TRANSCRIPT 🔗
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The information and opinions presented in this Arc Energy Ideas podcast are provided for informational purposes only and are subject to the disclaimer link in the show notes.
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This is the Ark Energy Ideas Podcast with Peter Turzakian and Jackie Forrest, exploring trends that influence the energy business.
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Welcome to the Ark Energy Ideas Podcast.
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I'm Jackie Forrest.
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And I'm Peter Tertzakian.
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Welcome back.
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It is recording time.
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Thursday, April the 30th in the morning, and looking at the oil prices.
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They're certainly bouncing around.
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I mean, there's generally strength as this Street of Hormuz saga drags on yet another week.
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We're certainly over$100 a barrel, both for Brent and for WTI.
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I mean, solidly over.
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The difference between spot barrels you buy in the physical markets versus the front month is still distorted on the other side of the world.
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Sure, they're paying north of$150.
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More flight cancellations in Europe, so this is not a situation that's getting any better.
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We'll talk about this and a lot more with our special guest here coming up in a minute.
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But before we do that, Jackie, you want to talk about the prime minister's economic update first?
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Yeah.
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So April 28th, we had the Canada economic update.
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There were two items I thought that were worth mentioning.
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Yeah.
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Uh first of all, the 2025-27, so this fiscal year deficit, will be 11 billion lower than expected.
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And one of the reasons for that is the higher oil price, which has resulted in more revenue to the government.
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And so it's still a huge number, by the way.
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It's 11 billion smaller, but it's still a$67 billion deficit.
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So still a huge, huge number.
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The other thing I wanted to mention is there wasn't much for new policy, but there was something interesting there.
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The investment tax credit for carbon capture storage now applies to enhanced oil recovery.
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And that was, you know, an issue a lot of people saw as kind of unfair.
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You know, like you're sequestering CO2 when you're doing enhanced oil recovery.
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And the Americans were giving a subsidy for that.
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So now there is a tax credit.
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It's half of the size as if you were doing the pure CCS without the enhanced oil recovery.
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But um I think that's some good news.
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That's that's some good news.
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Well, I'm not surprised the deficit is lower.
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Certainly on our real-time indicators here at our studio, we are now looking at$46 billion in royalties and taxes for this year, which will be an all-time high.
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And a large part of that goes to royalties, but the taxes are definitely much higher.
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Not surprising, given the higher oil prices lead to higher margins.
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Okay.
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Did you predict any of that stuff from the prime minister in the polymarkets?
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No, no, but I did uh have a look at polyclock.
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Did you bet on anything in the polymarkets?
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No, because you got to get like cryptocurrency first.
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And then I tried to go down that whole path and it just, you know, I got distracted.
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But I have to say, I do look at it once in a while and I find it interesting.
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The the number of questions around the Middle East and the oil market situation have just exploded.
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But some of them are kind of insightful as well.
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So I thought I'd highlight Trump announces U.S.
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blockade of Hormuz lifted by May 31st, 43% chance, according to the people that are betting on uh poly market.
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So, you know, here we are at the end of April.
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So this could go on another month.
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And certainly from the news coming out of the US, there is certainly a growing expectation that this strait closure could be extended.
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I also found another funny one.
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Trump will rename the strait to the Strait of Trump by May 31st.
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What's the what's what's the percentage on that one?
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Uh 4%.
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4%.
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Okay.
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I think it's more likely it's going to be the Trump Iran strait.
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I don't know.
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And there's lots of other funny ones.
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Like there is even like how many ships will transit the strait this week is a bet.
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Anyway, there's a bet for everything regime change, not regime change.
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It's just crazy.
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And did you there was, I think it was in the
Load full transcript
Wall Street Journal yesterday an article about how most people who bet on the polymarkets lose.
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In other words, there's only a handful of people who are actually using a lot of bots and things that are actually sweeping the money off the table in those polymarkets.
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So it is really betting for sure.
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It is betting.
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Speaking of bots and AI, some interesting news in the last week or so and some good podcasts that certainly I listen to as I immerse myself in AI even more.
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And that is something we talked about over a year ago on the podcast.
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Remember, we were talking about how something has to give, because this tremendous growth in data centers and power demand is just not sustainable.
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And also, we were talking about how crazy it is that you can make these prompts and it gives back these answers and it's just getting better and better.
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But that behind the scenes, the power consumption is huge.
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And it's all for 20 bucks a month.
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And we were amusing that that's completely unsustainable.
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It's not any longer like a simple Google query like we were used to.
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This is now turning from a few seconds of computations to now minutes.
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Well, especially as you get these agents going that can be running.
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It's just like an exponential usage of this compute power.
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And the compute power is in short supply, as is the energy behind it.
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And hello, the realization sets in that somebody has to pay for all this stuff.
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And so increasingly there's tokenization.
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It's probably even going to come to ChatGPT and OpenAI, where you're going to have to pay per use, which is something that we talked about over a year ago.
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And in some instances, some people are conjecturing that uh all these agents working together may actually cost as much as hiring a human.
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So we shall see how this story plays out.
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But there's no question at a time when the cost of energy is going through the roof and the supply of computing power is insufficient to run all these agents, that somebody's gonna have to pay for all those crazy prompts that we put into these machines.
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Yeah, and people are just kind of running stuff that, like, I don't know, do you do this?
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And I don't, I'm not even very advanced, but you know, do things and I'm like, ah, barely look at it, right?
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So if I had to pay, I would be more
selective about what I do.
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You use the deep think mode by accident to ask what the weather is in Calgary, and the thing grinds away.
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The thing grinds away for two minutes.
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Anyway, let's talk about the energy situation because it's getting a lot more serious.
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And I want to invite to the podcast Rory Johnson, founder of Commodity Context, someone whom I've known for quite a while.
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Rory's got a substack, which we will post on the site and a podcast as well.
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So we're delighted to have you straight from the center of the universe.
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Toronto, welcome, Rory Johnson.
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Well, you guys are in Calgary, the center of my general universe.
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So thank you so much for joining for having me on the podcast, Peter and Jackie, uh longtime listener, first time caller.
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So big honor.
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Great.
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And you know, I started listening to your oil ground up podcast.
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We'll put a link to that in the show notes, but I recommend people to check that out as well.
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Thank you.
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So your phone has been just ringing off the hook, I would say.
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I just see you everywhere.
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How has it been since uh the end of February for you?
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You know, I've been saying that I thought that the busiest I could get was January of this year after the Trump administration kidnapped Nicolas Maduro, and there was all this interest in Venezuela and oil industry, and there was this Canada angle.
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I thought that was about as busy as I could get.
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And the joke this year is like, absolutely not.
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Now Iran is far, far busier.
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And I think the ongoing joke is that Trump doesn't believe in weekends.
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Like, we haven't had a weekend really since the year started.
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Every weekend we've had major news breaking.
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It's just been unyielding.
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Uh so I think myself and I would argue the broader oil market at this stage is just acutely exhausted by what's been going on.
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Yeah, you know, you talked about a substack.
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We are subscribers to it, and it's been really valuable.
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So you've been doing some great work.
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So thanks for helping to keep us informed over the last while.
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Let's just pick it up with the big news where the UAE United Arab Emirates dropped out of OPEC.
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What's your take on that?
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Yeah, I saw that news as I was about to get in the shower in the morning, and I'm like, wow, okay, so that that's what's happening for today now.
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I had other plans.
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I had other plans for my Tuesday, and again, the market just never stops.
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So I think it's important to kind of split it into near and longer term consequences.
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The near-term consequence is basically nothing.
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I think, you know, people are like, oh, is this going to justify oil price selling off because the UA is going to produce more?
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No, because the vast majority of the UA's production is still on the bad side of the Strait of Hormuz.
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It has this offset pipeline to Fujera, but that's already been maxed out.
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So the current thing restraining Emrati production is not OPEC quotas, but rather the Iranian kind of closure of the strait.
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That said, in the longer term, this almost guarantees more Emrati production than we otherwise would have expected.
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And I think importantly for OPEC, I would argue this is the largest schism or kind of crack in the producer group since its founding.
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We've had large members go to war with each other multiple times, and we've never had such large members leave the alliance, the producer group, the organization.
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And this is not just any member.
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This is not the same as, you know, when Angola left in 2024 or even Qatar left in 2019.
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The UAE arguably was the second most important member of OPEC broadly.
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Yeah, let's put some numbers to it.
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I mean, I think they're producing just a little over three million barrels a day.
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They have spare capacity up to five now because they've built more infrastructure.
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They've been drilling, but they've been choked back because they've been part of OPEC.
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And so now that they're out, notwithstanding they can't get their oil through the Straits of Hormuz yet, they'll probably bypass it with a pipeline here in the future, almost guaranteed.
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Yeah.
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So this is not really today's story, other than, as you point out, the major fractures.
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And it's even bigger than just an OPEC story.
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It's sort of the rivalry or the contentiousness in the Middle Eastern politics between the Saudis and the UAE, the different factions.
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But it
is a longer-term story.
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Absolutely.
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And I think to your point, you hit on the nail there that the primary reason that the UE wanted out was that it has invested in upstream production capacity expansion well ahead of any other member of OPEC.
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It's expanded production capacity by over a million barrels a day since 2019, outstripping any of the other major OPEC members.
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And the ADNOC, the national oil company, puts its estimate at 5 million barrels a day by 2027.
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I think the IEA puts it around 4.3 million barrels a day right now, but still notably higher than where we are.
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I think the other important thing here is that the kind of least well-kept secret in the oil market is that the UAE has been kind of a thorn in the side of OPEC policy for a while now.
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It's been chronically cheating its production quota by between 300 and 500,000 barrels a day, pretty well since 2021, 2022.
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So it's always kind of had one foot half out the door.
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And it was very clear that OPEC leadership and Saudi Arabia was trying to placate the Imratis to keep them in the tent.
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But I think at this stage it's kind of failed, I think clearly.
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And to the kind of positive side of this, I think the Imratis were right that if this happened, if they announced this outside of the war, this would have been all I would be doing for the next weeks or months, uh, was talking about the UAE.
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And now this is going to kind of get swept under the kind of Iran and uh and Hormuz closure storyline.
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So I think they can bury this to a certain degree, but no doubt, I think it's pretty savage, I think, to the to the sense that, like, you know, even the prior couple days, OPEC was talking about this unified front opposing this kind of collective enemy in Iran and the closure of the strait and potential for it being told or whatever.
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And then they're like, ah, actually, we're gone.
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So yeah, I would say it's uh the politics are less than ideal for the producer group, but I think this is also far from the end.
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And many, many premature obituaries have been written by OPEC over the years.
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Right.
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Well, and you know, it was funny when you heard all the different views, there was everything from no big deal to this could be the biggest price war.
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So uh I think there's a lot of uh dispersion in terms of analysts' views on what this really means.
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Yeah.
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Have you been to the OPEC building?
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One of my career highlights was just before I left Scotiabank in 2019, I got to present the Secretariat on Canadian oil production outlooks.
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And that was very, very cool.
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I have sadly not been invited back since.
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I I have become a little more critical of OPEC's policies in the end-term years.
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Yeah, I've been there.
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I mean, it's on sort of a nondescript street with a bunch of luxury cars parked in front.
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And it'd be interesting to know what they're talking about today, because in some ways, the supply is being controlled in some undesirable ways.
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So let's talk about that.
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How much supply is now gone, given the choke point has been choked?
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Yeah.
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So let's just quickly kind of do our top-level barrel counting math of what we've lost from Hormuz today.
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So the headline number, I think everyone's heard at this stage, if you're even peripherally following the oil market, is roughly 20 million barrels a day of oil flowed through the Strait of Hormuz prior to the war and the closure.
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15 million barrels a day of that was crude, and 5 million barrels a day was products, roughly split between middle distillates like diesel and jet fuel heading to East and West Africa and into Europe.
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And then another chunk of roughly 2.5 million barrels of natural gas liquids and condensates that were largely going towards Asia for petrochemical feed.
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So that's kind of our total initial hit to exports and supply was 20 million barrels a day.
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There have been offsets, very importantly, most notably the Saudi East-West pipeline, which transits from the Gulf side of Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea.
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That pipeline has a rough capacity of 7 million barrels a day total, but there was already about two to two and a half million barrels flowing on the line prior to the war.
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So your switching capacity is more like four, four and a half, five.
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You also have a bit of switching capacity on a similar pipeline that routes around or moose to the Emradi port of Fujera on the Gulf of Oman side of things.
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And then you also have, I mean, up until very recently, you had uh Iran continuing to ship one and a half to two million barrels a day of crude and products through the strait.
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So, all in all, factoring for all these physical rerouting offsets, we still have about 13 million barrels a day of Gulf production across the six non-Iranian Gulf uh states that has been forcibly shut in
for lack of any available egress.
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And I think any anyone in Western Canada will be very familiar with when you do not have egress, you know, you can't just spill it onto the ground, you need to shut in these wells.
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So they're experiencing effectively that same thing, forced curtailment, like Western Canada saw in 18 and 19, and just to a completely different scale.
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Yeah.
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So 13 million barrels a day.
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And again, I think that took hold within the second week of the war.
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Those shut ins were basically maxed out.
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And so to date, we have roughly 600 million barrels of oil that was supposed to be produced this year that now has not been produced, and factoring for the lagged restarts of these projects, which I'm basically modeling on a three-month basis where you have a front heavy, like 70% recovery, then 20 then 10.
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That recovery path, if we assume that the restarts started May 1st, which was my kind of optimistic base case model.
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And now I realize that's tomorrow and that's not happening.
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But even in the kind of optimistic scenario that we got a restart starting on May 1st, the total loss barrels will be about a billion barrels of oil that we expected to have this year, that now is not going to be there and is going to need to be taken from the collective pool of global stocks.
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So I have to give you credit because you came up with that billion barrel number like a month ago.
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And now in the last week or so, we got all these other analysts kind of using the same number, but it was your number first.
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And uh it is optimistic because you also assume not only that things get going May 1st, but that it's like we get right back to full production, which I think there's some questions around that as well.
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For sure.
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I look at it like, you know, you have a bathtub that was full of water where we've drained the bathtub.
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And when the strait does open, and I I do think it will open at some point, that water, when you open up the taps, it's just gonna go right out the drain.
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We don't have the ability to build that uh storage back up.
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It's gonna take a very long time to do that.
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So, you know, the markets are not taking this as seriously, a billion barrels lost.
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And you recently wrote in your Substack that the situation is shockingly sanguine.
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And explain why you think that.
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Yeah, it's a good question.
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I would say over the past month, my life has been dominated by why aren't oil prices higher?
00:15:58.480 --> 00:16:26.159
Because I think I would have expected oil prices to at least initially overreact to kind of this shock, given the kind of, you know, scale of the shock that we're facing, the largest supply shock in the history of the oil market, and the kind of narrative and symbolic weight of Hormuz, given that not only is it a huge shock, but it, you know, to Peter's earlier point, it basically short circuits OPEC's normal capacity to fill in to supply losses with spare capacity, because all the spare capacity is on the wrong side of Hormuz.
00:16:26.399 --> 00:16:30.799
So yeah, I would say that my expectation was that we would have grinded higher faster.
00:16:31.039 --> 00:16:45.360
And the reasons that I think that we've fallen back from our, you know, when dated Brent hit its highest level in history on nominal dollar barrel level on April 7th, the day the ceasefire was fined, of over$144 a barrel, we've fallen back from there.
00:16:45.440 --> 00:16:49.360
And I think there are a couple good and not so good reasons as to why that is.
00:16:49.440 --> 00:16:55.840
And I kind of think it's important to kind of take the market for what it is and try and explain what's going on rather than just saying the market's wrong.
00:16:56.000 --> 00:17:11.680
So I think the most fundamental reason, I think the structural reason that we can explain away to a degree, the lack of immediate price reaction is that while we often talk about financial markets as forward-looking at their core, physical commodity markets are not as good at being forward-looking.
00:17:11.839 --> 00:17:32.319
I think you look at, you know, former Goldman Sachs commodity research head who basically said that uh these commodities are not anticipatory assets, that the core purpose of prices and the shape of the Fuchsia's curve, what we kind of talk about as term structure or time spreads, is basically to facilitate the clearance of the physical spot market.
00:17:32.559 --> 00:17:39.759
So when you are oversupplied, the spot prices get discounted relative to later dated cargos and that pays for storage.
00:17:39.920 --> 00:17:54.160
And in undersupplied markets, like we find ourselves today, that is basically just manifesting in backwardation or a premium on spot purchases, effectively creates an opportunity cost for holders of inventory, forces those barrels in the market to fill the hole.
00:17:54.319 --> 00:17:57.680
I think basically the I kind of ran it through my fair value model.
00:17:57.759 --> 00:18:10.240
And given the fact that we started the year oversupplied with surplus and kind of rising stocks, we did have a little bit of time, a little bit of buffer to draw those down before the model started pointing to really, really spiky prices.
00:18:10.400 --> 00:18:16.960
Now, if you assume a 4 million barrel a day net draw, now again, that's a fraction
of the 13 that we've lost the market.
00:18:17.119 --> 00:18:29.759
But if you factor for a 4 million barrel net draw on OECD commercial stocks and the important visible kind of residual stocks in the market, that kind of makes sense that we're kind of 100, 110 Brent in April.
00:18:29.839 --> 00:18:39.839
But if that same model holds and kind of assumes the same decline in stocks right through the end of June, that puts us near$200 a barrel on fair value.
00:18:40.000 --> 00:18:42.480
Now, we could be slightly lower than that on optimism.
00:18:42.559 --> 00:18:46.319
We could be slightly higher than that on precautionary demand and panic.
00:18:46.480 --> 00:18:52.960
But I do think that the inexorable logic of lower stocks drives higher prices is going to eventually win out here.
00:18:53.279 --> 00:18:55.599
Yeah, but isn't there another way of looking at this?
00:18:55.759 --> 00:18:58.319
Okay, first of all, there was a big surplus.
00:18:58.480 --> 00:19:02.400
I think it was like a billion barrels or which up before we went into this.
00:19:02.480 --> 00:19:04.880
And everybody was super bearish at the beginning of the year.
00:19:04.960 --> 00:19:07.440
And now the tables have proverbially turned.
00:19:07.519 --> 00:19:11.680
But actually, the price of oil is much higher on the other side of the world.
00:19:11.839 --> 00:19:12.000
Yep.
00:19:12.240 --> 00:19:15.759
I mean, WTI is in Texas, Brent is in the North Sea.
00:19:15.839 --> 00:19:19.279
We'll call it, you know, the North and Western Hemisphere.
00:19:19.519 --> 00:19:27.759
But in the South and Eastern Hemispheres, I mean, they're paying north of$150 a barrel because they need it.
00:19:28.160 --> 00:19:37.440
You take into account the transportation times from the west northwest to the southeast, which is like 45 plus days.
00:19:37.759 --> 00:19:41.519
I mean, people are mopping up whatever barrels they can find in Southeast.
00:19:41.839 --> 00:19:46.400
And we don't hear about it much here because we're in our own little bubble, right?
00:19:46.559 --> 00:19:50.480
Even most of the traders here are in their own little bubble, I would argue.
00:19:50.799 --> 00:19:55.920
But the wave of higher prices is starting to creep into the West.
00:19:56.640 --> 00:20:10.480
And when the inventories really start to diminish, and when the strategic petroleum reserves, which we'll talk about, start to diminish, then the whole world is in more trouble if this thing doesn't get cleared up pretty soon.
00:20:10.880 --> 00:20:18.400
Yeah, you know, Brent and WTI, uh, Europe and North America are about as far from the epicenter of the shock as possible.
00:20:18.720 --> 00:20:20.799
So there is a kind of a natural lag here.
00:20:20.880 --> 00:20:31.599
And I think that part of the challenge is that the volatility of the news flow in this war has operated at like the speed of light or the speed of tweet, uh, I guess speed of true social post.
00:20:31.839 --> 00:20:35.119
Whereas these barrels take months to clear these arbitrages.
00:20:35.200 --> 00:20:38.240
And the pain that we're feeling that Asian importers are feeling.
00:20:38.400 --> 00:20:54.720
I mean, the the highest confirmed barrel of oil purchase that I've seen, I think it was the head of one of the big Asian banks talking about how there was a barrel delivered to Sri Lanka that factoring for all of the import and everything, it was like$284 a barrel landed.
00:20:54.880 --> 00:20:55.599
See, there you go.
00:20:55.839 --> 00:20:57.519
These are these are crazy, crazy high prices.
00:20:57.599 --> 00:20:59.519
And you have physical spot that are even higher.
00:20:59.680 --> 00:21:06.960
I think that for the broader market, despite how we kind of assume that the market can see a lot of stuff, I would say it's generally blind vet.
00:21:07.119 --> 00:21:10.559
And it's watching WTI and Brent as the kind of benchmarks of this.
00:21:10.720 --> 00:21:19.440
I think the other thing that's important here is the fact that the other kind of two factors I had mentioned with this that kind of help explain the more sanguine price.
00:21:19.680 --> 00:21:23.599
One, I think the ceasefire did legitimately take off a little bit of the tail risk.
00:21:23.680 --> 00:21:29.839
I think, again, obviously Hormuz and the crisis is deeply unsustainable and the largest in history, but it could have gotten worse.
00:21:30.000 --> 00:21:39.680
There was always the potential that we did see US troop, you know, boots on the ground in Carg Island or the Iranian mainland, and then you start firing missiles at Abcaque or other Saudi upstream facilities.
00:21:39.759 --> 00:21:40.960
Like it could have gotten worse.
00:21:41.119 --> 00:21:47.039
And I think at this point, it seems that the Trump administration is not interested in re ramping that kinetic activity.
00:21:47.200 --> 00:21:49.119
I think that does shave a little bit of that tail risk off.
00:21:49.279 --> 00:21:58.160
I think the final element here is that Trump has kind of been had an unprecedented degree of verbal intervention in this market, which I definitely hadn't expected.
00:21:58.240 --> 00:21:59.759
We had seven, eight.
00:22:00.160 --> 00:22:14.480
Moments where we've had, you know, a true social post or comments to press in the White House that prompted a$10 to$20 a barrel intraday sell-off, it explodes volatility and makes it more expensive for financial participants to hold those future contracts in the first place.
00:22:14.720 --> 00:22:23.920
But also, I think if you're if I was a future trader, and I thank goodness I'm not, if I was holding Brent at 110 or 115, sure, fundamentals are rock solid right now.
00:22:24.240 --> 00:22:32.240
But if I can get blown out to the downside of 15 bucks in the span of 15 minutes, that's going to make me pretty nervous to hold those positions with most conviction.
00:22:32.319 --> 00:22:37.440
I do think that the trader behavior is kind of further kind of, you know, driving
this a little bit.
00:22:37.759 --> 00:22:38.000
Right.
00:22:38.160 --> 00:22:48.400
And back to your$200, your view of that is because when the inventories draw down and there is no more oil in a lot of countries, we need demand destruction, right?
00:22:48.559 --> 00:22:51.839
And that's fundamentally what's driving the need for higher prices.
00:22:52.000 --> 00:22:58.160
Because I think the IEA is saying in the month of April, maybe 2 million barrels a day of demand destruction.
00:22:58.319 --> 00:23:01.279
Well, that's nothing close to the 13 million barrels a day lost.
00:23:01.359 --> 00:23:02.400
So we need that.
00:23:02.559 --> 00:23:05.519
But at the same time, I mean, yeah, like this is very unusual.
00:23:05.680 --> 00:23:09.200
We've had numerous episodes of$10 changes just like that.
00:23:09.680 --> 00:23:14.079
I mean, I think it's because this view that, you know, this could just all change very quickly.
00:23:14.240 --> 00:23:17.359
And that's sort of been the thinking that is out there.
00:23:17.519 --> 00:23:26.240
And maybe that's starting to change with the idea that the White House, or at least reports that the White House is expecting this closure could be for a while.
00:23:26.400 --> 00:23:27.839
So maybe that changes.
00:23:28.160 --> 00:23:28.880
Yeah, I would agree.
00:23:28.960 --> 00:23:39.440
I think the New York Times reported that the White, you know, advised in the White House were pushing for that Iran would buckle on its demands after two more months of blockade, which I saw that and like my jaw dropped.
00:23:39.599 --> 00:23:44.319
Like, yes, I think we were all, we're all gonna be buckling with two more additional months of this.
00:23:44.480 --> 00:23:56.160
So yeah, I but I think it's clear that both sides view themselves as winning this war currently, which makes any compromise, necessary compromise at this stage, very, very difficult to achieve.
00:23:56.319 --> 00:24:08.559
So, my base case is that eventually this conflict will end when the White House makes some kind of unpalatable concession to the Iranians in order to reopen the strait.
00:24:08.880 --> 00:24:14.799
But in order to do that, I think you're gonna need more external pressure on the White House than the market is currently providing.
00:24:15.119 --> 00:24:27.519
And going back to that kind of paradox of this kind of, you know, you get a$15 a barrel sell-off on an assumption that Trump is about to end the war, and then in doing so, reduces the pressure on him to end the war.
00:24:27.599 --> 00:24:32.079
And he kind of is most sanguine of all, thinks this is kind of entirely fine.
00:24:32.319 --> 00:24:33.839
So I do think that's part of it.
00:24:33.920 --> 00:24:46.319
And I think we saw the president get very obsessed with these maps of tankers heading to the US Gulf Coast, kind of this sign and kind of uh, you know, heuristic for US energy dominance in this crisis.
00:24:46.400 --> 00:24:53.200
And there's no doubt that North America is the most energy secure region on the planet remaining in this crisis.
00:24:53.359 --> 00:25:06.640
But the only reason those tankers are going to the United States is to pick up oil that other people in the world are willing to pay a higher price for than our Americans right now, which is why we got a 24 million barrel inventory draw in the IEA data last, you know, yesterday.
00:25:06.720 --> 00:25:07.200
It was crazy.
00:25:07.680 --> 00:25:10.640
The pre-conflict inventories were above the five-year average.
00:25:10.799 --> 00:25:28.240
So, but they're not gonna last very long because the tankers that were at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz immediately after the war, the captain probably got a satellite phone call from the ship owner and said, Okay, uh, this doesn't look like it's gonna end anytime soon, head to the United States.
00:25:28.559 --> 00:25:33.759
Takes 45 days to go from the Gulf to the Gulf of Mexico.
00:25:34.079 --> 00:25:36.240
So I'm not gonna say that because it's the Gulf of America.
00:25:36.480 --> 00:25:36.799
No.
00:25:37.279 --> 00:25:42.240
Go from the Strait of Trump to the Gulf of America.
00:25:44.160 --> 00:25:46.000
Okay, whatever we're calling these things.
00:25:46.240 --> 00:25:46.480
All right.
00:25:46.720 --> 00:25:49.200
45 days to go from Gulf to Gulf.
00:25:49.519 --> 00:25:56.640
And so, yeah, I mean, there's this, it's probably gonna accelerate these drawdowns, and then that's really when the prices are gonna start to go up.
00:25:56.960 --> 00:25:58.400
But I think it's worth just visiting.
00:25:58.559 --> 00:26:03.920
If this goes into late May and even June, the situation I think becomes quite painful.
00:26:04.079 --> 00:26:04.240
Yeah.
00:26:04.319 --> 00:26:10.400
You know, we're talking about shutdowns of industry, I think, blackouts in countries, big parts of Asia where there's no flights at all.
00:26:10.799 --> 00:26:11.200
Europe, too.
00:26:11.359 --> 00:26:12.640
So what does that look like, Rory?
00:26:12.799 --> 00:26:21.920
And and and I tie that back to the overall equity markets, which are just still, um, I know they've come off a little bit recently, but near all-time highs.
00:26:22.079 --> 00:26:23.759
And it's not just the North American ones.
00:26:23.839 --> 00:26:28.880
If you look at like indicators of global public equities, they are also very, very high.
00:26:29.039 --> 00:26:34.960
And it seems like the broader market's not sort of seeing the effect because, of course, a lot of these companies are not going to produce the widgets.
00:26:35.119 --> 00:26:36.400
They're gonna have supply chain issues.
00:26:36.559 --> 00:26:37.680
I liken it to like COVID.
00:26:37.839 --> 00:26:39.039
Do you remember at the beginning of COVID?
00:26:39.119 --> 00:26:47.440
There's like no problems because we had all this like kind of inventory, and then it was like, you know, eight or nine months into it where suddenly you couldn't get like toilet paper.
00:26:47.599 -->
00:26:51.279
Yeah, or shingles that you needed, or like how building supplies weren't available.
00:26:51.680 --> 00:26:52.799
Children's Tylenol?
00:26:53.039 --> 00:26:53.279
Yeah.
00:26:53.359 --> 00:26:55.519
So like Auto chips, auto chips.
00:26:55.680 --> 00:27:06.799
I mean, I think that the the uh semiconductors for specialized purposes are gonna be in short supply, they're saying, because of the helium that is in behind the streets of Hormuz.
00:27:07.039 --> 00:27:11.200
Helium is a very valuable and hard-to-get commodity.
00:27:11.359 --> 00:27:16.319
And so it's gonna be manifesting itself here in the next couple months.
00:27:16.720 --> 00:27:17.519
There's no doubt.
00:27:17.599 --> 00:27:28.319
I think that like for a little while there was at least a kind of almost a perfectly inverse relationship between oil and equities, that when oil prices spike, equities fell back through, like, let's say March, that was the trend.
00:27:28.480 --> 00:27:35.279
Now it seems to be that we're making kind of all, you know, recent or fresh crisis highs for oil and fresh all-time highs for equity.
00:27:35.440 --> 00:27:49.359
So clearly, I think like the market, I think a lot of the pushback on this kind of more concerned view on the oil market and the Hormuz crisis is coming from that macro, kind of more equity-driven or focused, you know, participants and investors.
00:27:49.440 --> 00:28:04.319
That there, there's such a deeply held view right now that equity should go up because of AI or whatever else, that the oil, you know, the Iran war and Hormuz crisis are a deep inconvenience to anyone that wants those prices to go higher.
00:28:04.480 --> 00:28:14.880
So it seems like we're gonna have to kind of keep going on that wily coyote goes over the side of the cliff and it takes them, you know, a month or so of running there to realize that there's no ground underneath them.
00:28:15.039 --> 00:28:28.799
I won't embarrass myself by saying too much about broad S P 500 because I'm not an equity strategist, but I do think that the fundamental view is that oil needs to go higher here to this question about demand destruction, everything else, there will be some supply adjustment.
00:28:28.880 --> 00:28:37.920
Like we probably were gonna expect one and a half million barrels a day of growth from the Americas this year, between Canada, the United States, Guyana, Brazil, and Argentina.
00:28:38.079 --> 00:28:41.920
Those are your kind of big five America's non-OPEC production growth source.
00:28:42.079 --> 00:29:02.079
But again, one and a half million barrels a day versus 13 million barrels a day shut in, even at its peak of US production growth in 2018, where total liquids growth grew by 2 million barrels a day year over year, which is the fastest pace of growth of any oil producer in the history of the market, to my knowledge, at least organic growth, that's not nearly enough.
00:29:02.240 --> 00:29:07.119
So clearly we're going to need to either fill with SPRs, which we're going to do in the intern, but that's temporary.
00:29:07.279 --> 00:29:09.359
And then after that, we're going to need to destroy demand.
00:29:09.519 --> 00:29:18.240
Now, when people typically talk about demand destruction, they talk about, you know, let's say 2022 or any other kind of recessionary or high oil price recessionary environment.
00:29:18.400 --> 00:29:22.400
You know, we're talking about one, two million barrel a day oversupply.
00:29:22.559 --> 00:29:25.119
We're talking about that's kind of what we need to destroy on the margin.
00:29:25.279 --> 00:29:29.440
That's pretty easy to do in the scheme of things with, you know, low triple-digit prices.
00:29:29.599 --> 00:29:36.079
The challenge is in this crisis, we're talking about even charitably, 10% of global demand needs to be cut back.
00:29:36.400 --> 00:29:37.279
We've never done that before.
00:29:37.440 --> 00:29:46.079
So all of I think our historical like literature around price sensitivities to like, oh, like a 10% increase in prices will drive a 1% reduction in demand.
00:29:46.240 --> 00:29:50.240
I just don't think that applies because we've never tested how far we need to go.
00:29:50.319 --> 00:29:59.680
Like for comparison, again, you can't take it all from one product, but if you could, you could ground every airplane on earth for the next year and it would not cover the Hormuz stop shortage.
00:29:59.759 --> 00:29:59.920
Yeah.
00:30:00.000 --> 00:30:01.920
Uh that's how large we're talking about.
00:30:02.319 --> 00:30:05.359
Well, the closest we came was during the pandemic.
00:30:05.519 --> 00:30:13.200
And on an instantaneous basis, I think there was a curtailment of 20 plus percent of demand on an annual average of 6%.
00:30:13.759 --> 00:30:20.319
But that took the lockdown of the entire world, at least for a couple months, to do that.
00:30:20.559 --> 00:30:23.359
So yeah, 13% is absolutely huge.
00:30:23.680 --> 00:30:25.359
But let's take it a bit forward.
00:30:25.519 --> 00:30:25.839
Okay.
00:30:26.079 --> 00:30:30.480
So the Strait of Hormones gets going again, but it's a new world.
00:30:30.640 --> 00:30:39.039
And let's just say in whatever deal is struck, Iran does start charging tolls with the ships going through.
00:30:39.279 --> 00:30:40.880
So what does that world look like?
00:30:41.039 --> 00:30:54.160
Higher insurance rates, higher tolls, higher risk premium for all the oil that comes through, higher cost of capital, sort of less willingness to invest in that whole region by multinationals.
00:30:54.480 --> 00:30:59.440
What does a world of oil and gas, LNG prices look like after that?
00:30:59.839 --> 00:31:03.839
The first thing I'll say is there's been a lot of controversy around the tolls thus far.
00:31:04.000 --> 00:31:12.640
Like the reports indicate that Iran may be saying that lots of people are paying the tolls, but there's no confirmation of the full extent of how much tolls are being paid.
00:31:12.799
--> 00:31:21.759
And the US Treasury recently issued, I want to say earlier this week, guidance that basically clarified that, yeah, paying the IRGC passage of tolls is a sanctions violation.
00:31:21.920 --> 00:31:23.680
So that is an additional complication to this.
00:31:23.759 --> 00:31:37.839
But let's say, in a world where part of the deal to reopen the strait that Trump, one of these unpalatable concessions the White House would have to make, would be ceding go forward control of the strait to Iran, which charges some kind of tolls.
00:31:38.079 --> 00:31:49.680
The first thing is that if they actually got to charge tolls on all the ships coming out of Hormuz, I've seen estimates that basically indicate that that could basically create an equal parallel source of revenue for Tehran, equal to its entire oil industry.
00:31:49.839 --> 00:31:59.920
So obviously a massive fiscal boost for Iran, which if we're in a world of trying to like constrain and kind of curtail Iran, not exactly the direction you want to go.
00:32:00.079 --> 00:32:03.039
But I think more importantly, it's just deeply politically unstable.
00:32:03.200 --> 00:32:07.680
Now, the Gulf is not going to tolerate it, but I would argue they don't have a lot of a choice in the near term.
00:32:07.839 --> 00:32:15.680
But I think in that situation, you basically just set up a deeply unbalanced, unstable situation that just begs for the next crisis.
00:32:15.839 --> 00:32:19.519
If you had asked me at the beginning of this year, what are the odds that Hormuz is closed this year?
00:32:19.759 --> 00:32:23.279
I would have put them at negligible odds, like 1% maybe.
00:32:23.519 --> 00:32:25.839
Going forward, Iran's broken that seal now.
00:32:25.920 --> 00:32:39.839
And I think if it's seen how it can do that, it's learned over this process as well, if it's in a position of go forward control, I would say that that ups the odds of a closure in any given year to maybe 5 or 10%, which is still small.
00:32:40.000 --> 00:32:42.559
But for a disruption this large, it's gigantic.
00:32:42.720 --> 00:32:44.160
To your point, Peter, I agree.
00:32:44.240 --> 00:32:49.599
I think that like it's going to permanently nerf the investment attractiveness of the region.
00:32:49.839 --> 00:33:01.119
But what you said earlier was a more fragile situation in that the supply from the Middle East going forward, if that's the situation, people are always worried about this happening again.
00:33:01.200 --> 00:33:05.279
And of course, that results in people trying to find alternative sources of supply.
00:33:05.359 --> 00:33:10.079
I also think it makes it harder for Middle East countries to invest in new supply.
00:33:10.880 --> 00:33:16.960
Now, many of them are national oil companies that maybe can invest their own cash flow and don't rely on foreign capital.
00:33:17.039 --> 00:33:21.440
But countries like Kuwait and Iraq are probably going to need foreign capital to grow their production.
00:33:21.519 --> 00:33:25.119
So I think it results in OPEC spare capacity maybe declining.
00:33:25.279 --> 00:33:34.160
I think another really interesting thing is over like the course of the last decade, there's been this real move to not have as many refineries in Western countries.
00:34:01.599 --> 00:34:08.480
California is another area that you read about because they've shut down refineries that they are kind of exposed now because they used to import refined products.
00:34:08.639 --> 00:34:18.000
So it'll be interesting to see if we see a resurgence in investment for energy security reasons in a lot of these countries to get these refineries back online or rebuild them.
00:34:18.079 --> 00:34:18.400
I don't know.
00:34:18.639 --> 00:34:32.960
I actually wrote a paper, contributed paper to the McDonald Laurie Institute, I want to say two years ago now, with I think you've had Heather Exner Perot on the podcast before, kind of talking about refining our hedge and that there's always been this debate about like, should we refine more product in Canada?
00:34:33.119 --> 00:34:35.920
Should we export products, value add, et cetera, et cetera?
00:34:36.079 --> 00:34:43.119
And I've always generally pushed back on that overarching thesis that that's the value we should be adding, or where our comparative advantage is.
00:34:43.440 --> 00:34:47.679
But we are roughly self-sufficient as Canadians in refined products.
00:34:47.840 --> 00:35:03.920
Two million barrels of refining capacity, roughly two million barrels of demand, which even if we're not every barrel refined is consumed in our borders, at least we have a GDP hedge against these explosions in refining margins, like we are likely going to see right now, particularly for middle distillates like diesel.
00:35:04.079 --> 00:35:12.800
So I think this has been one of those moments where middle distillates in particular has been the center point of pain in the oil market ever since 2022.
00:35:12.960 --> 00:35:17.599
And it comes core from the view that we do not have the refining capacity we need anymore.
00:35:17.760 --> 00:35:33.840
And the changes in crude slate, overwhelmingly towards light, sweet crude from the United States, is weaker in that middle distillate yield compared to, say, you know, I've heard referred to as the champagne of North American crudes, which is Canadian synthetic crude, which is a predominantly heavier portion in the middle distillets.
00:35:34.079 --> 00:35:34.239
Right.
00:35:34.320 --> 00:35:37.280
Well, you need the right refineries to uh be configured for that.
00:35:37.519 --> 00:35:38.800
We do have some exposure though.
00:35:38.960 --> 00:35:43.280
I was reading an article about Lower Mainland that they do import refined products.
00:35:43.440 --> 00:35:50.079
So although the country is generally well served, I think there are probably pockets that are reliant on imports.
00:35:50.159 --> 00:35:54.400
And I'm sure it'll all get worked out because we do
have enough in the continent.
00:35:54.559 --> 00:35:56.559
But uh maybe we'll relook at some of that.
00:35:56.800 --> 00:36:00.000
This brings me to another risk that I worry about.
00:36:00.079 --> 00:36:05.440
You know, when we hear stories that maybe the White House is thinking, well, this is going to go on for quite a long time.
00:36:05.519 --> 00:36:05.599
Yeah.
00:36:05.920 --> 00:36:13.760
Of course, they're going to come under pressure for gasoline prices, which are already over$4 a gallon on average, and in some places the US, even higher.
00:36:13.920 --> 00:36:17.360
So at the pain point that Peter talks about, that people complain a lot.
00:36:17.599 --> 00:36:23.039
And one way that President Trump could lower gasoline prices is by restricting U.S.
00:36:23.199 --> 00:36:24.159
crude exports.
00:36:24.320 --> 00:36:32.480
You know, maybe not all exports, but some that would very quickly create an oversupply in the continent and lower gasoline prices and solve his problem.
00:36:32.639 --> 00:36:35.360
Now, of course, it would create a whole domino of other problems.
00:36:35.599 --> 00:36:36.719
What are the risks of that?
00:36:37.039 --> 00:36:38.079
It's called hoarding.
00:36:38.400 --> 00:36:42.079
I mean the hoarding behavior happens when there's supply crunches.
00:36:42.400 --> 00:36:46.719
And the last time that happened, meaningfully, was in during the pandemic.
00:36:46.880 --> 00:36:53.119
I mean, we were hoarding everything from toilet paper to all sorts of other vaccines and things.
00:36:53.199 --> 00:36:59.039
And so, yeah, when you start getting critically short, you start hoarding and restricting exports.
00:36:59.280 --> 00:37:00.800
Chinese have already done that, right?
00:37:01.039 --> 00:37:01.280
Yeah.
00:37:01.360 --> 00:37:05.039
So China did, I want to say in the first week announce that it was restricting exports.
00:37:05.119 --> 00:37:08.960
Although the latest murmurs are that they're actually considering re-easing those export restrictions.
00:37:09.039 --> 00:37:10.559
So there's a bit of movement on their end as well.
00:37:10.639 --> 00:37:12.880
I want to say like the FD reported that yesterday.
00:37:13.119 --> 00:37:21.440
But like Jackie's core question about like export restrictions and trade restrictions to the Trump administration, that is also near my very top of my like kind of list of policy worries.
00:37:21.760 --> 00:37:28.320
I personally don't think it's as likely with crude oil specifically, because again, they're such a large exporter of crude now.
00:37:28.480 --> 00:37:39.119
And I want to say there's enough people in the Trump orbit, refiners, crude traders, et cetera, that can kind of say, like, look, we really, really can't process all of this light suite domestically.
00:37:39.199 --> 00:37:40.719
It would really screw things up.
00:37:40.960 --> 00:37:42.639
So we'll export the crude.
00:37:42.719 --> 00:37:46.960
But I think where my bigger worry is, is refined product export and controls.
00:37:47.039 --> 00:37:47.199
Yeah.
00:37:47.360 --> 00:37:51.760
That you could see bans, limits, quotas put on exports.
00:37:52.079 --> 00:37:52.800
Like jet fuel.
00:37:53.039 --> 00:37:54.960
Like jet fuel, you know, all of these fuels.
00:37:55.039 --> 00:38:03.039
And I think that in particular, kind of adding to that vector of worry is the moves that the Trump administration has been taking on the Jones Act.
00:38:03.119 --> 00:38:14.480
Now, the Jones Act was initially suspended for 60 days, and they just announced another 90-day extension of that waiver for oil products through mid-August, which again, we're getting well into the summer here in terms of timelines.
00:38:14.800 --> 00:38:17.519
So the Jones Act is uh explain the Jones Act.
00:38:17.760 --> 00:38:17.920
Yeah.
00:38:18.000 --> 00:38:24.800
So the Jones Act is this like hundred-year-old piece of US legislation that basically protects the domestic shipping industry.
00:38:24.880 --> 00:38:35.760
And it basically says that for any good that is transported between two US ports, the ship needs to be owned by the US, built in the US, flagged by the US, and crewed by US citizens.
00:38:36.079 --> 00:38:55.119
So that is obviously very restrictive and dramatically reduces the fleet available to those ships, which is why you will much more frequently see, say, exports from the Gulf Coast to Latin America and then imports to the East Coast from Europe, because it gets around those Jones Act restrictions.
00:38:55.199 --> 00:38:56.800
The system optimizes.
00:38:57.119 --> 00:39:04.559
But if you were, let's say, let's go through the scenario where you put like a hard cap or a hard block on the export of refined products.
00:39:04.719 --> 00:39:09.199
Given that the US Gulf Coast is a net product exporter, it needs to get rid of those barrels.
00:39:09.440 --> 00:39:20.079
If it didn't get rid of those barrels, you would temporarily build up surpluses in the Gulf Coast and depress prices, but you'd also eventually force refinery shut-ins and everything else because you couldn't get rid of the barrels.
00:39:20.559 --> 00:39:32.000
So removing the Jones Act to a degree allows those exports to continue, but just instead of going to Latin America or Asia or wherever, looping around and going to the two coasts and displacing those offsets as well.
00:39:32.159 --> 00:39:37.119
Now, again, I think there's so many distortions and this would be a bad idea on so many levels.
00:39:37.440 --> 00:39:43.119
But I see the export ban on products as more likely than crude.
00:39:43.199 --> 00:39:52.159
But if they did go to crude, it would absolutely smack Canada as well, given that if that would depress WTI and WCS is linked to WTI as a benchmark.
00:39:52.320 --> 00:39:57.679
And we also depend on US re-export capacity out of the Gulf Coast for our barrels.
00:39:57.840 --> 00:40:09.760
And even as we learned back this time last year during the trade war worries, that, you
know, we ship all of our barrels or Western Canadian barrels into Ontario via the Enbridge mainline that goes down through Chicago.
00:40:10.000 --> 00:40:13.199
There were concerns then, like, will these barrels get tariffed?
00:40:13.280 --> 00:40:15.599
You know, if the US puts tariffs on Canadian crude?
00:40:15.760 --> 00:40:20.880
The trade lawyer answers I got were technically no, but you know, the Trump effect.
00:40:20.960 --> 00:40:23.039
And the answer is no one knows, and he could do anything.
00:40:23.199 --> 00:40:29.679
So I think there is a direct angle of Canadian concern here, given our dependence on that US monopsony of the Midwest.
00:40:29.920 --> 00:40:30.079
Yeah.
00:40:30.239 --> 00:40:39.760
And if we have a situation where the product tanks are full and refineries are cutting runs, oil price in North America could be a lot lower than what's happening.
00:40:39.840 --> 00:40:40.880
It's very substantial.
00:40:40.960 --> 00:40:43.199
So that would hurt Canada for sure.
00:40:43.519 --> 00:40:50.159
That comes to my next question, which of course there's been numerous pipeline expansions and greenfield pipelines being proposed here in Canada.
00:40:50.320 --> 00:40:54.800
We've got companies that want to build pipelines to send more to the United States.
00:40:55.039 --> 00:41:08.880
We've got expansions more to the United States, but we also have expansions on the existing Trends Mountain coming and the potential for a greenfield West Coast pipeline that's being led right now by the Alberta government and of course is subject to this MOU getting assorted here.
00:41:09.039 --> 00:41:13.760
And hopefully by July or early July, we'd have some sense of that project and what it would look like.
00:41:14.000 --> 00:41:21.199
But when you look at it from a crude oil market perspective, in your view, which direction should be prioritized?
00:41:21.599 --> 00:41:34.880
This is actually the subject of I had the pleasure of joining Peter at a presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Natural Resources, exactly on this topic, which is we have all these different paths and options for our crude to flow, but we have choices to make.
00:41:35.119 --> 00:41:36.800
You know, let's go through those four different options.
00:41:36.880 --> 00:41:50.719
So we have Enbridge mainline, roughly 400,000 barrels a day of capacity expansion or expansion capacity there, 360 on Enbridge, I think what's 550 on the Bridger expansion that would basically link in with those Keystone XL assets.
00:41:50.800 --> 00:41:58.079
And then maybe this million barrel a day pipeline, the Northwest Coast oil pipeline that's currently being championed by the Daniel Smith government of Alberta.
00:41:58.320 --> 00:41:59.599
All of those do different things.
00:41:59.760 --> 00:42:01.119
And I think it's important to note that.
00:42:01.280 --> 00:42:06.559
I think the most similar are the Bridger expansion and the expansion on the Enridge mainline.
00:42:06.880 --> 00:42:10.320
Both of those are going to be reasonably inexpensive in the scheme of things.
00:42:10.400 --> 00:42:13.199
I guess bridgers are going to be slightly more because it's a new greenfield pipe.
00:42:13.360 --> 00:42:24.159
But again, building the United States is going to be cheaper, but it further entrenches us into that US kind of monopsony market and doesn't allow us any strategic flexibility for our barrels.
00:42:24.480 --> 00:42:34.320
The Transmountain expansion, that 360,000 barrels, is good and further allows us to get ever more oil into the Pacific Basin, but it only does so through limited infrastructure.
00:42:34.480 --> 00:42:37.519
We can't get VLCCs in and out of the port of Vancouver.
00:42:37.599 --> 00:42:39.039
It's not a deep water port.
00:42:39.199 --> 00:42:42.719
So for instance, we can't service the Indian oil trade right now that way.
00:42:42.880 --> 00:42:47.440
We're depending entirely on VLCCs out of the US Gulf Coast to service that trade.
00:42:47.679 --> 00:42:59.039
So then you get to this Greenfield Northwest Coast Oil Pipeline, which is a million barrels a day, at least on paper, but we're talking likely$30 plus billion dollars to get this pipe built.
00:42:59.119 --> 00:43:02.719
Now, hopefully we can get for cheaper than that, but I wouldn't be holding my breath.
00:43:02.960 --> 00:43:11.119
And I think that it's really hard for that to compete on a pure economics basis with any of those south-facing pipelines.
00:43:11.280 --> 00:43:29.280
And that's, I think, fundamentally the reason if we let the private sector entirely drive the direction they're going to drive in the direction of the lowest netbacks, the highest profitability, the most optimized system, which is good for them in good times, but doesn't provide any strategic optionality in bad times.
00:43:29.760 --> 00:43:40.000
So we were talking earlier about Saudi Arabia's East West Pipeline, which was built in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War and the Tanker War, exactly for this eventuality and this risk.
00:43:40.159 --> 00:43:42.960
It did not go fully utilized for 40 years.
00:43:43.119 --> 00:43:47.679
And then all of a sudden it became arguably the single most important piece of energy infrastructure on planet Earth.
00:43:47.920 --> 00:43:48.159
Right.
00:43:48.400 --> 00:43:51.760
It went from being insurance to uh being very valuable, right?
00:43:52.079 --> 00:43:52.239
Yes.
00:43:52.320 --> 00:43:57.599
And I think that is a lesson we can take here because people will say, like, oh, well, what if the pipeline's underutilized?
00:43:57.760 --> 00:43:59.199
Won't that be sunk cost, sunk capital?
00:43:59.280 --> 00:43:59.760
And like the answer.
00:44:00.159 --> 00:44:03.119
Just yes, but it's valuable in that insurance.
00:44:03.199 --> 00:44:22.800
And if we had had that pipeline, let's say, available during last year's tariff fight, you know, one of the weird things about that tariff fight is that if you look
at most other exporters in the United States for most other products, the research showed that 90 plus percent of the incidence of those tariffs were falling on US consumers and US companies through margin compression.
00:44:23.199 --> 00:44:32.639
When it came to Canadian oil exports, though, we were likely gonna eat 50% of that tariff on our side of the border through wider differentials, just because we don't have any other options to send those products.
00:44:32.880 --> 00:44:37.679
If we had another pipeline, we could have had more optionality and we could have had more market power in that dynamic.
00:44:37.760 --> 00:44:42.639
And I think that's the thing that I want the United States to be a good, reliable ally going forward.
00:44:42.880 --> 00:44:44.880
But I think, you know, hope is not a strategy.
00:44:44.960 --> 00:44:46.480
And I think that we do need strategies here.
00:44:46.559 --> 00:44:51.440
And the private sector alone can't incorporate that strategic optionality into its own calculations.
00:44:51.519 --> 00:44:53.199
It has to look purely at profit.
00:44:53.360 --> 00:44:57.760
And I think that's where we get a jaw, you know, a role for either the Alberta government or the Crown.
00:44:57.840 --> 00:44:59.519
I think they think they have to serve a role here.
00:44:59.840 --> 00:45:01.519
Yeah, we've talked a lot about this, Rory.
00:45:01.679 --> 00:45:04.320
And as you said, we talked about it at the standing committee.
00:45:04.559 --> 00:45:11.280
But broadly speaking, this conversation's been about the consequences of military action, military warfare.
00:45:11.519 --> 00:45:17.599
But really, now what we see is just an extension of this global economic warfare.
00:45:17.760 --> 00:45:17.920
Yeah.
00:45:18.159 --> 00:45:22.320
Whether it's gonna started with tariffs and sanctions, invasion of Venezuela, so on.
00:45:22.400 --> 00:45:26.159
We've talked a lot about mercantilism coming back on this podcast.
00:45:26.400 --> 00:45:33.599
This economic warfare that's coming from the Strait of Hormuz is really causing a lot of collateral damage all around the world.
00:45:33.920 --> 00:45:53.440
And the issue of geoeconomic warfare, and what we're talking about now also, is the state capitalism, where the state aligns with its strategic industries to provide everything from national security to diversification of exports and what have you, which is part of national and energy security.
00:45:53.599 --> 00:45:55.679
I mean, these are the topics toujours.
00:45:56.000 --> 00:46:08.400
These really are a consequence of what our prime minister calls the rupture, the decline of the international order and into a world of realism where it's almost like every country for themselves.
00:46:08.639 --> 00:46:20.079
And when it's every country for themselves, you also see the sort of hoarding type behaviors and all sorts of other things that really we haven't had to think about much over the past many decades, but here we are.
00:46:20.400 --> 00:46:22.159
So thank you for your insights.
00:46:22.320 --> 00:46:31.199
You know, I can tell you that the industry has lost a lot of analysts, really good banking analysts over the last 10 years, especially Canadian ones.
00:46:31.360 --> 00:46:34.480
And Rory, I really commend you on the work that you do.
00:46:34.639 --> 00:46:40.639
Uh, you're one of the few analysts left, and certainly one of the very few that we can have such a great conversation with.
00:46:40.800 --> 00:46:42.320
So keep up the good work.
00:46:42.400 --> 00:46:45.840
We'll point to your commodity context Substack and podcast.
00:46:45.920 --> 00:46:52.159
And I am sure we're gonna have to have you back to follow this ongoing and evolving situation.
00:46:52.400 --> 00:46:53.840
Thanks again for joining us.
00:46:54.159 --> 00:46:55.519
Thank you both so much for having me.
00:46:55.599 --> 00:46:56.559
It was an absolute pleasure.
00:46:56.800 --> 00:46:57.920
And thanks to our listeners.
00:46:58.000 --> 00:47:13.840
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