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And what debtors realize is that when every claimant has a vote, they don't necessarily have to appeal to the high value claimant.
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They could focus on a deal that really appeals to maybe the low-value claimants or those claimants who don't even have compensable claims, with the premise that if they can clear the 75% threshold, they can bind everyone in that class.
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So that, of course, really disadvantages those who have been most harmed by the tortious conduct.
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You're listening to Bite-sized business law, where we discuss big issues in small doses.
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This podcast is sponsored by the Fordham University School of Law Corporate Law Center, which is run by Fordham Law Professor Richard Squire and me, your host Amy Martella.
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Okay, let's get down to business.
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Welcome back to Bite-Sized Business Law.
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In any bankruptcy, creditors are required to vote on a plan of reorganization.
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But what happens when there are tens of thousands of claimants, many with uncertain or disputed claims, all voting on how to divide a limited pool of assets?
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That's the question that lies at the heart of some of the most contentious debates in mass tort bankruptcies, and it's the one we'll explore today.
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Samir Perik is back today.
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He's a professor of business law at Wake Forest Law School and the editor-in-chief of the Bloomberg Law Bankruptcy Treatise.
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His forthcoming article, Mass Tort Voting, takes center stage inspired today's topic.
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Also joining us today is Richard Squire, Professor of Business Law here at Fordham Law School, director of the Corporate Law Center, and a bankruptcy and corporate restructuring scholar.
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Samir and Richard, welcome.
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Great to be back, Amy.
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Thanks for having me again, Amy.
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I'm really excited to talk about this article.
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Yeah, as am I.
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So, Samir, why don't you, before we get into the mass tort context specifically, why don't you give our listeners a little background and explain this basic notion of claimants' right to vote on any plan of reorganization?
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Well, we think about these mass tort cases, right?
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These huge cases with hundreds of thousands of claimants thinking about Purdue and Boy Scouts of America and the J and J.
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Talk case and Combat Arms, the MDL from 3M.
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And, you know, in those cases, there it's just resolution is very difficult.
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You can't have your day in court if you're one of these claimants.
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Think of how many generations it would take to actually have trials where we actually adjudicate these claims.
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So really what we're looking for in terms of resolution is some sort of settlement platform to accelerate recoveries and get distributions to victims.
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But that can be very elusive, right?
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So in our conversation, we're not really talking about class aggregation under Rule 23 because these cases don't qualify under Rule 23.
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So really what we're thinking about when we think about settlement is either something out of court or more realistically, something through the multidistrict litigation process or bankruptcy.
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So those are the two platforms.
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Neither platform is that great.
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They have a lot of flaws, they disenfranchise victims in a number of different ways, but this is sort of what we have.
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What is the saving grace here is at the end of a very long protracted process, there's this idea of the vote.
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These victims get to vote on the settlement offer that they receive.
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And the idea is that that is going to add legitimacy to what is oftentimes a very illegitimate process.
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Right?
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Victims get to hear the settlement terms, they get to confer with their attorneys, and they get to vote yay or nay.
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If we're going to sort of accept that narrative then, right, then the voting process is very prominent and emphasized in this resolution mechanism.
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But if we accept that promise as well, then we have to have a voting process that has integrity.
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And what sort of emerged recently is that, especially with the JJ case we're going to talk about in just a second, that it's maybe even systemically broken.
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And that really was not fully appreciated by commentators and scholars.
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Just to set this, set this up.
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So in traditional bankruptcy, traditional corporate restructuring, you've got these two requirements, right?
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In order to for the plan to get approved.
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That's what, the majority of the claimants in each class and something representing two-thirds of the value of the aggregate claims, is that right?
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Yeah, that's right.
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So when we think about a traditional bankruptcy case, we have what I call the traditional voting requirements.
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So when we think of
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a settlement, the settlement will come in the form of a plan of reorganization.
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We're going to take put aside an exception that is not applicable here, but for that plan to be approved by the court and go into effect, every class of creditor has to vote in favor of that plan.
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So how do we deem a class to be voting in favor?
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Well, it's a majority in number and it's two-thirds in value.
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So what does that look like?
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So let's imagine we have a class of 10 creditors, and the aggregate value of debt for that class is$10 million.
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So you would need at least six out of the 10 creditors to vote in favor.
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That would be the majority vote.
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And then you need at least, you know, seven of the$10 million to vote in favor of the plan for to get to two-thirds of value.
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So that's the traditional voting model.
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And you can see how it protects a lot of different parties, right?
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So you can't have one very large creditor dominating the class at the same time.
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You can't have the tyranny of small voters, small claimants, because they still need to have the two-thirds in value.
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So that's the traditional voting requirement.
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But that doesn't work in mass torts.
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Because in mass torts, right, all these claimants show up and the court doesn't know what the claims are worth.
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They haven't been adjudicated.
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Lots of people just showing up.
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They haven't been into court even in the vast majority of cases.
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So the courts have said, okay, well, what are we going to do with them?
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We can't do the traditional voting requirements to determine whether this claimant class is voting in favor of a plan.
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So what courts have decided, and what has ultimately been codified in these asbestos cases and other mass tort cases, is that every claimant, their claim is recognized as being worth one dollar.
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So every claimant gets one vote.
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They're all flooding into the voting booth.
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The problem is we don't know which claims are meritorious and which claims are non-meritorious.
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There's no filtering going on.
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So that's really the risk that we think about in the mass tort context.
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I see.
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So in your example, Samir, of the traditional corporate bankruptcy, you said, say there's 10 claimants.
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And that's actually closer to what you'd see in traditional corporate bankruptcies, maybe, you know, a couple hundred, something like that.
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But what you're saying in your article is in the mass tort context, you're getting tens of thousands of claimants.
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So these companies have now turned to bankruptcy to resolve it.
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But that creates all of these problems.
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One of which you've just mentioned is this one dollar valuation approach.
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You also write about weak powers of attorney and the introduction of litigation finance.
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So why don't you draw out these problems for us and what they mean, starting maybe with that$1 valuation approach?
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What is it and why are bankruptcies forced to take this approach in the mass tort cases?
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I mean, you mentioned the scale, but also what effect does that have on the other traditional thresholds that we have in bankruptcy?
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Starting off with the this, as you mentioned, the$1 valuation.
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It seems like an elegant solution, but it actually creates a lot of problems.
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So every claimant is given this$1,000 of their claim is recognized as having$1 in value.
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And then for voting purposes, they all submit their votes.
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What I think Congress tried to do to balance the risk of some sort of exploitation is requiring that a creditor class, in order to deem to have approved the plan that's been proposed, at least 75% of claimants in that class have to vote in favor of the plan.
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So it's almost like the special supermajority requirement.
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So thinking is that, hey, okay, yeah, maybe we've cut some corners along the way, but courts can say, look, over 75% of claimants voted in favor of the plan, so it must be a good deal, right?
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That's that's the undercurrent.
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The problem, I think, is obvious, right, as you start unpacking a little bit, is that in these cases, you have certain extremely meritorious claimants that have well documented their claim.
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And I'll give you an example from the from the J and J Tau case.
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You could have ovarian cancer claimants, and those claimants are high value claimants.
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Maybe those claims are worth a million dollars.
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Each individual claim is worth a million or five or half a million or something like that.
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Then you have maybe lung cancer claims.
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Those claims are not as evidenced as the ovarian cancer
claims.
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So the idea is that they are probably worth less.
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So maybe it's 250,000 or 150,000 a claim.
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And then you have claims that oftentimes are not evidenced at all, and there's a question of whether they're compensable.
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So that could be maybe the gynecological claims.
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So you have these different classes of claims.
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And what debtors realize is that when every claimant has a vote, they don't necessarily have to appeal to the high value claimant.
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They could focus on a deal that really appeals to maybe the low-value claimants or those claimants who don't even have compensable claims, with the premise that if they can clear the 75% threshold, they can bind everyone in that class.
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So that, of course, really disadvantages those who have been most harmed by the tortious conduct.
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So that's really the risk here that we're trying to address.
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Now the JJ case really brought this forward, and I'll kind of tell the story as quickly as I can.
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I think most of our familiar with the fact that JJ was facing tort liability based on their talcum powder.
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And, you know, at the time JJ didn't think much of it.
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But you fast forward to 2019, and suddenly there are a lot of claimants who are making this allegation of ovarian cancer, et cetera, based on use of talcum powder, and we have a multi-district litigation created in New Jersey.
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So JJ doesn't like the way the MDL is going, primarily from the fact that they've disputed that talcum powder causes cancer.
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But in MDL, what happens a lot of times the MDL judge is forcing a settlement sort of merit notwithstanding.
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So JJ decides to file for bankruptcy.
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And it's a total, it's a very meandering process.
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Really, what happens is they file in bankruptcy court in New Jersey.
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Ultimately, that case is thrown out because of the fact that the court recognizes that there's a lack of insolvency.
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JJ files again, makes some changes to the structure of its talk subsidiary, hoping to be successful.
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That is unsuccessful as well.
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That gets thrown out.
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So JJ is not daunted by this.
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They think, you know what, let's try it one more time.
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So they decide to file in the Southern District of Texas.
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And what they decide to do ultimately is first have the voting.
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Let's have the voting before we go into bankruptcy, as part of what's called a pre-packaged plan.
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And then if they can clear the 75% threshold, JJ thinks, well, then we can go into court and we can show the bankruptcy judge, hey, don't throw us out this time.
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We got all the votes, everyone's happy, let's move forward.
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So JJ has the balloting outside of the bankruptcy process, and it's unsuccessful.
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They fall short, about 10% short, which is significant.
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So JJ decides to do something, and this is the allegation.
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There's no evidence that JJ did this, but here's the allegation.
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JJ decided that, well, we need more people voting.
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So what they did is they sent out word allegedly through the plaintiff's attorney community saying that, hey, you remember all those claims that you rejected, all those parties you didn't represent because you thought their claims were specious?
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Go back to them and bring them back into the process because we're gonna pay out every claim at least$1,500.
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We're not even gonna scrutinize them.
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So even if there's a bad claim, bring them in.
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Now JJ knows as those parties start entering the voting booth, of course they're gonna vote in favor of the plan because these new voters they don't have meritorious claims.
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And you could argue their claims aren't compensable at all.
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All they want is that$1,500 that's been dangled.
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Right?
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So this moves forward, and lo and behold, we have a revote, and suddenly JJ clears the threshold.
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So this lands in bankruptcy court.
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As you can imagine, a lot of parties object.
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And Judge Lopez has to make sense of this.
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And in looking through this, what he realizes he a number of problems are highlighted, right?
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First and foremost, the fact that you have non-meritorious claimants voting.
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They are pushing the case above that 75% threshold and binding all claimants.
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That's the first problem.
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The second problem is that a lot of these attorneys in the J and J case, they're coming into court and saying, Your Honor, I have a right to vote on behalf of 15,000 clients or 20,000 clients.
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And as the court starts probing that a little bit, they realize those attorneys actually did not have the authority to do that.
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The engagement letters did
not provide for that.
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And he makes it very clear in his uh opinion that he didn't think the plaintiff's attorneys in this case were trying to deceive the court at all.
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They honestly believed they have the authority, but they didn't.
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And that is the scariest part about this because it's unclear how much this is unfolding in other cases.
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So, Samir, you said it became clear that many of these claims were non-meritorious.
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How did that become clear?
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Because you're what part of your article is saying there's just not enough human power in the court system to assess the merit of these claims.
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So did they sit down and go through each one and say, oh, did you really suffer?
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Did you get a cancer diagnosis?
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Like how did they determine, okay, did or did they just assume you guys went out to these plaintiffs' lawyers who formally rejected these claims and brought them back in?
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They must not be meritorious.
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It's more along the ladder.
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The idea that, you know, during the intake process, a lot of individuals are interviewed and they're asked basic questions.
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You know, what product did you use?
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How do you know it's a J and J product?
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Things like that.
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What is your harm?
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And oftentimes in these cases, what emerges is that this individual hasn't been harmed or they didn't use any talcum powder.
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You know, and when that emerges, of course, oftentimes place attorneys will walk away from that representation.
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What we're seeing though in a lot of these cases, and we'll talk about litigation finance in just a second, is that if you know that a claim is not going to be filtered in any way, that they're kind of ride through this process, then there's an incentive to marshal these claims.
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And then once they appear, because of no filtering, they have a right to vote.
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And of course, the interests of that party diverges dramatically from those of meritorious claimants who are interested in getting a fair settlement and they're not going to take the first offer on the table.
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You know, they're they're willing to wait.
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That divergence is where we see the sort of disenfranchisement.
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If you can go out and get enough non-meritorious claimants, they can actually be the ones who are dictating the terms of the settlement and whether the plan will be approved.
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That's the fear.
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Because of the 75% threshold, you have people who are voting who are pushing the the debtor over the threshold and binding everyone, but they shouldn't be voting at all.
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And as Richard knows this well, if you are not entitled to a recovery from the bankruptcy estate at all through the plan, then you should be deemed to be voting against the plan.
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Yeah, well, tell us more about that, Richard.
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There's actually a provision of the uh code in chapter 11.
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This is what I think Samir is referring to, that says that if your claim is worth nothing, uh then you are deemed not to have accepted the plan.
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In other words, by operation of the statute, you're not allowed to be considered to be accepting the plan.
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A rule like that's precisely to prevent manipulated or collusive results, basically, where parties who really don't have any can't get any benefit from a plan are nonetheless voting in favor, maybe because of a side deal, or maybe they also have a different claim in that's being put in a different class.
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So in order to get a plan approved, but in a way that isn't actually representing the interests of the whole class and doing what class voting is supposed to be doing in the context of bankruptcy, which is putting people together who have a common economic and financial interest, are receiving similar types of, or really identical, it's supposed to be nearly identical, types of payouts.
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And so we can trust a majority voting system where the majority in the class, if it approves the plan, gives us reason to think that it really is good for the members of the class as a whole and therefore should be binding on the class as a whole.
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Because the rule here in bankruptcy is it's democratic in terms of you can vote against a plan, but still be bound by it if a majority of your fellow class members are voting in favor.
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So it's kind of an anti-ballot stuffing rule in a way, trying, you know, getting junky votes that shouldn't be counted at all, getting their votes into the ballot box.
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This seems like an attorney problem because you would assume that the attorneys are well aware of this bankruptcy rule, and yet they are putting forth claimants who are not entitled under this rule.
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Yeah, and normally, I mean, this is one of the reasons why using bankruptcy for these cases has problems.
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Samir said at the beginning, every settlement platform we have is flawed.
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And you're now identifying one of the mechanisms kind of that justice can be undermined here.
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So if you
think what is the normal defendant incentive when facing mass tort uh litigation, normally the defendant wants to exclude the junky cases, right?
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I mean, obviously, if there's a case and it's not clear that the plaintiff was even injured by the defendant's product or there's no clear injury or no clear connection, the defendant would normally try to get the case dismissed.
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And if it was a class action, defendant would say that party shouldn't be part of the class, right?
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Or would set up a mechanism in distributing, let's say, the uh settlement in a class action or or that a judgment if it if it got that far, that would assess the value of that claim would make sure that that claimant got nothing, right?
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So normally the defendant would be policing the plaintiff's attorneys, to get to your point, Amy, in a way that would prevent them from, or at least make it more difficult for them to advance junky, non-meritorious claims.
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But what's happening here with this voting mechanism, there isn't anything analogous to that in the class action setting.
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In the class action setting, it's not majority rules.
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Uh, it is you can unilaterally opt out if you're part of the plaintiff's class, certainly if their damage is being assessed, if you don't like what the class action is offering you, right?
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So, but now we have this majority voting rule, which is specific to bankruptcy.
00:18:24.480 --> 00:18:38.720
And so now you get this perverse incentive where it's in the collective or the joint interests of the defendant and the plaintiff's attorney to stuff the ballot box with bad claims in order to hit the voting thresholds.
00:18:38.799 --> 00:19:01.839
And just to be clear, what's going to happen there, and this is what Samir is suggesting, what those bad claims will be voting for is a low payout threshold, which will simultaneously undercompensate the meritorious claims in the class, but overcompensate the junky claims, which is fine with the junkie claimants and with the junky claimants' attorneys.
00:19:02.000 --> 00:19:09.680
And so that is the perverse dynamic that's being set up through the voting mechanism, which is particular to bankruptcy.
00:19:10.079 --> 00:19:15.680
Richard, you and I had a conversation on one of our episodes with Brooke Gottberg about the Purdue case.
00:19:15.839 --> 00:19:21.920
And it kind of felt like no matter what you voted, the outcome there, you couldn't deny that the plan hit the 75% approval threshold.
00:19:22.160 --> 00:19:26.240
But for me, and I think for Brooke, too, there remained something kind of yucky about it.
00:19:26.319 --> 00:19:35.920
It felt like, yeah, maybe you hit the threshold, but there's still all these individuals, these groups of individuals who are really harmed and
they're really opposed to this plan, they're opposed to releasing the sacklers from civil liability.
00:19:36.160 --> 00:19:41.279
I'm wondering now, Samir, that you're peeling back the curtain on the mechanics of voting.
00:19:41.599 --> 00:19:46.160
Did those claimants who approved this really actually have meaningful claims?
00:19:46.240 --> 00:19:48.960
And did they deserve to meet the 75% threshold?
00:19:49.279 --> 00:19:52.799
It's unclear how pervasive this is, but it goes back to what you're asking.
00:19:52.880 --> 00:19:57.279
So the mechanics of this, the power of attorney is the real question mark here.
00:19:57.359 --> 00:19:59.680
Because what happens Yeah, tell us about power of attorney.
00:19:59.920 --> 00:20:05.599
Yeah, you know, in these cases, what's happening is that, you know, it's rare that claimants actually vote.
00:20:05.759 --> 00:20:07.359
The victims actually vote.
00:20:07.519 --> 00:20:15.839
What oftentimes happens is attorneys come before the court and say, Your Honor, I represent 15,000 clients and they're all voting in this way.
00:20:16.400 --> 00:20:18.160
Okay, well, what's the basis for that?
00:20:18.319 --> 00:20:20.720
So we allow that kind of action by attorneys.
00:20:20.960 --> 00:20:26.559
In cases where it is authorized, there tends to be an engagement letter where there's a very explicit power of attorney provision.
00:20:26.799 --> 00:20:33.759
The tricky thing is that courts tend not to verify that the appropriate language is in the engagement letter.
00:20:33.920 --> 00:20:35.599
They trust the plaintiff's attorneys.
00:20:35.680 --> 00:20:41.920
And, you know, the idea of trusting is fine, but trust but verify is, I think, something that really has to carry forward here.
00:20:42.079 --> 00:20:44.319
So we have a lot of examples of this as of late.
00:20:44.640 --> 00:20:46.880
I'll give you one from the Imherst bankruptcy case.
00:20:47.119 --> 00:20:50.640
In that case, we had a very colorful attorney named Thomas Bevan.
00:20:50.960 --> 00:20:56.079
And his argument was that he was representing 15,000 clients in that case.
00:20:56.160 --> 00:20:58.160
And that was a dispositive block.
00:20:58.400 --> 00:21:03.359
Emherst could not clear the 75% threshold without the votes of his clients.
00:21:03.680 --> 00:21:05.920
So he initially votes against the plan.
00:21:06.000 --> 00:21:10.400
Then the debtor's counsel reaches out and tries to explain hey, this is a good deal, maybe you should reconsider.
00:21:10.559 --> 00:21:13.920
He reconsiders and he withdraws those rejections.
00:21:14.160 --> 00:21:15.440
That's still not sufficient.
00:21:15.599 --> 00:21:18.319
So debtor's counsel goes back, talks with some more.
00:21:18.559 --> 00:21:22.240
Then his clients apparently vote in favor of the plan.
00:21:22.480 --> 00:21:25.519
So that flip-flop catches attention of a lot of parties.
00:21:25.680 --> 00:21:31.200
So there's an objection that is filed against these votes, and the court has
to have a hearing.
00:21:31.359 --> 00:21:39.519
As part of that hearing, the court interviews Thomas Bevan, and this horrible revelation emerges where he's on the stand.
00:21:39.599 --> 00:21:44.880
He doesn't realize that this is shocking to the conscience, but he's saying, I don't have a power of attorney provision.
00:21:45.039 --> 00:21:48.000
I get to vote for my clients because they don't know what's going on.
00:21:48.160 --> 00:21:50.480
I don't have to tell them there's a bankruptcy case.
00:21:50.640 --> 00:21:53.359
I don't even have to tell them there's a settlement on the table.
00:21:53.519 --> 00:21:58.160
I get to do that for them because they don't know anything about this case.
00:21:58.319 --> 00:21:59.759
Also, we find out he never even.
00:22:00.240 --> 00:22:06.799
Asked his clients whether they had used Immers talc or if they'd even been harmed by the use of talcum powder in general.
00:22:07.039 --> 00:22:16.079
So all this emerges, and the court is shocked because they realize he honestly believes that he has the power to vote for this block, but he doesn't.
00:22:16.240 --> 00:22:20.240
And this is the dispositive voting block in the case.
00:22:20.480 --> 00:22:23.920
And then I think some people would like to say, hey, that's an outlier.
00:22:24.079 --> 00:22:35.759
But then we see echoes of that in the JJ case, where once again the plaintiff's attorneys, and once again, and I'm not trying to disparage plaintiff's attorneys, there's so many great plaintiff's attorneys, but this is just trying to highlight a misunderstanding in the process.
00:22:36.000 --> 00:22:50.480
The attorneys who represented over 50% of the claimants in the case, as Judge Lopez is questioning what is your basis for you saying that you get to vote on behalf of this block, what emerges is that they don't have any contractual authority to do that.
00:22:50.640 --> 00:22:56.480
Their power of attorney provision doesn't provide for it at all, even though they had made that representation repeatedly.
00:22:56.640 --> 00:23:01.279
And but for Judge Lopez asking them to substantiate it, we never would have learned.
00:23:01.440 --> 00:23:03.680
It happened in J and J, it happened in Immers.
00:23:04.000 --> 00:23:10.079
We don't know how many other cases it's happened in, because without the objection, it almost never comes to light.
00:23:10.160 --> 00:23:11.119
So that's the real fear.
00:23:11.519 --> 00:23:16.160
So, okay, so the weak power of attorney, uh, the$1 valuation are big problems.
00:23:16.319 --> 00:23:22.559
You and I have also talked in the past, Samir, about what you call a pay capital in litigation finance, the ill effects of that in general.
00:23:22.720 --> 00:23:24.480
How does that concept fit in here?
00:23:24.799 --> 00:23:26.720
Yeah, so this is the amplifier effect.
00:23:26.880 --> 00:23:28.480
This is adding fuel to the fire.
00:23:28.640 --> 00:23:34.960
We already have a compromise system, and now we have an actor that
is amplifying the exploitation.
00:23:35.119 --> 00:23:37.680
Not necessarily intentionally, but I can quickly explain.
00:23:37.759 --> 00:23:52.160
So when we think about claims in these mass tort cases, because we can't have a true adjudication, all we know is they're going to go through a process and ultimately there's going to be a settlement trust created, and that settlement trust is going to disperse proceeds to claimants.
00:23:52.400 --> 00:24:05.519
But once again, because there's so many claims and there's no filtering, what we see happening is non-meritorious claims ride through the system and then get paid out at the same rate as meritorious claims.
00:24:05.680 --> 00:24:13.759
So if you understand that's going to happen, you understand as well that there is an incentive to marshal non-meritorious cases.
00:24:14.000 --> 00:24:20.079
Because you never have to actually take them into court and try to adjudicate them and have them evaluated.
00:24:20.160 --> 00:24:22.160
You understand that they're just going to ride through.
00:24:22.400 --> 00:24:32.400
So what Litigation Finance has done has provided the funding and the implicit encouragement to plaintiff's attorneys to go out and marshal all the claims you can.
00:24:32.559 --> 00:24:39.839
Don't worry about whether it's potentially non-compensable or maybe there's some flaws in the evidentiary basis.
00:24:40.000 --> 00:24:41.440
Just go ahead and marshal it.
00:24:41.680 --> 00:24:46.799
So that is bringing more non-meritorious claimants into the voting booth.
00:24:47.039 --> 00:24:47.200
Right.
00:24:47.279 --> 00:24:50.160
And that's what Richard was talking about, stuffing the ballot.
00:24:50.480 --> 00:24:52.799
Yeah, so you said there's no filtering mechanism.
00:24:52.880 --> 00:24:54.880
That's what allows these claims to ride through.
00:24:55.200 --> 00:24:55.359
Yes.
00:24:55.599 --> 00:24:58.400
So why don't we turn then, Samir, to some of your proposed solutions?
00:24:58.480 --> 00:25:07.119
Because a lot of them do address that front-end filter at the beginning in order to make sure that you know we never get to this place with tons and tons of non-monitorious claims.
00:25:07.200 --> 00:25:09.680
So talk to us a little bit about your proposed solutions.
00:25:10.319 --> 00:25:16.720
Yeah, so at the one simple level, we have a problem with the every claimant gets one vote model.
00:25:17.200 --> 00:25:19.519
So I think there's an easy solution there.
00:25:19.920 --> 00:25:25.839
Trying to return to the traditional voting requirements, which is of course a majority in number and two-thirds in value.
00:25:26.079 --> 00:25:31.839
And the easiest way to do that is for the court to create valuation tiers.
00:25:32.160 --> 00:25:34.240
Right now we're not filtering claims.
00:25:34.400 --> 00:25:38.079
And I addressed that in another part of the paper, and I'll talk about that in just a second.
00:25:38.160 --> 00:25:42.160
But at a very simple level, can we bring back the traditional voting requirements?
00:25:42.240 --> 00:25:42.960
And I think we can.
00:25:43.119 --> 00:25:47.440
So what a bankruptcy court could do is say, okay, we're going to create valuation tiers.
00:25:47.599 --> 00:26:05.599
And if you're in this talcum potter case and you're alleging ovarian cancer, well, we understand that that is the highest value claim available, and we believe that there's three types of claims within that subcategory, and they're worth either a million dollars, 750,000, or half a million.
00:26:05.920 --> 00:26:07.519
Okay, then what's below that?
00:26:07.680 --> 00:26:10.640
Then we have the, let's say, lung cancer claims.
00:26:10.720 --> 00:26:17.119
And the same kind of maybe there's three types of claims within that subcategory, and then the lowest value claims are the gynecological claims.
00:26:17.440 --> 00:26:37.200
As the court creates those tiers and creates those rough valuation estimates, now they can go back to the claims that have been filed in the case and start classifying them, saying, okay, we're going to start classifying all the claims, and you're going to actually receive a rough claim valuation just for the purposes of voting.
00:26:37.680 --> 00:26:42.160
Once we instill that, now we can go back to the traditional voting requirements.
00:26:42.319 --> 00:26:45.759
That way we eliminate the tyranny of non-meritorious claims.
00:26:45.920 --> 00:26:53.359
Now suddenly just marshalling these low-value, maybe gynecological claims, that's not going to be profitable.
00:26:53.519 --> 00:26:54.799
That's not going to be lucrative.
00:26:54.880 --> 00:26:57.119
That's not going to allow you to control the vote anymore.
00:26:57.279 --> 00:27:02.240
So the idea is that altering that back-end dynamic will change front-end incentives.
00:27:02.319 --> 00:27:05.519
So that's that's the first piece for me is making that change.
00:27:05.599 --> 00:27:07.440
But it doesn't solve the problem, right?
00:27:07.519 --> 00:27:13.680
You're still, you still could see non-meritorious claims flood the system, nevertheless, and ultimately affect the voting process.
00:27:13.839 --> 00:27:15.119
So how do we address that?
00:27:15.279 --> 00:27:18.640
You know, AI is sort of the you know the flavor de jour right now.
00:27:18.960 --> 00:27:21.200
I'm kind of hopping on that bandwagon a little bit.
00:27:21.359 --> 00:27:25.759
So what a lot of courts have said, wow, there's all these claims that get filed.
00:27:26.160 --> 00:27:27.680
How are we going to process them?
00:27:27.920 --> 00:27:34.240
So one thing that a court could do is that they could require every claimant to fill out what's called a plaintiff fact sheet.
00:27:34.319 --> 00:27:40.559
And what that plaintiff fact sheet does is it provides all the factual details of that party's claim.
00:27:40.799 --> 00:27:42.480
Okay, have you been harmed?
00:27:42.640 --> 00:27:43.519
How were you harmed?
00:27:43.680 --> 00:27:44.720
What product did
you use?
00:27:44.880 --> 00:27:45.759
How did you use it?
00:27:45.920 --> 00:27:47.279
All those very simple questions.
00:27:47.440 --> 00:27:53.599
It doesn't require the claimant to establish causation, but it does require the claimant to tell their story.
00:27:53.839 --> 00:28:00.160
Once you get those plaintiff fact sheets, now, of course it said, look, we can't look through 150,000 plaintiff fact sheets that we're not going to try.
00:28:00.319 --> 00:28:04.960
But with AI, what you could do is you could upload all of those fact sheets.
00:28:05.039 --> 00:28:14.559
And then through predetermined protocols, the AI platform could determine which claims pose a high risk of being non-meritorious or non-compensable.
00:28:14.799 --> 00:28:22.640
Then you could have basically an iterative process where let's say we take 150,000 claims and AI determines that 30,000 are high risk.
00:28:22.880 --> 00:28:23.200
Great.
00:28:23.279 --> 00:28:28.400
Then they can do a second pass with additional protocols, maybe narrow that down to 15,000.
00:28:28.559 --> 00:28:31.279
Then you could do another one, maybe narrow it down to 10,000.
00:28:31.440 --> 00:28:43.839
Then you could have an actual individual, a person, go through those high-risk 10,000 claims and determine which ones should be either kicked out of the case or maybe more documentation is necessary.
00:28:44.160 --> 00:28:54.480
At the end of that process, which could be done relatively quickly, then a determination could be made that, okay, these are the claims that the court is going to dismiss from the case.
00:28:55.359 --> 00:29:04.559
What the corollary to that is, is that let's say there's 10,000 claimants being kicked out of the case because they have no just substantiation for their claim.
00:29:05.359 --> 00:29:10.640
The court could determine who are the attorneys representing these claimants.
00:29:11.119 --> 00:29:15.599
And then let's say there's one attorney in particular who's representing half of them.
00:29:15.759 --> 00:29:20.880
Then the court could penalize that attorney by withholding some of her fees.
00:29:21.119 --> 00:29:23.440
And I explained exactly how that would work in my article.
00:29:23.519 --> 00:29:26.880
It's somewhat a convoluted process, but I do think it could work.
00:29:26.960 --> 00:29:30.400
It has been done and used in MDL settings and in the past.
00:29:30.480 --> 00:29:32.240
So I think it could be used in bankruptcy as well.
00:29:32.400 --> 00:29:41.119
But that is, those are my two big pieces, which is kind of changing how the voting process works, but also deterring non-meritorious claims from appearing in the case in the first place.
00:29:41.279 --> 00:29:52.480
And then the final piece is I think this is an easy one, making sure that when an attorney relies on a power of attorney, that that provision actually gives that attorney the power to vote on behalf of their client.
00:29:52.640 --> 00:29:55.599
And that's a very simple, we know what language has to appear.
00:29:55.759 --> 00:30:04.960
It's merely the court asking the attorney to produce a representative sample of their engagement letter and the court reviewing that, making sure yes, you have the power.
00:30:05.119 --> 00:30:10.720
But once again, the court instructing the attorney, even when you have the power, you still have to tell the client about the settlement.
00:30:10.799 --> 00:30:16.720
You have to tell them the terms of the settlement, and you have to give the client, the attorney, to have some sort of input in that process.
00:30:16.960 --> 00:30:21.839
Those are the three big pieces that I think can very easily be implemented.
00:30:22.000 --> 00:30:26.799
And once they are, I think it can really be a dramatic shift in improving the voting process.
00:30:27.039 --> 00:30:31.119
Yeah, the AI idea is brilliant because it can deal with this large scale.
00:30:31.359 --> 00:30:46.240
One thing you mentioned to me here, which I actually thought was an interesting solution, was some sort of collaboration between bankruptcy courts and district courts, where like they're holding these mini trials that represent, you know, one tier, and then you hold a trial, it represents the second tier.
00:30:46.640 --> 00:30:48.160
Explain that to our listeners.
00:30:48.559 --> 00:30:52.319
I think this is actually the most optimal way to get the valuation tiers.
00:30:52.400 --> 00:30:55.200
So I'd kind of framed it as the bankruptcy court playing that role.
00:30:55.359 --> 00:31:02.160
But in reality, the bankruptcy court is not trained to adjudicate and assess these types of tort claims.
00:31:02.319 --> 00:31:05.039
That's really not where their experience lies.
00:31:05.200 --> 00:31:09.359
So what I propose in the article is that there's two different ways to go about it.
00:31:09.440 --> 00:31:18.400
Either the district court in that jurisdiction could do a perform an act that's called withdrawing the reference, or the bankruptcy court itself could lift the automatic state.
00:31:18.480 --> 00:31:20.240
But the ultimate result is the same.
00:31:20.559 --> 00:31:30.079
Certain representative cases in that dispute would be transferred to the district court, and the district court would assess those claims.
00:31:30.240 --> 00:31:34.720
And I think of a term that could be familiar with a lot of the listeners is the bellwether trial.
00:31:35.039 --> 00:31:44.799
So the bankruptcy court may say, okay, we have 150,000 claimants, but really when we boil it down, there are five or six different categories.
00:31:44.960 --> 00:31:54.319
We're gonna find five or six representative cases for each category, and we are going to transfer those cases to the district court.
00:31:54.400 --> 00:31:58.880
And the district court is going to have a hearing assessing these individual cases.
00:31:59.119 --> 00:32:09.680
Usually it's there's an expedite discovery, and the idea is that at the end of that, there is either there's a ruling
or there's some sort of assessment of the claim that determines what the claim is worth.
00:32:10.000 --> 00:32:16.000
As the court moves through that bellwether process, they start getting determination of the valuation tiers.
00:32:16.319 --> 00:32:22.400
With that information, with that new data, they can send that back to the bankruptcy court to basically finish the process.
00:32:22.559 --> 00:32:31.839
Now the bankruptcy court, as we talked about before, can say, hey, I know if you have an ovarian cancer claim of this type, then your claim is worth$250,000.
00:32:32.319 --> 00:32:36.960
If you have an ovarian cancer claim of this other type, then we know it's worth zero.
00:32:37.200 --> 00:32:38.960
By creating that stratification, right?
00:32:39.039 --> 00:32:47.519
Now we can go back and implement the rest of my proposal, which is just kind of allowing for the traditional voting requirements, you know, majority in number and two-thirds in value.
00:32:47.759 --> 00:32:49.599
It's not a novel idea.
00:32:49.839 --> 00:32:51.200
It has done in the past.
00:32:51.440 --> 00:32:52.720
So this happened in the A.
00:32:52.799 --> 00:32:52.880
H.
00:32:53.119 --> 00:33:05.839
Robbins case, and it happened recently with PG ⁇ E, where realizing the bankruptcy court's limitations, the bankruptcy court and PGE lifted the automatic stay and sent cases to the district court for once again to assess the tort claims.
00:33:06.240 --> 00:33:22.319
The use of the district courts to assess the merits of these claims, both whether there's actually bireponents of the evidence that the uh the elements of a tort would be established and then what the damages would be, that is the traditional role of the trial courts.
00:33:22.400 --> 00:33:27.839
That's why we have trial courts and that's why they've you know what what they've developed to do over hundreds of years.
00:33:28.079 --> 00:33:33.279
So to have the adversarial system play out in front of a judge and sometimes a jury.
00:33:33.519 --> 00:33:35.599
And they're fairly good at doing that.
00:33:35.839 --> 00:33:44.240
They are the best we have at providing the very filtering that is the concern when we try instead to do this in bankruptcy.
00:33:44.400 --> 00:33:49.279
So that I think raises the question of why are we even in bankruptcy in the first place?
00:33:49.440 --> 00:33:50.960
It's mass torts.
00:33:51.119 --> 00:33:57.519
Why not do them in front of judges and juries the traditional way, either individually or class actions?
00:33:57.759 --> 00:34:09.840
Now, I think there are some cases where the explanation for bankruptcy is clear, which is that the defendant is almost certainly insolvent or will be rendered insolvent by the weight of all of these claims.
00:34:10.000 --> 00:34:16.480
This is what happened with the asbestos litigation that's kind of was the um the archetype of all this, the prototype of all this.
00:34:16.639 --> 00:34:24.320
John Mansville and other cases like that, where the asbestos liability was simply crushing and the companies were would be um were insolvent.
00:34:24.639 --> 00:34:27.599
And you mentioned a more recent example, Samir, I think it's Purdue.
00:34:27.679 --> 00:34:33.119
The OxyContin liability is enough to really just render Purdue not viable going forward.
00:34:33.280 --> 00:34:44.400
But we're also using bankruptcy to deal with uh the tort liability of defendants like JJ, who people are not legging and are not plausibly being rendered insolvent.
00:34:44.719 --> 00:34:52.079
And so it seems then what we're doing is we're substituting what's a pretty good filtering mechanism, which is the trial process.
00:34:52.239 --> 00:35:07.679
And we are we're displacing that with a what's not, as a by your acknowledgement, is not an effective mechanism for filtering, which is the bankruptcy process, in a context where we don't have the type of financial distress or insolvency that bankruptcy was designed for.
00:35:07.840 --> 00:35:16.079
So one question might be why are those cases with the not plausibly insolvent defendant even in bankruptcy in the first place?
00:35:16.400 --> 00:35:17.599
Yeah, and that's a great question.
00:35:17.679 --> 00:35:23.840
So when we're comparing the two platforms, we think of MDL, MDL serves a number of different cases very well.
00:35:24.079 --> 00:35:25.679
You know, we can think of the traditional model.
00:35:25.760 --> 00:35:28.320
I think the example I think of is the VW diesel case.
00:35:28.400 --> 00:35:33.039
You may remember VW misstated their miles per gallon and manipulated that process.
00:35:33.199 --> 00:35:35.679
There was no dispute about liability in that case.
00:35:35.840 --> 00:35:38.880
MDL was a perfect platform and it worked perfectly.
00:35:39.119 --> 00:35:46.639
Bankruptcy, though, offers some advantages that I think address deficiencies for MDL in other types of cases.
00:35:46.880 --> 00:35:51.519
The classic example is a case where a corporate defendant is disputing liability.
00:35:51.760 --> 00:36:00.400
That's problematic because MDL, and I won't sort of dive too deep into the minutia, but MDL is oftentimes great at procedural streamlining.
00:36:00.559 --> 00:36:05.760
And it's great when parties agree that there has to be a settlement, there is liability, it's not disputed.
00:36:05.840 --> 00:36:13.280
And what the MDL judge is going to do is just force these parties to negotiate until there is a settlement and basically gonna hold them captive.
00:36:13.519 --> 00:36:25.679
But like we saw with JJ, when liability is disputed, suddenly MDL can be suboptimal, where really all the MDL judge is doing is trying to force a settlement, but one party is saying, I don't want to settle.
00:36:25.840 --> 00:36:26.000
Right?
00:36:26.079 --> 00:36:28.079
So what is bankruptcy offering in exchange?
00:36:28.239 --> 00:36:33.760
What bankruptcy offers is why it still makes it very attractive, is it's it's offering speed, a more efficient
resolution.
00:36:33.920 --> 00:36:35.920
Now, I think a lot of parties will dispute that.
00:36:36.079 --> 00:36:44.159
You know, a lot of the cases we've seen recently have not necessarily resolved on an expedited schedule, especially if we look at the best wall case and things like that.
00:36:44.320 --> 00:36:48.320
But nevertheless, that's one thing that bankruptcy is offering is speedy resolution.
00:36:48.480 --> 00:36:51.039
It's also offering a public platform.
00:36:51.519 --> 00:36:53.440
So these are public proceedings.
00:36:53.599 --> 00:36:58.079
The settlement that is ultimately proposed can be discovered and reviewed by anyone.
00:36:58.320 --> 00:36:59.920
It's not done in the shadows.
00:37:00.000 --> 00:37:06.559
We understand what the resolution is, we understand when there are acknowledgments of guilt, which is not the case in MDL.
00:37:06.719 --> 00:37:10.000
You know, that settlement is done in the shadows, it's not made public.
00:37:10.320 --> 00:37:13.599
So that's another thing that makes the bankruptcy process some attractive.
00:37:13.760 --> 00:37:23.920
Also keep in mind with bankruptcy, because of the bankruptcy court judge and the powers that that judge has, you know, there is a platform for settlement and negotiation, like we see in MDL.
00:37:24.000 --> 00:37:39.840
But if that fails in bankruptcy, at that point the bankruptcy judge can start applying pressure in a unique way, not least of which is dismissing the case, you know, and that could be disastrous for the corporate defendant because it's going to send them back to the MDL court, oftentimes the court that they left because they said that it was deficient.
00:37:40.000 --> 00:37:41.599
So I hear what you're saying, Richard.
00:37:41.679 --> 00:37:47.679
It's it's very complicated and bankruptcy is flawed and it doesn't really work for every type of case.
00:37:47.840 --> 00:37:50.079
And I think the one example you gave makes a lot of sense.
00:37:50.159 --> 00:37:53.199
Like what happens when the corporate defendant is not insolvent?
00:37:53.760 --> 00:37:56.320
Well, you know, once again, that is debated, right?
00:37:56.480 --> 00:38:05.920
JJ is going to argue that it doesn't seem like the talx subsidiary is insolvent, but they have limited resources to pay these claims.
00:38:06.079 --> 00:38:07.920
So that's the argument JJ makes.
00:38:08.000 --> 00:38:16.480
Now, the argument is sort of viable because J and J altered the funding agreement, the amount of money that they would make available to their subsidiary.
00:38:16.639 --> 00:38:20.800
So maybe that kind of feels like that seems like a little bit of manipulation on JJ's part.
00:38:20.880 --> 00:38:23.920
And that's a discussion that a lot of bankruptcy court judges are having.
00:38:24.000 --> 00:38:25.199
But I hear your concern.
00:38:25.280 --> 00:38:26.880
You know, is this the place for bankruptcy?
00:38:27.119 --> 00:38:29.039
Is bankruptcy the place for these cases, rather?
00:38:29.199 --> 00:38:31.199
That's a meaningful debate that still has to be had.
00:38:31.519 --> 00:38:42.159
You said that MDL may not be the ideal place when a defendant is disputing liability, like JJ saying, we don't think our talc, uh, our powder caused these diseases.
00:38:42.400 --> 00:38:52.400
But another place that defendants assert that there is no real liability, that their uh products were not harmful or didn't cause the injuries, is court, right?
00:38:52.480 --> 00:38:53.519
Is a trial, right?
00:38:53.679 --> 00:38:58.320
And so, and a trial also has the benefit that you're identifying as being very public.
00:38:58.559 --> 00:39:03.440
And we also know that trial judges can pressure parties to settle as well.
00:39:03.599 --> 00:39:05.119
That's certainly something that happens.
00:39:05.679 --> 00:39:27.519
So it seems that given that option for defendants who really think they're innocent, who really think they're being kind of shaken down, and there just is no real plausible scientific connection, let's say, between their product and the alleged injuries, those defendants must have some reason to think that there's just the traditional trial system, even before we get to MDL, is not satisfying for them.
00:39:27.679 --> 00:39:29.280
It's not going to get them what they need.
00:39:29.599 --> 00:39:31.360
And it'd be interesting to talk about why.
00:39:31.519 --> 00:39:34.320
Do they think that the juries will be biased against them?
00:39:34.480 --> 00:39:37.599
Do they think that there's too much randomness potentially in jury verdicts?
00:39:37.679 --> 00:39:42.960
So you could, I don't know, like let's say there's 10 different cases, you win nine, but the tenth jury is kind of right.
00:39:43.199 --> 00:39:47.840
You get unlucky, and then it imposes punitive damages that are crushing.
00:39:48.000 --> 00:40:06.639
And so it seems that uh it must be in the interest of defendants, even those who think really think that the claims don't have merit, to go to bankruptcy to avoid a trial process where normally they would have their day in court and try to prove that there is no demonstrable um caused injury by their products.
00:40:06.880 --> 00:40:29.199
And they're willing to go so far as even to maybe manufacture financial distress, as you were talking about, to try to satisfy a real or uh potentially judicially imposed insolvency requirement, such as cabineting off a subsidiary, limiting its access to funding, and then placing that into bankruptcy and saying, well, that really is insolvent or close to it.
00:40:29.280 --> 00:40:37.440
And so if we think that insolvency or financial distress should be a criterion for legitimate bankruptcy uh proceeding, you've got it.
00:40:37.679 --> 00:40:45.039
The defendant there has actually, in some ways, contrived that insolvency or distress in order to take advantage bankruptcy.
00:40:45.119 --> 00:40:53.599
So there must be something from the defendant's perspective, even the
defendant who thinks it's innocent, that bankruptcy provides over just the regular trial system.
00:40:53.840 --> 00:41:01.119
Yeah, and I think we start off with the your first point about what about having trials outside of bankruptcy, outside MDL?
00:41:01.280 --> 00:41:02.639
What's the reluctance there?
00:41:02.800 --> 00:41:04.719
And I think you identify the lottery effects.
00:41:04.800 --> 00:41:08.239
So as a as an academic, as a policymaker, you're looking at that.
00:41:08.320 --> 00:41:09.760
We think about lottery effects.
00:41:09.840 --> 00:41:12.480
You know, we have a pool of claimants who are all harmed.
00:41:12.639 --> 00:41:21.679
You know, if you go into these trials, out of, you know, you know, one party may receive a$100 million judgment and the next person may receive nothing, even though they're similarly situated.
00:41:21.760 --> 00:41:23.840
So from a policy perspective, that's a little troubling for me.
00:41:23.920 --> 00:41:24.400
But you're right.
00:41:24.480 --> 00:41:27.280
That's the nature of trial work in the US.
00:41:27.440 --> 00:41:30.880
I think from a corporate defendant's perspective, why are they unhappy?
00:41:31.039 --> 00:41:42.159
Well, most have been unhappy because what they argue is that even though they may win a lot of those cases, the costs associated with that and going through a trial are so staggering.
00:41:42.320 --> 00:41:46.159
And keep in mind, it's not one case, it's not 20 cases.
00:41:46.320 --> 00:41:52.880
Sometimes there's hundreds or even thousands of these cases unfolding all around the country in federal and state court.
00:41:52.960 --> 00:41:58.320
So a lot of corporate defendants, I talk to GCs all the time, they argue that even when we win, we lose.
00:41:58.400 --> 00:41:59.840
These are Pyrrhic victories.
00:42:00.000 --> 00:42:05.599
You know, we're winning in court, but the cost of that win basically cripples the company.
00:42:05.760 --> 00:42:08.719
So they feel like they have to find some other platform.
00:42:08.880 --> 00:42:11.840
So that's that's part and parcel of the search.
00:42:12.000 --> 00:42:20.239
Now the question is, you know, are they going too far in manipulating and trying to convince the court that they are worthy to access bankruptcy?
00:42:20.400 --> 00:42:21.360
And that's a fair question.
00:42:21.440 --> 00:42:47.039
We see that it's a popular phrase called the Texas two-step, which is an elaborate process under Texas state law, also available under Pennsylvania state law and Delaware state law and Arizona state law, where an entity is created, and then ultimately that entity holds all the liability regarding the mass toward an issue, and then that entity itself is filed for bankruptcy on the premise that it has no assets, all it has is liability.
00:42:47.360 --> 00:42:55.039
Okay, and a lot of courts have rejected that and said this is not appropriate, this seems to be a manipulation, seems to be exploitation.
00:42:55.199 --> 00:42:57.280
Plaintiff's attorneys absolutely hate it.
00:42:57.360 --> 00:43:00.000
They believe it's an attempt to avoid liability.
00:43:00.239 --> 00:43:08.559
You know, I think that we haven't seen as much action on the Texas two-step front as of late, and that maybe that's an acknowledgement, right?
00:43:08.639 --> 00:43:13.360
So a lot of people have heard you, Richard, and they've heard other commentators saying, hey, this isn't appropriate.
00:43:13.519 --> 00:43:17.679
And I think now when you go into boardrooms, there's not that much discussion of the Texas two-step.
00:43:17.760 --> 00:43:19.280
I think corporate defendants are moving away from that.
00:43:19.360 --> 00:43:21.039
They understand the optics are terrible.
00:43:21.360 --> 00:43:23.119
But we still have this problem.
00:43:23.360 --> 00:43:25.840
How do we resolve these cases?
00:43:26.320 --> 00:43:30.159
We don't have a great platform, we don't have tried and trude mechanisms.
00:43:30.320 --> 00:43:31.360
Now you'll be shocked.
00:43:31.519 --> 00:43:44.320
The argument on the table in some boardrooms is maybe we could file for bankruptcy overseas, go through that, get the releases we want, and then have that resolution recognized by the US federal bankruptcy court.
00:43:44.639 --> 00:43:47.360
And that will ultimately make it binding in the US.
00:43:48.000 --> 00:43:56.639
Once again, another very dramatic step, and that's something that probably for another time, but that's how that's how desperate a lot of these parties are to settle these cases.
00:43:56.960 --> 00:43:59.679
Yeah, and I would just note what are the relevant.
00:44:00.159 --> 00:44:13.760
Relative benefits of bankruptcy from the defendant's perspective, why they would prefer that over the lottery system and the other disadvantages, including the expenses of state law or federal district court trials, including class actions.
00:44:14.000 --> 00:44:25.360
You know, the class action was supposed to be a mechanism for realizing the economic efficiencies of aggregating many cases into one, like you're describing happens in bankruptcy.
00:44:25.440 --> 00:44:30.800
And I think it's important to notice that, first of all, in bankruptcy, there's no jury requirements.
00:44:30.880 --> 00:44:41.440
And so if defendants are worried that they won't be treated fairly by juries, they often perceive that they'll get a more fair adjudication by a federal judge in the form of a bankruptcy judge.
00:44:41.519 --> 00:44:43.280
So that's one, I think, advantage.
00:44:43.360 --> 00:44:56.159
And then another procedural advantage is that the normal rules under requirements under Rule 23 for aggregating claims into a class action, commonality and so on, uh, those don't apply uh in bankruptcy.
00:44:56.239 --> 00:45:07.280
And so you are effectively having a class action in bankruptcy in these cases without having to satisfy rules of civil procedure requirements uh for a class action.
00:45:07.440 --> 00:45:09.599
So
I think that that's the other side of the coin.
00:45:09.679 --> 00:45:14.320
That's the upside from the defendant's perspective of going uh the bankruptcy route.
00:45:14.639 --> 00:45:15.199
I think that's fair.
00:45:15.280 --> 00:45:16.800
And just really quickly, I can put a bow on it.
00:45:16.880 --> 00:45:26.719
You know, when we think about why is bankruptcy attracted to corporate defendants, I already mentioned the speed, the fact that it that you have a judge who can allow for a settlement process to unfold.
00:45:26.800 --> 00:45:31.519
If it's unsuccessful, then the judge can start applying pressure and ultimately bring resolution forward.
00:45:31.679 --> 00:45:39.280
Also keep in mind if you have future victims, future claimants, uh asbestos is a good example of this, those cannot be resolved in MDL.
00:45:40.079 --> 00:45:48.000
And the class aggregation is not an option because you don't have commonality in terms of you don't have with causation and outcome and damages for victims.
00:45:48.159 --> 00:45:50.079
So class aggregation is off the table entirely.
00:45:50.239 --> 00:45:53.360
So you put those pieces together, especially the future victims piece.
00:45:53.440 --> 00:45:59.679
I think that's why corporate defendants still believe that there is a way for that bankruptcy platform to ultimately be advantageous to all parties.
00:46:00.000 --> 00:46:04.079
So, Samir, before you go, you testify before Congress about some of these issues.
00:46:04.559 --> 00:46:09.840
Is there any legislation being proposed to address some of these problems with mass for bankruptcies?
00:46:10.480 --> 00:46:10.880
Not really.
00:46:11.039 --> 00:46:13.920
I I hear every now and then something bubbles forward.
00:46:14.159 --> 00:46:20.639
Sometimes it's specifically focused on addressing the Texas two-step maneuver that a lot of parties have found offensive.
00:46:20.960 --> 00:46:23.440
I don't see a comprehensive approach.
00:46:23.679 --> 00:46:32.880
When I testified before the Senate judiciary, I argued that there are very simple tweaks that could be made to the bankruptcy code to make it far more equitable for all parties.
00:46:33.199 --> 00:46:35.920
These are not difficult changes, they can be done very easily.
00:46:36.159 --> 00:46:37.440
Has that moved forward?
00:46:37.840 --> 00:46:38.880
Unfortunately, it hasn't.
00:46:39.039 --> 00:46:44.719
So right now we're in this position where we're looking at maybe a new wave of mass tort cases coming.
00:46:44.800 --> 00:46:46.960
We think about forever chemicals and things like that.
00:46:47.119 --> 00:46:52.880
And we do not have a platform designed to handle those types of cases.
00:46:53.039 --> 00:47:03.760
And the voting problems I'm identifying in my current paper and what we've been talking about is just one example of the systemic deficiencies in the system that are sort of just being ignored.
00:47:04.000 --> 00:47:09.679
So I do worry about the next wave and how those are going to be resolved and how those victims are going to be compensated.
00:47:10.000 --> 00:47:18.320
Well, Samir Parik, your article, Mass Twort Voting Takes Center Stage, is very helpful in this arena, and hopefully they are paying attention down in Washington.
00:47:18.480 --> 00:47:19.199
We certainly are.
00:47:19.360 --> 00:47:21.679
So, Samir and Richard, thank you so much for your time today.
00:47:21.760 --> 00:47:23.440
This was a very interesting discussion.
00:47:23.760 --> 00:47:24.320
Thank you both.
00:47:24.400 --> 00:47:24.880
This is great.
00:47:25.039 --> 00:47:25.760
Thank you, Samir.
00:47:25.920 --> 00:47:26.480
Thank you, Andy.
00:47:26.639 --> 00:47:27.280
This was fun.
00:47:30.880 --> 00:47:36.159
Thanks to everyone at Fordham Law School, especially the Dean's Office and our corporate law center donors for supporting this podcast.
00:47:36.400 --> 00:47:39.280
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00:47:39.440 --> 00:47:44.000
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