TRANSCRIPT 🔗
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Good afternoon everyone. For our lunch
plenary session, we have a great fireside
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chat focused on antitrust from the FTC
to the DOJ. We have much to
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talk about and we are delighted to
have a former FTC Chair and a former
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FTC Commissioner here to share their perspectives. Our thanks to our Corporations, Securities
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and Antitrust Executive Committee and it's co
chair, Sveetlana Ghans for helping putting this
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discussion together. Set Lana wanted to
be here to introduce this session but had
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a last minute conflict. And now
let me introduce our moderator. She has
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been a regular at this conference since
the beginning, so she really doesn't need
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an introduction for this audience. But
Judge Naomi Rao has had a very impressive
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career with service and all three branches
of government. She was appointed to the
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United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in twenty nineteen.
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Prior to the bench, she served
as the administrator of OIRA. Before OIRA,
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she taught for eleven years at the
Anton Ninskalia Law School. In twenty
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fourteen, she founded the Center for
the Study of the Administrative State. From
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twenty two thousand and five to two
thousand and six, she served as Special
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Assistant and Associate White House Council to
President George W. Bush. Judge Row
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clerked for Judge Jay Harvey Wilkinson on
the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth
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Circuit and Justice Clarence Thomas in the
Supreme Court. She is a graduate of
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Yale and her laudry is from the
University of Chicago Law School. I have
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to confess that we recently did a
prep call with this group for this session,
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and I don't want to oversell it, but between the contrasting views of
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these former commissioners and Judge Row's commanding
unders ending of the law, I think
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we are in for a real treat. So please join me and welcoming Judge
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rowan our panel. Nate, thanks
so much for that kind introduction. It's
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really a pleasure to be back here
at this conference. Hard to believe it's
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the eleventh one. I think I
have been at every single one of these
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conferences, and it is great to
be back, you know, and also
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Load full transcript
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with events in recent years, there's
a lot more of the executive branch to
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review, so you know, it
gives us. It gives us a lot
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of things to talk about. And
you know, one of the things that
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has perhaps most been in the news
is the Federal Trade Commission. There's been
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the recent noisy exit of Commissioner Wilson, that there has been discussion about the
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FTC's wool making authorities. There's a
lot of pending litigation, which of course
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I will not speak to, but
there's a lot going on with this particular
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agency. And I can think of
to no better people to talk about this
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issue with EI their full bios or
in the materials. So I'll just give
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them a you know, just tell
you a little bit about who we have.
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We have John Leebowitz, who he
was a commissioner at the FTC from
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two thousand and four to two thousand
and nine. He was then elevated to
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be the Chairman of the FTC,
where he served until twenty thirteen. And
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he also served as a partner at
Davis Polk for many years. And we
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have Noah Phillips who was also a
commissioner of the FTC. He served from
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twenty eighteen to twenty twenty two.
Prior to that, he was chief counsel
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to Senator Cornyn, and he is
currently a partner at Kravath. So,
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so I think we have a lot
of things to talk about, so so
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we can jump right in. So
so we have today we're at the Executive
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Branch Review Conference, and so I
guess my first question, I hope this
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is not controversial, is do we
all agree that the FTC is a part
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of the executive branch? So I'm
happy to take the first answer. But
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let me just begin by thanking Nate
and the whole team at the Federalist Society
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for the kind invitation to be here. It's such an honor to be here
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with all of you, and in
particular with John and Judge Row. I'm
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privileged to know both of them and
their tremendous public servants and human beings.
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The answer is yes, it's part
of the executive branch. But I should
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add that I have sitting on the
mantle above my desk a portrait of former
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Commissioner Humphrey, and can I can
I interject for one second if I may,
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in the middle of my Humphrey story, complimentary way if you contrasting in
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contrast, I think of ourselves complent
And when I was a chair of the
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FTC. I did not have a
picture of President Obama in my office,
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although many of my fellow INDI pending
agency chairs independent agencies within the executive branch
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chairs did. I had a picture
of William Humphrey because I also believed in
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the independence of independent agencies. But
I didn't give you that. I would
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have given you one if you had
asked me, But so it came to
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it yourself. I don't think it's
right to pin me with confusion, John,
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because I didn't get to finish the
sentence. The reason I have the
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portrait of William Humphrey is because I
never quite understood what quasi sorry, that's
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William Humphrey, of Humphrey's executor.
The firing protection that FTC commissioners enjoy is
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cognizable under the Constitution because the agency
is quasi judicial and quasi legislative. I
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still don't know what that means.
I see little echoes of it in the
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statute. But I don't think there's
anything wrong with what Justice Kagan said when
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she was describing the FTC and say
LA law and said, well, those
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look like executive functions. I think
that's absolutely right. So now I do
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see some daylight between us. Yet, John, you said, the FTC
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is an executive agency, but it's
independent agency within the executive branch. What
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does that mean? Well, I
think what it means is, at least
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when I was at the agency,
and I was the agency as a non
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chair commissioner and a commissioner, you
tried very hard to keep politics away from
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your decision making. And I think
that's a wonderful at least when a commission
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is functioning properly an independent commission.
I think it's a wonderful virtue of an
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independent commission. And I'll give you
one example if I can so. One
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of the issues that every commissioner,
Democrat and Republican agreed on was stopping a
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kind of behavior by brand pharmaceutical companies
and generic pharmaceutical companies. Brand pharmaceutical companies
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would essentially pay the generics to stay
out of the market for a period of
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time, and we called it pay
for delay pharmaceutical payments. And and yet
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the brands and the generics were and
we finally went a case in the Supreme
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Court stopping the practice, or at
least under a rule of reason approach,
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stopping the practice five three that was
in Actavis. But there was no doubt
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that the generics were very close to
the Democrats. The brands were very close
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to Republicans and also to Democratic senators
from various from various states around what's like
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New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware where
they were headquartered. And yet I think
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all of the commissioners and it was
win win for these companies right, and
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lose lose for consumers because brands have
big, high margins, generics have tiny
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margins, and the brand could pay
the generic more not to compete, to
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sit it out than to compete.
And yet every commissioner, after after thinking
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about this issue, because not all
of us came to the agency with any
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knowledge about this or much knowledge about
it, came to the conclusion that this
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was worth a fight. We lost
in a couple of appeals courts, and
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we designed a circuit split. We
tried to create a circuit split to get
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a case of the Supreme Court.
We ultimately did and we won, and
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that saved consumers all of US billions
and billions of dollars a year. Now,
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I'm not saying it wouldn't have happened
if we were controlled by the executive
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branch, but I think it would
have been. It could have been much
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more complicated. Do you have any
thoughts about that? I mean, do
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you think that what does it mean
to you to be independent part of an
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independent agency? So what I hear
in the colleque we already is a little
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bit of two different concepts. One
is the concept of independence and the other
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is the concept of not being political. And to some extent, the latter,
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to me, is fairly faithful to
you know, the progressive design of
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the agency by President Wilson, there
was a belief in expertise that you could
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have a group of people who were
really deep in the weeds of business conduct,
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and they would be given special authority
to study business conduct and they would
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fashion policy on their own, but
critically they would advise the Congress, which
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they did. They would even advise
the courts. And there's a provision in
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the FTC Act that permits that,
although I don't know that it's ever been
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used. So there's a notion of
expertise as opposed to politics. I don't
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know how coherent that notion is right
at the end of the day, even
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if we're dealing in things that a
lot of people would agree as a matter
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of public policy ought to be technocratic. There are sort of inevitable political judgments
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that must be made, right,
there are trade offs. We saw some
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of this in the discourse I feel
like around COVID, like, yes,
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there was a risk, but you're
going to shut down education, and that's
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a real thing we need to weigh. And maybe that's not a doctor's opinion,
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that's a social judgment someone is making. But the separate concept is the
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one of independence, and there I
think, you know, that's a different
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idea. There is this firing protection
at least as of today April twenty five,
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wherever we are twenty twenty three,
it still exists. And so the
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FTC has some theoretical at least room
to move away from what the White House
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directs, because that is it's the
White House. The Presidency is the institution
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to which that independence is sort of
directed. But I think as a practical
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matter, what we see as a
lot of interplay between the agency and the
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executive, we also see the agency
having a lot of interplay over time with
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Congress. Now Congress is clearly not
executive, but it certainly can have an
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impact on the independence of an agency. And so I think it's important for
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us to sort of decouple those concepts
and then take each of them as they
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are and analyzed them. So I
want to ask you both about FTC rulemaking.
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But first I have a question,
how do you feel about aira review
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of FTC rules. I'm just asking
for a friend, So I have no
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If a legislative scheme were to send
rulemakings to OIRA, I don't think I
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would have any objection to it.
We have to be by statute. It
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would happen to not by executive order
the rest of yeah, so it would
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have to be by statute. It
would have to be by statute, and
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the statute doesn't direct us to do
that. Now, when we did rulemakings,
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you know, we always looked at
a cost, costs and benefits.
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I think under Magmas you have to
do a cost benefit analysis when you do
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a Magmas rule, and the FTC
has multiple Magma's rulings that are ongoing.
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Now that's the former rulemaking at the
FTC. For those who don't know it,
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it's different than APA rulemaking and much
more, much more medieval form of
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rulemaking. It takes longer to do
to do rules, usually five six years.
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So I would not be just to
just to come back to your question,
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I would not be averse to it. I know there's always a tension
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between or I gather there is sometimes
a tension between OIRA and independent agencies.
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Independent agencies or you know, act
like an independent agency or should and but
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I don't. I don't think if
there was a satutary designation that would be
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that would be very workable. Yeah, I guess where I fundamentally start.
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Let's leave aside the institutional arrangement and
the law. As a matter of policy,
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is it a good idea to have
another set of eysed on proposed rules,
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and in particular to help answer the
question, you know, what are
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the potential costs of this rule?
Inevitably, if the agency is proposing the
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rule, they support the policy,
and so having a set of eyes they
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may not be married to pursuing whatever
policy that is. Take a look and
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assess the costs. I think is
important, even in the context of enforcement
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action, whether or not you really
buy the distinction between the political and the
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expert. I do think it's very
important for the agency always to get things
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right and to look very carefully and
consider very carefully the arguments being made and
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the facts and circumstances that applies afociori
in the context of rulemaking, because the
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impact of the thing is so much
greater. And when I was a commissioner,
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one of the things I got very
well. One of the things that
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led me to
dissent, I suppose
most prominently in one rulemaking matter, was
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I didn't feel like the agency had
done sufficient homework in scoping the rule and
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thinking about the implications, and so
having another set of eyes to me would
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be helpful. Is that a yes, that's a yes. But can I
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just add one thing? The design
of any commission is such, and not
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only commissions, but particularly commissions,
is such that you have you have political
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appointees on top of bureaucrats. And
so those political appointees an independent agency or
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from both parties, or at least
only three can be from the president's party,
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And so you should have some degree
of creative tension I think in any
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decision that an independent agency makes between
the career staff and the political appointees on
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top. So what about rulemaking.
There's been there's been a lot of talk
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recently about rulemaking efforts in the current
FTC, and I'm wondering if the two
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of you would be interested to share
your thoughts about that, to the extent
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to which maybe this rulemaking is a
break from previous rulemakings, and you know,
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the legitimacy or authority for current rulemaking
efforts. So Judrau mentioned earlier that
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the job that I had before I
was a Federal Trade Commissioner was as a
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counsel to Senator corn In on the
Judiciary Committee, And so that was sort
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of That was a seven year period, and I spent a lot of time
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thinking about a lot of constitutional issues. I think, perhaps above them all
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the separation of powers. So I
vividly recall the first time someone presented me
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the concept. Oh sorry, let
me back up. There is a constant
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back and forth on the Federal Trade
Commission about what the phrase unfair methods of
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competition, which section five of the
statute allows the agency to enjoin, what
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that phrase means, and critically whether
into what extent it exceeds the scope of
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the Sherman Act. Some people also
say the Clayton Act. It's another discussion.
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So there's already a debate about what
do the words mean, what kind
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of conduct the agency can condemn?
On a case by case basis. The
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moment I saw the concept that you
could make a rule a regulation about an
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unfair method of competition, I immediately
came back to those separation of powers issues
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with which I'd familiarize myself on the
Judiciary Committee, because it struck me that
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if people couldn't agree on what it
meant, we had a delegation problem.
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And low, you know, you
go back to Scheckter poultry. And what
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is it that the NIRA, the
National Industrial Recovery Act, gives the president
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the power to make rules about it. He gets the power to do codes
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of fair competition, which sounds a
lot. You know, it's the linguistic
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obverse of unfair methods of competition,
so that it strikes me as a constitutional
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problem. But the other thing is
this, to me, the case upon
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which this is all based, you
know, a Skelly Right decision from your
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court, from the US Court of
Appeals for the DC Circuit from I never
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sat with Scully Right. National Petroleum
Refiners just doesn't hold up in terms of
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the way that we think about statutes
and the way we think about rulemaking power
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today as a general matter. And
I think in light of the major questions
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doctrine again sort of author sheori,
it really just doesn't look like the agency
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has the power. Let me let
me just say that National Patrolling Refiners,
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though it is written by a Skelly, right, And though I think that
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in that decision, which is actually
fairly brief his opinion, he does say
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something along the lines of, well, it's not clear to me that the
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FTC has this rulemaking authority, but
it's clearly effectuates what we all believe to
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be the spirit of the FTC Act, and so therefore we were upholding it.
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But it was then nanimous decision.
It is, it is precedent,
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right, it is the closest thing
we have to president. And by the
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way, what they were fighting about
then, which was a big fight and
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now is taken for granted, was
the octane rule. It's the rule that
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requires gasoline stations to post the octane
of the gasoline that we're all filling up
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with. So I think, I
guess I would, I think it will.
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I don't want to prej I don't
want anyone to pre judge. Judge
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Rao here and thank you, honor, to be on this panel with you,
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and of course with my friend Noah. But look, I do think
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that the the ftc because there is
this precedent, and because, particularly for
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low income workers, there is a
very serious problem with non competes. Right,
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maybe they're not enforceable, but if
you're making thirteen dollars an hour McDonald's
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and you want to go or in
fifteen dollars an hour at Burger King,
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you may not know that. And
so I think they get a chance to
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take a shot down the field at
something that is arguably and I believe is
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within their bailiwick, and that would
be effectuating their mission. I guess the
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one thing I'd add to what I
said before, the law on non compete
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agreements is very old. It's well
older than the Republic. This goes back
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to old English law and the relationship
you know, between artisans and their apprentices,
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and it's always been a rule of
reason. So forget the legal authority,
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forget the constitutional considerations, just brass
tax antitrust law. They've drafted,
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not just in the context of low
wage workers, ball workers and workers broadly
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defined and what non compete clauses are
broadly defined. They've drafted a per se
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rule for conduct that is very clearly
not governed by that in the draft rule,
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right, not in the final rule. So you get to you know,
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they get to modify whatever they do, and then it's subject to the
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courts. And I'll just say this. Obviously you're right about the history,
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Noah, but it is also true
that non competes have become much more have
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become much broader, have become much
more abused. And I'll I'll just give
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you one example that involves my family. I have a daughter. She works
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for a twelve person interior design company
in Brooklyn, and when she was asked
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to sign her most recent contract,
it had a ten year non complete.
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She's twenty five years old. It
had a ten year non compete with like
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no geographic boundaries whatsoever. Now not
everybody gets to call up someone who works
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on the Federal Trade Commission and say, Dad, is this enforceable? But
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but and so you know, I
hear you, and reasonable people can disagree,
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and you know, we'll see where
they come out and we'll see what
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happens. So I'll end on a
point of agreement, which is I agree
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with you that we have apparently far
too many non compete agreements in this country.
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I agree that many of them appear
to be unenforceable, and many others
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appear also to be unjustified. So
I think as a matter of public policy,
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that's a discussion we ought to have, and you know Congress is having
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that discussion. States are very actively
having this discussion. The notice of posed
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rolemaking goes through all of the recent
legislation. So I'm not unsympathetic on the
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policy, but I do think that
doesn't answer the question of the legal authority
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well, and I don't disagree that
sometimes. I mean, sometimes you can't
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bring an enforcement action when you're at
the FTC, or you can't write a
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rule, and we did a fair
amount of rulemaking. We don't didn't consider
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ourselves a rule making agency. We
consider ourselves more enforcement of policy agency,
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because actually I believe sometimes it's appropriate
for the legislature to do it, and
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it's not appropriate for for an agency, independent or otherwise to draft a rule.
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So I agree on that point as
well. I think, or we're
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in sympathy and we're complimentary or something. What about Noah's concerns about the non
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relegation principle or maybe more mildly,
the major questions doctrine. Well, there's
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a major questions doctrine. It's been
articulated by the Supreme Court. It's going
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to be something that that the FTC
is going to have to confront if it
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goes forward with its rule and uh, and you know, we have a
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system where it's going to be challenged
in the courts and the courts will have
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the ultimate uh will make the ultimate
a decision on that. So I think
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it's a Now some would say that
the major questions doctrine non delegation is probably
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a recently is a recently emerging doctrine. I'm no expert in this area.
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Uh and uh and really hadn't been
front and center in jurisprudence until
until fairly
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recently. But having said that,
they have to confront it. They you
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know, they can promulgate a rule. And again, sometimes you promulgate a
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rule and it gets thrown out and
uh and that's the way our system works.
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And we should all be we should
all be glad that, you know,
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rules that don't meet judicial standards as
a general matter aren't upheld. Okay,
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maybe we can talk a little bit
about the structure of FTC right now.
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So, so there was so one
commissioner Christine Wilson had a kind of
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noisy exit where she where she resigned
her post at the Commission and raised some
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pretty serious allegations against the way the
Commission is currently operating. The current makeup
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of the Commission is three Democratic commissioners. There are no minority Republican commissioners at
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present. Someone, and what do
you think about the noisy exit? Uh?
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Some of the charges that were leveled
there? And also how does it
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affect the legitimacy of the commission?
You know, to have vacancies of the
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of this sort join it? Sure, so it's unfortunate, you know,
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I know Christine Wilson, like her
a lot. I know Lena Khan and
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I have enormous respect for her.
It's it's bad for the stature of the
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agency when you have a let's just
call it a fiery exit like that on
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the you know, on the editorial
age of the Wall Street Journal. I
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think the Commission fires well. I
know I characterised actually knocked over the picture
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of water, but uh, and
you know my view, and it may
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be antiquated. Uh was that or
a quaint was hit the Commission? This
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is another reason why I really like
the stature the the the the independent agency
301
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structure is because the commission functions better
when everyone is sitting around and trying to
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solve a problem. Uh and uh, and you try to come to a
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consensus. Now this was probably not
your experience on your commission, but it
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was certainly the experience on the commissions
I served on. And uh uh and
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so uh you know, I hope
they add new commissioners sooner rather than later.
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And I'll just say one other,
one other point on this. So
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take for example, a lot of
your antrust layers. You know that they're
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promulgating a new merger guidelines. And
one of the things we tried to do
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when we did the last round of
merger guidelines in two thousand and nine,
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in two thousand and ten was we
tried to make sure that we had a
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consensus. We had a consensus on
the commissioners, We had some degree of
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consensus around stakeholder interest stakeholders. But
if you if you end up writing and
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we did that for a very and
we thought we pushed very hard in many
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ways to make to make certain types
of mergers involving Nason competitors and certain types
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of and other things like direct evidence
more a part of merger reviews, but
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we were very we wanted to make
sure we had a consensus because the most
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important thing about the merger guidelines was
that they get adopted by the courts,
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and they very quickly got adopted by
the courts. So I think if you're
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a three person democratic FTC and you
are proposing guidance on mergers, you want
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to be very careful that you still
try to strive for consensus, because there's
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not really much value in in promulgating
merger guidelines. It won't be adopted by
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the courts. So a lot baked
in there. I guess I'd start with
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this. When I was in the
Commission majority, we had some very loud
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descents, and those descents drew a
lot of attention negative on the agency.
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And if you're the object of those
descents on some level, that's a hard
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thing to deal with. And if
you're a chair trying to run an agency,
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that's even harder. It's not easy
to herd cats. It's especially hard
328
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to herd like Senate confirmed cats.
It's true independent cats, independent, unfiable,
329
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unaccountable, all the things cats.
What Nate did not mention is there's
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a musical number at the end,
and so that's that's where we're going.
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Here are you going to dance?
I only think costumes are right back over
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here. So you know, then
when I found myself in the Commission minority,
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I saw some things I didn't like
and would call those out. And
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it's very clear from the paper record
for
the public that can the number of
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things that we're concerning Commissioner Wilson increased
over time, probably will certainly culminating in
336
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her descent in the Metal within recusal
matter. There is, however, a
337
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benefit hard as it is to run
an agency, I think, to the
338
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public, and also I want to
overstate this, but to the courts who
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are sometimes looking at matters as they
come up. And I was once a
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dissenting commissioner in a matter that ended
up in court against a Republican chair.
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There is a benefit to the ability
of someone noisily to exit and you can't
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rely and people shouldn't have to rely
on career civil servants to try to make
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the kind of noise and ways that
may not be appropriate. One of the
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benefits that the commission structure gets you
is where things are wrong, and yeah,
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it's subject to which people you have, there is at least an opportunity
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for that to get out, and
I think that can invite a positive sort
347
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of scrutiny. Again, I was
the object to some of this. It
348
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wasn't always easy, but I think
you know, kind of glad it's there.
349
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But dissenting is different from exiting.
Once you've exited, you can no
350
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longer dissent correct. So what do
you I mean, what do you think
351
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about the should you stay in dissent? Should? This is obviously something I
352
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struggle with. The decision, whether
you know, to stay in a job
353
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and leave depends on a lot of
different things. Some of those are personal
354
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things, some of those are professional
things. You know, I would say
355
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personally, I very much enjoyed the
occasional florid descent. I was less interested
356
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in rat attack lots of little things
because you want to produce good work product,
357
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and to my mind, you want
to save the really loud descents for
358
00:29:18.799 --> 00:29:22.799
the things that kind of matter.
Most say this, The descents should generally
359
00:29:22.880 --> 00:29:30.079
be because you disagree with you disagree
with outcomes, and you want to put
360
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that on the record. And I
descended plenty of times, and I'm not
361
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saying and and and I think in
the most recent departure of Commissioner Wilson,
362
00:29:40.559 --> 00:29:45.559
it was it was both. It
was both. It was both a substantive
363
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disagreement and it was also I'm very
unhappy with the way the Commission is being
364
00:29:51.000 --> 00:29:55.480
run, right, So I think
to your to your question, Uh,
365
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you can't descent when you're gone,
right, But but of course people get
366
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to decide when they're leaving, and
also there are different ways to descent and
367
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be heard. Just roughly, what
percentage of FTC decisions have a descent?
368
00:30:11.799 --> 00:30:15.240
Do you have a sense of that, what percentage draw descent? I guess
369
00:30:15.359 --> 00:30:19.759
it's fairly low. Well, yeah, because most of the work on which
370
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the Commission is voting on average over
time is like enforcement matters, and most
371
00:30:26.799 --> 00:30:30.759
of those enforcement matters are probably not
that controversial. My guess is, if
372
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you did the statistical work, you
would see a trend toward more over time,
373
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because I think the Commission is less
interested in what used to be garden
374
00:30:40.720 --> 00:30:44.440
variety work and more interested and kind
of edge stuff, and edge tends to
375
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raise controversy. There's also a lot
more rulemaking and stuff like that. But
376
00:30:48.960 --> 00:30:52.920
my guess is the numbers are still
pretty weighted in favor of I think that's
377
00:30:52.960 --> 00:30:56.480
right. And there also is a
practice, going back to when I was
378
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chaired before that sometimes you know,
there would be there would be a reasonable
379
00:31:02.559 --> 00:31:04.960
there would be a close matter where
reasonable people could disagree, and there would
380
00:31:06.000 --> 00:31:08.799
be some internal discussion, and you
would find yourself in the minority, and
381
00:31:08.839 --> 00:31:15.400
then you would just vote for five. You would vote for the consensus decision
382
00:31:15.799 --> 00:31:19.240
because you wanted to show a consensus
on a particular matter. So I don't
383
00:31:19.240 --> 00:31:22.039
think that happens anymore. It does
it? No? I think it still
384
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happens, but probably less over time. So let me ask you another structural
385
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questions. So, one of the
things I learned from my government service talking
386
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to many independent agency independent agency heads
or chairman, is that in practice,
387
00:31:38.680 --> 00:31:45.559
a lot of independent agencies can operate
like a single headed executive agency because the
388
00:31:45.799 --> 00:31:51.440
chair controls the balance of power.
In most independent agencies, they have significant
389
00:31:51.440 --> 00:31:56.279
control over staffing and agenda setting and
things like this. And so I'm
wondering
390
00:31:56.200 --> 00:32:02.039
how much does the bipartisanship of these
multi member commissions really Does it matter?
391
00:32:02.160 --> 00:32:07.799
Does it make a difference where the
chair you know, controls the balance of
392
00:32:07.839 --> 00:32:14.559
power and the agenda in most cases. So I think where I would start
393
00:32:14.680 --> 00:32:20.039
in answering that question is it really
depends a lot on the chair and the
394
00:32:20.119 --> 00:32:23.279
people. Like this is as much
a personality driven thing and the views of
395
00:32:23.279 --> 00:32:29.599
the individuals driven thing. Because there's
no guarantee that the chair controls the members
396
00:32:29.640 --> 00:32:32.880
of their party. That's a decision
that those commissioners are going to make whether
397
00:32:32.960 --> 00:32:38.799
to follow the chair. John,
you had a lot of fun. So
398
00:32:39.079 --> 00:32:45.680
I would say, look, the
chair controls most of the agenda, the
399
00:32:45.759 --> 00:32:50.960
vast majority of the agenda. But
I think from from my perspective, at
400
00:32:51.000 --> 00:32:54.279
least in the commissions I served in, you know, we were always sort
401
00:32:54.319 --> 00:33:00.880
of talking about ideas, and when
I became chair, I went and I
402
00:33:00.920 --> 00:33:02.720
taught to all my colleagues, all
of whom I liked and trusted, and
403
00:33:02.799 --> 00:33:07.960
we sort of worked through sort of
a consensus proactive agenda. One thing was
404
00:33:08.039 --> 00:33:15.960
on uh, stopping a reverse payment
but pay for delay pharmaceutical stems. Another
405
00:33:15.960 --> 00:33:19.279
issue was doing more on in the
privacy area. We had a few others,
406
00:33:20.000 --> 00:33:22.880
and then we had vigorous you know, disagreements sometimes on on matters.
407
00:33:22.880 --> 00:33:27.880
But but uh, and by the
way, you know, I'm thinking about
408
00:33:27.880 --> 00:33:30.000
this, No one from Olirah ever
invited me in to go talk to them,
409
00:33:30.079 --> 00:33:32.720
or no one ever wanted to come
over. Maybe Cass Sunstein came over.
410
00:33:32.759 --> 00:33:37.839
Wa I invited them all over.
I'm sorry, I said, I
411
00:33:37.880 --> 00:33:39.119
invited them all over. Well,
you we were a really good head of
412
00:33:39.160 --> 00:33:45.119
Olirah, and that's a really smart
thing to do. Anyway, So I
413
00:33:45.119 --> 00:33:49.359
think it does depend a lot on
the chair, although I do think that
414
00:33:49.480 --> 00:33:54.079
the chair often speaks for the Commission, certainly on consensus issues, and the
415
00:33:54.160 --> 00:34:00.200
chair sort of runs the agency as
on a day to day basis. Yeah,
416
00:34:00.720 --> 00:34:05.359
did you often have your same party
commissioners breaking ranks with what you wanted
417
00:34:05.400 --> 00:34:13.039
to come? Well, it's an
interesting question. So when I first became
418
00:34:14.039 --> 00:34:15.519
so when I was on the Commission
for my first four and a half years,
419
00:34:15.519 --> 00:34:17.800
I was the only Democrat. There's
a Democrat independent and in either two
420
00:34:17.880 --> 00:34:23.320
or three Republicans. When I became
chair, I was the only Democrat with
421
00:34:23.320 --> 00:34:30.960
an independent and two Republicans. When
we had a full commission, I had
422
00:34:30.960 --> 00:34:36.679
a we had a Democrat who was
more conservative on anti trust issues certainly than
423
00:34:36.760 --> 00:34:43.079
I was, and then the other
Democratic commissioner and a Republican who was more
424
00:34:43.159 --> 00:34:46.480
aggressive on ani trust issues than one
of the Democrats. So the answer is
425
00:34:46.519 --> 00:34:53.119
from time time it happened. Yeah. So so what about transparency with a
426
00:34:53.239 --> 00:34:59.840
multi member agency. There have been
various allegations part in the Noisy Noisy ex
427
00:35:00.119 --> 00:35:05.800
Commissioner Wilson about lack of transparency,
and I'm wondering is transparency different for an
428
00:35:05.840 --> 00:35:09.679
independent agency like the FTC as opposed
to know, an executive branch agency.
429
00:35:10.519 --> 00:35:15.280
I know there are various laws like
sunshine laws that apply to multi member commissions,
430
00:35:15.840 --> 00:35:19.840
but but you know, transparency is
something that we often talk about is
431
00:35:19.920 --> 00:35:28.920
really important in the regulatory space.
So I haven't spent really anytime in that
432
00:35:28.960 --> 00:35:31.920
part of the executive branch that understands
itself properly as the executive branch, so
433
00:35:31.960 --> 00:35:36.400
I can't speak to the comparison.
What I will say is this, when
434
00:35:36.440 --> 00:35:39.519
you have a multi member commission,
each of the members of that commission,
435
00:35:39.920 --> 00:35:46.440
in theory are superordinate to the whole
staff, and so they can get in
436
00:35:46.519 --> 00:35:52.480
theory information about what is going on, and there ends up being kind of
437
00:35:52.599 --> 00:35:57.480
back and forth where especially if a
member is concerned that something might be amiss
438
00:35:58.000 --> 00:36:00.440
or they're interested in a matter that
they're going to have a problem with when
439
00:36:00.480 --> 00:36:05.400
it comes up to the Commission,
there is an exercise, you know,
440
00:36:05.920 --> 00:36:08.280
between the staff and the Commissioner and
the chairs office about you know, what
441
00:36:08.360 --> 00:36:15.199
kind of information is delivered when,
and so it's not a transparency visa be
442
00:36:15.320 --> 00:36:20.440
the public or the press. Congress
is a little bit the difference a little
443
00:36:20.440 --> 00:36:24.599
bit differently situated. But even within
the Commission there are sort of real transparency
444
00:36:24.679 --> 00:36:30.599
issues that pop Papala. We had
fear of those issues, I would say
445
00:36:30.880 --> 00:36:37.440
internal commission
transparency issues because Bill Kvassa, who was my immediate processor, wanted
446
00:36:37.480 --> 00:36:39.519
to make sure that every commissioner had
a chance to see whatever was going on.
447
00:36:39.599 --> 00:36:42.719
And I thought that was a really
good approach, and so we continued
448
00:36:42.760 --> 00:36:47.519
it. Right so, you you
know so and not every in not every
449
00:36:47.679 --> 00:36:52.559
commissioner or not every chair has done
that over history going back and looking yes,
450
00:36:52.960 --> 00:36:59.079
so this change pretty early after Chair
Khan came on. One of the
451
00:36:59.119 --> 00:37:04.639
first things that the new majority did
was they adopted a bunch of resolutions that
452
00:37:05.320 --> 00:37:09.239
essentially divested the Commission of power to
initiate antitrust investigations. It used to be
453
00:37:09.280 --> 00:37:14.920
the Commission would vote to initiate investigations
and so everyone could have a chance to
454
00:37:14.960 --> 00:37:19.440
see what was going on. And
in the name of efficiency, they took
455
00:37:19.440 --> 00:37:22.480
that power away from the Commission and
that was a reduction in transparency. And
456
00:37:22.519 --> 00:37:28.960
you saw Commissioner Wilson and myself sort
of ten yeah, yeah, yeah,
457
00:37:29.039 --> 00:37:30.320
Although as a practical matter, I
don't know that it made much of a
458
00:37:30.360 --> 00:37:34.280
difference. Right. We never had
a problem when I was at the Commission
459
00:37:34.360 --> 00:37:38.000
as a nonshare commissioner, comissioner getting
process to move forward on a matter,
460
00:37:38.119 --> 00:37:43.159
right, and I don't think anyone
really resisted. I've never seen an example
461
00:37:43.239 --> 00:37:45.639
of where process was a real issue. I mean, it was an opportunity
462
00:37:45.639 --> 00:37:49.000
to ask questions and say, is
this really going to be a case?
463
00:37:49.400 --> 00:37:53.960
Are we wasting our time? Whatever? Okay, I have a few more
464
00:37:54.000 --> 00:37:57.400
questions, but then we're going to
open up to the audience. So there's
465
00:37:57.800 --> 00:38:00.320
a microphone if if any of you
have questions for our for our panel.
466
00:38:00.440 --> 00:38:06.440
But so some of the things we
were chatting about a little bit before before
467
00:38:06.440 --> 00:38:10.760
we came out stage, you know, is what happens if Humphreys executor is
468
00:38:10.840 --> 00:38:16.199
overruled. I know you both have
a have a Humphries picture in your office.
469
00:38:16.239 --> 00:38:22.079
Maybe maybe I should get one too, But you know it's I am
470
00:38:22.519 --> 00:38:25.880
you know, after Seila Law and
Collins, you know what is what do
471
00:38:25.960 --> 00:38:30.320
you think may happen with Humphries?
And if Humphries were to be overruled by
472
00:38:30.360 --> 00:38:35.599
the Supreme Court, what would the
consequences of that be for the FTC?
473
00:38:37.280 --> 00:38:42.559
I don't know that the consequences are
that huge. Right. Selah has obviously
474
00:38:42.800 --> 00:38:49.159
impacted the course of the CFPP,
But there are plenty of agencies in the
475
00:38:49.199 --> 00:38:53.800
executive branch that don't have formal independence
in the sense that the FTC and some
476
00:38:54.760 --> 00:39:02.440
other agencies similarly located enjoy, but
kind of norms and pressure effectively protect agency
477
00:39:02.519 --> 00:39:07.039
heads from firing unless things are really
bad, you know, you think of
478
00:39:07.119 --> 00:39:13.760
like the FBI or the Department of
Justice. The President has complete authority to
479
00:39:13.840 --> 00:39:16.480
fire the heads of those agencies.
But there's a cost, right, And
480
00:39:16.519 --> 00:39:21.119
it doesn't mean the president isn't always
willing to bear or isn't often willing to
481
00:39:21.159 --> 00:39:23.199
bear the cost, But there is
a cost. And I just don't know
482
00:39:23.480 --> 00:39:29.119
if you introduced, if you sort
of invalidated that part of the statute,
483
00:39:29.320 --> 00:39:34.000
would it really change that much.
My guess is actually no, it might
484
00:39:34.039 --> 00:39:37.079
be right. It may not change
in terms of actual firings. But what
485
00:39:37.119 --> 00:39:39.960
about presidential control. Well, you
know, it's it's a very interesting question.
486
00:39:40.000 --> 00:39:45.079
I agree most I agree partly with
you. I concurrent part in my
487
00:39:45.119 --> 00:39:49.960
dissent in part the Yeah, that
was a feeble attempt at a joke.
488
00:39:50.000 --> 00:39:51.920
But if you're not going to laugh, that's my last joke of the day.
489
00:39:52.039 --> 00:39:55.920
I've got some, you've got some
last job. So so look,
490
00:39:58.480 --> 00:40:02.280
I would say that if Humphrey's Executive
well, first of all, I should
491
00:40:02.320 --> 00:40:05.760
say, and I want to say
that it's you know, if you go
492
00:40:05.760 --> 00:40:10.559
back and you read Humphreys Executor,
a unanimous, a unanimous opinion written by
493
00:40:10.599 --> 00:40:16.320
I think Justice Sutherland, it's it's
a you know. He points out that
494
00:40:17.199 --> 00:40:25.920
the FTC is not exactly like other
branches of the other parts of the executive
495
00:40:25.920 --> 00:40:30.079
of the executive branch. Right,
the FTC sits as a court, for
496
00:40:30.119 --> 00:40:37.599
example, on matters before it,
in its administrative proceedings. And and so
497
00:40:37.360 --> 00:40:45.519
I guess I think that in normal
times, if Humphrey's Executor is overturned,
498
00:40:46.079 --> 00:40:51.239
it won't be a it won't be
a disaster, and it may not even
499
00:40:51.320 --> 00:40:59.320
be a c change but I think
it does change to some extent the character
500
00:40:59.360 --> 00:41:01.880
of an independent agency. And then
that's a character that you probably heard me
501
00:41:01.920 --> 00:41:07.239
say I really like because I do
think that
independence allows you to get out
502
00:41:07.280 --> 00:41:12.280
from under political decision making. Not
that it's always political decision making the executive
503
00:41:12.280 --> 00:41:15.480
branch or Congress, but it allows
you to do the thing you think is
504
00:41:15.599 --> 00:41:22.760
right, regardless of what you know, what what the politicians who appointed you
505
00:41:22.360 --> 00:41:27.639
or nominated you believe. And I
think that's generally a good thing. And
506
00:41:27.679 --> 00:41:31.000
I do believe make two more points
quickly. I do believe that in the
507
00:41:31.000 --> 00:41:36.159
back of some commissioner's minds, it
would not be unreasonable to think, well,
508
00:41:36.199 --> 00:41:37.519
if the President wants me to do
this, and I do that,
509
00:41:38.159 --> 00:41:42.000
you know, is it going to
is it going to cost me in some
510
00:41:42.079 --> 00:41:47.639
way? And and by having a
truly independent agency, I think that's uh,
511
00:41:47.679 --> 00:41:53.199
that is a that is less a
less likely outcome. Uh and uh
512
00:41:53.400 --> 00:41:59.320
and so and I guess one other
point, well, let me stop there
513
00:42:00.199 --> 00:42:04.119
at least. So President by naturing
Executive Order on Anti Trust, in which
514
00:42:04.119 --> 00:42:09.000
he used the word encourage for various
policies taken by the FTC, he said,
515
00:42:09.079 --> 00:42:13.760
you know, we encourage the FTC
to do you know, various things,
516
00:42:13.760 --> 00:42:17.920
take various policy positions. So what
does that look like? So you
517
00:42:17.960 --> 00:42:22.119
know, if it was, say, you know, the Agriculture Department,
518
00:42:22.119 --> 00:42:27.719
the President could just issue an order
saying Agriculture Department shall pursue this policy.
519
00:42:27.760 --> 00:42:34.840
So is there a difference between encouraging
and directing? So I think there is,
520
00:42:35.039 --> 00:42:37.559
and I think that's why we have
these words. And I vaguely recall
521
00:42:37.679 --> 00:42:43.320
from the July twenty twenty one executive
order for the rulemakings, there's like a
522
00:42:43.360 --> 00:42:51.400
different verb used for the non compete
and then one of the or shall enthusiastically,
523
00:42:51.960 --> 00:42:57.840
with all deliberate speed consider Yeah.
That, But I think it comes
524
00:42:57.880 --> 00:43:00.239
back to the flip of the question
judge that usked before, which is no.
525
00:43:00.280 --> 00:43:06.119
But at the end of the day, like you can't be fired even
526
00:43:06.199 --> 00:43:12.440
if you enjoy independence under the statute. Saying no to the President of the
527
00:43:12.519 --> 00:43:17.239
United States whatever your statutory scheme is
not a little thing. But does the
528
00:43:17.280 --> 00:43:24.800
President call the chairman of the FTC
and suggest policies, encourage consider policies.
529
00:43:25.719 --> 00:43:28.480
I don't know if you want to
speak to that, but you were the
530
00:43:28.559 --> 00:43:31.320
you know, I had to stop
taking prison Obama's calls after a while,
531
00:43:31.360 --> 00:43:35.920
because it was just you were so
incessive what we should do. He just
532
00:43:36.199 --> 00:43:40.400
he just wanted a rematch on basketball
chap That's what he wanted. No,
533
00:43:42.000 --> 00:43:45.079
we we had a you know,
I mean, look, I certainly had
534
00:43:45.119 --> 00:43:50.320
a sense of what the administration was
thinking, because I paid attention to what
535
00:43:50.360 --> 00:43:53.599
they were thinking and friends who worked
in the administration, in the executive branch
536
00:43:53.639 --> 00:44:00.920
of the executive branch. But no, I didn't mean that disparagingly, disparagingly
537
00:44:01.800 --> 00:44:09.400
the uh. But no, I
think actually the only handful of times I
538
00:44:09.480 --> 00:44:14.320
can I can think about a president
and when I was service President Bush and
539
00:44:14.320 --> 00:44:22.239
President Obama UH discussing policy issues,
I think was when we maybe went over
540
00:44:22.280 --> 00:44:30.000
and tried to encourage them to put
something on say pharmaceutical competition into their budget.
541
00:44:30.119 --> 00:44:35.519
Uh. And and and there was
a large breach at the VA in
542
00:44:35.599 --> 00:44:38.559
maybe two thousand six or seven,
and the President wanted us to do an
543
00:44:38.559 --> 00:44:45.199
investigation. Wasn't quite within our jurisdiction, and UH called up the chair,
544
00:44:45.719 --> 00:44:47.639
and the chair asked us what we
thought. We all thought that was a
545
00:44:47.679 --> 00:44:51.239
good idea, so we did it. But it's it's a little bit different
546
00:44:51.239 --> 00:44:55.239
now. I think they were careful
in that executive order not to not to
547
00:44:55.400 --> 00:45:02.159
direct because I think they recognize the
distance between an executive between different types of
548
00:45:02.199 --> 00:45:06.800
agencies, not to direct the commission
to do it, but they coordinate much
549
00:45:06.800 --> 00:45:09.280
more now. I don't I have
quite gotten my arms around that. I
550
00:45:09.280 --> 00:45:15.239
don't think it's necessarily a bad thing, but I think it's a it's certainly
551
00:45:15.280 --> 00:45:20.480
a new development. Okay, why
don't we take a question from the audience,
552
00:45:21.159 --> 00:45:22.360
Thank you so much. But the
gentleman over there was first, so
553
00:45:22.480 --> 00:45:25.440
if his president is currently in office, he gets the goal. Hi,
554
00:45:25.840 --> 00:45:30.960
Miames Devin Watkins, I question whether
the FTC's removal protections are still a good
555
00:45:31.000 --> 00:45:36.480
precedent. In Seal A law of
the Supreme Court said, instead of making
556
00:45:36.480 --> 00:45:40.400
reports and recommendations of Congress, as
the nineteen thirty five FDC did, the
557
00:45:40.440 --> 00:45:45.239
Director possesses the authority to probably be
binding rules,
and that was one of
558
00:45:45.280 --> 00:45:50.559
the reasons they gave for eliminating the
protection from removal. Given that we all
559
00:45:50.599 --> 00:45:54.719
agree today that the FDC of today
has that binding rulemaking authority that didn't exist
560
00:45:54.760 --> 00:46:00.719
in nineteen thirty five, why isn't
under current precedent that protects and unlawful.
561
00:46:00.719 --> 00:46:05.920
Well, look, I think this
is an argument being raised today in front
562
00:46:05.920 --> 00:46:09.920
of the Commission, in front of
federal courts. I think my allusion earlier
563
00:46:10.000 --> 00:46:15.519
to what Justice Kagan writes in Sale
a Law is about that issue precisely.
564
00:46:15.480 --> 00:46:19.960
But the state of play right now, at least as a matter of Supreme
565
00:46:20.000 --> 00:46:22.960
Court precedent, is you've got free
Enterprise Fund, and you've got sale a
566
00:46:23.039 --> 00:46:25.719
Law, and you've got Cullins,
And each time the Court has sort of
567
00:46:25.760 --> 00:46:31.920
walked up to every's executor and not
yet upset the precedent. So you know,
568
00:46:32.239 --> 00:46:37.199
I think it's a fair question to
raise, and we're going to see
569
00:46:37.199 --> 00:46:39.119
what happens. Yeah, I mean
I think, well, I agree absolutely
570
00:46:39.159 --> 00:46:43.800
with you, and I think Justice
Roberts, who I believe wrote the Celia
571
00:46:43.840 --> 00:46:51.239
opinion, is very careful about both
distinguishing the FTC from the CFPB as a
572
00:46:51.360 --> 00:46:57.599
multi member commission, and then also
says things like, but is it really
573
00:46:57.639 --> 00:47:01.480
the commission that it was in nineteen
So I think we're all gonna be watching
574
00:47:01.519 --> 00:47:07.039
to see to see where the Court
comes out. And you know, Axelon
575
00:47:07.199 --> 00:47:12.239
was sort of the kind of amused
bush for for humphreyes for revisiting of Humphreys
576
00:47:12.280 --> 00:47:15.599
executor. And my guess is that's
going to happen in the next several terms.
577
00:47:15.800 --> 00:47:21.199
Be sort of surprised if it doesn't, So we'll have to see.
578
00:47:22.000 --> 00:47:24.639
Ask for an elaboration from a couple
of small things from the beginning of the
579
00:47:24.679 --> 00:47:29.880
discussion, do you think it's possible, in a bipartisan way, putting cynicism
580
00:47:29.920 --> 00:47:35.199
aside, to come up with a
clear, sort of cohesive definition of where
581
00:47:35.320 --> 00:47:40.519
politics ends and where policy or scientific
government or scientific decision making, which is
582
00:47:40.519 --> 00:47:43.840
sort of the way that these agencies
I think we're designed to work, and
583
00:47:43.880 --> 00:47:46.599
they're earlier part of the twentieth century. Is that really possible today? And
584
00:47:46.920 --> 00:47:53.719
how would you two really define that? Putting party affiliation aside. And the
585
00:47:53.800 --> 00:48:00.360
second point
is to what extent do
you think the the situation is sort of
586
00:48:00.360 --> 00:48:04.639
frozen in time with the concept of
government from the nineteen tens, twenties,
587
00:48:04.639 --> 00:48:08.440
and thirties, which may be develop
with all good intentions. How do you
588
00:48:08.440 --> 00:48:14.519
think American society will overhaul these institutions
which have been with us for almost a
589
00:48:14.639 --> 00:48:19.599
hundred years in some cases, and
we're sort of unprecedent when they started out,
590
00:48:19.639 --> 00:48:22.119
when we'll sort of the next revolution
in government happen. And is it
591
00:48:22.199 --> 00:48:28.360
realistic to expect that from the courts
or would it require Congress to do something
592
00:48:28.400 --> 00:48:30.880
if that's possible in a major way, to change this way the system works.
593
00:48:32.199 --> 00:48:37.360
How would you see that happening if
the current system really is outdated as
594
00:48:37.679 --> 00:48:42.400
many people believe it is, or
was founded in assumptions about how government would
595
00:48:42.440 --> 00:48:49.039
work that haven't played out so a
lot. There are two different questions.
596
00:48:49.360 --> 00:48:52.480
Let me sort of try to tackle
the first one and hope I remember the
597
00:48:52.519 --> 00:48:57.719
second one when I'm done. What
I would say is this, at least
598
00:48:57.760 --> 00:49:01.440
in my mind, there are problems, leave some issues where you could build
599
00:49:01.480 --> 00:49:07.960
consensus around the notion that the thing
being determined really is a matter of expertise.
600
00:49:07.519 --> 00:49:12.360
I don't know why my mind goes
to this, but like drug approval
601
00:49:13.480 --> 00:49:16.320
or you know how I don't know. Okay, bad example, right,
602
00:49:19.920 --> 00:49:29.159
Richard Pierce keeping us honest every day? How to allocate spectrum? Or maybe
603
00:49:29.159 --> 00:49:34.239
that's even a bad example, like
how the particulars of spectrum find one example.
604
00:49:34.519 --> 00:49:38.000
I'm trying. I like to think
there are some areas, but it
605
00:49:38.039 --> 00:49:42.760
doesn't take a lot of time or
even a lot of my talking to get
606
00:49:42.760 --> 00:49:47.519
you into a position where people very
clearly can spot where value judgments are creeping
607
00:49:47.519 --> 00:49:50.960
in. I mean, I don't
mean that pejoratively, like we have to
608
00:49:50.960 --> 00:49:55.280
make value judgments in governing at large. Congress makes them, prosecutors make them,
609
00:49:55.280 --> 00:50:01.639
everybody makes them. And so minding
where that line really is I think
610
00:50:01.679 --> 00:50:06.599
inevitably going to be hard. I
don't know that it lays along partisan lines.
611
00:50:06.679 --> 00:50:09.719
Although maybe folks on the right trending
to see more things as laden with
612
00:50:09.800 --> 00:50:14.599
value judgment, folks on the left
tend to see more things as matters of
613
00:50:14.599 --> 00:50:19.840
expertise, you know, like I
don't know where the minimum wage ought to
614
00:50:19.840 --> 00:50:23.239
be or whatever your issue. But
I think it's a very very hard line
615
00:50:23.360 --> 00:50:28.519
to draw. So I think I'm
sorry, I finish. I think the
616
00:50:28.559 --> 00:50:31.320
next question was about, you know, sort of when's the next revolution and
617
00:50:31.400 --> 00:50:37.360
government and the agency is not operating
as maybe people envision them. That's way
618
00:50:37.400 --> 00:50:40.960
above my pig grade. But what
I will say is this, The tension
619
00:50:42.199 --> 00:50:49.400
I see isn't between how the agencies
independent agencies were conceived and how they're operating.
620
00:50:49.719 --> 00:50:53.320
The tension, to my mind is
they were conceived with a view in
621
00:50:53.360 --> 00:51:01.079
particular of the separation of powers and
the Constitution at a time when that view
622
00:51:01.159 --> 00:51:07.480
of the separation of powers and the
Constitution isn't you know, where I see
623
00:51:07.480 --> 00:51:10.559
things moving and I kind of see
things moving in a return to where they
624
00:51:10.599 --> 00:51:16.840
originally were. It's not a response
to sort of how the agencies are behaving.
625
00:51:17.719 --> 00:51:21.840
It's more a response to the structuring
of the agencies. And this,
626
00:51:21.920 --> 00:51:23.639
by the way, it leads to
me to an important point. I do
627
00:51:23.800 --> 00:51:27.519
hear a lot of people say things
like, oh, you know, the
628
00:51:27.559 --> 00:51:31.679
Commission is overreaching, and so the
constitutional response is going to be this.
629
00:51:32.000 --> 00:51:37.320
To my mind, the constitutional response
shouldn't be to like a policy disagreement or
630
00:51:37.320 --> 00:51:44.199
the agency overreaching. It's is the
structure inherently problematic from a constitutional perspective,
631
00:51:44.239 --> 00:51:46.639
and that, to my mind,
that's the big tension that all of these
632
00:51:46.679 --> 00:51:51.679
agencies are facing. Yeah, I
agree with that, I mean and and
633
00:51:51.880 --> 00:51:55.440
but I also think it is true
and that that that when you take a
634
00:51:55.480 --> 00:51:59.960
different job, a job at an
independent agency where there's the SEC the FC,
635
00:52:00.079 --> 00:52:04.519
see the ftc UH, you have
a different function and you're supposed to
636
00:52:04.519 --> 00:52:07.360
behave that way. So no,
and I worked on the Judiciary Committee where
637
00:52:07.360 --> 00:52:10.559
we were involved in policy and politics, right, and we went over to
638
00:52:10.679 --> 00:52:15.599
the FTC and we tried to put
politics aside. I'm not saying we were
639
00:52:15.639 --> 00:52:19.760
like Thomas A. Beckett, but
we we tried to distance ourselves from that
640
00:52:19.840 --> 00:52:24.800
because we had different obligations and and
so, uh, you know, we
641
00:52:24.840 --> 00:52:30.119
live
in a twenty four seven news
cycle. We have people who much more
642
00:52:30.199 --> 00:52:38.159
today get their information from channels that
reinforce their pre existing views rather than sort
643
00:52:38.159 --> 00:52:43.920
of objective, more objective sources.
Uh. But but but but so you
644
00:52:44.960 --> 00:52:52.000
have to kind of there's no doubt
that there's there's a political the FTC is
645
00:52:52.000 --> 00:52:54.480
not supposed to be a political agency, but it lives within the swirl of
646
00:52:54.519 --> 00:52:58.559
politics to some extent, and you
have to be aware that. But you
647
00:52:58.719 --> 00:53:04.280
have to try to distinguish what you're
doing now from those other factors in the
648
00:53:05.000 --> 00:53:07.320
in the atmosphere. And and then
I don't I mean, I guess,
649
00:53:07.400 --> 00:53:13.559
I guess again, agreeing with Noah, I don't think that the independent agency
650
00:53:13.719 --> 00:53:17.280
system is broken. I mean,
I actually think it works pretty well for
651
00:53:17.400 --> 00:53:25.320
doing the business uh that it's supposed
to under its statute. And when when
652
00:53:25.400 --> 00:53:30.239
commissions go too far, as some
white might have said commissions have Dad,
653
00:53:30.599 --> 00:53:37.119
let's say the nineteen eighties. You
know, they are very often chasened by
654
00:53:37.119 --> 00:53:43.280
the courts, and so uh,
you know, we'll have to We'll have
655
00:53:43.320 --> 00:53:45.360
to It would have to be Congress, of course, or I suppose the
656
00:53:45.400 --> 00:53:49.239
Court in some way, but I
think it would have to be Congress.
657
00:53:49.760 --> 00:53:52.519
Uh. That changes the structure.
But I don't think that structure has failed.
658
00:53:52.559 --> 00:53:57.760
And again, one thing you get
on the FTC is a built in
659
00:53:57.840 --> 00:53:59.880
descent. You know, for those
of you in the audience are and I
660
00:54:00.000 --> 00:54:04.440
trust lawyers, and you try to, you know, to try you think
661
00:54:04.440 --> 00:54:07.360
about the Tunny Act, right,
I don't think there's ever been a single
662
00:54:07.400 --> 00:54:12.360
example of where a judge has reversed
a settlement at the Justice Department under the
663
00:54:12.440 --> 00:54:17.719
Tunny Act. On the other hand, minority positions on the FTC, whether
664
00:54:17.760 --> 00:54:23.000
they're Democratic minorities or Republican minorities,
gives you some leverage in negotiating an outcome
665
00:54:23.760 --> 00:54:28.679
or a procedure or a pathway forward. And it and it also gives you
666
00:54:28.760 --> 00:54:30.599
a very clear voice of dissent.
We've just seen that very recently in a
667
00:54:31.480 --> 00:54:37.119
in a very clear way. Yes, I guess I just wanted to follow
668
00:54:37.159 --> 00:54:42.519
up on a preceding question and bring
the conversation back. I supposed towards started
669
00:54:43.119 --> 00:54:50.159
on the reverse payments settlements between pharma
companies and interests of full disclosure. I've
670
00:54:50.159 --> 00:54:53.119
wrote an articles and followed briefs against
the FTC on this issue. So those
671
00:54:53.119 --> 00:54:55.760
who are fighting boards for me,
But I don't want to religate the issue
672
00:54:55.800 --> 00:55:02.480
itself. I guess the question is
why isn't necessarily good to take the politics
673
00:55:02.519 --> 00:55:07.519
out of that question? As of
course, you know, the earlier version
674
00:55:07.639 --> 00:55:12.960
of that litigation had Department of Justice
and FTC on opposite side, right,
675
00:55:13.000 --> 00:55:15.880
So you had some very smart lawyers
and economists on one side, some very
676
00:55:15.920 --> 00:55:19.519
smart lawyers economists on the other side, and at least some of them thought
677
00:55:19.880 --> 00:55:25.400
that there's some consumer benefit in these
settlements, maybe because drug companies ultimately get
678
00:55:25.400 --> 00:55:29.000
more money and develop more what.
You don't have to agree with it.
679
00:55:29.199 --> 00:55:31.199
The point is that that was the
view. And if that's the view,
680
00:55:31.360 --> 00:55:37.000
why is it inappropriate for political process
to work out us to like what do
681
00:55:37.079 --> 00:55:40.719
we weigh more? Do we weigh
more that? Or that? Just it
682
00:55:40.760 --> 00:55:45.119
seems a bit odd to say that, Well, you'll get a professional judgment
683
00:55:45.119 --> 00:55:47.119
on this, all right, maybe
I'll take this, so it's not you
684
00:55:47.159 --> 00:55:52.320
know, the political process could have
very much resolved this problem. And as
685
00:55:52.400 --> 00:55:54.599
you may recall, we had sort
of a two prong strategy of the FTC.
686
00:55:54.920 --> 00:55:58.000
One problem was to create a circuit
split and get a case of Supreme
687
00:55:58.039 --> 00:55:59.960
Court, because we thought they would
come out in a pretty good place,
688
00:56:00.079 --> 00:56:01.639
and they came out in the pretty
good place. And the other prime was
689
00:56:01.679 --> 00:56:07.440
to try to get Congress to pass
a law that would make these deals presumptively
690
00:56:07.440 --> 00:56:14.480
illegal. We got that through the
House, we got it into the Affordable
691
00:56:14.559 --> 00:56:17.960
Care at Conference Committee, and then, for those of you who love obscure
692
00:56:17.960 --> 00:56:25.800
footnotes, uh, Senator Kennedy passed
away. They lost sixty vote, they
693
00:56:25.840 --> 00:56:34.320
lost a A. They didn't have
sixty votes, so they couldn't close debate
694
00:56:34.400 --> 00:56:37.639
under closure, and the House took
the Senate. The House took the Senate
695
00:56:37.719 --> 00:56:42.039
version of the pay for delayed legislation, so it never got passed because it
696
00:56:42.039 --> 00:56:45.400
wasn't in the Senate version. So
the political process was involved. I don't
697
00:56:45.400 --> 00:56:46.320
have a problem with that. You
know, if we had
lost, that
698
00:56:46.360 --> 00:56:50.880
would have been unhappy. But if
we had if they had said these deals
699
00:56:50.880 --> 00:56:54.000
are absolutely legal, but that would
have been the end of the end of
700
00:56:54.000 --> 00:57:00.239
the outcome. Just to be clear, it's pretty clear to me at least
701
00:57:00.639 --> 00:57:05.480
that Congress has delegated authority both to
the Department of Justice and the FTC to
702
00:57:05.679 --> 00:57:08.719
enforce the antitrust laws. And like, yes, some of the decisions about
703
00:57:08.719 --> 00:57:15.320
the kind of business conduct against which
they might enforce may be laid in with
704
00:57:15.000 --> 00:57:19.519
values and whatever, but prosecutors do
have to make decisions about the law.
705
00:57:19.639 --> 00:57:24.079
And that's pretty much true for all
prosecutors on some level. Like some decisions
706
00:57:24.119 --> 00:57:29.599
matter a lot, but that's part
of just the way law works. To
707
00:57:29.679 --> 00:57:34.119
me, I don't see that as
like, maybe you disagree on the policy
708
00:57:34.199 --> 00:57:43.760
question, but it is fairly well
within the scope of antitrust consideration. First
709
00:57:43.760 --> 00:57:45.400
of all, thank you all for
being here. This has been very interesting.
710
00:57:46.000 --> 00:57:52.920
Are there any downsides to delegating rulemaking
authority to these independent agencies and if
711
00:57:52.960 --> 00:57:55.239
there are, is there anything more
that can be done to protect individuals?
712
00:57:58.880 --> 00:58:04.840
I think the big side is a
democratic deficit, right when you get to
713
00:58:04.880 --> 00:58:08.400
a point where there's really no limit
on the decisions being made and they're really
714
00:58:08.440 --> 00:58:14.719
being made by people who are not
accountable right to the public in the way
715
00:58:14.719 --> 00:58:20.880
that Congress is or members of Congress
are. I think that's the major problem.
716
00:58:21.320 --> 00:58:25.960
It also creates a you know,
it's an odd fit within our tripartite
717
00:58:27.039 --> 00:58:32.079
scheme of government in terms of what
can be done. Congress can be clear
718
00:58:32.119 --> 00:58:37.360
in what it writes right, and
to some extent, the pressure the courts
719
00:58:37.400 --> 00:58:43.320
will apply if they're policing the major
whether it's the Major Questions Doctrine or the
720
00:58:43.360 --> 00:58:46.159
Nondelegation Doctrine, will force Congress into
the position you want to give them authority
721
00:58:46.199 --> 00:58:51.480
to right rules. Be clear about
what that authority is. Then these problems
722
00:58:51.480 --> 00:58:54.159
don't arise. That's sort of how
I think about it. Yeah, I
723
00:58:55.159 --> 00:59:04.280
agree with that. And again we
now have a judiciary writ large that is
724
00:59:04.440 --> 00:59:13.079
very skeptical of rulemakings by a rule
of rulemakings generally by from the executive branch,
725
00:59:13.480 --> 00:59:16.599
and so I think we'll have to
see how that plays out. But
726
00:59:16.679 --> 00:59:22.480
in recent years it has played out
I would say not particularly well for some
727
00:59:22.559 --> 00:59:25.280
of the most edgy, controversial rulemakings. And I guess I would say,
728
00:59:25.519 --> 00:59:30.239
aside from the sort of democratic deficit
issues, I think the other the other
729
00:59:30.280 --> 00:59:32.320
big problem is sometimes agencies don't get
it right. I think more often they
730
00:59:32.360 --> 00:59:37.360
do than they don't. But sometimes
even if it's not arbitrary and capricious,
731
00:59:37.400 --> 00:59:42.599
it's the wrong outcome. So you
know, I think, yes, Congress
732
00:59:42.639 --> 00:59:45.639
could make this clearer. No,
they won't make it clearer because it's just
733
00:59:45.719 --> 00:59:49.480
not in there. It's not in
their DNA to do that kind of thing
734
00:59:50.079 --> 00:59:55.199
easily. It's very difficult thing for
them to do. Yes and no,
735
00:59:55.440 --> 01:00:00.960
right, people have other constitutional issues
with the law about to But recently,
736
01:00:00.119 --> 01:00:05.880
right, the Congress passes the Horse
Racing Integrity and Safety Act, which gives
737
01:00:05.880 --> 01:00:09.480
the FTC all sorts of weird powers. But like that's Congress pretty specifically writing
738
01:00:09.519 --> 01:00:13.840
to a topic. Now there's a
whole other discussion to be had about that
739
01:00:13.880 --> 01:00:16.679
particular law. I think Congress can
still do this, they just have to
740
01:00:16.840 --> 01:00:22.760
want to. They do any tax
an attacks pretty frequently. Yeah, yes,
741
01:00:22.880 --> 01:00:27.559
I can think yes. But like, for example, I think Congress
742
01:00:27.599 --> 01:00:31.679
wanted when it created the FTC to
create an agency that had much more limited
743
01:00:32.960 --> 01:00:38.400
uh sanctions and much broader jurisdiction.
That's why they said unfair methods of competition,
744
01:00:38.920 --> 01:00:45.400
right, Uh. They wanted it
to have broader jurisdiction than than the
745
01:00:45.480 --> 01:00:52.760
Justice Apartment, and they don't put
people in jail and so uh so so
746
01:00:52.880 --> 01:00:58.119
limited, so very limited sanctions,
and I that I think was by design,
747
01:00:58.480 --> 01:01:00.400
and I you know, if if
if I'm not saying you're suggesting this,
748
01:01:00.480 --> 01:01:07.280
but if you wanted to pair back
the the jurisdiction of the FTC that
749
01:01:07.719 --> 01:01:14.480
I think is unlikely to happen by
Congress, and I certainly don't think it
750
01:01:14.480 --> 01:01:22.159
should happen. Yeah, question back
and my research, I've been coming across
751
01:01:22.239 --> 01:01:34.599
some rare reports on intolerance in the
World Economic Forum for dissenting views, do
752
01:01:34.800 --> 01:01:40.119
either of you or do you know
of any others that are given consideration to
753
01:01:40.280 --> 01:01:53.480
the impact of stakeholder capitalism and the
World Economic Forum on the work and responsibilities
754
01:01:54.400 --> 01:02:02.679
of the agency with which you have
been involved. I mean, I think
755
01:02:04.880 --> 01:02:08.559
I can't speak to the particulars of
the World Economic Forum. Generally, the
756
01:02:08.639 --> 01:02:14.360
agencies invite a lot of stakeholder input
and the story of you know, which
757
01:02:14.360 --> 01:02:20.800
inputs get credited and how the agency
proceeds in light of the input that it
758
01:02:20.920 --> 01:02:22.800
gets, as you know, the
object of a lot of writing an administrative
759
01:02:22.880 --> 01:02:34.719
law. Agree. So I have
a question about vacancies. So many federal
760
01:02:34.920 --> 01:02:40.039
independent commissions and boards have gone significant
periods with vacancies. As you mentioned,
761
01:02:40.079 --> 01:02:45.679
there are currently vacancies from the Republican
side on the FTC, and one instance
762
01:02:45.679 --> 01:02:49.000
that comes to mind for me is
the Merit Systems Protection Board, which from
763
01:02:49.039 --> 01:02:52.400
twenty seventeen to twenty twenty two lacked
a quorum. One of the reasons for
764
01:02:52.440 --> 01:02:58.760
that was because of one senator who
disagreed with the constitutionality of the MSPB and
765
01:02:58.840 --> 01:03:02.840
therefore sought to hold up any nominees
from moving forward. My question for you
766
01:03:04.199 --> 01:03:08.079
is whether or not you believe a
senator who disagrees with the constitutionality of a
767
01:03:08.119 --> 01:03:15.920
specific border commission holding up the filling
of vacancies is a one legitimate under the
768
01:03:15.960 --> 01:03:22.440
separation of powers and two reasonable way
of expressing that concern about the constitutionality of
769
01:03:22.480 --> 01:03:29.039
the Border Commission. Well, I
would say, without knowing the particular circumstances
770
01:03:29.079 --> 01:03:32.920
of who was holding it up and
why, I think it's a good idea
771
01:03:32.960 --> 01:03:37.559
to have a quorum in these agencies, even if you believe that they are
772
01:03:37.679 --> 01:03:45.159
constitutional, because because these agencies have
functions and people are before them and their
773
01:03:45.239 --> 01:03:50.800
real lives are impacted, and so
you know, my sense is you want
774
01:03:50.840 --> 01:03:55.079
to let agencies you want to make
sure that agencies have quorums. I'd also
775
01:03:55.119 --> 01:03:59.639
say that this is partly an issue
of both knowing. I worked in the
776
01:03:59.639 --> 01:04:02.440
Senate of Senate procedure. You know, sometimes you don't even have to surface
777
01:04:02.719 --> 01:04:08.400
if you are the one person putting
a hold on something, and and and
778
01:04:08.400 --> 01:04:11.119
and they may you know, at
some point they may think about ways too.
779
01:04:11.559 --> 01:04:15.360
And of course they are think about
ways they may want to make their
780
01:04:15.480 --> 01:04:19.840
procedure a little more effective. But
to your underlying question, I think it's
781
01:04:19.840 --> 01:04:23.320
a bad thing for agencies not to
have quorms, even if you disagree with
782
01:04:23.519 --> 01:04:26.719
you know, what they're supposed to
be, even if you disagree with their
783
01:04:26.760 --> 01:04:30.440
constitutionality. I definitely agree with that. Well, and after Axon, you
784
01:04:30.440 --> 01:04:41.159
can now bring your constitutional challenge directly
to court. Say what yes? I
785
01:04:41.199 --> 01:04:46.280
think that the way Republicans respond to
this as the big elephant in the room,
786
01:04:46.440 --> 01:04:53.679
pardon the pun. Do you see
a Republicans you know you both were
787
01:04:53.760 --> 01:04:57.840
in the Senate, they have experienced
there. Do you see a Republicans going
788
01:04:57.880 --> 01:05:03.199
back to the consensus that exist or
forty years or the UC or Republicans accepting
789
01:05:03.239 --> 01:05:10.519
this idea that un Detroust law counter
resolves social issues, and Republicans just happened
790
01:05:10.519 --> 01:05:16.320
to have other ideas about what those
social issues are, and you know,
791
01:05:17.559 --> 01:05:25.920
adopting this enforcement galore. I mean, I think it's fairly clear that,
792
01:05:26.480 --> 01:05:31.440
especially in the last few years,
the voices within the Republican Party for you
793
01:05:31.480 --> 01:05:36.639
know, enforcement galore, pursuing social
issues what have you, through antitrust are
794
01:05:36.719 --> 01:05:44.559
growing. Whether they have and they
found right incredible allies on the left who
795
01:05:44.599 --> 01:05:49.159
absolutely want to do those things.
Whether that lasts, how it manifests,
796
01:05:49.320 --> 01:05:54.880
I don't know. It's not of
you that I share. And it was
797
01:05:54.960 --> 01:05:58.679
very interesting to be on the Commission
at a time where that existed. I
798
01:05:59.239 --> 01:06:02.079
did one thing I used to say
to members of Congress I won't out anyone
799
01:06:02.119 --> 01:06:09.320
in particular, was big tech is
a gateway drug. And I do think
800
01:06:09.360 --> 01:06:13.599
people need to be a lot more
clear about when they sign up for what
801
01:06:13.719 --> 01:06:18.079
sounds like a politically appealing idea or
maybe a tweet that sounds good, what
802
01:06:18.199 --> 01:06:23.960
the long term implications of that policy
concession are. Because I think they are
803
01:06:24.039 --> 01:06:29.360
real. I think they will work
bad things for antitrust law, but critically,
804
01:06:29.400 --> 01:06:34.800
above all, bad things for consumers. We've seen a lot of normalization
805
01:06:35.440 --> 01:06:40.840
I'll pick on one bill in Congress
of the idea that cartels are okay if
806
01:06:40.840 --> 01:06:44.880
they're people I like. So there's
a bill right now to protect the news
807
01:06:45.000 --> 01:06:51.000
organizations and allow
them to cartilize.
Whatever you think about the merits of that
808
01:06:51.079 --> 01:06:55.880
idea, it's definitely not pro competition, right. The whole idea is to
809
01:06:55.960 --> 01:07:00.480
displace competition and commissioner. But Joya
got up and gave a speech recently where
810
01:07:00.480 --> 01:07:01.360
it was like, we shouldn't go
after, you know, the honest,
811
01:07:01.400 --> 01:07:08.800
good laborer when they want to cartilize, because John Sherman said something, and
812
01:07:11.679 --> 01:07:14.880
again, like I tend to be
a pro competition person. Those are not
813
01:07:14.960 --> 01:07:19.760
competition ideas their distribution of rent ideas, but they also hurt people, like
814
01:07:19.800 --> 01:07:24.440
if you make things more expensive,
people pay more, and in particular they
815
01:07:24.519 --> 01:07:26.800
hurt the poor, and I think
we need to keep that in mind.
816
01:07:27.800 --> 01:07:31.960
Yeah, and I'm I'm not thinking
within the core of Republican circles, but
817
01:07:32.400 --> 01:07:39.039
watching all of this from the outside, I'd also say that you sometimes have
818
01:07:39.199 --> 01:07:44.000
to distinguish the rhetoric which is very
very heated, from the actual action here,
819
01:07:44.639 --> 01:07:49.280
and it is meaningful at least as
as I think about it. That
820
01:07:49.440 --> 01:07:56.760
last Congress, when there were Democratic
majorities on both sides, Congress did not
821
01:07:56.840 --> 01:08:01.159
pass and I trust and I support
a lot of that anti trust legislation,
822
01:08:01.159 --> 01:08:09.039
but Congress didn't pass it, and
so I kind of wonder whether I kind
823
01:08:09.079 --> 01:08:15.560
of question whether the rhetoric, particularly
on the Republican side, over very I
824
01:08:15.560 --> 01:08:20.920
think legitimate concerns will ground itself or
come to ground in anti trust legislation.
825
01:08:21.000 --> 01:08:26.439
I'm kind of skeptical that it will. The mental exercise in which I like
826
01:08:26.520 --> 01:08:31.439
to engage is scrap antitrust just put
in securities or tort like we don't think
827
01:08:31.479 --> 01:08:34.359
of body these bodies in law,
like you could use them as a cudgel,
828
01:08:34.520 --> 01:08:38.680
right, you can direct political leadership
to go after people who don't like
829
01:08:40.199 --> 01:08:43.840
But it's like a from South Park, like the underpants gnomes problem, Like
830
01:08:43.880 --> 01:08:45.520
you know that they get the underpants
and then they make profits, but you're
831
01:08:45.560 --> 01:08:49.199
not sure how. There's a lot
of like if we had more of this,
832
01:08:49.319 --> 01:08:53.039
we would get more of that,
And I'm just not seeing the middle
833
01:08:53.199 --> 01:08:57.039
in a lot of these cases.
I think that analogy was unfamiliar to many
834
01:08:57.039 --> 01:09:08.239
of us. It's a very important
cultural reference. Sorry quest every years.
835
01:09:08.359 --> 01:09:11.560
I never heard of enforcement glare.
It sounds like a bond Vision villain.
836
01:09:11.720 --> 01:09:24.600
But I my question is the FTCs
hasn't has well been accused recently of working
837
01:09:24.600 --> 01:09:27.720
with the Europeans to do things that
I can't do in America. But even
838
01:09:27.760 --> 01:09:31.680
before this current commission, when the
FTC went after Qualcom, for instance,
839
01:09:31.960 --> 01:09:36.840
the other FTCs in other countries go
after the American company, they sort of
840
01:09:36.920 --> 01:09:45.039
seemed to take their leads from the
American FTC, and and this had some
841
01:09:45.079 --> 01:09:48.279
devastating effects. And then when the
FTC lost a lot of those cases went
842
01:09:48.319 --> 01:09:53.159
away in Korea, I think,
in Japan certain other things, I think
843
01:09:53.159 --> 01:09:57.319
they had effect what it happened here. And so my question is what should
844
01:09:57.399 --> 01:10:02.439
the role of the FTC be with
American come Beanese and its outlook with all
845
01:10:02.479 --> 01:10:06.359
these other what i'll call copycat FTCs
in other countries. Well, well,
846
01:10:06.399 --> 01:10:10.560
it's a it's it's a really good
question. I mean my view, Well,
847
01:10:10.600 --> 01:10:14.680
first of all, whenever you have
a merger, and often when you
848
01:10:14.760 --> 01:10:18.760
have parallel conduct cases, no matter
where they started, uh, it's appropriate
849
01:10:18.800 --> 01:10:25.439
for the agencies to share information,
talk to each other, often the target
850
01:10:25.720 --> 01:10:30.079
and sometimes the target even in a
conduct case, allows the exchange of confidential
851
01:10:30.159 --> 01:10:33.199
information. So I think that's a
good thing. I also think that the
852
01:10:33.359 --> 01:10:41.399
leadership of and I've read a lot
of stuff about Qualcom. At one point
853
01:10:41.399 --> 01:10:44.319
I did a little bit of work
for Qualcom, but not on the particular
854
01:10:44.359 --> 01:10:49.199
matter you're talking about. So I
just wanted to disclose that. But it's
855
01:10:49.319 --> 01:10:57.840
it is also appropriate for the FTC
and the Nitrust Division to show international leadership
856
01:10:57.920 --> 01:11:03.279
on antitrust issues, and so I
guess it sort of comes down to are
857
01:11:03.279 --> 01:11:10.840
they exercising good judgment right, And
that's the most important thing from my perspective.
858
01:11:11.119 --> 01:11:17.119
Now, there have been some stories
about certain instances in which the FTC
859
01:11:17.720 --> 01:11:25.640
was or the FTC was lobbying another
another agency. I haven't, I don't.
860
01:11:25.800 --> 01:11:31.479
I certainly read about that, and
you know I would certainly that gets
861
01:11:31.479 --> 01:11:38.199
you kind of close to that gets
you in a circumstance where it's if it's
862
01:11:38.199 --> 01:11:41.199
accurate, where they're a legitimate questions
being raised. But I do I just
863
01:11:41.199 --> 01:11:46.359
do want to say one is appropriate
to share information with with your foreign counterparts.
864
01:11:46.359 --> 01:11:49.279
In two is we all want to
believe me, we all want the
865
01:11:49.359 --> 01:11:57.880
FTC and the Antitrust Division to be
leaders in the world antitrust community. Otherwise,
866
01:11:58.159 --> 01:12:00.680
particularly for American corporations, life would
be far farmer difficult. I think.
867
01:12:03.199 --> 01:12:06.960
So I was both on the Commission
where both of the cases that you
868
01:12:08.039 --> 01:12:13.520
mentioned and alluded to we're going on, and I'm now a law firm that
869
01:12:13.560 --> 01:12:17.159
is representing the defendency each. So
I'm largely going to take a pass.
870
01:12:17.199 --> 01:12:23.399
What i will say is this John
is correct. Especially where you have international
871
01:12:23.680 --> 01:12:30.159
cross border mergers, or you have
conduct that reaches across state lines state in
872
01:12:30.159 --> 01:12:35.720
the international sense of the word,
it is inevitable that lots of enforcers are
873
01:12:35.720 --> 01:12:40.359
going to be involved, and there
are protocols, there are rules, and
874
01:12:40.399 --> 01:12:44.520
there are laws about how they share
information about things, and that can be
875
01:12:44.560 --> 01:12:49.520
good, but it is also critical
that US law enforcers their job is to
876
01:12:49.640 --> 01:12:56.319
enforce US law, and keeping that
top of mind in any context is critical.
877
01:12:57.079 --> 01:13:01.600
Thank you. I think we're out
of time now, so can you
878
01:13:01.840 --> 01:13:04.520
all please join me in thanking our
account