TRANSKRYPCJA 🔗
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That's really the key is understanding your assets gives you
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the ability to understand your attack service.
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Welcome listeners to the Industrial Security Podcast. My name is
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Nate Nelson. I'm here with Andrew Ginter, the vice president
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of Industrial Security at Waterfall Security Solutions. He's going to
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introduce the subject and guest of our show today. Andrew,
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how's it going.
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I'm very well, Thank you, Nate. Our guest today is
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Brian Derico. He is the founder of Trident Cyber Partners,
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and he's going to be talking about using asset inventory tools.
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I mean, we've had a lot of people on vendors
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mostly talking about what's available, how it works. He's going to,
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you know, look at the problem from the point of
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view of the user using these tools, and you know
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why using these tools turns out to be a little
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harder than you might expect.
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Then, without further ado, here's your conversation with Brian de Rico.
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Hello Brian, and welcome to the podcast. Before we get started,
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can I ask you to say a few words of introduction,
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tell us a little bit about yourself and about the
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good work that you're doing at Trient Cyber Partners.
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Good morning, Andrew, Brian de Rico been in the critical
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infrastructure sector for about fifteen years. Spent my entire career
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at a large utility solely focused on the cybersecurity requirements
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for nuclear power plants, and my last role there was
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actually was the program manager responsible for the entire cyber
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program across the fleet, again all really dealing with OT
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type stuff and regulatory requirements. I left in October, started
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my own business, Tried and Cyber Partners, and mainly aim
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to help other critical infrastructure sectors with their cyber problems.
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Thanks for that, And our topic eventually is going to
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be acid inventory. But you know, let me ask you.
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You've spent a lot of time working at nuclear You've worked,
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you know, in very old plants in you know, you've
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done some work recently with very modern plants. Can you
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talk about, you know, in terms of automation, what's the
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difference between sort of very old automation and very new
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automation that you've been exposed to.
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Yeah, so there's there's a lot of similarities. Right at
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the end of the day, whether it's a new plant
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or an old plant, it is still a nuclear power plant.
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So there is a nuclear reaction that is heating some water.
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That water is heating some other water, and a secondary
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loop that is flashing to steam spending a turbine making electricity.
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So that is nuclear power one oh one. It doesn't
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matter how new or old the plant is. They've all
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generally worked that way for a long, long period of time.
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To your point, what you do see is the amount
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of digital assets in those plants is drastically different from
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new to old. So in my previous role, I had
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done some industry benchmarks to try and figure out what
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is sort of the average number of you know, digital
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devices that are in a plant, and it came in
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around seventeen or eighteen hundred per unit. These new plants
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that they're building, they're an order of magnitude larger than that.
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There are you know, potentially ten thousand devices on a
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single unit because everything is digital. You know, I don't
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know how many people have had an opportunity to tour
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a nuclear plant. I would certainly advise if you have
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that opportunity, is a really really cool thing to see.
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And most plants are all analogy. There is a lot
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of analog equipment, a lot of analog indication, and the
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new plants that's not that case anymore. So trying to
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keep track of all of your digital devices becomes a
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very important and critical problem. For example, you know, and
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some of the older plants that we worked in, you know,
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as you're going through getting asked at inventory, you open
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up a cabinet, you kind
Load full transcript
of look for what is digital?
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What are the blinky lights? And you know, you go
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through and that is generally a manual way that we
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did a lot of asset inventory. These newer plants, you
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open the racks and everything inside is digital. Everything inside
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could be considered, you know, an attack pathway, and you know,
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there were some discussions and there's some thought process out
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there that essentially calling locations critical is going to be
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an easier way to do it, because saying this entire rack,
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no matter what's in it, is going to be a
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critical digital component, is an easier way than trying to
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label an inventory all fifty or sixty devices. So that
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was a thought process that was considered. But again, at
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the end of the day, every device was considered on
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a case by case basis. But it kind of gives
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you an idea of just the scale of how much
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digital equipment there are in newer plants nowadays.
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Andrew, I'm glad we're getting the opportunity to talk about
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nuclear because it seems like a pretty relevant and highly
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important field, and yet it never seems like we get
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a guest on who wants to talk about it. So
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where does nuclear stand in the paneple that is industrial security?
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For you?
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We're going to be talking mostly about asset inventory, but
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let's talk about nuclear for a while. I mean, you know,
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Brian said a few words, you know, in a sense
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he's lived a lot of this stuff, you know, without
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even knowing how unusual it is. Nuclear is an extreme.
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You know, when we talk about worst case consequences of compromise,
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what's the worst case The worst thing that can happen
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in a coal fired power plant? A boiler bowson, people die. Okay,
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what's the worst thing that can happen in a nuke?
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The nuclear core explodes, you know, Chernobyl and hundreds of
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square kilometers become unlivable for centuries. Oh that's very bad.
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So you know, the consequences drive the intensity of your
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security program. And nukes are an extreme. I mean, the
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only thing I can imagine that's possibly more sensitive than
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nukes's I don't know nuclear weapons targeting systems and you know,
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launch launch protocols. It's just it's that extreme. You know,
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what does that mean for cybersecurity. Well, you know, let's
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start with physical security. In different parts of the world,
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there's different rules. In a lot of the world, you
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need a security clearance to visit the site. You know,
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in North America you can get tours of the site.
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But you know, in a lot of places, you you're
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a lot of stuff is classified. I don't have a
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security clearance. I've never seen network diagrams for a nuclear site.
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I'm guessing a bunch of this stuff is classified. It's
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you know, it's national secrets. It's it's it's that intense.
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On the cybersecurity side, again, I talk to people, uh,
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you know, we we serve nuclear customers at Waterfall, and
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you know, they do things that seem, again, seem extreme.
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They might have all of their OT systems in one
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room in one building, and all of their IT systems,
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all our IT servers, email servers and whatnot. They do
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have IT networks. You know, in nuclear plants you need
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to you need to schedule work crews, You've got to
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pay your people. So they have IT networks and all
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of the IT servers are in a different room, in
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a different building. Why. Because they cannot afford someone any
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time someday to make a mistake and plug a cable
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from an IT network into an OT asset. That's completely
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unacceptable cybersecurity wise, And so they physically separate it so
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that as much as possible, they make these kinds of
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errors impossible. You can't do it, you can't plug the
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wrong cable and it's in a different building. You know.
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Another example, you might imagine that there would be multiple
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security levels. You might imagine that the technology that
controls
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the core, you know, the control rods into the core
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that keeps the core from exploding, is more sensitive than
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the OT systems that control the steam turbines. I mean
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a coal power a coal fired power plant has steam turbines.
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Steam turbines have steam turbines, you imagine. In fact, again,
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when I talk to these people, a lot of nuclear sides,
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in my understanding, have only two security levels absolutely highest
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critical and business, and nothing in between. Again, why why
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would the steam turbines be protected to the same degree
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as the core control system? In part, it's because you
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know the physics of these systems the steam, you know,
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there are distant physical connections. You know, the liquid from
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the core heats up the liquid in the steam, and
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so you know there's a theoretically a risk that something
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happening to the steam turbines could leak back into the core.
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But more fundamentally, these people just say, we cannot afford
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to make mistakes with security, and so we're going to
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dumb it down. We're not going to have seven or
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eight or thirteen security levels. And you have to remember
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which is which and apply the right policies to the
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right equipment. It's going to be absolutely critical or business,
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end of story, and you know which room you're in.
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That's the policy you apply again as much as possible.
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They eliminate human error. You know regulations. I'm most familiar
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with the North American regulations. You might imagine. I mean
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NERKSIP handles the power grid. If you fail to live
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up to your obligations under NRKSIP, what happens you can
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be fined as much as a million dollars a day.
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It's never been levied, but you know, you get fined
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with the nukes if they fail to live up to
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their regulations. They're shut down, they lose their license to operate.
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It's that simple. If you cannot operate safely, you cannot operate. Bang,
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you're down. So again, intense attention is paid to the
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detail of cybersecurity and cybersecurity regulations.
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Uh.
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You know another example, I'm not aware of any nuclear generator.
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Now I might, I don't know all the generators in
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the world. I'm not aware of any nuclear generator that
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has any kind of OT remote access period. Nothing remotely
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gets into OT. You want to touch OT, you walk
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over to the server room. So again intense in a
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sense though, you know what I what I what I
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see of the nukes is that they are leaders in
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the cybersecurity field. You know, they they do things extremely intensely,
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and as other parts of the field other you know,
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power plants, other refineries, other you know, high consequence sites.
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As the threat environment continues worsening, as cyber attacks keep
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getting more sophisticated, they look over at what is nuclear
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doing and they pull one after another technique out of
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the nuclear arsenal and start applying it in their in
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their circumstance. So you know, even if you're not required
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to follow the nuclear rules, I would encourage people to read.
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You know, it's ANYI the Nuclear Energy Institute eight nine
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standard or the NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission five seventy one.
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I'd actually recommend eighth nine. It's it's more readable, it's
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got more examples. The five dots seventy one is sort
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of more terse and saying here's the regulation. Follow it.
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But yeah, they are leaders in the space, and over
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time I see people drawing on their expertise and the
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way they do things. And our topic is asset inventory.
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And so you know, we're talking about how much automation
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there is, we're talking about how hard it is to count.
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Can we back up a minute, you know, in principle,
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you know, the the truism is you cannot defend what
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you don't know you have. And so that's why we
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do inventory. Is that it or is there more to it?
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Why are
we doing these inventories? What good is an
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asset inventory?
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So it's a great question, and I'm going to give
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two answers, right, So one is on the nuclear space.
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The first answer is we have to right, and sometimes
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that is an answer. I don't think it's a good one,
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but it is an answered. So we do have regulatory
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compliance around an asset inventory because to your point, it
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does sort of fuel other aspects of your cyber programs,
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such as supply chain vulnerability management, configuration management, et cetera.
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The flip side is, it's just it's a smart thing
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to do, right. You can't build a vulnerability management program
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if you don't know what software is out there that
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you're potentially vulnerable to. So trying to build a vulnerability
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management program when you don't know what's out there is
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it's a fool's errand because you're never going to be
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able to understand your total risk. And that's really the
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key is. Understanding your assets gives you the ability to
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understand your attack surface. And once you understand your attack surface,
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you can then figure out what are my vulnerabilities? What
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do I need to mitigate? What is a you know,
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possible you know threat vector an adversary could use to
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attack you know, this device or this process. And you
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can't do any of that without having the asset inventory first.
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There's tools out there to do asset inventory. You know,
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we don't have to do a manual walk down and
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count the blinky lights in the cabinets, you know, do
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the tools not solve the problem is is there still
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a problem when you've deployed one of these tools.
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Yeah, So there are a number of tools that do
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this and some are better than others. Right, make sure
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of the these but they do a great job of
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asset inventory. So I currently do professional services for a
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software company and a lot of their deployments in the
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OT
space are generally for people that want to use
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the tool as their asset inventory. Now, the issue is
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sort of becomes a couple of pieces. One that comes
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up can come up often, and I saw this in
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nuclear all the time. Is a lot of those tools
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that we're talking about, they depend on network traffic, right,
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so they're looking at source and destination and they're passively
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trying to piece together these are their assets on your network,
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and this is what they do and how they do it.
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So one problem is going to be you have assets
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that are not networked. If you have safety critical devices,
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they may be isolated. So you're not going to be
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able to deploy a tool to do that. So you
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are going to have to manually enter those in and
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manually keep track of those in some way, shape or form.
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And then the second piece is a lot of these
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tools that we talked about, they can't just be deployed instantly.
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You can't just throw a box in a rack and
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you call it macaroni. You know, there are architectural changes
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that have to happen to your network. You have to
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get traffic from switches, you have to open span port,
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you have to deploy sensors, and that's where things can
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get a little difficult on the ot side of the house.
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Modern switches, any kind of managed switch has got a
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span port or a mirror port. You lug into the switch,
261
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you turn on mirroring, and off you go. You can
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start seeing the traffic, and you know, a lot of
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these these asset inventory tools can start figuring out what
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are the assets based on their traffic. You know, I
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get that some some systems are are not on the network,
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the safety systems. That makes sense, but is it is
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it more complicated than that? I mean, I imagine you're working
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with some older systems, older switches, or you know, do
269
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any of these plants use non managed switches?
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So I'm sure there are some non managed switches out there.
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I would not be surprised if there are some, you know,
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hubs that are still out there and kicking. While in theory, yeah,
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opening up a span port is a is a simplistic idea.
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Where that turns into and where it becomes difficult is
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a lot of these OT vendors and even environments that
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you're in. Nobody wants to change the system without vendors
277
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involvement because everybody scared about what are the consequences, Because again,
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this isn't an IT system, this is an OT system.
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There could be some huge process changes in huge impacts
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and risk if whatever you want to do doesn't go
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according to plan. And that's where I have seen the
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most amount of struggle come from. Is you know, you
283
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want to get some a span port. You reach out
284
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to the vendor, you say, hey, this is what we're
285
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looking to do. We just want to span this traffic.
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And the vendors don't want to budget. The vendor, you know,
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hasn't deployed that they don't know what that's going to
288
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look like. They tell you that, hey, we're going to
289
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have to refat the entire system. You know after making
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this change. Now you know, meanwhile, is there going to
291
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be an impact? No, we can look at switch utilization
292
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and see, you know, hey, even if we double. You know,
293
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we'll double the switch utilization. You know, you're not going
294
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to see a huge impact to that because your switch
295
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is only at five or ten percent utilization. But it's
296
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just it's the there isn't an understanding on the vendor side.
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So for some of these big control system vendors, it
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becomes difficult for them to bless as it were making
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these changes. And that's where we have seen the most
300
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amount of struggle. And we even had projects where we
301
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had to provide a lot of the testing and we
302
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provided you know, this is what needs to happen because
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the vendor just didn't have the knowledge. And I think
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as time goes on, for
you know, the control system
305
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vendors that are out there, I think that's going to
306
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be more and more of an issue because more and
307
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more of their deployments are going to have a requirement
308
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for some form of higher detection capability. We can't just say,
309
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you know, these things are you know, they're in an
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OT environment, they're safe, that this system the case right
311
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There needs to be higher level of detection and the
312
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vendors need to be more willing to work. And as
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time goes on, I think it'll be easier but retrofitting
314
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this sort of technology in existing systems becomes increasingly difficult
315
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because nobody wants to touch the system that isn't broke.
316
00:18:31.799 --> 00:18:34.599
So a couple of quick points there. You know, Brian
317
00:18:34.720 --> 00:18:38.400
used a couple of acronyms people might not recognize. He said,
318
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you know, you might have to refat the entire system.
319
00:18:40.559 --> 00:18:44.839
What's that FAT is factory acceptance test. It's set everything
320
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up and test every function of the system, emergency recovery
321
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every function of the system, and make sure that it
322
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meets the requirements that were laid out when you issued
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the contract to get the system built. Typically days you
324
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have to shut the plant down to do it. So
325
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nobody wants to refat anything. So that's that's what the
326
00:19:07.680 --> 00:19:10.000
vendors are threatening, saying, well, if you make a change
327
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that we haven't tested, we have to retest it, don't
328
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we You know. Another point he made was about bandwidth.
329
00:19:17.079 --> 00:19:20.319
And you know, for anyone who's not real familiar with
330
00:19:20.319 --> 00:19:22.799
how mirror or span ports work, you've got to switch
331
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with I don't know, twenty four ports on it forty
332
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eight ports. It has to be a managed switch. You
333
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log into the switch with a username and pass word
334
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and you can configure the switch. And one of the
335
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things you can configure is it's called a mirror port
336
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or a span port. It's a port or you know,
337
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multiple ports where you send copies of stuff. So typically,
338
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if you're going to do an asset inventory, you can
339
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figure one port and say every message that anybody sends
340
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to anybody else on the system, send a copy of
341
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the message out this port. And now the asset inventory
342
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system can look at the messages and say, oh, there's
343
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IP addresses in use. I wonder what kind of machine
344
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this is. It's using this t CP port number, and
345
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it figures out what kind of stuff is on the
346
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network based on the network traffic, and the mirror port
347
00:20:06.480 --> 00:20:10.000
gives you that traffic, and the throughput consideration is you know,
348
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I thought, and now I'm not an expert on switches,
349
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I assumed that modern switches you would put you know,
350
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they have ports twenty four ports out the front, and
351
00:20:19.480 --> 00:20:22.680
every message that comes in goes onto a backplane. It's
352
00:20:22.720 --> 00:20:25.640
a very high speed backplane. And I thought that the
353
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message went to every one of the other ports, and
354
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the ports decided do I send this out or not,
355
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and so it would go to the mirror port as well.
356
00:20:32.720 --> 00:20:34.960
That's what I assumed, And so you know, turning on
357
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the mirror port would not in fact increase the amount
358
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of traffic on the backplane because every message is visible
359
00:20:44.160 --> 00:20:48.039
to every port. You know, what I didn't get clarification
360
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from from Brian, but what it sounds like is at
361
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least some of the switches he's dealing with, if you
362
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enable the mirror port, then the source. If Port A
363
00:20:56.759 --> 00:21:00.000
is sending a message to Port B, it first puts
364
00:21:00.119 --> 00:21:03.480
on the backplane address to Port B, and a second
365
00:21:03.559 --> 00:21:06.359
time puts the same message on the backplane addressed to
366
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the mirror port, because it's been configured to send everything
367
00:21:09.000 --> 00:21:11.039
to the mirror port, and that would tend to double
368
00:21:11.440 --> 00:21:14.039
the amount of traffic on the backplane. But these backplanes
369
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are massively high speed because they have to support all
370
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of the twenty four ports simultaneously. So he's saying, look,
371
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your average backplane is, you know, barely loaded, and doubling
372
00:21:27.359 --> 00:21:31.720
the load is
immaterial. What he did not say was that,
373
00:21:31.880 --> 00:21:34.680
you know, configuring the switch causes the switch to malfunction.
374
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I would imagine ancient switches that you know, were were
375
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around sort of at the beginning of the concept of
376
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mirror ports and span ports might have defects in their
377
00:21:44.400 --> 00:21:46.799
software that if you turn on the mirror port it
378
00:21:46.880 --> 00:21:49.480
might malfunction. But you know, he didn't say that. I
379
00:21:49.519 --> 00:21:51.400
forgot to ask him, and the fact that he didn't
380
00:21:51.400 --> 00:21:53.720
say it says to me he's never run into it,
381
00:21:53.839 --> 00:21:55.640
or you know, he would have mentioned it. So that's
382
00:21:56.039 --> 00:21:58.200
I'm putting words in his mouth there. But I'm guessing
383
00:21:58.240 --> 00:21:59.920
that's not so much a concern. The concern is to
384
00:22:00.160 --> 00:22:02.720
put The concern is testing. That's just you know, people
385
00:22:02.759 --> 00:22:05.680
worry about things working the way they're supposed to if
386
00:22:05.680 --> 00:22:08.599
you make a change that has not been anticipated. This
387
00:22:08.680 --> 00:22:11.799
is the essence of the engineering change control discipline that
388
00:22:11.920 --> 00:22:16.400
is again used intensely at nuclear sites and used but
389
00:22:16.519 --> 00:22:19.640
maybe just a little less intensely at other critical infrastructure
390
00:22:19.680 --> 00:22:25.279
sites in the modern day. You're saying, you know, the
391
00:22:25.319 --> 00:22:32.160
control system vendors don't get acid inventory. I mean span ports,
392
00:22:32.160 --> 00:22:36.000
mirror ports. They're also used for intrusion detection systems. This
393
00:22:36.160 --> 00:22:41.319
is what Dragos uses, this is what Nasomi uses. You know,
394
00:22:42.160 --> 00:22:45.720
the six pillars of the cybersecurity framework, and this framework
395
00:22:45.799 --> 00:22:48.240
include detect, respond recovery. You've got to be able to
396
00:22:48.240 --> 00:22:50.200
look at what's happening on the hosts. You got to
397
00:22:50.200 --> 00:22:53.680
be able to look at what's happening on the networks. Really,
398
00:22:53.720 --> 00:22:55.920
you know, the the vendors in the modern day don't.
399
00:22:55.759 --> 00:23:01.039
Get this credit where it's due. Do get it better
400
00:23:01.079 --> 00:23:04.680
than others. However, you know, there have been some vendors
401
00:23:04.759 --> 00:23:07.079
we've worked with that did not want to make any
402
00:23:07.200 --> 00:23:09.799
changes because they just wanted to give us the same
403
00:23:09.880 --> 00:23:13.119
system that they gave us twenty years ago, you know,
404
00:23:13.200 --> 00:23:16.319
with one version you know, higher than what we deployed
405
00:23:16.440 --> 00:23:20.400
again decades in the past. And you know, when
pressed,
406
00:23:20.759 --> 00:23:24.880
while the people on the vendor side are experts in
407
00:23:24.920 --> 00:23:27.599
what they are doing, they are experts in safety design,
408
00:23:27.680 --> 00:23:30.400
they are experts in PLCs and how all of these
409
00:23:30.440 --> 00:23:34.599
things talk together, they're not IT people. So when you
410
00:23:34.680 --> 00:23:37.519
start talking, you know, hey, I want to open up
411
00:23:37.519 --> 00:23:41.839
a standport, it's different. They don't understand. They think it's
412
00:23:41.839 --> 00:23:45.319
going to cause an impact to the system. Meanwhile, as
413
00:23:45.759 --> 00:23:48.519
people with an IT background, we can see that, Hey,
414
00:23:48.680 --> 00:23:51.519
you know you're using managed switches, you can enable a
415
00:23:51.559 --> 00:23:56.279
stand port. The inputs are one hundred meg and you know,
416
00:23:56.440 --> 00:24:02.400
even if all of your PLCs are completely maxing that throughput,
417
00:24:02.880 --> 00:24:05.359
the backplane of the switch is going to be nowhere
418
00:24:05.400 --> 00:24:10.200
near utilization and even doubling that, you're not going to
419
00:24:10.200 --> 00:24:13.440
see a decrease. And it just it takes a long
420
00:24:13.559 --> 00:24:17.599
time to get the vendors on board. And again, you know,
421
00:24:17.839 --> 00:24:22.240
we even offered to do some testing and show what
422
00:24:22.279 --> 00:24:26.279
the utilization changes were, and you know we have seen
423
00:24:26.319 --> 00:24:29.359
that again with some vendors are better than others. But
424
00:24:29.720 --> 00:24:31.759
you know, I feel like at the end of the day,
425
00:24:31.960 --> 00:24:34.119
it's we just want to give you the same system
426
00:24:34.160 --> 00:24:37.640
that you've already had, and mayking changes to that as scary.
427
00:24:38.160 --> 00:24:42.119
And you know, we're an isolated system, so you know,
428
00:24:42.200 --> 00:24:45.000
we don't need to deploy a lot of that technology
429
00:24:45.039 --> 00:24:48.079
because we're just going to stay isolated and not connected
430
00:24:48.119 --> 00:24:51.680
to anything. And the reality is that isn't as effective
431
00:24:51.680 --> 00:24:57.240
either because you while you lose the sort of network
432
00:24:57.279 --> 00:25:00.920
attack path, you still have several other such as physical
433
00:25:00.920 --> 00:25:05.519
supply chain and portable media. So having detection capability is actually,
434
00:25:05.559 --> 00:25:08.200
in my opinion, it's worth the risk of plugging that
435
00:25:08.240 --> 00:25:10.920
thing in as long as you have a sound architecture.
436
00:25:11.039 --> 00:25:13.799
And that's where some of the struggles begin with, with
437
00:25:14.119 --> 00:25:17.200
changing sort of that mindset from on the vendor side.
438
00:25:17.680 --> 00:25:21.480
For example, you know, some of the control system vendors
439
00:25:21.480 --> 00:25:25.160
that you know there's workstations and stuff there. They understand that, yes,
440
00:25:25.200 --> 00:25:28.119
there are detection pieces. You're going to deploy some level
441
00:25:28.160 --> 00:25:30.839
of network contrusion detection. You're going to deploy some level
442
00:25:30.839 --> 00:25:33.640
of scene agent. Right, so I need to sense this
443
00:25:33.799 --> 00:25:36.920
log and we've had good luck, you know, again with
444
00:25:37.000 --> 00:25:41.440
particular vendors. There. Some vendors will actually included with their
445
00:25:41.480 --> 00:25:45.319
control system they will also include a security suite, so
446
00:25:45.400 --> 00:25:48.079
they will have their own you know, hids or nids,
447
00:25:48.079 --> 00:25:50.720
your seam and that's all included. You know, they have
448
00:25:50.759 --> 00:25:55.319
a patching server that distributes you know, Microsoft quick fixes
449
00:25:55.359 --> 00:25:56.079
and all that stuff.
450
00:25:56.079 --> 00:25:56.559
It's great.
451
00:25:57.480 --> 00:25:59.920
However, when you get to that lower level of your
452
00:26:00.079 --> 00:26:03.400
PLC type stuff where you know, again we were working
453
00:26:03.400 --> 00:26:06.279
with a PLC vendor and they would not bunch. They
454
00:26:06.279 --> 00:26:09.640
did not want to change their design. They thought that
455
00:26:09.880 --> 00:26:13.680
the switch there would be a loss in time of
456
00:26:13.680 --> 00:26:17.400
communication which would affect the safety related aspect of the design,
457
00:26:17.720 --> 00:26:18.839
and they did not want to budge.
458
00:26:19.880 --> 00:26:20.880
And you know, it.
459
00:26:20.880 --> 00:26:24.839
Took two years for us to work with them, for
460
00:26:24.920 --> 00:26:29.359
them to understand that we have requirements and you know,
461
00:26:29.480 --> 00:26:33.240
when the programs were implemented, specifically across nuclear it was
462
00:26:33.359 --> 00:26:35.240
understood that you're not going to go in and bolt
463
00:26:35.240 --> 00:26:38.319
this stuff onto existing systems. But when you're starting fresh,
464
00:26:38.400 --> 00:26:41.319
when you're building a system from the ground up, it
465
00:26:41.440 --> 00:26:44.079
has to have all of these components. You know, there
466
00:26:44.160 --> 00:26:46.599
is no longer an excuse to say, oh, you know,
467
00:26:46.680 --> 00:26:49.200
it's already working. You know, we're not going to go
468
00:26:49.279 --> 00:26:51.680
play around with it. It's going to that could obviously
469
00:26:51.759 --> 00:26:55.119
cause issues. Everything has to be baked in from the
470
00:26:55.160 --> 00:26:59.200
ground up. The cybersecurity keys has to be foundational. And
471
00:26:59.240 --> 00:27:01.720
again with the p LC vendors, we found it to
472
00:27:01.799 --> 00:27:05.519
be again one particular vendor, very difficult for us to
473
00:27:05.559 --> 00:27:08.680
get that through and it took a number of people
474
00:27:09.359 -->
00:27:12.680
you know, trying to work there. You know, the PLC
475
00:27:12.720 --> 00:27:17.200
engineers through why this is okay, you know, we promise here,
476
00:27:17.519 --> 00:27:20.160
you know, here's some data to back it up, and
477
00:27:20.200 --> 00:27:23.680
they finally did agree to use the architecture that that
478
00:27:23.759 --> 00:27:25.920
we were you know, we had kind of specified from
479
00:27:25.960 --> 00:27:26.720
a design.
480
00:27:26.480 --> 00:27:30.160
Perspective, we sweat blood, we fight with the vendors, we
481
00:27:30.319 --> 00:27:34.039
get our asset inventory system deployed, we you know, augment
482
00:27:34.119 --> 00:27:37.799
it with with manual inventory for the air gap or
483
00:27:37.839 --> 00:27:43.119
the isolated networks, and we use it for managing patches
484
00:27:43.119 --> 00:27:46.079
and vulnerabilities. Is there anything else we use it for?
485
00:27:46.960 --> 00:27:51.440
Yeah? Absolutely, to your point, vulnerability management is a big one,
486
00:27:51.519 --> 00:27:53.359
right because I think at the end of the day,
487
00:27:53.480 --> 00:27:57.720
your asset inventory is going to give you what your
488
00:27:57.960 --> 00:28:01.039
you know, what your risk profile is, what your attack
489
00:28:01.119 --> 00:28:05.319
surface is. Vulnerabilities is one part of that. You know.
490
00:28:05.359 --> 00:28:08.799
There there is uh, you know, another piece of it
491
00:28:08.960 --> 00:28:12.119
that is supply chain, right, so we talked about that
492
00:28:12.200 --> 00:28:15.000
a little earlier. Being able to understand what are the
493
00:28:15.039 --> 00:28:17.839
important devices that I Am going to produce, you know,
494
00:28:17.960 --> 00:28:22.079
procure h and procure those with certain sets of requirements.
495
00:28:22.119 --> 00:28:25.000
That's also critical. Another thing that we would use it
496
00:28:25.079 --> 00:28:30.440
for is configuration management. So understanding what is your configuration?
497
00:28:30.720 --> 00:28:33.400
You know, you can build tools, You can use tools
498
00:28:33.799 --> 00:28:36.720
that tell you, you know, this is the configuration on
499
00:28:36.759 --> 00:28:40.160
the device. And some of those tools out there, you know,
500
00:28:40.200 --> 00:28:43.160
some of those network contrusion systems that are OT centric
501
00:28:43.599 --> 00:28:47.640
can also give you alerts and understandings on you know,
502
00:28:48.359 --> 00:28:51.359
what is when changes happen. You know, you have a
503
00:28:51.400 --> 00:28:55.440
code download to a PLC, is that expected? And then
504
00:28:55.519 --> 00:28:57.680
also you know, this is the running code of that
505
00:28:57.759 --> 00:29:00.160
PLC and this is what changed, and you would have
506
00:29:00.279 --> 00:29:03.960
visibility into all of that and again all based on
507
00:29:04.119 --> 00:29:07.200
their asset inventory and having as much information as you
508
00:29:07.319 --> 00:29:08.799
can about those assets.
509
00:29:09.880 --> 00:29:12.079
You know, the latest automation systems have a lot of
510
00:29:12.119 --> 00:29:17.839
devices and acid inventory counts them. This is great, but
511
00:29:18.000 --> 00:29:20.880
there's a lot more we need to do with the information.
512
00:29:21.119 --> 00:29:23.599
So you've talked about patching. You know, there's a lot
513
00:29:23.640 --> 00:29:26.160
of We've had people on the show talking about s
514
00:29:26.240 --> 00:29:30.640
bomb uh, you know, software bill of materials, keeping track
515
00:29:30.720 --> 00:29:34.480
of sort of embedded software when vulnerabilities are announced. Is
516
00:29:34.480 --> 00:29:41.160
there automation for tracking s bombs and vulnerabilities? And you know,
517
00:29:41.319 --> 00:29:45.839
doing the mechanics of patching, and you know, arguably counting
518
00:29:45.880 --> 00:29:49.319
the asset is the easiest part of managing the inventory.
519
00:29:50.440 --> 00:29:53.000
You know, is there more in sort of that we
520
00:29:53.039 --> 00:29:54.799
can expect of modern tools.
521
00:29:55.559 --> 00:29:59.039
I think there is. And you know, vulnerability management is
522
00:29:59.079 --> 00:30:02.160
always going to be one of the most difficult things
523
00:30:02.200 --> 00:30:06.480
to conquer because if you don't have an updated software inventory,
524
00:30:06.720 --> 00:30:08.720
you're never going to know what's out there. You can
525
00:30:08.759 --> 00:30:11.599
do all the Windows patches in the world, but you know,
526
00:30:11.759 --> 00:30:15.279
there are obviously tens and tens of thousands of non
527
00:30:15.400 --> 00:30:21.000
Windows vulnerabilities where if you're running again insert whatever software
528
00:30:21.039 --> 00:30:25.000
product right, there are huge vulnerabilities around a lot of those.
529
00:30:25.079 --> 00:30:28.839
So can you automate it? I think it comes down
530
00:30:28.839 --> 00:30:32.759
to you can automate the visibility right, so you can
531
00:30:32.799 --> 00:30:37.319
at least understand and have up to date dashboards of this.
532
00:30:37.480 --> 00:30:40.400
These are the devices that you need to worry about, right,
533
00:30:40.720 --> 00:30:43.920
this particular device has five critical vulnerabilities, and then that
534
00:30:43.960 --> 00:30:47.519
gives your you know, your internal cyber engineers something to
535
00:30:47.599 --> 00:30:51.160
go after to mitigate to overall reduce that risk. I
536
00:30:51.200 --> 00:30:54.799
also think it's important from a business perspective to understand
537
00:30:54.839 --> 00:30:56.039
what are we going to do?
538
00:30:56.240 --> 00:30:56.400
Right?
539
00:30:56.480 --> 00:30:59.359
On the IT side, there's a lot of patching processes,
540
00:30:59.519 --> 00:31:02.400
and there's you know SLA is associated with is your
541
00:31:02.759 --> 00:31:05.720
you know, is the vulnerability critical, high, medium, low, et cetera.
542
00:31:06.160 --> 00:31:11.480
On the OT side, in general, OT is very adverse
543
00:31:11.599 --> 00:31:15.519
to patching and mitigation. And I agree with that in
544
00:31:15.559 --> 00:31:18.640
some senses, and I don't agree with that in other senses.
545
00:31:18.720 --> 00:31:21.400
And I think as a business, you guys like you
546
00:31:21.519 --> 00:31:24.559
need to understand what is your tolerance for that risk?
547
00:31:24.640 --> 00:31:28.160
What are you willing to accept and are there areas
548
00:31:28.200 --> 00:31:31.039
where you know, yes, we we're comfortable we're not patching
549
00:31:31.079 --> 00:31:33.359
because we have all these controls in place, and you know,
550
00:31:33.440 --> 00:31:35.559
in order to get the device, you know, there's guns,
551
00:31:35.599 --> 00:31:38.440
gates and guards in the middle of it. You know,
552
00:31:38.480 --> 00:31:41.279
but hey, maybe if something really, really really big comes out,
553
00:31:41.319 --> 00:31:42.680
we are going to take care of it. And we
554
00:31:42.759 --> 00:31:45.400
do have to come up. So I don't think there
555
00:31:45.480 --> 00:31:47.960
is a way to fully automate it, but you can
556
00:31:48.000 --> 00:31:51.839
at least automate the visibility so you don't have people,
557
00:31:52.039 --> 00:31:55.200
you know, just manually searching NVD with a software list
558
00:31:55.279 --> 00:31:57.799
that they don't even know as accurate. You can get
559
00:31:57.839 --> 00:31:59.960
that part out of the way. There are tools out
560
00:32:00.039 --> 00:32:02.680
there that will help you, and then becomes a business
561
00:32:02.680 --> 00:32:06.119
decision and sort of a business process around Okay, with
562
00:32:06.200 --> 00:32:09.519
all that information, here is your overall risk profile. What
563
00:32:09.519 --> 00:32:13.160
are you going to do about it? And that, you know,
564
00:32:13.200 --> 00:32:16.920
that becomes the deeper discussion again around what specifically the businesses,
565
00:32:17.039 --> 00:32:19.440
how much risk tolerance you do have, how much risk
566
00:32:19.440 --> 00:32:21.759
avoidance you want to have, and you know kind of
567
00:32:21.759 --> 00:32:22.279
go from there.
568
00:32:23.160 --> 00:32:25.440
Well, Brian, thank you so much for joining us today.
569
00:32:25.880 --> 00:32:27.599
Before I let you go, can I ask you can
570
00:32:27.640 --> 00:32:29.799
you sum up for our listeners, what should we take
571
00:32:29.839 --> 00:32:32.599
away in terms of you know what we're doing with
572
00:32:32.640 --> 00:32:33.519
asset inventory?
573
00:32:34.119 --> 00:32:39.079
Absolutely, I would say asset inventory is the most important
574
00:32:39.160 --> 00:32:41.920
part of your program because if you don't know what
575
00:32:42.000 --> 00:32:44.160
assets are out there, you're never going to be able
576
00:32:44.160 --> 00:32:47.440
to protect your organization from somebody that maybe they know
577
00:32:47.480 --> 00:32:51.119
what's out there and you don't. So asset inventory is critical.
578
00:32:51.200 --> 00:32:55.799
You cannot build upon your internal program without understanding what
579
00:32:55.839 --> 00:32:59.759
your attack service is. I think another point is there
580
00:32:59.759 --> 00:33:03.200
are tools to help you. This is not something that
581
00:33:03.240 --> 00:33:06.119
we need to do manually anymore. You do not have
582
00:33:06.160 --> 00:33:08.640
to go into cabinets and count every single blinky light.
583
00:33:09.400 --> 00:33:12.680
There are tools and you know, products out there that
584
00:33:12.720 --> 00:33:15.279
will help us get closer to where we want to be.
585
00:33:16.119 --> 00:33:18.200
And then at the end of the day, you still
586
00:33:18.240 --> 00:33:22.960
need an internal team that understands what the information coming
587
00:33:23.000 --> 00:33:27.319
back gets. So if if you you know, if you
588
00:33:27.400 --> 00:33:30.680
do need help in deploying these tools or selecting tools
589
00:33:30.799 --> 00:33:34.200
or understanding what the risk is, I'd be happy to help.
590
00:33:35.079 --> 00:33:38.000
You can connect with me on LinkedIn. Brian de Rico.
591
00:33:38.359 --> 00:33:41.160
I'm I think I'm the only one, uh and I
592
00:33:41.200 --> 00:33:44.559
can help you with those problems because again once we
593
00:33:44.759 --> 00:33:47.400
once we conquer assets and get the tools in place,
594
00:33:47.640 --> 00:33:51.400
a lot of pieces of the program become a lot easier.
595
00:33:51.880 --> 00:33:56.079
And my goal and what I love is just driving efficiency.
596
00:33:56.240 --> 00:33:59.319
So let's automate, automate, automate, use tools to kind of
597
00:33:59.319 --> 00:34:03.319
help us see what we can't and just do what
598
00:34:03.359 --> 00:34:05.200
we can to protect vertical infrastructure.
599
00:34:08.599 --> 00:34:12.960
Andrew, that just about concludes your interview with Brian. Do
600
00:34:13.039 --> 00:34:15.599
you have any final thoughts about what he talked about
601
00:34:15.679 --> 00:34:18.000
there that you can leave our listeners with?
602
00:34:19.239 --> 00:34:21.119
What I took a wave here is is you know
603
00:34:21.119 --> 00:34:24.280
the importance of inventory and the need for automation. I mean,
604
00:34:25.239 --> 00:34:28.559
if a modern nuclear generator has you know, ten thousand
605
00:34:28.599 --> 00:34:31.519
plus devices in it that have CPUs in them that
606
00:34:31.639 --> 00:34:33.559
have to be managed, that have software that have to
607
00:34:33.559 --> 00:34:37.800
be managed, you know, I don't know that a nuclear
608
00:34:37.840 --> 00:34:42.079
generator is that much more heavily instrumented than the average
609
00:34:42.440 --> 00:34:45.800
industrial thing. If you buy a steam turbine, it's a
610
00:34:45.920 --> 00:34:49.559
modern turbine is heavily instrumented. If you buy any kind
611
00:34:49.559 --> 00:34:52.039
of physical equipment, it's going to be heavily instrumented. This
612
00:34:52.119 --> 00:34:54.880
is you know, there's there's three hundred plus CPUs and
613
00:34:54.920 --> 00:34:58.679
a modern automobile and that's you know, that's something that
614
00:34:58.760 --> 00:35:02.599
fits in your living room. We're talking about massive installations.
615
00:35:03.440 --> 00:35:05.679
You know, I would imagine that a big refinery has
616
00:35:05.800 --> 00:35:09.280
as many as one hundred thousand plus devices if it's
617
00:35:09.320 --> 00:35:12.679
been upgraded recently. You know, when was the last time
618
00:35:12.719 --> 00:35:16.480
you tried to manage a spreadsheet with ten thousand rows
619
00:35:16.519 --> 00:35:18.199
in it? When was the last time you try to
620
00:35:18.239 --> 00:35:20.280
manage the spreadsheet with one hundred thousand rows in it?
621
00:35:21.679 --> 00:35:25.760
Just manually counting the blinking lights takes a long time.
622
00:35:26.719 --> 00:35:30.480
Automation to me is essential. I mean this is you
623
00:35:30.519 --> 00:35:34.840
look at the cybersecurity framework sort of the grand compendium
624
00:35:34.880 --> 00:35:38.000
of everything that is cyber what's the first thing you do? Well,
625
00:35:38.119 --> 00:35:40.960
the first thing you do is figure out who's responsible
626
00:35:40.960 --> 00:35:43.920
for the program and you know, assigned budget responsibility. Okay,
627
00:35:43.920 --> 00:35:46.119
what's the second thing you do? You take asset inventory.
628
00:35:46.159 --> 00:35:49.880
You've got to understand what you're protecting. So yeah, this
629
00:35:49.880 --> 00:35:52.239
this all makes sense that you need the inventory and
630
00:35:52.480 --> 00:35:54.480
in the modern world you need automation. There's no way
631
00:35:54.519 --> 00:35:57.760
you can do this anymore manually. So you know, my
632
00:35:58.920 --> 00:36:01.679
thanks to to Brian we Go and you know, learn
633
00:36:01.719 --> 00:36:02.920
something here.
634
00:36:03.320 --> 00:36:06.760
Yes, our thanks to Brian and Andrews always thank you
635
00:36:06.800 --> 00:36:07.480
for speaking with me.
636
00:36:08.000 --> 00:36:09.320
It's always a pleasure. Thank you, Nan.
637
00:36:10.159 --> 00:36:14.119
This has been the Industrial Security podcast from Waterfall. Thanks
638
00:36:14.159 --> 00:36:15.960
to everyone out there and listening.