Full Transcript for 31 – Turning Point – from Germany’s Reactive Zeitenwende to Proactive Strategic Change in Europe?

frankly just don't stack up. 00:02:00.360 --> 00:02:04.320 And that seems a far cry from Chancellor Olaf Scholz's "Sit and Vendor" speech two years 00:02:04.320 --> 00:02:09.440 ago, in which he promised a new era in German and foreign and security policy. 00:02:09.440 --> 00:02:14.160 So have we really had a "Sit and Vendor" and is that term still useful? 00:02:14.160 --> 00:02:15.320 No and no. 00:02:15.320 --> 00:02:19.520 On the substance, I stand by the assessment that we made at the end of last year, based 00:02:19.520 --> 00:02:24.520 on the work of the Action Group "Sit and Vendor", that the change, Germany's sea change or turning 00:02:24.520 --> 00:02:29.320 point as trailed by Olaf Scholz in that speech is not only seriously incomplete on its own 00:02:29.320 --> 00:02:33.400 terms, but it's dangerously inadequate to meet the challenges that we actually face 00:02:33.400 --> 00:02:37.560 and seize the opportunities that we'll need to in order to not despair but actually act 00:02:37.560 --> 00:02:40.240 as is the theme of this conference here. 00:02:40.240 --> 00:02:44.040 In terms of the speed of change, the level of ambition of that change and how internationally 00:02:44.040 --> 00:02:48.560 coordinated it's been and the coherence it has across policy sectors, it hasn't met 00:02:48.560 --> 00:02:51.400 the requirements. 00:02:51.400 --> 00:02:56.000 The one exception I would say is the sustainability of the change that's been made, which is likely 00:02:56.000 --> 00:02:59.080 to stick, but that's also because it hasn't gone very far, to be quite honest. 00:02:59.080 --> 00:03:02.320 Even though in some areas such as relations to Russia, I'm not sure the current position 00:03:02.320 --> 00:03:06.640 will actually be sustained in a, if there's a geopolitical shift again. 00:03:06.640 --> 00:03:10.160 That assessment also goes for the five major fields that were covered in the speech, support 00:03:10.160 --> 00:03:14.480 for Ukraine as the first, building Germany's defence capabilities, second, third, the approach 00:03:14.480 --> 00:03:19.520 to authoritarian states, fourth, Germany's contribution to and positioning in key institutions, 00:03:19.520 --> 00:03:23.520 EU and NATO especially, and fifth, and lastly, its energy mix. 00:03:23.520 --> 00:03:27.440 While Germany has got off Russian gas, and it did so fast, partly because Russia turned 00:03:27.440 --> 00:03:31.840 off the tab, it hasn't yet found an energy mix that answers geopolitical as well as 00:03:31.840 --> 00:03:35.800 ecological and economic considerations that is sustainable in the long run. 00:03:35.800 --> 00:03:39.560 This is where a shift to the positive, the Titan vendor has succeeded in opening up the 00:03:39.560 --> 00:03:44.680 space of discussion in which geopolitical considerations, security considerations in 00:03:44.680 --> 00:03:48.960 fields of energy and economy as well as others can actually be discussed. 00:03:48.960 --> 00:03:52.600 However, going with the latest research we've been doing, including virus series of focus 00:03:52.600 --> 00:03:56.280 groups that we commissioned around Germany, and which was just presented to the Action 00:03:56.280 --> 00:04:00.600 Group Titan vendor this week, I think the term has now outlived its usefulness because it 00:04:00.600 --> 00:04:05.200 seemed by experts and the general public alike as empty, and has become something of a symbol 00:04:05.200 --> 00:04:09.640 of inadequacy rather than of rising to meet the geopolitical moment that alone setting 00:04:09.640 --> 00:04:13.080 the kind of strategy we need to face the future with confidence. 00:04:13.080 --> 00:04:14.080 But that's in Germany. 00:04:14.080 --> 00:04:18.080 Elsewhere, it has been different, and some didn't need to change so much in the first 00:04:18.080 --> 00:04:19.080 place. 00:04:19.080 --> 00:04:23.120 Others have recognized mistakes of the past and have changed position rhetorically at 00:04:23.120 --> 00:04:27.520 least, even if questions remain about the material backup to that and how sustainable 00:04:27.520 --> 00:04:28.920 that change will be. 00:04:28.920 --> 00:04:31.760 And that's what we want to talk about with our guests today. 00:04:31.760 --> 00:04:36.760 So to help us discuss both the German and European dimensions of this, including how 00:04:36.760 --> 00:04:41.080 to bring about the strategic turning point, we need to see, we're joined by a fabulously 00:04:41.080 --> 00:04:45.200 international panel, which we hope will help you understand the multiple perspectives in 00:04:45.200 --> 00:04:46.200 play here. 00:04:46.200 --> 00:04:51.040 So first up, welcome to Benjamin Haddad, a member of the French National Assembly and 00:04:51.040 --> 00:04:56.800 self-described recovering think tanker, as I heard you say yesterday, having had quite 00:04:56.800 --> 00:05:01.000 the career in security studies before heading into politics. 00:05:01.000 --> 00:05:05.920 Welcome also to Ambassador Jonathan Seveov, the Secretary General of the Estonian Foreign 00:05:05.920 --> 00:05:07.760 Affairs Ministry. 00:05:07.760 --> 00:05:12.560 And finally, Dr. Sabina Fischer, senior fellow in the Research Division on Eastern Europe 00:05:12.560 --> 00:05:17.920 and Eurasia at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. 00:05:17.920 --> 00:05:22.120 So we're going to give our hosts the privilege of going first. 00:05:22.120 --> 00:05:26.440 Jonathan, we're talking about how the security debate has changed or needs to change in Europe 00:05:26.440 --> 00:05:30.360 or parts of Europe, but Estonia hasn't had the same turning point, partly because it 00:05:30.360 --> 00:05:38.200 warned about Russian intentions, the weaponization of Nord Stream 2, and it ended up being right. 00:05:38.200 --> 00:05:40.600 How does it feel to have been proven right? 00:05:40.600 --> 00:05:44.360 And what are the changes Germany

and others need to make to catch up? 00:05:44.360 --> 00:05:50.920 But also, we must also ask this, what changes do you think Estonia might also need to make? 00:05:50.920 --> 00:05:54.720 So first of all, thank you for having me and thank you for the kind words. 00:05:54.720 --> 00:05:57.160 It's great to be here in Tallinn at the Linn-Otmeri Conference. 00:05:57.160 --> 00:06:02.120 I think the conference year after year becomes more and more relevant. 00:06:02.120 --> 00:06:08.280 You know, I think it doesn't feel particularly great to have been right. 00:06:08.280 --> 00:06:09.960 We always knew we were right. 00:06:09.960 --> 00:06:15.680 I'm sure our opponents back in the day in those debates also thought they were right. 00:06:15.680 --> 00:06:19.480 And then when they realized they weren't, they did the gracious thing of saying that 00:06:19.480 --> 00:06:22.600 they were mistaken and changed course. 00:06:22.600 --> 00:06:29.240 That's not relevant today because we're in the middle of a war that will shape Europe's 00:06:29.240 --> 00:06:34.280 history, Europe's future, certainly Estonia's security. 00:06:34.280 --> 00:06:39.200 And instead of focusing on who was right, who was wrong a year ago or 10 years ago, we 00:06:39.200 --> 00:06:41.680 should be focusing on the future. 00:06:41.680 --> 00:06:46.840 What it is that we're trying to get out of this, how do we define victory, which shouldn't 00:06:46.840 --> 00:06:50.880 really be a controversial issue and hasn't been for Estonia. 00:06:50.880 --> 00:06:52.680 We've said it publicly, officially. 00:06:52.680 --> 00:06:58.880 We define victory as an outcome that safeguards territorial integrity and sovereignty as cornerstones 00:06:58.880 --> 00:07:00.040 of European security. 00:07:00.040 --> 00:07:04.800 And that obviously also includes territorial integrity and sovereignty for Ukraine. 00:07:04.800 --> 00:07:08.720 Our definition of victory includes the notion that aggression as a tool of statecraft should 00:07:08.720 --> 00:07:13.600 be discredited, meaning that the aggressor should not find himself in a better position 00:07:13.600 --> 00:07:19.760 strategically or politically or economically than he was when he decided to commit aggression. 00:07:19.760 --> 00:07:24.720 That relates to this notion of accountability, both with regard to war crimes and the crime 00:07:24.720 --> 00:07:30.240 of aggression, but also to accountability in the sense of the damages that have been 00:07:30.240 --> 00:07:37.400 caused in Ukraine and potential reparations or if not those, then the use of frozen assets 00:07:37.400 --> 00:07:40.760 for the reconstruction of Ukraine. 00:07:40.760 --> 00:07:48.040 And it includes the notion of Europe that security architecture remains standing on 00:07:48.040 --> 00:07:53.360 the two feet it's been standing on that's NATO and the European Union with those that 00:07:53.360 --> 00:07:57.520 are willing and able as part of those organizations. 00:07:57.520 --> 00:08:03.600 And that obviously includes Ukraine and Boltova and others with the caveat of them meeting 00:08:03.600 --> 00:08:06.200 the necessary requirements. 00:08:06.200 --> 00:08:08.520 These are merit-based organizations. 00:08:08.520 --> 00:08:15.280 But we should be very, very open and clear about the fact that war instability, chaos 00:08:15.280 --> 00:08:21.280 in post-Cold War Europe has always stemmed from those so-called gray areas. 00:08:21.280 --> 00:08:27.520 And if we leave a gray area in the middle of the geostrategic center of Europe, then 00:08:27.520 --> 00:08:31.800 we'll have nothing but war, chaos and instability in the future. 00:08:31.800 --> 00:08:38.240 So that's what we're focused on, talking about it openly, pushing for others to do more, 00:08:38.240 --> 00:08:40.000 pushing ourselves to do more. 00:08:40.000 --> 00:08:44.800 The only metric that matters is not whether we were right yesterday, whether we are right 00:08:44.800 --> 00:08:45.800 today. 00:08:45.800 --> 00:08:49.640 The only metric that matters is whether we win or whether we lose. 00:08:49.640 --> 00:08:52.400 And we won't know until it happens. 00:08:52.400 --> 00:08:56.720 Now, I don't want to go on for too long, but I'll just say one more thing. 00:08:56.720 --> 00:08:57.800 We're democracies. 00:08:57.800 --> 00:09:01.440 We're very good at creating narratives, talking about stuff. 00:09:01.440 --> 00:09:09.960 So it's only natural that when we win wars, we celebrate them with concrete dates in mind. 00:09:09.960 --> 00:09:15.800 When we lose wars, we tend to do a very good job at explaining the loss away. 00:09:15.800 --> 00:09:17.960 Sooner or later, the defeat becomes evident. 00:09:17.960 --> 00:09:19.960 We lost the war in Afghanistan. 00:09:19.960 --> 00:09:20.960 Taliban is back. 00:09:20.960 --> 00:09:21.960 We lost it. 00:09:21.960 --> 00:09:23.460 But when did we lose it? 00:09:23.460 --> 00:09:29.360 My point being here, that our defeats, unless they're total defeats, which are unlikely at 00:09:29.360 --> 00:09:33.120 this stage, our defeats usually come under other banners. 00:09:33.120 --> 00:09:39.160 They come under the banner of peace or of strategic stability. 00:09:39.160 --> 00:09:42.560 That's why we're advocating for very clear language when it comes to what we're trying 00:09:42.560 --> 00:09:45.800 to get out of this current war. 00:09:45.800 --> 00:09:52.920 We're somewhat concerned that others find it difficult to use similarly clear language 00:09:52.920 --> 00:09:57.200 because it obviously raises all sorts of logical questions as to why there are certainly no 00:09:57.200 --> 00:10:00.960 intellectual gaps or holdbacks. 00:10:00.960 --> 00:10:08.160 And final thing I want to say before handing it over to colleagues on Germany. 00:10:08.160 --> 00:10:16.480 I can sense how the criticism that comes from this part of Europe towards Germany, how we

00:10:16.480 --> 00:10:23.360 can irritate our German friends for good reasons, who likes to be criticized. 00:10:23.360 --> 00:10:27.560 And I'm not saying this as a government official, but just as an observer. 00:10:27.560 --> 00:10:33.120 When you look at the criticism coming from Polish think tanks or Lithuania or Latvia 00:10:33.120 --> 00:10:36.000 or Estonia, look at the essence of the criticism. 00:10:36.000 --> 00:10:42.880 It is those countries, those societies demanding for more Germany, more German military might, 00:10:42.880 --> 00:10:46.560 more German economic presence, more Germany. 00:10:46.560 --> 00:10:50.240 And I know it can be irritating, but if you take a few steps back and look at the context, 00:10:50.240 --> 00:10:58.720 look at who's talking and consider their history, there cannot be a greater compliment to Germany's 00:10:58.720 --> 00:11:05.160 democracy and trustworthiness that you have Poland demanding for more Germany or Lithuania 00:11:05.160 --> 00:11:07.520 demanding for more Germany. 00:11:07.520 --> 00:11:14.320 So I hope that our German friends, even when they disagree, see this as the most significant 00:11:14.320 --> 00:11:21.720 of compliments that Germany could get from countries that frankly, 67, 80 years ago, 00:11:21.720 --> 00:11:25.560 were in a, how to put it mildly, a fundamentally different position. 00:11:25.560 --> 00:11:26.560 That's right. 00:11:26.560 --> 00:11:27.920 And that's been a consistent theme of Berlin's side out. 00:11:27.920 --> 00:11:29.760 We want the best Germany we can get. 00:11:29.760 --> 00:11:32.680 And part of that involves identifying the problems. 00:11:32.680 --> 00:11:35.400 Problems need to be made, but also creating solutions. 00:11:35.400 --> 00:11:38.720 Now, Benjamin, over to you. 00:11:38.720 --> 00:11:42.400 It's been said that there has been a French site and vendor, the Bratislava agenda, as 00:11:42.400 --> 00:11:43.400 it's been laid out. 00:11:43.400 --> 00:11:47.560 Could you talk us through the reasons behind that, what it constitutes and also how sustainable 00:11:47.560 --> 00:11:48.560 it is? 00:11:48.560 --> 00:11:51.840 Because there have also been criticisms that it's a lot of talk, not backed up by rhetoric. 00:11:51.840 --> 00:11:53.840 So how do you see France's change? 00:11:53.840 --> 00:12:00.280 Let me pick up on one point that John Lynch has made because I think it's really critical. 00:12:00.280 --> 00:12:04.320 Your question is does the European site and vendor real? 00:12:04.320 --> 00:12:08.680 And of course, the jury is still out because it will depend on whether we win this war or 00:12:08.680 --> 00:12:09.680 not. 00:12:09.680 --> 00:12:12.920 Vladimir Putin's first hope was to take over key very quickly in a couple of weeks that 00:12:12.920 --> 00:12:16.440 Ukraine would fall apart and that of course allies wouldn't react. 00:12:16.440 --> 00:12:21.440 And what we've seen so far is that allies have stayed united, that Europeans have dramatically 00:12:21.440 --> 00:12:27.600 increased their defense spending in Germany and France elsewhere, sent weapons to Ukraine 00:12:27.600 --> 00:12:30.240 and that we're still focused and we're still, we're still discussing. 00:12:30.240 --> 00:12:34.920 Today, how to increase both the quantity but also the nature of our military support for 00:12:34.920 --> 00:12:36.160 Ukraine. 00:12:36.160 --> 00:12:41.880 But of course, Putin's gambit and this is why I was troubled a few months into the war 00:12:41.880 --> 00:12:46.800 when I started seeing France that I think we're doing this for the right reasons but 00:12:46.800 --> 00:12:50.800 started writing that Putin had already lost because he'd lost Ukraine strategically because 00:12:50.800 --> 00:12:55.080 Sweden and Finland were about to join NATO because we were united because NATO had found 00:12:55.080 --> 00:12:56.720 a purpose again. 00:12:56.720 --> 00:13:01.440 And as much as I appreciated the optimism, this is a long game. 00:13:01.440 --> 00:13:07.600 Unfortunately, there's no quick fix to this and the biggest test is whether we're able 00:13:07.600 --> 00:13:12.720 to sustain our support and sustain our own effort to arm ourselves at the same time. 00:13:12.720 --> 00:13:14.560 And this is where we're going to be tested. 00:13:14.560 --> 00:13:15.920 We'll discuss this in more detail. 00:13:15.920 --> 00:13:23.320 Let me talk about the French Zeit-Vendeur as I think the economist has called it. 00:13:23.320 --> 00:13:31.000 One thing hasn't changed is that since 2017 and I would say even before but clearly President 00:13:31.000 --> 00:13:36.600 Macron more than his predecessors has put that as the center of his agenda, we're pushing 00:13:36.600 --> 00:13:43.080 a vision that Europe could be wiped out of history, that Europe could become sort of 00:13:43.080 --> 00:13:49.440 a passive theater of great power rivalry with no agency over its technological, military, 00:13:49.440 --> 00:13:55.960 economic, energetic future and that it needs to take ownership of its own security and 00:13:55.960 --> 00:14:01.680 be able to, without naivety, defend its own security interests, trade interests, protect 00:14:01.680 --> 00:14:11.760 itself maybe from dangerous foreign investments, infrastructure and technology and so forth. 00:14:11.760 --> 00:14:18.880 The test for our ability to promote this agenda is our support for Ukraine and is our ability 00:14:18.880 --> 00:14:25.200 to integrate the security imperatives and the threats not only I would say of our partners 00:14:25.200 --> 00:14:29.480 like Estonia, Poland and others but also to recognize the fact that Russia is targeting 00:14:29.480 --> 00:14:30.480 us. 00:14:30.480 --> 00:14:35.600 Not only is targeting the European security architecture and it's putting this as clearly 00:14:35.600 --> 00:14:39.040 dismantling the security architecture is one of its key

priorities but it's targeting 00:14:39.040 --> 00:14:42.280 France directly. 00:14:42.280 --> 00:14:47.120 Constant cyber attacks against our infrastructure, hospitals, key ministries, interference in 00:14:47.120 --> 00:14:51.160 our democracy which started by the way, I mean at the very beginning of Macron's campaign 00:14:51.160 --> 00:14:59.840 in 2017, the hacking of his emails, propaganda, going after our interests in Africa with Wagner 00:14:59.840 --> 00:15:03.840 with propaganda operations and so recognizing that. 00:15:03.840 --> 00:15:05.800 You mentioned the Bratislava speech. 00:15:05.800 --> 00:15:09.080 I do think it was a historic speech for a couple reasons. 00:15:09.080 --> 00:15:14.840 I mean, of course there was the tone recognizing at the beginning of the speech that alluding 00:15:14.840 --> 00:15:23.320 to Jacques Chirac's famous sentence in 2003 that the new members in Central Europe had 00:15:23.320 --> 00:15:26.280 lost an opportunity to shut up. 00:15:26.280 --> 00:15:28.480 He said we wasted an opportunity to listen to you. 00:15:28.480 --> 00:15:33.800 Now, if you allow me to maybe take a second on this comment, it's interesting because 00:15:33.800 --> 00:15:39.000 when I started traveling to Warsaw for example on a regular basis, especially when I was 00:15:39.000 --> 00:15:43.960 working in ThinkTanks, I would hear this reference all the time, the Chirac sentence. 00:15:43.960 --> 00:15:47.480 And I would go back to France and tell them, you know, I mean they still care very much 00:15:47.480 --> 00:15:52.040 about this and people tell me, oh yeah, but Chirac was right because he was right about 00:15:52.040 --> 00:15:53.540 Iraq. 00:15:53.540 --> 00:15:55.600 And it was interesting, I said, well, but that's not the point. 00:15:55.600 --> 00:16:03.280 The point is you have countries that have after half a century of occupation were abandoned 00:16:03.280 --> 00:16:08.160 behind the iron curtain that have recovered their sovereignty, their freedom 15 years ago 00:16:08.160 --> 00:16:10.520 and now you're telling them to shut up. 00:16:10.520 --> 00:16:17.880 And the point I'm trying to make is there was for a long time in Paris a lack of sensitivity, 00:16:17.880 --> 00:16:21.240 historical empathy, geographical empathy towards the region. 00:16:21.240 --> 00:16:24.400 And I would say just lack of curiosity, not enough engagement. 00:16:24.400 --> 00:16:29.040 I would go to ThinkTanks events such as this one and I would very often be the only French 00:16:29.040 --> 00:16:32.880 person and I was invited because I was part of an American organization. 00:16:32.880 --> 00:16:34.200 And I think that has changed. 00:16:34.200 --> 00:16:42.600 Now you see all across the region, parliamentarians, diplomats, ThinkTank experts trying to engage. 00:16:42.600 --> 00:16:47.920 There is no agenda for European sovereignty or strictee cotonomy, however you want to 00:16:47.920 --> 00:16:48.920 call

it, I'm not. 00:16:48.920 --> 00:16:54.520 I don't have any theological opinion about the terms without pushing back against Russian 00:16:54.520 --> 00:16:59.320 aggression, without making the case to especially to this region, but to all of Europe that 00:16:59.320 --> 00:17:02.760 Europe can protect themselves against Russian aggression. 00:17:02.760 --> 00:17:05.640 That was I think the key point of the Breislaube speech. 00:17:05.640 --> 00:17:06.640 Absolutely. 00:17:06.640 --> 00:17:09.960 And just to remember that that comment came in the same year that there was a famous letter, 00:17:09.960 --> 00:17:14.440 an open letter, Germany loves open letters as we know, but this was from Jürgen Habermas 00:17:14.440 --> 00:17:19.320 and Jacques Dergidah that actually referred to a core Europe and a non-core Europe. 00:17:19.320 --> 00:17:23.160 And that comment from Chirac played into exactly the idea that there was a hierarchy within 00:17:23.160 --> 00:17:27.360 Europe despite the formal equality that we were going to see through NATO and EU membership. 00:17:27.360 --> 00:17:30.560 There were still some true Europeans and those who were lucky to be there on tolerance from 00:17:30.560 --> 00:17:31.560 the others. 00:17:31.560 --> 00:17:35.840 And addressing that grievance has been so important in actually understanding what 00:17:35.840 --> 00:17:37.720 that French site and vendor might be. 00:17:37.720 --> 00:17:41.040 And so bringing Central and Eastern Europe into that perspective, and we'll come more 00:17:41.040 --> 00:17:44.160 on to that later, but Sabina, we'd like to come over to you. 00:17:44.160 --> 00:17:49.760 Reflecting on all of this, we've heard Ben just talk about this perception of old Europe 00:17:49.760 --> 00:17:50.920 versus new Europe. 00:17:50.920 --> 00:17:58.200 That has also been a perception that Germany has in to varying degrees also had or been 00:17:58.200 --> 00:18:00.200 criticized for having. 00:18:00.200 --> 00:18:06.280 How would you assess this from a German perspective and what is the need for further change within 00:18:06.280 --> 00:18:10.280 Germany and do we need more? 00:18:10.280 --> 00:18:16.160 As much as Germany is obviously listening more to North and Central and Eastern Europe, 00:18:16.160 --> 00:18:18.840 I would also argue that there's more that could be done. 00:18:18.840 --> 00:18:19.840 What would you say to this? 00:18:19.840 --> 00:18:24.120 Yeah, I mean, I can start by saying that we definitely need more. 00:18:24.120 --> 00:18:27.840 And I've been saying that also publicly in Germany for the past two years. 00:18:27.840 --> 00:18:36.440 So I agree with the criticism of sort of the Titan vendor policy getting stuck on various 00:18:36.440 --> 00:18:38.200 issues and aspects of it. 00:18:38.200 --> 00:18:39.760 And that's a problem. 00:18:39.760 --> 00:18:45.760 Nevertheless, I would actually like to stress that there have been changes, very, very profound

00:18:45.760 --> 00:18:51.280 changes in the German perception of the whole region. 00:18:51.280 --> 00:18:52.280 Really. 00:18:52.280 --> 00:18:57.400 I mean, there is a lot of a lot more humbleness with regard to the positions. 00:18:57.400 --> 00:19:03.720 And also the warnings that were given by Poland, by the Baltic states with regard to Russia's 00:19:03.720 --> 00:19:05.960 imperialism, right? 00:19:05.960 --> 00:19:09.640 And Russia's aggressive policies. 00:19:09.640 --> 00:19:17.280 I think the German perception of not of Central Eastern Europe, so basically partners, the 00:19:17.280 --> 00:19:22.960 partners in the European Union and NATO, but indeed of Eastern Europe has changed profoundly. 00:19:22.960 --> 00:19:32.240 So I mean, and this is in a way really tragic because until February 2022, the mainstream, 00:19:32.240 --> 00:19:38.720 let's say German perspective of Eastern Europe was very, very much focused on Russia. 00:19:38.720 --> 00:19:45.200 So there was this Russia prism and the political community in Berlin looked at the other countries 00:19:45.200 --> 00:19:49.400 in the region through this prism. 00:19:49.400 --> 00:19:58.680 And it required the full scale invasion to finally, finally put Ukraine and Moldova and 00:19:58.680 --> 00:20:02.680 Georgia and the other countries on the mental map in Germany. 00:20:02.680 --> 00:20:06.160 And I think they are there to stay. 00:20:06.160 --> 00:20:12.600 But this is, of course, something that I as a German have to say that this is, it's, 00:20:12.600 --> 00:20:17.440 I mean, it started to change slowly after 2014. 00:20:17.440 --> 00:20:21.400 So there was a process before the full, the beginning of the full scale invasion, but 00:20:21.400 --> 00:20:25.120 of course it was, it was much too slow. 00:20:25.120 --> 00:20:29.880 So this is where we are with regard to the criticism. 00:20:29.880 --> 00:20:35.720 I mean, I think it's very important to have a nuanced and granulated picture of Germany's 00:20:35.720 --> 00:20:42.920 policies and the politics behind them because we are in a difficult domestic situation. 00:20:42.920 --> 00:20:52.480 I think the Titan vendor and the changes in the thinking that made the Titan vendor possible, 00:20:52.480 --> 00:20:56.120 they're there to stay with regard to the Democratic parties. 00:20:56.120 --> 00:21:01.880 And it's already said that I have to say this, the Democratic parties, because we have less 00:21:01.880 --> 00:21:12.400 Democratic parties now on the political fringes of the political spectrum. 00:21:12.400 --> 00:21:19.920 And here we have very different positions and also strategic visions with regard to 00:21:19.920 --> 00:21:23.800 Russia, Ukraine, the whole region and the war. 00:21:23.800 --> 00:21:26.480 And we have very important elections coming up. 00:21:26.480 --> 00:21:30.840 And some of the Democratic parties are under very serious pressure. 00:21:30.840 --> 00:21:38.800 So this is

a tension that will impact on Germany's policies in the coming months and years. 00:21:38.800 --> 00:21:39.800 And it worries me. 00:21:39.800 --> 00:21:45.640 I wanted to make one point in reaction to what you said, Johnson, about narratives, because 00:21:45.640 --> 00:21:48.920 I mean, I was a little bit surprised when you said that democracies are actually very 00:21:48.920 --> 00:21:56.960 good at producing narratives because my impression also with regard to my own position within 00:21:56.960 --> 00:22:03.200 the German discourse, for instance, but also when we look at the global debate specifically 00:22:03.200 --> 00:22:07.600 about the war against Ukraine, but also then Gaza, etc. 00:22:07.600 --> 00:22:10.920 is that we're really not good at narratives. 00:22:10.920 --> 00:22:16.160 And that Russia is actually, I mean, I'm not saying it's already winning the war of 00:22:16.160 --> 00:22:19.000 narratives, but we're moving in this direction. 00:22:19.000 --> 00:22:26.440 And this is, I think, a really, it's a really great danger for Ukraine. 00:22:26.440 --> 00:22:30.440 It's very existential, but also for our democracies. 00:22:30.440 --> 00:22:36.960 Look, I guess I have to then jump back in and say that I don't necessarily disagree with 00:22:36.960 --> 00:22:37.960 you. 00:22:37.960 --> 00:22:42.440 The point I was trying to make is that democratic governments are in power because they have 00:22:42.440 --> 00:22:46.080 been able to explain to their people what they're trying to do, create some sort of a 00:22:46.080 --> 00:22:47.080 narrative. 00:22:47.080 --> 00:22:51.400 And it's tested every few years, whether they can explain it away, whether they cannot. 00:22:51.400 --> 00:22:55.880 There isn't much else that keeps a democratic government in power, but their ability to 00:22:55.880 --> 00:22:58.600 create a narrative. 00:22:58.600 --> 00:23:03.440 This is not necessarily the case in foreign policy. 00:23:03.440 --> 00:23:06.240 But there the limitation isn't our ability. 00:23:06.240 --> 00:23:08.400 It's our willingness. 00:23:08.400 --> 00:23:12.280 And that's the reason why we should be concerned. 00:23:12.280 --> 00:23:16.240 When we don't make sense, and I'm talking about we are not Estonian, or German, or any 00:23:16.240 --> 00:23:19.240 particular country, this is a hypothetical. 00:23:19.240 --> 00:23:25.520 If we don't make, if our narrative doesn't make sense in the wider world, if we're using 00:23:25.520 --> 00:23:33.560 talking points that clearly are superficial or hollow, then the limitation usually is not 00:23:33.560 --> 00:23:35.080 our ability. 00:23:35.080 --> 00:23:36.680 It's something else. 00:23:36.680 --> 00:23:41.560 And that we should openly call out, talk about. 00:23:41.560 --> 00:23:46.400 Perhaps not openly, openly in the general public because everybody's domestic political 00:23:46.400 --> 00:23:48.720 situation is difficult. 00:23:48.720 --> 00:23:51.960 Every few years our American friends come here and tell us about how difficult it is 00:23:51.960 --> 00:23:58.880 and how the voter in Wisconsin doesn't necessarily vote because of his or her foreign policy 00:23:58.880 --> 00:24:02.920 possessions and doesn't necessarily understand why the transatlantic relationship is of importance 00:24:02.920 --> 00:24:07.400 and how we need to all take this into consideration, to which I always like to reply, well, listen 00:24:07.400 --> 00:24:13.160 to the voter in Hamburg doesn't necessarily care about these things either. 00:24:13.160 --> 00:24:16.880 And because I can't speak on behalf of Germany, let me then speak on behalf of Estonia. 00:24:16.880 --> 00:24:22.840 Well, the voter in Tartuma doesn't necessarily vote because of his or her foreign policy 00:24:22.840 --> 00:24:25.840 ideals either. 00:24:25.840 --> 00:24:29.800 So sometimes we need to have those open discussions behind closed doors. 00:24:29.800 --> 00:24:33.920 And that's not actually impossible to do. 00:24:33.920 --> 00:24:40.480 When we don't have those discussions, then whether we want it or not ends up undermining 00:24:40.480 --> 00:24:42.240 trust. 00:24:42.240 --> 00:24:43.840 And that's dangerous. 00:24:43.840 --> 00:24:44.840 Right. 00:24:44.840 --> 00:24:46.600 And this is something we've seen. 00:24:46.600 --> 00:24:49.720 And this is often said that Germany's current problem is a communication problem. 00:24:49.720 --> 00:24:51.520 I think it's not only a communication problem. 00:24:51.520 --> 00:24:52.680 There's a substance issue as well. 00:24:52.680 --> 00:24:57.320 But there is also a communication problem here that the Schultz administration in particular 00:24:57.320 --> 00:25:02.080 has not been willing to outline the kind of clarity of vision that we've heard from all 00:25:02.080 --> 00:25:05.400 of you today that actually victory is what is needed. 00:25:05.400 --> 00:25:08.680 And Jonathan, you mentioned before we're very good at dressing up defeat in other language. 00:25:08.680 --> 00:25:13.600 And I think we're pre-dressing it here in terms of restraint, prudence, Bisonenheit, 00:25:13.600 --> 00:25:17.000 these watchwords for the German government at the moment, which don't understand that 00:25:17.000 --> 00:25:19.120 actually we need to be going for that victory. 00:25:19.120 --> 00:25:26.760 Well, the logical question comes to anyone's mind when the person listens to a government's 00:25:26.760 --> 00:25:29.520 tiptoeing around the definition of victory. 00:25:29.520 --> 00:25:36.080 The logical question is whether or not the tiptoeing is that particular government attempting 00:25:36.080 --> 00:25:40.160 to keep the back door open. 00:25:40.160 --> 00:25:45.160 It's not really wise communicative policy because you can't hide it indefinitely. 00:25:45.160 --> 00:25:49.240 I mean, sooner or later it comes an infection point when you have to take a stand, go left 00:25:49.240

--> 00:25:51.520 or go right. 00:25:51.520 --> 00:26:01.880 But our inability to use clear language is not driven by our limitations when it comes 00:26:01.880 --> 00:26:03.400 to articulation as such. 00:26:03.400 --> 00:26:05.520 It's driven by something else. 00:26:05.520 --> 00:26:08.080 And smart people know this. 00:26:08.080 --> 00:26:10.520 And the people in the Kremlin are smart. 00:26:10.520 --> 00:26:15.800 So I'm not worried necessarily what this does to the cohesion of the West or of Europe. 00:26:15.800 --> 00:26:18.560 It does undermine trust because it raises those questions. 00:26:18.560 --> 00:26:21.680 And you ask those questions and sometimes those questions end up being insulting because 00:26:21.680 --> 00:26:24.800 they're maybe not, maybe that's not the case. 00:26:24.800 --> 00:26:26.320 Maybe it's something domestic political. 00:26:26.320 --> 00:26:27.320 Who knows? 00:26:27.320 --> 00:26:35.240 The main worry is that in addition to fully being on board with what President Macron suggested, 00:26:35.240 --> 00:26:40.720 which is strategic ambiguity with regard to certain issues, there should be some areas 00:26:40.720 --> 00:26:43.920 where we should have strategic clarity. 00:26:43.920 --> 00:26:45.960 And we seem to be lacking that. 00:26:45.960 --> 00:26:53.200 And that's a problem because it communicates to the Russians that Putin's only remaining 00:26:53.200 --> 00:26:57.360 argument in his theory of victory, which is that time is on his side. 00:26:57.360 --> 00:26:59.560 And by the way, this is a very short-term proposition. 00:26:59.560 --> 00:27:03.320 It's not like some other, you know, the Chinese think in centuries. 00:27:03.320 --> 00:27:07.240 This Putin argument, they count in weeks and months. 00:27:07.240 --> 00:27:08.240 Time is on my side. 00:27:08.240 --> 00:27:09.240 Everything else is lost. 00:27:09.240 --> 00:27:11.200 He clearly isn't making Russia great again. 00:27:11.200 --> 00:27:15.840 He clearly isn't unifying the Russian world. 00:27:15.840 --> 00:27:18.480 His troops clearly weren't welcomed with flowers. 00:27:18.480 --> 00:27:21.360 But time is on his side. 00:27:21.360 --> 00:27:34.080 And we communicate in ways that hints at us keeping the door open to some sort of a walkout. 00:27:34.080 --> 00:27:38.680 Then unfortunately, that reinforces Putin arguments in the discussions that really matter. 00:27:38.680 --> 00:27:43.000 And those discussions take place somewhere in the suburbs of Moscow, where people get 00:27:43.000 --> 00:27:49.720 together amongst close friends, the people who keep Putin and his policies around. 00:27:49.720 --> 00:27:54.240 We shouldn't be communicating strategic ambiguity in all areas of our policy. 00:27:54.240 --> 00:27:55.240 No, 100 percent. 00:27:55.240 --> 00:27:58.400 There should be clarity of vision backed up with ambiguity about how we're going to achieve 00:27:58.400 --> 00:27:59.760 it to keep them on the back foot. 00:27:59.760 --> 00:28:00.760 That's clear. 00:28:00.760 --> 00:28:02.520 You mentioned before you can't speak for the voter in Hamburg. 00:28:02.520 --> 00:28:06.240 Well, thankfully we can, slightly after these focus groups that we've just commissioned. 00:28:06.240 --> 00:28:10.120 And for voters in Magdeburg and elsewhere around Germany, where we conducted a series 00:28:10.120 --> 00:28:11.240 of these focus groups. 00:28:11.240 --> 00:28:15.200 And one of the clear things that came out of that is a lack of understanding about this 00:28:15.200 --> 00:28:17.160 clarity of vision and clarity of message. 00:28:17.160 --> 00:28:20.960 And a feeling that comes from it that voters are not being well represented and they're 00:28:20.960 --> 00:28:24.600 not being well managed and governed, actually, that there is a lack of leadership and a lack 00:28:24.600 --> 00:28:28.960 of ability to rise to the challenges, which they very clearly care about. 00:28:28.960 --> 00:28:31.840 And this was clearly geopolitical and geo economic challenges. 00:28:31.840 --> 00:28:35.360 People do feel impact their lives, but they don't feel they're being served a political 00:28:35.360 --> 00:28:37.720 offer that actually credibly manages that. 00:28:37.720 --> 00:28:41.520 And so the encouraging part of this, of course, is the scope for political actors who want 00:28:41.520 --> 00:28:45.760 to move into that space and who could actually communicate and come up with a credible vision. 00:28:45.760 --> 00:28:46.760 Donut and I'm struck. 00:28:46.760 --> 00:28:52.200 You said sort of defeats are hard to kind of understand because we can explain it away 00:28:52.200 --> 00:28:53.200 over time. 00:28:53.200 --> 00:28:56.800 And then it's difficult for us to figure out exactly when it happened. 00:28:56.800 --> 00:28:59.760 You also said that victory is easy to commemorate. 00:28:59.760 --> 00:29:03.960 But I would also say that victory seems to be, at least in this case, hard to define 00:29:03.960 --> 00:29:08.960 or that we, you know, are having all kinds of disagreements about precisely how we define 00:29:08.960 --> 00:29:11.040 victory, particularly in Ukraine. 00:29:11.040 --> 00:29:15.720 So that's why I want to come to you, Benjamin, on this because of a panel that you were on 00:29:15.720 --> 00:29:18.640 here at Leonard Mary. 00:29:18.640 --> 00:29:22.680 We talked in our pillars of victory episode on Berlin's side out about what Ukrainian 00:29:22.680 --> 00:29:24.440 victory means and how you achieve it. 00:29:24.440 --> 00:29:29.520 You said that integrating Ukraine into NATO should be considered a key part of the definition 00:29:29.520 --> 00:29:30.920 of Ukrainian victory. 00:29:30.920 --> 00:29:36.520 And yet we're not expecting an invite to Ukraine at the upcoming Washington summit. 00:29:36.520 --> 00:29:42.080 So why does it seem to be so hard to really figure out, you know, this diplomatic part 00:29:42.080 -->

00:29:44.600 of Ukrainian victory between allies? 00:29:44.600 --> 00:29:49.120 Is there some nervousness about what kind of reordering effects a victory in Ukraine 00:29:49.120 --> 00:29:50.120 might have? 00:29:50.120 --> 00:29:54.440 It's clear to me that the definition of victory can not only be territorial. 00:29:54.440 --> 00:29:59.720 Putin has not lost hundreds of thousands of people just to gain control of a few towns 00:29:59.720 --> 00:30:01.240 in Donbass. 00:30:01.240 --> 00:30:05.880 This is about first dismantling the European security architecture. 00:30:05.880 --> 00:30:11.920 And it's about wiping out Ukraine as a sovereign nation as in its ability to choose freely 00:30:11.920 --> 00:30:16.120 and democratically its future and its Western orientation. 00:30:16.120 --> 00:30:21.640 This started, we all know it in 2014 in Maidan, the day that European kids were getting shot 00:30:21.640 --> 00:30:27.080 at for the European flag because they saw it as the inspiration for a better future. 00:30:27.080 --> 00:30:36.120 And this is what Putin saw as a threat, a counter-democratic model at his borders. 00:30:36.120 --> 00:30:37.440 And we couldn't see this. 00:30:37.440 --> 00:30:38.920 We didn't support it in 2014. 00:30:38.920 --> 00:30:43.320 I think we rose to a certain extent to the event in 2022. 00:30:43.320 --> 00:30:45.880 So of course, this is part of this. 00:30:45.880 --> 00:30:51.760 And it's the only way to ensure also the long-term stability and deterrence in the region. 00:30:51.760 --> 00:30:56.080 We made a mistake when we closed the door to Georgia and Ukraine in 2008, thinking that 00:30:56.080 --> 00:31:02.680 sending them an invitation to NATO would provoke Russia when it was exactly the other way around. 00:31:02.680 --> 00:31:06.480 It provoked the aggression and it invited Russia to attack to see that they were not 00:31:06.480 --> 00:31:07.480 being defended. 00:31:07.480 --> 00:31:09.760 Now, there's no agreement today. 00:31:09.760 --> 00:31:13.120 This is something, by the way, that if we're talking about the French site and vendor that 00:31:13.120 --> 00:31:14.680 French-Khalili changed position on. 00:31:14.680 --> 00:31:19.640 It was with Germany in 2008 and Bucharest closing the door to Ukraine. 00:31:19.640 --> 00:31:24.760 And there's a sense in Paris that not only is it what Ukrainians are fighting for, but 00:31:24.760 --> 00:31:28.640 this is also, if you look at the other options, people talk the Israeli option. 00:31:28.640 --> 00:31:29.640 Israel has nuclear weapons. 00:31:29.640 --> 00:31:36.960 If you talk about the South Korean option, there's close to 100,000 American troops there. 00:31:36.960 --> 00:31:41.320 The only way to ensure long-term stability and deterrence is to have robust security 00:31:41.320 --> 00:31:42.920 guarantees that pass through NATO. 00:31:42.920 --> 00:31:48.200 Now, I think today the United States and Germany considered that this would send the wrong 00:31:48.200 --> 00:31:49.520 message during the war. 00:31:49.520 --> 00:31:53.440 And of course, it's not about having Ukraine join NATO during the war, but at least send 00:31:53.440 --> 00:31:54.840 an invitation for after. 00:31:54.840 --> 00:31:59.200 Clear signal once again, as Jonathan said, to Putin that we're in the long run, that 00:31:59.200 --> 00:32:02.840 time is not playing in his favor. 00:32:02.840 --> 00:32:05.040 But there's still the debate about this. 00:32:05.040 --> 00:32:10.680 And I wish we'd go further and maybe just a point on Germany because I really don't want 00:32:10.680 --> 00:32:13.160 to underestimate what's going on in Germany. 00:32:13.160 --> 00:32:17.000 I mean, if you look at the dramatic increase in defense spending, if you look at what Germany 00:32:17.000 --> 00:32:23.600 is doing in terms of weapons delivery for Ukraine, even the change in intellectual 00:32:23.600 --> 00:32:28.280 software that I see from the German intellectual and political elite, I don't think it should 00:32:28.280 --> 00:32:31.040 be underestimated. 00:32:31.040 --> 00:32:35.000 If you're an external actor, France is a very presidential system where the president pushes 00:32:35.000 --> 00:32:37.040 a button and the whole system follows. 00:32:37.040 --> 00:32:41.040 And of course, we see Germany and you have the chance, it tells you, well, I have a different 00:32:41.040 --> 00:32:43.800 coalition parties and then there's the Bundestag and there's the Lander. 00:32:43.800 --> 00:32:45.920 So it's a very different system. 00:32:45.920 --> 00:32:52.800 The one thing on which I think it's still frustrating for us is I find that Germany 00:32:52.800 --> 00:32:58.840 has a much harder time overcoming certain taboos without the United States. 00:32:58.840 --> 00:33:04.840 We went to long range missiles with the Brits without getting permission from whoever. 00:33:04.840 --> 00:33:07.020 Same thing for the tanks. 00:33:07.020 --> 00:33:12.440 We had a debate on Ukraine's NATO and the president said we need to support Ukraine's 00:33:12.440 --> 00:33:14.240 accession into NATO. 00:33:14.240 --> 00:33:17.120 And I think these are still things for the Germans. 00:33:17.120 --> 00:33:20.000 It's complicated to go there without the United States. 00:33:20.000 --> 00:33:23.840 Just to back up to the Bratislava speech just a second ago and the Ukraine's NATO membership 00:33:23.840 --> 00:33:27.760 and its support from France, this was a key signal in terms of actually giving credibility 00:33:27.760 --> 00:33:28.760 to that shift. 00:33:28.760 --> 00:33:32.800 And this is what I actually asked President Macron to do at Globpsack last year to say, 00:33:32.800 --> 00:33:36.400 look, it's all very well and good saying we're now listening to Central East Europe. 00:33:36.400 --> 00:33:38.440 You're going to need some concrete steps to back that up. 00:33:38.440 --> 00:33:43.080 So how about

actually supporting Ukraine's NATO membership as one and credit to him? 00:33:43.080 --> 00:33:44.480 Actually he then went and did that. 00:33:44.480 --> 00:33:47.120 And it was great to see that brought a lot of credibility, but you're right. 00:33:47.120 --> 00:33:50.800 That's not aligned yet with the German position, nor with the US position. 00:33:50.800 --> 00:33:54.480 Although to make it clear and Sabina will come to you on this in just a moment, what's 00:33:54.480 --> 00:33:59.040 good for the US is not necessarily good for Germany because we are much more drastically 00:33:59.040 --> 00:34:03.240 and directly exposed to the threats that would come from not getting Ukraine right 00:34:03.240 --> 00:34:04.880 than the Americans are. 00:34:04.880 --> 00:34:06.920 So what's what's holding Germany back on this? 00:34:06.920 --> 00:34:11.560 I think what you just described, Benjamin, is it's really a difference in strategic 00:34:11.560 --> 00:34:14.240 culture between France and Germany. 00:34:14.240 --> 00:34:18.600 And it also has a lot to do with Germany's post-war history. 00:34:18.600 --> 00:34:24.320 So this is really about political traditions and it's very difficult to leave them behind. 00:34:24.320 --> 00:34:31.160 I mean, and the whole discussion about strategic autonomy and Germany's hesitations with regard 00:34:31.160 --> 00:34:37.000 to strategic autonomy, because there is such a strong focus on transatlantic relations. 00:34:37.000 --> 00:34:40.320 That is one of the big differences between between Germany and France. 00:34:40.320 --> 00:34:47.920 And I mean, I think we all know that the Franco German tandem, I mean, there have been some 00:34:47.920 --> 00:34:53.160 bumps in the road, including because of this over the past few years. 00:34:53.160 --> 00:34:58.240 I don't see this changing fundamentally. 00:34:58.240 --> 00:35:04.960 I mean, the German attitude or the attitude of the German government with this government. 00:35:04.960 --> 00:35:10.400 There is a lot of concern and also fear with regard to the upcoming presidential election 00:35:10.400 --> 00:35:14.280 in the US. 00:35:14.280 --> 00:35:20.720 I don't really see a plan B in Berlin right now, which may have to do with the fact that 00:35:20.720 --> 00:35:25.000 and this brings us back a little bit to what we discussed at the beginning with the fact 00:35:25.000 --> 00:35:31.720 that even though there have been profound changes in political thinking about Russia, 00:35:31.720 --> 00:35:36.440 about the region, about European security in more general terms, the political approach 00:35:36.440 --> 00:35:42.360 and I appreciate all the good words you said about what has been done in fact, because I 00:35:42.360 --> 00:35:46.920 agree, you know, defense spending, it's it's it is really unprecedented. 00:35:46.920 --> 00:35:51.200 So German policymakers are right when they point out that what has been done since February 00:35:51.200 --> 00:35:58.920 2022 was absolutely unthinkable, really literally until the 23rd of February 2022. 00:35:58.920 --> 00:36:02.400 So this is true. 00:36:02.400 --> 00:36:10.200 But still, when it comes to the implementation of Titan vendor, the approach is, let's say, 00:36:10.200 --> 00:36:17.160 it's technocratic, it's also bureaucratic, and it is less strategic than it should be. 00:36:17.160 --> 00:36:21.600 I wanted to say one tiny thing about communication. 00:36:21.600 --> 00:36:26.240 Just wanted to point out that I don't think the whole government has a communication problem. 00:36:26.240 --> 00:36:32.840 I mean, there are people in the government who have a very clear language about about 00:36:32.840 --> 00:36:33.840 the war. 00:36:33.840 --> 00:36:36.840 For example, for example, is widely celebrated for his police, for his police, for his police 00:36:36.840 --> 00:36:37.840 story, the Minister of Defense. 00:36:37.840 --> 00:36:41.160 I mean, we have a and he's a social democrat. 00:36:41.160 --> 00:36:49.760 And he's very outspoken, both about the, well, the outcome of the war that that would be 00:36:49.760 --> 00:36:54.040 in Germany's interest, but also about German security policy itself. 00:36:54.040 --> 00:36:58.600 You know, I mean, he's the one who through the term Kriegsdurchdigkeit, how would you 00:36:58.600 --> 00:37:02.240 translate that war readiness war readiness into the German debate. 00:37:02.240 --> 00:37:04.640 See listeners, my German's improving. 00:37:04.640 --> 00:37:05.640 Congratulations. 00:37:05.640 --> 00:37:07.640 I'm very happy to hear it. 00:37:07.640 --> 00:37:14.680 So yeah, so it's, it really has to do with this government. 00:37:14.680 --> 00:37:18.600 It's a very, it's a difficult constellation, you know, with these three parties who do 00:37:18.600 --> 00:37:23.680 not necessarily see eye to eye, but with Boris Pistorius taking his position, you also see 00:37:23.680 --> 00:37:27.080 that there is an internal debate in the social democratic party. 00:37:27.080 --> 00:37:28.080 You do. 00:37:28.080 --> 00:37:31.480 And also Pistorius is reward for that clear communication has been to be consistently 00:37:31.480 --> 00:37:33.520 rated the most popular politician in Germany. 00:37:33.520 --> 00:37:36.800 So again, there would be a lesson here if we were willing to learn it. 00:37:36.800 --> 00:37:41.920 What we also have to be aware of is that there are, I think there are different necessities 00:37:41.920 --> 00:37:46.240 when it comes to talking about the war in different European societies. 00:37:46.240 --> 00:37:49.680 I mean, I think it was the Estonian defense minister who said yesterday, we should not 00:37:49.680 --> 00:37:55.800 talk about a potential Ukrainian defeat because this is basically, it's just depressing and 00:37:55.800 --> 00:37:56.800 it's discouraging. 00:37:56.800 --> 00:38:00.760 We, we are discouraging the Ukrainians and ourselves.

00:38:00.760 --> 00:38:03.560 I think in Germany, it's exactly the other way around. 00:38:03.560 --> 00:38:11.080 I think in Germany, we have to talk about the potential knock on effects of a Ukrainian 00:38:11.080 --> 00:38:16.840 defeat in order to make it clear to people what, what, what the stakes are really, because 00:38:16.840 --> 00:38:18.920 I think many people still don't understand that. 00:38:18.920 --> 00:38:19.920 That's right. 00:38:19.920 --> 00:38:22.160 And that's what we've been trying to do also with some of our publications with some of 00:38:22.160 --> 00:38:25.240 the clear language that's been coming out of the action group, Titan vendor and it to 00:38:25.240 --> 00:38:29.320 be fair, some German politicians have communicated this very clearly, Roger Kiesewetter, Norbert 00:38:29.320 --> 00:38:32.920 Rutgen, also a lot of the greens and some from the FTP too. 00:38:32.920 --> 00:38:36.200 But Jonathan, I want to come to you on this because you, in your TED talk and also what 00:38:36.200 --> 00:38:39.800 you mentioned earlier, the only metric that matters is winning. 00:38:39.800 --> 00:38:43.160 And while we might give credit to Germany for what's been done, pointing to what we've 00:38:43.160 --> 00:38:45.960 done doesn't really get us to what we need to do. 00:38:45.960 --> 00:38:46.960 Absolutely. 00:38:46.960 --> 00:38:51.360 And before going into that question, I just want to aggressively agree. 00:38:51.360 --> 00:38:54.560 We have to make it absolutely clear what the stakes are. 00:38:54.560 --> 00:39:01.920 For human beings in democracies, we're not going to take the hard steps unless we understand 00:39:01.920 --> 00:39:06.560 that the alternative to those steps is even worse. 00:39:06.560 --> 00:39:08.800 That's the only thing that can make us move. 00:39:08.800 --> 00:39:12.480 So why not talk openly about the stakes? 00:39:12.480 --> 00:39:15.480 Let's not be afraid of the truth. 00:39:15.480 --> 00:39:19.480 And the only metric that matters indeed is whether or not we win. 00:39:19.480 --> 00:39:20.960 The outcome is what matters. 00:39:20.960 --> 00:39:23.000 Can I link those two things just very briefly? 00:39:23.000 --> 00:39:26.760 Because this also came up on a discussion with Tim Snyder and Elliot Cohen and Marcus 00:39:26.760 --> 00:39:27.760 Tarkner yesterday. 00:39:27.760 --> 00:39:30.360 The slogan of this conference, "Let us not despair but act." 00:39:30.360 --> 00:39:33.400 Indeed, let us not despair, but we have to be absolutely clear-eyed about the threats 00:39:33.400 --> 00:39:34.400 that we face. 00:39:34.400 --> 00:39:37.320 It's what we're going to do with them that actually matters, that changes the difference 00:39:37.320 --> 00:39:40.520 from fear as paralysis into fear as driver for credible action. 00:39:40.520 --> 00:39:42.960 So we have to know what the stakes are. 00:39:42.960 --> 00:39:45.800 We have to know what our goals are. 00:39:45.800 --> 00:39:48.480 And then we have to focus on those goals. 00:39:48.480 --> 00:39:52.360 And then the debate could revolve around the issues of what is to be done. 00:39:52.360 --> 00:39:55.120 And there are obviously dilemmas involved. 00:39:55.120 --> 00:40:01.400 I'm not going to argue that some of the concerns that some nations have are somehow lacking 00:40:01.400 --> 00:40:04.120 in legitimacy. 00:40:04.120 --> 00:40:05.880 But let's have those debates then. 00:40:05.880 --> 00:40:10.560 But when it comes to the stakes, when it comes to our shared goals, without those, we can't 00:40:10.560 --> 00:40:13.760 really expect to pull this off. 00:40:13.760 --> 00:40:22.440 I sometimes listen to our European and Western leaders get agitated on the point that, "Look, 00:40:22.440 --> 00:40:24.960 but we've done so much." 00:40:24.960 --> 00:40:31.240 And agitated at, for instance, the Ukrainians when they're critical still, because obviously 00:40:31.240 --> 00:40:36.200 we've done a lot and we've made major changes and Germany has done so and France has done 00:40:36.200 --> 00:40:39.640 so, frankly, Estonia has done so. 00:40:39.640 --> 00:40:42.640 And it hasn't been easy, obviously. 00:40:42.640 --> 00:40:44.640 But look at the wider picture. 00:40:44.640 --> 00:40:47.120 We have a house that's on fire. 00:40:47.120 --> 00:40:52.780 An active arsonist is not only pouring gasoline but sending fire to additional rooms. 00:40:52.780 --> 00:40:54.680 People are dying in the house. 00:40:54.680 --> 00:40:57.880 And now we've showed up with the fire trucks. 00:40:57.880 --> 00:40:59.920 Some arrived an hour late. 00:40:59.920 --> 00:41:02.600 Some arrived a year late. 00:41:02.600 --> 00:41:05.640 Some of the water misses the target. 00:41:05.640 --> 00:41:07.120 Some of it is useful. 00:41:07.120 --> 00:41:09.120 But the house is still on fire. 00:41:09.120 --> 00:41:15.480 And now the fire brigades around the building are telling the families in the house that, 00:41:15.480 --> 00:41:17.400 "Look, don't be critical of us. 00:41:17.400 --> 00:41:18.680 We showed up. 00:41:18.680 --> 00:41:20.880 They want to survive this." 00:41:20.880 --> 00:41:29.720 And for as long as the war is ongoing, we haven't really achieved what we're supposed to achieve. 00:41:29.720 --> 00:41:38.160 So all of this talk on how well we've done, I fully agree with Ben, we shouldn't be congratulating 00:41:38.160 --> 00:41:42.680 ourselves for a victory that we have yet to achieve. 00:41:42.680 --> 00:41:47.000 All of this is nothing but waste of time. 00:41:47.000 --> 00:41:48.000 We need to focus. 00:41:48.000 --> 00:41:54.920 And the same, by the way, applies to the question of, are we Estonians happy now that the others 00:41:54.920 --> 00:41:57.840 have recognized that we will write five years ago? 00:41:57.840 --> 00:41:59.440 We don't care. 00:41:59.440 --> 00:42:00.440 We don't care. 00:42:00.440 --> 00:42:02.960 We'll deal with

this in the future. 00:42:02.960 --> 00:42:04.120 We'll have a seminar. 00:42:04.120 --> 00:42:05.920 We'll get historians together. 00:42:05.920 --> 00:42:07.360 It's going to be fun. 00:42:07.360 --> 00:42:08.960 We'll share war stories. 00:42:08.960 --> 00:42:13.160 Today, the focus should be on the future and only on the future. 00:42:13.160 --> 00:42:18.160 Sabina, I'm struck actually by something you said, which relates exactly to what Jonathan 00:42:18.160 --> 00:42:19.160 just said. 00:42:19.160 --> 00:42:24.360 We have a division between those who think that the consequences of a Ukrainian defeat 00:42:24.360 --> 00:42:28.520 can be contained and those who don't think that it could be contained. 00:42:28.520 --> 00:42:32.240 So the house on fire analogy here is very, very apt. 00:42:32.240 --> 00:42:34.760 It got me to what you said yesterday. 00:42:34.760 --> 00:42:37.040 Who are those? 00:42:37.040 --> 00:42:39.960 Is that fair? 00:42:39.960 --> 00:42:47.200 And also, that really seems to fly into, we remember a Rolf Mutsenich in Germany saying 00:42:47.200 --> 00:42:51.360 that we should freeze the conflict, for example, this idea that you could contain this. 00:42:51.360 --> 00:42:55.800 Now, that seems to fly in the face of what we hear from our Nordic and Baltic friends 00:42:55.800 --> 00:42:59.640 who say that their expectations, despite all of this talk in Germany, are still really 00:42:59.640 --> 00:43:00.640 high. 00:43:00.640 --> 00:43:03.280 And it also contradicts what's been said in Paris very clearly too. 00:43:03.280 --> 00:43:07.640 It rather puts Germany and those others who don't see the potential spillover out on a 00:43:07.640 --> 00:43:08.640 limb, doesn't it? 00:43:08.640 --> 00:43:11.880 Well, I was very unhappy with this statement by Rolf Mutsenich. 00:43:11.880 --> 00:43:16.000 I mean, I hated the term frozen conflict before February 2022. 00:43:16.000 --> 00:43:17.840 I hate it even more now. 00:43:17.840 --> 00:43:21.920 And I've been fighting against it for the past, I don't know, 10, 15 years because I've 00:43:21.920 --> 00:43:26.920 done a lot of work on unresolved conflicts in the EU's Eastern neighborhood. 00:43:26.920 --> 00:43:30.560 And I think it's just totally, completely inappropriate as a term. 00:43:30.560 --> 00:43:37.960 So I was very unhappy also because I think the whole idea of, I mean, I think it's just 00:43:37.960 --> 00:43:40.960 completely impossible to freeze this war. 00:43:40.960 --> 00:43:42.480 It's not possible. 00:43:42.480 --> 00:43:47.240 And especially not in the current situation and along the current front line. 00:43:47.240 --> 00:43:52.400 So also strategically and tactically, it's just very stupid. 00:43:52.400 --> 00:44:03.560 On the questioning of whether or not the war and its implications are containable, I think 00:44:03.560 --> 00:44:08.920 you find people who think they are containable. 00:44:08.920 --> 00:44:14.000 It is containable not only in Germany in different parties, but you also find them in the United 00:44:14.000 --> 00:44:15.960 States for instance. 00:44:15.960 --> 00:44:27.360 So the difference is between those who think that the effects of a Russian victory on 00:44:27.360 --> 00:44:36.720 Europe and also the global order would be so comprehensive, negative that basically it 00:44:36.720 --> 00:44:39.680 would put the rules based international order at risk. 00:44:39.680 --> 00:44:45.520 And then there are those who believe that it is possible actually to contain the effects 00:44:45.520 --> 00:44:50.040 so that they don't destabilize the European and the rules based international order. 00:44:50.040 --> 00:44:56.600 So it is important to not to become too involved in Europe to contain the war and the conflict 00:44:56.600 --> 00:45:02.280 to Ukraine in order to be able to invest more capacities in Asia. 00:45:02.280 --> 00:45:08.120 So these are two very different strategic outlooks, but you have these positions in both political 00:45:08.120 --> 00:45:09.120 communities. 00:45:09.120 --> 00:45:14.080 And you could also add that of course the Russia's war against Ukraine and its outcome 00:45:14.080 --> 00:45:18.480 are part of the systemic rivalry and China is watching this very closely. 00:45:18.480 --> 00:45:23.440 I want to speak about the idea that it's possible to contain the war with regard to 00:45:23.440 --> 00:45:25.320 Germany and the US. 00:45:25.320 --> 00:45:30.200 And I mean you find people in Germany and the US who think that but for different reasons. 00:45:30.200 --> 00:45:36.240 So I think in Germany the idea speaks to a longing for peace in significant segments 00:45:36.240 --> 00:45:37.480 of German society. 00:45:37.480 --> 00:45:40.400 And there's really been a change in language on this in Paris. 00:45:40.400 --> 00:45:45.160 And quite clearly I mean President Macron's rhetorical move to first of all say Russia's 00:45:45.160 --> 00:45:50.000 defeat is necessary as well as Ukraine's victory to not rule out putting ground troops into 00:45:50.000 --> 00:45:54.720 Ukraine actually to get this strategic ambiguity in service that has shown that that's been 00:45:54.720 --> 00:45:56.560 a switch that's been made in Paris. 00:45:56.560 --> 00:45:58.560 But how credible is that beyond the rhetoric? 00:45:58.560 --> 00:45:59.560 I think it's very credible. 00:45:59.560 --> 00:46:05.200 I mean there's a sense that first Russia's victory would be a catastrophic defeat for 00:46:05.200 --> 00:46:06.200 Europe. 00:46:06.200 --> 00:46:09.800 I mean that it's all the US existence that's at stake that we would have a Russia that would 00:46:09.800 --> 00:46:14.360 be at the border of the Baltic states, Romania, Poland and more aggressive than ever. 00:46:14.360 --> 00:46:18.240 And especially in the context of the questions arising from the United States with the election 00:46:18.240 --> 00:46:22.600 and with

the question on the US security guarantees down the road. 00:46:22.600 --> 00:46:28.200 And on the strategic ambiguity I mean there's a sense that we've been self-censuring negotiating 00:46:28.200 --> 00:46:32.460 with ourselves for the last two years constantly signaling to the adversary our own limits and 00:46:32.460 --> 00:46:36.960 red lines where we have an adversary Russia that has put no such red line either on its 00:46:36.960 --> 00:46:38.960 rhetoric or on its action. 00:46:38.960 --> 00:46:43.800 And so you have to turn it around and maybe give him something to think about. 00:46:43.800 --> 00:46:50.480 Now when it comes to being backed by substance I mean look if you look at the last ranking 00:46:50.480 --> 00:46:54.560 the kill ranking that takes into account support for multilateral institution like the European 00:46:54.560 --> 00:46:58.760 Peace Facility and everything that other countries used to refinance their support for Ukraine. 00:46:58.760 --> 00:47:02.480 France has ranked third behind the United States and Germany. 00:47:02.480 --> 00:47:09.840 Now of course if you take per GDP or you know countries like Estonia or way above us if 00:47:09.840 --> 00:47:14.680 the question is and by the way and these rankings don't take into account the quality 00:47:14.680 --> 00:47:18.240 of the weapons like a Caesar cannon is not very expensive will be very effective on the 00:47:18.240 --> 00:47:19.240 ground. 00:47:19.240 --> 00:47:22.560 If the question is should we do more I think we should all do more. 00:47:22.560 --> 00:47:26.120 We should all do more in quantity we should be very creative about how we find resources 00:47:26.120 --> 00:47:28.120 also to sustain our support. 00:47:28.120 --> 00:47:31.280 I'm very supportive of the Estonian idea that pushed forward by... 00:47:31.650 --> 00:47:36.210 Prime Minister Kai has to have a defense Euro bonds, 100 billion on the table. 00:47:36.210 --> 00:47:40.690 We consider that COVID was an existential crisis and we created common debt. 00:47:40.690 --> 00:47:43.730 Well, I do think that's existential as well. So let's create common debt. 00:47:43.730 --> 00:47:48.290 I introduced a resolution in the French parliament to confiscate Russian frozen assets, 00:47:48.290 --> 00:47:51.730 not only the windfall profits, but I think we have to build the legal framework 00:47:51.730 --> 00:47:57.490 to go after the capital. The aggressor should pay for the reparation and the support for Ukraine. 00:47:57.490 --> 00:48:03.730 So let's think about, once again, there's no quick fix to this. We're in the long haul. 00:48:03.730 --> 00:48:06.370 So let's think about how we can sustain our support in the long haul. 00:48:06.370 --> 00:48:09.490 Right. And it's understanding what those different pillars of victory actually are, 00:48:09.490 --> 00:48:12.530 the financial and economic, as well as the military, and putting it together with the 00:48:12.530 --> 00:48:16.610 diplomatic that gives us the strategic position and street it means to actually go forward, 00:48:16.610 --> 00:48:20.450 which is what we covered on our Pillars of Victory multiple episode with some wonderful 00:48:20.450 --> 00:48:24.290 guests that you can listen into. There's another link to that in the show notes, of course. 00:48:24.290 --> 00:48:28.370 But I want to come to this point on coherence more widely because Sabina, you mentioned before 00:48:28.370 --> 00:48:34.770 that Berlin is in lockstep with Washington on its position for Ukraine. But we can all see 00:48:34.770 --> 00:48:39.810 Berlin is not in lockstep with Washington when it comes to China or on geoeconomics more widely. 00:48:39.810 --> 00:48:44.370 And I think this, this for me at least points to what the real Titan vendor would actually be, 00:48:44.370 --> 00:48:48.530 which is a clear strategic approach. And we've mentioned different strategic cultures. 00:48:48.530 --> 00:48:51.250 But Ben, I want to come back to you first on this because you, 00:48:51.250 --> 00:48:54.610 you talked about strategic autonomy and so on. And we could disagree whether that's autonomy 00:48:54.610 --> 00:48:58.290 from the US or it's more strategic agency for Europe, which I think is a more 00:48:58.290 --> 00:49:03.890 compelling way to put it certainly to Berlin. But it needs a strategy. And every time Macron 00:49:03.890 --> 00:49:07.250 has put something forward on this, he's been waiting for a response from Berlin and it 00:49:07.250 --> 00:49:11.410 frankly hasn't come. There was a lot of frustration in Paris after the 2017 Sorbonne 00:49:11.410 --> 00:49:17.490 speech where he did lay out ambitious vision for sovereignty and agency. And we felt there was 00:49:17.490 --> 00:49:22.290 no response from Berlin. Now we did move forward, did a lot of things. I mean, at the end of the day, 00:49:22.290 --> 00:49:29.410 the relationship with Chancellor Merkel did give us the bonds on COVID, the recovery package, 00:49:29.410 --> 00:49:34.450 was 800 billion euros. But there's a lot more to do as you talked about geoeconomics. I mean, 00:49:34.450 --> 00:49:41.570 it is also the end of a certain naivete that trade necessarily leads to the pacification of 00:49:41.570 --> 00:49:47.330 relations. I mean, we've seen on the contrary that energy was used as a weapon by Russia as 00:49:47.330 --> 00:49:53.170 leveraged over our democracies. And we're going to find the same situation probably tomorrow 00:49:53.170 --> 00:49:57.810 with China. So the question is not to cut ourselves from trade, of course not, but it's to protect 00:49:57.810 --> 00:50:03.090 ourselves, to protect our industrial interests, to screen investments. And we've led 10 years ago, 00:50:03.090 --> 00:50:08.050 China by harbouring in Athens. I mean, so it is a good stake at the port in Hamburg. 00:50:08.050 --> 00:50:16.770 Absolutely, which was criticized by France, by the way. So it

is about giving ourselves the tools 00:50:16.770 --> 00:50:22.370 to be able to defend ourselves in this respect. But I don't want to be too defensive about it, 00:50:22.370 --> 00:50:26.850 because we were talking about it yesterday. It is also about making Europe a competitive, 00:50:26.850 --> 00:50:33.970 innovative continent. I mean, we've lost 20 to 25 points of GDP from the United States 00:50:33.970 --> 00:50:40.770 in since 2008, because the US has invested massively in its economic recovery, in its green and 00:50:40.770 --> 00:50:48.210 industry, in its tech industry, because it has extraordinarily competitive university campuses, 00:50:48.210 --> 00:50:52.930 etc. etc. And the capital market system, it actually works to move from start up to scale up. 00:50:52.930 --> 00:50:57.570 And integrate a capital market, of course. Right. Now, it's often said that we do need 00:50:57.570 --> 00:51:00.770 more leadership when we need more strategy in Europe. I've just said it, but Jonathan, 00:51:00.770 --> 00:51:04.930 you're too modest to say it, I'm sure. But we've got that leadership coming from the Baltic states, 00:51:04.930 --> 00:51:09.330 haven't we? I mean, your for freedom agenda is the bones of this kind of strategy we need, 00:51:09.330 --> 00:51:13.570 isn't it? It depends on how you want to find leadership. If leadership is just being ambitious 00:51:13.570 --> 00:51:21.250 and clear in our messages, then I'm very happy to take the compliment. But true leadership 00:51:21.250 --> 00:51:25.730 really depends on whether or not others will follow. And on some points, we've been able to do, 00:51:26.530 --> 00:51:31.090 you know, demonstrate leadership in other cases, we haven't been. So it depends, 00:51:31.090 --> 00:51:35.570 depends on whether or not we actually can get others to follow. The way it usually works 00:51:35.570 --> 00:51:42.690 is not by others following you, but by others taking your ideas on board and making those ideas 00:51:42.690 --> 00:51:50.930 their own. So a good leader, I mean, the fact that you're a leader is only evident during the phase 00:51:50.930 --> 00:51:55.010 where your leadership really is in question. By the time your leadership is solidified, 00:51:55.730 --> 00:52:01.490 those are no longer your ideas. They then become everyone's ideas. So there's a bit of a tragic 00:52:01.490 --> 00:52:07.330 note in that sort of leadership. But there's one more point I want to underline. Leadership or 00:52:07.330 --> 00:52:13.250 demonstrated success, a successful leadership is only heroic from the benefit of the hindsight. 00:52:13.250 --> 00:52:19.410 By definition, a leader has to put him or herself ahead of the pack that means alone. 00:52:20.290 --> 00:52:26.130 And at a moment before others join and take those ideas and make them their own, 00:52:26.130 --> 00:52:33.410 the leader is alone. That runs counter to every part of our foreign policy DNA. 00:52:33.410 --> 00:52:44.530 Never alone again is part of our DNA. So it's not, it's not an easy ride. It takes a lot of courage. 00:52:45.410 --> 00:52:51.650 It takes a lot of willingness to take risks. We'd rather not do it, to be honest with you. 00:52:51.650 --> 00:52:57.650 The only reason why we ever put ourselves out there, expose ourselves in a position where we're 00:52:57.650 --> 00:53:05.890 by definition alone is because we understand what the stakes are. And we understand that the risk 00:53:05.890 --> 00:53:12.690 of not doing so is far greater than the risk of sometimes putting ourselves out there and being 00:53:12.690 --> 00:53:18.290 alone. But I don't want to leave the people with an impression that this is a, you know, 00:53:18.290 --> 00:53:27.730 all heroic, simple stuff. It is hard. It's risky. It's rather terrible, I should say. I'd rather 00:53:27.730 --> 00:53:32.610 not do it. Right. And this is it. Leadership is a responsibility. It's a serious responsibility. 00:53:32.610 --> 00:53:37.330 Some take leadership when they get glory, but you rarely take real leadership to get the glory, 00:53:37.330 --> 00:53:41.890 if it's true leadership. Victories have several fathers. Defeats are orphans. 00:53:41.890 --> 00:53:47.570 We know that. And again, I want to underline this. You can only lead others when they buy into the 00:53:47.570 --> 00:53:53.970 idea that you represent. And then that idea becomes theirs. It becomes theirs. Great leaders in 00:53:53.970 --> 00:53:57.730 history. I mean, we talk about them as historical figures, but they were great because they were 00:53:57.730 --> 00:54:04.530 able to not just have people follow them as individuals, but have people follow that idea, 00:54:04.530 --> 00:54:11.170 the churchals of the past. And then the idea is shared by others. So you don't get to be 00:54:11.170 --> 00:54:17.570 heroic as an individual for long. People take your idea on board, and you're only successful if you 00:54:17.570 --> 00:54:21.970 manage to do that. That requires them to recognize what's going on. And yes, point we made about 00:54:21.970 --> 00:54:25.490 understanding central and eastern Europe, listening to those and understanding where 00:54:25.490 --> 00:54:29.330 leadership is actually coming from. So, I mean, it would surely be a step to the true site and 00:54:29.330 --> 00:54:34.290 vendor that not only Germany, but Europe needs, wouldn't it? Yeah, absolutely. And I mean, we 00:54:34.290 --> 00:54:38.930 talked about German leadership earlier in our discussion. I think it is very important at the 00:54:38.930 --> 00:54:45.570 same time for me, and this is really against the background of German history in the 20th century, 00:54:45.570 --> 00:54:51.970 to me, the embeddedness of German policy within the European framework is also extremely important. 00:54:51.970 --> 00:54:58.770 So one is possible only in combination with the other. And yeah, this is the way I want to see

00:54:58.770 --> 00:55:04.370 German policy evolve. I mean, it's a very abstract idea of peace. Again, it has a lot to do with 00:55:04.370 --> 00:55:09.330 German history in the 20th century and some other factors. But this is very important. And the idea 00:55:09.330 --> 00:55:15.330 that it's possible to contain the war and the conflict more or less to Ukraine so that it doesn't 00:55:15.330 --> 00:55:21.890 affect Germany and the European Union is very important in that respect. And I think, you know, 00:55:21.890 --> 00:55:27.410 what we see now in certain corners of the German political debate also, after the beginning of 00:55:27.410 --> 00:55:33.010 the election campaign has to do with that. In the US, it's different. In the US, I think this position 00:55:33.010 --> 00:55:40.210 is underpinned by the global strategic vision. And the US, I mean, these are people who argue that 00:55:40.210 --> 00:55:45.010 the US should have and must have their focus on Asia, on China. They are. And this again, 00:55:45.010 --> 00:55:50.370 reflects that strategic distance between the two countries rather than the similarity that's often 00:55:50.370 --> 00:55:54.290 actually pointed out. We see on the one hand a very clear vision of systemic competition 00:55:54.290 --> 00:55:57.890 that is there. And on the other, an attempt to salvage what you can from the flat world of 00:55:57.890 --> 00:56:01.570 globalization by clinging to multi-polarity. And that, of course, would be the negative 00:56:01.570 --> 00:56:05.330 interpretation of strategic autonomy that Europe would exist as that autonomous poll, 00:56:05.330 --> 00:56:09.090 regardless of values. And I think that's something that comes out very clearly from this 00:56:09.090 --> 00:56:12.690 conference is something that people are really trying to avoid here. But the message hasn't 00:56:12.690 --> 00:56:17.490 necessarily penetrated every other. Well, it's not penetrated all of the chancellories of Europe. 00:56:17.490 --> 00:56:21.730 Let's say, let's put it in that sense. Not only is China watching, the world is watching. 00:56:21.730 --> 00:56:25.810 And the world is watching us, who we've proclaimed to have the greatest military alliance in the 00:56:25.810 --> 00:56:30.770 history of the world, which I believe to be true, combined the population of more than a billion 00:56:30.770 --> 00:56:38.530 people, 440 million of us Europeans, in a fight that we've many of us have said is existential, 00:56:38.530 --> 00:56:44.050 like President Macron, Prime Minister Carlos, a fight for our future with a country that Senator 00:56:44.050 --> 00:56:50.290 John McCain famously described as nothing but a gas station with nukes. Okay, we're in this struggle. 00:56:50.290 --> 00:56:57.490 It's been going on for three years. And it seems to be a draw at the moment. So when we look at how 00:56:57.490 --> 00:57:03.250 the world reacts, not only vis-a-vis the war in Ukraine, but vis-a-vis the West in general, 00:57:03.250 --> 00:57:09.730 and we see them sort of sitting on the fence, then that's the reason why. That's the reason why. 00:57:09.730 --> 00:57:14.530 And there is no question, I don't think in anybody's mind, that in the, not even talking about 00:57:14.530 --> 00:57:22.690 the long term in the midterm, Europe is going to be successful in countering Russia. The question 00:57:22.690 --> 00:57:28.370 is about the Russia challenge. To look down the 21st century, the list of challenges is huge. 00:57:28.370 --> 00:57:34.290 Russia is perhaps not the most significant one when you look at it from a sort of a historic 00:57:34.290 --> 00:57:45.010 perspective. We don't come across as definitive winners of the century. And that's our fault. 00:57:45.010 --> 00:57:52.050 Obviously, everything is interconnected. Our success in Ukraine will lead to a credibility 00:57:52.050 --> 00:57:58.210 with regard to other conflicts out there. So I think we need to be, we need to be better, 00:57:58.210 --> 00:58:03.890 we need to be better at connecting those dots and pursuing a coherent strategy, not only in 00:58:03.890 --> 00:58:08.450 Europe, but obviously also globally. The historical anomaly of democracy's dominance 00:58:08.450 --> 00:58:12.450 came about by us really being the best we could be. We need to get back that winning mentality, 00:58:12.450 --> 00:58:16.450 don't we Ben? We need to get back that winning mentality. And I want to add something because 00:58:16.450 --> 00:58:23.090 we talked about leadership and communicating a definition of victory. And I say this as a 00:58:23.090 --> 00:58:30.210 politician, now elected in Paris. We should not forget that our public opinions are one of the 00:58:30.210 --> 00:58:36.370 fronts. And Putin is very aware of this. He's communicating his threats when he's talking 00:58:36.370 --> 00:58:42.450 about nuclear weapons. It's clearly about talking to our public opinions. And one thing that struck 00:58:42.450 --> 00:58:49.010 me when I was in DC in January, making the case with a few colleagues from the Baltic States and 00:58:49.010 --> 00:58:56.770 others to representatives, Democrats and Republicans making the case for unblocking the aid to Ukraine 00:58:56.770 --> 00:59:01.890 is that some of the Republicans who were skeptical did make, I think, an argument that was reasonable. 00:59:01.890 --> 00:59:07.090 They said, "President Biden has not articulated what our victory is, what our end game is, 00:59:07.090 --> 00:59:12.450 what we're going to use this money for." And I thought, as much as I wanted them to approve the 00:59:12.450 --> 00:59:17.490 aid, I thought, "Okay, this is not a crazy point." And it's really important that we do this. It's 00:59:17.490 --> 00:59:22.930 really important that we not only put it into the framework of what we've been saying, which is 00:59:22.930 --> 00:59:29.250 defending the existence of Europe, the

European security architecture, but also phrasing it 00:59:29.250 --> 00:59:35.810 very concretely in terms of what impact it will have on everyday living, on the ability of Russia 00:59:35.810 --> 00:59:42.290 to control the cost of food, the cost of energy, and how that would affect the purchasing power of 00:59:42.290 --> 00:59:47.570 the everyday French. And this is where I want to go back to what you both said early on. Yes, we 00:59:47.570 --> 00:59:52.530 should talk about the cost of defeat. Because the problem is when we talk about everything that 00:59:52.530 --> 00:59:56.290 we've spent and done in the last two years to support Ukraine, and of course, sometimes it's 00:59:56.290 --> 01:00:01.730 at the expense of other things, one of the problems in politics is that you never have the 01:00:01.730 --> 01:00:07.730 counterfactual. You never have the price of inaction or the price of Russian victory and the 01:00:07.730 --> 01:00:11.730 concrete impact it would have on our societies. And I think that's something that when you talk 01:00:11.730 --> 01:00:16.610 about leadership, it's extremely important to be able to regularly articulate this to our public 01:00:16.610 --> 01:00:20.770 opinions. Right. And that's exactly what the demand that seemed to come across in our focus group 01:00:20.770 --> 01:00:25.890 would suggest. But Sabina, last word to you, this is surely what the German government would need 01:00:25.890 --> 01:00:30.850 to do if there's to be a true Titan vendor worthy of the name to articulate that vision, 01:00:30.850 --> 01:00:34.850 clearly, and a strategy for achieving it, not only as a load star for policymaking, but as a 01:00:34.850 --> 01:00:41.330 rallying point for the nation. I agree with that. I wanted to focus on something different. I mean, 01:00:41.330 --> 01:00:48.210 I think it is important to understand that 2024 will be a very decisive year. I talked a lot 01:00:48.210 --> 01:00:55.170 at Leonard Mary conference with Moldovan colleagues. They are under massive permanent 01:00:55.170 --> 01:01:01.170 hybrid attack. If Russia advances and we know that it's not going well in Ukraine at the moment 01:01:01.170 --> 01:01:07.090 for Ukraine for reasons that have a lot to do with our own policies. If Russia advances along the 01:01:07.090 --> 01:01:13.810 Black Sea coast, Moldova will be under immediate threat again. Developments in Georgia are extremely 01:01:13.810 --> 01:01:22.930 worrying. I've been told by one person that he's not an oligarch. He's a monogarch. So the monogarch 01:01:22.930 --> 01:01:32.850 of Georgia is actually gearing up to a post Russian victory scenario of regional development. 01:01:32.850 --> 01:01:37.730 And he saw this as one of the reasons for the for the turn the Georgian government has taken 01:01:37.730 --> 01:01:44.610 over the past months and probably, I mean, it's a trend so several years. So I think 2024 will be 01:01:44.610 --> 01:01:51.410 very,

very decisive also with regard to our own states and societies. It's a super election year. 01:01:51.410 --> 01:01:58.610 So I mean, I'm watching this. I'm concerned. I'm a little less optimistic than you are with the 01:01:58.610 --> 01:02:04.690 prospect with regard to the prospects of success. So I think we really need to get our acts together. 01:02:04.690 --> 01:02:10.210 So, you know, don't despair, but act is the motto of this conference. And I think we should take 01:02:10.210 --> 01:02:15.330 it to heart. Absolutely. That speaks to the urgency that we have in our democratic moment and in our 01:02:15.330 --> 01:02:19.810 strategic moment. Thank you very much once again to our guests today, Benjamin Haddad, Jonathan 01:02:19.810 --> 01:02:25.570 Seviov and Sabina Fisher. Now, as we said earlier in the show, we did hear from Estonian Prime Minister 01:02:25.570 --> 01:02:30.850 Kaya Kallis herself, who in addition to her panel appearances at the Leonard Mary Conference in 01:02:30.850 --> 01:02:36.610 Tallinn, spoke to international media during a briefing at Stenbach House, the Estonian government's 01:02:36.610 --> 01:02:42.690 official seat. So we get to finish up our last regular episode of this season, hearing from one 01:02:42.690 --> 01:02:47.810 of Europe's most impressive leaders, don't we, Ben? We certainly do. And at the time of recording 01:02:47.810 --> 01:02:52.370 this special intro and the segues that we put between our different segments of this Berlin 01:02:52.370 --> 01:02:57.730 Side Out, it looks like Kaya Kallis is actually gaining a lot of support for a really top job 01:02:57.730 --> 01:03:03.570 in Brussels. Her name is very much in the mix for the position of HRVP, or the High Representative 01:03:03.570 --> 01:03:08.130 for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, 01:03:08.130 --> 01:03:13.410 which is widely considered one of the top three jobs. Why is her name in the running? Well, 01:03:13.410 --> 01:03:19.810 there are some sort of quota based reasons. One is the party affiliation that she has, which is the 01:03:19.810 --> 01:03:26.050 Renew Europe or Liberal Party. And with Ursula von der Leyen likely to become Commission President 01:03:26.050 --> 01:03:31.410 again. And the name's in the running for the Council President of Antonio Costa of Portugal, 01:03:31.410 --> 01:03:37.410 from respectively the European People's Party, the centre right, and the Socialist and Democrats, 01:03:37.410 --> 01:03:43.250 the centre left, that leaves the Liberals needing a top job. So Kaya Kallis ticks that box. She also 01:03:43.250 --> 01:03:48.690 ticks the box of being from Central and Eastern Europe, which with von der Leyen, again in poll 01:03:48.690 --> 01:03:54.690 position for the Commission President, coming from Western or Northern Western Europe. And Costa 01:03:54.690 --> 01:03:59.490 coming from Portugal in Southern Europe leaves Central and Eastern Europe needing a top spot 01:03:59.490 --> 01:04:05.410 as well. And so she ticks that box. But let's be very clear, Kaya Kallis is not in the running 01:04:05.410 --> 01:04:11.010 because she ticks boxes. Kaya Kallis is in the running because of how impressive she has been 01:04:11.010 --> 01:04:16.530 as a leader, particularly over the last two years. And now she will have the chance, we hope, to show 01:04:16.530 --> 01:04:21.650 that leadership talent, to show those leadership skills on the top stage. And it would certainly 01:04:21.650 --> 01:04:27.090 be a massive step change from what we've seen from Josette Borel in recent times, if Kallis can 01:04:27.090 --> 01:04:31.410 bring the kind of approach that she brought to being Prime Minister of Estonia into the being 01:04:31.410 --> 01:04:37.250 the position of high representative. And she's certainly aware of the key challenges that we 01:04:37.250 --> 01:04:42.130 face. So let's turn to her now for our first answer in that press conference and hear from her about 01:04:42.130 --> 01:04:48.370 what their strategic priorities are for 2024 and how serious the challenge in Ukraine actually is. 01:04:48.370 --> 01:04:58.210 I think 2024 is really a year of strategic defense. I think what I said yesterday, 01:04:58.210 --> 01:05:06.610 in 2023 we were maybe overly optimistic. I mean, everybody was talking about the 01:05:06.610 --> 01:05:14.130 counter offensive and big disappointments come from big expectations. So I think we 01:05:14.130 --> 01:05:24.050 should avoid a mistake of being overly pessimistic in 2024. Yes, we need to be very honest and open 01:05:24.050 --> 01:05:33.170 about this. The support needs to get to Ukraine, sure, but fast. And we have to make sure that 01:05:33.170 --> 01:05:40.770 we do not create pessimism from pessimism. I mean, that, you know, this is all circling around. 01:05:40.770 --> 01:05:46.210 This would lead to inaction. It's like, okay, there's nothing to do there. You know, it's all 01:05:46.210 --> 01:05:55.090 going down. So we don't have to do anything. But I think this is wrong. We still have to 01:05:55.090 --> 01:06:02.930 believe in Ukraine's victory and also build our strategies around that. All the actions we do will 01:06:02.930 --> 01:06:09.170 follow that suit. So Ben Kallis encouraged us just there to keep believing in Ukraine's victory. 01:06:09.170 --> 01:06:13.970 But we also heard from Estonian Foreign Minister Marga Sakna on our talent side out special with 01:06:13.970 --> 01:06:19.330 Timothy Snyder, Elliot Cohen, and Anna Isabel-Zavier that we can't just believe we have to act. 01:06:19.330 --> 01:06:24.610 But believing in victory first helps you figure out how to act, right? It is the first step. 01:06:24.610 --> 01:06:29.810 Well, it does. For that, you have to understand why we need to win, why it's so absolutely crucial 01:06:29.810 --> 01:06:35.570 that Ukraine and indeed the whole of Europe

wins a common victory, as Robin Wagner told us on our 01:06:35.570 --> 01:06:40.770 Pillars of Victory episode in Ukraine and that Russia is defeated there. So you have to understand 01:06:40.770 --> 01:06:45.490 that. But I'd actually also point to something Elliot Cohen said in that episode, where he 01:06:45.490 --> 01:06:50.610 talked about the psychologist William James and saying that you don't do brave things because 01:06:50.610 --> 01:06:55.570 you have brave feelings, but rather you get the brave feelings when you do brave things. 01:06:55.570 --> 01:07:00.050 And when you commit to winning, that will make winners of us all. And that's the attitude I 01:07:00.050 --> 01:07:04.770 think we actually have to take. So Prime Minister Kallis said something about this too, this 01:07:05.730 --> 01:07:11.890 action that you get from that attitude. So specifically what we as a collective West have 01:07:11.890 --> 01:07:17.010 to commit concretely to get to victory. Our promise is to not save lives. The actual 01:07:17.010 --> 01:07:26.370 weapons in the hands of Ukrainian soldiers do. Actually, air defense does. So that's why we need 01:07:26.370 --> 01:07:36.290 to really deliver. Sometimes I feel that many things are mixed up in the picture. The promise 01:07:36.290 --> 01:07:46.050 is giving to Ukraine, long term promises and actual deliverables. So if we put them all together, 01:07:46.050 --> 01:07:51.650 we can bat ourselves in the back and say that, oh, we have done a lot. But actually, 01:07:51.650 --> 01:08:00.450 when I hear they all go through the NATO's bases in Poland and they actually know what 01:08:00.450 --> 01:08:09.890 Ukraine is getting. And that is not the promises, the slogans, what we hear. So that is a real 01:08:09.890 --> 01:08:17.890 worry regarding this. Of course, our military aid to Ukraine has been over 500 million. And this 01:08:17.890 --> 01:08:26.370 amounts to more than 1.3 percent of our GDP. We have also agreed to allocate long term support, 01:08:26.370 --> 01:08:37.330 0.25 percent of our GDP from 24 to 27 to Ukraine as military aid. And if all countries would do 01:08:37.330 --> 01:08:44.690 the same, then it would actually lead to Ukraine's victory. Ben, as you've said before, we're often 01:08:44.690 --> 01:08:50.050 afraid of our own power in the West. What would happen if we actually did act appropriately to 01:08:50.050 --> 01:08:55.250 bring about our strategic objectives? Now, part of that is because the Russian narrative isn't 01:08:55.250 --> 01:09:01.090 questioned nearly enough in the West. Russia is a country with an economy smaller than Canada's, 01:09:01.090 --> 01:09:05.250 but it occupies a big spot in our collective Western imagination. So we've heard from the 01:09:05.250 --> 01:09:11.170 Prime Minister there about what we need to do, the acts that we need to take to bring about 01:09:11.170 --> 01:09:16.610 our strategic objectives. But Ben, as you've said before, often we're afraid of our own power to do 01:09:16.610 --> 01:09:22.050 that. Now, part of that is because the Russian narrative isn't questioned nearly enough in the 01:09:22.050 --> 01:09:26.690 West. It is a country with an economy that is smaller than Canada's, actually, but it occupies 01:09:26.690 --> 01:09:31.490 a big spot in our collective Western imagination, doesn't it? It does. And this is a really 01:09:31.490 --> 01:09:35.970 interesting point because this is where Russia's approach mirrors that of the populists in our own 01:09:35.970 --> 01:09:41.010 societies and the anti-democratic forces, which comes as no surprise. I mean, Russia has absolutely 01:09:41.010 --> 01:09:45.890 zero soft power. We're not going to see people moving en masse to Russia or suggesting that we 01:09:45.890 --> 01:09:51.250 really adopt the Russian model. Because when implied in practice, what that Russian model means too 01:09:51.250 --> 01:09:57.170 often is no inside toilets, rampant poverty, public drunkenness, poor health outcomes, domestic 01:09:57.170 --> 01:10:01.570 violence, and all sorts of other things that we've actually put largely into the past in our country. 01:10:01.570 --> 01:10:05.890 So it's like a step back in time. And if that's what you mean by traditional values, then well, 01:10:05.890 --> 01:10:09.730 you're welcome to them. But certainly that's not where I would see Europe's future. And I don't 01:10:09.730 --> 01:10:16.290 think anyone sensible actually would. The point here is that Russia pretends to provide a very 01:10:16.290 --> 01:10:21.650 simple solution to all of the West's woes. And for sure, there are things we need to fix in our 01:10:21.650 --> 01:10:25.730 societies. There are things we need to get right. We need to give people that sense of a credible 01:10:25.730 --> 01:10:30.850 sense of a hopeful future that we've talked about many times on the show. But certainly adopting 01:10:30.850 --> 01:10:35.330 the Russian approach is absolutely not the way to go about that. But again, it's about providing a 01:10:35.330 --> 01:10:41.330 very simplistic and simple answer to what are in fact complex problems. So wouldn't it be nice 01:10:41.330 --> 01:10:45.490 if there were such a simple answer? Well, there isn't. And it's actually about doing the hard work 01:10:45.490 --> 01:10:50.370 to understand how we go about both fixing our problems, but also playing on those real strengths, 01:10:50.370 --> 01:10:54.610 which have included the tolerance and diversity that you mentioned in alluding to gay ropa. 01:10:54.610 --> 01:10:59.170 We don't have to convince anyone of the merits of flat whites and lattes, I think. But at the same 01:10:59.170 --> 01:11:03.330 time, there are serious things that we actually need to fix. And one of the people who's been doing 01:11:03.330 --> 01:11:08.530 most thinking about that and how we actually put that in combination with resolute defense 01:11:08.530

--> 01:11:14.450 is Prime Minister Kalas. Now, one journalist asked the Prime Minister about that Russian narrative, 01:11:14.450 --> 01:11:18.930 and you've just provided a very, one of my favorite refutations of it that I think I've 01:11:18.930 --> 01:11:25.570 ever heard. But somehow it still sticks in some people's minds in the West simply because they 01:11:25.570 --> 01:11:31.890 don't actually know very much about how ordinary Russians actually live, which you've also talked 01:11:31.890 --> 01:11:38.370 about just now. There is still this idea that Russia is a bastion of traditional values against the 01:11:38.370 --> 01:11:43.650 gay ropa of a decadent West that we've talked about. So how should we address that narrative? 01:11:43.650 --> 01:11:47.890 Let's hear from the Prime Minister on this. It's a very good book by Timothee Schneider, 01:11:47.890 --> 01:11:53.970 The Road to Unfreedom, that shows that when Russia can't become the West, the West will become Russia, 01:11:53.970 --> 01:12:00.210 and how the narratives of the far right are actually meeting the narratives of Russia regarding 01:12:00.210 --> 01:12:06.050 Europe. This is that Europe is morally corrupt. That means all the gay marriages and all these 01:12:06.050 --> 01:12:12.210 things, not the traditional family. And then Europe is under a migration pressure, and that 01:12:12.210 --> 01:12:19.330 migration pressure is Muslim migration mostly. So now they are actually creating the situation where 01:12:19.330 --> 01:12:25.890 it's not the only narrative, but actually people see the migration pressure is there. They created 01:12:25.890 --> 01:12:34.370 from Syria, bombing Syria, back then Wagner in Africa, so that where do the migrants go? 01:12:34.370 --> 01:12:41.810 They go to Europe. So actually they are creating this and also from Ukraine. They all come to 01:12:41.810 --> 01:12:48.930 Europe. And what our adversaries know is that migration is our vulnerability. 01:12:49.810 --> 01:13:01.650 And therefore these two meet. Now coming to the European elections, then all these parties 01:13:01.650 --> 01:13:11.890 anti-migration, I mean, I think what we have to understand, I would say so, that 01:13:14.290 --> 01:13:19.410 Russia is weaponizing migration. Our adversaries are weaponizing migration. 01:13:19.410 --> 01:13:25.970 But they are also weaponizing human rights because they know that human rights are 01:13:25.970 --> 01:13:33.890 very important to European Union. So I mean, they push the migrants over the border. They 01:13:33.890 --> 01:13:42.690 create the problems for European side because they weaponize this, that it's human rights. 01:13:42.690 --> 01:13:49.650 You have to accept those people. And that is, of course, water to the middle of the far right. 01:13:49.650 --> 01:13:56.930 The far right, at least in Estonia, and I've read from other parts of Europe as well, 01:13:56.930 --> 01:14:06.210 they are actually quite careful regarding Ukraine. So they are saying that, 01:14:08.770 --> 01:14:18.770 of course, we support Ukraine, but we have done enough. So it is not so direct that they are 01:14:18.770 --> 01:14:27.650 against Ukraine or supporting Ukraine. So they don't go very directly, but they do this, 01:14:27.650 --> 01:14:35.810 the narratives regarding Ukrainians in our societies, and we have done enough. 01:14:35.810 --> 01:14:40.850 I mean, now our own people need support. And let's draw the line and have, 01:14:40.850 --> 01:14:49.570 that is gone, that is not our problem. So it is not as direct, but it's definitely going to 01:14:49.570 --> 01:14:57.730 have an effect because the populists are always coming up with simple solutions to very complex 01:14:57.730 --> 01:15:03.330 problems. One example of how Russian narratives can penetrate our society comes up whenever we 01:15:03.330 --> 01:15:09.010 hear arguments that NATO expansion provoked Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Now, Prime Minister 01:15:09.010 --> 01:15:16.210 Kalis was asked about countering this narrative, and she amusingly called it "my favorite topic." 01:15:16.210 --> 01:15:25.330 I have to tell you a story for this. Sorry, but it's also related to a book. So it's a very good 01:15:25.330 --> 01:15:35.810 book, "Marie Seretí, Not One Inch." Where did this idea come that Russia was promised that 01:15:35.810 --> 01:15:43.890 NATO is not enlarging? And it's a very good book, very good historical, I mean, very good work done 01:15:43.890 --> 01:15:50.450 and very well written and everything. And so I am in France. I have my birthday weekend, I get this 01:15:50.450 --> 01:15:59.330 book, I'm reading this book on the beach and there's an American couple just beside me. And 01:15:59.330 --> 01:16:06.450 they ask, is it a good book? I say, oh, it's so good book. And then we go back to Estonia. I am in 01:16:06.450 --> 01:16:12.050 airport or I mean traveling back to Estonia and I'm reaching the conclusion of this book. 01:16:12.050 --> 01:16:19.330 And I was like, how can she come to such a conclusion based on such good work that she has 01:16:19.330 --> 01:16:24.690 done? So basically that we should have offered Russia something. They have legitimate security 01:16:24.690 --> 01:16:32.530 interests or whatever. Why I'm telling this is that then I said that I really, first I thought that, 01:16:32.530 --> 01:16:37.650 oh my god, I recommended this book to the Americans and now they are thinking that we should offer 01:16:37.650 --> 01:16:46.130 something to Russia. But then I said to Munich Security Conference, you know, Christa Fosken, 01:16:46.130 --> 01:16:52.370 I said that can you invite her? I really want to debate her on the conclusion. And he said, fine. 01:16:52.370 --> 01:17:01.570 And we had this debate there regarding this, whether it was promised or not. And whether there 01:17:01.570 --> 01:17:10.930 should be something offered to them. By the way, she also

told that, you know, she's a historian 01:17:10.930 --> 01:17:17.010 working in a university and she gets a call from Jens Stoltenberg's office and they say that, 01:17:17.010 --> 01:17:22.050 you know, Jens Stoltenberg wants to have a dinner with you because Kajagal has recommended your book. 01:17:22.050 --> 01:17:29.250 And he has read the book and he wants to discuss this. It's like, okay, I get the dinner two hours 01:17:29.250 --> 01:17:34.370 with Jens Stoltenberg because you recommended the book. But anyway, so I think there are a lot 01:17:34.370 --> 01:17:39.330 of good arguments. One is that what I tried to, what I say in the global south is that 01:17:39.890 --> 01:17:46.770 every country has the right to choose their defense alliances. I mean, believe me, read this 01:17:46.770 --> 01:17:53.570 book and you can understand they didn't want us in NATO. We worked so hard to get into NATO. So it 01:17:53.570 --> 01:17:59.250 wasn't like NATO wants to expand. No, we wanted to get in because we have a neighbor like this. 01:17:59.250 --> 01:18:08.290 Because we are in NATO, we don't have a war like Ukraine has because we are under NATO's umbrella. 01:18:09.170 --> 01:18:22.450 And it is not about, you know, NATO is not about, it's not threatening Russia. Not the single 01:18:22.450 --> 01:18:29.810 European or NATO country is threatening Russia. I mean, not Latvians, not us. We are not declaring war 01:18:29.810 --> 01:18:38.850 on Russia. No, definitely not. So we are not presenting any threats. So what are they afraid of? 01:18:39.570 --> 01:18:50.450 So, I mean, these are the things and I think what mostly works is that it was our wish. 01:18:50.450 --> 01:18:57.330 We worked so hard. We are able to really confront this narrative, but it keeps on popping up. 01:18:57.330 --> 01:19:01.650 And this is such an important point that Prime Minister Kallas made there, talking about the very 01:19:01.650 --> 01:19:06.370 real struggle that actually Central and Eastern European states had in order to convince the 01:19:06.370 --> 01:19:11.250 existing NATO states at the time that they belonged in that exclusive alliance. Well, 01:19:11.250 --> 01:19:14.770 they have really shown the value of having them in. They have shown they not only belong, 01:19:14.770 --> 01:19:19.970 but can lead the way as Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently said. And frankly, 01:19:19.970 --> 01:19:24.690 they are setting an example for a lot of the rest of the alliance and will be at the heart and 01:19:24.690 --> 01:19:30.370 hopefully at the head of the European pillar that NATO truly needs if it is actually going to not 01:19:30.370 --> 01:19:35.330 only survive but thrive going forward. Now, there is another very important aspect of this, 01:19:35.330 --> 01:19:39.810 which is about self-determination, of course. And this is the difference between a sphere of 01:19:39.810 --> 01:19:45.010 influence as empires like Russia would seek to

have and a sphere of integration where countries 01:19:45.010 --> 01:19:49.570 can collectively determine which alliances they would like to try and be part of. Now, 01:19:49.570 --> 01:19:53.330 of course, they have to convince the others, but they have the right themselves to try and 01:19:53.330 --> 01:19:58.770 understand for themselves which alliances to join. Now, of course, this is a key point that relates 01:19:58.770 --> 01:20:03.730 also to colonialism and histories of empire. And we know that doesn't only pertain in Europe, 01:20:03.730 --> 01:20:08.770 of course, it pertains all around the world. And it's a particularly big question when we talk 01:20:08.770 --> 01:20:13.170 about relations with the global south, which is why I think it would be extremely interesting if 01:20:13.170 --> 01:20:17.890 Prime Minister Kalas were to be appointed as high representative for the common foreign and security 01:20:17.890 --> 01:20:22.770 policy. She would have a point of difference coming from a small country or smaller country. And 01:20:22.770 --> 01:20:27.090 remember, it's the size of the fight in the dog, not the dog in the fight that counts in a lot of 01:20:27.090 --> 01:20:32.210 these things. But coming from a smaller country that was indeed colonized and occupied rather 01:20:32.210 --> 01:20:37.170 than coming from a former imperial nation, she would have a different point from which to launch 01:20:37.170 --> 01:20:42.850 off discussions with the global south. So let's hear what she had to say about that issue. 01:20:42.850 --> 01:20:48.530 I think we have a very good position. And that is that we have never colonized anybody. We don't 01:20:48.530 --> 01:20:59.090 have that as small countries. So we are not suspected of really pushing forward our own 01:20:59.090 --> 01:21:08.210 interests when we talk about these struggles. And I think that is our strength, what we have to 01:21:08.210 --> 01:21:18.930 use, especially with the global south and countries all around the world to explain what is at stake 01:21:18.930 --> 01:21:33.010 here. Yes, you know, Russia is working hard also to convince the countries from other parts of 01:21:33.010 --> 01:21:39.810 the world to see the world how they are seeing this. We have to do the same. 01:21:39.810 --> 01:21:44.770 So actually understanding this as a global struggle, one in which we all have interest 01:21:44.770 --> 01:21:49.090 at stake, or at least certainly those who would wish to live in a democratic and free future, 01:21:49.090 --> 01:21:52.690 wherever they reside, be that in the north, the south, the east or the west, 01:21:52.690 --> 01:21:57.810 that is part of the key challenge that the new HRVP will actually have. And one point that 01:21:57.810 --> 01:22:04.530 really stood out to me, Aaron, when we were in Tallinn, was echoing the words of the historian 01:22:04.530 --> 01:22:09.650 Timothy Snyder in saying that we have to treat these different incidents of democracies under 01:22:09.650 --> 01:22:15.730 attack of authoritarian aggression, not as individual isolated cases, but as part of a 01:22:15.730 --> 01:22:20.210 wider connected phenomenon. Now, of course, that doesn't mean these things are all done 01:22:20.210 --> 01:22:25.650 in coordination or they're all done in through some kind of conspiratorial mechanism. But what 01:22:25.650 --> 01:22:30.450 they have in common is that they put democracy under threat and they put freedom under threat. 01:22:30.450 --> 01:22:35.890 And so we need to present a clear, strong and united front against them. And one of the most 01:22:35.890 --> 01:22:42.850 hot aspects of that front right now, of course, is in Ukraine. Exactly, Ben. And we've made the case 01:22:42.850 --> 01:22:49.810 before here that Russia is already at war with us, not simply at war with Ukraine, but actually 01:22:49.810 --> 01:22:56.610 with all of us. Ukraine is simply the flashpoint right now of that systemic struggle between 01:22:56.610 --> 01:23:03.890 an authoritarian Russia and a democratic West. That's something that our Estonian hosts in Tallinn 01:23:03.890 --> 01:23:10.450 certainly understand, something that the Prime Minister certainly makes a point of continuing 01:23:10.450 --> 01:23:17.010 to stress. Here's what she had to say about this. What is important to understand is that 01:23:17.010 --> 01:23:28.130 there are different tensions building up all across the world. And Azerbaijan, Armenia, for 01:23:28.130 --> 01:23:39.330 example, Middle East, South China Sea. In 1938, I think a mistake was made to treat all these 01:23:39.330 --> 01:23:47.330 kind of Italian invasion in Abyssinia, the German occupation and all these things, 01:23:47.330 --> 01:23:55.890 Japan war, to treat them as isolated events. And I think we shouldn't do that now. So if you are 01:23:55.890 --> 01:24:06.610 not afraid of the war reaching your country, then the overall peace of the world in different parts 01:24:06.610 --> 01:24:15.410 should concern us all. But, yeah, Ukraine in defeat is definitely something that all the 01:24:15.410 --> 01:24:24.610 aggressors would learn from that this pays off. You can just, in 2024 or 22, you can just bluntly go 01:24:24.610 --> 01:24:31.650 and colonize part of another country and nothing happens to you. So you can do it. 01:24:31.650 --> 01:24:35.410 So we are in a systemic competition. The Prime Minister made that point very clearly here. 01:24:35.410 --> 01:24:41.730 But if we're going to win this competition, we need to be able to back it up with the necessary 01:24:41.730 --> 01:24:49.330 resources. Not simply to help Ukraine win, but to step up our own deterrence, to step up our 01:24:49.330 --> 01:24:55.890 own ability to be able to handle the geostrategic challenges of the future, which also are in the 01:24:55.890 --> 01:25:02.050 Indo-Pacific as well. Prime Minister Callis laid out the measures she thinks

Europe in particular 01:25:02.050 --> 01:25:11.330 should consider to get from, as you often say, Ben, from should to did, how we actually build 01:25:11.330 --> 01:25:19.170 that capacity. I also hope that other countries will follow suit because I think in European 01:25:19.170 --> 01:25:27.010 level using the proceeds is already a good thing, first step. But eventually, all countries will 01:25:27.010 --> 01:25:32.050 come to the place where the taxpayers will say that, you know, why should we pay for this? 01:25:32.050 --> 01:25:37.730 We haven't caused the damages in Ukraine. And this is a very, very accurate question. 01:25:37.730 --> 01:25:48.370 So I think we will get there eventually. Then, of course, on our own defense, we have to 01:25:48.370 --> 01:25:56.530 strengthen the European defense and boost our defense industry. The big gap is capital, access 01:25:56.530 --> 01:26:03.570 to capital regarding, you know, boosting defense. Good to see that the trajectory is going higher 01:26:03.570 --> 01:26:12.290 and it reached 360 billion defence spending of countries last year, euros. Then it was 01:26:12.290 --> 01:26:20.530 360 billion euros last year. This is the level not seen since the Cold War. But it's still 01:26:20.530 --> 01:26:30.690 not enough. I mean, only 18 countries are reaching 2 percent this year. And in 23 was 11 percent, 01:26:30.690 --> 01:26:42.210 but still it's not 32 countries of NATO. And of course, closing the existing gaps in our 01:26:42.210 --> 01:26:47.970 security and defence. That also means boosting the defense industry. And there, of course, 01:26:47.970 --> 01:26:56.210 it is, we have proposed the Euro bonds. We are pushing this forward. France is supporting. 01:26:56.210 --> 01:27:02.210 And we have some other countries also on board. We have some countries who are very much against 01:27:02.210 --> 01:27:09.570 this. But, you know, we have done this when we really understand that we are in crisis. I mean, 01:27:09.570 --> 01:27:14.690 in terms of COVID, everybody understood that, you know, we have to act fast. So we raise capital 01:27:14.690 --> 01:27:19.730 together. And I think, you know, this illustrates that not only all countries understand that we 01:27:19.730 --> 01:27:26.050 are in this crisis now, we have to act now. But we are working on that. We also did the defence 01:27:26.050 --> 01:27:35.330 investment fund in order to put the seed money into the defence industry so that to open up the 01:27:36.050 --> 01:27:44.130 capital of private funds as well. I also need to point out the shadow war that is going on 01:27:44.130 --> 01:27:51.330 against our societies. So Russia is really wanting to sow fear in our societies and also 01:27:51.330 --> 01:27:57.810 make us refrain from supporting Ukraine. We see different hybrid types of attacks in different 01:27:57.810 --> 01:28:04.210 parts of the European Union. I think it would be a mistake to treat them in isolation. For

example, 01:28:04.210 --> 01:28:13.650 one intelligence office, they were telling that we are saying to another member state that, you 01:28:13.650 --> 01:28:23.090 know, we see that Russians, they have plans to attack your warehouse. And then when there is a 01:28:23.090 --> 01:28:28.850 fire in the warehouse, then the other country says that, oh, we are going to invest the fire and we 01:28:28.850 --> 01:28:35.410 don't know it's Russians. Although the intelligence told them two weeks before that the Russians want 01:28:35.410 --> 01:28:45.170 to attack this warehouse. So the point being that I feel that there is this innate understanding 01:28:45.170 --> 01:28:50.930 or hope that it's not Russians. I think if we are treating these in isolation, then we don't 01:28:50.930 --> 01:28:58.050 understand how serious the situation really is. And Aaron, I'm sure you were as glad as I to see 01:28:58.050 --> 01:29:03.490 that in fact, since Prime Minister Kala spoke, the number of countries meeting that 2% target has 01:29:03.490 --> 01:29:07.730 in fact risen. The NATO figures that have been announced ahead of the Washington summit show 01:29:07.730 --> 01:29:12.690 that now 20 of the Alliance members are meeting that target. But don't forget that target is a 01:29:12.690 --> 01:29:18.450 flaw, not a ceiling. And it also depends what you get for your money there that will determine the 01:29:18.450 --> 01:29:23.170 capabilities which really actually are what we need to be focusing on. 2% is good political 01:29:23.170 --> 01:29:30.130 shorthand, 2.5% would be better. And I think we can expect to see an increase in that flaw at some 01:29:30.130 --> 01:29:34.210 point in the next couple of years, perhaps even already from the Washington summit, let's see. 01:29:34.210 --> 01:29:40.610 But it depends on those capabilities that we need. And that's where the EU has to get its act together 01:29:40.610 --> 01:29:46.770 and work together with NATO in order to help boost the defense industrial base in Europe and to make 01:29:46.770 --> 01:29:51.650 sure that we're procuring the strategic enablers, the strategic strike capability, the military 01:29:51.650 --> 01:29:57.090 mobility assets that we need in order to actually be able to bear the bulk of conventional deterrence 01:29:57.090 --> 01:30:03.410 responsibility in Europe ourselves. Now, that's something that it wouldn't matter whether Donald 01:30:03.410 --> 01:30:07.490 Trump were elected again, were elected again, or Joe Biden gets a second term. It's something that 01:30:07.490 --> 01:30:12.210 would be welcomed across the board in Washington. And frankly, I think it's the only thing that 01:30:12.210 --> 01:30:17.730 will actually really keep NATO together in the long term is if we see that real burden shifting 01:30:17.730 --> 01:30:25.090 the creation of a true European pillar of NATO. And unsurprisingly, Kaya Kalas was also rather 01:30:25.090 --> 01:30:30.610 clear about

that. We are not voting in American elections. So we have to work with every leader 01:30:30.610 --> 01:30:38.130 that the Americans are choosing for themselves. Last time when Trump was president, then all the 01:30:38.130 --> 01:30:45.250 allies actually invested more in defense. And that was a good thing on the European level. But I think 01:30:46.130 --> 01:30:55.410 still, I mean, we shouldn't be worrying or worrying about, you know, leaders of different 01:30:55.410 --> 01:31:04.050 countries, but thinking what we can do ourselves as Europe, you know, in spite of who is the 01:31:04.050 --> 01:31:08.930 president of the United States. And that means that we have to invest more in our defense. 01:31:08.930 --> 01:31:15.250 Everybody, all the allies who have also had the defense investment pledge, and we have to boost 01:31:15.250 --> 01:31:20.610 our defense industry. We have to make sure that all these things are interoperable, 01:31:20.610 --> 01:31:27.170 that we do the exercises together, and all these things that we are trying to do here, 01:31:27.170 --> 01:31:38.770 that we would actually be able to defend NATO, I mean, here, if the threat is here. 01:31:38.770 --> 01:31:43.650 And so talking about then the possibility of a Donald Trump victory, 01:31:43.650 --> 01:31:48.370 or indeed a Joe Biden victory, brings us to thinking about how we need to actually fix 01:31:48.370 --> 01:31:53.890 our own roof in order to make sure that we have the democracies that are worth defending, 01:31:53.890 --> 01:31:59.010 that live up to their promise at home to our citizens, that enough of our people are actually 01:31:59.010 --> 01:32:04.930 satisfied with our system to buy into it, and to therefore create the truly resilient societies 01:32:04.930 --> 01:32:09.250 that we will need to win this systemic competition. And this is something that was very much understood 01:32:09.250 --> 01:32:15.090 during the Cold War. It was something that leaders around Europe and the US, even Richard Nixon, 01:32:15.090 --> 01:32:20.690 understood this interestingly, addressing a group of NATO leaders in 1973, he talked about the 01:32:20.690 --> 01:32:25.730 welfare state and the importance of the welfare state, and social housing provision, and so on. 01:32:25.730 --> 01:32:30.370 Because what Nixon and also every other leader, I think, in that NATO grouping realized, 01:32:30.370 --> 01:32:35.170 was that our systemic competition, our war, is on two fronts. One is international, 01:32:35.170 --> 01:32:41.170 and for that we need the diplomatic, military, and security means as well as the right attitude 01:32:41.170 --> 01:32:46.530 in order to win it. But we have to win it at home as well. And we have to head off the threats to 01:32:46.530 --> 01:32:52.050 our democracy at home. And that means really giving our people that credible sense of a better future. 01:32:52.050 --> 01:32:57.010 It means increasing political participation, and perhaps a different political economic model too. 01:32:57.010 --> 01:33:01.330 And that's all things that we are going to be talking about on the small little PS 01:33:02.130 --> 01:33:06.370 to season two of Berlin Side Out that we've got planned for next week, isn't it, Aaron? 01:33:06.370 --> 01:33:13.570 Absolutely. I'm looking forward to it. And we will also have much more details on what's next for 01:33:13.570 --> 01:33:23.810 Berlin Side Out, as well as for us and our work on how we get to that strategic capacity building, 01:33:23.810 --> 01:33:30.770 how we actually achieve those objectives necessary to be able to secure our societies, 01:33:30.770 --> 01:33:36.050 but also ensure that, as we've often said on this podcast before, our societies remain worth 01:33:36.050 --> 01:33:45.490 defending, that they are prosperous societies, that they are open societies, that we also win 01:33:45.490 --> 01:33:49.890 on that second front that you've been talking about then, not simply the military, but also the 01:33:49.890 --> 01:33:55.410 societal. So that's all for this special bonus edition of Berlin Side Out, partly recorded in 01:33:55.410 --> 01:34:00.770 Tallinn. Thanks very much indeed to all of our guests who were joining us at the Leonard Mary 01:34:00.770 --> 01:34:05.490 conference, which was a terrific conference. And congratulations to Helga Kalman, the organizing 01:34:05.490 --> 01:34:10.930 team from ICDS there in Tallinn, who made it such an intellectually stimulating as well as a very 01:34:10.930 --> 01:34:16.210 enjoyable experience for us all. Thank you very much indeed to Estonian Prime Minister Kaya Kallas 01:34:16.210 --> 01:34:19.970 for her time when she was speaking with the international media, including us at Berlin 01:34:19.970 --> 01:34:24.770 Side Out. Thank you to our project assistant Julian Stofler, our technical producer, Hendrik 01:34:24.770 --> 01:34:30.210 Werner and the DGAP team who made Berlin Side Out season two possible. And stay tuned for some 01:34:30.210 --> 01:34:35.650 exciting news about our third season, as well as details about the Democratic Strategy Initiative, 01:34:35.650 --> 01:34:40.370 which will look at how we get from reactive site and vendor to proactive strategy that marshals 01:34:40.370 --> 01:34:45.250 our resources to win the systemic competition. You can find links in our show notes, links to our 01:34:45.250 --> 01:35:02.530 guests and to some readings, but for now though, I'll be the same and tschüss!