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They are elected by you. I am elected by you.
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I am constrained as they.
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Are constrained by a system that our founders put in place.
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The founder separated power because they knew it was the
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best way to protect our citizens.
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They didn't want one person, one man, to have all
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the power like a king.
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We show by our work that breed people can govern themselves.
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You can't pay lip service to the Constitution without obeying it.
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Keep your eye on the ball. Structure is a structure
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is destiny, as.
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This is necessary and proper. The podcast of the Federal
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Society's Article one Initiative. All views expressed on this podcast
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do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Society. Well,
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good morning, Good morning, it's nice to see you all.
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Welcome to the thirteenth annual Executive Branch Review Conference. My
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name is Nate Kes Merrick, and I am Vice President
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and Director of the Practice Groups for the Federal Society.
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On behalf of my.
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Colleagues and our Practice group leadership, we are very pleased
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to gather here in Washington, DC to discuss the current
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state of the Executive Branch. Welcome as well to our
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audience joining us via the live stream. Thanks for tuning
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in and we do look forward to your feedback.
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A few quick notes and.
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Advertisements here at the outset. First, if you are seeking
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colee for your attendance today, please be sure to check
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in and check out using the QR code on the
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back of your program. Secondly, this year, our practice Group
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executive committees have been hard at work to put together
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a full slate of debate and discussion for this EBER conference.
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In fact, there is so much to discuss that for
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the first time ever, over the last month, we hosted
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four virtual preview panels covering such topics as the history
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of executive orders, the weaponization of DOJ, efficiency, and civil
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Load full transcript
rights enforcement, and last week we looked at DOZE and
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environmental regulation. If you missed any of these panels, you
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can find them in your program by scanning the QR
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code that's up on the screen there or on page
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six of your program. That QR code will also take
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you to the livestream recordings of every panel from today. Lastly,
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I wanted to draw your attention to an upcoming great
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new mini documentary from our Regulatory Transparency Project. I thought
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this audience would be interested in particular in this effort
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as you know. In March, President Trump issued an executive
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order scaling back federal DEI initiative. This new RTP film
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Looks takes a look at the future of DEEI as
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it revisits the Fearless Fun case, which challenged a race
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based grant program under Section nineteen eighty one of the
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Civil Rights Act of eighteen sixty six. Be on the
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lookout for promotional emails and the film's release coming up
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on Friday, May sixteenth. Turning now to the business at hand,
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this year's conference theme is theories of Presidential Power. No doubt,
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since January, there has been much to discuss each day,
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often several times a day, about the Trump administration's efforts
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to remake the modern executive.
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Branch and the administrative state.
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For those of you keeping score at home, here are
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only a few quick stats reflective of the last three months.
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The President has signed one hundred and forty three executive orders.
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For Harrison FDR signed ninety nine executive orders in his
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first one hundred days, and President Trump signed a total
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of two hundred and twenty eos during the first four
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years of his first term. According to Reuters. As of
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mid April, over two hundred and sixty thousand federal employees
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have been fired, taken early retirement, or have been earmarked
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for termination. The Trump administration has also fired agency officials
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and inspectors general. The administration revoked security clearances for lawyers
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at specific law firms. President Trump, as you all know,
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tapped Elon Musk to lead the efforts of the Department
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of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, which has halted government payments
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and the work of some government agencies. The administration has
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also inspired over two hundred and fifty five lawsuits, fifty
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three of them coming from the ACLU alone, challenging its
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actions and sparking a renewed discussion about nationwide.
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Injunctions and tros.
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Based on these items and more, many of many have
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observed that the first one hundred days of this administration
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have been historic, but it's not my job to offer
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praise or criticism. As you know, the Federal Society takes
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no formal positions on legal or policy issues, and we
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remain committed to convening leading experts to debate and discuss
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the most important constitutional, legal and policy considerations of our time. Today,
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we're very excited about our morning session, looking at presidential personnel,
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our luncheon roundtable exploring nationwide injunctions, our afternoon sessions looking
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at presidential policy, and our.
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Closing address with the DOJ's Assistant.
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Attorney General for Civil Rights, the Honorable Harmeet Dylan.
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So let's get started.
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Our first panel this morning will explore whether we have
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come to the end of Humphrey's executor. I am thrilled
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that Professor arm Gevore is moderating the discussion. Aram is
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the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the George Washington
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University Law School. He previously served in various senior positions
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in the US Department of Justice and the White House,
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and in private practice before that. He's an accomplished scholar
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and an in demand legal commentator. He's well recognized for
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his expertise and regulation AI and national security law. His
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law degree is from gw and his undergrad.
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Is from the University of Michigan.
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I've known Arham for a few years, and I consider
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--> 00:06:41.600
it my good fortune. His considerable brilliance is only outmatched
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by his genuine warmth, humor, and kindness. What I'm really
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trying to say is that he's a Midwesterner.
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From Michigan just like me.
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Please join me in welcoming Arum and our first panel.
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Thank you, Nate.
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Can everyone hear me? Thank you, Nate. Thank you to
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the Society for putting on these important events on incisive
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and crucial issues of the day. Today's discussion is on
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Humphrey's Executor, and there's a lot to unpack. We don't
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have a ton of time, although it seems like ninety
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minutes is a lot, you really need a couple of
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days to work through all of the materials, so we'll
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be moving at a pretty quick clip. Very very lucky
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to have with us Professor Jed Sugarman, who is a
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professor of law and the Joseph Lipsitt Scholar at Boston
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University School of Law. He's a historically detailed, oriented lexical
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originalist and he is quite active with regard to separation
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of powers type issues. He has a book that's forthcoming,
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A Faithful President, The Founders Versus the Originalists.
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I look forward to.
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Its publication to reading it. And on the question of
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Humphrey's Executor, which really comes down to does the president
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have the discretion to remove a principal officer at will?
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If the statutory basis for that officer's position requires four
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cause removal. He has quite distinct views on this from
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an April seventeenth brief to the District the District of
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Columbia and Slaughter and Bedoia versus Trump with regard to
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the removal of two FTC commissioners. His position is that
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Humphrey's executor is good law. In recent non controlling opinions
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suggesting otherwise rely on disproven assumptions and erroneous histories. So
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we look forward to his unearthing or his repeating of
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an earth constitutional history with regard to this. Next we
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also have Alan Werman, who's the Julius C. E.
Davis
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Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, also an originalist.
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So it's really great to see a diversity of views
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with commonalities and differences. Elon is the author of a
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number of books that I've read. He has a textbook
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and administrative law, and he's quite active in the space.
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He has a differing position, and to really frame up
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this issue in terms of what's sort of like the
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biggest thing happening right now, as you know, the president
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is exercised that will removal authority for all manner of
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officers principal inferior, and potentially even non officers as well,
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without cause throughout the executive branch before the Supreme Court,
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at least as of the ninth of April, so just
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about a month ago, there was a stape in place
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with regard to a case challenging the removal of a
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National Labor Relations Board member as well as a Merit
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System's Protection Board member. And to frame out some of
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these other cases, as you know, Humphreys is in nineteen
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thirty five case before that, in Myers versus United States,
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the Supreme Court recognized that Article two of the Constitution
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gives the President an unrestricted power of removing executive officers
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who had been appointed by him with advice to consent
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to the Senate. That's Article two, Section two, class to
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the appointments clause. In Humphreys, the Supreme Court created an
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exception to that rule. The Court held that Congress may
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quote forbid the removal except for cause of members of
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the Federal Trade Commission, and in the Court's view, the
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FTC exercise no power of the executive power vested by
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the Constitution of the President. And then in recent years
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the Supreme Court is clarified that Humphrey's executor's exception to
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the unrestricted removal power that the president generally has over
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principal executive officers represents quote the outermost constitutional limit of
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permissible congressional restrictions of the president's removal authority that's under
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say LA law versus Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Noting what
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a third discussion for today, Jennifer Mascouts is currently serving
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as Senior Council to the President. Unfortunately had a conflict.
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She is cited all over that case, so we're really
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missing her presence on this panel. But in particular, the
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holding of Humphy's executor applies only to administrative bodies that
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do not exercise substantial executive power. You might see that
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I was looking down as I was saying that, because
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I am quoting from a February twenty fifth letter from
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the Acting Solicitor General of the United States then Sarah
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Harris to Mike Johnson, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
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transmitted under a federal statute twenty eight US Code, Section
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five thirty D that requires a transmitdle of information and
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a letter when the United States Department of Justice no.
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Longer intends to defend the constitutionality of a statute. So
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that's this letter. So there's so much going on. What
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I'll do now is pause and ask Jed to offer
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his thoughts for ten to twelve minutes, Elan to do
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the same, and then we'll have a really spirited discussion
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after that.
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Jed, great, well, Thank you, Rom, and thank you for
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that introduction. I really appreciate it. And let me also
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thank the Federal Society for continuing to have robust debates
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about this and being open to different perspectives. To have
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one flavor of an originalist and another flavor of originalist
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that you know, ideological spectrum is amazing, but it actually
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But what I will say is I think one thing
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that will demonstrate here is that there are diferent approaches
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to originalism as a method. And what is helpful about
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originalism is that, as a matter of the and I'm
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quoting Scalia in an article by Scalia, a rule of laws,
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a law of rules, and so one reason I'm an
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originalist is that we
can have a debate about the
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historical basis and that constrains judges, and so I think
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that's an important thing. And I hope that, And I
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do think that there's going to be a test over
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the next couple of years about just how originalists this
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court is. And I think originalists and non originalists have
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questions about the Roberts Court's actual commitment to the method
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that they say they're committed to. But also, I really
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want to thank Elon because there are a lot of
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people who are engaged in this debate, and Elon is
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the most willing to show up and engage and defend,
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and I think that's commendable. And we've you know, we
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have a dog and pony show, and I don't know
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who's the dog and who's the pony. But we just
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got back from Atlanta where I workshopped. They gave me
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the wonderful honor of workshopping the book that around mentioned
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a faithful president, the founders versus the originalists. And I'm
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saying that as an originalist because I'm trying to save
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originalism from itself. And I think this is the test
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case because the history is clear, The history is clear
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that the claims made by the unity executive theory, and
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I'll describe the three pillars. Those three pillars have been debunked.
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Those questions were raised a long time ago, but there
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has been worked by a cadre. But I'd say maybe
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ten or a dozen different legal historians over the past
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five years, in the time since free Enterprise and a
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lot of the work since say LA law that has
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explained why these three pillars have fallen. But again, I
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want to thank Elon for having been engaged with all
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of those debates along the way all and he makes
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my work better by raising questions. And that's why I
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keep showing up myself, is that you know, debate improves things,
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unlike what many people think today in the twenty first
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century that debate is a problem. I think. So I
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want
to just thank the Federal Society for being committed
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to different perspectives. Okay, that's a long wind up, but
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let me say here, there's a handout that's gone around.
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I'm using the handout to use my time more effectively.
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I'm not going to go through every stage of it,
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but this also might be a way of seeing the
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arguments in little organized and teeing up questions that you
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might have about some of those details. But let me
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summarize the three pillars, and I'll try and go through
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why they have fallen, and I think Aram with Aram's invitation,
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I'll explain. I'll focus on some of the evidence that
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is most relevant to the FED and Humphrey's executive. So
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the three pillars are the executive vesting clause of the
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first sentence of Article two of the Constitution, which I
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have here on the handout, the executive power shall be
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vested in a president of the States of America. And
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the second pillar is the take care clause that the
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President shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
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I like to call that the faithful execution clause, except
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there two because the president takes an oath to faithfully
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execute the office. I'll say more about the importance, the
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legal importance. This is not just a nod to God.
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I mean, I love to nod to God, but that's
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not what the faithful execution clause is actually about. It
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was about legal It had a legal constraint as opposed
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to a legal empowerment, meaning from the Magna Carta to
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through the eighteenth century through the patriots who took the
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oath as a legal matter to be able to distinguish
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their fealty their allegiance to the emerging states that had
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rebelled against England. It was a defense against treason prosecutions.
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It had legal significance. That's pillar number two, and pillar
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number three is the ostensible decision of seventeen eighty nine
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by the First Congress, where there's actually is a lot
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of evidence in favor of Humphrey's Executor and the Fed.
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So but let me let me as I let me
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go through briefly about the main evidence against those pillars,
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and then I will I will highlight a couple of
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claims about about the Humphrey's Executor and let's say more
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treasury or fiscal matters, which is what the dividing light
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might be for the Roberts Court even if they're not
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persuaded by all this other evidence. So, first, executive vesting
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what it was executive power. There is a series of articles,
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but i'll just the most recent article I published on
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this came out in the Notre Dame Law Review in
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November called venality A The Strangely Practical History of Unremovable
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Officers and Limited Executive Power. It turns out there there's
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a book that's often quoted by Hartley. I'lp you Hartley,
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The go Betweens the past is a foreign country. Turns
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out England is literally a foreign country, and England, the
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monarchy of England was a different system. But the Americans
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did pick up on and inherited some background understandings. The
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king could not remove many officers, now not all, but
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many officers in England because they had offices as property,
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and that shaped even that system declined and was reformed,
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but it was still in place by the founding. So
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the founders were well aware that many offices were held
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as unremovable property. And when you go back into Marby
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versus Madison, there's a puzzle that many people just like
292
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didn't understand. It couldn't unpack and the work over the
293
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last So why is it that Chief Justice John Marshall
294
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says three separate times in Marbury people have heard of Marbury.
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I just want to be just okay. So Marbury is
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the one of the three most famous con law cases.
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I'd say, right. And yet this puzzle persisted until the
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excellent work of Jane Manners in Levmanond, and I piggybacked
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on them to show that the default rule was totally
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different in the eighteenth century. If a statute was silent,
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if a statute gave an officer a term of a
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tenure of limited years, like five years, six years. The
303
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default rule was that it was unremovable that the term
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was five years, and there was a lot of good
305
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reason I explained in venality for this. So Chief Justice
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John Marshall basically tells us that whether or not you
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attached this as a property rule, it was a an
308
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anti removability default rule. So that's there's more to say
309
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about that. But the main point here is that as
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a matter of eighteenth century original public meaning, the term
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executive power did not imply removal. Okay, that's point number
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one on the pillar number two of the take care
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clause A faithful execution. Faithful execution was had a meaning
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from the Magna Carta upped through the eighteenth century that
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it was a legal limit, often justiciable in many ways,
316
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that an officer had to defer to statutes and the oath.
317
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The framers knew how to you know, knew the coronation oath.
318
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They didn't use the language anything close to the coronation Oath.
319
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They chose language from mid level or high level officers
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to impose a duty of deference to legislation. Deference to legislation.
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I e. Legislative primacy and faithful execution was their language
322
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for that. Now, I'll just trust the living constitutionalist liberal
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justice of the nineteen eighties, Chief Justice William Ranquist, on this.
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This is Ranquist. Ranquist says, there's I'm paraphrasing Morrison versus Olsen, which,
325
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by the way, unlike I think what some people think,
326
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Scalia was a dissenter, not that wasn't the majority opinion.
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He was a loan dissenter. Ranquist says that there's nothing
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inconsistent between between showing good cause and being able to
329
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faithfully execute the office. Good faith and good cause are cousins,
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very closely related cousins. I don't know that they could
331
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get married in all states, but they're very close cousins.
332
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00:21:12.319
So the point is that there is all the way
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back to the founding. This is not just a matter
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of congressional invention. The idea that the president's powers, especially
335
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only imply powers, if implied, are still governed by the
336
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text of the Constitution, and that good faith or good cause.
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Can Congress elaborate on that question. I think it can, Okay,
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third the first Congress, So I'm gonna just if you
339
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have the handout in front of you, I'm not going
340
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to go into all the detail. All that detail is
341
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an article that ballooned out to one hundred and fifteen pages.
342
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Thank you and I'm sorry to the editors at the
343
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University of Pennsylvania Law Review. But it turns out that
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the decision of seventeen to eighty nine is a myth.
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Only nine members of the House out of nine out
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of fifty four, So if you're keeping score at home,
347
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that's seventeen percent. Only teen percent articulate a presidentialist theory.
348
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Now are there is an ambiguous There are a number
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of others. But a lot of this debate that came
350
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out of the House is incredibly complicated, and I think
351
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it even begs the question, why are we turning to
352
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the First Congress as originalists? Why is it that the
353
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First Congress gets so much weight. Well, it's out of necessity,
354
00:22:21.799 --> 00:22:25.920
it's not proper, but it's necessary and not proper. Why
355
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is it necessary and not proper to rely on the
356
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First Congress? It's because the ratification debates the most important
357
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material for originalists, as what we the people ratified in
358
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seventeen eighty seven and seventeen eighty eight. The historical evidence
359
00:22:40.440 --> 00:22:44.599
is overwhelmingly on the side against the unitary executive theory.
360
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Madison and Hamilton in the Federal's papers side with and
361
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that's more relevant to what we the people debated, not
362
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the first Congress. But there's also only one moment that
363
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anyone has been able to point to in the ratification
364
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debates where anyone pointed to an idea of removal, and
365
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it was associated not with executive power. It was associated
366
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implicitly by the citation of the commander in chief clause.
367
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Because the only removal cited in the ratification debates was
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over army officers, Navy officers, and the militia. That is
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a pretty big expressio unius problem. If the only time
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the ratification debates mentioned removal and they didn't mention executive
371
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power or take care, but they only mentioned military officers
372
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under the commander in chief clause, that tells you that
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not even the biggest critics of presidential power thought it
374
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was plausible that the executive power clause implied removal. So
375
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let me just let me wrap up with two other
376
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points of originalism about FTC and Humphrey's executor. One is
377
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the sinking fund. And this is work that was first
378
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by Jerry Mishaw, but recently by Christine Chabbeau and much
379
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more detail. Hamilton proposes a sinking fund with five members
380
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on it. That sinking fund is was about debt sinking.
381
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It was to resolve the debts. This was, by the way,
382
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if you know, for musical fans, this is rap battle
383
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number one from Hamilton. They Hamilton proposes a sinking fund,
384
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and that sinking fund has five officers, the Attorney General,
385
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the Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, and the Vice
386
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President who is unremovable, and the Chief Justice, who's unremovable. Okay,
387
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if that's and that gets enacted, and that has tremendous power.
388
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And if we're talking about, you know, liquidation, we're talking
389
00:24:31.680 --> 00:24:36.000
about liquidating debt, this is also liquidating whatever that means
390
00:24:36.000 --> 00:24:39.200
about the constitution. Sinking fund is pretty clear original evidence.
391
00:24:39.240 --> 00:24:42.119
That's something like the FED. But here's one more example,
392
00:24:42.400 --> 00:24:45.599
and it's Madison's proposed comptroller. Now this is going to
393
00:24:45.640 --> 00:24:48.240
get into the weeds, and Elan is going to quote
394
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one line from the proposal, but if you read all
395
00:24:51.599 --> 00:24:55.519
of the other paragraphs after the proposal, it is unmistakably
396
00:24:55.599 --> 00:25:00.599
clear that everyone debating Madison on his proposed
comptroller thought
397
00:25:00.599 --> 00:25:03.440
that what he was proposing was a comptroller that could
398
00:25:03.440 --> 00:25:06.440
be removed only for good behavior. Let me repeat that.
399
00:25:06.759 --> 00:25:11.720
What everyone debating Madison said, Madison, you've just proposed a
400
00:25:11.759 --> 00:25:16.839
comptroller serving a good behavior. Is that that's and that
401
00:25:16.960 --> 00:25:21.079
was Madison's approach to independence, and ultimately it didn't succeed.
402
00:25:21.480 --> 00:25:24.480
But the point is this was highly contested, and this
403
00:25:24.559 --> 00:25:27.680
proposal came soon after what was ostensibly a decision of
404
00:25:27.680 --> 00:25:31.599
seventy to eight nine. Madison distinguished. But let's just say,
405
00:25:31.799 --> 00:25:34.200
if you're not persuaded by me, that the decision of
406
00:25:34.200 --> 00:25:37.279
seventeen to eighty nine did not decide anything, right, I
407
00:25:38.119 --> 00:25:40.160
think what Elan and I might agree on is that
408
00:25:40.240 --> 00:25:44.119
what it related to was department heads. A week after
409
00:25:44.200 --> 00:25:47.440
that debate, Madison comes back and says, well, here's comptrollers.
410
00:25:48.319 --> 00:25:51.359
Comptrollers do something like and I'm using modern terms, but
411
00:25:51.480 --> 00:25:53.640
it's in a way to understand what Madison was trying
412
00:25:53.680 --> 00:25:59.160
to propose. Here, comptrollers do quasi adjudication. Comptrollers have to
413
00:25:59.200 --> 00:26:04.640
decide cases when there are contested questions, legal questions between
414
00:26:04.720 --> 00:26:08.079
citizens and the government. And he said that's that's like
415
00:26:08.079 --> 00:26:10.599
an inherent conflict of interest. We need some we need
416
00:26:10.599 --> 00:26:13.960
an ALJ here. Okay, he didn't say ALJ. But we
417
00:26:14.079 --> 00:26:17.799
need a quasi adjudicator under the executive branch, and that
418
00:26:17.839 --> 00:26:21.200
a judicator needs to be independent, and everyone understood him
419
00:26:21.200 --> 00:26:24.920
to be proposing a comptroller serving at good behavior. Good
420
00:26:24.960 --> 00:26:29.039
behavior is much more protected than the FTC or the FED.
421
00:26:29.599 --> 00:26:33.359
So if you thought that Madison and Hamilton were on
422
00:26:33.400 --> 00:26:35.720
your side, right, well, if you thought Madison and Hamilton
423
00:26:35.799 --> 00:26:38.000
were on the unitary executive side, we see again and
424
00:26:38.039 --> 00:26:41.880
again that from original public meaning that these issues were
425
00:26:42.079 --> 00:26:45.200
resolved in ways that previewed even if they didn't use
426
00:26:45.240 --> 00:26:49.440
the language of quasi legislative or quasi judicial. And in
427
00:26:49.480 --> 00:26:52.359
our modern terms, there was an emphasis of what is
428
00:26:52.440 --> 00:26:55.880
quasi legislative. It's like specific expertise below the
level of
429
00:26:55.920 --> 00:26:59.920
Congress that was part of those debates, expertise in fiscal matters,
430
00:27:00.200 --> 00:27:03.440
and second quasi judicial that goes all the way back
431
00:27:03.480 --> 00:27:06.359
to the founding as the importance of independence for those
432
00:27:06.400 --> 00:27:07.599
who adjudicate cases.
433
00:27:07.640 --> 00:27:08.359
And I'll stop there.
434
00:27:08.960 --> 00:27:12.319
Thank you so much. Jed, very interesting summing it up.
435
00:27:12.720 --> 00:27:16.680
Humphrey's executor is good law new evidence. Since Sumfrey's executor
436
00:27:16.759 --> 00:27:22.759
demonstrates their Article two did not imply unconditional presidential removal authority,
437
00:27:23.400 --> 00:27:26.519
the gauntlet has been thrown along your response.
438
00:27:26.920 --> 00:27:30.599
So thank you for having me here. Is this working? Okay?
439
00:27:31.839 --> 00:27:34.160
First of all, I just like to think Jet as well.
440
00:27:34.279 --> 00:27:37.599
Jeed has made my work better, and he really forces
441
00:27:37.599 --> 00:27:39.519
me to grapple with things that I didn't think deeply
442
00:27:39.599 --> 00:27:42.319
enough about. He's convinced me that the decision of seventeen
443
00:27:42.319 --> 00:27:45.240
eighty nine has more ambiguity than I previously appreciated. And
444
00:27:45.920 --> 00:27:47.480
I do think we make each other better. And so
445
00:27:47.519 --> 00:27:49.319
I'm very much glad we're here. Having said that, I
446
00:27:49.319 --> 00:27:52.839
wish I had gone first, because I'm not going to
447
00:27:52.880 --> 00:27:55.960
respond to everything he said. Now hopefully there'll be another round.
448
00:27:56.000 --> 00:27:57.599
I'm going to stick with what I sort of wanted
449
00:27:57.640 --> 00:27:59.799
to say the affirmative case. But let me just say
450
00:27:59.799 --> 00:28:02.200
he's wrong about the comptroller, he's wrong about the Sinking Fund.
451
00:28:02.519 --> 00:28:06.160
He's not wrong about Marbury. But Marshall was wrong about Marbury,
452
00:28:07.279 --> 00:28:10.880
just like Marshall was wrong about everything else in that opinion. Actually,
453
00:28:11.160 --> 00:28:13.680
except the bottom line of judicial review follows from the
454
00:28:13.720 --> 00:28:16.079
nature of inconstitution but of course you have to deliver
455
00:28:16.160 --> 00:28:18.920
a commission for it to be effective. Okay, So Marshall
456
00:28:18.960 --> 00:28:20.279
was wrong about a lot of things in that case,
457
00:28:20.279 --> 00:28:22.039
but we can come back to it. I also think
458
00:28:22.079 --> 00:28:24.240
you're wrong about Madison and the Federalist and Hamilton in
459
00:28:24.279 --> 00:28:26.160
Federal seventy seven. That's what I'm not going to talk
460
00:28:26.160 --> 00:28:30.759
about in this round. As to the controller though, the
461
00:28:30.759 --> 00:28:32.519
one Okay, let me just and then I promise this
462
00:28:32.559 --> 00:28:34.480
doesn't count against my time, doesn't where it is?
463
00:28:34.880 --> 00:28:36.400
Yeah, because I haven't looked yet. Okay.
464
00:28:37.759 --> 00:28:40.759
The line and the comptroller debate, which, by the way,
465
00:28:40.759 --> 00:28:43.839
Madison withdrew the proposal after he got attacked for it. Right,
466
00:28:44.079 --> 00:28:45.799
The line that he said I'm going to rely on
467
00:28:46.160 --> 00:28:48.759
was Madison's actual proposal, which was to create a short
468
00:28:48.839 --> 00:28:52.200
term of years for the comptroller unless sooner removed by
469
00:28:52.240 --> 00:28:56.160
the President. That was the proposal, right, And I would
470
00:28:56.200 --> 00:28:59.240
be eager to understand why that isn't decisive of this
471
00:28:59.359 --> 00:29:01.519
question what Madison. I know, I said I wasn't going
472
00:29:01.519 --> 00:29:03.160
to do it. I'm going to do the controller. Just
473
00:29:04.079 --> 00:29:07.279
what Madison was saying is he wanted to create independence
474
00:29:07.519 --> 00:29:10.880
in this officer by creating a short term of years.
475
00:29:11.240 --> 00:29:13.759
Why is that relevant, Because as soon as the term expired,
476
00:29:14.039 --> 00:29:16.839
the Controller would need approval by the Senate for a
477
00:29:16.880 --> 00:29:19.680
reappointment to the office. And so you couldn't just be
478
00:29:19.720 --> 00:29:22.359
a lackey of the President because you'd have to respond
479
00:29:22.400 --> 00:29:25.240
to the Senate if you wanted that reappointment. But still,
480
00:29:25.559 --> 00:29:28.319
you know, the language had unless sooner removed by the President,
481
00:29:28.359 --> 00:29:31.480
and Madison's proposal confused a bunch of people, right, I
482
00:29:31.480 --> 00:29:34.559
don't remember if it was Benson. Someone said, what are
483
00:29:34.599 --> 00:29:36.839
you talking about? The controller isn't going to be independent.
484
00:29:37.079 --> 00:29:38.839
He's going to be the most accountable person in the
485
00:29:38.839 --> 00:29:40.880
whole department, in the whole executive branch.
486
00:29:40.920 --> 00:29:45.599
If he has accounts as a confroll. That's a joke
487
00:29:45.640 --> 00:29:46.400
that clearly didn't fall.
488
00:29:46.559 --> 00:29:51.519
No, I'm not even following it anyway, Say okay, well
489
00:29:51.599 --> 00:29:53.480
this definitely does not count against my time. Okay, so
490
00:29:53.559 --> 00:29:58.039
now'st me nine thirty.
491
00:29:58.200 --> 00:29:59.759
This is so, this is what I was gonna say.
492
00:29:59.519 --> 00:30:00.880
Ok this is a friendly fights.
493
00:30:03.519 --> 00:30:04.759
Yeah, it's true, could be much worse.
494
00:30:04.759 --> 00:30:09.079
Okay, So Humphrey's executor just a high level background, Like
495
00:30:09.119 --> 00:30:12.680
everybody agrees that it's reasoning is dead. Okay, there's no
496
00:30:12.720 --> 00:30:15.960
such thing. As quasi legislative quasi judical power. There are
497
00:30:16.079 --> 00:30:19.160
nine votes on the Supreme Court against that proposition. If
498
00:30:19.200 --> 00:30:22.359
you look at Sea law, what was the dissent focused
499
00:30:22.400 --> 00:30:24.519
on Morrison of the Olsen. They weren't focused on this
500
00:30:24.559 --> 00:30:27.920
idea of quasi legislative quasi judical power. The reasoning is dead.
501
00:30:28.000 --> 00:30:30.119
I think Jed might have just tried to resurrect it
502
00:30:30.160 --> 00:30:32.440
a little bit. But basically, there are nine votes on
503
00:30:32.480 --> 00:30:34.799
the Supreme Court. If it's not legislative power, if it's
504
00:30:34.839 --> 00:30:36.880
not juditial power, then it's executive power.
505
00:30:36.960 --> 00:30:37.880
The question is.
506
00:30:37.960 --> 00:30:40.759
Okay, so what is the actual answer to this question
507
00:30:40.839 --> 00:30:43.559
of four cause removal under the original meaning of the
508
00:30:43.720 --> 00:30:46.359
executive power clause, that take care clause, the necessary and
509
00:30:46.359 --> 00:30:49.640
proper clause. And then you know, the Court had never
510
00:30:49.680 --> 00:30:52.480
told us because in Humphrey's Executor they made up this
511
00:30:52.559 --> 00:30:56.559
new category of stuff of power. Okay, so what's the answer.
512
00:30:57.400 --> 00:30:59.240
I'm gonna So I was doing this this morning in
513
00:30:59.240 --> 00:31:03.079
the hotel room. There are at least seven possible conceptions.
514
00:31:03.119 --> 00:31:05.119
I'm going to be very quick about what kind of
515
00:31:05.160 --> 00:31:09.640
power overlock execution the executive vesting clause grants, okay, very quickly,
516
00:31:09.799 --> 00:31:10.880
and then I'm going to tell you what I think
517
00:31:10.920 --> 00:31:13.400
the right answer is, and I'm going to sound, you know,
518
00:31:13.440 --> 00:31:15.480
like I'm being liberal or progressive or something.
519
00:31:15.519 --> 00:31:17.519
But just wait, just wait till the end. Okay.
520
00:31:18.359 --> 00:31:21.119
Option one is it grants nothing, right, It's it's just
521
00:31:21.160 --> 00:31:22.920
identifies who the president is going to be and the
522
00:31:23.440 --> 00:31:26.160
president's only power over lock execution is what can be
523
00:31:26.200 --> 00:31:28.519
inferred from the take care clause. Okay, that's one view.
524
00:31:28.960 --> 00:31:31.400
View number two is it grants the power. The president
525
00:31:31.440 --> 00:31:34.880
has the power to personally execute all laws. This is
526
00:31:35.119 --> 00:31:38.200
not the conventional view. I think it's cy precautious view.
527
00:31:38.240 --> 00:31:40.519
I don't think many formalists have that view, but that
528
00:31:40.640 --> 00:31:44.279
is a possibility. The most conventional formalist view is the
529
00:31:44.319 --> 00:31:47.759
president can direct control and remove officers. You can't personally
530
00:31:47.759 --> 00:31:50.519
execute the law, but he can direct control and remove them.
531
00:31:50.960 --> 00:31:54.359
A slight finessing on this is I think Judge Naomi
532
00:31:54.440 --> 00:31:57.799
Rows view, which is that, yes, in theory, the president
533
00:31:57.880 --> 00:31:59.680
has a right to control, but the only way to
534
00:31:59.720 --> 00:32:02.519
infer worse that is through removal. In other words, an
535
00:32:02.519 --> 00:32:05.400
officer could disagree with the president or disobey an order.
536
00:32:05.559 --> 00:32:08.640
It wouldn't make that action ultra virus. It would the
537
00:32:08.680 --> 00:32:11.720
officer's action would still be lawful, but then the president
538
00:32:11.759 --> 00:32:14.640
could remove them for failing to obey the instruction. So
539
00:32:14.640 --> 00:32:18.519
it's a fine distinction. Gary Lawson's view is the president
540
00:32:18.680 --> 00:32:21.119
doesn't have the right to remove as long as he
541
00:32:21.119 --> 00:32:24.400
can countermand anything right. And so the acts of officers
542
00:32:24.440 --> 00:32:27.039
would be ultra virus if they ignored the president, and
543
00:32:27.039 --> 00:32:28.799
you can show that, but the president doesn't have to
544
00:32:28.839 --> 00:32:31.559
be able to remove them. John Harrison's view, this is
545
00:32:31.640 --> 00:32:34.039
view number six, is that the president either has to
546
00:32:34.079 --> 00:32:36.200
be able to remove or control. I don't care which,
547
00:32:36.640 --> 00:32:39.079
just one way or the other. It's how you retain
548
00:32:39.119 --> 00:32:43.160
the executive power. Seventh and last view is my view,
549
00:32:43.200 --> 00:32:45.240
which I'm going to briefly sort of defend, which is
550
00:32:45.279 --> 00:32:48.480
I think the president has a constitutional right to remove
551
00:32:48.839 --> 00:32:52.240
the officer, but not necessarily a constitutional right to control
552
00:32:52.279 --> 00:32:55.519
the exercise of that officer's discretion. And what do I
553
00:32:55.559 --> 00:32:59.359
mean by that? Anybody could bark orders, anybody could command
554
00:32:59.400 --> 00:33:01.920
an officer to you something. The question is different. The
555
00:33:02.000 --> 00:33:05.000
question is the constitutional obligation on the part of the
556
00:33:05.079 --> 00:33:08.720
officer to obey. And in this respect, the Constitution actually
557
00:33:08.720 --> 00:33:10.960
only says one thing with respect to principal officers that
558
00:33:11.000 --> 00:33:13.599
they have to give the president information about their duties,
559
00:33:13.799 --> 00:33:16.960
in my view, so that the president can intelligently exercise
560
00:33:17.039 --> 00:33:19.880
the removal power. This may seem like splitting hairs, but
561
00:33:19.920 --> 00:33:23.039
it actually distributes political costs in a pretty sensible way.
562
00:33:23.400 --> 00:33:27.359
If the president wants to interfere with an officer's exercise
563
00:33:27.400 --> 00:33:29.799
of
their duties that Congress has given that officer, then
564
00:33:29.839 --> 00:33:32.039
the president has to be willing to fire the officer,
565
00:33:32.279 --> 00:33:35.119
which comes at a high political cost. And the cost
566
00:33:35.200 --> 00:33:37.640
is going to be higher if you think the interference
567
00:33:37.799 --> 00:33:40.720
is illegitimate or there isn't this constitutional right of control.
568
00:33:40.759 --> 00:33:45.519
It's basically Daniel Webster's response to Andrew Jackson firing two
569
00:33:45.519 --> 00:33:48.519
secretaries of Treasury because he wanted them to remove the
570
00:33:48.680 --> 00:33:50.880
US Treasury deposits from the Bank of the United States
571
00:33:50.880 --> 00:33:53.000
and that they didn't do it, and he got censured
572
00:33:53.039 --> 00:33:56.279
in the Senate. So the political costs are actually distributed
573
00:33:56.319 --> 00:33:59.200
in an interesting way if you care about both accountability
574
00:33:59.599 --> 00:34:03.400
and some degree of expertise and independence. Okay, that was
575
00:34:03.519 --> 00:34:09.679
only four minutes, so in it's okay, yeah, three, that's right.
576
00:34:10.519 --> 00:34:13.519
In three minutes. Let me start with the proposition of
577
00:34:13.519 --> 00:34:14.400
the removal power.
578
00:34:14.480 --> 00:34:16.440
Why do you you can go like for another five
579
00:34:16.480 --> 00:34:17.719
it's ten to twelve minutes.
580
00:34:18.119 --> 00:34:22.760
They're good, good, starting now, okay, sir in okay, So
581
00:34:22.920 --> 00:34:25.199
three formalists are precisionists.
582
00:34:25.400 --> 00:34:26.320
So that's that's where we are.
583
00:34:26.400 --> 00:34:29.559
Yeah, well, I'm cherry picking the evidence of the rules,
584
00:34:29.679 --> 00:34:33.079
Jed would say, baby, okay, So why so let me
585
00:34:33.079 --> 00:34:35.199
start with removal, then control, and then let me talk
586
00:34:35.199 --> 00:34:38.239
about what the implications are for four cause restriction. Where
587
00:34:38.320 --> 00:34:41.440
does the removal power come from? This is really interesting.
588
00:34:41.440 --> 00:34:44.360
In Michael McConnell's book, he says on the executive power,
589
00:34:44.440 --> 00:34:46.760
the presidency, the president who would not be king, He says,
590
00:34:46.800 --> 00:34:50.280
it's a great mystery that the Constitutional Convention doesn't talk
591
00:34:50.280 --> 00:34:52.840
about the removal power. Jed just said, it's a mystery
592
00:34:52.880 --> 00:34:54.119
that the ratification.
593
00:34:53.639 --> 00:34:54.679
Debates didn't talk about it.
594
00:34:54.719 --> 00:34:58.719
Okay, But there's an explanation that Jed has actually made
595
00:34:58.760 --> 00:35:01.000
me appreciate more in his own work. Right in a
596
00:35:01.000 --> 00:35:02.599
part of his work he didn't mention today, which I
597
00:35:02.599 --> 00:35:04.719
think is useful. He takes different things from it, and
598
00:35:04.760 --> 00:35:07.119
he can respond to what I'm about to say. But
599
00:35:07.159 --> 00:35:10.719
here's what I take from it. Okay, The executive power
600
00:35:10.760 --> 00:35:13.800
was understood as the power to oversee the execution of
601
00:35:13.840 --> 00:35:17.119
the laws. One person unaided could not possibly do that
602
00:35:17.239 --> 00:35:20.719
on his own. So what's the conclusion. The appointment of
603
00:35:20.719 --> 00:35:25.039
officers to assist was understood to be a quintessential element
604
00:35:25.239 --> 00:35:28.400
of the executive power itself. The executive power, the power
605
00:35:28.440 --> 00:35:31.840
to oversee lo execution, necessarily entailed a power to appoint
606
00:35:31.840 --> 00:35:34.480
officers to assist. What does that have to do with removal.
607
00:35:34.760 --> 00:35:37.360
There was a common law maxim that said he who
608
00:35:37.440 --> 00:35:41.440
appoints removes the removal powers incident to the appointment power,
609
00:35:41.480 --> 00:35:43.639
Which makes sense because if you have the appointment power,
610
00:35:43.639 --> 00:35:46.079
then you just appoint somebody new and then you displaced
611
00:35:46.079 --> 00:35:49.320
the prior officer. That is how commissions actually worked. You know,
612
00:35:49.400 --> 00:35:51.480
you are commissioned to this new office and the previous
613
00:35:51.519 --> 00:35:54.599
office holders hereby displaced. So why was the removal power
614
00:35:54.599 --> 00:35:58.559
not talked about? Because until the Beardly Committee, the Committee
615
00:35:58.559 --> 00:36:01.639
of Postponed Matters, which was in September. I think so
616
00:36:01.679 --> 00:36:04.880
that at the very end of the Constitutional Convention, the
617
00:36:04.920 --> 00:36:09.280
removal power, the appointment power, excuse me, was not shared.
618
00:36:10.079 --> 00:36:10.880
It was divided.
619
00:36:11.360 --> 00:36:13.920
The Senate had the appointment of ambassadors and judges and
620
00:36:13.920 --> 00:36:16.239
the president had the appointment of all other officers, So
621
00:36:16.280 --> 00:36:18.440
you don't need to talk about the removal power, because
622
00:36:18.480 --> 00:36:21.400
the president would remove by making new appointments of his officers,
623
00:36:21.400 --> 00:36:24.840
and the Senate would remove by appointing new ambassadors. It
624
00:36:24.880 --> 00:36:27.639
wasn't until the Beardly Committee gave all of this power
625
00:36:27.679 --> 00:36:31.360
to the President and Senate together right nomination and then
626
00:36:31.400 --> 00:36:34.159
buying with advising consent that it raised this question, Well,
627
00:36:34.199 --> 00:36:36.360
wait a minute, does this mean the President and Senate
628
00:36:36.440 --> 00:36:39.480
together now have to remove according to the common law
629
00:36:39.480 --> 00:36:42.440
maxim This is why they debated this in seventeen eighty nine,
630
00:36:42.519 --> 00:36:45.079
because they didn't have an opportunity to think about it
631
00:36:45.199 --> 00:36:48.239
until they were creating the departments. It just wasn't an
632
00:36:48.280 --> 00:36:50.920
issue until it was too late to have thought about
633
00:36:50.960 --> 00:36:54.079
it right in the constitutional convention. So this common law
634
00:36:54.159 --> 00:36:59.239
rule might suggest that the President and Senate together must remove, right,
635
00:36:59.280 --> 00:37:01.639
because they took together a point and a lot of
636
00:37:01.679 --> 00:37:04.840
people took that position in seventeen eighty nine, and Madison said,
637
00:37:05.119 --> 00:37:08.079
that is totally plausible to me, and I would think
638
00:37:08.119 --> 00:37:11.119
it's correct if the Constitution had said nothing else on
639
00:37:11.159 --> 00:37:13.679
the matter. And he thought that the take care clause
640
00:37:14.000 --> 00:37:16.360
and the executive power clause. But again that's a bit
641
00:37:16.440 --> 00:37:19.360
question begging here derogated from the common law rule. He
642
00:37:19.400 --> 00:37:23.119
basically said, the president will be unable to ensure faithful
643
00:37:23.119 --> 00:37:25.760
execution of the law if the Senate gets a back
644
00:37:25.920 --> 00:37:29.159
end check on his removal of officers. Then it's effectively
645
00:37:29.199 --> 00:37:31.000
and I'm sort of speaking for Madison here in my
646
00:37:31.039 --> 00:37:34.719
own language, it's effectively transferring the take care duty to
647
00:37:35.039 --> 00:37:37.320
the Senate. But otherwise he would agree. So when you
648
00:37:37.400 --> 00:37:39.920
look in seventeen eighty nine, and actually Jed's py chart
649
00:37:39.960 --> 00:37:41.360
is super helpful if you have it.
650
00:37:41.599 --> 00:37:41.960
Okay.
651
00:37:43.159 --> 00:37:47.039
A majority of members of Congress thought that the Constitution
652
00:37:47.199 --> 00:37:50.480
answered this question either the President and Senate together have
653
00:37:50.599 --> 00:37:53.840
this power or the president alone has this power. It
654
00:37:53.920 --> 00:37:56.679
was only a small number who thought Congress had discretion
655
00:37:57.159 --> 00:37:59.639
whether to give the removal power to the Senate or not,
656
00:38:00.000 --> 00:38:03.480
which is very interesting since that's the conventional academic view today,
657
00:38:03.519 --> 00:38:05.719
and it's like, where did that come from exactly? And
658
00:38:05.840 --> 00:38:10.440
so okay, so removal yes, But let me suggest that
659
00:38:10.440 --> 00:38:13.320
that doesn't necessarily answer the question of whether Congress can
660
00:38:13.320 --> 00:38:17.039
impose four cause restrictions, because the president has the removal
661
00:38:17.039 --> 00:38:20.199
power in that case. But it's conditioned. Well, I want
662
00:38:20.199 --> 00:38:22.280
to suggest that it's a bit more complicated, and that
663
00:38:22.320 --> 00:38:25.239
the secret that the secret star of this might be
664
00:38:25.280 --> 00:38:29.119
the necessary and proper clause. Under my view, the opinion's
665
00:38:29.159 --> 00:38:32.559
clause actually provides the only constitutional obligation on the part
666
00:38:32.559 --> 00:38:34.880
of officers to obey. Otherwise, why would you need the
667
00:38:34.920 --> 00:38:37.639
opinion's clause. If the President, by virtue of the executive power,
668
00:38:37.719 --> 00:38:40.280
could direct and control, and the officers had to obey
669
00:38:40.519 --> 00:38:44.000
the president, you wouldn't need the opinions clause. There, Washington
670
00:38:44.079 --> 00:38:48.280
Jefferson Madison, with respect to the Controller said to multiple supplicants,
671
00:38:48.320 --> 00:38:51.199
I cannot interfere with the controller's duties. I can only
672
00:38:51.239 --> 00:38:53.960
remove in the case of malpractices. So this is pretty
673
00:38:53.960 --> 00:38:56.960
consistent with prior practice, and I've called this the other
674
00:38:57.000 --> 00:39:00.920
decision of seventeen eighty nine. In the same statute clarifying
675
00:39:01.000 --> 00:39:03.559
in my view that the heads of department that the
676
00:39:03.559 --> 00:39:07.400
President can remove the heads of the department. Here's Foreign
677
00:39:07.400 --> 00:39:11.119
Affairs and War. There's this interesting clause that said, the
678
00:39:11.159 --> 00:39:14.039
said Principal Officer shall conduct the business of the said
679
00:39:14.039 --> 00:39:16.320
Department in such manner as the President of the United
680
00:39:16.360 --> 00:39:20.119
States shall, from time to time order or instruct super interesting.
681
00:39:20.159 --> 00:39:23.199
If the president already had this power, why would Congress
682
00:39:23.280 --> 00:39:26.800
need to have establish it in the statue. Okay, what's
683
00:39:26.840 --> 00:39:29.639
the implication for four cause? Just give me like another
684
00:39:29.840 --> 00:39:34.320
two minutes. It's one possibility is you could say, look,
685
00:39:34.840 --> 00:39:38.440
this was the dividing line between principal and officers. The
686
00:39:38.440 --> 00:39:41.559
president could remove That was the president's power. It couldn't
687
00:39:41.719 --> 00:39:44.000
direct and control, and it's up to him to decide
688
00:39:44.000 --> 00:39:46.639
whether they are faithfully executing the law. I think this
689
00:39:46.760 --> 00:39:49.480
creates on its own a problem for four cause restrictions,
690
00:39:49.639 --> 00:39:53.280
at least if they're judicially reviewable. If they're judicially reviewable
691
00:39:53.320 --> 00:39:56.159
whether there was cause, then it's no better than giving
692
00:39:56.159 --> 00:39:58.679
the Senate a check on the removals. Now you're transferring
693
00:39:58.719 --> 00:40:00.960
the take care duty to the courts, and that's problematic.
694
00:40:01.199 --> 00:40:04.039
But let me suggest something else. Under the
Necessary and
695
00:40:04.119 --> 00:40:05.920
Proper Clause, which I'm not going to get into how
696
00:40:05.960 --> 00:40:08.800
it operates, would it be necessary and proper under our
697
00:40:08.840 --> 00:40:13.400
form of government to create property rights in holding federal office?
698
00:40:13.599 --> 00:40:16.599
The venality that Jed described in his talk James the
699
00:40:16.639 --> 00:40:20.880
First made Francis Bacon Attorney General for life. Could Congress
700
00:40:20.960 --> 00:40:24.400
say that the president may appoint an attorney general for life,
701
00:40:24.760 --> 00:40:27.880
not to be removable, but for cause. It's effectively granting
702
00:40:27.880 --> 00:40:31.519
a lifetime tenure. I think Jed's answer is no to that. Interestingly,
703
00:40:31.679 --> 00:40:34.480
I think we agree about that. Well, if that's true,
704
00:40:34.480 --> 00:40:37.159
then what about ninety nine years. That's cutting a little
705
00:40:37.159 --> 00:40:41.039
close to life for most people? What about fifteen years?
706
00:40:41.679 --> 00:40:45.079
What about seven years? What's the difference. You're creating a
707
00:40:45.119 --> 00:40:49.639
property interest in holding federal office, which seems fundamentally incompatible
708
00:40:49.639 --> 00:40:50.719
with republican government.
709
00:40:51.159 --> 00:40:51.400
Jed.
710
00:40:51.519 --> 00:40:53.280
Now, so I'm going to needle him a bit and
711
00:40:53.320 --> 00:40:56.400
maybe he can respond to this relies on Montesquieu in
712
00:40:56.400 --> 00:41:00.760
his work, where he says that removal is an element
713
00:41:00.800 --> 00:41:02.840
of despotic government because you know, you need to be
714
00:41:02.880 --> 00:41:06.960
able to remove offices quickly. That's true in a monarchy.
715
00:41:07.400 --> 00:41:10.679
Montesque says, the buying and selling of offices is okay.
716
00:41:10.840 --> 00:41:13.679
People have a stake in the system in that way.
717
00:41:13.760 --> 00:41:16.760
But Montesque, in that same passage says, but of course,
718
00:41:17.039 --> 00:41:19.559
property rights in office, the buying and selling of offices
719
00:41:19.599 --> 00:41:21.480
would be inconsistent.
720
00:41:20.800 --> 00:41:21.559
In a republic.
721
00:41:21.920 --> 00:41:26.559
And he quotes Plato on this, saying, creating property interests
722
00:41:26.559 --> 00:41:29.280
in federal office would kind of like be making a
723
00:41:29.320 --> 00:41:32.360
man a pilot or a sailor for his silver what's
724
00:41:32.400 --> 00:41:35.719
the connection to being able to pilot or a ship?
725
00:41:36.360 --> 00:41:38.519
And so I would suggest that under the necessary and
726
00:41:38.599 --> 00:41:41.519
proper clause, Congress probably doesn't have the power to create
727
00:41:41.559 --> 00:41:44.400
property interests in offices and what are forecost protections but
728
00:41:44.639 --> 00:41:47.440
such property interests. Okay, hopefully that's enough for Jed to
729
00:41:47.440 --> 00:41:48.440
start getting angry at me.
730
00:41:49.719 --> 00:41:54.519
All right, So, just to sum up, Lawn's position is
731
00:41:54.559 --> 00:41:59.039
that Humphreys is bad law and that the President has
732
00:41:59.360 --> 00:42:02.280
very bad Lae law. And also Marbury might have been
733
00:42:02.280 --> 00:42:05.119
bad law or might be still good law, but for
734
00:42:05.159 --> 00:42:09.199
bad reasons. We didn't quite get into that. And that
735
00:42:09.480 --> 00:42:13.599
under the relevant provisions and necessary and proper the executive
736
00:42:13.639 --> 00:42:16.880
vesting clause, the opinion's clause, the appointment's clause, that take
737
00:42:16.920 --> 00:42:21.119
care clause, his position is reinforced. I have a lot
738
00:42:21.159 --> 00:42:23.480
of questions, but I think much more important is I
739
00:42:23.480 --> 00:42:25.760
want to give Jet an opportunity to respond and then
740
00:42:25.760 --> 00:42:28.400
Elan to respond to Jet. And this isn't like round one.
741
00:42:28.440 --> 00:42:31.920
It's like round six, you know, like over multiple days
742
00:42:31.960 --> 00:42:32.840
and and years.
743
00:42:34.039 --> 00:42:36.760
So this is tremendously helpful, and I actually want to
744
00:42:36.800 --> 00:42:39.280
go I want to go in reverse order of your arguments,
745
00:42:39.519 --> 00:42:42.039
because I just want to emphasize that there's a what
746
00:42:42.079 --> 00:42:45.239
we agree about. And I think what we agree about
747
00:42:45.360 --> 00:42:48.599
is the significance of the necessary and proper clause. And
748
00:42:50.280 --> 00:42:52.800
this is really breaking away from maybe some of my
749
00:42:52.840 --> 00:42:57.280
political priors. But in this work, as I and others
750
00:42:57.320 --> 00:43:00.880
have worked on, and I'm really relying on a school
751
00:43:00.920 --> 00:43:05.039
of thought that Gary Lawson and Guy Sideman and Robert
752
00:43:05.079 --> 00:43:09.880
Natelsen have most pioneered about fiduciary constitutionalism. So the title
753
00:43:09.920 --> 00:43:15.639
of my book is a simple is a textual reference
754
00:43:15.960 --> 00:43:18.800
to faithful execution. But there are many parts of the
755
00:43:18.840 --> 00:43:22.719
Constitution that highlight a fiduciary background to the Constitution. Now,
756
00:43:22.719 --> 00:43:25.199
Gary Lawson and Guy Sideman go in one direction. I
757
00:43:25.199 --> 00:43:27.599
think their book is worth reading. I disagree with their
758
00:43:27.679 --> 00:43:31.320
non I'm more sympathetic to the non delegation argument. That
759
00:43:31.559 --> 00:43:35.039
non delegation exists, but for other reasons, however, there is
760
00:43:35.079 --> 00:43:39.760
a The fiduciary concept of necessary and proper is a
761
00:43:40.360 --> 00:43:44.119
is a more robust version that John Marshall himself because
762
00:43:44.119 --> 00:43:47.079
he's right about everything right, John Marshall and McCulla
versus
763
00:43:47.079 --> 00:43:51.079
Maryland applies necessary and proper to figure out if the
764
00:43:51.199 --> 00:43:55.480
National Bank is constitutional. And at that threshold of necessary
765
00:43:55.480 --> 00:43:59.079
and proper, I mean it's it's loose, it's it's informal,
766
00:43:59.199 --> 00:44:01.280
or it's a standard more than a rule, but you
767
00:44:01.360 --> 00:44:04.320
still have to demonstrate. Congress has to demonstrate that what
768
00:44:04.400 --> 00:44:08.480
it's enacted under this, under the sweeping clause, it's not
769
00:44:08.599 --> 00:44:11.199
as sweeping as it's as it actually originally meant. It
770
00:44:11.199 --> 00:44:14.239
has to be necessary and proper. Okay. So one thing
771
00:44:14.280 --> 00:44:16.639
I think we agree on, and one argument for the
772
00:44:16.679 --> 00:44:19.360
FED being treated differently, or one reason why the Humphreys
773
00:44:19.400 --> 00:44:23.079
executor is still good law, is that there is that
774
00:44:23.159 --> 00:44:26.599
this is not plenary power for Congress. Let me repeat that, right,
775
00:44:26.639 --> 00:44:29.079
And this is where I may be disagree with others
776
00:44:29.079 --> 00:44:33.679
on the left. There is no plenary grant, grant of
777
00:44:33.880 --> 00:44:36.119
unenumerated implied powers in an Article one.
778
00:44:36.360 --> 00:44:41.559
We should end right now, and this is this is
779
00:44:41.880 --> 00:44:46.639
this is heresy in many ways, as Elon knows to
780
00:44:46.760 --> 00:44:49.960
defend enumerated power, doctrine and non delegation.
781
00:44:50.280 --> 00:44:52.519
But the upshot is it's also a way to distinguish
782
00:44:52.519 --> 00:44:57.599
between the FED and other offices because I'd say a
783
00:44:57.639 --> 00:44:59.679
lot of the worry that on the left, right and
784
00:44:59.719 --> 00:45:03.239
center about the unity executive theory is wiping out the FED.
785
00:45:03.360 --> 00:45:06.920
And i think one argument and your right to worry
786
00:45:06.960 --> 00:45:09.360
about that, especially if you're looking at your four oh
787
00:45:09.360 --> 00:45:14.000
one k right, an argument for the FED having a
788
00:45:14.039 --> 00:45:17.320
particular design, I'd say it extends to other kinds of commissions,
789
00:45:17.480 --> 00:45:20.039
is tailoring it to what's necessary and proper. So okay,
790
00:45:20.079 --> 00:45:22.360
so I want to highlight I think we agree about that.
791
00:45:22.440 --> 00:45:25.079
And it turns out that's not just me talking, and
792
00:45:24.519 --> 00:45:27.960
that's not just Chief Justice John Marshall, but also members
793
00:45:27.960 --> 00:45:31.599
of the First Congress articulated something like that as a
794
00:45:31.639 --> 00:45:36.960
reason why congressional recognizing a power to create independence was
795
00:45:37.000 --> 00:45:40.719
not a plenary power. For example, when Elon asks me, well,
796
00:45:40.880 --> 00:45:43.639
not an attorney general for life? How about ninety nine years,
797
00:45:43.639 --> 00:45:45.920
I'd say, on a question of necessary and proper, we
798
00:45:45.920 --> 00:45:48.360
can have that debate about what's necessary and proper for
799
00:45:48.400 --> 00:45:53.599
the attorney general. We may disagree about the exact independence,
800
00:45:53.800 --> 00:45:56.079
but that's why the necessary and proper clause is why
801
00:45:56.159 --> 00:46:00.559
it goes well beyond Congress's power to create any life
802
00:46:00.719 --> 00:46:05.800
tenure in executive offices. Okay, working, I'm gonna I'm gonna
803
00:46:05.800 --> 00:46:09.000
skip to the two textual points that I think are
804
00:46:09.079 --> 00:46:12.559
hugely important here, and they cut against Elon. One is
805
00:46:12.840 --> 00:46:16.159
this appointment's clause argument. Okay, it turns out that the
806
00:46:16.480 --> 00:46:20.039
that the compromise that Elon highlights is actually it gives
807
00:46:20.119 --> 00:46:23.360
up the ghost on the argument because when they went
808
00:46:23.440 --> 00:46:27.400
to this committee of postponed powers, they did not leave
809
00:46:27.840 --> 00:46:31.280
appointment power to the president alone. And when they shifted it,
810
00:46:31.320 --> 00:46:34.079
like look at Article two, the president has the power
811
00:46:34.119 --> 00:46:37.480
to appoint with the advice and consent of the Senate.
812
00:46:38.079 --> 00:46:41.800
And Elan, you're acknowledging that they couldn't rest on the
813
00:46:41.880 --> 00:46:43.880
sole appointment power of the president. They knew what they
814
00:46:43.920 --> 00:46:47.639
were doing. And the Okay, so first, that is the
815
00:46:47.679 --> 00:46:51.000
way the maxim works. You go out the way you
816
00:46:51.039 --> 00:46:55.679
came in. Removal follows appointment. That was the art, That
817
00:46:55.719 --> 00:46:59.039
was the common law maxim. So then that's an argument
818
00:46:59.039 --> 00:47:02.199
for the Senate. Now, what Elon doesn't tell you is
819
00:47:02.239 --> 00:47:05.199
that the only people who made this argument and cited
820
00:47:05.199 --> 00:47:08.679
the common law argument were the senatorials. No one in
821
00:47:08.719 --> 00:47:11.840
the first Congress believed what Elon just told you. And
822
00:47:11.920 --> 00:47:15.599
I think that's a problem for the not know what
823
00:47:15.639 --> 00:47:20.039
Madison tells you? What Madison? Because Madison doesn't Madison cites it. No, No, listen,
824
00:47:20.199 --> 00:47:23.639
Elon you just told If you go back review the tape,
825
00:47:25.840 --> 00:47:29.480
what Elon told you is Madison says this common law
826
00:47:29.519 --> 00:47:32.880
maxim would be a problem. Why does he say it
827
00:47:32.920 --> 00:47:34.639
would be a problem. He says it would be a
828
00:47:34.679 --> 00:47:38.280
problem because we have this the President and the Senate
829
00:47:38.719 --> 00:47:42.239
jointly appoint and that's
what the maxim means. But there's
830
00:47:42.280 --> 00:47:45.639
an accept that. But he says later Congress, he says,
831
00:47:45.760 --> 00:47:49.559
the reason why that maxim doesn't apply is another textual argument.
832
00:47:49.719 --> 00:47:53.199
But those are two different arguments. Elon Madison agrees that
833
00:47:53.239 --> 00:47:57.039
the only way the maxim applies is President plus Senate.
834
00:47:57.239 --> 00:48:00.199
Now I agree with Elon that the set that the
835
00:48:00.199 --> 00:48:02.280
only people who made this argument the senatorials, and the
836
00:48:02.320 --> 00:48:06.119
senatorials lost. But here's the point of the pie chart. Okay,
837
00:48:06.280 --> 00:48:08.519
the point of the pie chart is that there are
838
00:48:08.840 --> 00:48:11.880
lots of mixed If nothing else comes away from the
839
00:48:11.880 --> 00:48:13.840
pie chart, you should see that lots of people should
840
00:48:13.840 --> 00:48:17.280
be upset because they're getting small pieces of the pie.
841
00:48:17.559 --> 00:48:20.719
No one wins. The decision of seventeen eighty nine. That's
842
00:48:20.719 --> 00:48:24.119
why the article is called the Indecisions of seventeen eighty nine.
843
00:48:24.360 --> 00:48:27.320
When you have okay, so this is I can say
844
00:48:27.400 --> 00:48:29.719
much more about this than some other venue. But when
845
00:48:30.079 --> 00:48:33.639
original public meaning is unclear, then it's not fixed. When
846
00:48:33.679 --> 00:48:36.159
they couldn't agree, and they really they couldn't agree in
847
00:48:36.199 --> 00:48:40.159
the Convention, they couldn't agree in the First Congress, it
848
00:48:40.199 --> 00:48:43.000
means that we have to then rely on other textual sources,
849
00:48:43.000 --> 00:48:46.280
and that's necessarily proper plause. Finally, on the handout on
850
00:48:46.320 --> 00:48:49.079
the elon puts a lot of stock in the opinion's clause,
851
00:48:49.639 --> 00:48:51.519
just let's you know. And it turns out the opinion's
852
00:48:51.519 --> 00:48:53.800
clause is the most overlooked part of this whole debate.
853
00:48:53.960 --> 00:48:56.599
The opinion's clause in the middle of the handout. Under
854
00:48:56.639 --> 00:49:00.599
section two, the President may require the opinion in writing
855
00:49:00.639 --> 00:49:03.840
of the Principal Officer in each of the Executive Departments
856
00:49:03.920 --> 00:49:07.440
upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.
857
00:49:08.079 --> 00:49:10.800
Why would they and why would the founders? Why would
858
00:49:10.960 --> 00:49:15.280
the Convention delegates include that sentence? If the President had
859
00:49:15.280 --> 00:49:19.320
a power to remove and they and members of the
860
00:49:19.880 --> 00:49:24.000
in ratification and in the First Congress, people cited that
861
00:49:24.079 --> 00:49:26.920
clause and said, that's that tells you that the president
862
00:49:27.000 --> 00:49:31.400
doesn't have removal or or control because it implies that
863
00:49:31.440 --> 00:49:32.480
they had to state it.
864
00:49:32.519 --> 00:49:32.639
Now.
865
00:49:32.639 --> 00:49:34.400
I'm not going to go into all of the detail
866
00:49:34.400 --> 00:49:37.320
all of the different theories, but let me just say
867
00:49:37.519 --> 00:49:40.599
there is an academic consensus that this is a problem
868
00:49:41.079 --> 00:49:44.519
for presidential power that this clause gets included. I have
869
00:49:44.679 --> 00:49:48.440
dug into the background of the of the of the
870
00:49:48.480 --> 00:49:52.519
information or opinions clauses that preceded seventeen eighty seven. All
871
00:49:52.719 --> 00:49:56.960
four times state constitutions used anything like an information or
872
00:49:56.960 --> 00:49:59.920
opinion clause, it was because it was between two indi
873
00:50:00.039 --> 00:50:04.920
dependent bodies, a Council of revision judges. The reason why
874
00:50:05.000 --> 00:50:08.400
those clauses were added to state constitutions was to say,
875
00:50:08.639 --> 00:50:13.840
between these two independent bodies, how can we clarify that
876
00:50:13.880 --> 00:50:16.639
one body has a power to ask questions of the
877
00:50:16.679 --> 00:50:20.320
other when they're independent. That's the context. The original public
878
00:50:20.400 --> 00:50:23.840
meaning of the opinion's clause is one of This is
879
00:50:23.880 --> 00:50:29.199
perhaps the best textual evidence against the removal argument of
880
00:50:29.199 --> 00:50:30.320
the interexecutive theory.
881
00:50:31.400 --> 00:50:32.719
Thank you, Jed Alon.
882
00:50:34.159 --> 00:50:37.280
Just keep going, Okay, I think I'll focus on two
883
00:50:37.280 --> 00:50:37.800
things here.
884
00:50:37.880 --> 00:50:39.480
One is the opinion's clause.
885
00:50:41.480 --> 00:50:46.280
Under Jed's view, and I think it's the prevailing academic view, right,
886
00:50:46.800 --> 00:50:50.800
what power does the president have to do with the
887
00:50:50.840 --> 00:50:54.000
information in question? Why does the president need the information?
888
00:50:55.000 --> 00:50:58.280
If he can't direct them, if he can't remove them,
889
00:51:00.000 --> 00:51:01.719
it's the president to do with it. So Peter Strauss
890
00:51:01.760 --> 00:51:03.519
has an answer, which is like, oh, well, the president
891
00:51:03.639 --> 00:51:05.880
is effectively the persuader in chief.
892
00:51:06.519 --> 00:51:08.199
Okay, he could.
893
00:51:08.079 --> 00:51:11.960
Cajole, coax, mobilize different aspects of the government, but at
894
00:51:12.000 --> 00:51:14.639
the end of the day, he's just the persuader in chief, right,
895
00:51:14.719 --> 00:51:19.239
And that just seems totally inconsistent with the way the
896
00:51:19.239 --> 00:51:23.360
administration actually worked and the opinion's clause actually operated. Whereas
897
00:51:23.440 --> 00:51:26.159
under my view, the opinion's clause, I do think is
898
00:51:26.199 --> 00:51:28.519
a problem for the direction and control view of the
899
00:51:28.519 --> 00:51:31.159
executive power, but it makes perfect sense under my account,
900
00:51:31.239 --> 00:51:34.599
which is, if the president's only power is to remove,
901
00:51:35.400 --> 00:51:38.800
you're going to need some way to get information before
902
00:51:38.840 --> 00:51:41.440
exercising the removal power. People say, oh, well, you know,
903
00:51:41.480 --> 00:51:44.360
he could have always commanded and threatened removal. It's but yes,
904
00:51:44.400 --> 00:51:47.960
but you want the president to have information first before
905
00:51:48.239 --> 00:51:51.079
he removes, which is why this is the one constitutional
906
00:51:51.119 --> 00:51:54.920
obligation on the part of principal officers. Now, Jed, I'll
907
00:51:54.960 --> 00:51:57.960
let him, you know, speak to it. Yesterday he was
908
00:51:58.000 --> 00:52:00.000
asked this by Gary Lawson actually in his book workshop.
909
00:52:00.000 --> 00:52:02.320
When you had an answer, you, well, the president can
910
00:52:02.360 --> 00:52:04.400
get information and then relate to the Senate, and the
911
00:52:04.400 --> 00:52:06.519
President and the Senate together, so he'll have an answer
912
00:52:06.559 --> 00:52:09.360
to that. But under the prevailing sort of persuader in
913
00:52:09.400 --> 00:52:11.599
chief view, that just seems so inconsistent with the way
914
00:52:11.599 --> 00:52:14.280
executive power operated for the first century and a half
915
00:52:14.639 --> 00:52:16.599
of the founding. Let me say something about the FED,
916
00:52:16.639 --> 00:52:19.480
and then maybe i'll stop. The example of the FED,
917
00:52:19.519 --> 00:52:22.199
if I may say so myself illustrates what I view
918
00:52:22.239 --> 00:52:25.519
as the brilliance of the proposal that I have advanced today,
919
00:52:25.719 --> 00:52:29.760
which is the distribution of political costs. Under my view
920
00:52:29.800 --> 00:52:32.360
of the president doesn't necessarily have a right to control that.
921
00:52:32.480 --> 00:52:36.280
Congress can vest discretionary duties in officers, and it is
922
00:52:36.480 --> 00:52:42.400
those officers obligation and power to execute those duties. Okay,
923
00:52:42.840 --> 00:52:46.679
But the president nevertheless has oversight through the power to
924
00:52:46.760 --> 00:52:52.159
remove And therefore, if the Congress wants the FED to
925
00:52:52.159 --> 00:52:55.360
have a degree of independence, it would be improper to
926
00:52:55.480 --> 00:53:00.320
remove the FED chair for purposes of interfering with the
927
00:53:00.360 --> 00:53:04.360
Fed's duties. But the president nevertheless has that power, and
928
00:53:04.400 --> 00:53:06.960
if he's willing to take the political cost, absorb the
929
00:53:07.000 --> 00:53:09.599
political cost of doing it, then he can go ahead
930
00:53:09.599 --> 00:53:12.079
and do it. And this is
I think a brilliant
931
00:53:12.079 --> 00:53:15.760
distribution of political costs. Why what does it mean the
932
00:53:15.800 --> 00:53:19.000
Fed's independent? Nobody's independent. Give me a break. That's not
933
00:53:19.079 --> 00:53:22.679
a thing. Okay, you want them to exercise. What they
934
00:53:22.719 --> 00:53:27.159
mean is independent from the president. They're not independent of passion,
935
00:53:27.199 --> 00:53:31.239
they're not independent of partisanship, they're not independent of political parties.
936
00:53:31.320 --> 00:53:31.679
Okay.
937
00:53:31.840 --> 00:53:35.320
So if you want to create some degree of expertise
938
00:53:35.440 --> 00:53:39.280
and independence in officers while ensuring a degree of accountability
939
00:53:39.280 --> 00:53:42.519
to the people through elections, what better way than this
940
00:53:42.639 --> 00:53:46.800
distribution of the president can remove has no constitutional right
941
00:53:46.840 --> 00:53:49.519
to control or direct, but he can attempt to do
942
00:53:49.599 --> 00:53:51.920
so through the removal power if he's willing to absorb
943
00:53:51.960 --> 00:53:55.079
the political costs. And I think that's a perfectly sensible
944
00:53:55.119 --> 00:53:57.920
way to run the FED and the system in general.
945
00:53:58.440 --> 00:54:00.760
So this is grade what I'm going to do now
946
00:54:00.840 --> 00:54:05.800
is sort of take moderators prerogative. The die has been
947
00:54:05.840 --> 00:54:11.960
cast opinions have been displayed and there's there's there's some commonality.
948
00:54:12.000 --> 00:54:14.519
But as to the question of Humphreyes, there's a divert
949
00:54:14.559 --> 00:54:17.199
you know, strict divergence. I want to unpack some of
950
00:54:17.199 --> 00:54:20.639
this and react to some of these points. The first
951
00:54:20.719 --> 00:54:23.000
is I want to introduce the thought Experiment using a
952
00:54:23.039 --> 00:54:26.119
presidential action from January twentieth of this year. And this
953
00:54:26.199 --> 00:54:27.880
is really for a long but also I'm interested for
954
00:54:27.960 --> 00:54:32.760
JET So you know, option seven is the president has
955
00:54:32.800 --> 00:54:35.239
the right to remove, but not the right to control
956
00:54:35.360 --> 00:54:38.639
or command. So on the you know, the first day
957
00:54:38.639 --> 00:54:42.880
of the term, there's the statue. It's the TikTok Statute.
958
00:54:42.960 --> 00:54:50.159
It's the Protection Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications
959
00:54:50.159 --> 00:54:53.599
Act known as PAFACA. We don't know need to know
960
00:54:53.679 --> 00:54:56.000
too much about PAFACA, but what I do want to
961
00:54:56.039 --> 00:54:59.119
focus on is section two of that action. I Airby
962
00:54:59.280 --> 00:55:01.679
ordered the Attorney General not to take any action on
963
00:55:01.719 --> 00:55:05.840
behalf of the United States to enforce a federal statute
964
00:55:06.079 --> 00:55:11.159
that authorizes the Attorney General to enforce another subpart, the
965
00:55:11.199 --> 00:55:15.119
Attorney General shall take appropriate actions to issue written guidance
966
00:55:15.199 --> 00:55:19.679
to implement my order to the Attorney General. And then third,
967
00:55:20.000 --> 00:55:22.800
I further order the Attorney General to issue a letter
968
00:55:22.920 --> 00:55:28.639
to each provider of apps stating that there has been
969
00:55:28.639 --> 00:55:31.960
no violation of the statute and no liability for any
970
00:55:32.000 --> 00:55:35.559
conduct that occurred during the above specified at least at
971
00:55:35.559 --> 00:55:38.639
this time seventy five day period. So when I read that,
972
00:55:38.639 --> 00:55:42.559
that struck me as different from prior presidential administrations, including
973
00:55:42.599 --> 00:55:45.880
Trump forty five. So this goes to sort of like
974
00:55:45.960 --> 00:55:53.440
the president aspect of option seven, is that, hypothetically, you know,
975
00:55:53.760 --> 00:55:54.960
a lawful order.
976
00:55:57.000 --> 00:56:00.360
So I don't know what If the question is, is
977
00:56:00.400 --> 00:56:03.760
the president ordered the attorney channel to do something unlawful, right,
978
00:56:04.280 --> 00:56:06.239
I don't think that that's a lawful order.
979
00:56:06.320 --> 00:56:06.480
Right.
980
00:56:06.880 --> 00:56:09.960
If the question is does the president have the constitutional
981
00:56:10.000 --> 00:56:13.159
power to direct the attorney general? Under my view, it
982
00:56:13.199 --> 00:56:16.400
would depend on whether the statute gave that power. We
983
00:56:16.440 --> 00:56:19.280
could also understand a default rule where if it's not
984
00:56:19.679 --> 00:56:22.679
you know, independent like the Kagan presidential administration, that if
985
00:56:22.679 --> 00:56:26.800
it's within the EOP kind of branch, then the presumption
986
00:56:26.960 --> 00:56:29.280
is the president can direct and control. I'm fine with
987
00:56:29.480 --> 00:56:32.679
all of that. That doesn't mean that the president can
988
00:56:32.760 --> 00:56:35.199
order something unlawful, which I don't know if that is
989
00:56:35.239 --> 00:56:36.440
that that what you were getting at.
990
00:56:36.480 --> 00:56:37.679
But like literally, guest.
991
00:56:37.760 --> 00:56:40.519
Can the president so that the president, at least within
992
00:56:40.559 --> 00:56:45.119
the statute authorizes the president to delay the effects you
993
00:56:45.119 --> 00:56:49.039
know of the fact if you make certain findings, which
994
00:56:49.280 --> 00:56:52.920
you know in some respects he did. But then he
995
00:56:53.079 --> 00:56:56.480
is then going further than that express authority to direct
996
00:56:56.480 --> 00:56:59.639
the Attorney General to engage in or not engage in
997
00:56:59.639 --> 00:57:04.159
certain law enforcement actions. Here are the
forebearing of enforcements
998
00:57:04.440 --> 00:57:09.280
and also the affirmative obligation to essentially create a safe
999
00:57:09.280 --> 00:57:14.960
harbor by the transmitdle of the letter providing his opinion
1000
00:57:15.000 --> 00:57:15.519
on the law.
1001
00:57:16.400 --> 00:57:21.360
So let me compare that to the situation of Andrew
1002
00:57:21.440 --> 00:57:24.760
Jackson and the bank deposits. Why was that so controversial?
1003
00:57:24.840 --> 00:57:28.000
Because the law said that the US Treasury deposits shall
1004
00:57:28.000 --> 00:57:30.400
remain in the Bank of the United States unless the
1005
00:57:30.440 --> 00:57:33.800
Treasury Secretary, the Secretary of the Treasury shall form an
1006
00:57:33.800 --> 00:57:36.760
opinion and that in his judgment, they are not safe
1007
00:57:36.920 --> 00:57:41.599
in the deposited in the Bank of the United States.
1008
00:57:41.960 --> 00:57:45.519
The duties, the discretion, the obligation was imposed on the
1009
00:57:45.599 --> 00:57:48.760
officer because Congress thought that that was the best place
1010
00:57:48.960 --> 00:57:55.000
for that discretion to be exercised neutral a political expert way,
1011
00:57:55.239 --> 00:57:57.360
whatever you want to call it. And the problem there
1012
00:57:57.719 --> 00:58:00.320
was that Andrew Jackson, but even Andrew Jackson, and by
1013
00:58:00.360 --> 00:58:03.480
the way, to be clear, it was very careful. There's
1014
00:58:03.559 --> 00:58:06.800
a there are notes from his cabinet meeting in which
1015
00:58:06.800 --> 00:58:09.800
they're discussing this, and he tells the Treasury secretary he's
1016
00:58:09.800 --> 00:58:12.320
talking to the audience, to his whole cabinet, and he says,
1017
00:58:12.519 --> 00:58:15.599
I don't want to be mistaken for directing the Treasury
1018
00:58:15.639 --> 00:58:18.559
Secretary in what to do. However, it would please me
1019
00:58:18.719 --> 00:58:22.360
if there was a uniformity in administration of my policies,
1020
00:58:22.519 --> 00:58:25.840
right basically strongly suggesting I will remove you, because at
1021
00:58:25.920 --> 00:58:28.639
least I have that power, even if I cannot directly control.
1022
00:58:28.760 --> 00:58:31.519
And the reason it was controversial was because everybody knew
1023
00:58:31.519 --> 00:58:34.519
that the removal was done because the President was trying
1024
00:58:34.559 --> 00:58:38.360
to supplant the judgment of the Treasury Secretary for his
1025
00:58:38.400 --> 00:58:41.719
own judgment. In this case, the attorney general. The funny
1026
00:58:41.719 --> 00:58:43.880
thing is there might be like a norm that the
1027
00:58:43.880 --> 00:58:46.920
attorney general should be independent, but it's actually quite unlike
1028
00:58:47.000 --> 00:58:49.480
the bank deposit case, where I don't think anybody actually
1029
00:58:49.519 --> 00:58:53.840
doubts that the President has the constant the statutory authority
1030
00:58:53.880 --> 00:58:56.039
to direct the officer, and it certainly could remove the
1031
00:58:56.079 --> 00:58:59.360
Attorney General if she ignored him. So again, it would
1032
00:58:59.400 --> 00:59:01.719
depend on exis factly how the statute is written and
1033
00:59:01.719 --> 00:59:04.679
in whose you know, whose judgment it is right to
1034
00:59:05.320 --> 00:59:06.239
make that determination.
1035
00:59:06.880 --> 00:59:07.119
Yeah.
1036
00:59:07.320 --> 00:59:09.400
Absolutely, And the reason why I asked, you know, I
1037
00:59:09.440 --> 00:59:13.280
framed that hypo is is that the precedent's requirement for
1038
00:59:13.559 --> 00:59:16.119
your option seven is like a really significant one. Right,
1039
00:59:16.840 --> 00:59:18.639
So just just to reveal that, Jed, what are your thoughts.
1040
00:59:18.719 --> 00:59:20.880
Yeah, let me take this. I think that's an excellent question.
1041
00:59:21.039 --> 00:59:23.639
And this also, I think frames I'm gonna take this
1042
00:59:23.719 --> 00:59:26.280
up to a higher level instraction about the questions. I
1043
00:59:26.360 --> 00:59:31.480
think one answer is around. I think maybe Congress's statutes
1044
00:59:32.000 --> 00:59:36.400
relate to answering that question, which is that when Congress
1045
00:59:36.440 --> 00:59:38.960
decides to create the Department of Justice. I have an
1046
00:59:39.039 --> 00:59:42.280
article on this. It's actually very different, right, So again,
1047
00:59:42.440 --> 00:59:45.360
go read that article that the founding of the creator,
1048
00:59:45.360 --> 00:59:48.679
the creation of the DJ was much more independent than
1049
00:59:48.760 --> 00:59:53.519
it is today, and as as time has unfolded, those
1050
00:59:53.559 --> 00:59:58.840
other changes reflect a congressional decision, a congressional choice to
1051
00:59:59.039 --> 01:00:03.360
make the dog an executive Department under the president, which
1052
01:00:03.400 --> 01:00:06.519
and I think that statutory background is I think the
1053
01:00:06.519 --> 01:00:09.519
best answer to the question, which is it's because Congress
1054
01:00:09.559 --> 01:00:13.719
has made the Attorney general under the unitary executive control
1055
01:00:13.760 --> 01:00:16.719
of the president. But that's different from the question of
1056
01:00:16.760 --> 01:00:22.199
whether Congress could change that. Congress made different choices like
1057
01:00:22.239 --> 01:00:26.079
the Tenure of Office Act that protected officers, requiring Senate
1058
01:00:26.159 --> 01:00:32.519
agreement to remove in the in eighteen sixty seven. Could
1059
01:00:32.559 --> 01:00:35.079
we looking forward? And I make this argument here and
1060
01:00:35.760 --> 01:00:40.159
moving forward, we have seen problems both by parties, by
1061
01:00:40.239 --> 01:00:44.599
presidents from both parties of misusing the Department of Justice
1062
01:00:44.599 --> 01:00:47.920
and misusing prosecution. I also think we've seen state
prosecutors
1063
01:00:47.960 --> 01:00:51.920
like the Manhattan DA abuse prosecutorial power as well. So
1064
01:00:52.039 --> 01:00:55.840
I would make an argument that moving forward, the reforms
1065
01:00:55.840 --> 01:00:57.480
we need to think about are how to make the
1066
01:00:57.480 --> 01:01:01.280
administrative administration of justice more independent, and I think as
1067
01:01:01.320 --> 01:01:03.840
a matter of the necessary and proper clause, that would
1068
01:01:03.880 --> 01:01:05.599
be one way to address this problem.
1069
01:01:06.079 --> 01:01:09.119
Yeah, so that makes a lot of sense. I think
1070
01:01:09.159 --> 01:01:13.320
it's well argued. Of course. What I what I really
1071
01:01:13.400 --> 01:01:15.880
like about your your respective response. The first of one
1072
01:01:16.000 --> 01:01:19.880
is you reference Andrew Jackson. It's that makes a lot
1073
01:01:19.880 --> 01:01:21.880
of sense, because in forty five, you know, like his
1074
01:01:22.000 --> 01:01:24.840
portrait was in the oval right. And the question then
1075
01:01:24.960 --> 01:01:26.920
is this has in the first hundred days? Is Nate
1076
01:01:27.000 --> 01:01:30.559
described And one of the implication you know, implied questions
1077
01:01:30.639 --> 01:01:34.559
is is the the trumper's version two point zero moving
1078
01:01:34.639 --> 01:01:39.519
in a departmentalist direction? And then Jed your your response,
1079
01:01:39.960 --> 01:01:43.400
of course, you know it's it's grounded in a lot
1080
01:01:43.440 --> 01:01:45.960
of good reasons. But then we have to counterbalance that
1081
01:01:46.039 --> 01:01:49.760
against the pardon and the communate commutation power, and like
1082
01:01:49.800 --> 01:01:52.440
the purest version of the take care clause authority would
1083
01:01:52.440 --> 01:01:54.519
have at least in my mind, would be like criminal
1084
01:01:54.559 --> 01:01:58.480
prosecution right, for which there's all kinds of other constitutional checks.
1085
01:01:59.760 --> 01:02:01.920
And another question that I want to frame again a
1086
01:02:01.960 --> 01:02:04.519
premise question with regard to Humphries and this you know
1087
01:02:04.679 --> 01:02:06.960
you brought this up at least with regard to constitutional
1088
01:02:07.039 --> 01:02:10.320
history on Earth since nineteen thirty five, what about the
1089
01:02:10.360 --> 01:02:14.320
statutory changes to the Trade Commission. It's a very different
1090
01:02:14.360 --> 01:02:17.519
Trade Commission than it was in nineteen thirty five. What
1091
01:02:17.559 --> 01:02:19.880
do you both make of that the Trade Commission has
1092
01:02:19.920 --> 01:02:23.280
a much more authority sort of like you know, had
1093
01:02:23.280 --> 01:02:25.760
a zenith and like into like the early seventies before
1094
01:02:25.760 --> 01:02:28.400
the Trade Commission Improvement Act. Because the Trade Commission was
1095
01:02:28.440 --> 01:02:32.320
regulating like toothpaste
and like soda and like essentially got
1096
01:02:32.320 --> 01:02:36.159
like all of American industry against it. How does that plant?
1097
01:02:37.239 --> 01:02:39.639
So to take the first crack at this, I'll just
1098
01:02:39.920 --> 01:02:42.880
I'll make a concession against interest here. So I had
1099
01:02:42.880 --> 01:02:46.480
a conversation a year ago with Eli n ACHMANI, who's
1100
01:02:46.519 --> 01:02:49.639
a you know, young scholar, and really he may even
1101
01:02:49.639 --> 01:02:52.199
be here, Eli At, he's a good guy. I was
1102
01:02:52.239 --> 01:02:54.199
gonna if he was here, I would totally change what
1103
01:02:54.280 --> 01:02:57.639
I was going to say. No, it's as he talked.
1104
01:02:57.679 --> 01:03:00.360
I haven't read the article, but I had a a
1105
01:03:00.400 --> 01:03:03.960
conversation with him, And I think there's another scholar that's
1106
01:03:03.960 --> 01:03:09.719
made a similar point that the twenty first century FTC
1107
01:03:09.880 --> 01:03:12.159
is not the FTC that was upheld in Humphries. And
1108
01:03:12.599 --> 01:03:16.760
that's I think that's the best argument about why you
1109
01:03:16.800 --> 01:03:21.239
could overturn why you could actually leave Humphreys in Humphreys
1110
01:03:21.320 --> 01:03:25.159
as a valid precedent or update it but also strike
1111
01:03:25.239 --> 01:03:27.679
down the FDC's independence, is that the FTC has become
1112
01:03:27.679 --> 01:03:31.599
a lot more executive power ish than quasi judicial and
1113
01:03:31.639 --> 01:03:35.679
quajis legislative than it by its design in nineteen thirteen,
1114
01:03:36.320 --> 01:03:38.719
and so I think that's I think it's important to
1115
01:03:38.760 --> 01:03:43.679
recognize that those details matter. I think they matter as
1116
01:03:43.679 --> 01:03:45.599
a matter of as a matter of the necessary and
1117
01:03:45.679 --> 01:03:48.840
proper clause, and also paying attention to statute to the
1118
01:03:49.440 --> 01:03:53.000
Congress's range of choices. But I'll stop there.
1119
01:03:54.440 --> 01:03:57.800
My answer is simple and will shore up my federalist society.
1120
01:03:57.840 --> 01:03:59.280
But a few days which I may have given up
1121
01:03:59.280 --> 01:04:04.119
a little bit throughout today's discussion, which is, it's executive power.
1122
01:04:04.199 --> 01:04:05.400
And it's always been executive power.
1123
01:04:05.440 --> 01:04:07.360
If it's not legislative power, if it's not judicial power,
1124
01:04:07.360 --> 01:04:10.559
it's executive power. And what it was doing in nineteen
1125
01:04:10.639 --> 01:04:14.199
thirty five was executive power. And if it wasn't, then
1126
01:04:14.199 --> 01:04:15.840
they should have been doing it anyway, because they're not
1127
01:04:15.880 --> 01:04:18.199
Congress and they're not a court. And so this whole
1128
01:04:18.239 --> 01:04:22.280
idea of like substantial executive power, in substantial executive power,
1129
01:04:22.719 --> 01:04:24.960
there's nothing in the Constitution that says Congress has power
1130
01:04:25.079 --> 01:04:27.199
necessary and proper power to decide which components of the
1131
01:04:27.199 --> 01:04:29.199
executive power, and substantial enough that they can take it
1132
01:04:29.199 --> 01:04:30.039
away from the president.
1133
01:04:30.239 --> 01:04:32.239
Can I just quickly follow up on that, which is,
1134
01:04:32.280 --> 01:04:35.199
and it goes back to something I left from what
1135
01:04:35.239 --> 01:04:39.639
you said in your opening remark. There is a perception
1136
01:04:39.760 --> 01:04:43.519
which I used to hold that when I read Humphreys
1137
01:04:43.519 --> 01:04:46.440
exactly when I read Meyers as a law student, I thought,
1138
01:04:46.760 --> 01:04:49.039
this is wrong on them as a matter of history.
1139
01:04:49.079 --> 01:04:51.320
And when I read Humphreys as a law student, I
1140
01:04:51.360 --> 01:04:55.320
thought they're just making this up. And as it turns out,
1141
01:04:55.360 --> 01:04:59.239
other historians and I've dug into this too, the language
1142
01:04:59.239 --> 01:05:03.280
of quasi wgislative and quasi judicial was not invented in
1143
01:05:03.320 --> 01:05:05.480
the twentieth century. It is a language that goes back
1144
01:05:05.480 --> 01:05:08.119
to the nineteenth century. And there's a through line that
1145
01:05:08.159 --> 01:05:11.119
I'm not going to get into, but for another article
1146
01:05:11.199 --> 01:05:13.880
or another project that Lana and I were debating yesterday.
1147
01:05:14.679 --> 01:05:17.679
The separation of powers is much more complicated than people
1148
01:05:18.039 --> 01:05:21.960
assume from the formal separation of powers is a late
1149
01:05:22.039 --> 01:05:27.159
twentieth century creation. More or less, the Founders were still
1150
01:05:27.159 --> 01:05:30.760
working out in Cow eight versions of legislative power executive power,
1151
01:05:30.920 --> 01:05:34.599
and there's no separation of the six states in the
1152
01:05:34.639 --> 01:05:38.199
original state constitutions had separation of powers clauses. The Framers
1153
01:05:38.199 --> 01:05:40.880
didn't adopt one, and there's good reason why their model
1154
01:05:41.000 --> 01:05:44.960
was more checks and balances of overlapping powers, like the
1155
01:05:45.039 --> 01:05:47.800
decision not to give the president full appointment power but
1156
01:05:47.880 --> 01:05:52.400
to divide that traditional executive power with the Senate. It
1157
01:05:52.440 --> 01:05:56.039
turns out that that model of informal separation and checks
1158
01:05:56.039 --> 01:05:59.199
and balances was the framing and there's a through line
1159
01:05:59.239 --> 01:06:03.480
from that to Humphreys of this sort of overlapping quasi legislative,
1160
01:06:03.519 --> 01:06:04.320
quasi judicial.
1161
01:06:05.440 --> 01:06:06.920
I agree with forty percent of that.
1162
01:06:09.400 -->
01:06:09.800
Take it.
1163
01:06:09.840 --> 01:06:12.159
So we have time for me to ask one more
1164
01:06:12.199 --> 01:06:16.119
sort of laden question, and then we'll give a generous
1165
01:06:16.119 --> 01:06:18.000
amount of time for Q and A to the audience.
1166
01:06:18.880 --> 01:06:20.920
This this, this one going to sort of goes back
1167
01:06:21.000 --> 01:06:25.079
to Marburie. You mentioned Elan and you're like anyone who
1168
01:06:25.119 --> 01:06:27.719
teaches Marborie, you know it's it's a super precedent. But
1169
01:06:27.719 --> 01:06:30.800
there's also all kinds of untruths in the opinion. Like
1170
01:06:30.840 --> 01:06:34.119
the most obvious one to me actually is its maximum
1171
01:06:34.320 --> 01:06:37.239
ubi use eb remedium right, So for every violation there
1172
01:06:37.280 --> 01:06:39.519
is a remedy, and that's just like totally not true.
1173
01:06:39.559 --> 01:06:42.119
There's all kinds of things that go wrong that courts
1174
01:06:42.119 --> 01:06:46.800
cannot resolve for you. But this brings me to page
1175
01:06:46.880 --> 01:06:51.599
twenty of Solicitor General Sour's brief, which is a stay
1176
01:06:51.719 --> 01:06:54.480
motion which was granted on the ninth of last month,
1177
01:06:54.679 --> 01:06:58.239
but also meant to be construed as a petition for SIRT,
1178
01:06:58.320 --> 01:07:01.840
which is a court lacks the power to issue equitable
1179
01:07:01.920 --> 01:07:05.719
relief for storing a removed executive officer. So one part
1180
01:07:05.719 --> 01:07:07.719
of the debate that we haven't really sort of covered
1181
01:07:07.760 --> 01:07:10.880
super well is what about that third branch which there's
1182
01:07:10.960 --> 01:07:13.639
like nothing an Article three section two to work with here,
1183
01:07:13.679 --> 01:07:16.880
just a couple of words. And this sort of brings
1184
01:07:16.880 --> 01:07:22.400
in some interesting themes of judicial supremacy versus departmentalism, Like
1185
01:07:22.559 --> 01:07:25.000
what's your take on the Article three power here?
1186
01:07:27.480 --> 01:07:29.679
This is great because I really wanted to be on
1187
01:07:29.800 --> 01:07:30.719
a different panel today.
1188
01:07:30.719 --> 01:07:32.599
Actually the inunction's pedal.
1189
01:07:32.679 --> 01:07:36.039
Okay, So this is like Remedies is the most never
1190
01:07:37.440 --> 01:07:40.400
I feel like for mescalarly and a judicial development perspective,
1191
01:07:40.440 --> 01:07:42.519
Remedies is like the next big thing.
1192
01:07:44.559 --> 01:07:48.559
So one point about Marbury, So I will answer it
1193
01:07:48.559 --> 01:07:51.119
seriously in a second, and I'll do the equitable as well.
1194
01:07:51.360 --> 01:07:54.960
Everyone understands that Marshall was wrong about basically everything right
1195
01:07:55.039 --> 01:07:57.519
in that opinion. He was wrong that the Commission didn't
1196
01:07:57.519 --> 01:07:59.960
have to be delivered. He was wrong that the Section
1197
01:08:00.400 --> 01:08:02.960
thirteen of the Judiciary Act of seventeen eighty nine gave
1198
01:08:03.039 --> 01:08:05.360
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to issue rits of
1199
01:08:05.360 --> 01:08:10.119
mandamus when it clearly says that when exercising appellate jurisdiction,
1200
01:08:10.159 --> 01:08:12.800
it may issue a rid of mandamus. So he manufactured
1201
01:08:12.960 --> 01:08:16.079
this statutory conflict which actually may or may not conflict
1202
01:08:16.079 --> 01:08:18.960
with Article three. It probably does, so that's another reason.
1203
01:08:19.039 --> 01:08:21.199
And he went through all these textual provisions for judicial
1204
01:08:21.239 --> 01:08:24.199
review which don't make any sense. I mean, he was though,
1205
01:08:24.399 --> 01:08:28.000
don't get me wrong, he was right on the bottom line. Okay,
1206
01:08:28.159 --> 01:08:30.960
So he's wrong about all of these things, and he's
1207
01:08:31.039 --> 01:08:36.079
just right that President Jefferson couldn't remove William Marbury like
1208
01:08:36.119 --> 01:08:38.319
from office for five years. I mean, it would be
1209
01:08:38.359 --> 01:08:40.840
astounding if Marshall got everything wrong in that opinion. But
1210
01:08:40.960 --> 01:08:44.359
that point, okay, So seriously, though, on the merits of
1211
01:08:44.399 --> 01:08:47.760
that question, there are a couple conceptions of the officer
1212
01:08:47.800 --> 01:08:50.279
William Marbury. One is he was the Justice of the
1213
01:08:50.279 --> 01:08:52.560
Peace for the District of Columbia, and some people have
1214
01:08:52.640 --> 01:08:55.520
made the argument, including myself, that it's at least conceivable
1215
01:08:55.560 --> 01:08:58.640
that he wasn't exercising executive power of the United States,
1216
01:08:58.680 --> 01:09:01.720
but rather executive power of the District of Columbia for
1217
01:09:01.760 --> 01:09:05.039
the same reason that territorial judges did not have lifetime tenure.
1218
01:09:05.359 --> 01:09:07.920
The theory seems to have been that they were exercising
1219
01:09:07.920 --> 01:09:09.920
the judicial power of a different sovereign. I no jud
1220
01:09:10.000 --> 01:09:11.880
disagrees with me on this. I see him shaking his
1221
01:09:11.880 --> 01:09:13.439
head out of the corner of my eye. But it
1222
01:09:13.520 --> 01:09:16.720
is at least like a possible conception of why the
1223
01:09:17.119 --> 01:09:19.920
removal power would not have applied. Another possibility is that
1224
01:09:19.960 --> 01:09:22.359
they were actually Article three judges, and Congress means that
1225
01:09:22.760 --> 01:09:25.880
this up by giving them five year terms. Some judges
1226
01:09:25.960 --> 01:09:29.239
did rule that make that ruling, it was disputed a
1227
01:09:29.279 --> 01:09:32.840
few years afterward. And then there's just Marshall was wrong,
1228
01:09:32.960 --> 01:09:35.439
and Jefferson did in fact fire all of the
Justices
1229
01:09:35.680 --> 01:09:38.720
of the Peace, and he reappointed some of them. Right,
1230
01:09:39.079 --> 01:09:42.399
So you know, Marshall is not a saint. He's great,
1231
01:09:42.479 --> 01:09:44.319
but he's not a saint, okay, And he didn't get
1232
01:09:44.399 --> 01:09:48.039
quite everything right about that und judicial power. Generally, this
1233
01:09:48.079 --> 01:09:49.399
is sort of a hobby horse of minds. So let
1234
01:09:49.479 --> 01:09:52.720
me just say one thing about injunctions in particular. Everybody
1235
01:09:52.800 --> 01:09:55.640
is talking about universal injunctions, which are a problem, like,
1236
01:09:55.920 --> 01:09:58.439
even if an injunction is owed or do at the
1237
01:09:58.520 --> 01:10:00.119
end of the day, why does it have to be
1238
01:10:00.199 --> 01:10:02.359
universal and apply to non parties? Why does it have
1239
01:10:02.399 --> 01:10:05.079
to be reenforcement? Those are all problems, But what people
1240
01:10:05.159 --> 01:10:08.760
aren't talking about is when is an injunction even appropriate?
1241
01:10:08.840 --> 01:10:11.520
And the answer is the remedy at law has to
1242
01:10:11.560 --> 01:10:14.640
be inadequate, okay, the alien enemies that, Oh, I don't
1243
01:10:14.640 --> 01:10:17.039
want to get too much into this. Habeas is a
1244
01:10:17.119 --> 01:10:21.520
legal remedy right and usually considered inadequate legal remedy, So
1245
01:10:21.560 --> 01:10:24.600
an injunction would not be appropriate, uh in that case.
1246
01:10:24.880 --> 01:10:28.960
And you know salary suits Myers Humphreys, Okay, Humphreys was dead,
1247
01:10:29.039 --> 01:10:30.720
so it was a bit different, Like you can't reinstate
1248
01:10:30.720 --> 01:10:34.159
a dead guy. But Humphreys, Myers Perkins, which is an
1249
01:10:34.159 --> 01:10:36.800
inferior officer case, the Wiener case, all of these were
1250
01:10:36.800 --> 01:10:39.399
suits for salary. They were removed and they sued for
1251
01:10:39.439 --> 01:10:42.680
their salary. Like what are these judges doing like issuing
1252
01:10:42.760 --> 01:10:46.000
tros reinstating people. Sue for your salary in the court
1253
01:10:46.000 --> 01:10:47.479
of claims and you will be made whole.
1254
01:10:49.159 --> 01:10:52.239
I've gone down plenty of rabbit holes here, so I'll
1255
01:10:52.279 --> 01:10:55.760
just say for another one, so I'll just say you
1256
01:10:55.800 --> 01:10:59.920
can read the amicus brief that Arom helpefully cited. It's
1257
01:11:00.079 --> 01:11:02.479
up on SSRN. About the Marvurie question, I will just
1258
01:11:02.520 --> 01:11:07.399
say one sentence about that, which is, if Jefferson, how
1259
01:11:07.560 --> 01:11:09.640
do we know that there was consensus that Marshall was right?
1260
01:11:10.039 --> 01:11:14.800
Jefferson wanted to remove and dropped the removal of the JPS,
1261
01:11:15.119 --> 01:11:19.439
and no one argued when they showed up the lawyers
1262
01:11:19.600 --> 01:11:22.319
for the for the executive branch, no one even made
1263
01:11:22.359 --> 01:11:26.239
the argument that they were removed. There was a they
1264
01:11:26.479 --> 01:11:29.760
argued on the terms that Marshall concluded, which was that
1265
01:11:29.800 --> 01:11:33.520
they were removed removed. The last thing I'll say is
1266
01:11:33.560 --> 01:11:36.199
a big picture point, which is to again, this may
1267
01:11:36.199 --> 01:11:39.399
be is a statement in interest or against interest. There's
1268
01:11:39.439 --> 01:11:43.399
a larger problem when it comes to judicial power. As originalists,
1269
01:11:44.039 --> 01:11:48.239
judicial power at Circus seventeen eighty seven was much narrative.
1270
01:11:48.319 --> 01:11:51.840
Judicial review was a thing, but judicial supremacy was not.
1271
01:11:52.159 --> 01:11:55.600
And the use of you know, nationwide injunctions. I mean,
1272
01:11:55.600 --> 01:11:58.520
as much as I'm sympathetic to them, now, I think
1273
01:11:58.560 --> 01:12:02.199
we have I think to agreeing with Elon As a
1274
01:12:02.199 --> 01:12:06.920
big picture point, I think both sides have to acknowledge
1275
01:12:07.239 --> 01:12:12.039
that judges are using a have have have have inflated
1276
01:12:12.359 --> 01:12:16.319
escalated judicial power far beyond anything that was conceived of
1277
01:12:16.520 --> 01:12:17.199
in the founding.
1278
01:12:18.079 --> 01:12:20.640
Well, thanks so much. Now it's a good time for
1279
01:12:20.720 --> 01:12:23.239
it to introduce Q and A. And just for the record,
1280
01:12:23.399 --> 01:12:27.199
I do agree with the holding of Marborough versus Madison
1281
01:12:27.800 --> 01:12:30.920
and a lot of the reasoning, Just just just to
1282
01:12:30.960 --> 01:12:31.479
say that.
1283
01:12:31.720 --> 01:12:33.640
I agree with the holding, not the reasoning.
1284
01:12:35.319 --> 01:12:39.680
You, Sir s Roman Bueler with the Madison coalition. My
1285
01:12:39.880 --> 01:12:45.800
question is if the Supreme Court should overturn Humphreys Humphrey,
1286
01:12:46.159 --> 01:12:51.680
would you favor Would each of you favor a constitutional
1287
01:12:51.720 --> 01:12:59.119
amendment which would give Congress the authority UH to authorize
1288
01:12:59.399 --> 01:13:04.520
UH certain officers to serve for a term who couldn't
1289
01:13:04.520 --> 01:13:07.279
be removed at will by the President, some kind of
1290
01:13:07.560 --> 01:13:12.600
amendment to restore the authority that Humphries now gives.
1291
01:13:15.760 --> 01:13:19.279
Yes, and I'd also leave the necessary and proper clause
1292
01:13:20.560 --> 01:13:24.159
either elaborate. I would say yes, and the necessary proper
1293
01:13:24.159 --> 01:13:26.199
clause would still be in the background in case it
1294
01:13:26.239 --> 01:13:28.159
was hard to work out the details of that amendment.
1295
01:13:28.359 --> 01:13:31.680
I like shorter amendments than longer because they're more likely
1296
01:13:31.720 --> 01:13:35.039
to pass. So the necessary proper clause is the back
1297
01:13:35.159 --> 01:13:38.800
is the eighteenth century backdrop that would set contours on
1298
01:13:38.840 --> 01:13:41.439
how robust that right was, how robust that power was.
1299
01:13:42.159 --> 01:13:44.520
And of course I've already committed myself to the position
1300
01:13:44.760 --> 01:13:48.199
that the original understanding, as I understand it, is a brilliant.
1301
01:13:47.880 --> 01:13:49.399
Distribution of political cause.
1302
01:13:49.760 --> 01:13:52.560
You know, structures this quite well, and so I think
1303
01:13:52.640 --> 01:13:54.600
I would stick with that right. I think at the
1304
01:13:54.680 --> 01:13:57.640
end of the day, who you know, who decides if
1305
01:13:57.680 --> 01:14:00.640
the president did or did not have upper cause?
1306
01:14:00.840 --> 01:14:01.039
Right?
1307
01:14:01.119 --> 01:14:03.760
So suppose we reinstated that authority, and then what made
1308
01:14:03.760 --> 01:14:06.520
it judicially enforceable? So court's going to say, no, you
1309
01:14:06.520 --> 01:14:08.479
didn't actually have cause? And the President said, no, I
1310
01:14:08.520 --> 01:14:10.560
really did have cause. How dare you think you know
1311
01:14:10.640 --> 01:14:12.960
more than I do about the execution of the laws
1312
01:14:12.960 --> 01:14:15.520
by this officer for whom I am responsible at what's
1313
01:14:15.560 --> 01:14:18.680
that going to look like? I mean, it's just it's
1314
01:14:19.039 --> 01:14:20.479
we the people, at the end of the day, are
1315
01:14:20.479 --> 01:14:23.520
the check on the president's removals. Here, as Madison said,
1316
01:14:23.520 --> 01:14:26.600
and he did say this so in the debates in
1317
01:14:26.600 --> 01:14:30.920
seventeen eighty nine, the wanton removal of meritorious officers will
1318
01:14:30.920 --> 01:14:34.960
subject the president himself to removal from office via impeachment.
1319
01:14:34.960 --> 01:14:38.880
And I think that's right. I think that's right, sir.
1320
01:14:40.800 --> 01:14:44.039
So looking at James Madison, Jane Madison argue that it's
1321
01:14:44.039 --> 01:14:48.359
the Actually the modern Secretary of State was removal at
1322
01:14:48.359 --> 01:14:50.520
will by the president and that the legislature could not
1323
01:14:50.680 --> 01:14:53.600
limit his authority be removed. But at the same time,
1324
01:14:53.720 --> 01:14:58.880
as Professor Schuman had talked about the comtroller, he said
1325
01:14:58.920 --> 01:15:03.119
should be limited at and I think resolving that disagreement,
1326
01:15:03.239 --> 01:15:05.800
in my mind, I posit that the controller did not
1327
01:15:05.960 --> 01:15:09.520
have any executive power. If you resolve it like that,
1328
01:15:09.920 --> 01:15:13.039
you can say you can keep Humphrey's executor while not
1329
01:15:13.319 --> 01:15:16.720
conflicting with the vesting clause they take care clause. And
1330
01:15:16.760 --> 01:15:21.439
I would also potentially posit that the monetary functions of
1331
01:15:21.479 --> 01:15:25.640
the Federal Reserve could potentially be protected from removable as
1332
01:15:25.720 --> 01:15:28.760
not exercising executive power, although the modern Fed with its
1333
01:15:28.760 --> 01:15:32.279
regulatory provol over banks would not. What do you think
1334
01:15:32.319 --> 01:15:35.760
about that possibility of kind of resolving the disagreement inconsistent
1335
01:15:35.800 --> 01:15:36.960
with Madison's views.
1336
01:15:39.199 --> 01:15:43.039
I think it is very important to disentangle different ideas here.
1337
01:15:43.600 --> 01:15:47.079
There are some powers, okay, that it is true, must
1338
01:15:47.159 --> 01:15:51.880
exclusively be exercised by one branch or another. Baby prosecution.
1339
01:15:52.000 --> 01:15:55.279
The people debate about that. Conducting war has to be
1340
01:15:55.319 --> 01:15:57.920
done by the executive whatever your vision of the non
1341
01:15:57.960 --> 01:16:01.479
delegation doctrine is the creation of an eligible principles that
1342
01:16:01.520 --> 01:16:04.359
has to be done by Congress. Divesting someone of private
1343
01:16:04.439 --> 01:16:07.640
rights vested private rights has to be done by the courts.
1344
01:16:08.439 --> 01:16:12.880
There is, however, a lot of functions the government can
1345
01:16:12.960 --> 01:16:16.279
do that is amenable to be exercised by more than
1346
01:16:16.319 --> 01:16:20.399
one branch, exercising more than one power. Okay, So could
1347
01:16:20.439 --> 01:16:24.279
claims against the government that the controller resolved be assigned
1348
01:16:24.479 --> 01:16:27.439
to the courts? Of course it could, because it is
1349
01:16:27.479 --> 01:16:30.119
amenable to an exercise of the judicitual power. There would
1350
01:16:30.119 --> 01:16:32.760
be a case or controversy. It would be contested, and
1351
01:16:32.800 --> 01:16:35.720
so on. This is a public right. This goes back
1352
01:16:35.760 --> 01:16:37.840
to Murray's list. See it could be assigned to the courts.
1353
01:16:38.119 --> 01:16:40.359
Could it be assigned to the Court of claims? An
1354
01:16:40.359 --> 01:16:43.000
executive branch court? People call it an article on court
1355
01:16:43.079 --> 01:16:45.439
whatever that means. It's an executive branch.
1356
01:16:45.800 --> 01:16:46.319
Of course it.
1357
01:16:46.279 --> 01:16:48.840
Could, right because a sovereign immunity doesn't have to content
1358
01:16:48.920 --> 01:16:51.520
to be sued. Could it resolve, which is what the
1359
01:16:51.520 --> 01:16:53.600
controller was, instead of the Court of claims it was
1360
01:16:53.640 --> 01:16:57.640
the controller. Could Congress resolve by committee claims against the
1361
01:16:57.640 --> 01:17:00.479
government and then pass private bills? Of course it could,
1362
01:17:00.560 --> 01:17:04.239
because it's a public right. But when Congress
acts, it
1363
01:17:04.319 --> 01:17:07.359
must act with by caramelism and presentment. When the courts act,
1364
01:17:07.720 --> 01:17:11.560
they must act with lifetime tenure judges right. And when
1365
01:17:11.600 --> 01:17:14.960
the president acts or when the executive branch acts, it
1366
01:17:15.039 --> 01:17:18.239
must be it must comport with the strictures of Article two,
1367
01:17:18.359 --> 01:17:21.920
which I have hypothesized or tried to establish, requires that
1368
01:17:22.159 --> 01:17:24.760
control by the president. So the fact that it could
1369
01:17:24.800 --> 01:17:27.279
be exercised by more than one branch doesn't change the
1370
01:17:27.359 --> 01:17:30.159
relationship of the president to the officer if that task
1371
01:17:30.279 --> 01:17:32.359
is assigned to the executive that's my view of it.
1372
01:17:33.079 --> 01:17:33.399
Thank you.
1373
01:17:34.199 --> 01:17:36.840
It's just I'm going to answer more with a syllabus
1374
01:17:36.880 --> 01:17:40.680
or a reading list. But so, this argument is something
1375
01:17:40.720 --> 01:17:44.600
that was most developed by Jerry Mishaw and Cass Sunstein
1376
01:17:44.760 --> 01:17:48.119
and Larry Lessig back in the nineteen nineties articles. Michaw's
1377
01:17:48.119 --> 01:17:50.720
book comes out in twenty eight two thousand and eight
1378
01:17:51.199 --> 01:17:56.399
ish where the upshot is. The three powers were identified
1379
01:17:57.079 --> 01:18:00.039
as functions of the power of the purse Article on,
1380
01:18:00.600 --> 01:18:03.560
the power of the sword Article two, and the power
1381
01:18:03.600 --> 01:18:08.399
of the word persuasion Hamilton, Federal seventy eight. A power
1382
01:18:08.439 --> 01:18:12.800
to persuade not necessarily president right, so to piggyback on
1383
01:18:12.840 --> 01:18:15.960
what you're asking right. There was an original understanding that
1384
01:18:16.000 --> 01:18:19.319
there was an in between with the informal checks and
1385
01:18:19.399 --> 01:18:23.319
balances informal separation of powers. The power of the purse
1386
01:18:23.880 --> 01:18:26.560
was more in the shared domain of Congress and the
1387
01:18:26.600 --> 01:18:29.600
executive branch. That helps explain the sinking fund. That helps
1388
01:18:29.640 --> 01:18:33.920
explain Madison's comptroller. And an outstanding book is by John Brewer,
1389
01:18:34.159 --> 01:18:37.199
not Justice David Brewer. John Brewer writes a book called
1390
01:18:37.199 --> 01:18:39.760
Sinews of Power. I rely on it heavily in my
1391
01:18:39.880 --> 01:18:43.640
article venality. The English tradition was to give treasury. The
1392
01:18:43.680 --> 01:18:47.079
way that England became a global empire was the most
1393
01:18:47.079 --> 01:18:49.479
powerful navy. How do they build the most powerful navy
1394
01:18:50.319 --> 01:18:53.359
the most powerful treasury? How did that treasury become so
1395
01:18:53.479 --> 01:18:58.359
powerful by giving its
officers life tenure? Life tenure for
1396
01:18:58.439 --> 01:19:01.399
treasury was the store worry of the English Empire. In
1397
01:19:01.439 --> 01:19:04.119
the seventeenth and eighteenth century, and that's the very much
1398
01:19:04.239 --> 01:19:11.680
the background, original public meaning of what the Americans inherited
1399
01:19:11.760 --> 01:19:16.319
or understood about unremovable offices as property from the story
1400
01:19:16.319 --> 01:19:16.880
of anality.
1401
01:19:18.079 --> 01:19:20.359
Thank you, so, just for the remaining questions, if you
1402
01:19:20.399 --> 01:19:22.760
could try to have sort of a quick response.
1403
01:19:22.520 --> 01:19:24.079
Yes, sorry, no, no, it is not.
1404
01:19:24.920 --> 01:19:28.279
This is good for we have the time, yeah, sir.
1405
01:19:28.399 --> 01:19:32.079
Yeah, Stephen Taff, Thank you, sirs. I want to divert
1406
01:19:32.159 --> 01:19:36.960
the discussion briefly to inferior officers because something you mentioned
1407
01:19:37.119 --> 01:19:41.159
is quite relevant, perhaps about how the notion of a
1408
01:19:41.199 --> 01:19:45.439
lifetime appointment or even a holding one's office as a
1409
01:19:45.520 --> 01:19:49.279
kind of property right you implied, was contrary to the
1410
01:19:49.319 --> 01:19:52.880
republican spirit of the founding and more reminiscent of the
1411
01:19:52.880 --> 01:19:58.239
Westminster system perhaps or even despotism. So what implications does
1412
01:19:58.279 --> 01:20:02.760
this have for procedural du process and the supposed shielding
1413
01:20:02.800 --> 01:20:05.079
of civil servants from removal.
1414
01:20:06.600 --> 01:20:08.319
So there's none of this one, I think we need
1415
01:20:08.359 --> 01:20:10.880
to go a little longer, and I consider this as
1416
01:20:10.960 --> 01:20:13.239
inferior and non officers as well.
1417
01:20:13.439 --> 01:20:19.840
Yes, okay, excellent question. Everything that I had said was
1418
01:20:19.880 --> 01:20:23.239
really about principal officers and why do I say what
1419
01:20:23.279 --> 01:20:25.720
I say about principal officers because I take the opinion's
1420
01:20:25.760 --> 01:20:28.399
clause seriously and the challenge that opposes to sort of
1421
01:20:28.399 --> 01:20:31.319
the conventional view. I believe there can be these sort
1422
01:20:31.319 --> 01:20:34.520
of spheres of independence that these principal officers have, subject
1423
01:20:34.640 --> 01:20:38.840
always to the President's supervision through removal. So that's for
1424
01:20:38.920 --> 01:20:42.600
principal officers. For inferior officers, my read of the text
1425
01:20:42.680 --> 01:20:44.800
in the history is the inverse or is it the
1426
01:20:44.840 --> 01:20:48.239
converse or contraposital. I don't know exactly my logic here,
1427
01:20:48.319 --> 01:20:52.199
but I think it's the inverse, which is Congress at least,
1428
01:20:52.199 --> 01:20:54.520
this is what the history has just sort of established,
1429
01:20:54.640 --> 01:20:58.720
can probably create four cause removal protections, okay for inferior
1430
01:20:58.760 --> 01:21:01.920
officers because they have to follow orders anyway, that's what
1431
01:21:01.960 --> 01:21:05.239
it means to be inferior. So in the Perkins case,
1432
01:21:05.399 --> 01:21:08.800
which is one that established this, you couldn't discharge during
1433
01:21:08.840 --> 01:21:11.840
times of peace a naval cadet in that case without
1434
01:21:11.840 --> 01:21:14.479
a court martial. No one doubts that the president had
1435
01:21:14.479 --> 01:21:17.840
the power to direct and command the cadet. So it's
1436
01:21:17.920 --> 01:21:20.880
really not sort of an issue aled js who have
1437
01:21:20.920 --> 01:21:24.000
four cause removal protections every single decision they make is
1438
01:21:24.000 --> 01:21:28.760
subject to be countermanded and reversed or removed or modified
1439
01:21:29.239 --> 01:21:32.680
by the agency head, who is politically accountable, And so
1440
01:21:33.079 --> 01:21:38.000
executive power in that sense right stays intact. Is there
1441
01:21:38.079 --> 01:21:41.399
some degree of hold, you know, creating property interests in
1442
01:21:41.439 --> 01:21:44.439
these inferior officers as a result, Yes, And that makes
1443
01:21:44.479 --> 01:21:48.079
me uncomfortable. It makes me less uncomfortable than principal officers
1444
01:21:48.119 --> 01:21:53.159
who have this greater discretion and the sphere of independence
1445
01:21:53.680 --> 01:21:57.720
in a way, because again they can exercise duties given
1446
01:21:57.760 --> 01:21:59.640
to them by Congress, and the president doesn't have that
1447
01:21:59.680 --> 01:22:02.399
right of control. So it does bother me. History could
1448
01:22:02.399 --> 01:22:06.960
have gone a different way. So the reason the theory,
1449
01:22:07.039 --> 01:22:10.880
the constitutional theory as to why they have removal restrictions
1450
01:22:11.279 --> 01:22:15.600
is because by granting the appointment of the inferior officers
1451
01:22:15.800 --> 01:22:19.159
in the head of department, which the constitution allows, right,
1452
01:22:19.199 --> 01:22:22.279
the removal power comes with it. I agree with that,
1453
01:22:22.279 --> 01:22:25.880
that's obviously true. So you can insulate inferior officers from
1454
01:22:25.920 --> 01:22:28.840
the president by interposing the decision of the principle the
1455
01:22:28.880 --> 01:22:31.520
head of the department. Right, if removal comes with appointment
1456
01:22:31.560 --> 01:22:34.039
and Congress confests the appointment of the inferior officer in
1457
01:22:34.079 --> 01:22:36.159
the head of the department. The removal power comes with that,
1458
01:22:37.159 --> 01:22:39.720
does it follow, which is what the courts have held
1459
01:22:40.279 --> 01:22:43.600
that therefore, Congress can also restrict the ability of the
1460
01:22:43.600 --> 01:22:46.800
head of the
department to remove by creating four cause restrictions.
1461
01:22:47.199 --> 01:22:50.039
I don't know. I don't know. If I had been
1462
01:22:50.079 --> 01:22:52.960
there in eighteen eighty six or whenever Perkins was decided,
1463
01:22:53.000 --> 01:22:55.560
I would have probably said, you can't do that. I
1464
01:22:55.560 --> 01:22:58.439
would have said, you could interpose between the inferior and
1465
01:22:58.479 --> 01:23:01.439
the president the principle the department. That doesn't mean you
1466
01:23:01.439 --> 01:23:04.239
can have fore cost protections. But I also don't lose
1467
01:23:04.239 --> 01:23:07.000
that much sleep over it, because inferior officers by definition,
1468
01:23:07.079 --> 01:23:09.960
have to follow orders, and so in this case, what
1469
01:23:10.000 --> 01:23:11.560
do they say, a page of history is worth a
1470
01:23:11.600 --> 01:23:15.960
volume of logic? The logic bothers me. But the history,
1471
01:23:16.279 --> 01:23:19.039
you know, much more clearly resolves it in favor of
1472
01:23:19.039 --> 01:23:22.159
restrictions on inferior officer removals. Did it have to go
1473
01:23:22.199 --> 01:23:23.920
that way? Is that the best answer? I don't know,
1474
01:23:24.359 --> 01:23:26.000
But I'm also not going to lose sleep over it.
1475
01:23:26.359 --> 01:23:26.880
I don't think.
1476
01:23:27.239 --> 01:23:29.479
I just maybe tonight I will because of the question.
1477
01:23:29.720 --> 01:23:32.439
My one sentence is that I appreciate Elon has been
1478
01:23:32.479 --> 01:23:35.479
more open minded about the debates, the historical and textual
1479
01:23:35.520 --> 01:23:39.119
debates than other unitary executive theorists, and I just want
1480
01:23:39.159 --> 01:23:43.239
to commend Elan. We learn from each other, we are accountable,
1481
01:23:43.359 --> 01:23:45.920
there is a degree of account We're independent, also accountable
1482
01:23:46.079 --> 01:23:48.680
to each other, and I think that's the way scholarship
1483
01:23:48.720 --> 01:23:50.920
is supposed to go. And so I'll just say, I'm
1484
01:23:50.920 --> 01:23:55.279
happy to debate any unitary executive theorist anywhere, anytime, as
1485
01:23:55.319 --> 01:23:56.960
long as I can check with my wife in her schedule.
1486
01:23:58.640 --> 01:24:01.439
Thank you, ma'am for me anywhere anytime.
1487
01:24:04.199 --> 01:24:06.640
You've got a lota is expecting a baby's and the
1488
01:24:06.640 --> 01:24:08.680
next month, so that second I stick by it.
1489
01:24:11.479 --> 01:24:16.479
I just really enjoyed the program today. I work in finance,
1490
01:24:16.560 --> 01:24:18.359
so I want to go back to this issue of
1491
01:24:18.399 --> 01:24:23.199
trying to single out the Fed. UH. There was a
1492
01:24:23.239 --> 01:24:27.359
well known interchange with one of the former FED governors
1493
01:24:27.399 --> 01:24:31.159
where after acknowledging the pressure that could be brought to
1494
01:24:31.159 --> 01:24:34.119
bear
on them and really the control either by Treasury
1495
01:24:34.399 --> 01:24:38.319
or Congress, his answer was, yes, but if they did that,
1496
01:24:38.800 --> 01:24:42.560
who would they have to blame? And I, to my mind,
1497
01:24:42.560 --> 01:24:45.920
what really singles out the FED is simply is there
1498
01:24:46.000 --> 01:24:53.439
is so much vested political interest in creating the appearance
1499
01:24:53.520 --> 01:24:57.479
of independence. And I completely agree with the statement where
1500
01:24:57.479 --> 01:25:01.039
you said, look, nobody's independent. Obviously the core are independent
1501
01:25:01.079 --> 01:25:06.159
in politicized cases. So I wonder I gathered making a
1502
01:25:06.159 --> 01:25:09.600
special case for the FED Elan you would say no,
1503
01:25:10.199 --> 01:25:12.640
and Jed, I'm more interested in hearing a little more
1504
01:25:12.680 --> 01:25:15.279
of a basis as to why you think that could be.
1505
01:25:15.720 --> 01:25:16.640
That would be impelped.
1506
01:25:18.199 --> 01:25:20.119
Let me just see if I get because the emphasis
1507
01:25:20.159 --> 01:25:24.520
on account the importance of accountability as the balance there, right,
1508
01:25:24.600 --> 01:25:26.720
So I think that's the kind of the arrangement under
1509
01:25:27.479 --> 01:25:30.560
a loose, necessary and proper arrangement of the balance here
1510
01:25:30.600 --> 01:25:34.039
I mean this, Uh Elon knows that there's a chapter
1511
01:25:34.119 --> 01:25:36.560
in my forthcoming book that I just can't include in
1512
01:25:36.600 --> 01:25:39.600
that book, but that the history of independent agencies is
1513
01:25:39.640 --> 01:25:42.760
not as independent as you would have thought. So there so,
1514
01:25:42.920 --> 01:25:46.079
the the Interstate Commerce Commission, I'm not gonna I'm gonna
1515
01:25:46.079 --> 01:25:48.640
avoid going down all the rabbit holes, but the independent
1516
01:25:48.680 --> 01:25:54.960
commerce the Interstate Commerce Commission is the granddaddy of independent agencies.
1517
01:25:55.079 --> 01:25:57.600
It was not. No one called it independent at the
1518
01:25:57.600 --> 01:26:00.880
time because there was a balance of these interests. What
1519
01:26:00.920 --> 01:26:06.439
I will say is we have reached that compromise by
1520
01:26:06.680 --> 01:26:10.239
not saying the Senate has to agree to any removal.
1521
01:26:10.720 --> 01:26:13.720
That might have been an eighteenth century solution. The solution,
1522
01:26:13.880 --> 01:26:16.520
the settlement that we have over the course of the
1523
01:26:16.640 --> 01:26:19.800
late nineteenth century through the twenty to twenty first century
1524
01:26:20.079 --> 01:26:24.640
is having to show inefficiency, neglective duty, or malfeasance. Those
1525
01:26:24.680 --> 01:26:29.039
are permissions, not just protections. And I have a more
1526
01:26:29.079 --> 01:26:31.920
capacious view of what constant's good cause. Right, So if
1527
01:26:31.960 --> 01:26:34.640
Congress has chosen good cause, that gives a lot of
1528
01:26:34.760 --> 01:26:38.439
latitude for a president to make a policy argument for removal.
1529
01:26:38.840 --> 01:26:42.319
And depending upon how capacious one wants to interpret inefficiency,
1530
01:26:42.720 --> 01:26:47.960
neglective duty, or malfeasance, that gives the president a lot
1531
01:26:48.000 --> 01:26:50.760
more latitude than you might have imagined for being able
1532
01:26:50.800 --> 01:26:54.600
to make those choices of accountability. So I think there
1533
01:26:54.640 --> 01:26:57.680
and because the president retains that choice, the buck does
1534
01:26:57.760 --> 01:27:00.640
sort of stop, or in the case of tariffs, the
1535
01:27:00.680 --> 01:27:04.520
buck might be crashing at the at the desk of
1536
01:27:04.560 --> 01:27:05.079
the president.
1537
01:27:05.680 --> 01:27:08.960
Thanks so much, Jed, Thanks Salon, And we will find
1538
01:27:09.000 --> 01:27:11.039
out in the next year whether there is really the
1539
01:27:11.159 --> 01:27:12.920
end of Humphreys, Executor.
1540
01:27:15.800 --> 01:27:15.840
M.
1541
01:27:25.199 --> 01:27:27.520
Thank you for listening to Necessary and Proper. If you
1542
01:27:27.600 --> 01:27:30.119
enjoyed this podcast, please tell a friend and don't forget
1543
01:27:30.119 --> 01:27:33.159
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1544
01:27:33.159 --> 01:27:37.119
about the Article one initiative, please visit fedsock dot org
1545
01:27:37.239 --> 01:27:41.119
slash article I. That's f E d s OC dot
1546
01:27:41.239 --> 01:27:43.079
org slash article I.
1547
01:27:51.920 --> 01:27:53.840
This has been a FEDSOC audio production