Court, because, after all, we have not been delegated the authority
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to make these types of sweeping decisions. So with that'll and my phil about
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starting to pass it on. Thank
you, Commissioner Sounnington, Thanks very much.
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I'm very pleased to be here and
to join my esteem Collies here on
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the panel. So on the subject
of regulation, media regulation is very much
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in the news. There's a mailstream
of congressional and lobbying activities swirling around the
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question of so called virtual MVPDs that
is, multi channel video programming distributors like
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cable and satellite TP and whether the
Commission ought to extend its authority to regulate
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retransmission consent negotiations that is, the
money that gets passed along for retransmitting broadcast
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content over online linear video providers.
I'm going to preview my own position on
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this one. I have no idea. There's no timely record before me.
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No member of the Commission can make
a decision responsibly without record support, and
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so it shouldn't surprise anyone that my
position is that a record refresh is warranted.
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It hasn't changed in the previous two
years that I've been thinking about this
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vMVPD dot kit. I don't know
whether it's possible to extend Commission authority over
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vMVPDs, nor do I know whether
it's the appropriate moment to do so.
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As a matter of policy, a
record refresh a public notice inviting new comments
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on a decade old proceeding would merely
arm the Commission with the facts and the
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law. And I'll soon be setting
a reply to a Congressional inquiry from a
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couple of weeks ago saying that the
same thing, albeit at a greater length.
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So one point I'm going to make
in this letter is one that I'd
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like to discuss here today. Namely, we should reset our expectations, because
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without Congressional action, I'm not sure
that there is such a thing as Commission
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regulation of the media marketplace in the
future, and maybe that's a good thing,
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but we should be clear that that
that's a decision that we're taking consciously
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and not by default. I've never
given a pan of gyro contemporary commission wisdom
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and media regulation. Goodness knows,
I'm certainly not going to do so here.
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It may wind up being a good
thing to let commission authority over the
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video marketplace lapse. We may want
to engage in a greater deregulatory deregulatory trend
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to ensure that there isn't a two
tier system where facilities based legacy broadcasters are
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penalized for doing that and over the
top providers are allowed to exploit a regulatory
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middle. So peering into my crystal
ball, however, I feel that's not
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on what's on tap for the upcoming
quadrennial review. Somehow, I imagine we'll
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discover or invent new and creative ways
to extend commission authority over even the smallest
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shade tree broadcasting outfits, rendering profitable
operation small DMAs fully impossible, and paving
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the way towards what we all know
is the goal of some groups in society
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and what they've said explicitly government takeover
of broadcast so I guess this
is where
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this is where my discussion of jurisdiction
starts to rhyme a little bit with what
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Commissioner car has been saying about government
takeover of the Internet. At a certain
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point, if broadcast becomes economically unviable, yet we want to continue regulating it,
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that's the immediate future of broadcast media
having been rendered artificially uncompetitive with over
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the top, depending on who you
ask, two thirds to four fifths is
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domestic Internet traffic goes to streaming video, and it should not surprise anyone to
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learn that whenever a new fiber trunk
is installed in a rural area, most
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of the excess capacity is immediately soaked
up by streaming video upscaling. Looking at
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it through this lens high costs,
build out subsidies in effect, if not
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in intent, and I think it
would have been pretty hard to sell this
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to the public in those these terms. But it looks like a concerted effort
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to take and replace the legacy media
transmission motive over the air, terrestrial broadcast,
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or even have installed cable and satellite
systems with a government subsidized Netflix pipe.
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Not to pick on Netflix in particular, but there you know, there's
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no doubt that a lot of this
content is Netflix content. Of course,
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you could be any streaming provider.
So when the future of media is fully
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streaming, and the Commission, together
with Congress, is making every effort to
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deliver on that vision, apparently,
what's the statutory predicate of our authority?
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And here we turn back again to
the question of regulation of over the top
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content. If we look at the
at the landmark decisions in terms of the
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FCC's jurisdiction over broadcast and over the
speech in broadcast, we're looking at Redline
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and PACIFICA, which stood for the
proposition that the Commission could pin back the
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ears of broadcast us at least somewhat
as to protected speech because of the literal
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physical transmission modality of broadcast signals,
that is, because spectrum is scarce and
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managed by the FC, and because
what broadcast signals involuntarily penetrate the home,
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and because the rival risk with one
another potentially, so broadcast occupies a unique
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space in comparison to other media of
protected speech. So all, in other
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words, we've all lived our lives
in a world where it's been a well
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settled principle that because broadcasters do these
things, they don't have the full heightened,
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the full speech protections for protected speech
that we would have in other media
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that are not so restricted, such
as print. So whether those decisions remain
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good law in the credent media marketplace, and whether broadcasters ought to be treated
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in a fashion harmonized with other players
I'm not going to show my own biases
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here, may be fully mooted over
the next decade, anyway, because as
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broadcast falls into secular declinent, aided
lately by the vigorous efforts of the Commission,
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commission authority over broadcast media and how
it interacts with the First Amendment increasingly
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looks like a dead letter. Who
cares whether the First Amendment protects a speech
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against commission interference when there are simply
no more licensed broadcasters for whom it would
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be an issue. Okay, so
what about non broadcast programming carried on MVPDs.
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We don't license them, we can't
reach them as the content, and
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currently there's no statutory or court predicate
for getting to that point. What about
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other bases of commission authority over say, cable systems. The ninety two Cable
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Act give the Commission authority explicitly,
and in general, the Commission relies on
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a facility's basis as the predicate of
most of its authority over wireline system.
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So we still have cable systems and
direct broadcast satellite in the ranks because of
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those physical facilities that are involved.
Great except the cable systems are shedding millions
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of subscribers per year as the American
consumer chooses, and I use that we're
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advisedly considering the subsidy and regulatory arbitrage
aspects that I highlated, but nonetheless chooses
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to get content over the top channels. And of course we've all seen how
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well the satellite guys you're doing lately. So while traditional MVPDs seem to have
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a little room left to run,
it seems that the writing may start to
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be on the wall for them as
well. And indeed, if you look
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at many cable operators who have both
a video business and an ISP business,
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they'll often tell you that it's the
ISP business where they really see their runway
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the future, whether consumers have asked
for it or not, or whether it's
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simply emerged as a confluence of regulatory
thumbs on the scale that no one really
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planned or intended or whether there was
you know, or whether there were people
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are arranging this for their benefit or
engaging in opportunistic lobbying. The point is
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the future is over the top,
and the Commission cannot circumvent First Amendment restrictions
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on the basis of the physical characteristics
of the medium, nor does it have
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a facility's basis as traditionally understood,
undergrading its authority regulate. Therefore, edge
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providers who are further subject further I
should say I'm shielded by Section two thirty
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protections, are in a very strong
position to say that there's just no such
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thing as content regulation and over the
top. That may be how we want
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that, maybe how we expect it
to wind out. From all the complaints
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that I hear from both sides of
the aisle, I'm not sure that's a
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decision that anyone is comfortable with.
If it's going to become the new normal,
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then we'd better start building out private
ways to live with it. But
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in any case, our expectation that
there's going to be speech regulation is just
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going to become falsified very quickly.
Our anticipation regulated media environment is just not
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going to prevail. So it would
appear the way things are trending, that
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nothing will happen unless Congress takes this
issue up with this degree of clarity,
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recognizing that the disparity in physical medium
between watching a Bonanza rerun over the error
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and watching it on demand make the
regulatory environment completely different for those two situations.
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So Congress has has got to consider
whether that is whether we want to
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consciously walk into this situation or whether
we're sleepwalking into it. They have to
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consider whether what their constituents are going
to expect from them. They're going to
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have to ask the question, what
does it mean for someone who spent sixty
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seventy years of their lives growing up
in a regulated media environment to suddenly be
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confronted with totally unregulated media at this
point in our lives. What about interference?
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We hear so much about Russian interference
in the elections, or some other
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countries interference in the elections, all
this kind of thing. What exactly are
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we supposed to do about it?
In an atmosphere of over the top where
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nothing, there's no political file,
nothing whatsoever. You're stopping anyone from buying
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anything on any show. So I
want to make sure that I'm not calling
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for anything in particular, so much
as awareness of the situation and for us
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to appreciate the distinction between where we've
been until now and where we're going to
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be now and going forward now.
I guess if I am going to make
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a call for action or a recommendation, it would be that the best thing
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the Commission can do right now in
the media marketplace is just to get out
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of the business of broadcast regulation.
I'm not saying that we need to turn
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it down to two guys and a
dog. I'd settle for three. But
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there's really an angle to which we
have to ask the question what social good
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exactly is being served by media regulation
that still pretends it's nineteen seventy two and
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that's the big three yearle of the
er. I think there's none. I
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think at this point we should be
asking instead, what are what are we
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trying to preserve as far as localism
and journalism, as far as a profitable,
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profitable, sustainable business model of whatever
size in small and medium sized communities,
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in terms of real local relevance to
advertising and not just feeding it into
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gigantic national social media campaigns. In
terms I might add of the maintenance of
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the emergency alerting systems that have always
been funded not just in dollars and cents,
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but in terms of capacity, in
personnel and resilience by broadcasters. So
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there are no number of social goods
that I think could be preserved just fine
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if we limited if we eliminated the
regulatory orbitrage here and gave
broadcasters a fair
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shake, that's something the Commission can
do right away without waiting for Congressional action.
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But otherwise the ball is in congress
Is court. The inflexible and mechanical
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application of legacy Commission rules is just
going to continue to kill the broadcast sector
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while leaving the entire question of speech
regulation off the field. In other words,
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we're going to stick by the environment
of the seventies to say that we
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need to regulate broadcast speech and hug
it to death, and that at the
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same time we've got no reason to
reach into anything else. That's just pure
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path with penance, folks. There's
no rhyme nor reason to a policy approach
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like that. If Carvers intends that
the Commission should in fact regulate media in
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the future, which I'm not calling
for, I just want to point out,
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without intervention, it simply will not, and people will have to think
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hard about finding a predicate that is
in fact not biolative of the First Amendment.
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Thanks very much, looking forward to
a likely discussion. Thank you,
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Commissioner Adelson. Well, thank you
Josh Hark, and thanks for inviting me
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here today. I really appreciate it. It's nice to be on a panel
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with sitting commissioners where there has been
commissioners and the real ones are over there.
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We rarely get elevated to that level. But interestingly, the these are
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Republican appointees, Democratic appointees on this
side, so this room will be happy
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that the ones in power. Capital
also flows that way this side. Okay,
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well that could change, you know
the I think I'm going to focus
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more since I'm not on the broadcast
rule now. Commissioner Simonson on Commissioner cars
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comments and really focused today, particularly
in some of the legal issues surrounding net
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neutrality and to lesser extent, the
Digital equity ruling. You know, net
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neutrality is something I've been involved in
since the very outset of it in you
337
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know, two thousand and three,
back on the Commission when we first looked
338
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into this, and it's really an
article of faith on both sides, on
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00:25:38.359 --> 00:25:42.640
the Democratic side and Republican side.
First, as you pointed out, as
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adopted under Obama by Wheeler, repealed
under Trump with a jeet, and now
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about to be or proposed to be
reinstated in almost the same form by Chairwoman
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rosen Whistle now that she's gained the
majority. So previous court rulings is you
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put it up forced the FCC to
go to a title too if they wanted
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to apply net neutrality, and that
means that, you know, the treaty,
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as you said, is common carrors
and things have to be just and
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reasonable, so it's very heavy handed
regulation. So the question, you know,
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the basic tenets of net neutrality,
which we started with back and there's
348
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bipartisan agreement on in the early days
where no blocking, no throttling, and
349
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no paid prioritization are largely complied with
by ISPs. So you know, going
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back when it was pushed in the
early two thousands by large cloud providers like
351
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Google as the White Knight, and
those days, you know, they were
352
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beloved and seen as sort of fighting
for the good of the Internet. To
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preserve free carriage is essentially at the
expense of ISPs, and what we've seen
354
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since then, you know, is
that it's inhibited carriers from monetizing their network
355
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investments in infrastructure, and it's now
so entrenched in practice that the new rule
356
00:26:52.119 --> 00:26:57.240
won't change the status quo that gives
cloud providers a free ride, you know,
357
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and the cloud providers like Meta and
Netflix, Google have captured the line
358
00:27:03.039 --> 00:27:07.200
share of the revenue and certainly the
profits from the growth of the Internet.
359
00:27:07.240 --> 00:27:10.240
And you look at the stock of
some of the major carriers is exactly what
360
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it was in the mid nineties,
believe it or not. And you'd think
361
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if you look back in the mid
nineties, you to say, all right,
362
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everybody's going to own one or two
of these devices, everybody's gonna use
363
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them, nobody's going to live without
them. There'll be more than one per
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person in the country. Probably the
major wireless carriers are going to be doing
365
00:27:25.200 --> 00:27:27.519
pretty well. Right in twenty years
from now, Well their stock is flat
366
00:27:27.640 --> 00:27:32.839
or down in that period, it's
pretty remarkable. But the stock of these
367
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companies that didn't exist at that time
when they first began are in the trillions.
368
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So you know, the FCC is
going to finalize the new rules probably
369
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in early to mid year twenty twenty
four, leading to another round of litigation.
370
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And that's what might be of interest
to discuss today to this crowd,
371
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is how the Supreme Court's Major Questions
doctrine will apply with a two to three
372
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year legal saga ahead. Now,
coming from my perspective, the way that
373
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the Major Questions Doctrine is being applied
is strikes me as judicial activism, attractive
374
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to reign in the administrative state,
as a counter to Chevron. So,
375
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you know, the question is whether
the courts or the expert agencies interpret Congressional
376
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intent and statute when it's unclear.
I served on the Senate staff for fifteen
377
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years, as you pointed out,
and was involved in, you know,
378
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interpreting or basically writing the law.
You know, the staff had a huge
379
00:28:26.319 --> 00:28:30.960
role in writing these laws. And
when I was in the Majority leader or
380
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Minority leader's office, you know,
I was basically making the sausage. And
381
00:28:33.799 --> 00:28:37.279
it was very hard then to get
Congress to get specific. You think it
382
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was hard in the in the nineties, it's a lot harder now. So
383
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it's very difficult for Congress Pacific specific, which is why they delegate to agencies
384
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and give them basic direction and allow
the agencies to delegate, you know,
385
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the delegate to agencies how to interpret
these statutes. And so the question here
386
00:28:56.119 --> 00:28:59.960
for me is somebody's looked at the
Constitution and served in two of the three
387
00:29:00.200 --> 00:29:06.039
branches. Should the courts or agencies
interpret the statute fundamentally? And I say
388
00:29:06.079 --> 00:29:08.160
the export agencies, not the courts. And look at the way the Constitution
389
00:29:08.240 --> 00:29:12.440
is structured. Article one is Congress, two executive agencies, Article threes of
390
00:29:12.480 --> 00:29:18.480
courts, all due respect, inspect
park. The idea is that law is
391
00:29:18.559 --> 00:29:23.680
obviously paramount, and the executive agencies
are the ones to interpret and execute the
392
00:29:23.759 --> 00:29:26.440
laws, and the courts are to
hold them accountable to ensure that they do
393
00:29:26.480 --> 00:29:32.079
it in an honest way. Now, most issues at the FCC are bipartisan,
394
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and it truly performed its role effectively. I think that witness to that
395
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is the way that these two outstanding
commissioners handled the two to two situation.
396
00:29:38.960 --> 00:29:45.119
As who pointed out, up until
just very recently when the third commissioner on
397
00:29:45.160 --> 00:29:48.680
the Democratic side was approved, the
FCC got a lot done and most of
398
00:29:48.720 --> 00:29:52.119
what we do is bipartisan, but
some things get politicized. As I pointed
399
00:29:52.160 --> 00:29:56.839
out, you know net neutrality is
probably the premiere example of that. So
400
00:29:57.519 --> 00:30:02.559
the question for those of us who
suppor or Chevron deference for agencies is,
401
00:30:02.559 --> 00:30:07.960
is the FCC handing the Supreme Court
a case that is ripe to overturn it?
402
00:30:08.039 --> 00:30:14.640
What's a justification for flip flopping on
policy every time the administration changes party
403
00:30:14.720 --> 00:30:18.839
hands? Is it truly an expert
agency if it keeps changing? Well,
404
00:30:18.519 --> 00:30:22.920
to me, if it's going to
change every time there's a change in control
405
00:30:22.960 --> 00:30:27.160
of the administration, there has to
be evidence of a change in material circumstances
406
00:30:27.200 --> 00:30:33.240
that justify the shift in policy.
Here, there's no evidence of a problem.
407
00:30:33.279 --> 00:30:37.039
As you pointed out, the Internet
is still alive and well, hence
408
00:30:37.079 --> 00:30:40.640
it's more right for getting overturned and
setting what I think is a bad precedent.
409
00:30:41.359 --> 00:30:45.680
Now gets particularly interesting in this case
because the iron is that Justice Thomas
410
00:30:45.799 --> 00:30:51.720
opinion in the Brand X case cited
Chevron to allow the FCEC to decide whether
411
00:30:51.799 --> 00:30:56.640
to classifind or Title one or Title
two to deregulate certain ISPs. So that
412
00:30:56.000 --> 00:31:00.279
decision, he said, oh,
Chevron, this is deregulatory, says great,
413
00:31:00.319 --> 00:31:04.799
Let's let Chevron rule. Now the
decision has been used to impose,
414
00:31:06.319 --> 00:31:10.799
you know, a strong regulatory regime. Justice Thomas is questioning his own decision.
415
00:31:11.720 --> 00:31:15.440
See now we're looking at flip flopping
by both the FCC and the Supreme
416
00:31:15.440 --> 00:31:22.200
Court. Both sides appear to me
to be outcome driven, which is worse
417
00:31:22.799 --> 00:31:26.279
for federal agency to be outcome driven
to the courts, I would argue the
418
00:31:26.279 --> 00:31:30.319
courts. We expect the courts to
be neutral arbor, as you expect at
419
00:31:30.359 --> 00:31:37.319
least some changes from administration to administration, and certainly looking at the changes and
420
00:31:37.359 --> 00:31:40.839
circumstances if they occur, the agency
should be in a position to do that
421
00:31:40.920 --> 00:31:42.680
and the court should be neutral arbor. So if there's a
precedent here,
422
00:31:44.799 --> 00:31:48.759
why is it getting overturned? Well, is it a major questions issue?
423
00:31:49.240 --> 00:31:53.720
Or is that, you know,
an excuse? Could that be an excuse
424
00:31:53.759 --> 00:32:00.480
by the courts for deregulation? How
can the Supreme Court flip using the doctrine
425
00:32:00.480 --> 00:32:04.559
from the Brandex decision, which is
so recent and so direct to the point,
426
00:32:05.960 --> 00:32:09.240
we expect consistent principal decisions from Supreme
Court. But the new version of
427
00:32:09.319 --> 00:32:14.480
the major questions doctrine appears outcome driven, and now they've got this case,
428
00:32:14.480 --> 00:32:20.480
it could be handed where the agency's
flip flopping without an evidentiary basis. So
429
00:32:20.519 --> 00:32:23.799
you're seeing both agencies and the Supreme
Court increasingly politicized, which I think undermines
430
00:32:24.319 --> 00:32:30.160
confidence in both as independent arbiters of
the law on the substance of the policy.
431
00:32:30.200 --> 00:32:34.119
In our industry, there's a serious
concern without the imposition of Title II
432
00:32:34.599 --> 00:32:38.319
impacts five G in particular, which
wireless carriers are clearly having trouble monetizing.
433
00:32:38.400 --> 00:32:42.839
As I've discussed, and we discussed
this, you know, there's an issue
434
00:32:43.319 --> 00:32:46.559
that the draft, like the previous
Wheeler rule, subjects mobile to the same
435
00:32:46.640 --> 00:32:51.920
rules as wireline. But among the
biggest upsides to five g's its ability to
436
00:32:51.960 --> 00:32:57.400
facilitate private networks and slicing, which
are by nature discriminatory. People here probably
437
00:32:57.400 --> 00:33:00.559
don't know about network slicing if you're
unless you're deep into the on this telecom
438
00:33:00.680 --> 00:33:05.960
law. But essentially under five g's
the first technology where carriers can take a
439
00:33:06.000 --> 00:33:08.440
piece of its spectrum and a piece
of its network, basically slice it off
440
00:33:08.440 --> 00:33:14.440
and allow a business to have a
private little network of its own, which
441
00:33:14.559 --> 00:33:19.440
you know, seems to be in
some ways violative of the idea of net
442
00:33:19.480 --> 00:33:22.559
neutrality. But at the same time, there's an exemption for specialized services in
443
00:33:22.599 --> 00:33:28.839
the draft, but it's vague,
so it's difficult for carriers to know if
444
00:33:28.839 --> 00:33:32.200
they're going to be able to engage
in innovative solutions without further clarification from the
445
00:33:32.240 --> 00:33:37.720
FCC, so it could have a
chilling effect and already depressed five G CAPEX.
446
00:33:38.359 --> 00:33:42.240
But you know, to sort of
include on the major questions doctor,
447
00:33:42.279 --> 00:33:45.519
and i'd ask, you know,
when I think about that more broadly,
448
00:33:46.039 --> 00:33:50.960
why are we distinguishing
major and minor
issues? Statutory construction should be the same
449
00:33:51.000 --> 00:33:54.839
either way. Congress writes major and
minor statutes with all kinds of vagaries in
450
00:33:54.880 --> 00:34:02.000
them that agencies have to distinguish.
Understand why the major major questions doctrine says,
451
00:34:02.000 --> 00:34:05.480
well, if it's big, Congress
wouldn't have really delegate it without thinking
452
00:34:05.519 --> 00:34:07.880
about it, but without having been
more explicit about it. But I think
453
00:34:07.880 --> 00:34:14.119
the same applies to minor issues.
So really this seems like a power grab
454
00:34:14.199 --> 00:34:21.000
by the court's judicial aggrandizement to say
we're going to take over administrative law and
455
00:34:21.000 --> 00:34:25.920
the biggest issues in the country.
Because Congress shouldn't be able to delegate on
456
00:34:27.000 --> 00:34:30.119
major issues, but they should be
able to delegate on minor issues. But
457
00:34:30.239 --> 00:34:35.800
you know, the FCC may be
inviting an egregious example of overruling a precedent
458
00:34:35.840 --> 00:34:43.159
to apply this newfound major questions doctrine. So interesting kind of situation that we're
459
00:34:43.159 --> 00:34:45.840
in from a from a legal perspective, I wanted to talk about, and
460
00:34:45.320 --> 00:34:50.920
just just to wrap up on the
aggressive interpretation of the digital equity rules,
461
00:34:50.920 --> 00:34:53.000
I would agree, you know,
applying them far beyond I think what Congress
462
00:34:53.000 --> 00:34:57.360
intended doesn't make a lot of sense. For example, you know, we
463
00:34:58.239 --> 00:35:01.239
I'm at Digital Bridge now, and
we best in a lot of infrastructure,
464
00:35:01.239 --> 00:35:04.719
and we essentially follow where our customers
want us to go. So if a
465
00:35:04.800 --> 00:35:07.199
Carrie says I want to sell tower
here, I want some fiber over there,
466
00:35:07.719 --> 00:35:12.920
will provide it. But then we're
subject to being questioned as to whether
467
00:35:12.920 --> 00:35:16.400
we're providing digital equity when we're simply
following our customers as to where they want
468
00:35:16.480 --> 00:35:22.559
us to place infrastructure. So applying
it to infrastructure seems a step too far,
469
00:35:22.599 --> 00:35:25.559
and I think beyond what Congress intended, which again is I think going
470
00:35:25.599 --> 00:35:30.840
to invite certainly some scrutiny in the
courts, but I'd rather see that addressed
471
00:35:31.719 --> 00:35:36.519
by the FCC in advance, and
I hope that with the good work of
472
00:35:36.639 --> 00:35:38.800
these commissions sitting here in the chair
and the other commissioners, that can get
473
00:35:38.800 --> 00:35:43.639
addressed before they adopted on the number
fifteenth. But I'm not over then,
474
00:35:44.119 --> 00:35:49.960
I'm not overly confidence magic Abel says, happen I heard it here first.
475
00:35:50.079 --> 00:35:53.480
What I guess that's not gonna happen. Well, pray on. We'll thank
476
00:35:53.519 --> 00:35:58.760
you very much for the time.
I'll wrap it there. Thank you Commissioner,
477
00:35:58.920 --> 00:36:00.960
Thank you, Judge Park. It's
a pleasure of being here. Thank
478
00:36:01.000 --> 00:36:09.440
you Brian Tremont for the invitation.
Either you'll get blamed or uplifted. And
479
00:36:09.880 --> 00:36:15.719
also please allow this. I'm from
South Carolina and Steve Matthews is here from
480
00:36:15.719 --> 00:36:20.000
my old high school. So allow
me to say hello in the back from
481
00:36:20.039 --> 00:36:23.679
the gentleman who just just had a
big smile back there. It's good to
482
00:36:23.679 --> 00:36:30.159
be here. Nine years ago,
in Hillary Shob's Brooking Institute commentary commending the
483
00:36:30.239 --> 00:36:37.440
Act's eightieth anniversary, she described the
Communications Act of nineteen thirty four as being
484
00:36:37.519 --> 00:36:43.280
considered at the time and I quote
a minor piece of legislation bundled with the
485
00:36:43.320 --> 00:36:49.239
new deal, and if radioworld dot
Com is right, the standard government printed
486
00:36:49.280 --> 00:36:53.679
text version of the thirty four Act
numbered some forty five pages with six titles.
487
00:36:54.400 --> 00:36:59.400
Fast forward eighty nine years and subject
you check as you Lauriers like to
488
00:36:59.760 --> 00:37:05.280
say, day nearly three hundred pages
later, you have challenged us this afternoon
489
00:37:05.480 --> 00:37:10.840
with an intriguing theme originalism. Whatever
it is, originalism, I'm cold.
490
00:37:10.880 --> 00:37:15.639
So if you hear things and the
Communications Act of nineteen thirty four, clearly
491
00:37:16.400 --> 00:37:22.880
this is no longer considered a minor
piece of legislation. I find it fascinating.
492
00:37:22.920 --> 00:37:27.199
So I'm the one you'll throw darts
at today, but I'll just go
493
00:37:27.199 --> 00:37:30.880
ahead and accept them, so get
ready. I find it fascinating to hear
494
00:37:30.000 --> 00:37:35.320
scholars act them, editions, jurists, and likely more than a couple of
495
00:37:35.320 --> 00:37:39.199
you in this room adhere to the
concept that all statements in the United States
496
00:37:39.280 --> 00:37:45.440
Constitution should be interpreted strictly according to
how it would have been understood or intended
497
00:37:45.880 --> 00:37:51.119
at the time of its adoption in
seventeen eighty seven. Now, if I
498
00:37:51.159 --> 00:37:58.320
am interpreting this position correctly, and
we're to apply that same standard or concept
499
00:37:58.400 --> 00:38:01.960
to the Communications Act of nonineteen thirty
four, I would not only have to
500
00:38:02.079 --> 00:38:07.920
wrestle with its first major overhaul in
sixty two years in the form of the
501
00:38:08.000 --> 00:38:15.039
ninety six Act, but the predecessor
laws of nineteen oh six, nineteen ten,
502
00:38:15.159 --> 00:38:22.159
nineteen twelve, and nineteen twenty seven, each responding to a changing landscape
503
00:38:22.079 --> 00:38:29.079
to regulate safety frequencies, licensing and
licensing, and operating guidelines. In the
504
00:38:29.159 --> 00:38:34.000
nineteen thirty four actors, you know, the FCC was created to manage administrative
505
00:38:34.039 --> 00:38:37.679
and broadcast issues of the day,
as well as to regulate inner state and
506
00:38:37.800 --> 00:38:44.519
foreign communications, among many other responsibilities. And if I made to continue with
507
00:38:44.599 --> 00:38:51.639
my analogy, the twenty seven Amendments
and acted between seventeen ninety one and nineteen
508
00:38:51.719 --> 00:38:58.519
ninety two reflect changing societal values not
contemplated nor enacted in seventeen eighty seven.
509
00:38:59.239 --> 00:39:04.000
The point for me here is that
with every technological advance, every creative development,
510
00:39:04.079 --> 00:39:09.239
my new entrance, every policy shift, there has been a corresponding reinterpretation,
511
00:39:09.480 --> 00:39:16.320
redefining statutory overlay, or rewriting of
laws regulating or not companies in this
512
00:39:16.400 --> 00:39:22.320
space. Granted, sixty two years
is a very long time given the shifts
513
00:39:22.360 --> 00:39:28.239
that were incurring or have been occurring
in the marketplace, and the ninety six
514
00:39:28.400 --> 00:39:34.199
Act was offered as an answer to
our struggle to keep paid with an evolving,
515
00:39:34.360 --> 00:39:43.239
technologically advancing landscape. The complexity and
difference between policy, competitive and technological
516
00:39:43.280 --> 00:39:49.719
issues today, policy issues from nineteen
thirty four and yes, even nineteen ninety
517
00:39:49.760 --> 00:39:55.239
six seem dizzying to me. But
what I suspect near universal agreement on is
518
00:39:55.239 --> 00:40:01.639
that we have reached another inflection point
where there is friction on how much or
519
00:40:01.679 --> 00:40:08.079
how little we do to establish new
policy to address the evolving issues at hand.
520
00:40:08.760 --> 00:40:16.079
As a baseline, I suggest as
nirvana is a creation of policy where
521
00:40:16.159 --> 00:40:23.559
all stakeholders articulate exactly what the problem
is and where all stakers stakeholders are in
522
00:40:23.599 --> 00:40:30.159
agreement. But nirvana is a word
rarely used, making it difficult to set
523
00:40:30.159 --> 00:40:36.119
a successful agenda around an issue with
consensus. But the primary objective, in
524
00:40:36.159 --> 00:40:42.480
my humble opinion, should always be
to prevent any one party from framing an
525
00:40:42.519 --> 00:40:47.519
issue in the form of the resolutional
outcome they would like to see, not
526
00:40:47.719 --> 00:40:53.119
what the Times called for. As
an easy example, though I know the
527
00:40:53.199 --> 00:40:59.559
FCC is not in the pricing or
price regulation business, would be if one
528
00:40:59.639 --> 00:41:05.840
party proclaims that the issues should be
that we should be charged less, when
529
00:41:05.880 --> 00:41:13.119
the actual issue in question should be
what is the appropriate pricing to Fully understanding
530
00:41:13.199 --> 00:41:19.760
the issue consequences in each option before
us and their likely policy outcome is the
531
00:41:19.800 --> 00:41:25.360
most intense, informative, reflective,
and time consuming exercise. Listening to parties,
532
00:41:25.440 --> 00:41:30.519
positions and arguments, shifting through subject
matter interests with public interest groups,
533
00:41:30.519 --> 00:41:38.119
special interest groups, interested parties,
and often legislators comments and concerns. That's
534
00:41:38.159 --> 00:41:44.039
a complex and dynamic process. All
of this, of course, precedes the
535
00:41:44.159 --> 00:41:52.800
adoption and implementation, then monitoring and
assessment of what is ultimately decided their congressional
536
00:41:52.880 --> 00:42:00.000
legislative, congressional legislation. I'm really
cold, sorry about that, congressional legislat,
537
00:42:00.400 --> 00:42:07.480
executive orders, judic your interpretation,
the agency decision being upheld again or
538
00:42:07.519 --> 00:42:14.719
struck down, and whatever public policy
modifications. All of these influences decisions are
539
00:42:14.760 --> 00:42:19.360
shift triggers, and you have,
let's just call it, a very fluid,
540
00:42:19.920 --> 00:42:28.920
dynamic set of challenges that will enable
us to do good or challenge us
541
00:42:29.360 --> 00:42:34.159
to do better. And then of
course other decision makers on my right,
542
00:42:35.079 --> 00:42:38.800
a total of five of them.
Finally, who no doubt, just like
543
00:42:38.960 --> 00:42:45.480
I did before the summer of twenty
eighteen where I took my leave, have
544
00:42:45.599 --> 00:42:50.679
been asked in challenges more than once
when it comes to policy making, should
545
00:42:50.880 --> 00:42:58.440
the goal be to prevent or correct
potential market failures or harms before they occur,
546
00:42:59.480 --> 00:43:05.280
or rather to rely on enforcement or
remedies after a harm violation has occurred.
547
00:43:06.400 --> 00:43:10.760
I am acutely aware that ex anti
regulation is aggressively proactive, why ex
548
00:43:10.800 --> 00:43:16.760
post regulation is not? And while
one attempts to anticipate, address or mitigate
549
00:43:16.880 --> 00:43:24.800
what could be irreversible or costly harms
as opposed to responding after problems materialize.
550
00:43:25.000 --> 00:43:30.920
If you ask me, my answer
when challenged with that question would not surprise
551
00:43:31.000 --> 00:43:36.320
you. It depends. It depends
on the type of action, market,
552
00:43:36.360 --> 00:43:40.320
segment antrabarious, systemic risk, and
other factors made on a case by case
553
00:43:40.360 --> 00:43:45.800
basis, depending on the facts in
play at the time. And that is
554
00:43:45.880 --> 00:43:52.920
why I sometimes arm wrestle with my
colleagues, because I understand when it comes
555
00:43:52.960 --> 00:43:59.719
to the net neutrality redebate, whichever
read, how many times we are re
556
00:44:04.000 --> 00:44:10.599
you know I come from the posture
that won't surprise you is that we make
557
00:44:10.679 --> 00:44:15.760
decisions and policies and rules and laws, not based on the best of times
558
00:44:15.800 --> 00:44:22.119
when everything are swimming, but on
those times when the most vulnerable you know,
559
00:44:22.320 --> 00:44:28.400
have have something to be concerned about, and we are concerned about uh
560
00:44:28.960 --> 00:44:34.599
them and their outcomes. But what
is known and measurable with all of this
561
00:44:35.199 --> 00:44:39.599
dynamic uh, the state of our
economy, our priorities and stated needs.
562
00:44:40.360 --> 00:44:46.920
We're influenced by international and domestic trends, political and legal dynamics, and the
563
00:44:46.960 --> 00:44:55.400
public expectations. That's the number one
priority and the number one influencers, particularly
564
00:44:55.440 --> 00:45:04.679
at the community level they're in Primarily
there will influence and determine where the agency
565
00:45:04.760 --> 00:45:10.719
leans, but not necessarily not always
where the agency lands when it comes to
566
00:45:10.760 --> 00:45:16.280
advanced services, and the collective successes
or failures of the majority of the five
567
00:45:17.000 --> 00:45:24.760
will be measured always by whichever party, whichever influencers have the ears over the
568
00:45:24.880 --> 00:45:34.039
congressional or judicial branches. So today
it's net neutrality, as we said,
569
00:45:34.079 --> 00:45:38.199
I've lost count and tomorrow will neutrality
again. Okay, yeah, well today
570
00:45:38.239 --> 00:45:45.239
in the global today we have net
neutrality, as was mentioned, the prevention
571
00:45:45.360 --> 00:45:51.800
of digital discrimination you know, rules
to be a debated spectral policy, including
572
00:45:51.840 --> 00:45:59.119
the impact of the lack of auction
authority, that allocation of spectrum efficiently and
573
00:45:59.159 --> 00:46:04.199
among and barely among commercial providers,
federal agencies, public safety energies, and
574
00:46:04.239 --> 00:46:09.920
consumers while considering all of those technical
and economic aspects, aspects of spectral management
575
00:46:10.320 --> 00:46:17.559
such as interference, sharing and pricing, broadband deployment rules, data and mapping,
576
00:46:17.679 --> 00:46:22.800
the harmonization of various programs that have
been layered, uh, you know,
577
00:46:22.960 --> 00:46:30.360
to address the needs of particularly the
pandemic in this vacation, what survives
578
00:46:30.360 --> 00:46:37.079
and what does not? Uh you
know, robo calls the emergency alert systems,
579
00:46:37.840 --> 00:46:44.320
rights of way fees uh USF you
know, for me and it's
principles
580
00:46:44.679 --> 00:46:50.159
and its future including it, like
I said, those legal challenges and yes,
581
00:46:51.239 --> 00:46:58.320
I am going to mention it the
contribution factor. So we're at a
582
00:46:58.519 --> 00:47:04.360
very interesting time and I know every
one says this, but it is particularly
583
00:47:04.559 --> 00:47:07.960
interesting because we are wrestling, you
know, with a number of things.
584
00:47:08.400 --> 00:47:15.079
You've got the calls for access to
affordable, reliable and high quality digital infrastructure,
585
00:47:15.320 --> 00:47:21.800
mobile networks again, cloud computing,
e government that can enable communities to
586
00:47:21.920 --> 00:47:25.639
access information, education, healthcare,
entertainment, and social services, as well
587
00:47:25.679 --> 00:47:31.320
as full participation in civic and economic
activities. You've got calls for inclusion and
588
00:47:31.400 --> 00:47:37.320
equity in the design, development and
use of technologies, especially from marginalized and
589
00:47:37.440 --> 00:47:45.400
vulnerable groups, older adults, which
I have become, you know, people
590
00:47:45.440 --> 00:47:50.239
with disabilities, those who are from
low income and rural communities. They face
591
00:47:50.480 --> 00:47:57.760
barriers assessing and they face barriers benefiting
from the technology that many of us in
592
00:47:58.400 --> 00:48:04.280
this room take for granted. Again, you've got cause more empowerment and engagement
593
00:48:04.400 --> 00:48:12.559
of the communities and shaping these technological
landscape, particularly as the money is flowing
594
00:48:12.920 --> 00:48:19.400
to state and local governments. There's
a need for resilience and the adaptation of
595
00:48:19.559 --> 00:48:27.320
rapid and complex changes that technologies bring
to social, economic, and environmental aspects
596
00:48:27.320 --> 00:48:34.639
of the communities. Technologies creating new
challenges, opportunities and yes, risk in
597
00:48:34.719 --> 00:48:39.320
these communities. The tackling and the
addressing of the digital divide, cyber attacks,
598
00:48:39.800 --> 00:48:49.920
misinformation, automation, displacement or again
environmental impacts. Communities crying for the
599
00:48:50.039 --> 00:48:54.639
capacity to cope and to respond to
these challenges as well as to leverage as
600
00:48:54.719 --> 00:49:04.400
leveraging the opportunities that these technologies in
the times offer us. And then there's
601
00:49:04.440 --> 00:49:13.079
a I and it's implications, particularly
those who feel that there are vulnerabilities and
602
00:49:13.320 --> 00:49:21.719
unevenness and inequity. Be inequities you
know abound. So I end as I
603
00:49:21.840 --> 00:49:31.880
begin, and I often rely on
history, being the daughter of his former
604
00:49:32.440 --> 00:49:43.800
history teacher and librarian. That I
hear you speak about the shifts, the
605
00:49:43.880 --> 00:49:50.480
ebbs, and flows as if it
were something new or unpredictable. It is
606
00:49:50.519 --> 00:49:58.400
not. You have laws decisions that
in some ways seem static, but you
607
00:49:58.519 --> 00:50:08.400
have interpreters, through policymakers and other
interested parties that will demand of us that
608
00:50:08.599 --> 00:50:21.639
constant reinterpretation and reapplication of what seemingly
is static and finite to address the interests
609
00:50:21.679 --> 00:50:27.320
and the challenges of today. So
to me, while I know there are
610
00:50:27.320 --> 00:50:31.639
attentions and disappointments among all of us
depending on what decision we do or do
611
00:50:31.760 --> 00:50:40.559
not make, none of this is
surprising. All of this is quite understandable
612
00:50:42.159 --> 00:50:49.039
because the communities that we serve and
the people who are on the wrong side
613
00:50:49.119 --> 00:50:54.559
of some of these issues, will
demand that we interpret every law and every
614
00:50:54.760 --> 00:51:01.840
rule in a way that will improve
their communities. That is a constant that
615
00:51:02.320 --> 00:51:07.760
is evolving, and all of that
is to be expected. Thank you,
616
00:51:08.320 --> 00:51:13.639
Thank you, Commissioner and thanks to
all of you for your thoughtful and thought
617
00:51:13.679 --> 00:51:20.079
provoking statements. Let me open up
the discussion by just giving all of you
618
00:51:20.159 --> 00:51:22.039
a chance to respond to anything that
you heard from each other that you want
619
00:51:22.119 --> 00:51:28.159
to react to, respond to,
expand on. Thanks so much. I'll
620
00:51:28.159 --> 00:51:31.760
pick up a little bit on my
good friends comments on the Major Questions doctrine.
621
00:51:32.559 --> 00:51:37.159
I have some differences of opinion there. I'll say I think fundamentally,
622
00:51:37.159 --> 00:51:40.199
I think, in my view,
the Major Question doctrine operates in a very
623
00:51:40.400 --> 00:51:45.039
neutral way that it is not an
expression of sort of substantive preferences or will.
624
00:51:45.119 --> 00:51:50.639
So if Congress passes a law that
is regulatory in nature and an agency
625
00:51:50.719 --> 00:51:52.800
uses it to deregulate, you can
run a fowl the Major Questions doctrine.
626
00:51:52.840 --> 00:51:58.679
Similarly, if they tell us to
deregulate and you regulate the opposite, you
627
00:51:58.719 --> 00:52:01.119
get the same outcome. But I
also want to set back in terms of
628
00:52:04.039 --> 00:52:07.039
the separation of powers and almost the
constitutional question and think about it from a
629
00:52:07.039 --> 00:52:09.960
policy perspective, and you ask,
why would it make sense that there be
630
00:52:10.039 --> 00:52:14.320
a Major Questions doctrine? But yet
there'll be sort of lesser questions that could
631
00:52:14.320 --> 00:52:16.760
be delegated. I think fundamentally it
goes back to the quip about you know,
632
00:52:16.800 --> 00:52:21.880
elephants in mouseholes,
meaning you can't
actually hide mice in mouseholes. That
633
00:52:21.880 --> 00:52:24.159
that's sort of okay, but that
you cannot hide elephants in mouseholes that once
634
00:52:24.159 --> 00:52:29.199
it gets sufficiently large. But I
think more than that from a policy perspective,
635
00:52:30.199 --> 00:52:31.639
if you have this concept of Chevron, and I understand there's a broader
636
00:52:31.639 --> 00:52:35.880
debate about Chevron, but when you
have Chevron, there's an incentive structure in
637
00:52:35.920 --> 00:52:39.159
Congress for legislators to get together and
they pass the bill. And maybe they
638
00:52:39.159 --> 00:52:42.960
can't get it exactly the way they
want and still pass it, but they
639
00:52:43.000 --> 00:52:45.480
can get it to sort of what
I said earlier, between the forties,
640
00:52:45.559 --> 00:52:50.039
Okay, we generally agree that the
outcome should be somewhere in here, and
641
00:52:50.079 --> 00:52:52.599
we're delegating authority to an agency to
figure it out from there. And again
642
00:52:52.920 --> 00:52:57.599
you can make argument as to why
that is a bad thing, but that
643
00:52:57.719 --> 00:53:01.559
creates a dynamic that is the opposite
of what happens in the absence of major
644
00:53:01.639 --> 00:53:06.920
questions doctrine. What happens in the
absence of a major questions doctrine is you
645
00:53:07.000 --> 00:53:13.159
have legislatures that are refusing politicians refusing
to come to the middle because they don't
646
00:53:13.199 --> 00:53:15.039
have to. And one of the
great examples of that is Title TOO.
647
00:53:15.840 --> 00:53:20.280
So there is a lot of people
that agree that we'd be better off if
648
00:53:20.320 --> 00:53:23.360
Congress passed a law on Title II
or net neutrality, whatever the branding is.
649
00:53:24.440 --> 00:53:29.119
And there are bills in Congress,
but they all come from the left
650
00:53:29.199 --> 00:53:30.480
or from the right with a poison
pill. They don't give it on the
651
00:53:30.559 --> 00:53:34.920
left. On the left, there's
a legislation that says we're gonna put not
652
00:53:35.039 --> 00:53:40.119
the netutrality rules themselves in place,
but the actual agency decision itself from twenty
653
00:53:40.159 --> 00:53:45.320
fifteen to twenty sixteen, which obviously
Congress doesn't have to do because they could
654
00:53:45.360 --> 00:53:51.320
just legislate anew But they're refusing to
do that. Why because they know there's
655
00:53:51.320 --> 00:53:53.679
a safety valve, and that safety
valve is they can stick out an extreme
656
00:53:53.719 --> 00:53:59.320
position in Congress, not work to
the middle towards consensus, because an agency
657
00:53:59.360 --> 00:54:02.159
is gonna come in and do exactly
what it is that they want to do
658
00:54:02.679 --> 00:54:06.519
on a three to two basis.
And so I think, again, putting
659
00:54:06.559 --> 00:54:10.960
aside separation of powers constitutional considerations,
there is a policy value in the major
660
00:54:12.039 --> 00:54:17.400
questions, doctrine of compelling, of
forcing to some extent elective representatives to do
661
00:54:17.480 --> 00:54:22.519
their job. We're not necessarily it's
not forcing them to do it. It
662
00:54:22.599 --> 00:54:27.440
is removing a safety valve that is
harming our politics. There's not been recently
663
00:54:27.559 --> 00:54:31.159
in the Washington Post and they said, we oppose the FCC's decision a couple
664
00:54:31.199 --> 00:54:35.519
of years ago to do Title two
regulation of the Internet because we thought it
665
00:54:35.519 --> 00:54:38.599
was a mistake. The fc is
doing it again now and we the washingt
666
00:54:38.599 --> 00:54:43.159
Post editory board, are slightly flipping
our position. Why because they say the
667
00:54:43.239 --> 00:54:46.920
Internet is too important to be left
unregulated, and so we think it is
668
00:54:47.000 --> 00:54:52.440
time for the FCC to move forward
with Title II. And that's the problem.
669
00:54:52.719 --> 00:54:57.079
When you have this safety valve of
the agency doing it, people start
670
00:54:57.159 --> 00:55:00.280
saying this is too important. Someone
must do something, an agency must step
671
00:55:00.280 --> 00:55:04.920
in. But if we have these
ability of the agencies to do it,
672
00:55:04.920 --> 00:55:07.280
it takes that off the table for
Congress to have solve this problem. Probably
673
00:55:07.320 --> 00:55:12.599
should be solved permanently, but it's
one that Congress can do but without major
674
00:55:12.679 --> 00:55:17.280
questions doctrine, without sort of hard
look at Chevron, we are making it
675
00:55:17.320 --> 00:55:22.639
easy for Congress and there's lots of
incentive structures right now for members of Congress
676
00:55:22.679 --> 00:55:25.880
who go to their corner and not
compromise. So it is constitutional on separation
677
00:55:25.920 --> 00:55:31.320
of powers, but I often think
it's the right thing that will drive the
678
00:55:31.360 --> 00:55:37.079
people's actual elective representatives to the middle
to compromise if they'll respond to the response.
679
00:55:37.559 --> 00:55:43.000
You know, having worked in Congress
for fifteen years, maybe that's why
680
00:55:43.039 --> 00:55:45.599
I think the articles of the Constitution
were in order for a reason. But
681
00:55:45.639 --> 00:55:49.519
also the history of it says the
same thing, that Congress sets the rules,
682
00:55:49.559 --> 00:55:51.920
and how difficult is that to do? As I said, made this
683
00:55:51.960 --> 00:55:55.119
sausage. Working for the majority leader, our job is basically to get consensus,
684
00:55:55.119 --> 00:55:59.519
and it's very interesting to think about
how that job works. Basically a
685
00:55:59.559 --> 00:56:01.880
lot of the I wasn't worried about
so much the policy as it was about
686
00:56:01.920 --> 00:56:06.800
getting unamus consent. This is in
the nineties, early two thousand, always
687
00:56:06.800 --> 00:56:08.960
trying to get unamus consent. When
we're in the majority, we're working with
688
00:56:09.000 --> 00:56:12.840
a minority to see if we can
get agreement on things. If it's not
689
00:56:12.880 --> 00:56:15.519
a major issue. In the Senate, anybody can amend anything anytime, so
690
00:56:15.679 --> 00:56:19.239
you want to get something done you've
got to take as many of these amendments
691
00:56:19.239 --> 00:56:22.519
as you can. So it's like
open season. If there's something you can't
692
00:56:22.559 --> 00:56:23.519
agree on, then you get into
a vote. But we want to minimize
693
00:56:23.519 --> 00:56:27.320
the number of things to go to
a vote. So the job is essentially
694
00:56:27.760 --> 00:56:32.360
one of building consensus, and the
Senate is designed that way constantly, sort
695
00:56:32.360 --> 00:56:37.960
of sublimating our own policy concerns as
the leader to the broader role of the
696
00:56:37.000 --> 00:56:42.639
Senate and coming together. And the
way you do that is often you got
697
00:56:42.639 --> 00:56:44.400
to take off the rough edges.
I mean, I don't know how many
698
00:56:44.400 --> 00:56:46.440
amendments we kind of said, well, that's really pissing off Senator so and
699
00:56:46.440 --> 00:56:49.639
so, so we got to take
that out. Can we adjust this?
700
00:56:49.719 --> 00:56:52.800
That gets centered xyz mad? Can't
we all just agree on this? Okay?
701
00:56:52.840 --> 00:56:55.800
Fine, this is back in the
days when Congress functioned. Well,
702
00:56:57.679 --> 00:57:00.599
it's still functions the same way.
The problem is you just don't get to
703
00:57:00.639 --> 00:57:04.159
that compromise for a number of reasons, as it's been politicized. So the
704
00:57:04.199 --> 00:57:07.360
fact that Congress can't write specific statutes
is not a new problem. This is
705
00:57:07.719 --> 00:57:10.639
very I'm old, so I guess
it's it's still a problem. Going back
706
00:57:10.639 --> 00:57:13.639
to me, but I think it
goes back further than me. Even looking
707
00:57:13.679 --> 00:57:15.360
at the you know, Communications Act
at thirty four, you still have,
708
00:57:17.000 --> 00:57:22.840
even in the nineteenth century and eighteenth
century difficulty of getting very specific in statutes.
709
00:57:22.880 --> 00:57:28.440
So statute by the requirement and the
design is always going to be a
710
00:57:28.480 --> 00:57:30.719
little bit higher level. You talk
about written by committee, well, they
711
00:57:30.719 --> 00:57:32.079
have committees, lots of committees,
and when you're done with the committee,
712
00:57:32.119 --> 00:57:35.599
you got the full body, so
you talk about a Franken sign monster.
713
00:57:35.599 --> 00:57:37.000
By the time the statute gets out
of there, there's been a lot of
714
00:57:37.039 --> 00:57:42.280
hands on it, and it's a
consensus document because you also get to get
715
00:57:42.280 --> 00:57:45.679
the president assigner at the end.
So that was a
heroculean effort to get
716
00:57:45.760 --> 00:57:49.559
you know, Acts of Congress done. And now the courts are saying,
717
00:57:49.599 --> 00:57:52.400
well, Congress wasn't specific enough on
a major question, so we're not going
718
00:57:52.440 --> 00:57:54.639
to let the agencies interpret it.
Well, you know, Congress has the
719
00:57:54.679 --> 00:57:58.360
ability to go back if they think
an agency over steped its bounds. First
720
00:57:58.360 --> 00:58:00.920
of all, traditional statute or construct
allows the courts to say this is inconsistent
721
00:58:00.920 --> 00:58:05.719
with the statute and there's no reason
they need to change how that's done.
722
00:58:06.159 --> 00:58:08.679
Whether it's major questions or not.
You know, you don't have to give
723
00:58:08.760 --> 00:58:14.039
Chevron defference to agencies that depart from
the statutory clear statutory intention, but you
724
00:58:14.119 --> 00:58:17.719
have to give them some deference to
be able to interpret vague statues in ways
725
00:58:17.719 --> 00:58:22.280
that bring their expertise to bear and
not have the court substitute its opinion that
726
00:58:22.280 --> 00:58:23.639
this is something Congress has got to
go back and do when they know full
727
00:58:23.639 --> 00:58:27.559
well Congress is not going to do
it. And further, Congress has the
728
00:58:27.599 --> 00:58:30.199
ability to go back if it thinks
in an agency over stepped or misinterpreted the
729
00:58:30.239 --> 00:58:35.079
way that it intended for a law
to be executed, they can rewrite the
730
00:58:35.159 --> 00:58:37.840
law. It's the same issue.
They got to go through that hell consensus
731
00:58:37.880 --> 00:58:39.559
process, but they can rewrite it. They even put in place, to
732
00:58:39.599 --> 00:58:44.159
think all, the Congression Review Act, which means that in the Senate it's
733
00:58:44.159 --> 00:58:49.239
a privileged motion to basically repeal a
regulation. And this was applied to FCC
734
00:58:49.360 --> 00:58:52.000
regulations of an effect to pass a
few times, but ultimate is vetoed by
735
00:58:52.039 --> 00:58:59.400
the President on FCC regulation. So
there is on broadcast in particular, going
736
00:58:59.440 --> 00:59:02.360
back to you know, media ownership
rules. So I think you could say
737
00:59:02.400 --> 00:59:08.719
that I don't think. I think
that the Major Questions doctrine is a way
738
00:59:08.719 --> 00:59:15.639
of bringing more power to the courts
to basically second guess almost what agencies are
739
00:59:15.639 --> 00:59:22.119
doing and have them be the final
arbiter of what Congress intended, rather than
740
00:59:22.159 --> 00:59:27.559
the agencies on issues where clearly Congress
would expect the agencies to act and have
741
00:59:27.599 --> 00:59:36.159
some discretion. I'm wondering if you
could give us a sense of the textual
742
00:59:36.360 --> 00:59:40.159
arguments how did we get from,
you know, nineteen thirty four Act about
743
00:59:40.280 --> 00:59:45.519
radio to this conversation? And the
Major Questions doctrin will obviously be an interesting
744
00:59:45.559 --> 00:59:49.719
and important part of how, you
know, whatever cases come out of this
745
00:59:49.800 --> 00:59:53.039
unfold. But can you just give
as background some of the textual arguments in
746
00:59:53.159 --> 00:59:55.840
Title I Title too? What is
it that we're talking about? How did
747
00:59:55.880 --> 01:00:00.760
we get from radio to net neutrality? It's hard to change those I mean,
748
01:00:01.239 --> 01:00:05.480
we're stuck in this Title I Title
two environment, which I don't think
749
01:00:05.559 --> 01:00:08.000
is it's a problem. The Congress
can't act to kind of change that.
750
01:00:08.079 --> 01:00:14.039
So basically the court's forced if it
wanted to regulate neutrality, the agency was
751
01:00:14.079 --> 01:00:15.320
not able to do under Title one, so it's basically forced to go to
752
01:00:15.360 --> 01:00:20.039
Title two, which isn't that they
end up forbearing from a lot of requirements
753
01:00:20.039 --> 01:00:22.480
of Title fee which they didn't intend. So it's extremely awkward that the fact
754
01:00:22.519 --> 01:00:27.320
that Congress hasn't been able to change
the fundamental structure since nineteen thirty four,
755
01:00:27.800 --> 01:00:32.760
that the FCC's working under this awkward
dynamic. Right. Well, it's so
756
01:00:32.800 --> 01:00:36.719
with nineteen thirty four, we've got
two things. We've got the radio regulation,
757
01:00:36.800 --> 01:00:39.159
then we've got the telephone regulation,
right, and they of course with
758
01:00:39.280 --> 01:00:44.920
radio regulation that the zumer is because
radio stations would with the limited spectrum that
759
01:00:44.920 --> 01:00:46.920
it could be sent and received,
particularly at that time. Obviously we can
760
01:00:47.119 --> 01:00:51.760
operate more frequencies now, but with
the limited spectrum that could be sent and
761
01:00:51.800 --> 01:00:54.320
received on which you can transmit and
receive at the time, there is a
762
01:00:54.400 --> 01:00:59.639
need for some kind of geographic exclusivity
and for some sort of separation by frequency,
763
01:01:00.079 --> 01:01:02.679
and so so there's a coordinating function
that you need to do. That's
764
01:01:02.679 --> 01:01:07.360
our radio authority. As far as
the telephone stuff, let's remember the United
765
01:01:07.400 --> 01:01:09.519
States was the only country in the
world that had a private telephone system by
766
01:01:09.599 --> 01:01:13.760
nineteen thirty four. The British had
one for a while then it got nationalized
767
01:01:13.840 --> 01:01:15.280
a lot of other places. It
was just built by the Post Office in
768
01:01:15.320 --> 01:01:21.519
the first place. So the whole
idea of a private telephone system was a
769
01:01:21.599 --> 01:01:25.480
compromise between the facts on the ground
of the capabilities that AT and T had
770
01:01:25.480 --> 01:01:28.519
brought to the market. I want
to point out that it was already in
771
01:01:28.559 --> 01:01:31.000
the trust busting era that AT and
T was making its first deals with the
772
01:01:31.079 --> 01:01:35.920
Justice Department back in nineteen thirteen,
right, So this long predates the New
773
01:01:35.920 --> 01:01:38.000
Deal. As such, it was
much more of a recognition that the Bell
774
01:01:38.119 --> 01:01:45.920
system had won the fights among the
many early telephone companies to reach a combination
775
01:01:45.119 --> 01:01:51.880
of the most customers with the best
service with the sharpest elbows, with sometimes
776
01:01:51.960 --> 01:01:57.079
exclusions of other parties from their long
lines and technical standards from supplying from supplying
777
01:01:57.119 --> 01:01:59.679
the phones themselves. Which let's remember, you didn't used to be able to
778
01:01:59.679 --> 01:02:02.199
buy a phone, you had to
lease it from the phone company. So
779
01:02:02.199 --> 01:02:05.840
so that's the world where we're coming
from. Where it was the federal government
780
01:02:06.239 --> 01:02:09.679
going, you might say, back
to the first Roosevelt presidency, never mind
781
01:02:09.679 --> 01:02:14.719
the subsequent ones, that that was
was grappling with the question, how are
782
01:02:14.800 --> 01:02:19.039
we going to keep a private phone
system working when it's an inherently exclusionary,
783
01:02:19.119 --> 01:02:22.559
natural, natural monopoly. And that's
where all of this Title two stuff comes
784
01:02:22.559 --> 01:02:24.920
from. The reason that we have
the whole concept of Title one service is
785
01:02:24.960 --> 01:02:28.000
that we used to be able to
do all kinds of other stuff over the
786
01:02:28.000 --> 01:02:34.079
phone. I don't know if anyone
ever used dial a Joke or famously famously
787
01:02:34.119 --> 01:02:37.199
that was that was was his first
consumer Yeah, that was was his first
788
01:02:37.239 --> 01:02:40.360
consumer product back when he was a
Yeah, well so so what what it
789
01:02:40.440 --> 01:02:45.400
used to be If you lived in
Berkeley you could call up Stephen Steve wosneyas
790
01:02:45.440 --> 01:02:50.320
phone number that he'd set up specifically
with an answering machine that had a different
791
01:02:50.320 --> 01:02:53.119
Polish joke every day. So you
know, so that's that's a Title one
792
01:02:53.159 --> 01:02:55.760
service, Right. We're not going
to say there's a natural there's a natural
793
01:02:55.760 --> 01:03:00.559
monopoly in Polish jokes, in fact
that they seem to be quite widely asseminated.
794
01:03:00.639 --> 01:03:04.280
But you know, but the point
is the point is there's if your
795
01:03:04.280 --> 01:03:07.880
services s thought quotes, if your
if your service is voicemail, if your
796
01:03:07.920 --> 01:03:09.800
service is dial a joke. It
makes sense that you're not going to treat
797
01:03:09.840 --> 01:03:14.239
that like that's monopoly you're AT and
T. That's the only place that can
798
01:03:14.320 --> 01:03:16.559
run a phone line into people's houses, and it controls all the switching stations,
799
01:03:16.559 --> 01:03:20.280
and that manufactures all the phones and
all the you know, all the
800
01:03:21.039 --> 01:03:23.920
all the the switchboards and whatnot through
you know, through their subs, through
801
01:03:23.960 --> 01:03:29.920
subsidiaries. So we we find ourselves, as you know, as my colleagues
802
01:03:29.960 --> 01:03:32.400
have said, with a law that
seems reddit fully adapted to the times.
803
01:03:34.559 --> 01:03:37.440
If we're going to say that we
that we need to have the title to
804
01:03:37.599 --> 01:03:39.960
framework, then we're really saying that
we need to have the system that was
805
01:03:40.000 --> 01:03:44.599
set up as an alternative to nationalizing
AT and T back when AT and T
806
01:03:44.760 --> 01:03:45.599
was the only game in town,
and that we're going to apply it to
807
01:03:45.679 --> 01:03:50.039
every internet service provider in the country, including the wireless ones that talk to
808
01:03:50.079 --> 01:03:54.119
our phones, which is you know
that that puts us again in an even
809
01:03:54.159 --> 01:03:59.559
more convoluted situation, because if we're
going to say that you can't discriminate and
810
01:03:59.599 --> 01:04:02.199
that there's de facto unlimited settlement,
free peering, in other words, the
811
01:04:02.239 --> 01:04:06.079
phone has to take whatever gets pushed
down to it. Obviously we want that
812
01:04:06.119 --> 01:04:10.119
in a certain sense. We don't
want your phone picking and choosing what websites
813
01:04:10.159 --> 01:04:13.760
you're allowed to go to. But
it also means that the federal government,
814
01:04:13.880 --> 01:04:18.400
which constrains the supply of spectrum,
is providing the special equivalent of an unfunded
815
01:04:18.440 --> 01:04:21.400
mandate. Right, they're saying,
your phone has to take whatever gets pushed
816
01:04:21.400 --> 01:04:25.239
down, but we won't provide the
special resources to do it. It's a
817
01:04:25.360 --> 01:04:29.800
very tough question, and I love
it when Congress answers these sorts of questions
818
01:04:29.800 --> 01:04:33.000
for it because that results that results
a good degree of ambiguity as for how
819
01:04:33.320 --> 01:04:36.880
how do we deal with the statutory
language when the social facts have changed this
820
01:04:36.920 --> 01:04:42.079
time and the other time. The
third time, Let's think back to the
821
01:04:42.159 --> 01:04:45.159
ninety six Act, which, as
Commissioner Cleiburn pointed out, was the last
822
01:04:45.159 --> 01:04:48.480
time that Congress fully wrapped its arms
around the question. At that time,
823
01:04:48.880 --> 01:04:51.960
your internet service and your phone company
were two different things. More or less,
824
01:04:51.960 --> 01:04:57.000
you had dial up internet service,
right. A few
fortunate people had
825
01:04:57.039 --> 01:05:00.960
t one lines or DSL, but
it was mainly diale up internet. And
826
01:05:00.039 --> 01:05:04.039
there is a natural disconnect between your
isp ISP used to be and the person
827
01:05:04.039 --> 01:05:08.639
who was the company that was connecting
you to your internet service via your phone
828
01:05:08.679 --> 01:05:11.960
line rather than the company that provided
the line. There's a natural split between
829
01:05:12.000 --> 01:05:15.920
that, and so we wound up
in this area where it seemed obvious that
830
01:05:15.960 --> 01:05:19.199
the phone line was still a natural
monopoly, but that your internet service provider
831
01:05:19.280 --> 01:05:21.800
was a specialized service that you would
get over it. So, in other
832
01:05:21.800 --> 01:05:27.079
words of Title one service and again
with the consolidation of those two things,
833
01:05:27.280 --> 01:05:30.199
we've been striving to unpick this thing. Brand DECKX came up. Well,
834
01:05:30.239 --> 01:05:36.199
that's where Justice Scalia raised his famous
pizzeria argument against in fact against Title I
835
01:05:36.280 --> 01:05:40.639
treatments. In favorite Title two treatment, he's saying, what can you really
836
01:05:40.639 --> 01:05:43.920
separate these if you're getting the line
and the service from the same place.
837
01:05:44.000 --> 01:05:47.519
Isn't this like the pizzeria saying we
don't offer delivery. All we do is
838
01:05:47.599 --> 01:05:51.400
bake a pizza and set to your
house. Two different services, right?
839
01:05:51.880 --> 01:05:57.400
But that shows the difficulty of grappling
with this. Justice Thomas has repudiated his
840
01:05:57.480 --> 01:06:00.960
position in brannd X, but it
remains a good law. So but good
841
01:06:00.039 --> 01:06:03.559
luck enough to base for the decisions
line I say, it's a very muddled
842
01:06:03.599 --> 01:06:06.360
situation. Well, I'm just ad. This is why when people talk about
843
01:06:06.360 --> 01:06:09.679
Republican commissioners, they say, are
you afraid of the smart one or the
844
01:06:09.719 --> 01:06:13.920
other one. That's an example of
why people make that distinction right there.
845
01:06:14.039 --> 01:06:15.400
But look on brand next too.
I think we have to recognize there's been
846
01:06:15.440 --> 01:06:19.239
a c change with West Virginia versus
EPA. What Brandax said was we think
847
01:06:19.280 --> 01:06:23.760
it is ambiguous as to whether the
Internet should be treated as a Title one
848
01:06:23.880 --> 01:06:28.599
or title to service. And now
what we know after West Virginia versus EPA
849
01:06:28.760 --> 01:06:33.320
is that that is a decision that
cuts against Title I, meaning the presence
850
01:06:33.559 --> 01:06:40.079
of mere ambiguity is no longer enough
post West Virginia versus EPA to impost title
851
01:06:40.119 --> 01:06:42.880
to classification, so it cuts our
way. In fact, you know,
852
01:06:42.880 --> 01:06:45.320
Don Verrilli, the former Obamas list
for General, filed a paper at the
853
01:06:45.360 --> 01:06:51.280
FCC saying exactly that which is today
post West Virginia versus EPA. To turn
854
01:06:51.320 --> 01:06:55.920
the Internet from a Title one to
a Title two service would run a foul
855
01:06:56.000 --> 01:07:01.159
of West Virginia versus EPA. We
have a few minutes left, so let
856
01:07:01.199 --> 01:07:06.360
me open up the floor to see
if there's any questions from the audience.
857
01:07:09.199 --> 01:07:15.960
Yeah. I think that's probably better. Yeah, yeah, for people who
858
01:07:15.000 --> 01:07:20.199
are watching online, no pressure.
There's like eight people watching online so they'll
859
01:07:20.199 --> 01:07:28.920
mess us up. Hi. My
name is Graciela Pastorm. I'm at Jones
860
01:07:28.960 --> 01:07:33.960
Day. I just have a I
have two questions. Actually, the digital
861
01:07:33.960 --> 01:07:39.639
equity initiative that you were discussing in
the beginning, Commissioner Karm was probably not
862
01:07:39.760 --> 01:07:45.119
foreseen by Congress and passing the Infrastructure
Bill. So do you or do the
863
01:07:45.159 --> 01:07:50.320
other commissioners foresee agencies like the FCC
or other agencies continue to needing to have
864
01:07:50.519 --> 01:07:56.239
their regulations shut down by the Supreme
Court and the major questions doctrine or do
865
01:07:56.280 --> 01:07:59.679
you think that they're now going to
reformulate, because what it sounds like is
866
01:07:59.679 --> 01:08:02.719
that they're and it maybe keep pushing
from what you've all discussed. And it's
867
01:08:02.840 --> 01:08:09.360
very expensive to overturn every administrative agency
decision. So it's kind of two questions
868
01:08:09.400 --> 01:08:13.000
in one. But that's just the
first question. But yeah, thanks me.
869
01:08:13.039 --> 01:08:15.000
My view is yes, you know, we are going to vote next
870
01:08:15.000 --> 01:08:17.600
Wednesday. It's going to pass this
Digital Equity provision. As you noted,
871
01:08:17.640 --> 01:08:21.399
it was based on one page of
law of the thousand plus page of the
872
01:08:21.399 --> 01:08:28.920
twenty twenty one Infrastructure Act. It
did not complicate contemplate let one authorize us
873
01:08:28.960 --> 01:08:31.600
to adopt this just sweeping, intrusive
set of rules. I think this is
874
01:08:31.640 --> 01:08:36.680
going to be another instance where West
Virgin Niversus EPA and the harder look that
875
01:08:36.760 --> 01:08:41.159
courts are giving at Chevron is going
to result in an overturning of the FC's
876
01:08:41.159 --> 01:08:44.279
decision. Again, it's gonna be
a waste of resources to get there,
877
01:08:44.920 --> 01:08:46.199
but thankfully for you being at jonesay
you can benefit from some of the waste
878
01:08:46.239 --> 01:08:51.079
of resource on the way there.
Yeah. I also have a second question,
879
01:08:51.159 --> 01:08:55.920
which is, you know, as
current and former
commissioners at an administrative
880
01:08:55.920 --> 01:09:01.239
agency, can you contemplate a legislative
solution to limiting agencies from broadening their powers
881
01:09:01.279 --> 01:09:05.479
outside of the courts? Or is
it only the courts? Because as I
882
01:09:05.560 --> 01:09:10.359
just said, it is extremely expensive
to continue to have to overturn these agency
883
01:09:10.399 --> 01:09:15.680
decisions, and especially when they've gone
so off the cough or they've gone in
884
01:09:15.720 --> 01:09:19.039
such a different direction. So is
there another solution to limiting their powers?
885
01:09:19.119 --> 01:09:24.279
I mean, they can be more
specific there in there, I mean Congress
886
01:09:24.279 --> 01:09:26.479
can be more specific. I think
that's the goal of some of those who
887
01:09:26.479 --> 01:09:30.880
are pushing the major questions. Doctrines
for Congresses specify exactly what they mean in
888
01:09:30.960 --> 01:09:34.600
terms of what the level of delegation
is and what agencies should do. But
889
01:09:34.640 --> 01:09:38.920
the way Congress is moving since my
day's there, and I think everybody sees
890
01:09:38.960 --> 01:09:41.199
this, is that it's more difficult
to do that, not less, given
891
01:09:41.239 --> 01:09:44.920
the polarization and the way that Congress
is functioning. Used to function much more
892
01:09:45.039 --> 01:09:49.279
bipartisan basis, where that was also
difficult, but now without unless you get
893
01:09:49.319 --> 01:09:53.199
one party control of both and sixty
votes in the Senate, which only happened
894
01:09:53.199 --> 01:09:57.880
for a very brief period under Obama, and then we haven't seen it since
895
01:09:58.600 --> 01:10:09.880
there is a very great difficulty in
getting that done. Let's see. Uh,
896
01:10:09.920 --> 01:10:15.439
I'll go ahead and different you yeah, yeah, well, okay,
897
01:10:15.439 --> 01:10:20.119
thank you very much. Thank you. Ben Slifka visiting from Seattle. Retired
898
01:10:20.159 --> 01:10:24.880
monopolist. I remember the days of
one hundred and ten bod dial up modems.
899
01:10:25.159 --> 01:10:28.960
But I took a Starlink antenna up
to seventy four degrees northern Canada in
900
01:10:29.039 --> 01:10:31.760
July. I got one hundred and
forty megabits a second down and forty megabits
901
01:10:31.760 --> 01:10:35.760
a second up. How does the
and I think the you'll see the prevalence
902
01:10:35.840 --> 01:10:42.960
of of satellite internet service. Uh, increased dramatically and the prices will drop
903
01:10:43.039 --> 01:10:47.560
dramatically. How would that change the
discussions you've had? So I should defer
904
01:10:47.600 --> 01:10:51.199
you given the Canadian nature of the
question, uh as the Simson is from
905
01:10:51.239 --> 01:10:57.680
Canada. Uh. Well, one
thing that's interesting is and this sort of
906
01:10:57.720 --> 01:11:00.039
goes to some of the backwards nature
of regulation and is a lot of people
907
01:11:00.119 --> 01:11:03.039
at the FCC, not myself,
will look at the fact that you know,
908
01:11:03.359 --> 01:11:08.920
you have that high quality service from
a lower orbit satellite starlink and some
909
01:11:08.960 --> 01:11:11.000
of so it's great, and some
of people will say, well, we
910
01:11:11.079 --> 01:11:14.159
actually and treat that as if it's
zero megats per second over zero megabates per
911
01:11:14.199 --> 01:11:18.479
second, because we have a policy
preference to build fiber to one hundred percent
912
01:11:18.479 --> 01:11:20.720
of the location. So when you
hear people talk about the digital ide in
913
01:11:20.760 --> 01:11:24.399
this country, there's all sorts of
juicing the numbers. You hear this number
914
01:11:24.439 --> 01:11:27.600
about fifteen or sixteen million people,
but what you're actually seeing with that is
915
01:11:27.720 --> 01:11:31.119
that's some people that don't have a
fixed wired internet connection. But if you
916
01:11:31.119 --> 01:11:34.439
look at people that have access to
all sorts of different technologies to get what
917
01:11:34.439 --> 01:11:38.239
they want was just I want my
phone to work. The number is much
918
01:11:38.319 --> 01:11:41.479
lower. So I think we should
be looking to those types of technologies to
919
01:11:41.520 --> 01:11:45.920
complement what we have, but there's
a policy override that's getting in the way.
920
01:11:45.960 --> 01:11:47.800
And if you want to add,
you know, I was just about
921
01:11:47.840 --> 01:11:53.119
diving forward to eat my microphone when
UK, because I've been I think the
922
01:11:53.239 --> 01:11:56.640
very first thing I ever said,
at the very first speech I ever gave
923
01:11:56.680 --> 01:12:01.479
after taking office at the Free State
Foundation for Randy May was that we have
924
01:12:01.600 --> 01:12:05.800
a wide diversity of mechanisms for delivery
at the last mile at this point,
925
01:12:05.920 --> 01:12:10.520
and that really undermines the rationale for
Title too, since the whole point of
926
01:12:10.560 --> 01:12:13.960
a natural monopoly is that it actually
is an exclusionary monopoly. If you can
927
01:12:14.000 --> 01:12:16.319
get fixed wireless service that's just as
fast as wired, and if you can
928
01:12:16.359 --> 01:12:19.399
get satellite on top of that,
then you don't just have three different services.
929
01:12:19.439 --> 01:12:24.119
You have three different mediums of service
with potential for multiple providers in each
930
01:12:24.159 --> 01:12:27.079
one of those. And I think
under those circumstances, it would have been
931
01:12:27.159 --> 01:12:30.000
very hard to justify Title two in
the first place, and it wouldn't have
932
01:12:30.039 --> 01:12:31.640
been justified, and there wouldn't have
been a rivalry between, for example,
933
01:12:31.640 --> 01:12:34.319
the Bell system and the other telephone
systems. If they all could have been
934
01:12:34.319 --> 01:12:39.119
delivered wirelessly
using a small number of
facilities to cover a wide area, then
935
01:12:39.119 --> 01:12:41.920
there never would have been telephone monopolies
in the first place, and we'd be
936
01:12:41.960 --> 01:12:45.520
looking at a very different history of
telecommunications loot. Now what we have,
937
01:12:45.680 --> 01:12:48.479
if anything, is a wide diversity
of physical media of connection leading out to
938
01:12:48.520 --> 01:12:54.880
a relatively small number of upstream services, which you know are arguably the ones
939
01:12:54.920 --> 01:12:58.920
where we should start asking questions about
common carriage in this day and age.
940
01:12:59.199 --> 01:13:02.359
So it's it's a very very different
situation from what we saw before. Personally,
941
01:13:02.479 --> 01:13:06.159
I would feel much less upset get
if I get fired by my wireline
942
01:13:06.159 --> 01:13:10.119
ISP to my house because I would
turn to the my hot spot on my
943
01:13:10.159 --> 01:13:12.800
phone. I'd be back online in
three or four seconds. You know,
944
01:13:13.319 --> 01:13:15.359
I feel a lot less upset about
that than being barred from one of the
945
01:13:15.399 --> 01:13:21.039
big four or five big text ecosystems
because on my ISP fires me, I
946
01:13:21.039 --> 01:13:23.960
can get a new one. Well, I pick up my phone and I
947
01:13:24.039 --> 01:13:26.119
have a new one. I drive
down to Starbucks and I have a new
948
01:13:26.119 --> 01:13:29.520
one. You know, it's really
not a big deal compared to what it
949
01:13:29.600 --> 01:13:30.520
used to be. If, for
example, AT and T were to ban
950
01:13:30.600 --> 01:13:33.880
you from your system from its system. But if you get demonetized from a
951
01:13:33.920 --> 01:13:38.520
site where you've got millions of followers
or what you've based your living on,
952
01:13:38.720 --> 01:13:41.640
and that where you've expected that the
terms of service were going to sustain you,
953
01:13:41.800 --> 01:13:43.600
and then all of a sudden you
get fired off with that, that's
954
01:13:43.640 --> 01:13:46.039
a very very different world. So
if we were writing the rigs under contemporary
955
01:13:46.039 --> 01:13:49.039
circumstances, there's no way we would
wind up here. There's no way Congress
956
01:13:49.039 --> 01:13:54.359
would have brought us here. And
increasingly we're clinging to this last mile,
957
01:13:54.720 --> 01:13:59.199
not because we're like the drunk looking
for his keys. You know, everyone
958
01:13:59.239 --> 01:14:03.279
knows this joke on clicking for his
keys under you under the street light,
959
01:14:03.399 --> 01:14:05.720
right, and he's like, I
lost my keys in the alley, Well,
960
01:14:05.720 --> 01:14:08.640
why are you looking over here?
Because the light is better here.
961
01:14:08.760 --> 01:14:13.279
You know, we've got a clear
regulatory predicate for reaching the last mile ISPs,
962
01:14:13.319 --> 01:14:15.439
because we always did, because that
was how monopoly AT and T worked.
963
01:14:15.840 --> 01:14:21.159
If that isn't relevant anymore, then
there's the question of if we do
964
01:14:21.239 --> 01:14:26.279
have a predicate to act, but
it's no longer wise to act, to
965
01:14:26.279 --> 01:14:30.600
what degree should we still be acting? Yeah, having been there in the
966
01:14:30.640 --> 01:14:32.800
early days. I completely concur with
your point, and your point's valid on
967
01:14:32.880 --> 01:14:36.159
the capacity issue. I mean,
going back to the early days two thousand
968
01:14:36.199 --> 01:14:41.279
and three, the concern was there
wasn't adequate capacity from ISPs, so they
969
01:14:41.279 --> 01:14:44.720
needed to be regulated in order to
ensure that they didn't throttle in order to
970
01:14:45.600 --> 01:14:48.680
advance their own services perhaps or advance
their own content to agree that they acquired
971
01:14:48.680 --> 01:14:51.840
it. Right now, there's so
much capacity and so much competition that those
972
01:14:53.319 --> 01:14:56.079
arguments are really moved. As you
pointed out, I think that's a good
973
01:14:56.079 --> 01:15:00.920
example. Even satellite is an option. If Verizon my files is discriminating,
974
01:15:00.960 --> 01:15:02.720
I go to Comcast in my neighborhood. Now some places have less options,
975
01:15:02.720 --> 01:15:06.960
but ultimately they do have space X. I mean there generally is competition for
976
01:15:08.039 --> 01:15:12.600
basic broadband that the speeds are so
much faster, there's really no incentive or
977
01:15:12.760 --> 01:15:15.640
ability for carriers to discriminate in the
way. That was originally the concern that
978
01:15:15.680 --> 01:15:19.760
prompted early calls for going to title
too. So I really concur with you
979
01:15:19.800 --> 01:15:24.680
on that, And two things I
will add to that is there is not
980
01:15:24.840 --> 01:15:31.000
even is so the absolutes that I
think I'm hearing here don't necessarily exist in
981
01:15:31.039 --> 01:15:38.479
every hamlet in this nation when it
comes to you know, opportunities at at
982
01:15:38.680 --> 01:15:44.000
my doorstep. And you know,
I continue to bring up that there are
983
01:15:44.039 --> 01:15:49.520
a lot of economic incentives, a
lot of you know, capacity, economic
984
01:15:49.560 --> 01:15:56.439
capacity that we see flowing through the
states from the government. Again, so
985
01:15:56.840 --> 01:16:02.000
the traditional and legacy c incentives to
do some of the harms that you hear
986
01:16:02.039 --> 01:16:10.520
people like me speaking about, they're
not there today. My issue is always
987
01:16:11.199 --> 01:16:15.880
do we have the proper backstops in
terms of ensuring and protecting those when tomorrow
988
01:16:15.960 --> 01:16:20.119
comes in the nature of all of
this and the conversations we're having and the
989
01:16:20.199 --> 01:16:26.439
money and all of the incentives are
no longer there, will these companies and
990
01:16:26.520 --> 01:16:31.039
will some of your clients act in
the same manner, And if they don't,
991
01:16:32.319 --> 01:16:40.520
what type of backstop regulatory or otherwise
would they have if individuals are harmed?
992
01:16:41.680 --> 01:16:44.319
Okay, well we're out of time, but thank you so much to
993
01:16:44.399 --> 01:16:48.279
our panelists for this really great discussion. One quick announcement